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DECTSIONS
RELATING TO
THE PUBIC ELANDS.
10MAESTEAD APPLICATION-SUCCESSF UL CONTESTANT.
WRIGHT V. GOODE.
When a homestead applicant contests an entry successfully, on the ground of prior
settlement, he is entitled to the statutory period of three months from date of
settlement in which to make entry; and in the.computation of this period, the
time between his original application to enter, and the date of legal notice of
cancellation, should be excluded.
Notice of cancellation to the successful contestant in such case, by registered letter,
is not effective if it fails to reach said contestant, and such failure is not due to
any negligence on his part.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 6, 1898. (C. J. G.)
The record in this case is as follows: On November 3, 1893, Thomas
Jabezanka made homestead entry No. 3257 for the SW. of Sec. 1 T.
27 N., R. I W., Perry land district, Oklahoma.
On October 31, 1893, the local office received by mail an application
for said land from Samuel Wright, alleging that he had been a bonafide
settler thereon since October 7, 1893.
On November 22, 1893, the local office rejected Wright's application
for conflict with homestead entry No. 3257 aforesaid. In accordance
with instructions received from your office for the disposition of appli-
cations received by mail and those presented in person, homestead
entry No. 3257 had been made of record by the local office before
Wright's application was reached in regular order.
On January 5, 1894, Wright filed affidavit of contest against said
entry wherein he alleged his prior settlement and abandonment on the
part of Jabezanka, and on January 25, 1894, he filed an appeal from the
rejection of his application.
In passing upon said appeal your office, on September 25, 1894, con-
cluded as follows:
The order for action on Mr. Wright's application was in accordance with the in-
structions laid down in letter C of October 14, 1893, case of George W. Randall, and
your decision rejecting his application for conflict with homestead entry 3257, would
have been proper, had there been no evidence of settlement. In an affidavit, how-
ever, accompanying his application and which was executed October 28,1893, before
the probate judge of county K, Oklahoma Territory, Mr. Wright alleges "That he
is at this time a bona fide settler on the tract."
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As said alleged settlement antedates the entry of Jaboezanka, who does not allege
settlement, you should have ordered a hearing under the rule laid dowii in the de-
cision in the case of Todd v. Tait, 15 L. D., 379. The same end will be gained, how-
ever, by proceeding with the contest as would be reached by a hearing ordered by
this office, and you will therefore proceed with the contest in accordance with the
Rules of Practice.
A hearing was duly had at which Jabezanka made default, and upon
the evidence submitted by Wright the local office recommended the
cancellation of the entry and that Wright be allowed to make entry.
On July 1, 1896, your office canceled Jabezanka's entry, and on Sep-
tember 16, 189X, the local office notified Wright by registered mail ad-
dressed to Blackwell, Oklahoma, of the cancellation of said entry and
that he could apply to enter within thirty days. The letter containing
the notification was returned uncalled for.
On February 2, 1897, the local office gave to the attorneys of Wright
personal notice in writing of the cancellation of the entry and his right
to enter. On the same day Caleb Goode filed homestead application
for the land in question, which was suspended to await the action of
Wright.
On March 8, 1897, the local office received by mail the homestead
application of Wright, dated March 6, 1897. Accompanying the said
application was an affidavit to the effect that on or about February
1, 1897, Wright was taken sick with asthma and was confined to his
bed nearly all the time up to the date of his affidavit.
The local office rejected Wright's application to enter because the
time granted him within which to act had expired, and because of the
intervening adverse claim of Goode.
On March 10, 1897, the local office placed Goode's application of
record as No. 9028.
On April 7 1897, Wright appealed from the rejection of his applica-
tion, and on June 17, 1897, your office affirmed the decision of the local
office.
A further appeal by Wright brings the case to this Department, the
appellant basing his allegations upon the provisions of section two of
the act of May 14,-1880 (21 Stat., 140). There seems to have been a
misconception of Wright's true status. In view of the showing herein
made his case is properly adjudicated under the provisions of section
three of said act. The only question involved is as to whether he
applied to enter within three months from the date of his settlement.
In computing this time the period between the date of his settlement
and his application of October 31, 1893, and the period between the
date of legal notice of cancellation of the contested entry and his appli-
cation of March 8, 1897, must be charged against him; or, what is the
same thing, the time between his application of October 31, 1893, and
the date of legal notice of cancellation, should be excluded. This
necessarily involves the question as to whether the notice of September
16, 1896, mailed to him at Blackwell, constituted legal notice.
Your office holds that the notice mailed to Wright on September 16,
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1896, by registered letter, the same being properly addressed to him at
his post-office of record, was in itself a complete notice. According
to this holding more than three months had elapsed before Wright
applied to enter. Bt i the case of John P. Drake ( L. i)., 574),
cited in your office decision, it was held (syllabus):
Notice of a decision by mail, whether by registered or unregistered letter, will not
bind the party to be served if such notice fails to reach him; but the failure to thus
receive notice can not be set up by one whose own laches has prevented service in
the manner prescribed.
Wright states in a corroborated affidavit that during the months of
September, October, November and December, 1896, and January and
February-, 1897, he or some member of his family asked about three
times a week for mail at the Blackwell post-office, and that they were
never informed or received notice of the registered letter in question.
The postmaster at Blackwell states that Wright gets his mail through
the general delivery and that said Wright never refused to take same
from him. The assistant postmaster is unable to say whether he ever
delivered to Wright the notice as to said registered letter.
Following in the line of the above cited decision this Department is
of opinion that it does not appear in the case at bar that the failure to
receive the notice of September 16, 1896, which was sent by registered
letter, was due to the negligence or laches of Wright or his attorneys.
Hence time did not run against him until he was duly notified. The
first legal notice, therefore, received by Wright, of the cancellation of
the entry, was that given to his attorneys on February 2, 1897. le
applied to enter on March 8,1897, which was within three months from
the date of his settlement, computing the time as hereinbefore set out.
By his contest Wright was shown to have been the first settler, and he
has continuously kept up his residence and improvements to the present
time. The homestead entry of Goode, therefore, made in the presence
of such prior adverse settlement right, must be canceled.
Your office decision is hereby reversed, Goode's entry will be can-
celed, and unless there are other reasons than those appearing in the
recor(l, Wright will be allowed to perfect his application to enter.
REPAYMENT-PRE-EMPTION ENTRY.
EDWARD f. SANFORD.
The right to repayment does not exisb where the entry is properly allowed on the
proofs presented, but is subsequently canceled on the ascertainment that it was
procured on the false and misleading representations of the entryman.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 6, 189. (C. J. G.)
It appears from the record in. this case that on January 9, 1894,
Edward 1l. Sanford made pre-emption cash entry for. the NE. of Sec.
33, T. 123 N., R. 66 W., Aberdeen land district, South Dakota.
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In the final proof, upon which the entry was allowed, the witnesses
testified that the entryman settled on the above described tract May
14, 1883, and that his residence was thereafter continuous. The entry-
man's affidavit was to the same effect, except he states that his resi-
dence was continuous so far as possible."
Upon the report of a special agent a hearing was subsequently ordered
in said case, and upon the evidence adduced at said hearing the local
office found that the entryman had never established and maintained
his residence in compliance with law.
The entryman appealed to your office where the decision of the local
office was affirmed, it being held " that the entrymall's final proof was
false and fraudulent, and that he attempted to secure title to the tract
in question by an evasion of the pre-emption laws." Upon further
appeal the Department affirmed the judgment of your office, and the
entry was finally canceled.
The entrynan has now appealed from your office decision of December
19, 1895, which denies is application for repayment of the purchase
money paid by him on his pre-emption cash entry on the ground that
" the law governing the return of purchase money does not apply to
cases of this character."
It is argued in said appeal, substantially, that the ntrymnan's final
proof was not false and fraudulent, he having stated the facts as they
really existed; that he should not be held responsible for failure to
submit a detailed statement of the nature and extent of his residence,
he having stated that it was continuous " so far as possible; " that nnder
the circumstances the local office should have asked for a detailed state-
ment of the character of the residence claimed. That the conclusion
of the Department, as to want of residence, having been based almost
exclusively on his testimony at the hearing, is evidence of his honesty
and good faith; that having concededly acted in good faith his is a case
where repayment may properly be made.
The second section of the act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287) author-
izes repayment only where the entry has been "canceled for conflict,
or where, from any cause, the entry has been erroneously allowed and
cannot be confirmed." It is plain that the entry in question was not
"canceled for conflict." The definition of the phrase "erroneously
allowed," as given in the general circular issued by the Land Office is
as follows:
If the records of the Land Office or the proofs furnished should show that the
entry ought not to be permitted, and yet it were permitted, then it would be
"erroneously allowed." But if the tract of land were subject to entry, and the
proofs showed a compliance with law, and the entry should be canceled because
the proofs were shown to be false, it could not be held that the entry was "erron-
eously allowed; " and in such case repayment would not be authorized.
The land in question was subject to entry, and it cannot be gainsaid
that the entryman's proofs showed a compliance with law. Under
these circumstances it was proper for the local officers to allow the'
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entry; in fact they would have erred if they had not allowed it. As
was said in the case of George A. Stone (25 L. ID., 111, on review):
It was not error for the local officers to devolve upon the entrymen the risk inci-
dent to any material falsity in his proofs. It does not lie in his month to reproach
them for accepting his representations as trae and acting thereon.
The subsequent proceedings bad on the special agent's report, and
which resulted in the cancellation of the entry, showed conclusively
that said entry was procured upon the false and misleading represen-
tations of the entryman, and not that the entry had been erroneously
allowed. These proceedings demonstrated that the entryman had not
established and maintained continuous residence, while it was to be
inferred from his proof that he had. The entry might have been con-
firmed but for the laches of the etryman, which were not made to
appear in his proofs. The fact that there was no error i the allow-
ance of the entry, whilch is the exclusive act of the government, is the
true test in determining whether repayment should be made. It being
apparent that the entry was not thus erroneously allowed the statute
does not authorize repayment.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
PACIFIC COAST MARBLE CO. V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. ET AL.
Motion for review of departmental decision of September 9, 1897, 25
'L. D., 233, denied by Secretary Bliss, January 4, 1897.
SWAMIP LAND-ACTS OF MARCH , 1849, AND SEPTEMBER 8, 1850.
STATE OF LOUISIANA (ON REVIEW).
The act of September 28, 1850, removed the restrictions and exceptions in the grant
of swamp lands made to the State of Louisiana by the act of March 2, 1849, and
vested the title in said State to all the swamp and overflowed lands which
remained unsold at the passage of said act of 1850, and it therefore follows that
said State is entitled to the benefit of the indemnity provisions of the aets of 1855,
and 1857.
The field notes of survey having been accepted by the State as the. basis of the
adjustment of the swamp grant, the character of land for which the State
asks indemnity may be determined thereby, except where a direct issue is made,
in which ease an investigation may be ordered and the character of the land
determined on the evidence so submitted.
The decision of March 15, 1897, 24 L. D., 231, recalled and vacated.
Secretary Bliss to the Conmissioner of the General and Office, January
(W. V. D.) 6, 1898. (F. L. C.)
The State of Louisiana has filed a motion for review of the decision
of the Department of March 15, 1897, (24 L. D., 231) holding that the
act of September 28, 1850,. granting swamp lands to the several States
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has no application to said State and that therefore it is not entitled to
the indemnity provisions made by the act of March 2, 1855.
The decision omplained of was rendered upon the appeal of the State
from the action of your office rejecting the application for indemnity
under the acts of Al arch 2, 1855, (10 Stat., 634) and March 3, 1857, (11
Stat., 251) for swamp lands sol( by the government after the grants
made by the acts of March 2, 1849, (9 Stat., 352), and September 28,
1850, (9 Stat., 519) and prior, to said acts of March 2, 1855, and March
3, 1857.
Your office rejected these applications solely upon the ground that
the only evidence submitted by the State as to the swampy character
of the land for which indemnity was asked, was the certificate of the
State agent stating that on examination of the field notes of survey,
the lan(ls appear to have been swamp laud. You refused to make an
examination of said lists to ascertain whether the field notes of survey
showed said lands to be swamp and overflowed at the date of the grants
for the reason, that the sale of said lands by the government raised a
presumption against the swampy character of the laund at the date of
the grant, and that indemnity would not be allowed except upon
clearest proof that the lands were swamp and overflowed at the date
of the grant which you required to be shown by the testimony of two
disinterested witnesses.
While the Department i passing upon this appeal held that there
was no sufficient proof offered by the agent of the State in support of
the swampy character of the lands it also held that the swampy char-
acter or condition of the land forming the basis for indemnity should
be shown in the same way and by evidence of the same character as
was required to- entitle the State to lands under its grant. But in
considering all the legislation relative to the grants of swamp lands to
this State, and of the several acts granting swamp land indemnity, it
was determined that as te United States had granted, in contempla-
tion of law, all the swamp lands in Louisiana by the act of 1849, there
was no swamp land in the State sl)ject to the act of 1850, when that
act was passed, and as the latter act did not apply to the State of
Louisiana, it was therefore not entitled to the indemnity granted by'
the acts of 1855 and 1857.
Upon this ground the action of your office rejecting the application
of the State was affirmed.
It is urged by counsel for the State in the argument of this motion
that the right of the State of Louisiana to the benefit of the act of Sep-
tember 28, 1850, has received judicial and legislative recognition by
the supreme court in the cases of Martin v. Marks, 97 U. S., 345; Lou-
isiana v. United States 123 U. S., 32; Louisiana v. United States 127,
U. S., 182, and by the act of Congress of March 2, 1889, (25 Stat. 877),
known as the "Gay act," which was not called to the attention of the
Department when the decision of March 15, 1897, was rendered.
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The case of Martin v. Marks was an action in the nature of eject-
meat brought by Marks who claimed title under the State of Louisiana,
of lands that had been listed to said State as inuring to it under the
act of September 28, 1850, against Martin who relied on a patent from
from the United States, dated MIay 20, 1873. The question at issue was
whether the land so listed was confirmed by the act of March 3, 1857.
The court in stating te case said:
This was an action in the nature of ejeetment, brought by Marks, the plaintiff
below, who asserted title under the swamp land act of Sept. 28, 1850, and the earlier
act of March 2, 1849, in regard to the same class of lauds in the State of Louisiana.
The defendant relied on a patent from the United States, dated May 20, 1873. The
evidence of plaintiff's title under the act of 1850, which is all we shall now consider,
is as follows:
"NORTI-WESTERN DISTRICT, LA.
"A.-List of swamp land unfit for cultivation. selected as inuring to the State of
Louisiana under the provisions of an act of Congress approved 28th September, 1850,
excepting such as are rightfully claimed or owned by individuals."
It is evident tat the question as to whether the State of Louisiana
was entitled in common with all the other States to the benefits of the
act of September 28, 1850, was considered by the court, because it
assigns as the reason for the passage of the act approved March 3,
1857, the failure of the Secretary to perform the duties enjoined upon
him by the act of 1850, which had become a grievance and hence the
confirmatory, act of 1857, was passed. Upon this point the Court says:
It seems that, seven years after the passage of the swamp land grant, this failure
of the Secretary to act had become a grievance, for which Congress deemed it neces-
sary to provide a remedy, by the act of March 3, 1857 (11 Stat., 251), which declares
that the selection of swamp and overflowed lanuls granted to the States by the act of
1850, heretofore made and reported to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
so far as the same shall remain vacant and unappropriated, and not interfered with
by an actual settlement under any existing law of the United States, be and the
same are hereby confirmed, and shall be approved and patented to the States in con-
formity to the provisions of said act.
The case of United States v. Louisiana, 123 U. S., 32, was an action
brought by the State against the United States in the Court of Claims
to recover on two demands, one arising under the act of Congress of
February 20, 1811, and the other under the acts of September 28, 1850,
and March 2, 1855. Referring to this claim the court says:
The second of these demands arises upon the act of Congress of September 28,
1850, 9 Stat., 519, c. 84, " to enable the State of Arkansas and other States to reclaim
the swamp lands within their limits," and the act of March 2, 1855, 10 Stat., 634, c.
147, "for the relief of purchasers and locators of swamp and overflowed lands." The
act of September 28,1850, granted to the States then in the Union all the swamp and
overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation, within their limits which at
the time remained unsold. The second section made it the duty of the Secretary of
the Interior, as soon as practicable. after the passage of the act, to prepare a list of
the lands described and transmit the same to the governor of the State, and at his
request to cause a patent to be issued therefor. It would seem that this duty was
not discharged and, notwithstanding the grant was one in pesenti, many of the
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lands falling within the designation of swamp and overflowed lands were sold to
other parties by the United States. The act of March 2, 1855, was designed to cor-
rect, among other things, the wrong thus done to the State; it provided that, upon
due proof of such sales, by the authorized agent of the State, before the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, the purchase money of the lands should be paid
over to the State. Such proof was not made, but equivalent proof was submitted to
the Commissioner as to the character of the lands from the field notes of the sur-
veyor general of the State. This mode of proof was accepted by the Commissioner
in other cases as early as 1850. The amount found in this way by the Commissioner
on the 30th of June, 1883, to be due to the State from the United States, on account
of sales of swamp lands to individuals, made prior to March 3, 1857, was $23,855.04.
It does not appear that there was any serious contest in the Court of Claims, either
as to the validity or the amount of these demands; but it was objected that the
demand arising upon the acts of September 28, 1850, and of March 2, 1855, was barred
by the statute of limitations, and that both demands were set off by the unpaid bal-
ance of the direct tax levied under the act of August 5,1861,12 Stat., 292, which was
apportioned to the State .of Louisiana. The First Comptroller of the Treasury had,
at different times previous to the commencemeut of this action, admitted and certi-
fied that the sums claimed were due to the State on account of the five per cent net
proceeds of sales of the public lands, and on account of sales of swamp lands within
the State purchased by individuals; but had directed the amounts to be credited to
the State on account upon the claim of the United States against her for the unpaid
portion of the direct tax mentioned.
See also United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. S., 182.
The act of March 2, 1889, supa, (the Gay act) restored to the public
domain lands that had been reserved from disposition because claimed
to be embraced within the lands of the Spanish private land claim,
known as the Houmas grant. This act restored said lands to settle-
ment and entry under the homestead laws, but provided:
That the provisions of this act shall be limited to the lands claimed by actual
settlers for purposes of cultivation whose titles are now incomplete, within the
limits of the Donaldson and Scott, Daniel Clark, and Conway grants, and that after
setting apart to each of said settlers not to exceed one hundred and sixty acres, the
residue of the public lands within said grants shall continue to be, as they are now,
a part of the public domain: Andprovided further, That nothing in this act shall
preclude the State of Louisiana from enforcing its claim to said residue of public
lands under the acts of Congress granting swamp lands to the several States of the
Union.
The language of the court in the decision cited, which I have quoted
at length, and the last proviso to the act of March 2, 1889, is a clear
recognition of the right of the State to the benefit of the act of Septem-
ber 28, 1850, and sustains the former decisions of the Department hold-
ing that
the act of September 28, 1850, removed the restrictions and exceptions in the grant
of swamp lands made to the State of Louisiana by the act of March 2, 1849, and
vested the title in said State to all the swamp and overflowed lands which remained
unsold at the passage of said act of 1850. 17 L. D., 440.
This is in harmony with the almost unbroken line of decisions by the
Department, and it is, in my judgment, the true interpretation of
the act; for whatever may have been the motives that induced the
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passage of the act of March. 2, 1849, or whatever may have been the
physical conditions existing in said State at the passage of said act, it
is apparent, from what has been said, that the act of September 28,
1850, enlarged the swamp land grant so as to bring within its operation
all lands "the greater part of which is wet and unfit for cultivation"
and made it applicable to all the States then in the Union, and, as said
by Attorney-General Garland in his opinion (5 L. D., 464), it
was substantially a re-enactment of the act of March 2,1849, so far as Louisiana
was concerned, with an extension of the grant in that act so as to include the lands
which had been excluded by the exception in the former enactment, as to which it
was a new and substantive grant on the 28th of September, 1850. 1 Lester, 543; Ib.,
554; 2 L. D., 652; 3 L. D., 396; 5 L. D., 464; 17 L. D., 440.
Upon a careful examination of these several acts of Congress in the
light of the decisions cited, the Departmentis satisfied that the decision
of March 15, 1897, does not correctly construe the act of September 28,
1850, and that the State is entitled to the benefit of said act, and hence
to the indemnity provision of the acts of 1855 and 1857. Said decision
is therefore recalled and revoked and the decision of the Department
of January 19, 1887, 5 L. D., 464, is reaffirmed.
As to what proof should be required to show the svampy character
of the and for which indemnity is claimed, it was said in the decision
of March 15, 1897, that it should be shown in the same way and by
evidence of. the same character as was required to entitle the State to
lands under its grant. Te State of Louisiana having elected to abide
by the field notes in the adjustment of its swamp land grant, and that
grant having been heretofore adjusted in said State under this rule, I
can see no reason why any frther proof should be deemed necessary,
except where a direct issue is made when investigation may be ordered
and the character of the land determined upon the evidence so sub-
mitted.
Inasmuch as the application of the State was rejected by your office,
without examination, and solely upon the ground that no proof would
be considered by you, except the testimony of two disinterested wit-
nesses as to the swampy character of the land, you are directed to
examine said lists, in accordance with the instructions herein given, but
in the examination of the field notes you are to be governed by the
decision of the Department of March 25, 1887, 5 L. D., 514.
TIMBER LAND ENTRY-MINERAL LAND.
0HORMICLE V. HILLER ET AL.
A contest against a timber land entry, on the ground that it embraces land of known
mineral character, must be determined on the conditions existing at the date of
the purchase, and not on developments subsequent thereto.
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The requirement in the act of June 3, 1878, that a timber land applicant shall show
that the land applied for contains no mining iprovements, contemplates
improvements on existing mining claims. Abandoned mineral workings on land
not included in any existing location or entry are no bar to a purchase under
said act.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) January 7, 1898. (P. J. C.)
The record shows that on June 15, 1887, S. W. Hiller applied to pur-
chase, under the act of June 3, 1878, (20 Stats., 89) land described as
the NE. 1 of See. 4, Tp. 11 N., R. 15 W., S. B. Mer., Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, land district, and after due notice, offered final proof and pur-
chased the same September 5, 1887. There was excluded from the
pulrclase mineral lot No. 37, known as the Pine Tree Lode. The correct
description of the land purchased is lots 1 and 2 and S. j of NE. of
said section-the total acreage beinog 141.50/100 acres.
It appears that there was a contest filed against this entry January
15, 1890, and a hearing ordered. The hearing was not had, however,
and on June 8, 1895, the contest was formally dismissed by the con-
testants.
On Jtne 22, 1895, W. C. Chormicle filed a petition alleging that the
land had been known to be mineral in character since 1856; that there
was a group of gold quartz mines thereon known as the Pine Tree
mines for twenty years last past; that in 1892 te petitioner purchased
the same from the former owners; that ever since his purchase he has
been in the actual possession of and working the same; that -the
improvements and developments thereon cost at least $100,000; that
he does not know Hiller- that when lie purchased the said mines he
had no notice or knowledge of Hiller's claim thereto or of any other
claim; that the claim of "s iller is a fraud upon the government" for
the reason that if he ever went upon the land, lie must have seen that it
was mining ground and that mining had been carried on there for a
great many years. It was prayed that a patent be not issued to Hiller
and that a hearing be granted.
By letter of July 25, 1895, your office ordered that the petitioner be
given sixty days within which to apply for d hearing on the charges.
The local officers ordered a hearing
with a view to the-cancellation of said entry, contestant alleging that said land is
miueral land and that he is the owner of valuable mines situated thereon, and has
made valuable improvements.and extensive explorations thereon.
The Summit Lime Company, the-California Lime Company and Joseph
Moffatt on showing that they were the transferees of Hiller were
allowed to enter their appearance and defend.
On consideration of the evidence the local officers, referring to the
mineral locations under which the protestant claims, held:
These several mines are spoken of by the various witnesses as the "Pine Tree
Group," and the ones on the land in question are . . . all owned by contestant,
and were bought or located by him about three years after Hiller had made his
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entry. These elaims were merelyrelocations of former ones, located priortolHiller's
entry; and it is contended by counsel for contestant that Hiller must have known
of the existence of mineral thereon,. that the land had been worked as mineral land,
and therefore was put upon inquiry
We think it fair however to conclude from all the testimony that these claims
were not used, if not actually abandoned at that time; and thus, even if the then
existing conditions were decisive of the matter, it is not proved that Hiller's entry
was fraudulent. Wo understand, however, that as to the character of the land it is
a question of present fact and we fi ld, after carefully reading all the testimony that
the whole area claimed by contestant on said NE. of Sec. 4, is mineral land and
ehiefly valuable as such....
We, therefore, recommend that the land included within the lines of the claim
as above recommended be segregated as mineral land and that the entry of Biller
remain intact as to the balance.
On appeal, your office found that the land incladed within the min-
ing locations named was knovni mineral land in character at the date
of the timber entry, and affirmed the decision of the local officers with
the statement that the known character of tile land at the date of the
tilnller entry ad not its known character at the date of the hearing,
was the controlling question in issue. In discussing the question
involved, your office said:
It appears from te evidence that one of the locations on said quarter section
made.prior to 1887, was ahandoned on account of a disagreement or falling out of
the owners, another bedause of the difficulty and expense of obtaining motive
power for a mill at that time, and others tor lack of means to prosecute the work,
so that it is not at all fair to conclude that land was not known- to be mineral
in character siupy because it was not then being worked for mineral.
On the contrary I am of the opinion that in every instance where it appears from
the evidence that a location was made, and that such an amount of development
work was performed prior to the entry of Hiller as disclosed a vein of quartz of such
character as would justify a reasonably prudent person in the expenditure of his
time and means in the effort to work the sane as a mihiug property, he ground
covered by sch location must have been and was kno-wii to be mineral in character
at date of the sale to Hiller.
From your office (lecisioli the entryman has appealed, assigning error
as follows:
First. The Commissioner erred in deciding that the testimony showed that the
land covered by the Oregou, Utah, Bunkerhill; Nevada, and California, amineral
claims, or either of them, was known to be mineral land, at the time Hiller made
his timber land entry, September 5th, 1887.
Secondly. The Commissioner erred in holding that the mere fact that the land
was being prospected for minerals at the time Hiller made his entry, was conclusive
evidence that the land was in fact known to be mineral at that time, in the absence
of proof that any valuable deposits of mineral had then been discovered in the
prospect holes.
Thirdly. The Commissioner erred in reversing the decision of the register and
receiver, wherein they found that Hiller did not know when he made his entry, that
the land had any value for minerals, and that his entry was not fraudulent.
Fourthly. The- Commissioner erred in not deciding from the evidence, that no
mineral of value bad beeh discovered on the land at the time Hiller entered it, and
that the prospect holes previously dug, had then been abandoned by the prospectors
and locators.
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Fifthly. The Commissioner erred in not deciding that the land is more valuable
for the timber growing upon it, than it is for minerals.
Sixthly. The Commissioner erred in not dismissing the contest of Chormicle for
want of proof that Hiller knew the land was mineral at the time he made his entry.
The testimony in this case is quite voluminous and is surcharged
with an extraordinary amount of irrelevant and redundant matter. It
would seem as if the attorneys had exhausted their ingenuity in get-
ting in testimony that has no relevancy whatever to the issue. It is
made extraordinarily perplexing to winnow the grain from the chaff
because there have been almost numberless mining locations and relo-
cations made on the land, each under a different name, and in giving
their testimony each witness has used the name by which he knew it
at the time, and in many instances there is nothing to associate the
former locations with the later ones.
It is doubtful if out of the four hundred and twenty seven pages of
testimony, there are fifty pages of relevant evidence.
It will be observed that Chormicle in his protest does not allege any
interest in himself in any part of the land in controversy prior to the
purchase of Hiller. The averment that he did not know of Biller's
entry at the time he purchased the so-called Pine Tree group is without
force. The entry being of surveyed land was shown upon the public
records of the local office and he was charged with notice thereof.
The "Pine Tree Group " and "Pine Tree Mines" as referred to both
in the protest and in the testimony, are used as a sort of a general
description for a great number of locations made on and in the vicinity
of the land in controversy. The Pine Tree claim itself was originally
located in 1878, and was quite extensively worked by various parties.
As before stated, it was excluded from Hiller's purchase, so there is no
controversy as to the ground included therein. When Chormicle
bought the Pine Tree claim in 1892, five years after Hiller's purchase,
it was known as the Compromise, and was located as such December
24, 1888, more than a year after Hiller's purchase. The other claims
which lie wholly or in part on the land in dispute are the Oregon, Cali-
fornia, Nevada, Utah and Bunker Hill. These claims were all located
January 1, 1891, and were transferred to Chormicle, after his purchase
of the Compromise. Some of the land included in these last-named
locations had been located as mining claims as early as 1878, but these
early locations had been abandoned or forfeited, and, apparently,
repeatedly relocated.- The land seems to have been regarded as of
little value, anl, outside of that done upon the Compromise, but little
systematic work was ever done that tended to develop it. It is shown
by the district records, that in 1889 thirty:two different locations were
made in that vicinity, none of which have the names now used. It is
stated by one witness that one man made seventeen locations at one
time that he did not intend to work, but made them for the purpose of
selling them. This statement would seem to be verified by the facts as
disclosed by the testimony; at least it is not shown that any work was
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done on them with the view of mineral development, and they were
evidently abandoned when the present locations were made.
It is true there had been some work done on some of the old loca-
tions-outside of the Comprcnnise or Pine Tree-prior to the entry of
Biller, but the testimony does not show that at the time of the entry
there were upon the land any evidences of work then being done, or of
work recently done.
The burden of proof was upon the protestant and this he has failed
to sustain.
There is no evidence that any of the locations other than the Pine
Tree, ever paid for the working thereof, and the Pine Tree is the one on
which the improvements are located. As said by one of the witnesses
for the protestant, the other locations " in a very great measure," are
" prospecting holes." This same wiiness says the Pine Tree was located
two or three times.
It is claimed that Hiller's entry was friaudulent, for the reason that if
he had investigated the land he would have found the mineral improve-
ments, and this would have been sufficient notice to him that it was
held and claimed as mineral land. iller complied with the require-
mentsof the law in making his entry; he filed his affidavit stating that
the " land is unfit for cultivation, and valuable chiefly for its timber;
that it is uninhabited, that it contains no mining or other improvements,
nor, as I verily believe, any valuable deposits of gold," etc. This state-
ment is consistent with what is shown by the testimony, or, to put it
conversely, there is no evidence which shows that there were any mining
operations then being carried on or that there had been any mining
operations of recent date such as to indicate that the land entered con-
tained any valuable mineral. The fact that there bad been work done
some time prior to that, and that evidence of it may have remained, did
not of itself necessarily convey notice that the land contained valuable
mineral. In fact, the presence of old and apparently abandoned work-
ings would equally indicate that exploration has shown that the land
was without valuable minerals.
In Colorado Coal Company v. United States (123 U. S., 307), patents
had been issued under the pre-emption law to large tracts of land upon
which were subsequently discovered large bodies of coal, and the gov-
ernment sought to set aside the patents on the ground that they had
been procured by fraud, and- among other charges was one that the
land was not agricultural, but valuable for coal, which was known to
exist by the parties who procured the entries to be made.
In discussing this feature of the case, the court said:
We hold, therefore, that to constitute the exemption contemplated by the pre-
emption act under the head of " known mines," there should be upon the land ascer-
tained coal deposits of such an extent and value as to make the land more valuable
to be worked as a coal mine, under the conditions existing at the time, than for
merely agricultural purposes. The circumstance that there are surface indications
of the existence of veins of coal des not constitute a mine. It does not even
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prove that the land will ever be nder any conditions sufficiently valuable on ac-
count of its coal deposits to be worked as a mine. A change in the conditions occur-
ring sbsequently to the sale, whereby new discoveries are made, or by means
whereof it may become profitable to work the veins as mines, can not affect the
title as it passed at the timne of the sale. The qiestion must be determined accord-
ing to the facts in existence at the time of the sale. If upon the premises at that
time there were ot actual "kuown mines" capable of being profitably worked for
their product so as to make the land more valuable for mining than for agriculture,
a title to them acquired under the preemption act can not be successfully assailed.
The doctrine announced by the court would apply with equal force
to land of the character involved here. This land has timber on it
that is valuable for wood. It is not shown that it has any considerable
timber valuable for sawing, but there is a great quantity that may be
used in burning lime, for which purpose, it appears, the transferees
have secured it, and so far as demonstrated at the time the entry was
made, it was more valuable for that purpose than for mining.
Discoveries made subsequent to iller's purchase, can ot be used
to defeat his right to the land. The conditions that pertained at the
date of entry control, and not what may have been developed since.
(Arthur v. Earle, 21 L. D., 92.)
At some time, prior to Ruler's entry, there had been some work done,
outside of the Compromise, such as sinking prospect holes, running
drifts and short tunnels, and these were visible at the time of the
entry. While the statute says that applicant must show that the land
"contains o mining or other improvements," it is not believed that
Congress contemplated by this that everything in the way of old exca-
vations made with a view to mining should be construed as mining
improvements. It is fair to assume that Congress only meant to pro-
tect land upon which there were mining improvements upon existing
mining claims-claims that were alive and subsisting at the time.
There might be evidence of "other improvementss for agricultural
purposes, for instance, but in sch a state of decay as to induce rea-
sonable belief that the tract had been abandoned.. Again, there might
be present on land evidences of former inhabitancy, such as an old
cabin, but if it were not occupied and appeared to have been deserted,
this would not constitute an improvement within the meaning of the
law. In these instances it can hardly be claimed that the land would
not be subject to entry if the records of the local office were clear as to
the given tract. The same reasoning, it is thought, would apply to
abandoned mining claims, notwithstanding the presence of abandoned
mining improvements. If the land on which they are situated is not
segregated by an existing location or entry, the applicant would be
justified in assuming that it is subject to entry.
It is quite difficult to lay down any general proposition as to what
will give notice of mineral character, to parties seeking to enter under
non-mineral laws, land which at one time may have been regarded as
mineral, and may have been worked for mineral deposits, but the mere
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naked fact that land may have been at some former time worked for min-
eral, is not, in itself, sufficient to defeat an entry otherwise legal.
Section 3 of the act of June 3, 1878, supra, under which liller's
entry and purchase were made, provided:-
The register of the land office shall post a notice of such application embracing a
description of the land by legal subdivisions, in his office, for a period of sixty
days, and shall furnish the applicant with a copy of the same for publication, at the
expense of such applicant, in a newspaper published nearest the location of the
premises, for a like period of time.
The purpose of this posting and publishing is to give notice of the
application to purchase, in order that any adverse claimants to the
land may have opportunity to assert their claims and prevent the land
from wrongfully going to the applicant. In this case the record shows
that a notice of the application was regularly posted by the register in
the local land office, for the period required, and that a like notice was
regularly'given by publication in a newspaper, as required.
After setting forth the fact of the application and describing the
land, both the posted notice and the published notice contained the
following warning and citation to adverse claimants:
All persons holding any adverse claim thereto are required to present the same at
this office within sixty days from the first publication of this notice.
No response was made to these notices and no adverse claim of any
kind was asserted within the time fixed or at any time before January
15, 1890, which was more than two years after liller's purchase and
entry. A contest was instituted January 15, 1890, but, without being
prosecuted to a hearing, was dismissed by the contestants. The pres-
ent contest was instituted more than seven years after the entry was
made.
These facts tend strongly to corroborate and sustain the conclusion
that at the date of Hiller's entry the lands in question were not claimed
by any one under the mining laws and that the previous mineral loca-
tions and workings thereon had been abandoned.
The protestant has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that at the date of Hiller's entry the land entered was known to
contain any valuable mineral deposit or was claimed under the mining
laws or had mining improvements thereon which would defeat the
entry.
Your office judgment is therefore reversed and the protest dismissed.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-EMPTION FILING-OCCUPANCY.
MADSEN . CENTRA.L PACIFIC R. R. CO.
A pre-emption filing made after the map of definite location is filed, alleging set-
tlement prior to notice of withdrawal, will not in itself defeat the operation of
the grant.
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A claim of ocupancy, set up to defeat a railroad grant, will not serve such purpose,
if the qualifications of the alleged settler, and the character of the occupancy,
are not made to appear.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Conmissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) January 7, 1898. (F. W. C.)
An appeal has been filed on behalf of James Madsen from your
office decision of January 16, 1896, in which it is held that the W. A of
the NW. of Sec. 29, T. 11 N., R. 2 W., Salt Lake City, Utah, inured
to the Central Pacific Railroad Company under its grant made by the
acts of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 489), and July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 356).
Said tract is within the limits of the grant for said company as
adjusted to the map of definite location filed October. 20, 1868, at which
date the rights under said grant attached. The order of withdrawal
upon said map of location was made by your office letter of May 15, 18699
in which the local officers were instructed,
should it appear that parties have made bona fide settlements under the preemp-
tion laws on any of the land prior to the date of receipt of this order of with-
drawal, such settlers will be permitted to prove up and enter their claims either on
odd or even sections.
At the time of said withdrawal it thus appears that the rule of con-
struction was that the right under this grant (lid not attach until the
receipt of notice of withdrawal. at the local office, so that on May 26,
1869, Rais Cahoon was permitted to file pre-emption declaratory state-
ment for this land, in which statement settlement was alleged April 12,
1869. This filing remained of record until in 1888 the company, being
desirous of listing the land on account of its grant, served notice upon
Cahoon to come forward and show cause why his filing should not be
canceled, and also presented affidavits by James and Jens Madsen,
executed May 16, 1885, in which they swear that at the time of definite
location there was no settlement, cultivation or improvement whatever
upon said land belonging to or. claimed by said Rais Cahoon or anyone
else, but that the land was vacant, unoccupied, unappropriated and
unsettled.
Cahoon made no response to the notice, and the showing made by
the company was forwarded by the local officers with the recommen-
dation that Cahoon's filing be canceled; and by your office letter of
August 1, 1888, an order was issued to the local officers directing the
cancellation of said filing. Thereafter, to wit, on November 18, 1888,
the company was permitted to list the tract on account of its grant.
By letter of May 5 1894, the register transmitted an affidavit by
James Madsen, corroborated by Jens Madsen, to the following effect:
That at the time the line of the Central Pacific Railroad was definitely fixed a
bonafide settler was in the open, peaceable, exclusive and notorious, and adverse to
all the world except the United States, possession of the same; that at said time the
said tract of land was occupied, appropriated, interdicted and reserved land and
was not of the character contemplated by the grant to the said railroad.
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Upon this allegation hearing was ordered by your office letter of
September 13, 1894; which was duly held.
The testimony offered is very meagre and unsatisfactory. No attempt
is made to show a settlement by Cahoon antedating the filing of the
company's map of definite location. In fact, his connection with the
land either before or after the definite location of the road is not shown.
The testimony relied upon to defeat the grant is to. the effect that one
Sorensen was in the occupation and caltivation of this land from the
spring of 1868 until after the filing of the map of definite location.
No testimonywas offered to establish the qualification of said Sorensen
farther than that of one Baird, a witness for Madsen, who swears that
at the date of the definite location, October 20, 1868, Sorensen was
seventeen or eighteen years old. As to whether he was native or foreign
born is not clearly shown. It would appear that he is of foreign birth.
Sorensen never asserted a claim to the land, so far as shown by the
record, by the tender of an application to enter the same, and from
the testimony it is doubtful if he ever intended so doing.
The record filing by Cahoon can not be held to have defeated the
grant, as it was made subsequently to the filing of the map of definite
location, and no such showing has been made in support of the alleged
claim of Sorensen as would support a holding that the tract was
excepted from the operation of the grant. I therefore affirm your office
decision.
DEvouE V. RIEHL.
Motions for review and rehearing denied by Secretary Bliss, January
11, 1898. See departmental decision of November-12, 1897, 25 L. D.,
380.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEM7NINITY SELECTION-SETTLEMENT.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. KEMP.
The order of May 28, 1883, relieving the Northern Pacific company from'specifying
losses i support of indemnity selections, is only applicable to lands withdrawn
for the benefit of the grant.
An application to select a tract as indemnity, unaccompanied by a specification of
loss, is nobar to the acquisition of asettlementrightto the land covered thereby.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 11l 1898. (F. W. C.)
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company has appealed from your
office decision of February 17, 1896, holding for cancellation its indem-
nity selection covering the W. W of the NW. J of See. 23, T. 129 N., R.
35 W., St. Cloud land district, Minnesota, with a view to allowing the
homestead application of Charles Kemp covering said tract.
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Kemp's application was tendered October 18, 1892, and covered the
W. W- of the NW. and the W. A of the SW. i of said Sec. 23, and was
rejected for confilict with the selection made on account of the grant for
the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company.
This tract is within the- indemnity limits common to the grants for
the last mentioned company on account of the St. Vincent Extension
of its road and the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.
At the dates of the withdrawals ordered on account of said grants,
the W. W of the NW. - of said section 23 was embraced in the home-
stead entry of William J. Tomkins, made April 16, 1868, and canceled
November 29, 1875. Said tract was therefore excepted from the opera-
tion of said withdrawals.
The entire tract covered by Kemp's application was embraced in list
No. 25, tendered by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company on Novem-
ber 7, 1883; which application to select was rejected for conflict with
the grant for the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Com-
pany; the ruling at that time being that the last named company had
the superior right within the conflicting limits.
The Manitoba Company also made selection of the tracts covered by
'Kemp's application; but its selection was duly canceled October 21,
1895, and said company is not before this Department urging any
claim as to any of the land covered by said application.
The application to select filed by the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, before referred to, was not accompanied by a designation of
losses as bases for the selections covered by said list, and the same
was not supplied until April 26, 1892, when it filed its re-arranged list
No.. 25-A.
As before stated, Kemp's application to make homestead entry was
tendered on October 18, 1892, and in his appeal from the rejection of
said application he alleged settlement upon the land and continuous
residence thereon since 1884. Upon this allegation of settlement hear-
ing was duly ordered, and upon the testimony adduced it was shown
that he settled, as alleged, in July, 1884, and with his family has con-
tinuously resided on the land, that he has cleared, broke and fenced
about thirty-three acres, built a house and barn, dug a well, and other-
wise improved the land to the value of. about $900.
It will be noted that Kemp's settlement made in 1884 was the year
following the presentation of the application to select by the company;
but said application to select was not accompanied by a designation of
losses, as required by the regulations in force at the date of the pre-
sentation of said list. It is claimed by the company, however, that the
same was protected by the'order of May 28, 1883, in which order the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company was relieved from specifying a
basis for its indemnity selections; but, as held in the case of Northern
Pacific Railroad Company v. Miller (11 L. D., 428), the order did not
apply to lands not protected by withdrawal.
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As to the tract, iamely, the W. of the NW. , which was covered
by the entry of Tomiins at the date of the withdrawal on account of
the Northern Pacific grant, it must be held, under the authority of the
last mentioned decision, that said tract was not protected by said order
of May 28, 1883, and as to said tract the company's incomplete selec-
tion, tendered in 1883, was no bar to the settlement by Kemp. Your
office decision so held and awarded Kemp the right to enter the said
W. A of the NW. 4, but rejected his application as to the W. -4 of the
SW. 4 of said See. 23; 'from which action he failed to appeal.
Upon a review of the matter no reason appears for disturbing the
action taken in your said office decision, and the same is accordingly
affirmed; and upon completion of entry tly Kemp within a reasonable
time to be allowed by your office, the company's selection will be
canceled.
HILLIARD v. LUTZ.
Petition for the reversal of departmental decision of March 16, 1896,
22 L. D., 324, under the supervisory authority of the Department, denied
by Secretary Bliss, January 11, 1898. See also 23 L. D., 400.
MILLE LAC INDIAN LANDS-PRE-EMPTION.
MAHEW ET AL. v. MCLELLAN.
Under a pre-emption filing for Mille Lao lands protected by the second proviso to
section 6, act of January 14, 1889, wherein the right to make final proof has been
suspended by the act of July 4, 1884, it is incumbent upon the pre-emptor, dur-
ing such period of suspension, to maintain his possessory right by such acts as
will negative an inference of abandonment, if the rights of an intervening
adverse claimant are involved.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 1 1, 1898. (E- B., Jr.)
The laud involved in this case is the W4 NW4 and NWj SW4 of See.
12, T. 42 N., R. 25 W., St. Cloud, Minnesota land district.
On March 13, 1884, James F. McLellan filed pre-emption declaratory
statement No. 1978 for the land above described, alleging settlement
thereon March 4, 1884. On February 3, 1891, Moses Mahew filed pre-
emption declaratory statement No. 2061 for the SW- NWj and W4
SW4 of said section, and the SEI NE4 of section 11, same township
and range, alleging settlement thereon March 5, 1890. On February 3,
1891, David Johnston fifed pre-emption declaratory statement No. 2022
for the Wj N`W and W4 SW4 of said section 12, alleging settlement
thereon December 29, 1890. It thus, appears that Johnstol's filing con-
flicts with McLellan)'s as to all the land claimed by the latter, and that
Maliew's filing conflicts with McLellan's as to all the land claimed by
the latter except the NW4 NW4 of said section 12.
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MeLellan on March 12, 1891, gave notice of intention to submit final
proof on April 29, 1891, before the local office then at Taylor's Falls.
'That office reports tat L on the day set for hearing (April 29, 1891) the
case was called at 10 o'clock a. m., and placed on the calendar" and
"trial taken up May 7,1891," with all the parties above named present
and represented also by counsel. Instead of filing a written protest
against McLellan's filing, Mahew and Johnston appear to have pro-
tested in person. On the date last named McLellan submitted final
proof as in the ordinary course and, in addition, on that day and the
next, considerable other testimony; and the other parties each submit-
ted testimony. The privilege of cross-examination was freely allowed
and exercised by the respective parties. Upon the evidence, adduced
the local office decided, December 28, 1893, that "there was no compli-
ance " by McLellan " with the spirit of the law and hardly any attempt
to comply with the letter" and rejected his offered final proof. McLel-
lan appealed. Pending the appeal Mahew on August 11, 1894, and
Johnston on August 30, 1895, submitted final proof.
Your office on July 1, 1896, affirmed the decision of the local office,
Iodinlg that the evidence showed that MeLellan had maintained "but
a desultory connection with the land" and that "his proof offered as it
was in the face of adverse claims, does not show due compliance with
law and is therefore insufficient." His proof was accordingly rejected
and his filing held for cancellation. - It wa frther said in this con-
nection that "the respective rights and priorities" of Mahew and
Johnston "are not involved in this case and will receive attention in
another decision." An appeal by McLellan which assigns several
grounds of error brings the case here for consideration.
The land in controversy is within what was formerly known as the
Mille Lac Indian reservation. The history of legislative and depart-
mental action affecting the lands in said reservation, commencing with
the treaty of February 22, 1855 (10 Stat. 1165) may be readily gathered
from the cases of David H. Robbins (10 L. D. 3), Amanda J. Walters
et al. (12 L. D. 52), and Haggberg et al. v. Mahew (24 L. D. 489). The
treaties of March 11, 1863 (12 Stat. 1249) and May 7,1864 (13 Stat. 695),
under which these lands were ceded to the United States each contained
this provision:
That owing to the heretofore good conduct of the Mille Lao Indians, they shall
inot be compelled to remove so long as they shall not in any way interfere with, or in
any manner molest the persons or property of the whites.
Notwithstanding the right of occupancy thus conferred upon the
Mille Lac Indians numerous pre-emption filings and homestead entries
for these lands were allowed at the Taylor Falls land office, as would
seem under Departmental authority, between the year 1877 and July
1884, of which MeLellan's was one.
On July 4, 1884 (23 Stat., 89), an act was passed prohibiting any dis-
posal of saidlanids "untilfurtherlegislation by Congress." McLellan's
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filing was allowed therefore prior to the prohibition of July 4, 1884, and
while other filings and entries for Mille Lao lands were being allowed,
as above stated. The "further legislation" necessary to the disposal
of said lands was enacted January 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 642), and the
second proviso to the sixth section thereof declared:
That nothing in this act shall be held to authorize the sale or other disposal under.
its provision of any tract upon which there is a subsisting, valid pre-emption or
homestead entry, but any such entry shall be proceeded with under the regulations
and decisions in force at the date of its allowance, and if found regular and valid,
patents shall issue thereon.
In the case of Smith v. Lochren (22 L. D., 578), the latter having filed
a pre-emption declaratory statement, January 9, 1884, for a certain
tract of said lands, it was held (syllabus):
A pre-emption filing for Mille Lac lands, authorized by the rules in force at the,
time of -its allowance, is within the spirit and intent of the second proviso to section
6, act of January 14, 1889, and is accordingly protected thereby, if subsisting at the
date of said act.
-Under a filing of such character, however, wherein the right to make final proof is
suspended by provisions of the act of July 4, 1894, it is incumbent upon the pre-
emptor, during such period of suspension, to maintain his possessory right by such
acts as will negative an inference of abandonment, where the rights of an interven-
ing adverse claimant are involved.
The doctrines of that case both as to the validity of Lochren's filing
and the acts necessary to maintain the right to the land covered there-
by apply directly and broadly to the case at bar. While the adverse
claim in the Lochren case was a homestead entry made under the act
of February 14, 1889, straY, which not only did not provide for but, il
effect, prohibited the initiation thereafter of pre-emption claims to
Mille Lac lands, subsequent legislation (joint resolution of December
19, 1893, 28 Stat., 5 7) expressly confirmed all pre-emption filings made
within the period specified in the resolution, that is-
between the ninth day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, the date of
the decision of the Secretary of the Interior holding that the lands within said reser-
vation were subject to disposal as other public lands under the general land laws, and
the date of the receipt at the district land office at Taylor's Falls, in that State, of
the letter from the Commissioner of the General Land Office, communicating to them
the decision of the Secretary of the Interior of April twenty-second, eighteen hun-
dred and ninety-two, in which it was definitely determined that said lands were not
so subject to disposal, but could only be disposed of according to the provisions of
the special act of January fourteenth, eighteen hundred and eiglty-ine-
and furthermore, as construed in Haggberg et a. v. Mahew, spra,
said joint resolution operated, also, to validate settlements on these
lands when supported by pre emption filings made during the said
period. The said joint resolution included in its confirmatory provi-
sions homestead entries as well as pre-emption filings or entries and
thus beyond question placed both classes of claims upon the same foot-
iu-g. It only remains then to decide whether MLcellani duly maintained
his rights under his filing so as to prevent'the attaching of a superior
adverse claim in Mahew or Johnston.
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McLellan made settlement on the land on March 4, 1884. During
the rest of that year he was on the land, all told, according to his own
statements, not to exceed forty-six days, in periods ranging from one
day to fifteen days at the respective visits. During 1885 he was on the
claim, he states, not to exceed sixty-nine days, and during 1886 not to
exceed forty-eight days. During 1887 he was there on but one occa-
sion, in May of that year, a few hours at most, and did not return to
the land at all, thence, until about the middle of March, 1891, a period
of nearly four years. In the seven years succeeding his settlement he
was thus on the land only one hundred and sixty-three days. For
more than a year subsequent to the visit in 1887 le was living in the
same county in which the land is situated. In June, 1888, he left for
the Pacifice Coast, and was absent in Washington, Oregon, and British
Columbia until his return in March, 1891. The only improvements
placed on the land or cultivation thereof by him consisted in the erec-
tion of a small log shanty, the digging of a shallow unwalled well,
clearing and enclosing with a rude fence of brush, rails, and fallen tim-
ber about an acre of ground, and the planting of a few garden vege-
tables in 1884 or 1885. He made-no improvements, nor did any work
on the land between 1885 and March, 1891.
His voluntary absence from the land for more than four years is inex-
cusable in the face of the adverse claims initiated toward the close of
that period when the condition of his improvements indicated abandon-
ment. The plea of his counsel that this absence was justified by the
threatening attitude of the Indians finds no support in the testimony,
which makes no allusion whatever to any interference by the Indians
nor any apprehension on McLellan's part of danger from that source.
Mahew and Johnston had both made settlement on the land some time
prior to McLellan's return, the former in the spring of 1890 and the
latter early in January, 189L-and their improvements were easily to
be seen, and Mahew's were seen by McLellan at that time. He must
be held to have abandoned the land. The foregoing disposes of all the
questions presented in the case.
The decision of your office is affirmed. McLellan's filing will be can-
celed. The rights of Mahew and Johniston, respectively, in the premises
have already been determined in the case of Haggberg et catl. v. Mahew,
supra.
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SECOND HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ACT OF DECEMBER 29, 1894.
ALIX IEEIPFNER.
The right to make a second entry under the act of December 29, 1894, can not be rec-
ognized, where the first entry was abandoned without ay attempt to aise a
crop o the lands embraced therein.
A second entry will not be allowed on account of the worthless character of the land
covered by the first, if such entry was made without examination of the land.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 13, 1898. (C. W. P.)
The record shows that on October 22, 1894, Alix Ifeipfner made
homestead entry, No. 9728, of lots 1, 2 and 3, and the SE. of the W. i
of Sec. 5, T. 124 N., R. 72 W., Aberdeen land district, South Dakota.
On May 6, 1896, the said entryman filed a relinquishment of said:
entry, together with an application to make a second homestead entry,
embracing, in lieu of the aforesaid land, the SW. i of Sec .11, T. 123 N.,
R. 75 W.
In the application it is alleged, substantially, that afflant was misled
when he made said entry; that he had never examined the tract, but
took the word of another as to its quality; that his informant was one
whom affiant supposed to be well acquainted with the land, and who
would not deceive him as to its character, but his informant was either.
not aware of the kind of land he entered, or else deceived him; that
the tract is very stony and gravelly, and not at all suitable for raising
crops thereon; that affiant erected a small sod house on said tract.
immediately after making entry, but has not lived there to amount to
much, as he found be could not farm the land.
The local officers rejected this application, because the grounds set
out in the petition do not bring the case within the provisions of the
act of December 29, 1894 (28 Stat., 599).
On appeal, your office held that it not appearing " that Heipfner ever
attempted to raise any crops upon the tract in question," "his aban-
donment of the same cannot be said to be due to a failure of crops,
which would be necessary in order to bring his case within the provi-
sions of the act of December 29, 1894 (supra), and since he made his
entry without first examining the land he must suffer the consequences
of his own neglect," and cited the case of Nikolai Martenson (19 L. D.,
483).
The decision of your office is approved and affirmed.
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APPLICATION FOR SURVEY-ISLAND.
ARCHIE G. PALMER.
A hearing should be ordered on an application for the survey of an island in a non-
navigable stream, alleged to be above high water mark, and to contain more
than three legal subdivisions, and to have been in existence at the date of the
adjacent surveys, for if an island of such character was omitted from the public
survey through fraud or mistake an order for its survey may properly issue.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 13, 1898. (C. W. P.)
On November 22, 1897, you submitted the application of Archie G.
Palmer, of Central City, Nebraska, for the survey of an island in the
Platte river, in sections 4, 5, 8 and 9, township 13 north, range 5 W.,
Nebraska, and you recommend that the application be approved and 9,
survey ordered.
. From the application it appears that the island the applicant desires
to have surveyed contains about one hundred and twenty-five acres of
land; that the width of the channel between the island and the main
shore of Long Island on the south is from two hundred and sixty to
three hundred feet, and between the island and the main shore of Prairie
Island on the north is from twenty-five to fifty feet, the depth of the
river at ordinary stages of the water being from about one and a half
to two feet; and that the island is about two feet above high water
mark, not subject to overflow, and is fit for agricultural purposes, and
that there are no improvements upon the island, and that it existed at
and prior to the survey of the township embracing said island.
The application appears to have been served upon the riparian owners.
The township was surveyed and the river meandered in September,
1862, and the photolithographic copy of the plat, submitted by you,
shows no island in the locality described in the application and repre-
sented on the accompanying diagram.
The affidavits attached to the application state that the island was in
existence when the township was surveyed. But William A. Wilder,
Christian Miller, and Mrs. John Payne have filed a protest against the
approval of the application, claiming the island as a part of their lands
under the law of riparian rights. The protest is accompanied with
affidavits by the protestants and two others, showing that. between
Prairie Island and Long Island there are numerous small tow-heads, Do
one of which contains to exceed one acre of land, and three small brush
islands, one of said brush islands containig not to exceed fifteen acres
of land and each of the others not to exceed twenty-five acres; that
said islands are of no value to any other person than the owners of
adjoining lands for pasturing stock at low water time, and that they are
covered with a dense brush of willow, plum and a few cottonwood trees.
If these statements are correct, the application for survey should not
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be granted. John C. Christenson's case, 25 L. D., 413, and the case of
the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad Company v. Butler, 159 U. S.,
87. But if it is a fact that there was in existence, at the date of the
survey, an island in the locality described, above high water mark and
not subject to overflow and fit for agricultural purposes, containing
about one hundred and twenty-five acres of land-more than three
legal subdivisions-which was omitted from the survey of 1862, it may
be that the island was omitted from the original survey through fraud
or mistake, so that a survey should now be granted. To determine
whether the facts alleged in the application and affidavits accompany-
ing it are true, a hearing will be necessary. A hearing is therefore
ordered, and you will cause notice thereof to be given to the applicant
for survey and the owners of the adjacent lands.
INDIAN LAND-APPROVAL OF CONVEYANCE.
NANCY WHITEFEATHER.
It is no objection to the approval of an Indian deed that a certified copy thereof is
presented for action,,if the loss of the original is shown, or the custodian thereof
refuses to part with its immediate possession.
The approval of an Indian deed, in the absence of an intervening adverse right,
relates back to the date of said deed, and gives effect thereto from the time of
its execution.
Where, prior to the approval of an Indian deed, a conveyance adverse thereto is
made, and approval thereof secured on the ground that such action would serve
to protect parties holding under the first deed, the Secretary of the Interior may
approve said instrument, leaving the parties claiming thereunder to assert their
rights in the courts.
Assistait Attorney- General Van Devanter to the Secretary f the Interior,
January 13, 1898.
I have the honor to acknowledge the reference by the Acting Secre-
tary of a communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
dated January 10, 1898.
That communication states that certain lands in Kansas were allotted
and patented December 28, 1859, to Nancy Whitefeather, a Shawnee
Indian; that February 25, 1864, Nancy Whitefeather conveyed sepa-
rate portions of those lands to Brooking Jefferies (or Jefries) aud John
O'Connor, but these conveyances have never been approved by the
Secretary of the Interior that January 28, and 29, 1870, Nancy White-
feather having died in about 1868, Elizabeth Longtail and George
Washington claiming to be sole heirs of Nancy Whitefeather, conveyed
to Harry McBride and Thomas Jeffries, respectively, three separate
portions of the land so as aforesaid conveyed by Nancy Whitefeather;
that the deeds to Harry McBride and Thomas Jeffries were approved
by the Secretary of the Interior April 18, 1870, and June 11, 1870; that
subsequently it was discovered that Elizabeth Longtail and George
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Washington were not the sole heirs of Nancy Whitefeather but were
heirs inheriting only an undivided one-half interest in her real estate;
that February 16, 1895, the heirs inheriting- the other undivided one-
half interest conveyed the same to Win. J. Isaac; that the deed to
Isaac was approved by the Secretary of the Interior March 19, 1897;
that long previous to the conveyance to Isaac the title obtained by
Brooking Jeffries and John O'Connor from Nancy Whitefeather and
the title obtained by Harry McBride and Thomas Jeffries from Eliza-
beth LIougtail and George Washington had united in the same persons
that the approval of the deed to Isaac was obtained upon the repre-
sentation that the purpose and intent of said conveyances was to
quiet title in the several vendees and holders of said lands through:
mesne conveyance from the vendees (Harry McBride and Thomas Jeff-
ries) in the deeds approved in 1870;" that this representation has
proved to be false and it has been shown that the Isaac deed and its
approval were obtained adversely and in hostility to the title held
under the original conveyances of Nancy Whitefeather and the
approved conveyances of Elizabeth Longtail and George Washington.
It is shown that at the date of the deed to Isaac and at the date of its
approval the existing state of the title under the Nancy Whitefeather
deeds and those of Elizabeth Longtail and George Washington was
fully shown by the records of the county, and that those then holding
that title and their grantors had been in the actual and ndisturbed
occupancy and possession of these lands for over twenty-six years.
The communication of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs then
submits for your consideration and approval certified copies of the
original deeds from Nancy Whitefeather to Brooking Jeffries and John
O'Connor, respectively, saying that this is done
in order to accomplish now what it considered and held that it was doing when
this office recommended the approval of the Isaac deed, viz., to quiet the title of
innocent purchasers and present holders of said lands.
Proof is submitted showing the loss of the original deed to Brooking
Jeffries and showing that John O'Connor now has possession of the
original deed to him and refuses to part with the possession thereof or
permit an examination thereof, saying that he is satisfied it conveyed
a good title. In concluding his letter the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs says:
From a retrospection of the former correspondence and a close examination of the
latter I have no hesitancy in recommending the approval of these certified copies of
said deeds as au act of justice to the many innocent holders of town lots whose title
to such land was not complete y the approval of the deeds executed by only two
of the heirs of said Nancy, and do now so recommend.
Prompt action on these deeds is respectfully requested for the reason that actions
in ejectment are now pending in the courts, and the innocent holders and occupants
are necessarily anxious that their titles should be adjusted as promptly as possible.
The reference to me is for "opinion as to whether there are any legal
objections to the approval of the two certified copies of deeds." It
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seems to me that there is Do objection to the fact that in requesting
your approval certified copies are presented instead of the original
deeds. The loss of the Jeffries deed and the refusal of the custodian of
the O'Connor- deed to part with the immediate possession thereof is
sufficient reason for the non-tproduction of the originals. In the absence
of the intervening approved deed to Isaac, there is no doubt that a
present approval of the Whitefeather deeds would relate back to the
date thereof and give effect and validity thereto, from the time of their
execution. (Pickens v. Lomnax, 145 U. S., 310; See also George Big
Knife, 13 L. D., 511.) No statutory provision will in any event be
violated by their present approval, but whether an approval at this
time can relate back to the date of the Nancy Whitefeather deeds as
against ally title which may have been obtained under the intervening
approved Isaac deed, is subject to qestion. If the date of a present
approval is clearly shown therein so that upon contrasting it with the
approval of the Isaac deed the precedence of the former in the order of
time will be apparent, no injury or injustice will be done to Isaac or
anyone elaiming under him. If by reason of the approvalof the deed
to Isaac, you are without jurisdiction and authority to approve the
Whitefeather conveyances, that want of authority and the consequent
invalidity of a present approval will be apparent and no one can be
misled. In this connection it is to be observed that the approval of the
Isaac deed is shown not alone by the public records of the Indian Office,
but also by the public record of conveyances in the county in which the
lands are situate.
Without your approval it may be that the holders of the title under
the Nancy Whitefeather deeds will not be able to present to the courts
in the pending, or other suits, any equities of their own claim or any
infirmity in the Isaac deed growing out of the record state of the title
at that time and the existing and long-continued possession thereunder,
or growing out of any false representations which may have been made
on behalf of Isaac in procuring the approval of his deed.
If the conveyances by Nancy Whitefeather to Brooking Jeffries and
John O'Connor are deemed by you to have been of such a character as
to merit your approval, in the absence of any intervening approved
conveyance, I believe that, in the light of the statement and recom-
mendatiou of the Indian Office, you will be justified in approving the
conveyances shown by the two certified copies, casting upon the appli-
cants the duty of establishing, if they can, that nder the facts sur-
rounding this transaction as they may be developed byjudicial inquiry,
a present approval will relate back to the date of the conveyance
approved so as to give it full effect as of that time.
Approved, January 13,1898.
C. N. BLIsS, Secretary.
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RAILROAD GRANT-SETTLIEMENT RIGHTS-ESTOPPEL.
WIGHT V. CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. Co.
A pre-emptor who has made an affidavit in support of a railroad selection, to the
effect that he was not residing upon the tract embraced within said selection, at
the date when the company's right attached, -is estopped from setting up a con-
trary state of facts, as against the heirs of one who subsequently purchased said
tract from the company.
A pre-emption claim, based on alleged settlement prior to definite location, and filing
made prior to notice of withdrawal, can not be held to defeat the operation of a
railroad grant, where the fact of settlement is not clearly established, and the
pre-emptor has failed to show due maintenance of his claim after his filing, and
it further appears that the land involved-has been, for a long term of years, in
the adverse possession of one against whom the pre-emptor is estopped from set-
ting up his alleged settlement right.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, Jantuary
(W. V. D.) 13, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Lyman Wight has appealed from your office decision of June 13,
1895, in which it is held that lots 1 and 2 and the NE. I of the SW. ,
(should be NE. I of NW. 1) of See. 29, T. 10 N., R. 2 W., Salt Lake
City land district, Utah, inured to the Central Pacific Railroad Company
under its grant made by the act of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 489), and July
2, 1864 (13 Stat., 356).
The map showing the line of definite location of the company's road
opposite the tract in question was filed on October 20, 1868, at which
date the rights under its grant attached.
A land-office in the Territory of Utah was not opened until March 9,
1869, and the order of withdrawal on account of the grant to the
Central Pacific Railroad Company was not made until May15, 1869; so
that on April 3, 1869, Lyman Wight was permitted to file pre-emption
declaratory statement for this land, in which statement settlement was
alleged March 13, 1869.
The company included this tract in its list No. 3, filed November 4,
1884, which list was accompanied by an affidavit made by Wight on
the 6th of October, 1883, in which he swears
that he was not residing upon said land at the time the rights of the Central Pacific
Railroad Company attached to the same and that he has never resided thereon or
any part thereof.
- This list stood unchallenged until on December 19, 1893, Lyman
Wight filed a corroborated affidavit, in which he alleged that at the
time the line of the Central Pacific Railroad was definitely fixed " one
Wight was in the open, peaceable, exclusive and notorious, and adverse
possession" of the tract involved, as to all the world except the United
States, the land at that time being " occupied, appropriated, interdicted
and reserved land and was not of the character contemplated by the
grant to the aforesaid company."
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This affidavit was forwarded to your office, and by letter "F" of
January 10,1894, a hearing was ordered to afford Wight an opportunity
to prove the allegations of his affidavit. Hearing was called for March
20, 1894.
On February , 1894, Mrs. Mary L. House, widow of Hiram House,
filed a petition asking to be allowed to intervene-basing her applica-
tion upon an affidavit alleging ownership and possession of the tract
involved since March 29, 1888, through a deed of conveyance from the
Central Pacific Railroad Company.
Hearing was duly held, after several continuances, and upon the testi-
mony adduced the register and receiver were of the opinion that no such
claim was shown to exist, to the tract in controversy, at the date of the
'definite location of the Central Pacific Railroad, as would withdraw the
same from the operation of the grant to said company, and therefore
held that the land passed to the railroad company; in which opinion
your office concurred; and Wight has appealed to this Department.
From a review of the testimony it appears that the present claimant,
together with his father, Louis Wight, now deceased, made a joint set-
tlement prior to the filing of the map of definite location and to the
extension of the operation of the homestead and pre-emption laws'to
the lands in this Territory. Under the Territorial law the present claim-
ant in 1868 applied to the county surveyor, who made a survey of the
land included in this joint occupation. The claimant was at this time a
duly qualified pre-emptor and undoubtedly intended to claim land in
his own right in addition to that to be claimed by his father. He and
his father occupied the same house and used the same stable and other
buildings jointly, and cultivated the greater part of the tract, which,
according to the survey made at that time embraced about 58 acrs.
After the government survey of the land in 1869 it was found that the
buidlings were all upon section 20 and that the cultivated field extended
across the tract here in dispute. At this time the father and son made
a division of the land claimed, the father entering under the homestead
law the land in section 20, and the present claimant filing his pre-
emption declaratory statement, as before stated, for the tract in question.
Several nice questions would be thus presented for consideration by
the record made in this case were it not for the fact that Wight made
the affidavit before referred to, in 1883, in which he swears, as before
stated, that he was not residing upon the land at the time the rights of
the company attached under its grant, and that he never resided upon
any part thereof; and the only explanation offered as to the making of
said afmidavitis that the agent for the company who secured said affida-
vitinformed him that that was the only way he might secure the tract,
and that the inference gathered from the representations made by the
agent for the company led him to believe that he would have the pre-
ferred right of purchase from the company in the event of its securing
patent for this land.
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Following the filing of said affidavit, together with the company's
-list, in 1884, to wit, oI the 29th of March, 1888, Hiram House purchased
this laud, together with other tracts in the same section, from the Cen-
tral Pacific Railroad Company, and he immediately thereafter enclosed
the entire tract within a comion fence and has maintained undisputed
possession since said purchase.
As against the claimed rights and equities of the heirs of House, who
has since died, Wight alleges that he had an agreement with House to
the effect that upon purchasing this land, together with other tracts
in the same section, from the railroad company, he (House) would con-
vey to claimant the tracts here involved, Wight to pay House the
amount paid the company.
The showing upon this question, resting as it does upon the claim-
ant's own testimony, can not be considered.
Upon the record as made it must be held, whatever be the effect of
Wight's filing and settlement as regards the company's grant, that he
would be estopped from claiming the'tract as against those claiming
under the purchase made by Hiram House. Even should it be held,
therefore, that the tract was excepted from the operation of the com-
pany's grant by reason of the alleged claim of Wight existing at the
date of definite location, the equities of the purchaser, which are duly
protected by the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), would be clearly
superior to the claim now sought to be asserted by Wight under his
filing made, as before stated, in 1869.
After a careful review of the entire record, in view of the doubtful
character of the settlement shown at the date of the attachment of
rights under the grant; of the fact that Wight had failed to show that
his pre-emnption claim had been duly maintained since his filing made
in 1869; that House or his heirs have been in undisputed possession of
the land since 1888, under purchase from the railroad company, and
that Wight is estopped by his own action from now claiming as against
the heirs of such purchaser, it is directed that Wight's filing be can-
celed and the tract included in a list and submitted for approval as the
basis for patent to be issued on account of the grant.
For the reasons given your office decision must be and is accordingly
affirmed.
DURESS-SENTE]NCE OF IlMlPRISONMENT-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.
SKAGGS ET AL. V. MURRAY.
It can not be held, under a local statute that suspends civil rights during the term
of a sentence of imprisonment, that a decision of the General Land Office is
ineffective for the reason that the party adversely affected thereby had been
convicted and was imprisoned at the time the jdgment of the local office was
rendered.
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The preferred right of a successful contestant can not be defeated by an adverse
settlement claim acquired subsequently to the initiation of the contest.
A minor can not acquire settlement rights under the homestead law.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (C. W. P.)
The appeal of Sarah E. Skaggs, James Skaggs, William Skaggs, Jr.,
Cora Skaggs, and Edith Skaggs, from your office decisions of February
19, 1897, and June 4, 1897, rejecting their application to contest the
homestead entry, No. 12,743, of William Murray, of lots 5 and 6, and
the S. z of the SW. I of Sec. 32, T. 17 N., R. 2 W., Guthrie land district,
-Oklahoma Territory, made December 26, 1895, is before the Depart-
ment.
On March 17, 1897, the said Sarah E. Skaggs and others filed their
application to contest said entry, alleging, in substance, () that the
-said Sarah is the wife of William Skaggs; that the other contestants
are the minor children of the said William Skaggs; that on the 22d of
April, 1889, at about thirty minutes past two o'clock P. M., the said
Sarah and said minor children, in company with their father, the said
William, settled upon said land; that said settlement was made prior
to the settlement of said entryman; that on the 30th of April, 1889,
Robert M. McKenzie made homestead entry of said land; and on the
30th of April, 1889, the said William Skaggs filed a contest against
said last mentioned entry, alleging prior settlement; that subsequently
the said Murray filed a contest, alleging that both Skaggs and McKen-
zie were disqualified as sooners"; that on the 3d of October, 1890,
prior to the trial of said contests, the said William Skaggs was arrested
on a charge of felony and convicted thereof on the 12th of February,
1891, and sentenced to the penitentiary at Columbus, Ohio, for six
years, and thereby prevented from prosecuting his own contest, and
defending against the contest of the said Murray; that by means of
said conviction and imprisonment, the said William Skaggs "became
civilly dead, and that the life of his said contest died or expired with
the said conviction and sentence and confinement for the commission
of said felony," and that the contest of said Murray also "became func-
tus officio, and that all the rights of property of said Williamn Skaggs
vested in his wife and minor children, and that upon the conviction
and expiration of the contest aforesaid, the U. S. Land Office was
divested of jurisdiction, by operation of law, of both the person and
,the subject matter of the aforesaid contests; that by reason of the con-
viction of the said William Skaggs, the said Sarah "became the head
of the family," "but was prevented from asserting her rights by reason
of the status of the litigation at the tine;" that the acts of settlement
made by the contestants, and those acquired through the said William
Skaggs are as follows: "By William Skaggs, assisted by these plaint-
iffs," one dugout, two wells, twenty-four apple trees, one sod house,
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and ten acres of land broken, total cost 50, and by the contestants,
44 without the assistance of William Skaggs," one box house, thirty-five
acres broken, fencing and garden, total cost $118.50;
(2) That the testimony upon which the forfeiture of the right of the
said William Skaggs to said land was obtained was "fraudulent, false,
and untrue."
(3) That said Murray was allowed to make his homestead entry before
the contest proceeding of the said Murray and Skaggs was formally
disposed of, and without notice to the contestants, or any other person,
and that the contest and intervention of said Murray were illegal.
This affidavit of contest was rejected by the local officers, (1) because
William Skaggs is not civilly dead, (2) because Mrs. Skaggs had not
secured a divorce, but, on the contrary, is now living with said William
as his wife, and (3) because minor heirs can make no valid settlement.
Upon appeal your office held that:
If Mrs. Skaggs ever had any right to this land she has delayed too long in assert-
ing it. She does not aver any ignorance of her husband's protracted efforts to assert
his claim thereto. She will not be allowed to stand by and await the result of the
protracted efforts of her husband to assert his claim thereto, until said efforts have
proven fruitless, and ten, several years later, commence to assert her own claim.
She has waited out the statutory life of the entry before making any claim what-
ever in her own right to the premises. She now comes too late,
and sustained the actionof the local officers.
The records of your office show that on April 30, 1889, Robert M.
McKenzie made homestead entry of said land. On May 30, 1889,
William Skaggs filed a contest affidavit against said entry, alleging
prior settlement. On August 20, 1889, William Murray filed affidavit
of contest charging that both McKenzie and Skaggs were disqualified
as " sooners."
A hearing was had, at which Skaggs, being in the penitentiary at
Columbus, Oiio, appeared by attorney. Testimony was submitted, and
the local officers decided in favor of Murray. Upon appeal your office,
by letter of March 12, 1894, affirmed said judgment. Skaggs and
McKenzie appealed. While the appeals were pending before the
Department, Saggs moved for a rehearing. On September 7,1895,
the Department denied Skaggs's motion for rehearing, without preju-
dice, ad affirmed the decision of your office. On November 22, 1895,
the Department denied a motion for review, filed by McKenzie, and
McKenzie's entry was canceled by your office letter of December 19,
1895. On December 29, 1895, Murray made homestead entry of said
land. Skaggs filed a motion for rehearing, and on January 31, 1896,
appealed from the action of your office canceling McKenzie's entry.
Said motion for rehearing was denied on February 10,1896, and appeal
dismissed on December 3, 1896.
But it is insisted that the decision against William Skaggs was void,
because, while the contest was pending, and prior to the hearing before
the local officers, Skdggs had been convicted of a penitentiary offence,
and was imprisoned under his sentence, when the judgment of the
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local officers was rendered. And a provision in thelaws of the Terri-
tory of Oklahoma is relied on in support of the contention that the
Land Office was divested of jurisdiction by reason of such conviction
and imprisonment, which reads: Sec. 21, Oh. 25, Statutes of Oklahoma,
1890:
A sentence of imprisonment in the territorial prison for any term less than for life,
suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices
and all private trusts, authority or power, during the term of such imprisonment.
2 New York Revised Statutes, 101, Sec. 19, declares that
a sentence of imprisonment in the State prison for any term less than for life, sus-
pends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced . .. during the term of such
imprisonment;
and the Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of Davi v. Duffle,
3 Keyes, 606, held that, under this provision, the service of legal process
upon a convict in the State prison is regular and valid to confer juris-
diction; that the statute which " suspends all the civil rights of the
person sentenced to the State prison, does not suspend the rights of
others against him; that he may be sued, and the suit against him may
be prosecuted to judgment.
The provision in the New York statute is similar to the Oklahoma
law, and the interpretation of the provision by the Court of Appeals of
New York accords with sound reasoning. It would be strange indeed,
if a convict in a State prison should be exempt from ordinary proceed-
ings by action during his imprisonment.
The claim of Mrs. Skaggs to the laud, independent of that of her
husband, can not be recognized, for the reason (if for no other reason)
that the preferred right of Murray as a successful contestant could not
be defeated by Mrs. Skaggs's settlement acquired subsequent to the
initiation of his contest against McKenzie's entry. Hodges et al. v.
Colcord, 24 L. D., 221; ine v. Cliff, Id., 432.
That the minor children of William Skaggs are not qualified to
acquire title to public lands under the homestead laws is apparent. A
homestead entryman must be the head of a family, or a person who
has arrived at the age of twenty-one years. Sec. 2289 of the Revised
Statutes.
Your office decisions denying the application for a hearing are
affirmed.
On October 1, 1897, an application to intervene was filed by Robert
M. McKenzie, wherein it is alleged, among other things,
that the petitioner employed an attorney of Washington, D. C., to appeal said case
to the Honorable Secretary of the Interior for the consideration of $50.00, $48.00 of
which was duly paid, and your petitioner rested in the assurance that said case was
dnly appealed to your Honor, for your consideration, and he only learned that such
was not the case by the letter mentioned in his affidavit, hereunto attached, dated
August 4, 1897, and it was then for the first time that your petitioner learned that
his entry was canceled, on the 19th day of December, 1895, by direction of the Hon-
orable Commissioner of the General Land Office.
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The record in the case of Skaggs and Murray v. McKenzie shows
that an appeal was taken in behalf of McKenzie from the decision of
your office, and that on September 7, 1895, the Department affirmed
said decision; that a motion for review was then filed in behalf of
Mc~enzie, which was denied by the Department on November 22, 1895,
and McKenzie's entry canceled by your office letter of December 19,
1895.
This motion being founded on a misstatement of the record, affords
no proper grounds for intervention. But Mrs. Skaggs's affidavit of con-
test being dismissed, the motion, for that reason, is without support.
The motion to intervene is dismissed.
RES JDICATA-SERnYISORY AUTHORITY-PREFERENCE RIGHT.
PARCHER v. GILLEN.
The rule of res judicata as applied by the Department in determining whether a con-
test is barred by prior proceedings, does not, as against the government and
third parties, place matters which might have been tried and determined upon
the same footing with those which have thus been disposed of.
While the legal title to land remains in the government the Secretary of the Interior
is charged with the supervisory authority and duty of determining its proper
disposition; and a change in the person holding the office of Secretary, does not
defeat or prevent a review or reversal in any instance where the Secretary
making the ruling, or rendering the decision, if still holding the office, would
be in duty bound to review and reverse his own act.
The preferred right of entry given to the successful contestant by the act of May
14, 1880, can not be held to extend to one, who, under another statutory enact-
ment, is disqualified and prohibited from entering the land involved.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
17, 1898.
This case involves the N j of the NW i and lot 1 of Sec. 12, T. 39 N.,
R. 6 E., Wausau land district, Wisconsin.
March 10, 1894, John Gillen made homestead entry No. 7121 of the
tract, and March 24, 1894, D. W. Parchdr filed an affidavit of contest
against this entry alleging, among other things, that Gillen, in advance
of their being opened for settlement, entered and occupied the lands,
of which this tract is a part. A hearing was had, at which both par.
ties were present and introduced testimony, the receiver alone presid-
ing. A special agent was detailed to act in place of the register, who
was disqualified. While not present at the hearing, the special agent
duly considered the written transcription of the testimony and there-
after separate decisions were rendered, the receiver holding that the
charge of premature and unlawful entry was sustained by the evidence
and the special agent holding that the charge was not sustained.
April 3, 1895, your office approving the decision of the receiver, sus-
tained Parcher's contest and held Gillen's entry for cancellation.
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Gillen appealed, and April 22, 1896, this Department affirmed your
office decision. (330 L. and R., 63, not reported.)
Motion for a review of the departmental decision was filed by Gillen,
the chief error assigned being stated therein as follows:
(1). In not holding that the case of Gillen v. Beebe (16 L. D., 306), upon a motion
for rehearing, was res adjtudicata as to the question of whether or not Gillen was on
the land in dispute prior to December 20, 1890, as the application for rehearing in
that case was based upon this very point.
December 15, 1896 (23 L. D., 485), this Department revoked the
departmental decision of April 28, 1896, dismissed Parcher's contest,
and held Gillen's entry intact, solely upon the ground that the deci-
sions in the case of Gillen v. Beebe (16 L. D., 306.and 279 L. and R.,
319) finally and conclusively adjudged that Gillen did not prematurely
or unlawfully enter upon the land in contest.
January 12, 1897, Parcher filed a petition asking a reconsideration
of this last decision of the Department and Gillen was (uly notified.
Briefs by both parties were filed; and February 24-, 1897, counsel on
both sides argued orally before the Department the questions involved
in the case. My predecessor then concluded to defer action on said
petition and to permit his successor to decide it.
The whole case has been recently re-argued, both orally and in writ-
ing, and it is now before me for disposition.
The record shows the-following facts:
The tract in contest is part of the lands, commonly known as "water
reserve lands," which were withdrawn from settlement and entry by
the President's proclamation of April 5, 1881, and which were restored
to'settlement and entry under the homestead law, by the act of Con-
gress approved June 20, 1890 (28 Stat., 169).
The third section of said act reads as follows:
Sec. 3. That no rights of any kind shall attach by reason of settlement or squat-
ting upon any of the lands hereinbefore described before the day on which such
lands shall be subject to homestead entry at the several land offices, and until said
lands are opened for settlement no person shall enter upon and occupy the same, and
any person violating this provision shall never be permitted to enter any of said
lands or acquire any title thereto. This act shall take effect six months after its
approval by the President of the-United States.
The act took effect December 20, 1890. The receiver, who saw the
witnesses and heard them testify, your office, and the Department in
its first decision, all concurred in finding from the evidence that Gillen
unlawfully entered upon and occupied water reserve lands on December
19, 1890, and that he did this for the purpose of obtaining an advantage
in the settlement and entry thereof. The record has again been care-
fully examined and I am of opinion that this finding is fully sustained
by the evidence. Applied to these facts the statute commands that
Gillen shall "never be permitted to enter any of said lands or acquire
any title thereto." Smith v. Townsend (148 U. S., 490).
Gillen insists that by reason of the proceedings and the decisions in
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Gillen v. Beebe, first decided March 22, 1893, (16 L. D., 306), and reaf-
firmed February 12, 1894 (279 L. and R. Letter-press 319), it was finally
and conclusively adjudged that he did not enter upon and occupy said
lands in violation of the act aforesaid; and that Parcher and the United
States are bound by that adjudication, This claim of resjudicata was
not made before the local office in the present contest but was urged
by Gillen upon his appeal to your office and again upon his further
appeal to the Department. Your office in its decision of April 3, 1895,
held that the matter was not resjudicata and this holding was affirmed
by te departmental decision of April 22,1896, and was afterward with-
drawn and reversed by the departmental decision of December 15, 1896.
Uponl the same record and upon the same question these two depart-
mental decisions reached and announced opposite conclusions.
The facts in the case of Gillen v. Beebe will be briefly stated in order
that the application of the contention made by Gillen and recognized
in the decision now under review, may be understood. Beebe had
made homestead entry of a part of the lands now in question shortly
after 9 a. m., the hour of opening the local office, December 20, 1890,
being the day upon which the lands were opened to settlement. Gillen
subsequently made application to enter all the lands now in contro-
versy, alleging settlement between the hours of 12 and 1 a m., IDecem-
ber 20, 1890, and a hearing was had to determine the respective rights
of Gillen and Beebe to the lands claimed by both. The evidence was
brief and without conflict. The point of difference was one of law only.
Beebe contended before the local office that the portion of the statute
providing
that no rights of any kind shall attach by reason of settlement squatting upon any
of the lands hereinbefore described, before the day on which said lands shall be sub-
ject to homestead entry at the several land offices,
referred to the business day recognized in the practiceof the local office
and not to the calendar day. It was insisted by him that since the
local office opened at 9 a. m., and since a homestead entry could not be
made until the local office did open, Congress intended to inhibit set-
tlement up to the moment when the lands could be entered at the local
office according to its recognized hours for transacting business, and
that therefore Gillen's settlement was premature and unlawful and could
not avail against Beebe's entry. The local officers held that the statute
referred to the calendar day and not to the business day; that Gillen's
settlement between the close of the calendar day of December 19, and
9 a. m., December 20, was not premature or unlawful, and that Gillen
had the prior and better claim. On appeal, your office affirmed the
decision of the local office in this respect and, on further appeal, the
Department reached a like decision.
Up to this time there had been no claim, and no intimation of any
claim, that Gillen had entered upon water reserve lands prior to the
calendar day of December 20. Thus far, the claim of his disqualification
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was based exclusively upon his admitted entry upon said lauds between
the beginning of that calendar day and 9 o'clock in the forenoon
thereof. This statement of the very narrow issue tried and determined
respecting the qualifications of Gillen is given alitional significance
when we consider the issue which was tried and determined in the
same case, respecting the qualifications of Samuel H. Norton, another
party thereto, who claimed settlement on the morning of December 20,
upon a part of the lands included in Beebe's homestead entry. At the
hearing special inquiry was made to show that Norton had in fact
entered upon water reserve lands on December 19, for the purposeof
examining the land and selecting that which lie desired. This fiet was
distinctly pointed out in the briefs filed and it was earnestly insisted
that by reason thereof Norton was wholly disqualified to make entry
of any of said lands. While the contention was not recognized in the
decision' of the local office or in that of your office, it was reasserted in
the briefs and the departmental decision discussed the matter at length
and expressly held Norton was disqualified by such premature and
unlawful entry. The fact that Norton's disqualification resulting from
what he did before the calendar day of December 20, was made the
subject of inquiry at the hearing, was insisted upon in briefs of coun-
sel, and was determined in the departmental decision, when contrasted
with the fact that there was. no such inquiry, insistence or decision
relating to Gillen, demonstrates that the question of the latter's enter-
ing upon such lands before the calendar day of December 20, and his
consequent disqualification, was not tried or determined in that case.
Beebe thereafter filed a motion for rehearing, alleging that he had
recently been informed that Gillen had entered upon and occupied water
reserve lands upon December 19, in violation of the statute and that
he had also recently discovered several witnesses who would so testify.
The names of the witnesses were given and their affidavits filed.
Counter-affidavits were filed upon the part of Gillen and in passing
upon the motion the departmnent held (279 L. and R., 319):
anew trial will not be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence uiless
such evidence is of that character to necessarily cause the trial court to arrive at a
different conclusion. It is not shown to my satisfaction that the newly discovered
evidence of Beebe would necessarily have that effect in the case at bar, especially in
view of the fact that sch evidence would all be contradicted by witnesses called by
Gillen, judging from the affidavits now before me.
Hilliard v. Lutz (22 L. D., 324; on review, 23 L. D., 400) is a case quite
similar to the one now under discussion. There, Lutz, on the ground of
settlement in the early morning of December 20, had successfully con-
tested a homestead entry made by another upon water reserve lands
immediately following the opening of the local office, and as the result
of such contest was himseIf permitted to make homestead entry thereof.
Later Lutz's entry was contested. by a third party on the ground of
premature entry on December 19, as in this case, and when this second
case reached the Department it was contended that the question of
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Lutz's qualifications was determined in the first contest and could not
be made the subject of further inquiry. The Department held:
It is obvious that strictly speaking, any question involved i the present contest
is not res judicala by reason of having been decided in a former contest to which the
contestant herein was not a party, as one of the essential elements of res judicata,
viz., identity of parties, is wanting. However, the Department in order to prevent
useless litigation has adopted the rle that an issue once tried and determined
eau not be made the basis of a second contest. If then the question as to whether
or not Lutz is disqualified by reason of having entered upon water reserve lands
prior to the legal hour of opening has been passed upon in a former contest, that
question can not again be raised; tt if it has not heretofore been adjudicated, then
it is still a proper subject of investigation.
The history of the first contest is then recited whereby it appears
that Lutz's qualifications were not in ay manner questioned in the
first contest except by a motion for a rehearing, which was denied.
The decision proceeds:
It must be clear from what has been said above that the question as to whether
or not Lutz is disqualified by reason of having entered upon water reserve lands
prior to the legal hour of opening is not an "issne once tried a]d determined." There
has never been a trial upon that point prior to the present contest, nor did the
Department in the former contest decide that Lutz was not disqualified. The quali-
fications of.Lutz were not in issue in the former contest, and the fact that the
Department declined upon good and sufficient grounds to remand the case in order
that testimony might be taken upon that point is no bar to a subsequent contest in
which that issue is properly raised.
- The motion for rehearing alleging disqualification of the contestant
on account of his going upon the land on December 19, was common
to both cases. The qualifications of Lutz were not questioned at all
at the hearing in the first contest. Gillen's qualifications, however,
were made the subject of inquiry at the hearing in the Beebe contest,
but that inquiry was confined to the legal effect of his entering upon
the land on December 20, and prior to 9 a. m. thereof. The difference
in the two cases is not such as to prevent the application to this case
of the ruling in Billiard v. Lutz. The most that can be said of either
case is that in the first contest the disqualification of the contestant if
known and proved by the contestee, would have defeated the contest.
Since settlement by one prohibited or disqualified from acquiring any
right or title to the land is unavailing and confers no right of entry
upon such settler, it follows that where the sole ground of a contest is
the prior settlement of the contestant his disqualification may be suc-
cessfully interposed as a defense to the contest; but if the contestee
admits the qualifications of the contestant or fails to take issue thereon,
the government and third parties are not thereby precluded from
asserting such disqualification. The rule of res j'udicata, as applied in
the Department, does not, as against the government and third parties,
place matters which might have been tried and determined upon the
same footing with those which have been tried and determined. It
results that the question of Gillen's disqualification by reason of having
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entered upon water reserve lands on December 19, was not tried and
determined in the case of Beebe v. Gillen, and the decision therein did
not preclude at rial and determination of that question in this case.
It is urged by both parties that one Secretary of the Interior is
without jurisdiction or authority to review and reverse, upon the same
record, a decision of a preceding Secretary, the contestant insisting
that the decision of April 2, 1896, by Secretary Smith, was not subject
to review and reversal by Secretary Francis, and the contestee main-
taining that the decision of December 15, 1896, by Secretary Francis is
not subject to review and reversal by the present Secretary. If it is
literally true that a ruling by one Secretary can not be reviewed and
reversed, upon the same record, by a succeeding Secretary, then the
decision of Secretary Smith is now the decision of the Department in
this case, and the decision by Secretary Francis is void because with-
out jurisdiction or authority. The record at the time of the decision by
Secretary Smith is the record now; there have been no changes. To
avoid the application of this contention to the decision by Secretary
Smith, contestee calls attention to the fact that a motion for review
thereof was seasonably filed by him, and refers to the Rules of Prac-
tice, wherein provision is made for the filing of such motions. The
authority of the Secretary of the Interior is fixed by law and not by
rules of practice of his own or his predecessor's making. This authority
is conferred for the public good and its exercise is a duty pertaining to
his official station. Any act of his would be impotent to either divest
him of that power or to relieve him of that duty. The rules adopted
and promulgated from time to time are intended to regulate and pro-
vide for the orderly transaction and dispatch of the public business by
law placed under his direction and supervision, and do not attempt to
surrender any lawful authority or to avoid any official duty. This is
plainly recognized by the rules now in force, which, as a matter of pre-
caution rather than of necessity, contain the following express reser-
vation in the order for their promulgation, viz.:
None of said rules shall be construed to deprive the Secretary of the Interior of
the exercise of the directory and supervisory powers conferred upon him by law.
The Revised Statutes of the United States contain the following
provisions:
Sec. 441. The Secretary of the Interior is charged with the supervision of public
business relating to the following subjects:
* * * * *.*
Second, The public lands, including mines.
* * * * * **
Sec. 453. The Commissioner of the General Land Office shall perform, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, all executive duties appertaining to the
surveying and sale of the public lands of the United States, or in anywise respecting
such public lands, and, also, such as relate to private claims of land, and the issuing
of patents for all agents [grants] of land unde- the authority of the government.
* * **x **
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Sec. 2478. The Commissioner of the General Land Office, nnder the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior, is authorized to enforce and carry into execution, by
appropriate regulations, every part of the provisions of this title [public lands]
not otherwise specially provided for.
In Knight v. United States Land Association (142 U. S., 161, 177,178,
181), in construing these sections and discussing the jurisdiction and
power of the Secretary or the Interior over proceedings for the dispo-
sition of public lands, the court said:
The phrase, 'nder the direction of the Secretary of the Interior,' as used in these
sections of the statutes, is not meaningless, but was intended as an expression in
general terms of the power of the Secretary to supervise and control the extensive
operations of the Land Department of which he is the head. It means that, in the
important matters relating to the sale and disposition of the public doInain, the sur-
veying of private land claims and the issuing of patents thereon, and the adiiois-
tration of the trusts devolving upon the government, by reason of the laws of Con-
gress or under treaty stipulations, respecting the public domain, the Secretary of
the Interior is the supervising agent of the government to do justice to all claimants
and preserve the rights of the people of the United States.
The rules prescribed are designed to facilitate the department in the dispatch of
business, not to defeat the supervision of the Secretary. For example, if, when a
patent is about to issue, the Secretary should discover a fatal defect in the proceed-
ings, or that by reason of some newly ascertained fact the patent, if issued, would
have to be annulled, and that it would be his duty to ask the Attorney-General to
institute proceedings for its annulment, it would hardly be seriously contended that
the Secretary might not interfere and prevent the executioi of the patent. He could
not be obliged to sit quietly and allow a proceeding to be consummated which it
would be immediately his duty to ask the Attorniey-General to take measures to.
annul.
The Secretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the public
lands. The obligations of his oath of office oblige him to see that the law, is carried
out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a party not
entitled to it. He represents the government which is a party in interest in every
case involving the survey and disposal of the public lands.
In United States v. Schurz (102 U. S., 378, 402), the court, in referring
to the authority of the officers of the land department, held:
From the very nature of the functions performed by these officers, and from the
fact that a transfer of the title from the United States to another owner follows
their favorable action, it must result that at some stage or other of the proceedings
their authority in the matter ceases.
It is equally clear that this period is, at the latest, precisely when the last act in
the series essential to the transfer of title has been performed. Whenever this takes
place, the land has ceased to be the land of the government; or, to speak in tech-
nical language, the legal title has passed from the govermuent, and the power of
these officers to deal with it has also passed away.
In New Orleans v. Paine (147 U. S., 261, 266), in discussing the same
subject, the court says:
Until the matter is closed by final action, the proceedings of an officer of a depart-
ment are as much open to review or reversal by himself, or his successor, as are the
interlocutory decrees of a court open to review upon the final hearing.
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In Michigan Land and Lumber Co. i. Rust (168 U. S.,-), the supreme
court in again passing upon the jurisdiction of the Department, said:
It is, of course, not pretended that when an equitable title has passed the land
department has power to arbitrarily destroy that equitable title. It has jurisdic-
tion, however, after proper notice to the party claiming such equitable title, and
upon a hearing, to determine the question whether or not such title has passed.
(Cornelius . Kessel, 128 U.S., 456; Orchard v. Alexander, 157U.S., 372,383; Parsons
v. Venzke, 1614.U. S., 89.) In other words, the power of the department to inquire
into the extent and validity of the rights claimed against the government does not
cease until the legal title has passed.
A consideration of these decisions interpreting the statutes defining
the authority and duties of the officers of the laud department, clearly
demonstrates that so long as the legal title remains in the government
the lands are public within the leaning of those statutes and the
laws under which such lands are claimed, or are being acquired, are in
process of administration under the supervision and direction of the
Secretary of the Interior.
The legal title to the land embraced in illen's homestead entry
remains in the United States, and Gillen, upon due notice and after a
full hearing, is shown to be prohibited from acquiring title thereto. If
this entry remains intact and a patent is issued thereon, a direct viola-
tion of a plain provision of the land laws will receive official sanction
and approval, the rights of the people of the United States will not be
preserved, and a proceeding fatally defective will be consummated by
the passing of the government title to one expressly prohibited from
acquiring it. Jurisdiction and authority to apply the law to these facts
and prevent this unlawful acquisition of public lands certainly exists
somewhere, and if so it is possessed by the courts or the land depart-
ment. That the courts are without sch jurisdiction while the legal
title is in the United States is fully shown in United States v. Schurz
sujira, where at page 395 the court says:
The constitution of the United States declares that Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and
other property belonging to the United States. Under this provision the sale of the
public lands was placed by statute under the controlbof the Secretary of the Interior.
To aid him in the performance of this duty, a bureau was created, at the head of
which is the Conmissioner of the Ceneral Land-Office, with many subordinates.
To them, as a special tribunal, Congress confided the execution of the laws which
regulate the surveying, the selling, and the general care of these lands.
Congress has also enacted a system of laws by which rights to these lands may be
acquired, and the title of the government conveyed to the citizen. This court has
with a stfong hand upheld the doctrine that so long as the legal title to these lands
remained in the United States, and the proceedings for acquiring it were as yet
in fiei, the courts, would not interfere to control the exercise of the power thus
vested in that tribunal. To that doctrine we still adhere.
The holding thus announced has been frequently repeated by the
supreme court and is too well established to admit of any question.
A suit by the United States against this entryman to recover the
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legal title to this land can not now be maintained because the govern-
ment can not recover a title which it has not lost, and because the
entryman can not be compelled to restore a title which he does not
possess. A suit by the United States to determine whether the entry-
man has acquired an equitable title would be equally unsuccessful for
the reason that the authority of the land department over proceedings
to acquire title to public lands is exclusive and that authority extends
to determining whether or not an equitable title has passed and con-
tinues until the government has parted with the legal title. (United
States v. Schurz, spra, and Michigan Land & Lumber (o. v. Rust,
supra.)
If the contention under consideration is sound, it follows that during
the period intervening between the decision of Secretary Smith or
Secretary Francis and the issuance of patent, there is a hiatus during
which jurisdiction does not exist anywhere; and that the land depart-
ment must knowingly issue a patent to a disqualified entryman as a
condition precedent to any proceeding to declare him disqualified and
not entitled to such patent. It is not believed that a contention which
leads to such an anomalous and unreasonable result finds support in
either statutes or judicial decisions. There is no claim that the conten-
tion finds support in any statutory provision, and the only judicial
decisions cited in support thereof (United States v. Stone, 2 Wall., 525;
Mullen v. United States, 118 U. S., 271; Noble v. Union River Logging
Co., 147 U. S., 165) are cases in which, after the legal title had passed
from the government the Secretary of the Interior, erroneously assuming
that the land was still within thejurisdiction of the land department,
attempted to revoke the patent or other instrument of conveyance. It
was held that this was a judicial act and required the judgment of a
court. This would have equally followed if there had been no change
of secretary, (Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S., 530) and it is not in coniet
with the ruling in the other cases to which reference has been made.
The true rule drawn from an examination of all of the authorities is
that the jurisdiction of the land department ceases where the jurisdic-
tion of the courts commence, viz: when the legal title passes, and that
there is no hiatus between the termination of the one and the beginning
of the other. Under this rule the land will always be within a juris-
diction which can administer the law and protect both public and
private rights.
The office of the Secretary of the Interior is a continuing one. Its
incumbents come and go but the office remains. The powers and duties
of the office are impersonal, and operate uniformly at all times and
upon all controversies without reference to who may be exercising those
powers or performing those duties. A change in the person holding
the office does not authorize, and should not invite, a review or reversal
of prior rulings or decisions; and neither does such change prevent or
defeat a review or reversal in any instance where the Secretary making
the ruling or rendering the decision, if still in office, would be in duty
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bound to review and reverse his own. act. Administrative reasons as
well as the principles of common justice require that a secretary should
not disturb or reverse prior rulings or decisions, except where it ig
affirmatively shown that manifest injustice has been done or the law
clearly misapplied; but this is equally true of his own rulings and
decisions, and is not limited to those of his predecessor.
So long as the legal title remains in the government the Secretary of
the Interior, whoever he may be, is charged with the duty of seeing
that the land is disposed of only according to law. The issuance of a
patent is the final act and decision in that disposition and with it and
not before does the supervisory power and duty of the Secretary cease.
The departmental decision of December 15, 1896, herein is recalled
and vacated, and the former departmental decision of April 22, 1896,
affirming your office decision of April 3, 1895, is adhered to, subject to
the following modification:
By the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140), a contestant procuring the
cancellation of a homestead entry is given a preference right of entry
of the land thereby relieved from entry, but this statute is to be con-
strued and administered in harmony with others relating to the dis-
posal of the public lands and can not be held to confer such preference
right upon one who is by another act prohibited and disqualified from
making entry of such land. Here it appears by the testimony of the
contestant, Parcher, that he, like Gillen, entered upon these water
reserve lands December 19th, during the prohibited period for the pur-
pose of selecting a tract for entry and gaining an advantage over others
in the settlement and entry thereof. Using the language of the stat-
ute, it follows that he "shall never be permitted to enter any of said
lands or acquire any title thereto." Being prohibited from making
entry he is equally excluded from the preference right-of entry, other-
wise given to successful contestants.
Gillen's entry is hereby canceled, Parcher is denied any preference
right, and the land will be held subject to entry by the first qualified
applicant.
Prepared and approved by
WILLIS VAN DEVANTER,
Assistant Attorney General.
RAILROAD GRANT-RESERVATION-INDIAN LANDS.
NORMIERN PACIFIC R. EI. O. . MACLAY.
Lands in the Bitter Root valley above the Loo-Lo Fork, included in the reservation
made by the treaty of 1855, and surveyed under section 2, act-of June 5, 1872,
are excepted from the grant to the Northern Pacific.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (J. L. M'C.)
Your office, on August 30, 1893, refldered a decision in the case of
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Samuel Maclay, ivolving
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the N. of the NE. and the N. of NW. of Sec. 11, T. 11 N., R. 20 W.,
Missoula land district, Montana.
- The land described is situated in the valley of the Bitter Root river,
above the Loo-lo Fork. Said decision held Maclay's pre-emption entry
for approval, and rejected the claim of the railroad company.
On June 17, 1895, the Department affirmed said decision of your
office.
On June 29, 1895, counsel for the railroad company filed a motion for
review, which your office transmitted by letter of July 3,1895.
The principal ground of said motion for review was tat the ques-
tion of the right of the company to lands thus sibuated being" then
"before the United States supreme court for determination in the case
of the company v. Maclay, No. 762, it was error to decide the same
before the court rendered its decision."
The case was brought before the United States supreme court from
the circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit. The latter court held that
the tract i controversy, and others similarly situated (in the Bitter
Root valley, above the Loo-lo Fork), were not granted to the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company. (See 61 Federal Reporter, 554).
Action upon said motion for review has been suspended by, the
Department pending a decision by the supreme court in said case.
The Department is now in receipt of a communication from counsel
for the ompany, in which they state that said company have deter-
nined to withdraw their appeal to the United States supreme court in
the laclay case; and they suggest that it will not be necessary longer
to continue the suspension of said Bitter Root valley cases. In fact, it
is within the knowledge of the Department that said appeal has actu-
ally been withdrawn.
The land here in controversy is within the lands surveyed under the
second section of the act of June 5, 1872 (17 Stat., 226-7), and is a part
of the reservation nade by the treaty of 1855-being in "the Bitter-
Root valley above the Loo-lo fork"-and is therefore excepted from the
grant to the railroad company. (61 Fed. Rep., 554.) The railroad com-
pany has now abandoned all claim to lands embraced within the survey
under the act of 1872, supra, and any suspension heretofore existing of
lands within that survey is withdrawnl.
No reason appears why the departmental decision (of June 17, 1895,)
heretofore rendered should be disturbed.
The motion for review is therefore denied.
INDIAN LANDS-LEASE-ACT OF .JUNE 7, 1897.
RED CLIFF RESERVATION.
Under a patent for Indian lands that contains a provision, authorized by treaty,
that the lands so conveyed shall not be alienated or leased without the consent
of the President, a lease is ineffective until approved by the President.
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The provisions of the act of June 7, 1897, relative to leases of Idian lands, are
applicable only to allotments made under the act of February 8, 1887, or other
acts of Congress, where the title in fee has not passed to the allottee, and do
not include a lease executed by the heirs of an Idian patentee to whom title
has passed in accordance with treaty provisions.
Assistant Attorney- General Than Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
January 17, 1898. (H. G.)
Your reference of January 6,1898, of the letter of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, bearing date January 4, 1898 (Land 52463-1897,
52693-1897), for an opinion upon the questions therein submitted, has
been un(ler consideration, and I have the honor to present herewith my
views thereon.
It appears from this communication that, uinder departmental author-
ity, sealed proposals were invited for the purchase of all the merchant-
able timber upon the Red Cliff Indian reservation, in Bayfield county,
Wisconsin, to the extent, approximately, of one hundred million feet.
The successful bidder was required to erect a mill within the limits of
such reservation, of suitable capacity for the manufacture of not less
than ten million feet of lumber annually, of timber to be purchased
from the allottees or patentees thereon, and it seems, therefore, that
the duration of the contract might extend to the period of ten years.
In the bid of Mr. Frederick L. Gilbert, which was accepted by the
Department on September 23, 1897, there was a condition that the gov-
ernment shall furnish him with a mill site on the reservation, free of
cost, and in the official report of that date, submitting such bid for the
consideration of the Department, it was indicated that this condition
could not be complied with, as the reservation land, with the exception
of a very small tract, had been allotted in severalty or patented to the
Indians, but the acting agent at the La Pointe Agency had advised
the office of Indian Affairs that the Indians of the reservation would
willingly furnish a mill site thereon, and that there would be no diffi-
culty in that respect. Thereafter, and on October 25, 1897. a lease
was executed by and between Mr. Gilbert and the heirs of Henry Buf-
falo, a Chippewa Indian, deceased, for lot 2 of section 31, in township
51 north, of range 3 west, on the Red Cliff reservation, Wisconsin,
containing 61.58 acres, for-the term of ten years from the date thereof,
at an annual rental of two hundred dollars, payable annually in
advance. It has since been determined by the Red Cliff Indian busi-
ness committee that the lessors are the only heirs of the decedent pat-
entee for said lands.
The lease provides that it shall be valid and binding only after the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs states that in view of the situa-
tion and the necessities of the case, he is of the opinion that the inter-
ests of the Chippewa Indians of the Red Cliff reservation would be
subserved by the approval of the lease, and that the rental of the
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demised premises, at two hundred dollars per annum, which is some-
thing over three dollars per acre, appears to be adequate and beneficial
to the lessors.
He also suggests that the lease should be approved by the Secretary
of the Interior, as it so provides in terms, and also by the President,
as required by the treaty and prescribed by the patent.
The allotments or assignments to the Red Cliff Indians were patented
under the third article of the treaty with the Chippewa Indians, con-
cluded on September 30, 1854 (10 Stat., 1109), which authorizes the
President, from time to time, at his discretion, to cause the whole or
any part of the reservation, set apart by the treaty, to be surveyed,
and to assign to each head of a family, or single person over twenty-
one years, eighty acres of land for his "or their" separate use, and in
his discretion, as fast as the occupants of the reservations become
capable of transacting their own affairs, to issue patents therefor to
such occupants "with such restrictions of the power of alienation as
he may see fit to impose."
The patents issued in conformity with this stipulation of the treaty,
the form of which is submitted in the letter of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, convey the title in fee simple of the allotted portions
of the reservation to the several allottees and patentees, subject to the
stipulation that the patentees and their heirs shall not sell, lease or in
any manner alienate the tracts allotted and patented to them without
the consent of the President of the United States.
The lease is ineffective without the consent of the President, as his.
approval is a condition precedent to its validity, under the reservation
in the patent, which is expressly authorized by the terms of the treaty.
It should be submitted to him, with your approval thereon endorsed, if
you should determine that such recommendation should be made.
The lessee desires an authoritative ruling of this Department upon
the validity of the term of the lease, which is ten years, in view of recent
legislation of Congress as embodied in the Indian appropriation act,
approved June 7, 1897 (30 Stat., 85), wherein it is provided that
whenever it shall be made to appear to the Secretary of the Interior that by reason
of age or disability any allottee of Indian lands under this or former acts of Con-
gress can not personally and with benefit to himself occupy or improve his allotment
or any part thereof the same may be leased, in the discretion of the Secretary, upon
such terms, regulations and conditions as shall be prescribed by him, for a term not
exceeding three years for farming and grazing purposes, or five years for mining or
business purposes.
The Commissioner intimates that this provision does not apply to the
lease submitted in his communication, as the allotments were made to
the Indians on the Red Cliff reservation, and patents issued therefor in
fee, under the terms of the third article of the treaty with the Indians
of such reservation, prior to the legislation on the subject of leasing
lands allotted in severalty to reservation or tribal Indians and that the
sole proviso or condition in such patents is that none of the land shall
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be sold, leased or in any manner alienated without the consent of the
President.
It is clear that the lease does not fall within the provisions of this
act. The legislation has reference to allotments, made under the act of
February 8, 1887 (24 Stat.,.388), or other acts of Congress, where the
title in fee has not passed to the allottees and does not embrace cases
like the one at bar, where the title in fee has passed from the United
States to the allottee.
The term of a lease permitted under the act of June 7, 1897, for busi-
ness purposes, can not exceed five years, and this limitation as to the
term of the lease is not the only limitation, as the Indian lessor must
be one who by reason of age or disability can not personally and with*
benefit to himself occupy or improve his allotment or any part thereof.
If this statute operates in a case like the one now under consideration,
the lease would be subject to attack, not only because the term of the
lease extends beyond the statutory limitation of five years, but for the
further reason that there is no showing that the lessors are, on account
of age or disability, unable to successfully occupy or improve the allot-
ment of their ancestor.
But the statute does not apply to the case at bar. The Indian lessors
are not allottees or heirs of an allottee. They are not occupying the
position of heirs of an "allottee of Indian lands" under any act of
Congress, but are heirs of a patentee, whose patent was issued not by
authority of an act of Congress, but pursuant to the terms of a treaty.
The provisions of such treaty have not been abrogated by the act of
Congress referred to, nor by any act of Congress. The statute men-
tioned-that of June 7, 1897 (30 Stat., 85)-is a reiteration of the policy
of Congress relating to leases of Indian allotments in severalty, and
its language is similar to antecedent legislation enacted as supplemen-
tary to the act of February 8, 1887, allotting lands in severalty to cer-
tain reservation Indians (24 Stat., 388; 28 Stat., 304, 900; 29 Stat., 340).
It had reference to allotments where the title remains in the United
States in trust for the Indians, for the statutory period, or for sch
additional period as the President may, by virtue of an allotment stat-
ute, impose; it has no application to a lease like the one submitted,
executed by the heirs of an Indian patentee to whom the title has
passed from the United States by a patent issued under the solemn
provisions of a treaty.
The prohibition-of alienation, under the terms of the treaty, is one
which the President has seen " fit to impose," using the language of
the treaty, and is expressed in the patents which convey the title in
fee, issued to the Chippewa Indians residing on the Red Cliff Indian
reservation, and who are those with whom the treaty was made and
whose rights are secured thereby. It inhibits the Indian patentee from
selling, leasing, or in any manner alienating his lands without the con-
sent of the President. While this is a provision in restraint of aliena-
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tion it necessarily implies that the patentee has the power to sell, lease,
and convey the lands patented with the consent of the President.
I have, therefore, to advise that, in my opinion, the lease submitted
will be valid upon the approval of the President. The lease is also by
its own terms conditioned upon your approval.
If it receives the joint approval of the President and of the Secretary
of. the Interior, it will, in my opinion, be valid.
Approved January 17, 1898,
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
JA KSON ET AL. . GARRETT.
Motion for rehearing denied by Secretary Bliss, January 17, 1898.
See 25 L. D., 273.
RAILROAD GRANT-NDEMNITY-FORFEITED LANDS.
UNION OIL CO-MPANY.
The order of November 22, 1897, suspending action relative to the right of the South
er Pacific Company to make indemnity selections within the forfeited primary
limits of the Atlantic and Pacific grant, revoked, and directions given with respect
to the disposition of lands in said limits.
Secretary Bliss to the Coinmissioner of the General Land Offlce, January
(W. V. D.) 18, 1898. (F. W. C.)
November 22, 1897, the Department, on the application of the South-
ern Pacific Railroad Company, issued an order (25 L. D., 393), directing
your office to suspend action upon that part of departmental decision of
November 6, 1897, on review (25 L. D., 351), relating to the question of
the right of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to make indemnity
selections within the forfeited primary limits of the Atlantic and Pacific
grant. The purpose of this order of suspension was to withhold action
upon that particular portion of said departmental decision of Novem-
ber 6, 1897, during the pendency, in the supreme court, of proceedings
to obtain a rehearing and reconsideration of a prior decision therein,
upon which the departmental decision now in question was based.
Since the issuance of said order of suspension the Southern Pacific
Railroad Company has presented to the supreme court its petition for
rehearing in the case named and that petition has been considered and
denied, so that the decision of the court cited in the departmental
decision has now become final. The said order of suspension of No-
veinber 22, 1897, is hereby revoked and the application of the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company, which was therein treated as a motion for
re-review, is hereby denied.
In so far as departmental letter of November 8, 1893, in answer to
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your office letter of October 25, 1893, operated to defer the opening to
entry of the lands embraced in what was then known as suit No. 184
(which is the one recently decided in the supreme court, as hereinbefore
stated) it is hereby recalled, and you will proceed as theretofore directed
in departmental letter of July 15, 1893, relating to these lands.
SECOND CONTEST-RES JUDICATA-JURSD1CTION.
SEIXAS v. GLAZIER.
A second contest, or second hearing on the same charge is rarely permitted, but the
mere fact that a charge against an entry has formed the basis of a contest, which
failed for want of sufficient proof, will not, in itself, preclude the Land Depart-
ment from further consideration of the same matter, if the legal title to the
land still remains in the government, and it is made to clearly appear that
adherence to the former finding, or decision, will lead to the patenting of public
land in violation of express provisions of law.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, Ja'nuary
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. . (W. A. E.)
The Department is in receipt of your office letter of May 11, 1897,
returning, with evidence of service, the motion for review, entertained
April 24, 1897, of departmental decision of January 30, 1897, in the
case of Florian Seixas v. Henry E. Glazier, involving the NW. i of See.
11, T. 19 N., R. 2 W., Guthrie, Oklahoma, land district.
The history of the case, briefly stated, is as follows:
On May 3, 1889, Glazier filed soldier's declaratory statement for the
above described tract, upon which he made homestead entry on Octo-
ber 2, 1889.
; On August 3, 1891, Seixas filed affidavit of contest alleging that
Glazier had made said entry for and in behalf of the Cherokee Land
and Investment Company, and for-its use and benefit; and that the
entryman has never established his residence upon said tract.
A hearing was duly had and resulted in a decision by the local
officers in favor of the defendant.
On appeal, your office affirmed the action of the register and receiver,
and on further appeal the Department on July 2, 1894, affirmed the
decision of your office and dismissed the contest.
On May 27, 1895, Glazier, after due publication, submitted final
proof in support of his entry; and on the same day Seixas filed a pro-
test against the acceptance of said proof, alleging that
the said Henry E. Glazier entered said land as a homestead for the use and benefit
of the Cherokee Land and Investment Company, of which said Glazier was the
President, and that the improvements made by said Henry E. Glazier, or caused to
be made by him, or pretended to be made by him, were in fact made or caused to be
made by the said Cherokee Land and Investment Company for their use and benefit.
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With this protest Seixas filed certain papers as follows: 
First, an alleged copy of a contract, entered into on the first day of
August, 1889, between twelve persons therein named, of whom Henry
E. Glazier was one, associating themselves together into a company for
the purpose of locating and building a town or city in Oklahoma, to be
known as Cherokee City. Three tracts are named as part of the capi-
tal of said company, the tract in controversy being one. Henry E.
Glazier is named as president of the company for the first six months
after its organization.
Second, an alleged copy of a report made to the members of the com-
pany by (lazier, on January 24, 1890, in which he details the work
done and expenditures made on behalf of the company, upon the tract
in controversy, as well as upon the other tracts.
Seixas further alleged in an affidavit attached to his protest that
during the trial of his contest against Glazier's entry he used every
effort to prove the existence of the coiitract above referred to, but through
perjury and misrepresentation, the said Henry E. Glazier succeeded in
producing a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary; that afflant
is informed and has good reason to believe that during the month of
January, 1894, his attorneys succeeded in procuring a copy of said con-
tract, and of a report, which copies are attached to his protest and
made a part thereof; that he believes he can produce the original report.
- The local officers refused to reopen the question as to whether Glazier
had made this entry for his own use and benefit, or for the use and ben-
efit of the Cherokee Land and Investment Company, on the ground that
that matter had been adjudicated and determined by final decision of
the Department. Seixas was, however, permitted to cross-examine the
entrymau and his witnesses on the questions of residence, improve-
ments, etc.
On June 26, 1895, the local officers dismissed the protest and approved
the final proof, whereupon Seixas appealed to your office, which, by
letter of April 18, 1896, affirmed the action of the register and receiver.,
On further appeal, the Department, on January 30,1897, affirmed
the action of your office, on the ground that the question attempted to
be raised by the protestant is resjudicata.
Motion for review of said departmental decision was filed and enter-
tained, as above stated, and is now here for consideration.
On June 25, 1897, subsequent to the filing of the motion for review,
the attorneys for Seixas forwarded to the Department what purports
to be the originalreport made by Glazier to the members of the com-
pany on January 24, 1890. The. identity of this report is sworn to.
That part of the report material to the present inquiry reads as
-follows:
I have the honor to sublmit this-my report as president of your syndicate showing
briefly the aotion and disposition of your natters entrusted tomy care.
I have further to report that I have expended the following sumsin. improving the
north west quarter Sect. 19-12-2 W., filed on by the writer.
DECISIONS RELATING TO TE PUBLIC LANDS. 51
Filing fee -------------. $16.00
To quiet title2 -5.-----------------------------------..-.--. 00
To breaking out 46 acres ..---------- .-- 95. 00
Breaking out fire guards. Protecting timber-. .....------ ................. 5. 00
Paid for fence posts ----------------------------- 13.00
Foundation for house - --------- I------- -----------. - : 12. 00
Paid for fence wire and staples - .(.... '4.25
Lumber, windows, doors for house - ... 79. 50
Labor on house - . . 29.70Hardware for house-.- - -3.75
Setting posts and stretching wire --..---. 8. 00
Flue for house .......................-................... ---...-..- 6.50
Paid for surveying, board, &c ............................................ 95. 00
Cost me 20.00 for transportation for my daughter in supporting homestead
claim .0............ ................................................... 22 50
$485.20
These figures does not include anything for my own time and services. I have
spent eight months time performing-all kinds of labor necessary for the interests of
the company and by so doing neglected my own business, sacrificing and losing not
less than $2000, but as this is not a matter of charge, I will only add that in all ages
and countries the laborer is worthy of his hire. My services were reasonably worth
for the nine months $900.00.
To this I have also lost my further right to use my homestead entry and advantage
of service in the army, which is worth several hundred dollars. You will readily
see that I have met all expenditures, including board bills, surveying, and in pro-
tecting interests of company. The North West Quarter 11-19-2 W., on which I have
filed, ought to be reasonably worth $3000.00 or will be worth that without much
more additional expense, and will increase in value yearly.
The record in the original contest between Seixas and Glazier has
been called for and examined for the purpose of throwing light on the
present protest and enabling the Department to arrive at a satisfactory
conclusion.
It appears that at the original hearing the attorneys for Seixas intro-
duced the contract above referred to, and that the same was identified
by Glazier as well as by other members of the company. The attorneys
then asked that the contract be copied into the record, which was
done. The original, that is, the paper identified by Glazier and others,
is not found with the record, and was apparently not filed, the attor-
neys for Seixas seemingly relying solely on the copy introduced into
the record. In this contract three tracts are named as part of the
capital of the company, the tract in controversy being one. The secre-
tary of the company, testifies that he wrote in the description of. this
tract as Glazier bad agreed to put it in, and it was generally understood
among the members of the company that said tract was to be included.
Glazier admits having signed the contract, and says it was the under-
standing that the Reed brothers should furnish two quarter sections,
and Black (the vice president) and himself should furnish one quarter
section. He denies, however, that it was ever his intention to put in
the tract for which he had made homestead entry, or that he authorized
the secretary or any one else to write the description of said tract in
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the contract. Asked what tract he and Black intended to put in, he
replied: " e were not decided on which section we would put in."
Afterwards he testified that he had a idea of putting in the SW. of
Sec. 2, T. 19 N., R. 2 W., if he could have found some one to file on it.
The report alleged to have been made by Glazier to the members of
the company on January 24, 1890, was not introduced in evidence at
the original hearing, but -was referred to incidentally by several of the
witnesses. On cross-examination Glazier was asked: "Will ask you,
Mr. Glazier, whether in any report to the St. Joe members of this com-
pany you referred to this land in dispute as company land? l His reply
was: "I did not."
In the case of Moores v. Sommer (on review, 23 L. D., 514), it Was
held that (syllabus):-
The doctrine of es jucdicata, as between the parties to a controversy, will not
prevent the government from canceling an entry where it is apparent that it can not
be perfected without perjury on the part of the entryman.
As before stated, Glazier's declaratory statement was filed May 3,
1889, and his homestead entry made October 2, 1889. The contract
between him and others associating themselves into the Cherokee Land
and Investment Company was executed in August, 1889. The written
report by Glazier to that company which apparently acknowledges that
the land here in question is being acquired by him for that company,
and which apparently charges the company with all the expenses inci-
'dent to the entry and improvement of the land, is dated January 24,
1890, and Glazier's final proof was submitted May 27, 1895.
Section 2290, Rev. Stat., as in force when his homestead entry was
made, provides that Ol an application to make homestead entry the
applicant shall make affidavit:
That snch application is made for his exclusive use and benefit and that his entry
is made for the purpose of actual settlement and cultivation and not either directly
or indirectly for the use or benefit of any other person;
and section 2291, R1ev. Stat., provides that the entryman, as a part of his
final proof, shall make, affidavit-" That no part of such land has been
alienated except as provided in Section 2288." The section to which
reference is made has application only to alienation for church, cemetery,
school, and right-of-way purposes and is without application here. If
Glazier made this entry not for his exclusive use and benefit . .. .
for the purpose of actual settlement and cultivation" but " either directly
or indirectly for the use or benefit of any other person," or if at the time
of submitting his final proof he had alienated the land for purposes
other than those specified in section 2288, his entry was thereby ren-
dered unlawful and was one respecting which "it is apparent that it
could not be perfected without perjury on the part of the entryman.'-
While the necessity for promptly and finally determining controver-
sies arising in the disposal of the public lands is keenly recognized,
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and while a second contest, or second hearing, upon the same charge
is rarely permitted, the mere fact that a charge against an entry has
formed theibasis- of a contest which failed for want of sufficient proof
will not of its itself preclude the land department from further consid-
eration of the same matter, if, while the legal title remains in the
United States, it is made to clearly appear that adherence to the for-
mer finding or decision will lead to the patenting of public land in vio-
lation of express provisions of law. While the government retains
the legal title the land laws are in process of administration and the
jurisdiction and authority of the land departmentcontinues. In Michi-
gan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust (168 U. S., -), the supreme court in
discussing the jurisdiction of the Department, said:
It is, of course, not pretended that when an equitable title has passed the Land
Department has power to arbitrarily destroy that equitable title. It has jurisdic-
tion, however, after proper notice to the party claiming such equitable title, and
upon a hearing, to determine the question whether or not such title has passed.
(Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U. S., 456; Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S., 372-383; Par-
sons v. Venzke, 164 U. S., 89.) In other words, the power of the department to
inquire into the extent and validity of the rights claimed against the goverimient
does not cease until the legal title has passed.
In Knight v. United States Land Association (142 U. S., 161, 178), in
discussing the jurisdiction and power of the Secretary of the Interior
over proceedings for the disposition of public lands, the court said:
For example, if, when a patent is about to issue, the Secretary should discover a
fatal defect in the proceedings, or that by reason of some newly ascertained fact
the patent, if issued, would have to be annulled, ad that it would be his duty to
ask the Attorney-General to institute proceedings for its annulment, it wtould
hardly be seriously contended that the Secretary might not interfere and prevent
the execution of the patent. He could not be obliged to sit quietly and allow a
proceeding to be consummated which it would e immediately his duty to ask the
Attorney-General to take measures to annul,
and on page 181, the court farther says:
The Seeretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the public
lands. The obligations of his oath of office obliges him to see that the law is carried
out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a party not
entitled to it. He represents the government which is a party in interest in every
-ease involving the survey and disposal of the public lands.
The departmental decision of January,30, 1897, is therefore set aside
and you are directed to instruct the local officers to appoint a day for
a further hearing upon the question presented by the protest. Due
notice should be given to both Glazier and the protestant and you will
cause a special agent to be present to represent the government. The
case will then be adjudicated in the light of the evidence heretofore
taken and of that submitted at this new hearing.
.
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- PRACTICE-APPEAL-APPLICATIOW TO ENTEPh-ORLAHOMA.
WALK v. BEATY.
Under a rule to show cause why an entry should not be canceled the entryman
may either comply with the order, or stand on the record and appeal to the
Department.
The failure to file a "non-sooner " affidavit, with a soldier's declaratory statement,
may be subsequently remedied, even though an intervening adverse claim to the
land may be asserted.
The case of Lawsou H. Lemmons, 19 L. D., 37, cited and distinguished.
Secretar Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Oce, January
(W. V. D.) 18, 1898. (G-. B. G.)
The defendant, William W. Beaty, in the case of Leffie Walk v.
said Beaty, has appealed from your office decisions of March 6th and
July 23, 1896, "awarding preference right in the SW. 1 Sec. 14, T. 13
N., R. 3 E., to Walk."
The above described land is within the Oklahoma land district and
in what was the Kickapoo Indian reservation, which laids were thrown
open to settlement and entry on May 23, 1895.
On that day the soldier's declaratory statement of William W.
Beaty was filed for said land.
On August 8, 1895, Leffie Walk filed a homestead application for the
land, which was rejected by the local officers on that day for the reason
that Walk had entered the Kickapoo Indian reservation subsequent to
the passage of the act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 557), and for conflict
with the soldier's declaratory statement of the said Beaty.
On August 14, 1895, Walk appealed to your office, and with his said
appeal filed a protest against the completion of Beaty's soldier's declar-
atory statement. On September 11, 1895, however, Beaty completed
his soldier's declaratory statement by making homestead entry for the
tract.
On March 1, 1896, your office held, in view of the showing made by
Walk, that he was not disqualified because of his presence in the Kicka-
poo country prior to the date of the opening, but stated that this rul-
ing would not be understood as relieving Walk from contest by any
party who could show the facts to be otherwise than alleged by him,
and in view of his allegation of prior settlement the local officers were
directed to order a hearing to determine the respective rights of Walk
and Beaty to the tract in question.
Beaty filed a motion for review of this decision, pending which the
local office was called on for a report on the allegation of Walk that
Beaty's application to file his soldier's declaratory statement was not
accompanied by a "non-sooner affidavit' This report showed that
said soldier's declaratory statement was filed in the local office by John
H. Beaty, as agent for William W. Beaty, and was not accompanied by
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 55
such affidavit, either by the agent or his principal,-it being stated
that the filing "was allowed without non-sooner affidavit by oversight."
Thereupon your office held, on the authority of the case of Lawson
H. ILemmons (19 L. D., 37), that-
Since Beaty's application to file his soldier's declaratory statement was thus
defective when presented, it should have been rejected, and the intervening adverse
claim of Walk would have prevented the perfection thereof.
It was then held that the hearing theretofore ordered was unneces-
sary, and Beaty was advised that he would be allowed thirty days
from noticewithin which to show cause why his entry should not be
canceled and Walk allowed to enter the tract, and that in the event of
his failure to take action within the time specified, his entry would be
held for cancellation.
From this decision Beaty has appealed to the Department.
Counsel for Walk has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as being
an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Commissioner. It is con.-
tended that Beaty should have complied with the order to show cause,
or have waited for the order holding his entry for cancellation and then
appealed from such order. This contention is not sound. Beaty had
the right either to show cause, in compliance with the order of the
Commissioner, or stand on the record and appeal to the Department.
He has chosen the latter course.
The main question presented by the record is, whether Beaty's failure
to file a "non-sooner" affidavit with his soldier's declaratory statement
was fatal to his application in the presence of the intervening claim of
Walk.
The third section of the act of March 3, 1893, supra&, entitled, "An
act to ratify and confirm an agreement with the Kiekapoo Indians in
Oklahoma Territory, etc.," provides, among other things, that-
Until said lands are opened to settlement by proclamation of the President of the
United States, no person shall be permitted to enter upon or occupy any of said
lands; and any person violating this provision shall never be permitted to make
entry of any of said lands or acquire any title thereto.
The President's proclamation opening the Kickapoo lands was made
on May 18, 1895 (20 L. D., 470), and oil that day departmental instruc-
tions in reference thereto were issued, which directed, among other
things, that-
Any person applying to enter or file for a homestead under the provisions of sec-
tion three of the act of March 3, 1893, spr-a, will be required first to make affi-
davit, in addition to other requirements, that he did not violate the law by entering
upon or occupying any portion of said lands prior to the time fixed in the President's
proclamation for legal entrance thereon, the affidavit to accompany your returns for
the entry allowed.
It thus appears that the act opening these lands imposed a disquali-.
fication, for prematurely going thereon, and that the prescribed regula-
tions provided for a declaration, under oath, that the law had not been
56 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
violated. It is clear that such an affidavit should have been filed by
Beaty with his soldier's declaratory statement. It is suggested that
those regulations have no application to a soldier; but this is not
believed to be so. The language of the regulations is, "any person
applying to enter or file for a homestead" shall file such an affidavit.
The word "file" could not relate to anyone except a soldier. No filing
except the declaratory statement filing of a soldier was authorized at
that time for Oklahoma lands.
It is also clear that it was the duty of the local officers to reject the
filing for want of the affidavit required. But inasmuch as. the applica-
tion was not rejected, but allowed and placed of record by these offi-
cers, it is thought that no good reason exists why the defect may not
be supplied, even in the presence of an adverse laimJ. This affidavit
was not a statutory requirement, but a regulation of the Department.
The statute does not disqualify a man because he has failed to make
oath to his qualifications.
The requirement spra of the regulations was a precautionary meas-
ure adopted by the Department under general administrative author-
ity and for the guidance of the local officers in administering the law,
and did not, in itself, impose a disqualification.
So far as appears from the record, Beaty was not disqualified to make
an entry of the land. On September 11, 1895, when he completed his
soldiers' declaratory statement by making homestead entry for the
tract, he filed a "non-sooner" affidavit; and it is thought that the ends
of justice will best be met by treating it as supplying the defect in his
application. It does not follow, nor is it now held, that he was a qual-
ified entryman, but only that the conditions authorizing the filing have
been complied with.
This view is not believed to be in conflict with the decision of the
Department in the Lemmons case, supra, relied on by your office. In
that case, one Daniel D. Williams filed a soldier's declaratory* state-
ment for a tract of land in Oklahoma, which was suspended to allow
him to furnish "proof of his service in the United States Army during
the war." On May 31, 1892, while such suspension still existed, Lem-
mons was permitted to make homestead entry for the same land. On
June 6, 1892, the suspension of the declaratory statement of Williams
was removed by his filing the additional papers, and placed of record,
and on June 24, 1892, he was allowed to complete his filing by making
a homestead entry. On this state of facts the Department, in direct-
ing the cancellation of Williams's entry, said:
The application of Williams being defective when filed, should have been rejected
by the local office, and the entry of Lemmons intervening defeated any right which
Williams might otherwise have acquired by perfecting his defective application.
Section 2304 of the Revised Statutes provides that: 
Every private soldier and officer who has served in the Army of the United States
during the recent rebellion, for ninety days, and who was honorably discharged,
shall be entitled to enter, etc.
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."Service in the United States army during the war," is therefore a
condition on which depends the right of a soldier to make an entry of
public lands under this section, and until proof of that fact has been
offered the soldier can have no legal standing as a claimant before the
Department. There is, as has been seen, no statutory provision which
makes the right of entry of Kickapoo lands dependent on any particu-
lar proof that the law has not been violated by the premature entry
thereon. In the Lemmons case the declaratory statement was sus-
pended for proof requirements, while in the case at bar the declaratory
statement was received by the local officers and placed of record with-
out requiring the "non-sooner" affidavit, and the applicant may have
rested on the assumption that all of the requirements of the law bad
been met.
It is believed that Beaty's rights attached as of the date of the filing
of his declaratory statement. In this view there remains several ques-
tions which can not be decided on the present record.
Your office decision is reversed, and you will order a hearing between
the parties to determine whether the alleged settlement of Walk was
prior to Beaty's filing, and as to the qualifications of both Walk and
Beaty, at which hearing Walk will be permitted to show, if he can
that Beaty is disqualified by reason of his agent's presence in the ter-
ritory during the prohibited period.
PRACTICE-COSTS-RAILROAD GRANT-FILING-SETTLEMENT.
SAVAGE V. CENTRAL PACIFIC U . CO.
In a hearing ordered between a railroad company, and one alleging the land in ques-
: tion to have been excepted from the grant, the costs are properly taxable under
rule 55 of practice.
A declaratory statement filed after the attachment of rights under definite location
is ineffective as against the operation:of a railroad giant.
While a railroad company can not attack a declaratory statement of record on the
ground of the non-citizenship of the claimant, it will be heard on such charge
where acts of settlement are relied upon to defeat the grant.
The Central Pacific Railroad is entitled to the lands opposite the line between Ogden
- and Promontory Summit, and the line of said road, between said points, was
definitely located October 20, 1868.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 187 1898. (0. J. W.)
On December 18, 1893, Herbert Savage filed in the local land office
at Salt Lake City, Utah, his corroborated affidavit, alleging his quali-
fication as ahomestead settler:
That on the 20th day of October, 1868, one Savage and other parties, who were
qualified to enter the same, were in the open, peaceable, exclusive, notorious, and
adverse possession of the same, to all the world except the United States. That at
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said time the said tract was o~cupied, appropriated, interdicted, and reserved lands,
and were not of the character contemplated by the grant to the Central. Pacific
Railroad Company.
He asked that said company's list No. 3 be canceled, and that he be
permitted to obtain title to the land described.
Your office reports:
That Mr. Savage filed D. S. 1786, for the tract, June 14, 1869, alleging settlement
March 4, 1869.
Savage was an alien and did not declare his intention to become a citizen until
March 3 1869.
On the showing made your office directed that a hearing be had, at
which Mr. Savage should be allowed an opportunity to establish his
claim by proof, and it was directed that the status of the land on
October 20, 1868, be ascertained, this being the date of the definite
location of the line of the Central Pacific Railroad. A hearing was
ordered for March 20, 1894. On February 7, 1894, Cora House, a
daughter and one of the heirs of Hiram House, deceased, filed a cor-
roborated affidavit, alleging her qualification, and that she was in pos-
session of the land involved, and that she claimed through a chain of
mesne conveyances from the Central. Pacific Railroad company to her
father,-the deed to' her father bearing date March 29, 1888, since
which date they have had actual possession of the land, and have
grazed and improved the same, and asked that she be allowed to inter-
vene in the case, and to enter the land should the title of the govern-
ment be found to be paramount to that of the railroad company. The
hearing was postponed for various causes until April 27, 1894. The
testimony is chiefly in the form of depositions taken in accordance
with stipulations entered into between the attorneys of the respective
parties.
On May 25, 1894, the local officers, after a summary of the facts
presented and appearing of record, made the following finding:
We must hold that the contestant has failed to make such a showing of right, claim
or settlement, to the land in question, as would withdraw it from the operation of the
grant to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and therefore that the tract did pass
to the company under its grant on October 20, 1868.
From this decision Savage appealed. On June 12, 1895, your office
passed upon the case, under said appeal, and affirmed the decision of
the local officers. From said decision Savage again appealed, alleging
the following grounds of error:
1st. Error in denying Savage's motion to tax against the Central Pacific Railroad
company the costs of taking testimony.
2d. Error in holding that the declaratory statement of Herbert Savage, as shown
by the records of the land office, did not except the hind in dispute from the grant
to the Central Pacific Railroad Company.
3d. Error in holding that said tract was not excepted from said grant by virtue of
the claim settlement and improvements of Herbert Savage, made prior to the definite
location of said railroad.
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4th. In holding that there must be a lawful and valid'elaim to the land in dispute
in order to except it from said grant.
5th. Error in holding that the said grant to the Central Pacific Railroad company
took effect on the 20th day of October, 1868, and in awarding the land to said company.
The company's rights are based on the acts of July 1st, 1862 (12 Stat.,
492), and July 2d, 1864 (13 Stat., 358).
The aforesaid act of July 1, 1862, making the grant of lands to the
company, excepted from the grant lands reserved or otherwise disposed
of by the United States, and to which a pre-emption or homestead claim
may have attached, at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed.
The exception or proviso contained in section 2 of the act of July 2,
1864, amendatory of the act of July 1, 1862, is as follows-
And any lands granted by this act or the act to which this is an amendment shall
not defeat or impair any pre-emption, homestead, swamp land, or other lawful claim,
nor include any government reservation or mineral lands or the improvements of
any bona fide settler.
The alleged errors will be considered in the order in which they are
stated. The first one contains, negatively expressed, the affirmative
proposition that the railroad company should have been taxed with all
the costs of taking testimony. Under what rule, by what authority, or
for what reason, this should have been done, is not stated. The local
officers state that the costs were taxed under and i accordance with
Rule 55 of Practice. Your office seems to have made no specific ruling.
in reference t the costs, but the costs appear to have been properly
taxed. The second ground of complaint is, substantially, that your
office held that the declaratory statement of Savage, of record, was not
sufficient to except the land from the grant. Upon examination of that
part of the decision complained of, which relates to the declaratory
statement and to the qualifications of Savage, it is found to be so
expressed as to conuvey the impression that your office held the filing of
Savage to be nugatory and of no effect, since it is now made to appear
that be is an alien, and was disqualified at the time of said filing, and
that the company could take advantage of his disqualification now dis-
closed. If such is a proper interpretation of the language used, it does
not state the law correctly. It was, in substance, held by the supreme
court in the case of Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dunmeyer (113 U. S.,
629), that a pre-emption filing made before the filing of the map of defi-
nite location, excepted the land filed on from the operation of the grant,
and this rule has been followed here. In the case of Fish v. Northern
Pacific R. R. Co. (on review), 23 L., D., 15, it was held that an uncan-
celed pre-emption filing of record at the date when a railroad grant
becomes effective, excepts the. land from the operation of. the grant,
even though, at such time, the statutory life of the filing has expired.
Thus, while the homestead right is denied to an alien, yet if an alien
applies, and is permitted to file, this is such an adjudication of his right,
as estops the railroad company from disputing its validity, although
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the right to do so remains in the government, and this doubtless for
the reason that, as between the government and such person, this
default might be cured before final proof.
Your office found that the filing of Savage passed to record June 14,
1869, and that the company's map of definite location was filed Octo-
ber 20, 1868, and then proceeded to find that Savage acquired no right
under his filing, because he was at that time a alien, when the finding
should have been that the filing did not except the land from the
operation of the grant, for the reason that it was made subsequent to
the filing of the company's map, but this error was harnless to the
company.
The next proposition insisted upon is that the settlement and improve-
ments of Savage, made before the definite location of the company's
line had the effect of excepting the land from the grant. Your office
found in reference to the matter of settlement, that the evidence of
such settlement was not sufficient, to authorize the conclusion that
such settlement prevented the company's right from attaching under
the grant, but if the evidence was more satisfactory on this point, the
evidence that Savage was at that time an alien would destroy the effect
of the settlement; for while the company cannot attack a filing of
record, by proof of non-citizenship, it will be heard on such charge
where acts of settlement are relied on to defeat the grant.
* No separate consideration of the fourth assignment is necessary.
The fifth and last assignment of error attacks the basis on which your
office decision rests, by denying the fact found by your office, as to the
date of the definite location of the company's line. The argument
under this specification asserts that the land in question was covered
by the grant to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, which did not
take effect until April 10, 1869. The question thus presented is not an
-open one, it having been considered in the case of Central Pacific
R. B. Co., exjparte (5 L. D., 661), in which it was specifically held that
the Central Pacific railroad was entitled to the lands opposite the line
between Ogden and Promontory Summit and that the company's line
-between these points was definitely located October 20, 1868. This
ruling is adverse to the presenteontention, and must stand.- The claim
-of Miss Cora House is insisted upon only in the event it is found that
the land was excepted froui the company's grant, she being, as she
alleges, a bona fide purchaser from the company, and holding its deed,
As it is now held that the rights of the company attached on the filing
of its map of definite location October 20, 1868, it is not necessary to
make further reference to her claim.
With the modifications indicated herein your office decision is affirmed.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 61
HOMESTEAD ENTfRY--QTALIFICATIONS OF ENTRYMAN.
BONNETT V. JONES.
The. privilege of making a homestead etry, without regard to the ownership of
other land, -was not one of the rights of soldiers and sailors defined and described
in sections 2304 and 2305 R. S., hence the subsequent legislation making the
ownership of other lands a general disqualification does not abridge any right
conferred by said sections.
The disqualification resulting from the ownership of other lands is general, with no
exception as to the ownership of arid lands, and operative without respect to the
manner in which title to the land is obtained.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the Generalt Land Office, Janiary
(W. V. D.) 18,1897.
This case involves the SE. . of See. 5, T. 16 N., R. 7 W., Kingfisher
land district, Oklahoma Territory, and is before the Department upon
petition by James Jones for re-review of departmental decision of
December 23, 1896 (23 L. D., 547), which was on March 15, 1896 (24
L. D., 242), on motion for review, re-affirmed.
In the decision first cited, it was held that Jones was the owner of
one hundred and sixty acres of land in the State of Kansas, and that
such ownership disqualified him, under the law pertaining to Oklahoma,
from making homestead entry in that Territory, and it was, therefore,
directed that his entry made May 14, 1892, be canceled, and that a pref-
erenee right of entry be accorded to William J. 3onnett, who had filed
affidavit of contest May 20, 1892, alleging prior settlement.
- On motion for review it was urged by Jones that the act of March 3,
1891, (26 Stat., 989-1026) served to except the lands in the Cheyenne
and Arapahoe reservation from the abridgment of the right of entry
contained in the act of May 2, 1890, (25 Stat., 81). It was determined,
however, that no conflict necessarily existed between these statutes and
that the language of the act of May 2, 1890, was not affected by any-
thing contained in said act of March 3, 1891.
The act of May 2, 1890, section 20, provides:
and no person who shall at the time be seized in fee simple of one hundred and
sixty acres of land in any State or Territory, shall hereafter be entitled to enter land
in said Territory of Oklahoma.
The act of March 3, 1891, (26 Stat., 989-1026) providing among other
things, for the disposition of the lands acquired from the Cheyenne and
Arapahoe Indians, declares:
That whenever any of the lands acquired by either of the three foregoing agree-
ments respecting lands in the Indian or Oklahoma Territory shall by operation of
law or proclamation of the President of the United States be open to settlement,
they shall be disposed of to actual settlers only, under the provisions of the homestead
and townsite laws (exeept section twenty-three hundred and one of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, which shall not apply).
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By section five of another act of March 3, 1891, (26 Stat., 1095-1097)
amending and re-enacting the first section of the homestead law, (Rev.
Stat., Sec. 2289) it is provided:
But no person who is the proprietor of more than one hundred and sixty acres of
land in any State or Territory shall acquire any right under the homestead law.
: Construing these acts, it was held in the first departmental decision
in this case (23 L D., 547, syllabus,):
The special provision in section 20, act of May 2, 1890, limiting the right of home-
stead entry to persons not "seized in fee simple of one hundred and sixty acres, etc.,"
is not repealed by the general provisions in section 5, act of March 3,1891, amending
section 2289, R. S.
In denying the motion for review of that decision, it was held (24 L.
D., 242, syllabus,):
The provision in section 16, act of March 3, 1891, (26 Stat., 989) that the lands
specified therein shall be opened to settlement "under the provisions of the homc-
stead and townsite laws," should be construed to mean that said lands are to be
opened to settlement under the homestead and townsite laws governing the disposi-
tion of lands in Oklahoma, and not operating to repeal the provision contained in
section 20, act of May 2, 1890, disqualifying as homesteaders all persons owning one
hundred and sixty acres in any State or Territory, and applicable to all lands in
Oklahoma.
These rulings are believed to be right and are now. adhered to.
It is further urged that the Department was in error in not holding
that as Jones was an honorably discharged soldier in the late civil wart
and as in the act of May 2, 1890, and that of March 3, 1891, author-
izing the disposal of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe lands, it was provided
that the rights of such soldiers tnder sections 2304 and 2305 of the
Revised Statutes should in no wise be abridged, the defendant had
the right to make this homestead entry, notwithstanding his ownership
of one hundred and sixty acres in the State of Kansas.
The provision in the act of May 2, 1890, spra, upon which this con-
tention is made, is as follows:
The rights of honorably discharged soldiers and sailors in the late civil war, as
defined and described in sections twenty-three hundred and four and twenty-three
hundred and five of the Revised Statutes of the United States, shall not be
abridged.
Section 16 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 898-1026) contains
the same provision.
Prior to this legislation the ownership of one hundred and sixty
acres did not disqualify any one from entering public land under the
homestead law. An inquiry into the history of the homestead laws.
shows that the right to make homestead entry was conferred by sec-
tion 2289 of the Revised Statutes, and that persons who are honorably
discharged Union soldiers and sailors were equally entitled to its
benefits. Their right to make homestead entry of public lands did
not have its origin or existence in sections 2304 and 2305 but in sec-
tion 2289. If sections 2304 and 2305 were repealed they would still
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have that right equally with others. The special rights conferred
upon such soldiers and sailors by sections 2304 and 2305, were: 1st.
Section 2304 permitted them to delay entry, settlement and improve-
ment for six months after locating a homestead and filing declaratory
statement, and permitted them to take one hundred and sixty, instead
of eighty, acres of alternate reserved lands; and 2nd, section 2305
permitted them to deduct from the required time of residence upon an
entry, the period of service in the army and navy, or in some instances
the period of enlistment, excepting that residence, improvement and
cultivation for at least one year should be shown in all cases. These
are the rights conferred upon such soldiers and sailors by these two
sections, and are therefore the rights preserved by the provision
quoted from the acts of 1890 and 1891. While a repeal of sections
2304 and 2305 would take away these rights, the general right to make
homestead entry would still continue under section- 2289 and would
equally apply to honorably discharged Union soldiers and sailors.
The making of a homestead entry without regard to the ownership
of other land was not one of the rights of such soldiers and sailors "as
defined and described in"7 sections 2304 and 2305; hence, the subse-
quent legislation making the ownership of other lands a general dis-
qualification does not abridge any right conferred by sections 2304 or
2305.
It is further urged by counsel that as the land owned by Jones in
Kansas was arid, it could not have been intended that the ownership
of such land would amount to a disqualification. Congress had full
authority to make the disqualification resulting from the ownership of
other land general and absolute. It exercised that authority. There
are n exceptions in the act, and I am. not authorized to revise the
action of Congress by inserting exceptions where none were made by
that body. The words of the act are:
.... and no person who shall at the time be seized in fee simple of one hun-
dred and sixty acres of land in any State or Territory, shall hereafter be entitled to
enter land in said Territory of Oklahoma.
The language is explicit and the meaning clear.
It is urged that as this defendant acquired his Kansas land under
the commutation provision of the homestead law, the ownership thereof
does not disqualify him from making entry in Oklahoma Territory.
The fact that he had made an entry under the commutation provisions
of the homestead law may not have disqualified him from making this
entry in Oklahoma, but the ownership of one hundred and sixty acres
at the time of the Oklahoma entry does so operate, without regard to
how the land was obtained.
The petition is denied.
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FINAL PROOFUItJLE 3 OF PRACTICE.
MOCALLA V. ACKER (ON REVIEw).
One who submits final proof under rule 53 of practice, during the pendency of a con-
test involving an adverse settlement claim, must stand or fall on the showing
thus made as to compliance with law during the period covered thereby.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 19, 1898. (E. F. B.)
This is a motion filed by John S. McCalla for review of the decision of
the Department of September 22, 1897 (25 L. D., 285), accompanied by
a petition for rehearing which he asks may be considered with said
motion for review.
This motion was considered and denied by the decision of the Depart-
ment of December 13, 1879, which was recalled because of the failure
of the Department to give any consideration to the petition for
rehearing.
In this case John S. Mc(alla filed a contest against the homestead
entry of Calvin S. Acker for the SE. of Sec. 19, T. 27 N., R. 2 E., I. M.,
Perry, Oklahoma, alleging priority of settlement and that Acker is dis-
qualified from making entry of said tract. Upon the hearing of this
contest, the local officers on April 17, 1895, rendered a decision in favor
of Acker, from which McCalla appealed. Prior to the rendering of
this decision Acker filed his application to make final proof before a
probate judge at Newkirk, Oklahoma, and on the day fixed for the
taking of such proof AIcCalla appeared and filed a protest against its
allowance because of the pending contest. The testimony was taken
and was forwarded with the protest to the local officers, who, on May
25, 1895, dismissed the protest because McCalla refused to pay the fees
the local officers are entitled to for examining and approving such
testimony.
On July 26, thereafter, Acker filed in the local office a written request
to have his final proof withdrawn, which was forwarded to your office
without taking action thereon, with other papers in the case, and it
was considered by your office in passing upon the appeal of McCalla
from the decision of the local officers of April 19, 1895.
Your office by decision of February 13, 1896, affirmed the action of
the local officers and dismissed the final proof of Acker and the pro-
test of Mc~alla, from which decision McCalla appealed.
In passing upon this appeal the Department in the decision now asked
to be reviewed held that your office erred (1) in dismissing Mc(alla's
protest, because of the failure to pay the fees of the local office in
advance and (2) in dismissing the protest of McCalla and allowing the
withdrawal of the final proof of Acker which should be held to await
the final disposition of the contest, but affirmed your decision so far as
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it held that the contest of Mc~alla should be dismissed, the evidence
showing conclusively that Acker was the prior settler and that he was
iot disqualified.
A re-examination of the testimony shows no reason for disturbing the
decision of the Department, holding that Acker was the prior settler
and that he was not disqualified.
The gravamen of this motion is the alleged error innot finding aid
holding that Acaer had abandoned the land and this necessarily involves
the question whether he had the right to withdraw his final proof in
the face of McCalla's protest.
A mere protest against the allowance of final proof which would not
secure the protestant a preference right in the event of the cancella-
tion of the entry, would not prevent your office from allowing te with-
drawal of the final proof, or the making supplemental proof, because in
such case it would be a matter solely between the government and the
entryman. Hoffman v. lindman (9 L. D., 81). But if in the presence
of a valid adverse claim, final proof is offered which fails to show com-
pliance with the law, the claimant must submit to an order of caricella-
tion. Wade v. Meier (6 L. D., 308); Coffin v. Inderstrodt and authori-
ties therein cited (16 L. D., 382); Murphy v. Logan (19 L. D., 478).
In this case MeCalla was a settler upon the land, claiming the right
to enter it by virtue of priority of settlement which issue was pending
undetermined before the local office upon his contest when Acker filed
his application to make final proof. From the adverse decision of the
local officers upon that contest he filed his appeal in due time. His
rights were fully protected by his protest against the allowance of the
final proof and after the submission of such proof it could not be with-
drawn to his prejudice, and so the Department held in the decision now
asked to be reviewed, wherein it was said that
neither the sufficiency of the final proof nor the right of defendant to withdraw it,
should be passed upon pending the contest, and your office erred in allowing the with-
drawal of said proof and the dismissal of the protest, and so much of your office
decision as refers thereto, is reversed, and said proof and protest will be held to
await the final disposition of the contest, when they will be returned to the local
office for appropriate action.
There was no error in the decision complained of. It was therein
directed that the final proof should be returned to the local office for
appropriate action. If that proof shows that the entryman has com-
pliedwith the lawas to the residence and cultivation for the time covered
by such proof, his entry should be allowed. If it shows that he has
not complied with the law as to residence and cultivation during that
period, his entry should be canceled.
The question of priority having been decided in favor of Acker, no
other course could be pursued under the rules. See Rule 53, Rules of
Practice.
Nor has sufficient reason been shown for the granting of a rehearing
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in this case. The petition rests upon the ground that if petitioner is
.given an opportunity, he can submit further and additional proof that
Acker has abandoned the land and failed to reside thereon, which is
supported by fifteen. affidavits to that effect.
Motions for rehearing upon the ground of newly discovered testi-
mony must show that the party did not know of the testimony at the
time of the trial, and that it could not have been discovered by due
diligence. The only affidavit verifying this petition is the one attached
to the motion for review and this merely states that the motion is made
in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
Besides, the affidavits simply tend to corrobrate the testimony offered
by protestant at the final proof, which has not been passed upon by the
Department, but has been remanded to the local officers for action
thereon.
The motion and petition are both denied and the papers are herewith
returned.
You will instruct the local officers to pass upon the final proof,
together with the testimony offered by protestant both on direct and
cross-examination and to forward the result of their action to your office,.
without delay.
The decision of December 13, 1897, is hereby recalled and vacated,
and this decision is submitted therefor.
PRACTICE-HEARING-MILL SITE ENTRY-NOTICE.
REED v. BOURON.
The Department will not interfere with the exercise of the Commissioner's discre-
tion, in the matter of ordering a hearing, if an abuse of such discretion is not
shown.
A mill site entry, allowed withont publication of notice of application, may be
properly regarded as a nullity, in the disposition of a protest subsequently filed
alleging the mineral character of the land covered by said entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, anuary
(W. V. D.) 19, 1898. (P. J. C.)
Counsel for George J. Bouron have filed an application for a writ of
certiorari, for the purpose of having the record in the above entitled
case forwarded to the Department.
It appears that mineral entry No. 535, was made March 31, 1877, at
the Sacramento, California, land district, for the Peachy Consolidated
Quartz Mine and Millsite, but among other irregularities in said entry
the mill-site claim was omitted in the publication made. No notice of
the application for entry thereof has ever been published. Other
irregularities having been cured in the meantime, your office letter of
October 28, 1896, directed publication of the mill-site application.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 67
By letter of June 25, 1897, the local officers transmitted a verified
protest by Charles A. Reed, against the issuance of patent for the mine
and mill-site, alleging that he claimed the property by relocation in 1895
and 1896; that the mill-site was, at the time of its survey and location,
public mineral land of the United States, having quartz ledges running
through it bearing gold in paying quantities, and that the applicant for
patent and those claiming through him are, and have been, well aware
of the mineral character of the same; that there are five or six lodes
bearing gold running through the mill-site, and that the same had been
prospected and worked for more than twenty-five years.
By letter of September 25, 1897, your office dismissed the protest as
to the quartz mine and held respecting the mill-site that-
the allegations of its mineral character are specific and if, as a matter of fact, it is
true that the land embraced in the mill-site is mineral in character, it cannot be
patented as a mill-site.
A hearing was therefore ordered to determine the character of the
land and the order for republication of the mill-site application for
patent was suspended to await the result of the hearing.
From this order the mineral claimant filed an appeal in your office,
assigning numerous grounds of error, which your office, by letter of
November 24, 1897, declined to forward for the reason that the order
complained of is interlocutory and the 6rdering of a hearing is a
matter resting in the discretion of the Commissioner.
The mineral claimant now presents his application for a writ of
certiorari..
The ordering of a hearing, in any case relating to the public lands
upon application presented to your office, is lodged, in the sound dis-
cretion of the Commissioner, and the rule has uniformly been that
unless there is an abuse of that discretion the Department will not
interfere. There is no showing of such an abuse in the case at bar.
- But aside from that it is not apparent from anything before the
Department that your office would have been justified in doing other-
wise than ordering this hearing. There seems to be a direct charge
here that this land is not only now known to be mineral in character,
but was so known by the applicant for patent at the time the applica-
tion was filed. Under the express provisions of the statute (Sec. 2337)
only non-mineral lands can be entered as a mill-site. There having
been no publication of the application to enter this mill-site it is the
same as if there had been no entry and application therefor was now
being made for the first time. It is not necessary to inquire what
the result would be if after an entry regularly allowed and before
patent the land was discovered to be mineral in character.
The petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
Counsel in closing their brief request that-" If you (the Secretary of
the Interior) determine the hearing was properly ordered, then we ask
that patent issue for the mining claims, leaving the millsite for further
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action." This is a matter for the determination of your office, in the
first instance at least, and the papers are herewith returned for such
action in this connection as may be deemed appropriate.
iRAILROAD GRANT-ACT OF XrNE 22, 1874.
FLORIDA CENTRAL PENINSULAR R. R. CO. V. SU1IERALL.
The designation of a tract as the basis of a selection under the act of June 22, 1874,
estops the company from subsequently alleging that its relinquishment, in favor
of settlers, did not include the entry embracing said tract.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 22, 1898. (F. W. C.)
The Florida Central Peninsular Railroad Company has appealed
from your office decision of April 13, 1896, recognizing as against the
grant for said company the homestead entry of Robert Summerall,
made January 8,1877, covering the S. t of the NW. 1 of Sec. 27, T.29 S.,
R. 20 E., Gainesville land district, Florida, upon which he made 6ash
entry November 6, 1882, under the provisions of section 2 of the act of
June 15, 1880 (21 Stat., 237).
This tract covered by Summerall's entry is within the six miles pri-
mary limits of the grant under which said company claims, which was
made by the act of May 17, 1856 (11 Stat., 15). The rights under said
grant attached long prior to the entry by Summerall but your decision
recognizing said entry is based upon the relinquishments executed by
the clainiant under said grant on April 1, 1876, and June 25, 1891, by
which the company waived its claim to all lands between Waldo and
Tampa occupied by settlers whose improvements were made. prior to
the 16th day of March, 1881.
In making these relinquishments the company reserved the right to
select lands in lieu of those thus settled upon under the provisions of
the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 194), and it appears from your office
records that on May 2, 1887, per list No. 4, the company duly made
selection of the N. I of NW. t of See. 30, T. 29 S., B. 23 E., in lieu of
the tract covered by Summerall's entry; thus, in effect, recognizing the
application of the general relinquishments, executed by the company
in favor of settlers, as applying to the tract covered by Summerall's
entry.
The company's appeal would seem to be based upon the ground that
Summerall did not complete his entry by making the regular home-
stead proof, but rather chose to perfect it by making cash entry as
provided in the act of June 152 1880, supra.
In view of the company's action in selecting another tract in lieu of
that embraced in Summerall's entry, it would seem to be estopped from
asserting that Summerall's entry was not included in the general
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relinquishment before referred to, and its appeal is therefore dismissed
and Summerall's entry, if otherwise regular and proper, will pass to
patent.
For the reasons stated, your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-AMENDMENT.
JOSEPH HBISEL.
An entry may be amended to embrace an additional adjacent tract that was at the
date of the original entry included in the existing entry of another, where such
amendment corresponds with the original settlement claim, and no adverse
claim exists.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 22, 1898. (C. W. P.)
The record shows that on October 14, 1893, Williaiu Smith made
homestead entry, No. 1900, of the SW. A, of Sec. 17, T. 24 N., R. 3 W.,
Enid land district, Oklahoma Territory; that on December 15, 1893,
Joseph Heisel filed an affidavit of contest against said entry, alleging
abandonment; that on March 22, 1894, leisel dismissed his contest,
filed Smith's relinquishment, as to the S. - of said SW. 4 and made
homestead entry No. 7422 of the land so relinquished. It also appears
that on July 18, 1896, Heisel initiated a contest against Smith's entry
on the charge of abandonment, and that as the result of said contest,
Smith's entry was canceled by your office on April 3, 1897.
On April 2, 1897, Heisel filed an application to enter the N. 4 of
said SW. i;
The local officers rejected said application, and Heisel appealed to
your office, and with his appeal filed an application to be allowed to
amend his homestead entry No. 7422, by including therein the N. 4 of
said SW. 4.
In his affidavit, which is corroborated by only one witness, he says
that on May 16, 1893, lie settled upon the SW. 41 of said section 17,
prior, as he believes, to any other person, and has resided thereon and
"particularly the S. thereof ever since; " that he could not read Eng-
lish and was ignorant of the homestead laws, and had to rely upon
others and was wholly without money to carry on his contest against
Smith's entry, and was induced by Smith and the advice of others, who
lived near him, to dismiss his contest against Smith's entry and make
homestead entry of the S. of said section 17. Your office held that-
Heisel is not entitled to the right of amendment. He can not plead mistake. He
entered the land which he originally intended to enter. His action was voluntarily
taken, with fall knowledge of all the facts.
His application is denied, sbject to the right of appeal.
It is not deemed necessary to consider his appeal from your rejection of his appli-
cation to enter, as his application to amend was, of itself, an abandonment of such
application to enter.
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Heisel appeals to the Department.
There does not appear to be any adverse claim to the land applied.
for, and therefore the question is one entirely between Heisel and the
government. Under the circumstances, as set out by Heisel in his
affidavit, the showing made appears to be sufficient upon which. to
allow the amendment. Your office decision is accordiuglyreversed,.
and the papers are returned herewith that Heisel may make an amend-
ment of his entry as applied for.
CONTEST-JURISDICTION-SERVICE O NOTICE.
KNOTTS v. MOSGEdOVE.
Issuance of notice on a second contest, during the period allowed for filing a motion
for the review of a departmental decision in a prior case, will not defeat the
jurisdiction of the local office, where said notice is not served until after the
expiration of said period, and no motion for review is filed.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W V D.) 2 2,1898. .(C. J. G.)
On September 8, 1893, William Mosgrove made homestead entry for
the N. NW. 1, SE. i NW. 1 and NI. SW. of Sec. 10, T. 2 S., R.
32 E., La Grande land district, Oregon
On October 4, 1893, Perry Knotts filed a contest against said entry,
alleging priority of settlement. Upon this contest the local office ren-
dered decision in favor of Knotts, but upon appeal your office reversed
said decision.
On November 5, 1895, the .Department rendered decision affirming
the action of your office, Mosgrove's entry was held intact and the case
finally closed June 25, 1896. This decision was promulgated November
21, 1895, and the parties notified thereof January 25, 1896.
In the mean time, on September 24, 1895, and during the pendency
of Perry Knotts' appeal, Alonzo Knotts filed affidavit of contest against
Mosgroye's entry, alleging that the defendant had never resided upon
or cultivated this land as required by law. Notice was issued on this
contest February 20, 1896, and personal service was made March 7,
1896. Upon the testimony submitted at the hearing, at which both
parties were present, the local office rendered decision recommending
the cancellation of the entry.
From this decision Mosgrove appealed to your office, where, on July
22, 1897, the said decision was affirmed. A further appeal has been
made to this Department, it being alleged that it was error to find that
the defendant had never established a bona fide residence on-this land,
and furthermore that the local office was without jurisdiction to try the
case and that the order for trial was premature.
From an examination of the record it becomes evident that Mosgrove
never established residence on this land in compliance with law.
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Jurisdiction was acquired by the local office in this case by the
service of notice. Such service, as heretofore shown, was made on
March 7, 1896, which was after the expiration of thirty days from the
date when the parties to the former contest were notified of the depart-
mental decision. No motion for review was filed, hence the local office
had acquired full jurisdiction to try the case.
Your office decision of July 22, 1897, is accordingly affirmed.
- INDIAN LANDS-ALOTTMENT-TRIBAL RIGHTS.
WILLIM BANKS..
The usage of an Indian tribe may be accepted to establish a claim of membership
therein, on the part of one who under the general rule would be held a citizen
of the United States.
Under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, and the general allotment act, the
right of an Indian to an allotment of tribal lands is not lost by abandonment of
the tribal relation.
By the act of June 7, 1897, children of an Indian woman by blood, who, at the time
of her death, was recognized as a member of an Indian tribe, are placed on the
same footing as to rights in the property of such tribe as the other members.
thereof; but the children of one who is thus protected are not entitled to allot-
ments if the parent, prior to their birth, abandons the tribal relation.
Assistant Attorney General Van Devanter, to the Secretary of the Interior
January 22, 1898. . (W. C. P.)
On September 1, 1897, I submitted an opinion upon certain questions
arising in connection with the application of William Banks Tfor allot-
ments for himself and seven children as members of the Sac and Fox
of Missouri tribe of Indians.. It was held therein that any person who
can show that he is a member of said tribe and has not received an
allotment should be given one just as if his name had been upon the
original roll.
It was then said that the information furnished by the papers then
before this office was not sufficient to warrant an expression of opinion
as to the rights of Banks and his children. Other affidavits have been
filed and the matter has been again submitted to me for further consid-
eration.
From affidavits presented before the former opinion was rendered it
appears that William Banks,' sr., a white man, was married to an Indian
woman, a member of the-Sac and Fox of Missouri tribe; that the appli-
cant William Banks was born of this marriage about the year 1849;
that his parents lived-in Missouri just across the river from the reser-
vation in Kansas, then occupied by this tribe; that his 'mother was
recognized as a member of the tribe up to the time of her death, which
occurred about 1852; that she visited the tribe to receive the annuities
due her as such member, and that she took this child with her on some,
if not all, of these visits, and received ann-aities for him as well as for
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herself; that after her death lie was for a time in a school called the
Highland Mission, established for the benefit of these Indians; that
during the time he was there annuities were drawn by those in charge
of said school on his account that at some time during his childhood,
just when not being shown, his father removed him from the school and
after that he continued to live among the whites until about the year
1895 when he went to te reservation for this tribe in Nebraska. to
secure allotments for himself and children. It is further stated in
some of these affidavits that it was the custom. of these Indians to con-
sider all children born to any member of the tribe as members and to
place their names upon the rolls for annuity payments without any
action of the council or chiefs.
As a part of the additional proof the affidavit of Banks is filed, stat-
ing that he has always claimed the rights of membership in said tribe;
that he has never received any land by way of allotment or as a home-
stead and that he has for several years considered himself a citizen of
the United States and has exercised his rights as such to some extent.
He is corroborated by three others.
It seems from this proof that Banks,. whatever may have been his
status as to citizenship by reason of his parentage, was at one time
considered and treated s a member of this tribe of Indians. It was
said in Black Tomahawk v. Waldron (19 L. D., 311) that the laws and
usages of an Indian tribe may determine the membership therein of one
who would under the general rule be a citizen of the United States.
The proof in this case while not so full as could be desired, goes to
establish the usage of this tribe as being that children born as this
one was, were considered as members of the tribe.
It is plain, however, that le never recognized his tribal relations
after he reached years of discretion until he sought to real) the advan-
tages incident thereto. His tribal relations were completely severed so
far as his own acts could accomplish that end.
All tribal property among the Idians is held as communal property.
lUnder the general rule governing in the matter of community property
one who withdraws from the community or association, thereby forfeits
all his interest in the common property. In this case it must be held
that Banks gave up all right to share in the tribal property of the Sac
and Fox of Missouri Indians, iuless the legislation of Coggress shows
an intent to relieve from the effect of the general rule, Indians sever-
ing their tribal relations.
It has been the declared policy to encourage the breaking up of tri-
bal relations among the Indians and different laws have been enacted
with that end in view. The act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 402-420),
conferred the benefits of the homestead law upon Indians who had
abandoned their tribal relations but with a proviso as follows:
Provided, That any such Indian shall be entitled to his distributive share of all
annuities, tribal funds, lands and other property the same as though he had main-
tained his tribal relations.
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The allotment act of February 8, 1887 (2+ Stat., 388), declares every
Indian who has taken up his residence separate and apart from his
tribe and has adopted the habits of civilized life, a citizen of the United
States " without in any manner impairing or otherwise affecting the
right of any such Indian to tribal or other property." In view of these
provisions of law it must be held that Banks did not by severing his
tribal relations give up his distributive share in the tribal property
and that consequently he is entitled to an allotment in the lands of said
tribe.
This conclusion that Banks is entitled to al allotment in these tribal
lands is confirmed by a provision of the act of June 7, 1897 (30 Stat.,
62-90), which reads as follows:
That all children born of a marriage heretofore solemnized betweena white man
and an Indian woman by blood and not by adoption, where said Indian woman is at
this time or was at the time of her death, recognized by the tribe shall have the
same rights and privileges to the property of the tribe to which the mother belongs,
or belonged at the time of her death, by blood, as any other member of the tribe,
and no prior act of Congress shall be construed as to debar such child of such
right.
Banks' mother was a member by blood of the Sac and Fox of Mis-
souri tribe and recognized as such at the time of her death, and he
therefore is entitled to the protection of the provisions of this act.
The case of the children of Banks presents a different question.
Their father had severed his tribal relations before their births and
hence they can not claim to have been born members of this tribe.
Neither is it claimed that any one of them was ever considered or
recognized as having membership therein. The act of 1897 does not
seem to confer any benefits Upon persons in their position. Neither
did that act nor any of the others cited, make Banks a member of the
tribe from which he had separated himself. The object of that act was
not to make the persons coming within its provisions members of any
tribe of Indians nor to reinstate them where they had withdrawn from
such membership but to confer upon them simply one of the incidents
of membership, that is, a right to share in the distribution of the
property of the tribe. The mother of these children was not, so far as
the record shows, recognized as a member of this tribe nor was the
father so recognized at the date of said act and hence they have not
been brought within its provisions. They are not in my opinion enti-
tled to allotments in the land of these Indians.
Reference is made to the case of Ariadne Bohart as furnishing a prec-
edent for holding both Banks and his children entitled to allotments.
That case was decided upon an opinion of this office of June 8, 1895
(11 Op. A. A. G., 333), holding that Ariadle Bohart was entitled to an
allotment on the Nez Perce reservation, because her mother was a full
blood Nez Perce Indian and the regulations under which allotments
were made prescribed that an applicant to be entitled to al allotment
must be a recognized member of the tribe or his father or mother must
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be such. The same opinion, however, held that Ariadne Bohart's chil-
dren were not entitled. So far as that case is authority here it sustains
the conclusions hereinbefore announced.
Approved, January 22, 1898,
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
DESERT LAND-STATE SELECTIONS-PATENT.
STATE OF WASHINGTON.
The provision in the act of June 11, 1896, that patents for desert lands may issue to
the States when an ample supply of water is actually secured, without regard
to settlement and cultivation, is not limited to lands on which liens have
been placed under said act, but is applicable to all lands donated by the act of
August 18, 1894.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 22, 1898. (F. W. C.)
In your office letter "F" of June 19, 1897, submitting list No. 2 and
accompanying papers, filed by the State of Washington, for the segre-
gation of certain lands under section 4 of the act of August 18, 1894 (28
Stat., 372-422), you made the following reference to the act of June 11,
1896 (29 Stat., 434):
I desire to call attention to the provisions of the act of June 11, 1896 (29 Stat.,
413-434), in relation to liens on the -lands segregated under the above act of 1894,
and would recommend that the forms and the contract in the circular of November
22, 1894, be amended by adding, wherever the act of August 18, 1894, is referred to,
the words and acts amendatory thereof.'
In answer thereto the departmental letter of July 12, 1897 (25 L. D.,
33), said:
The recommendation made by you in the last paragraph of your letter of the 19th
ultimo, relative to the amendment of the forms and the contract in the circular of
November 22, 1894, will be made the subject of a separate communication.
The matter has again been called to my attention by your office
letter of October 12, 1897, submitting, for my approval, a draft of reg-
ulations concerning the making of final proof for desert lands segre-
gated under section 4 of said act of August 18, 1894.
The act of 1894, as therein declared, was enacted "to aid the public
land States in the reclamation of the desert lands therein, and the
settlement, cultivation and sale thereof, in small tracts to actual set-
tlers," and provided for donating and granting to such States, free of
cost, such desert lands, not exceeding one million acres in each State,
as the State may cause to be irrigated, reclaimed, occupied and culti-
vated by actual settlers. The provision for the patenting of these
lands is couched in the following language:
As fast as any State may furnish satisfactory proof according to such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, that any of said
lands are irrigated, reclaimed and occupied by actual settlers, patents shall be
issued to the State, or its assigns, for said lands so reclaimed and settled.
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The act of June 11, 1896, suprai provides:
That under any law heretofore or hereafter enacted by any State, providing for
the reclamation of arid lands, in pursuance and acceptance of the terms of the grant
made in section four of an act entitled "An Act making appropriations for the sun-
dry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-five," approved August eighteenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-four, a lien or liens is hereby authorized to be created by the State to
which such lands are granted and by no-other authority whatever, and when created
shall be vaid on and against the separate legal subdivisions of land reclaimed, for
the actual cost and necessary expenses of reclamation and reasonable interest
thereon from the date of reclamation until disposed of to actual settlers; and when
an ample spply df water is actually furnished in a substantial ditch or canal, or
by artesian wells or reservoirs, to reclaim a particular tract or tracts of such lands,
then patents shall issue for the same to such State without regard to settlement or
cultivation: Prorided, That in no event, in no contingency, and under no circum-
stances shall the United States be in any manner directly or indirectly liable for
any amount of such lien or liabilily in whole or in part.
UInder the act of 1894, lands coming within this. million-acre grant
could not be patented until they were shown to be "1irrigated, reclaimed
and occupied by actual settlers." The act of 1896, referring specifically
to arid lands granted to States by the act of 1894, authorized the crea-
tion of a lien thereon, by the State to which "such lands are granted"
to cover "the actual cost and necessary expenses of reclamation and
reasonable interest thereon from the date of reclamation until disposed
of to actual settlers." This act then further provided-
and when an ample supply of water is actually furnished in a substantial ditch or
canal, or by artesian wells or reservoirs, to reclaim a particular tract or tracts of such
lands, then patents shall issue for the same to such State, without regard to settle-
ment or cultivation.
The act of 1896, as is shown by this language, expressly dispenses
with proof of settlement and cultivation and authorizes the issuance
of patents when au ample supply of water is actually furnished in a
substantial ditch or canal, or by artesian wells or reservoirs to reclaim
the land.
The 4uestion which arises under this legislation is whether the pro-
vision in the act of 1896 prescribing the conditions on which patents
shall be issued, applies to all lands donated and granted -under the act
of 1894, or is limited to those lands on which a lien is created under
the act of 1896. As before shown, the specific reference, in the begin-
ning of the act, to arid lands so granted under the act of 1894, eces-
sarily meaning all lands so granted, is followed by a provision for the
creation of a lien upon "such land" and by a further provision for the
patenting of "such lands." It is believed that thewords "such lands"
thus twice employed, have the same meaning in each instance and refer
to the only lands specially mentioned in the act, which are those granted
under the act of 1894. lad it been the intention of Congress to limit
the provision in the act of 1896 relating to patents, to lands upon which
a lien had been created by the State under that act, such intention
could have been easily manifested and instead of repeating the words
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"such lands" other words, having a more limited meaning, vould have
been used, such as "the lands covered by any such lien." There does
not seem to be any reason for the patenting of lands, made suscep-
tible of irrigation by means secured through a lien placed thereon,
without requiring proof of settlement or cultivation, which does not
apply with equal force to lands mlade susceptible of irrigation by means
taken from the State treasury or secured in any manner other than
through such lien.
A construction should not be put upon the act which discriminates
in favor of lands irrigated by the expenditure of money obtained
through a lien, as against lands irrigated by the use of money derived
from other sources. The purpose and object of the law is to enable the
State to reclaim the lands as an inducement to their settlement and
cultivation by actual settlers in small tracts, and it is immaterial
whether the money expended in such reclamation is obtained through
the instrumentality of a lien or otherwise. The act of 1896 is remedial
in its purpose and should receive such construction, consistent with the
language there employed, as will best tend to accomplish the ultimate
and great purpose of this legislation. The act of 1S96 should be treated
as amending the act of 1894 by authorizing a lien to be placed upon the
lands as an aid in the accomplishment of their reclamation, and as also
amending the original act in the matter of patenting the lands to the
States, by dispensing with proof of settlement and cultivation and thus
confiding to the States the settlement and cultivation of the reclaimed
lands according to the expressed purpose of the first act. This seems
to have been the view taken of the amendment in the House of Repre-
sentatives at the time of its passage. Mr. Lacey, chairman of the com-
mittee of public lands, in explanation of the amendment said (Cong.
Rec. 54th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6222):
It is proposed now by this amendment to authorize those States to provide means
by which liens can be created upon the land to be irrigated, and that those liens
shall be enforced up to the time that the land is patented to the settler; and also to
modify the Carey act to the extent of providing that when the water and the irri-
gating ditches have been arranged so as to irrigate the land properly, then patents
to the land may issue at once.
Mr. Mondell, also, stated (p. 6224):.
I believe it is entirely safe to provide that the legislatures of the arid-land States
shall pass such laws as may tend to the irrigation, cultivation, reclamation and set-
tlement of the lands within their borders.
There is no expression in the act of 1896 from which it can be gath-
ered that it was the intention of Congress to limit the provision
therein, for issuing patents, to such lands as are covered by liens, and
even if the language used be considered doubtful in its meaning no
good reason suggests itself for so restricting the provision. The
amendment is therefore held applicable to all lands coming within the
act of 1894.
You will cause to be prepared a form of contract and other forms
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along the lines of this ruling and forward the same for my considera-
tion and approval.
The rules and regulations accompanying your letter of October 12,
1897, are also herewith returned for modification according to the views
herein expressed.
INDIAN LANDS-PATENT-RIGHT OF WvAY.
SOUTHERN UTE ALLOTMENTS.
In the issuance of patents to the Indian allottees of lands in the Southern Ute reser-
vation, over which the Denver and Rio Grande railroad has been constructed,
a clause should be inserted setting forth that the conveyance is made subject to
the right of way granted to said road by the special at of June 8, 1872, which
does not in terms protect the company's right.
Assistant Attorney General FTan Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
January 4, 1898. - (W. C. P.)
In response to your request of November 16, 1897 "for an opinion as
to whether patents to the Indian allottees of lands in the Southern
Ute reservation must be subject to the right of way of the Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad Company," I would submit the following:
By the treaty of March 2, 1868 (15 Stat., 619), between the United
States and the several bands of Ute Indians, a district of country
described as beginning at a point on the southern boundary line of
the Territory of Colorado where the meridian of longitude 1070 west
crosses the same, running thence north to a point fifteen miles north of
the fortieth parallel of latitude, thence west to the western boundary
of said Territory, thence south to the southern boundary of said Terri-
tory, and thence east to the place of beginning, was set apart for the
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians, and they,
on their part, relinquished all claims to any other lands. It is not neces-
sary to notice the other provisions of said treaty, except that appear-
ing in Article XIV, which reads as follows:
The said confederated bands agree that whensoever, in the opinion of the Presi-
dent of the United States, the public interests may require it, that all roads, high-
ways, and railroads, authorized by law, shall have the right of way through the
reservation herein designated.
By the act of April 23, 1872 (17 Stat., 55), the Secretary of the
Interior was authorized to negotiate with the Ute Indians of Col-
orado Territory for the extinguishment of their right to the south part
of the reservation, made in pursuance of said treaty of 1866. An
agreement was made with said Indians on September 13, 1873, and
ratified by the act of Congress approved April 29, 1874 (18 Stat., 36),
by which the Indians ceded their interest to a portion of their former
reservation described as beginning at a point on the eastern boundary
thereof, fifteen miles north of the southern boundary line of the Terri-
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tory of Colorado, running tence west to a point twenty miles east of
the western line of said Territory; thence north to a point ten miles
north of the thirty-eighth parallel of latitude; thence east to the east-
ern boundary of the Ute reservation, and thence south to the place of
beginning.
It was further provided that all the provisions of the treaty of 1868
not altered by said agreement should continue in force. It was also
agreed that an agency should be established on the southern part of
this reservation for tie Weeminuchi, Muache and Capote bands.
These bands seem to have been subsequently designated as the
Southern Utes and they occupied the strip of land fifteen miles wide
in the southern part of Colorado.
Another agreement was entered into with the confederated bands of
Ute Indians in Colorado, on March 6,1880, which was ratified by act
of Congress approved June 15, 1880 (21 Stat., 199). It was then con-
templated that the Indians should take their lands in severalty and
agreed that they should cede to the United States all the territory of
the then Ute reservation in Colorado, except as therein provided for
their settlement. The settlement of the Southern Utes was provided
for as follows:
The Southernl Utes agree to remove to and settle upon the unoccupied agricultural
lands on the La Plata River in Colorado; and if there should not be a sufficiency of
such lands on the La Plata River and in its vicinity in Colorado, then upon such
other unoccupied agricultural lands, as may be found on the La Plata River or in
its vicinity in New Mexico.
It was further provided as follows:
All provisions of the treaty of March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight and
the act of Congress approved April twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and seventy-
four, not altered by this agreement shall continue in force.
Said act of Congress provided for a commission to make a census of
these Indians, to select and make allotments of land in severalty to
them, and to superintend their removal, location and settlement on
such allotments. This part of the plan was not carried into execution
and the Southern Ute Indians continued to occupy the strip of land in
the south part of Colorado, as a reservation.
Another agreement was entered into with the Southern Ute Indians
in 1888, which provided for their removal to Utah, but this was never
ratified by Congress, being rejected by the act of February 20, 1895
(28 Stat., 677). At the same time it was directed that the agreement
of 1880 be carried out as i said act provided. It was then directed
that the Secretary of the Interior cause allotments to be made, to such
of the Southern Utes as should elect, and be considered by him quali-
fled, to take the same, out of the agricultural lands in their reserva-
tion in Colorado. For the use of those who should not elect to take
allotments, there was reserved the western portion of their reservation
and certain townships in New Mexico,
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subject, however, to th6 right of the government to erect and maintain agency build-
ings thereon and to grant rights of way through the same for railroads, irrigation
ditches, highways, and other necessary purposes.
It is in connection with the allotments made under this act that-the
question now presented arises.
Among the papers submitted are letters of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, written
in 1882 and 1883, in relation to certain maps of parts of this company's
road, filed under the right of way act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 482).
These maps affected lands in the original reservation, but entirely out-
side of the limits within which the allotments now in question were
made, and those letters do not afford any assistance in solving the
question now before the Department.
By the act of. June 8,1872 (17 Stat., 339), the Denver and Rio G rande
Railway Company was granted a right of way over the public domain,
with the proviso that said company should complete its railway to a
point on the Rio Grande as far south as Santa }'6, within five years, on
penalty of forfeiture of all rights under said act as to the uncompleted
portions of the road. By the act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 405), the
time for building the road was extended for five years.
Upon application of said company, the President of the UTnited States,
on May 12, 1880, made a formal statement as to the necessity for the
proposed road, in which, after mentioning the proposition of the com-
pany to extend its line of road through and over the reservation pro-
vided for the Ute Indians by the treaty of 1868 and the provision of
article XIV, thereof, said:
Now, therefore, being satisfied that the interests of the public at large do require
that such branches and extensions of said railroad should be constructed as proposed
by said company, I make this declaration of my opinion that the public interests
require the construction of such branches and extensions of said railroad through
and upon the said tract of land, so set apart for said bands of the Ute tribes of
Indians under the said treaty, the right to the construction of railroads through said
reservation being stipulated for in said article of said treaty in certain cases.
In 1883 the company filed two maps; one showing the line of road
from the tow:l of Antonito to the mouth of the iiio Piedra, and the
other to the town of Durango, which maps covered the entire line of
said road within the reservation where the allotments in question were
afterwards made. These maps were approved under said act of 1872.
In the letter returning the approved maps to the General Land Office,
dated January 15, 1884, the Secretary, after stating that the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs had recommended the approval, reserving the
question of compensation to the Indians for future consideration, said:
I concur in the views above expressed, and with the qualification mentioned as to
compensation, accordingly approve, under the granting act of June 8,-1872, the
maps referred to and return them here-with.
He, also, in that connection, referred to the provisions of article XIV,
of the treaty of 1868, spra, and the executive order of May 12, 1880,
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supra. I have not been able to learn that anything has been done in
regard to compensation.
This question as to right of the Indians to compensation for the right
of way does not affect the question now under consideration. The right
to compensation, if any, attached at the time the road was built and
can not be affected by the insertion in, or omission from, the patents
for allotments, made long subsequent to that time, of words denoting
that te.land is subject to said right of way. Neither can the insertion
or omission of such words affect the rights of the railroad company
or of te allottee. The question submitted is, therefore, one of policy
rather than of law.
It was formerly the policy to insert in final certificate and patents for
tracts of land traversed by railroads which had'been granted rights of
way, a reservation of such right of way and this whether the right was
claimed under the general right of way act of 1875 or under a special
act. This rule has, however, been changed as to roads claiming the
right of way under the general act. In: the case of Mary G. Arnett
(20 L. D., 131), it was held that said statute itself amply protected all
rights and it was, therefore, unnecessary to insert an excepting clause in
a patent for a tract of land crossed by such right of way. In the case
of Dunlap v. Shingle Springs and Placerville R. R. Co. (23 L. D., 67),
this ruling was adhered to and te distinction between cases arising
under the act of 1875 and nder special acts which do not i terms pro-
tect the company's right of way, was pointed out, the case of Florida
Central and Peninsular R. R. Co. v. Heirs of Lewis Bell (22 L. D., 451),
being referred to for the rule in such cases. On November 27, 1896
(23 L. D., 458), a circular was issued informing the local officers that
it is not necessary to note on final certificates a reservation of the right
of way where such right is claimed under the act of March 3, 1875, or
the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), granting the right of way for
canals and reservoirs. In the concluding paragraph of that circular it
is said:
It will be observed that the decisions above noted do not refer to cases where right
of way has been granted under special acts.
In this case the grant of the right of way was by a special act; there
is no question of forfeiture and the granting act does not in terms pro-
tect the company's right. Under the ruling in Florida Central and
Peninsular R. R. Co. v. Bell et a. (22 L. D., 451), where similar condi-
tions obtained, the patents for tracts across or over which this portion
of th'e Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Company's line runs should
contain a clause setting forth that the conveyance is made subject to
the right of way for said road.
The fact that in the preliminary or trust patent issued for Indian allot-
ments, the United States promise to convey a title in' fee simple free of
all incumbrance whatsoever at the end of the trust period, is an addi-
tional reason for inserting the excepting clause in such patents.
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In this case the road was built many years ago, so that the specific
tracts subject to the right of way are, or should be known, and, there-
fore, the excepting clause should be inserted in only those patents which
embrace those specific tracts.
Approved, January 24, 1898,
C. N. BLISS, 
Secretary.
STOKES v. PENSACOLA AND GEORGIA R. R. CO.
Motion for review of departmental decision of May 3, 1897, 24 L. D.,
396, dismissed by Secretary Bliss, January 24, 1898.
MINING CLAIM-APPLICATION FOR PATENT.
ASPEN MOUNTAIN TUNNEL LODE NO 1.
An application for mineral patent should not be allowed for land embraced within
the prior pending application of another.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Qffiee, January
(W. V. D.) 24, 1898. (P. J. C.)
It appears that The Aspen Mountain Tunnel and Drainage Company,
on February 11, 1896, made application, No. 522, for patent for the
Aspen Mountain Tunnel Lode No. 1 mining claim, survey No. 10,035,
Glenwood Springs, Colorado, land district. This application was
received and publication of notice commenced in a newspaper.
In March, 1896, and during the period of publication, the owners of
the raystone and the Alabama lode claims each filed a protest
against the acceptance by the local office of the application for patent
by the Aspen Company. (It is stated the owners of the Menlough
mining claim also filed a similar protest, but it is not found in the
record.) These protests allege, in substance, that the protestants are
the owners of the several claims; that in August, 1895, the owner of
the Sibley lode mining claim applied for a patent for the same; that
there was a conflict between the claims owned by the protestants and
the Sibley; that all of the conflict between protestants' claims and the
Sibley is also a part of the said Aspen Tunnel lode No. 1; that the
protestants each adversed the Sibley application,brought suits thereon,
and said suits are now pending and undetermined-
that unless said M. A. No. 522 is canceled and held for naught contestee will be
granted its receiver's receipt upon said premises so soon as said publication expires"
unless protestants go to the needless expense of again "adversing" and bringing suit
for the identical premises sued for in their adverse against said Sibley application.
The protestants pray that the application be canceled and publica-
tion notice ordered stopped.
At the request of counsel the local officers immediately forwarded
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the protests to your office, whereupon, by letter of March 25, 1896,
your office informed the register and receiver that their action was
irregular, required an immediate report fom them on the matter, and
directed them not to allow entry upon the application.
Without going into all the correspondence in detail, it is sufficient to
say-that, by direction of your office, the protestants were advised to
appeal from the action of the local office in allowing the application.
This they did, and the entire record was forwarded to your office, and
by letter of August 14, 1896, your office reversed the action below and
held the application for patent for the Aspen Mountain Tunnel Lode
No. 1 for cancellation.
From this decision the applicant has appealed, alleging that it is con-
trary to the rules of the land office and the law; that the application
is simply pending and not perfected and awaiting decision in the
adverse suits; that " there is no rule or law preventing the application
for patent for ground covered by previous entry pending adverses;"
that the survey having been allowed and approved by the surveyor-
general,the application filed and notices posted and published, it would
be subjecting applicant toadditional expense and delay to require him
to go through the same proceedings after the adverses are disposed of.
There is no brief filed by counsel for appellant, and it is not pointed
out wherein the decision of your office " is contrary to the rules of the
land office and the law." The question will not, therefore, be discussed
further than to say that it has uniformly been held by the Department,
where the question was raised, that an application for patent for a
mining claim will not be allowed to embrace therein ground covered by
the prior location and application of another (Rocky Lode, 15 L. D.,
571), and, also, that-
An entry allowed prior to the. final disposition of adverse proceedings must be
canceled and the parties placed it state quo, where it appears that such adverse
claim is still asserted and remains undetermined. (Meyer et al. v. Hyman, 7 L. D.,
83; se also Great Eastern Mining Co. . Esrneralda Mining Co., 2 Id., 704.)
It is true that in these cases the facts were not exactly the same as
those in the case at bar, but the principle announced applies with equal
force.
The question as to the right of possession of the ground in contro-
versy having been transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction,
there was no justification for the local officers in receiving an application
for the same land even from one not a party to the proceeding then
pending.
There was no specific rule in the mining circular approved December
10, 1891, covering such a case as this, but paragraph 49 of the new
Mining Regulations, approved December 15, 1897 (25 L. D., 561), was
prepared to meet just such emergencies as are here presented. It reads
as follows:
Before receiving and filing a mineral application for patent, local officers will be
particular to see that it includes no land which is embraced in a prior or pending
application for patent or entry, or any lands embraced in a railroad selection, or for
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which publication is pending or has been made by any other claimants, and if in
their opinion, after investigation, it should appear that a mineral application should
not, for these or other reasons, be accepted and filed, they should formally reject the
same, giving the reasons therefor, and allow the applicant thirty days for appeal to
this office under the Rules of Practice.
Your office judgment is affirmed.
RIGHT OF WAY-STATION GROUNDS-UNSURVEYED LAND.
ST. PAUL, MINNE APOLIS AND MANITOBA Ry. Co.
The actual use of unsurveyed public land as station grounds precludes the subsequent
acquisition of adverse rights to the land so occupied.
Secretary Bliss to the Coimmissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 24, 1898. (C. J. G.)
The St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company, under
the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 482), filed a plat,
showing its selection of station grounds at Laclede, Idaho, covering an
area of twenty acres in lots 1, , 3, the SW. of the NE., and the
NW. of the SE. i, Sec. 20, T. 56 N., R. 3 W., in the Cceur d'Alene
land district.
On July 23, 1892, your office refused to recommend the said plat for
approval, on the ground that the lands covered thereby, being unsur-
veyed, were not subject to approval under the above mentioned act.
After a survey had been made the railway company filed another
plat, which was also rejected by your office on May 19, 1897, but this
time for the reason that said plat, with the exception of about one
acre in the SW. of the NE. , covers land upon which entries have
been made, as follows:
lots I and 2, by John Kepky, August 7, 1896; and
lot 3, NW. i of SE. 1, by Lyman F. Markham, March 26, 1897.
In support of this last decision of your office the case of Dakota
Central Railway Company (12 L. D., 264) was cited.
The railway company has filed an appeal to this Department, it
being contended therein that, following the case of this company v.
Maloney et al. (24 L. D., 460), its plat should be approved, or a hearing
ordered to determine the priority of right between said company and
the adverse claimants named.
The syllabus of the case cited by the company is as follows:
The actual use of lands as station grounds, prior to survey, by a company that
has filed its articles of incorporation, proofs of organization, and constructed a
railroad over unsurveyed land, entitles said company to an approval of a plat of
said grounds, as against an intervening homestead entry, if such use antedates the
settlement of the homesteader.
Based on this ruling and the facts of the case under consideration,
the Department is warranted in instructing your office to order a
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hearing, after due notice to all parties concerned, for the purpose of
affording the railway company an opportunity to show that the lands
in question were actually used by said company as station grounds
prior to the initiation of the adverse claims referred to. It is so
directed.
INDIAN LANDS-TIMBER CUTTING.*
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE, Sejtember 28, 1897.
Logging Regulations to govern logging by Indians on the ceded
Chippewa Reservations, Minnesota, under the provisions of the act of
Congress approved June 7, 1897 (Public No. 3).
1st. The Indians on the ceded Chippewa reservations, Minnesota,
shall be authorized to enter into a contract or contracts with any respon-
sible person or persons to cut and bank any specified quantity of dead
timber standing or fallen on said reservations, at a given price per
thousand feet, such responsible person or persons being required to
give bond in a sufficient penalty, stipulating for the faithful perform-
ance of the obligations of such contract, the careful observance of the
intercourse laws, etc.
2nd. There shall be detailed from the corps of Chippewa examiners,
appointed under the act of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 62), for the
effectual carrying out of these regulations, a superintendent and as
many assistant uperintendents as the Commissioner of the General
Land Office may select. The superintendent detailed for the purpose
of directing logging operations, shall, with the assistance of the Indian
agent at White Earth agency, require each Indian desiring to cut and
bank saw-logs, to make a selection of the dead timber standing or
fallen; and thereafter make application to be allowed to contract for
the cutting and banking of such timber, describing by section, town-
ship and range the land on which the dead timber is standing or fallen.
3rd. Before any timber shall be cut under the foregoing authority, a
contract shall be entered into between the Indian applicant or appli-
cants and some responsible person or persons as provided in paragraph
one, and in such form as shall be prescribed by the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, which contract, however, shall not be of force
until the same is approved by the Indian agent and superintendent,
and confirmed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, which
approval and confirmation shall operate as a permit for the cutting and
banking of the timber applied for by the Indian or Idians.
4th. It shall be the duty of the superintendent and assistant super-
intendents to go into the woods with the loggers, and direct their
labors, to the end that no green or growing timber may be cut, and
*Not reported in Vo]. 25.
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that no live trees may be damaged in any manner, so as to cause them
to die, and also to inspect the scaling of the logs.
5th. The superintendent shall receive, in addition to his compensation
as examiner of Chippewa lands, two dollars per day for such time as
his services may be actually necessary in logging operations hereunder,
and both the superintendent and assistant superintendents shall receive
their necessary traveling expenses; and such additional compensation
and traveling expenses shall be paid from the proceeds of the sale of
logs. The assistant superintendents shall oversee and direct such por-
tions of the work as the superintendent may direct.
6th. With the exception of the superintendent, assistant superinten-
dents and scaler, and in cases where persons of sufficient knowledge
and skill for foremen, blacksmiths, filers, teamsters, clerks and cooks
cannot be found among the Indians, no white labor shall be employed
in performing this work.
7th. One-half of the cost of scaling shall be paid by the Indian log-
gers, and one-half by the purchaser of the logs. After the scaling is
completed, the sale of the logs shall not be valid until the same is
approved by the Indian agent and superintendent and confirmed by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
8th. The Indian agent will assume control of the proceeds of the sale,
fifteen per cent of which shall be deducted by him for the benefit of the
Indians, and to pay all expenses of the sale, such as advertising, tele-
graphing, additional compensation of superintendent and traveling
expenses of superintendent and assistant superintendents, provided
that, in any ca-se where the logs are sold for an amount exceeding $5
per thousand feet, the per cent or amount to be deducted for the benefit
of the Indians, as above stated, shall be proportionately increased in
the discretion of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The net proceeds remaining shall be divided and paid as follows:
1st. He shall pay, from the sales of the logs under each contract, the
party or parties furnishing the advances under the contract, authorized
in section 9, to the logger who delivered said logs.
9nd.. He shall pay the scaler or scalers of such logs, the amount due
on the part of the Indian logger.
3rd. He shall pay the foremen, blacksmiths, teamsters, filers, clerks
and cooks of the logger any balance that may be due them under their
contracts with the logger.
4th. He shall pay the laborers of the logger any unpaid balance
which may be due them under their contract for labor performed in the
cutting or delivery or banking of such logs.
5th. He shall pay the logger or contractor who banked such logs, any
part remaining of the amount to be paid under his contract.
9th. Any logging Indian, on a roper showing of his inability to fur-
nish his logging outfit, or to sustain himself, or his family, during the
logging operations, may receive advances of goods or cash from any
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party with whom he may contract, which contract shall first be approved
by the Indian agent to such a limit as the Indian agent may fix, and
such advances shall be paid by the Indian agent to the party making
the same frolij the amount to which such Indian is entitled for his
logging work.
10th. The Commissioner of the General Land Office shall have power
to prescribe such rules and regulations iot inconsistent with these
regulations as he may deem proper from time to time, for the more
efficient prosecution of the logging operations, and to thoroughly pro-
tect the interests of the Indians and the Government in the premises.
B INGER HEIRMANN,
Commission er.
Approved,
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
INDIAN LANDS-TIMBER CUTTING-ACT OF JNE 7, 1897.
THEODORE H. BEAULIEU.*
Permission to place portable saw mills in the vicinity of dead and down timber, cut
under the provisions of the act of¾June 7,1897, for the purpose of manufacturing
such timber into umber, may be granted, where the applicant enters into a con-
tract in the form prescribed by the regulations of September 28, 1897, and sub-
mits proof as to the present impracticability of marketing the timber.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, December
4, 1897. (J. I. P.)
I have before me your letter of the 22nd ultimo enclosing one from
Mr. R. H. Rosa, superintendent of dead and down timber, Chippewa
ceded lands, White Earth, Minnesota, covering the application of
Theodore H. Beaulieu for permission to cut dead timber, standing and
fallen, on certain sections in township 162 north, range 36 west, and to
establish portable saw-mills near such timber for its manufacture into
lumber.
Mr. Rosa states that the timber referred to has been dead many.
years, that it is rapidly decaying and that it is represented that if the
desired permission is accorded to Mr. Beaulieu the farming. community
in that vicinity will be greatly benefited.
You express the belief that if proper opportunity is not given to dis-
pose of the timber loss will result to the Indians. You have accord-
ingly recommended that you be authorized to grant permission to Mr.
Beaulieu to place a portable saw-mill in the-locality mentioned, on his
submitting satisfactory proof that the allegations as to the present im-
practicability of marketing the timber are true and when he has entered
into a contract in the form prescribed in the instructions of September
Not reported in Vol. 25.
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28, 1897, relating to dead and down timber on the ceded Chippewa
reservations, Minnesota, heretofore approved by the Department.
Under the authority of the act of June 7, 1897-Public No. 3, page
32-in pursuance of which the above instructions were issued, and
in accordance with your verbal request for such authority, I hereby
authorize you to grant the permission asked for in this and all other
cases, where the applicant will enter into a contract in the form pre-
scribed in the instructions of September 28, 1897, and where such per-
mission will, in your judgment, be for the benefit of the Indians and in
accordance -with the act of June 7, 1897 (supra).
You are also hereby directed to instruct Mr. Rosa, superintendent of
dead and down timber, to see that no other advantages inure to the
contractor in this or any other case, for the erection of a mill as pro-
posed, and require him to report to your office should any of said con-
tractors attempt to cut any other than dead and down timber on said
ceded lands; and on proof that any contractor has cut any other than
dead and down timber on said ceded lands,-his contract or permission
will be at once revoked.
ABANDONED MILITARY RESERVATION-SCHOOL GRANT.
INSTRUCTIONS.
The provision in the act of August 23, 1894, that lands within abandoned military
reservations restored for disposal under said act, shall be subject to entry by
actual settlers, is a congressional disposition of said lands that takes them out
of the operation of the school grant, if it had not attached prior to the estab-
lishment of the reservation.
The proviso to section 6, act of July 16, 1894, admitting Utah co the Union, does not
take the grant of school lands to said State out of the operation. of the general
rule as to the time when said grant attaches to the specific sections, or limit the
authority of Congress to so provide for the disposal of reserved lands, that on
their restoration the right of the State to the specific sections may be defeated.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) ,28, 1898. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt of your letter of November 18, 1897, resubmitting
for my consideration the circular of instructions to~the register and
receiver at Salt Lake City, Utah, as to disposal of the lands in the
abandoned Fort Cameron military reservation which received the
approval of the Department March 22, 1897, 24 L. D., 269.
It does not appear that any change is desired in these instructions
so far as they indicate the manner of disposal of the lands subject to
settlement and entry under the act of August 23, 1894 (28 Stat., 491),
which was the aim and purpose of the instructions, but the resubmis-
sion seems to be made merely with reference to the expression of
the Acting Commissioner as to what lands are excepted from settle-
88 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
ment and entry under the.act and to which the instructions did not
therefore apply.
The expression referred to is that " Sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 of this
reservation are reserved for school purposes.
The date when this reservation was established, and when it was
turned over to the custody of this Department, and when it was sur-
veyed, were not given in the letter of instructions of March 22, 1897,
and hence it received the approval of the Department upon the assump-
tion that the facts in that case warranted the statement made therein as
to the reservation for school purposes, but from the facts stated in the
communication now tnder consideration it is evident that it was intended
by your office to apply generally to military reservations turned over to
this Department under the act of August 23, 1894, following the decision
of your office of July 25, 1896, to which you refer, holding that as to the
lands within such reservations,
after providing for the preference rights of actual bona fide settlers, the balance
should be treated as public lands subject to all the land laws of the United States,
including grants for school purposes and all other public laws.
The question therefore submitted with your letter involves a con-
struction of the act of August 23, 1894, especially with reference to the
rights of the several States tnder the grant for school purposes to take
lands within the limits of abandoned military reservations containing
more than five thousand acres.
The grant to the several States of certain designated sections for
school purposes has been so clearly interpreted by the decisions of the
courts and of this Department as to leave little room for doubt as to
what lands come within its operation. It attaches to the specific sec-
tions in every township within the political boundaries of the State
which are disencunbered and free from reservation, at the date when
the sections are designated by survey,
but where the fee is in the United States at the date of survey and the land is so
encumbered that full and complete title and right of possession can not then vest in
the State, the State may if it so desires, elect to take equivalent lands in fulfillment
of the compact or it may await until the title and right of possession unite in the
government, and then satisfy its grant by takingthe lands specifically granted. State
of Colorado,6L.D., 412. eealsoCooper v.Roberts, 18 How., 173; Hanv.Missouri,
lb. 126; Beecher . Weatherby, 95 U. S., 517; IHeydeufeldt . Daney Gold Mining
Company, 93 U. S., 631.
Until the status of the land is actually fixed by survey, as shown by the township
plat, so that the grant may attach to the specific section, the government has the ab-
-solute power to dispose of it as a part of the public domain, or to provide for its dis-
posal in any manner that may promote the public interest. Gregg v. State of Colo-
rado, 15 L. D., 151.
This principle was clearly announced in the case of Heydenfeldt v.
Daney Gold Mining Company, supra, in which the court said:
A grant, operating at once and attaching prior to the surveys by the United
States, would deprive Congress of the power of disposing of any part of the lands
in Nevada until they were segregated fom those granted.
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Again the court in holding that the words of the present grants are
restrained by words of qualification intended to protect the State
against loss that might happen through the action of Congress in set-
tling or disposing of the public domain says:
Besides no other construction is consistent with the statute as a wole, and
answers the evident intention of its makers to grant to the State iprawsenti a quantity
of lands equal in amount to the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections in each township.
Until the status of the lands was fixed by a survey, and they were capable of identi-
fication, Congress reserved absolute power over them; and if in exercising it the
whole or any part of a sixteenth or thirty-sixth section had been disposed of, the
State was to be compensated by other land equal in quantity, and as near as may
be in quality. By this means the State was fully indemnified, the settlers ran no
risk of losing the labor of years, and Congress was left free to legislate touching the
national domain in any way it saw fit, to promote the public interests.
See also Mining Company v. Consolidated Mining Co. 102 U. S., 167.
Until survey, Congress reserved the right either to sell them or dispose
of them in any other way that commends itself to its judgment. Hence
if a reservation is created within the boundaries of any State prior to
survey, Congress may in providing for the survey of such reservation
and its restoration to the public domain so dispose of it as to deprive
the State of the right to the specific sections, in which event it would
be compensated by the selection of other lands in lien thereof. Heyden.
feldt v. Daney Gold Mining Company, supra, and Mining Company v.
Mining Company, spra. Gregg v. Colorado, supra.
Keeping inview this interpretation, has Congress by the act of August
23, 1894, so restored lands within abandoned military reservations con-
taining more than 5,000 acres, to the public domain as to subject them
"to all the land laws of the United States including grants for school
purposes and other public laws."
The act of July 5, 1884, (23 Stat., 103), providing for the disposal of
abandoned military reservations required that they shall be surveyed
and approved and disposed of at public sale to the highest bidder for
cash at not less than the approved value and not less than one dollar
and twenty-five cents per acre.
Under said act the Secretary is authorized to cause the lauds in said
reservation to be subdivided into tracts of less than forty acres each
and into town lots, or either, or both if in his opinion the public interests
so require. By a proviso to this act settlers who were in occupation
of any part of said reservation prior to its location or had settled
thereon prior to January 1, 1884, in good faith for the purpose of secur-
ing a home and entering it under the general laws ad had continued
in such occupation to the date of the act and were qualified to make
homestead entry shall be entitled to enter the land so occupied not
exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, according to the legal subdivi-
sions.
As these lands had been enhanced in value by the uses for which
they had been reserved, it was the general policy of the government at
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that time, that it should receive the benefit of such enhanced value by
offering them for sale to the highest bidder for cash in tracts or lots of
such area as would best subserve the public interest.
Many of these reservations, however, in the western States were of
such extended area that the act of July 5, 1884, could not be made to
apply to the entire area of such reservations without conflicting with
what afterwards became the established policy of te governmeitt to
wit, the disposal of the public lands to actual settlers as homesteads
rather than at public sale to the highest bidder, and hence the act of
August 23, 1894, was passed, which did not limit the right of home-
stead settlers to such lands as they were in actual occupancy of at the
date of location of the reservation or upon which they had settled prior
to January 1, 1884, but provided:
That all lands not already disposed of included within the limits of any abandoned
military reservation heretofore placed under the control of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior for disposition under the act approved July fifth, eighteen hundred and eighty-
four, the disposal of which has not been provided for by a suibsequent act of Con-
gress, where the area exceeds five thousand acres, except such legal subdivisions as
have government improvements thereon, and except also such other parts as are now
or may be reserved for some public use, are hereby opened to settlement under the
-public land laws of the United States, and a preference right of entry for a period
of six months from the date of this act shall be given all bou ide settlers who are
qualified to enter under the homestead law and have made improvements and are
now residing upon any agricultural lands in said reservations, and for a period of
six months from the date of settlement when that shall occur after the date of this
act: Provided, That persons who enter under the homestead law shall pay for such
lands not less than the value heretofore or hereafter determined by appraisement,
nor less than the price of the land at the time of the entry, and such payment, at
the option of the purchaser, be made in five equal installments at times, and at rates
of interest to be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior.
The established policy of the government to dispose of the public
lands to homestead settlers only, was thus preserved without discard-
ing the policy that formerly obtained of disposing of such lands for
revenue. The purpose of the act is made manifest by the report of the
House Committee on Public Lands, which was concurred in by the
report of the Committee on Public Lands of the Senate, so far as it set
forth the object of the bill, the circumstances which called for such leg-
islation and the policy which had prevailed in previous years with ref-
erence to the disposal of lands in abandoned military reservations
See Senate Report 6350-53d Congress 2d Session.
The House Committee in reporting the bill after referring to existing
legislation and that no provision had been made in the act of July 5,
1884, for opening the lands to agriculturat settlemnent, says:
The pending bill is intended to apply only to reservations of which the area
exceeds 5000 acres, and only to such portions of the reservations to which it shall
apply as have no improvements thereon and as are not reserved for any public use.
That beyond these reservations and parts of reservations the provisions of th said
act of July 5,18841, are to remain unchanged and in full operation, while those lands
as to which this bill shall operate shall be open to homestead settlement, with the
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condition that survey and appraisement thereof shall be made according to the pro-
visions of the act of July 5, 1884, and that parties claiming the same as settlers shall
be allowed ninety days in which to make entry thereof, with the requirements super-
added to the ordinary requirements of the homestead law that they shall pay for the
lands so entered by them at not less than the appraised value and not less than the
minimum price of such lands under the general statutes, in five equal installments,
at times to be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior by general regulations.
It is the established policy of the government to dispose of the public lands as
homes to actual settlers rather than to sell them for a money price for the benefits of
the Treasury, as was formerly done.
This is the policy applied to any public lands remaining undisposed of in the
vicinity of the lands once embraced in military reservations now abandoned, and the
settlers naturally doubt the expediency of applying a different rule to the latter
class of lands if agricultural in character, unimproved, and not required for any
public use. The reason ordinarily given therefor is that if the lands have enhanced
in value, the government rather than the individual settlers should have the benefit
of it, notwithstanding that with respect to lands generally the government has dis-
carded the policy of managing them and disposing of them for revenue.
In this the object is kept in view of securing the benefit of any enhancement of
value of the lands to the Treasury while giving settlers the preference in purchase
at such enhanced value, to be ascertained by appraisement. This would appear to be
in harmony with the general policy now prevailing which looks to the disposal of the
lands to the settlers, and as calculated to do away with the seeming anomaly in the
existing methods of disposing of abandoned military reservations ona different and
contradictory principle. It may be added that the proposed legislation would be in
the line of the legislation under which reliuquisled Indian reservations in the
Dakotas, Montana, and Oklahoma (re now being disposed of to settlers under the
homestead laws, but with payment of a prescribed price per acre, in addition to the
usual homestead requirements.
If thisreport is to be accepted as a guide to the true interpretation
of the act, it is apparent that it was not intended to repeal any of the
provisions of the act of July 5, 1881, but that its purpose was to keep said
act in full force as to the power of the Secretary to subdivide the reser-
vatton or any part of it into town lots or either or both, and to sell
them at public auction to the highest bidder while it further extended
the privilege granted to the-homesteact settler by subjecting all'the land
in such reservation, with certain exceptions therein named, to settle-
ment and entry, under the homestead law upon the conditions stated.
in the proviso to said act.
The words "those lands as to which this bill shall operate, shall be
opened to homestead settlement, with the condition that survey and
appraisement thereof shall be made according to the provisions of the
act of July 5, 1884," can have but one meaning, and clearly indicate
that the words of the act, " opened to settlement under the public land
lawvs of the United States," have reference to agricultural settlement
laws, and as the homestead law was the only law then in force under
which agricultural entries depending upon settlement could be made,
it meant opened to settlement and entry under the homestead law.
In construing the statute we are not to look to any single phrase in it but to its
whole scope in order to arrive at the intention of the makers of it. If a literal
interpretation of any of it woild be contrary to the evident meaning of the act taken
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as a whole it should be rejected. There is no better way of discovering its true
meaning when expressions in it are rendered ambiguous by their connection with
other clauses than by considering the necessity for it and the canses which induced
its enactment. Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold Mining Company, 93 U. S., 638.
But there is no difficulty in arriving at this conclusion from the con-
text alone, unaided by the report. The words "open to settlement
under the public land' laws" must necessarily have reference to laws
under which settlement is one of the means of initiating a right and is
an essential condition to the acquisition of title. It has a well known
technical meaning, and has reference to settlement which can only be
made and maintained in person as contradistinguished from occupancy
and settlement, which may be maintained by tenants and agents as in
the case of occupants of townsite lots.
This view is confirmed by other parts of the context, which when
read together make clear the purpose of the act. The preference right
of entry given to bona fide settlers "who are qualified to enter under
the homestead law," residing upon any agricultural lands in said reser-
vations is of itself indicative of the character of settlement contem-
plated by the act, but when read in connection with the proviso, "that
persons who enter under the homestead law shall pay for such lands not
less than the value heretofore or hereafter determined by appraisement
nor less than the price of the land at the time of entry," the conclusion
is irresistible.
It therefore follows that while the provisions of the act of July 5,
1884, remain unchanged and in full operation as to all abandoned mili-
tary reservations, all lands within such reservations that have been
placed under the control of the Secretary of the Interior prior to the
passage of the act of August 23, 1894, where the area exceeds five
thousand acres are also subject to disposal to actual settlers, who are
qualified to make homestead entry and that they are not to be treated
as "public lands subject to all the land laws of the United States
including grants for school purposes." Where the grant to the State
for school purposes had not attached to the designated sections prior
to the location of the military reservations which are afterwards aban-
doned, such sections are not subject to the grant, but indemnity must
be taken in lieu thereof.
As the lands withini the Fort Cameron military reservation had been
surveyed, and were subject to disposal under the act of August 23,
1894, at the date of the proclamation, January 4, 1896 (29 Stat., 876)
admitting the State of Utah into the Union, the declaration in the
circular of March 22, 1897, that " sections two, sixteen, thirty-two and
thirty-six of this reservation are reserved for school purposes " would
imply that the proviso to the sixth section of the act of July 16, 1894,
(28 Stat., 107) providing for the admission of Utah into the Union,
takes the grant for school purposes to said State out of the operation
of the general rule herein announced.
The sixth section of said act grants to the State for the support of
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common schools, sections two, sixteen, thirty-two and thirty-six with
the usual condition that where such sections have been sold or other-
wise disposed of by or under the authority of ay act of Congress,
other lands equivalent thereto may be taken in lieu thereof, with the
proviso:
- That the second, sixteenth, thirty-second, and thirty-sixth sections ebraced in
permanent reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to
the grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this act, nor shall any lands embraced
in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the grants
or to the indemnity provisions of this act until the reservation shall have been
extinguished and snch lands be restored to and become a part of the public domain.
It will be seen that the grant to this State is in the same general
terms as the grants to other States, that is, of specific sections in every
township, and where such sections have been sold or otherwise disposed
of at the date of survey, other lands equivalent thereto are granted in
lieu thereof, and there is nothing in the proviso that takes this grant
out of the operation of the general rule as to when the grant attaches
to the specific sections, -or as to the power of Congress to so provide
for the disposal of all the lands within the reservations, upon their
restoration to the public domain, as to defeat the right of the State to
the specific sections. On the contrary, it is clear that nothing more
was meant than, that upon the restoration of the lands to the public
domain they shall be subject to the grant and its indemnity provisions,
the same as all other parts of the public domain within said State, and
there is nothing in the language of the proviso to indicate that the
grant should take effect absolutely upon the extinguishment of the.
reservation so as to deprive Congress of the power to dispose of the pub-
lie domain in any manner it might deem proper. If at the date of
survey, and after the extinguishment of the reservation, the specific
section had not been sold or otherwise disposed of by authority of any
act of Congress, or if no provision had been made by Congress for the
disposal of said lands incompatible with the grant to the State, the
grant would attach to the specific sections, otherwise the State would
be required, to select other lands in lieu thereof under its indemnity
provisions of the grant.
The purpose of the proviso was two-fold: First, to deny the State
the right to indemnity for any of the specific sections which the gov-
ernment might appropriate for permanent use and occupation; and
second, to withhold from the State the benefits of section 2275, Revised
Statutes as amended by the act of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat., 796), so
far as it authorizes the selection of indemnity for school sections
embraced in Indian, military or other reservations, during the exist-
ence of such reservations, whether surveyed or unsurveyed.
This section provides that where the school sections are embraced in
a reservation, the selection of other lands in lieu thereof shall be a
waiver of the right to the school section, and that it shall be the duty
of the Secretary of the Interior without awaiting the extension of the
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public surveys, to ascertain by protraction or otherwise the number of
townships in such reservation and thereupon the State shall be entitled
to select indemnity lands in lieu thereof, but that the State shall not
be prevented from awaiting the extinguishment of the reservation and
the restoration of the lands to the public domain, and then taking the
school sections in place.
In the disposal of lands within the abandoned military reservations,
you will be controlled by the views herein expressed, and to that extent
the circular of March 22, 1897, 24 L D., 269, and of November 20, 1896
(23 L. D., 567), in which a similar expression occurs, are modified.
SWVAMP LAND CLAIM-STATE SELECTION-APPROVAL.
S`TATE OF CALIFORNIA.
Where a State, during the pendency of its appeal from the adverse action of the
local office on a swamp land claim, selects the tracts involved in said claim under
other State grants, and such selections are approved, the action of the State in
making sch selections must be held a waiver of its claims under the swamp
grant.
The approval of selections so made is a final adjudication of the right of the State to
make such selections, and operates to pass title thereunder; and the State having
accepted the title thus acquired will not he heard to question the validity thereof.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 28, 1898. (P. J. C.)
The Department is in receipt of your office letter "@K" of September
4, 1897, wherein the following facts are shown:
It appears that lands in T. 3 S., E. 7 E., M. D. M., had been returned
as high land by the approved plat in-1855. In 1866 the surveyor-gen-
eral of California entered a claim in the local office alleging that this
and other lands were swamp and overflowed under the act of September
28, 1850 (Section 2488 Revised Statutes). A hearing was had, and the
local officers decided that the laud was not swamp and overflowed as
claimed by the State. An appeal was taken from this action, and the
record was transmitted to your office, where it was mislaid and was not
found until 1879, when "the matter was then taken up and a decision
rendered July 13, 1879, which decision was declared final May 5, 1881."
It seems that your office reversed the decision of the local officers
and found the following described tracts to be swamp land:
Lot 1 of Sec. 19; the S. i of the NE. 1, the NW. I of the NE. , the
NE. i of the NW. { (or lot 2), the S. J of the NW. 1, the N. 3- of the
SW. i, and the SE. of Sec. 20; and the SW. 4of the NE. 1 and the
NW.- of Sec. 28.
No annotation was made on the tract books of your office showing
the pendency of the hearing to determine the character of the land,
and on October 18,1871 the tracts in sections 19 and 20 were approved
to the State under section eight of the act of 1841 (5 Stat., 455), and on
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February 2, 1872, the tracts in section 28 were approved to the State
under section thirteen of the act of March 3,1853 (10 Stat., 244), which
is a grant to California for public buildings. The lands thus approved
were selected and applied for by the State in the manner prescribed by
the statutes cited.
It appears that the State has conveyed the lands thus selected and
approved under said acts of S41 and 1853; that an application has
been made to the State to purchase the lands as swamp and overflowed
land. It is stated in your said office letter:
It has been held by this office that it would be necessary for the State of Califor-
nia to reconvey to the United States the lands certified to the State under the acts
of 1841 and 1853, spra, before they can be approved and patented under the s-wamp-
land grant.
I am now in receipt of a letter (with inclosures) from the attorney for the assignees
of the State,from which it appears that there is no State official, authorized by law,
to make such reconveyance. It is stated, however, that if a "reconveyance of the
outstanding worthless title, based on a void listing, is necessary," the assignees of
the State are willing to convey the land to the United States, in any manner deemed
necessary, in ordor that they may procure a valid title to the land under the swamp
grant.
In view of the decision of the Department in the case of Stokes v. Pensacola and
Georgia R. R. Co. (24 L. D., 396) and cases therein referred to, the matter is respect-
fully submitted to you for instructions as to whether a recon veyance from the assignees
of the State shall be demanded, or shall the lands be included in a list to be submitted
to you for approval nder the swamp-land grant.
The status of this matter, to briefly recapitulate it, is as follows:
The land was originally returned as agricultural in character in 1855;
some ten years thereafter the State sought to have it declared swamp
and overflowed; as a result of the hearing ordered for this purpose, the
local officers decided it was not swamp and overflowed; before a final
determination of this inquiry the State applied for and secured the lands
under the other acts named. It now seeks, through parties applying
to purchase the land from the State as swamp-land, to have the former
selections under the acts of 1841 and 1853 set aside and the tracts
approved to it under the swamp-laud act.
It is the opinion of the Department that this can not be done, or,
rather, that the State by its own action is estopped from now claiming
the land as swamp. The State, like any other party seeking redress
or the enforcement of its rights, is charged with notice of the condi-
tions it has produced. At the time it made its applications for the
land under the acts of 1841 and 1853, it knew of its former application
to have the tracts declared swamp and overflowed, and in view of this
its later action in applying for it nder other laws should be construed
as a waiver of its first application. The fact that the record had been
mislaid in your office and no action taken thereon for a number of
years, and that no notation was made on the tract books of the hear-
ing, is of no force so far as the State is concerned. It is charged with
notice of the status of its former application, and if it elected to take
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the land under other acts, it thereby waived its appeal and acquiesced
in the adverse decision of the local officers.
At the time when the State made its selections and at the time when
they were approved to it, the judgment of the local officers declaring
the land not to be swampy in character was still in force. Instead of
insisting upon its appeal to your office as a means of obtaining the
land nuder its swamp grant, the State voluntarily selected the land
and disposed of it under other grants.
The Department can not recommend, at this late day, a re-adjust-
ment of the former action.
It is urged that under the act of August 3, 1854, (10 Stat., 346), it is
the duty of your office to approve the land to the State as swamp.
This act is as follows:
That in all cases where lands have been, or shall hereafter be, granted by any law
of Congress to any one of the several States and Territories; and where said law
does not convey the fee simple title of such lands, or require patents to be issued
therefor; the lists of such lands which have been or may hereafter be certified by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under the seal of said office, either as
originals, or copies of the originals or records, shall be regarded as conveying the
fee simple of all the lands embraced in such lists that are of the character con-
templated by such act of Congress, and intended to be granted thereby; t where
lands embraced in such lists are not of the character embraced by such acts of Con-
gress, and are not intended to be granted thereby, said lists, so far as these lands
are concerned, slall be perfectly null and void, and no right, title, claim, or interest,
shall be conveyed thereby.
It is the latter clause of this act which it is claimed makes the approval
under the acts of 1841 and 1853 " perfectly null and void." This con-
tention is not considered sound. So far as any determination of the
question as to the swampy character of the land is concerned, at the
time the same was approved to the State, it was that it was not swampy.
The State then selected it under other grants with a full knowledge of
that decision. If the land was, as a physical fact, swamp in character, it
is hardly to be supposed that the State would have applied for it under
other grants.. But be that as it may, the Department will assume, after
this lapse of time, that the land was of the character contemplated by
the acts of 1841 and 1853.
And aside from this the approval by the Department of the selection
made by the State was a final adjudication of the right of the State
to make the selection, and operated to pass title to the State. And the
State having accepted the grant, neither it, nor its grantees, can now
be heard to dispute the validity of the title thus acquired. (Chandler
v. Calumet and Hcela Mining Co., 149 U. S., 79.)
In view of this determination it will be seen that the case of Stokes
v. Pensacola and Georgia P. R. Co., cited by your office, is hardly in
point. It was there determined that the grant to that road had not
been finally adjudicated, hence the Department still had jurisdiction
over the land, whereas in the case at bar the title has passed to the
State, and the Department is therefore without jurisdiction.
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The papers are herewith returned and you are directed to notify the
parties in interest of this decision.
RAILROAD GRANT-ORDER OF RESTORATION MODIFIED.
UNION OIL COMPANY.
The departmental order of January 18,1898, 26 L. D., 48, with respect to the restora-
tion of lands within the forfeited primary limits of the Atlantic and Pacific
grant modified.
Secretary Bliss to the Comiissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 28, 1898. (F. W. C.)
In departmental communication of January 18, 1808 (26 L. D., 48)
you were advised that
in so far as departmental letter of November 8,1893, in answer to your office letter
of October 25, 1893, operated to defer the opening to entry of the lands embraced in
what was then known as suit No. 184 (which is the one recently decided in the
supreme court, as hereinbefore stated), it is hereby recalled, and you will proceed
as theretofore directed in departmental letter of July 15, 1893, relating to these lands.
This contemplated a restoration of the lands involved in said suit
No. 184.
The decree which was passed by the circuit court of appeals declared
that it was not to
affect any right which the defendants, or any of them, other than the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company, now have or may hereafter acquire in, to or respecting
any of the lands hereinbefore described, in virtue of the act of Congress entitled
"An act to provide for the adjustment of land grants made by Congress to aid in the
construction of railroads and for the forfeiture of unearned lands, and for other pur-
poses," approved March 3, 1887.
In the decision of the supreme court (168 U. S., 1) the decree of the
circuit court of appeals was
affirmed in all respects to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, as well as to
the trustees in the mortgage executed by that company, and affirmed also as to the
other defendants, subject, however, to the right, of the government to proceed in
the circuit Court to a final decree as to those defendants.
The order of suspension will therefore remain as to the lands shown
by the record in said case No. 184 to be involved in the claims of the
defendants other than the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the
trustees in the mortgage executed by that company.
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SWAMP LAND CLAIM-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1S5T.
STATE OF MICHIGAN (ON REVIEW).
The act of March 3, 1857, did not confirm a certified list of swamp selections based
on an erroneous survey, where, prior to the passage of said act, the certification
had been corrected on evidence furnished by a resurvey.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Q0 lce, January
(W. V. D.) 28, 1898. (E. F. B.)
On March 8, 1889, your office transmitted to the Department a motion
for review of the decision of the Department of December 17, 1888,
(7 L. D., 514) affirming the decision of your office, rejecting the claim
of the State of Michigan, under the swamp land grant, to certain tracts
of land in the Reed City and Marquette land districts specifically set
forth in said decision.
These lands had been reported to your office as swamp and over-
flowed lands and were embraced in two lists which were approved by
the Secretary of the Interior in 1853 and 1854, respectively, but upon
discovery that the surveys upon which such selections were made were
erroneous, a resurvey of said townships was made, and supplementary
lists of lands in such resurveyed townships were prepared, which did
not embrace the lands in controversy and which abrogated and super-
seded all lists of lauds in said townships made prior thereto.
The State claimed that the first certification was conclusive of its
right to the lands not embraced in the second certificate, and that
under the act of March 3, 1857, its title to all the lands described in
such certifications was absolutely confirmed, both as to lands selected
under the oiiginal as well as under the corrected survey.
The Department denied the claim of the State upon the ground, that
as the lands were erroneously embraced in certifications based on origi-
nal surveys that were erroneous, the State was not entitled to such
lands as were not of the character granted and that the Secretary of
the Interior in the exercise. of a rightful jurisdiction, was authorized
to correct such certification in accordance with the facts. Further,
that the act of March 3, 1857, did not confirm the original selections
based on erroneous surveys, as such selections had been corrected prior
to the passage of said confirmatory act.
Said motion is based solely
upon the allegation of error in matters both of law and of fact appearing upon the
face of the record..
Action upon this motion was suspended upon the application of the
State of Michigan, it having been brought to the attention of the De-
partment by a letter from the Attorney-General of said State under
date of September 7, 1892, that the questions involved herein were also
involved in a case then pending in the United States circuit court for
the eastern district of Michigan.
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The case referred to is the case of The Michigan Land and Lumber
Company v. Charles A Rust, which was decided by the supreme court,
December 13, 1897; 168 U. S., 581.
The decision of the Department of December 17, 1888, is fully sus-
tained under the rulings annunciated by the supreme court in the case
above referred to and the motion is therefore denied.
SWAMP LAND CLAIM-HoMESTEAD-HEARING.
STATE OF MICIEIGAN v. FoSDICK.
In a case arising between a homesteader and a State claiming under the the swamp
grant, a hearing may be properly ordered to determine the character of the land,
where the said grant is adjusted on the field notes. of survey, but the survey
having been made prior to the grant, furnishes no satisfactory evidence as to the
actual character of the land.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 28, 1898. (E. F. B.)
On INovember 4, 1884, Oscar B. Fosdick made homestead entry at the
local office, Reed City, Michigan, of lot No. 8, See. 6, Bois Blanc Island,
which is also claimed by the State of Michigan as swamp and over-
flowed land. --
On December 24, 1884, your office held the homestead entry of Fosa
dick for cancellation, for the reason that the field notes of survey
showed said land to be swamp and overflowed at the date of the swamp
land grant to said State, but on March 12,1886, your office re-examined
the field notes of survey of the township embracing the tract in contro-
versy and it was then held that they do not show that said tract was
swamp and overflowed within the meaning of the swamp land grant.
The action of your office of December 29, 1884, holding the entry of Fos-
dick for cancellation was revoked and the claim of the State rejected.
From this action the State appealed.
Bois B]anc Island was surveyed in 1827, prior to the date of the
grant. At this date the deputy surveyors were not required to make
surveys with special reference to the swamp land grant, indicating
what lands are subject to the grant. See State of Louisiana 5 L. D., 514.
In the case of Cshing et al., v. State of Michigan 4 L. D.,.415,
involving the claim of the State to lands in. Bois Blanc Island as
swamp and overflowed land, it was held that:
As the survey furnishes no satisfactory evidence of the character of this land, and
the State cannot be deprived of it if it is of the character claimed, you are hereby
directed to return the record of these several cases to the local office, with instruc-
tions to order a hearing to determine the character of these lands at the date of the
grant, as near as may be obtained, after notice to all parties, and if it should appear
from such examination that the greater part of any subdivision was swamp and
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unfit for cultivation, such subdivision will inure to the benefit of the State under
the grant, and if the evidence shows that the greater part of any subdivision was
not of such character, such subdivision shall be sbject to entry.
The same action should be taken on this case, and you are therefore
directed to order a hearing to determine the character of the land as
above set forth.
MINERAL AND AGRICIJLITURAL CLAIMS-ESTOPPEL.
REID ET AL. V. LAVALLEE ET AL.
The fact that as between a mineral claimant and one claiming under the settlement
laws the settler is estopped by his own acts from denying the mineral character
of the land, does not relieve the Department from the duty of determining the
actual character of the land in dispute.
Land must be held non-mineral where no discoveries of appreciable value have been
made, and it does not appear that a further expenditure would develop the pres-
ence of mineral in paying Cuantities.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) -28, 1898. (E. B., Jr.),
The land involved in this case is a part of the NE. i of the NW. 1 of
section 26, T. 12 N., R. 8 E., M. D. M., Sacramento, California, land dis-
trict. On October 9, 1893, W. H. Lavallee, the defendant herein, made
homestead entry No. 6265 for the E. - of the NW. I and the E. A of the
SW. of said section, thus including the land first above indicated.
On February 9, 1895, he commuted said entry to cash entries No. 269
for the E. - of the NW. I, and No. 270 for the E. - of the SW. of said
section, by locating thereon military bounty land warrants Nos. 113,134
and 115,056, respectively.
On May 1, 1895, Thomas B. Reid, Isaac E. Reid and Anthony Ditt-
mar, the last named as agent for his wife Mary E. Dittmar, filed their
joint affidavit of contest, alleging that said Thomas B. and Isaac E.
Reid and said Mary E. Dittmar are the owners of, in possession and
entitled to the possession of, a five-sixth undivided interest in the West
End Quartz lode claim, about three-fourths of which is situated in the
NE..1 of. the NW. of said section; that said lode claim was duly
located by said Lavallee March 24, 1893; that afflants derive their
interests in said claim from and through said Lavallee by purchase
and conveyance prior to said cash entry No. 269; that said claim has
been duly held and represented each year, according to law, under its
said location, and is shown by the development thereof to contain a,
valuable ledge or lode containing gold; that said claim is more valu-
able for mining than for agriculture; that said Lavallee had personal
knowledge of the existence of said ledge or lode at and prior to his said
cash entryNo. 269, having had a number of tons of ore therefrom reduced
in a custom mill, and having reported to his co-owners, said affiantsJ
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that three tons of the ore had produced two ounces of gold worth $18.00
per ounce, and in addition sulphurets or concentrates worth $21.00;
that said Lavallee is not acting in good faith but is'seeking fraudulently
to acquiretitle to valuable mineral land under a pretended agricultural
claim; wherefore affiants protest against the issuance of patent for any
part of said lode claim, under or by reason of said.cash entry No. 269,
and ask that a hearing be had to afford them opportunity to prove the
foregoing allegations. This affidavit was duly corroborated.
Pursuant to direction of June 7, 1895, by your office, the hearing
asked was held at the local office, commencing October 7,1895, at which
appeared the contestants, said Lavallee, and, also, one H. T. Renton,
who, claiming to be a transferee of Lavallee under said cash entries,
was allowed to intervene. The local officers, on December 2, 1895,
decided the land in controversy to be agricultural in character, and
although they found the allegations of the contestants as to the loca-
tion of said lode claim, and as to purchases and conveyances from
ILavallee-to be true, and also that he had executed other conveyances
of his interest in said claim, prior to said cash entry No. 269, they
further decided that the validity of this entry was not affected thereby,
and recommended that the contest be dismissed and the said cash entries
passed to patent. On March 25, 1896, your office affirmed the decision
of the local offle and dismissed the contest. From your office decision
contestants appeal, assigning numerous errors of fact and law.
It appears from the record herein, in addition to the facts herein-
before set out, that said lode claim was located by said Lavallee March
24, 1893, the certificate of location duly filed for record April 4, 1893,
and that the locator and his gantees have held and worked the
same since according to ]aw; that about three fourths of said claim
are within the NE. i of the NW. i of said section 26; that by convey-
ances duly executed and recorded Lavallee, as locator of said claim,
had conveyed five-sixths of his interest therein to said Anthony Ditt-
mar, T. B. Reid and one C. H. Hubbard, prior to September 22, 1893; that
said Di ttmar and C. H. Hubbard conveyed their interests to said Mary E.
Dittmar and Isaac E. Reid, respectively, prior to February 10, 1894,
and that the conveyances thereof were dly recorded; that during all
the time from date of his said location Lavallee held a one sixth inter-
est in said claim until July 25, 1894, whent he conveyed the remainder
of his interest therein to one C. A. Roberts, and that this conveyance
was duly recorded December 20, 1894, all of the other aforesaid convey-
ances having been recorded prior to that time; that in all these con-
veyances said claim is particularly described by metes and bounds as
lode mining ground; and that Lavallee, on February 16, 1895, executed
a deed to said H. T. Renton for all the land embraced in said cash entries.
It is also shown that the mineral claimants and co-owners with Lav-
allee, of said lode claim, were induced to purchase their interests through
their reliance on the validity of the location made by Lavallee and
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through his representations of the existence therein of a valuable gold
bearing lode or ledge; and that they employed him to develop the claim
and paid him money from time to time, both before and after he made
his said homestead entry, for the development work, consisting chiefly
of a tunnel about one hundred feet in length, and expended considerable
sums for .supplies and materials needed in such development on the
strength of his representations, which representations continued to be
made as late as May, 1894.
It is urged, in effect, by protestants' counsel, that Lavallee, by reason
of his previous connection with said lode claim and his representations
as aforesaid, and protestants' reliance thereon, is estopped, as against
these protestants, from denying the mineral character of the land in
controversy, and that RentoD, as grantee of Lavallee, under his said
cash entry, with constructive knowledge of Lavallee's location of said
lode claim and of his conveyance of his interest therein, is similarly
estopped. t is not claimed that Renton had any knowledge of the
special representations made by Lavallee to protestanfs either before or
after the date of his homestead entry.
The contention as to estoppel, either as against Lavallee or Renton, is
cot well taken in this proceeding. There can be no doubt, from the
evidence, that Lavallee has been guilty of bad faith as against these
protestants. The only questions, however, properly before the land
department in this proceeding are those which relate to the actual
known character of the land in controversy at the date of cash entry
No. 269. If the land was then known to be valuable chiefly for its
mineral contents it was not subject to such entry, and the entry as to
such land must be canceled regardless of the good faith or bad faith of
Lavallee in the premises. The relations at any time existing between
Lavallee and protestants could not, in themselves, obviously, have any
bearing upon the real character of the land, nor could his representa-
tions, though fa]se and fraudulent, relieve the land department of its
duty. to determine the actual known character of the land at date of
the cash entry. The land department clearly could not regard the land
as mineral in character ad hold it for disposal under the mining laws,
by reason of its location by Lavallee as mineral land and his represen-
tations to his said grantees that the land was mineral, if, in fact, the
land was not then known to be mineral in character, nor could the
status of the land be affected in. any way by the further facts that such
representations were fraudulent as against such grantees, and that
Lavallee was at the same time claiming the land under the homestead
law. If the land was agricultural in character when Lavallee made his
cash entrytherefor, and if he is shown to have possessed the necessary
qualifications, and to have fully complied with the homestead law up
to-that time, his entry must stand. However much his conduct and
representations might operate as an estoppel against him in his private
affairs, the government can not be bound thereby. Lavallee's action
in representing the land to be mineral and in attempting to dispose of
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it as such, may subject him to liability for deceit but this department
has no jurisdiction over such questions.
It does not appear from the evidence that any mineral of appreciable
value has been found upon the land in controversy. The work upon
the lode claim prior to the cash entry consists chiefly of a tunnel of about
one hundred feet in length, which commences about three hundred and
fifty feet west of the west line of the homestead. Within ten or fifteen
feet of the mouth of this tunnel some small bodies of rock carrying gold
appear to have been found, and a little farther on a stringer of quartz
bearing small quantities of gold, but these all seem to have soon pinched
out; and the amount of precious mineral obtained from the tunnel in
the aggregate was of such small value as to afford no adequate compen-
sation for the expendliture incurred. No well-defined ledge or lode car-
rying valuable mineral is shown to have been discovered; nor is the
land shown to contain mineral in any-state of such value as to justify
expenditure to obtain it; nor does the showing warrant the belief that
further expenditure would disclose the presence therein of valuable ore-
or valuable mineral of any sort. It is also shown, on the other hand,
that the land in controversy, or the greater part thereof, has a rich,
deep, black soil, is well adapted to the growing of fruits and vegetables
and can be easily irrigated, and that Lavallee raised thereon vegetables
of good quality.
The failure of Lavallee to appear again as a witness after a recess
taken during the hearing, in order that further opportunity for cross-
examination might be afforded, is not sufficient ground upon which to
disturb the decision of your office, inasmuch as his testimony may be
eliminated without affecting, in any way, the conclusion reached as to
the character of the land in controversy. Lavallee, by reason of his
previous acts and representations is shown to have been unworthy of
belief, and his testimony has therefore not had any weight with the
Department.
Renton's petition to intervene, supported by his own affidavit setting
out the nature of his interest in the proceedings before the local office,
and by a duly certified transcript of the record of his deed from
Lavallee, executed February 16,1895, for the land embraced in Lavallee's
cash, entries was properly allowed by the local office; and the motion
of protestants that Renton be required to ftirther support his petition
by his oral testimony was properly denied.
It can not be held that the offer of Renton at the beginning of the:
hearing, to relinquish to the government the N. of the NE. i of the
NW. 4 of said section, in which subdivision the greater part of said
lode claim lies, "with a sole view to saving the expense and time of
litigation, and to the end that further controversy herein may cease,"'
was, as protestants contend,
"a confession of judgment and a full and direct admission as to the truth of all the
matters and things set up by the contestants in their affidavit of contest andpetition
for a hearing." *
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The offer was declined by protestants. That action on their part closed
this. incident in the case. It ceased thereafter to have any important
bearing upon the case. This disposes of all the material issues.
The decision of your office is affirmed in accordance with the views
expressed herein.
BRUINER V. MITCHELL.
Motion for review of departmental decision of November 27, 1897, 25
L. D., 438, denied by Secretary Bliss, January 29, 1898.
ALASKAN LANDS-POSSESSORY RIGHT-RESERVATION.
GEORGE KOSTROMETINOFF.
The protection accorded to the possessory rights of Alaskan Indians and other per-
sons by section 8, act of May 17, 1884, was not intended to apply to cases where
the settlement was made at a time when the land embraced therein was included
within a public reservation.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofce, January
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (WM M. B.)
This Department is in receipt of your office letters, of dates Decem-
ber 4, 1896, and November 18, 1897, transmitting the petition and sup-
plemental showing of George Kostrometinoff, wherein said petitioner
asks that a certain tract of land located, improved and occupied by him
and one Alexauder Miletich for domiciliary purposes, situate in the
town of Sitka, Alaska, the greater portion of which is embraced within
the limits of a public reserve made under executive order of June 21,
1890, be excluded from the operations of said order making such reserva-
tion, upon the ground that said tract was inadvertently or improperly
included within the reserve made by such order.
It appears that petitioner is a native of Sitka, Alaska, and he claims
to be an American citizen by provision of article 3 of the treaty of the
United States with Russia in 1867 (15 Stat., 539).
The said petitioner claims the right to occupy and hold quiet posses-
sion of tract claimed by him, under provision of section 8 of the act of
May 17, 1884 (23 Stat., 24), until such time as Congress may determine
the terms under which he may acquire title thereto.
The referred to provision of said section 8, of the act of May 17, 1884,
entitled "An act providing a civil government for Alaska," is in words
following:
Provided, That the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed
in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by
them but the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is
reserved for future legislation by Congress.
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The petitioner furnishes evidence to te effect that on December 1,
1879-prior to the date of the executive order complained of-he located
and occupied the tract in question, and posted on the premises, and
recorded at that time, a notice of such fact, and that he has iproved
the land and continued to occupy and hold possession of the same him-
self or by and through his tenants since the date of location.
The referred to notice is in words following:
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned citizens of the Jited States, have
located the following homestead claim:
A certain lot of land adjoining the town of Sitka, situated as follows.:
Comrneneing on the south-easterly or easterly side of the cemetery attached to the
Russian Trinity church, and running on a course about 40 degrees east of north 373
feet to the road leading to the old graveyard about 50 degrees west of north, then
along said course 237 feet, then by sides parallel to these said lines so as to form a
rectangular lot or plat of ground.
ALEX. MILETICH.
G-Ro. KOSTROMETINOFF.
It appears that the said Alex Miletich died on or about January 2,
1882, and that petitioner purchased what interest the deceased formerly
had in the land. The tract which it is claimed by said petitioner was
improperly included in the public reserve, herein before referred to,
comprises an area of about 2.03. acres of land.
Relative to the locus of the said tract, your letter '- GI" of November
18, 1897, contains the following statement, to wit:
The certified copy of the record of location, (Exhibit A) describes the land as
commencing at a point on the south-easterly or easterly side of the cemetery and
running thence north 40 degrees east 375 feet to a road, running north 50 degrees
west; "thence along said course" (direction not given, but platted on the map,
Exhibit .K, as S. 50 degrees E.) 237 feet, thence by sides parallel to these said lines
so as to form a rectangular lot or plot of ground.
The tract platted in exhibit K does not correspond with the description given,
in that it is described as a parallelogram cornering on the south easterly side of the
cemetery, while it is platted as being on both sides of the cemetery. Moreover from
the description it could as well be a parallelogram 373 feet by 237 feet immediately
to the northwest of, and bordering on the tract platted; in which event it would
embrace even more of the cemetery than is embraced in the tract as platted.
- I have frther to state the claim is apparently within the reservation established
by Brevet MajorGeneral Davis, December 1, 1867.
The disclosures made by the record submitted sustain the correctness
of the foregoing statement.
Paragraph of General Orders No. 6, dated New Archangel, Alaska
Territory, December 1, 1867, making the reservation referred to above
as having been established by General Davis, reads as follows:
1. For the information of all persons who desire to build houses and improvements
on the public lands in the City of Sitha and vicinity, and on the islands in the
harbor of Sitka, it is hereby announced that, until such time as the government of
the United States shall decide, through the proper agents, what locations and amount
of land may be required for government and Territorial purposes, the following
reserves are hereby declared, and the military authorities will hold and use them
as such:
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Paragraph 2 of said order contains a somewhat lengthy description-
not deemed essential to be herein set out-of the delimitations of the
reservation thereby made, within the limits of which it is supposed
the tract claimed by petitioner is embraced. And it does not appear
that the lands reserved in the town of Sitka by that order were restored
to the public domain, either prior to the date of petitioners location
and occupation of the land in question, on or about December 1, 1879,
or prior to the date of the reservation made on June 21, 1890.
It is an admitted fact that almost the entire tract of land claimed by
petitioner is included within the limits of the reservation which was
made on the date last metioned, and if, as a matter of fact, it be true
that the said tract is likewise embraced in the reservation made on the
first named date, to wit on December 1, 1867, then the reservation of
June 21, 1890, to which petitioner objects, could not be regarded as
having been erroneously or unlawfully made, in so far as it embraced
the claim of petitioner, since he had no right to occupy and claim a
tract of land which formed part of a public reserve at the time of his
settlement thereon and occupation thereof-which remained ill a state
of reservation during continuance of such occupation.
That particular provision of section 8 of the act of May 17, 1884,
supra, which protects Indians or other persons" in the district of
Alaska " in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occu-
pation or now (at date of said act) claimed by them," .was evidently
not intended to protect any person who located and occupied, as peti-
tioner did, a tract of land situate within a public reservation, if at the
time of settlement such tract was segregated from the public domain
by a prior and then existing reservation, and therefore not-subject to
location and occupation. The occupation of such lands under such
circumstances constitutes nothing less than an act of trespass, and the
referred to provision of section 8 of the act cited cannot be construed
as protecting such acts.
Recurring to the question as to the loculs of the tract of land occu-
pied by petitioner it may be observed that you do not state positively
that said tract is within the reservation made by the order of Decem-
ber 1 1867, but merely say that it is "apparently" within the limits
thereof.
The matter under consideration cannot be properly disposed of with-
out ascertainment of the exact locus of the land in question.
A careful consideration of the plat, found with the record submitted,
in connection with the certified copy of the record of location of the
tract, as also of an approved lat of the town of Sitka, whereon is
traced or marked by the War Department the boundary lines of the
reservation made by Brevet Major General Davis on December 1, 1867,.
fails to show the relative position of the land claimed by Kostrometinoff
to that forming the reservation established in said year 1867.
For the foregoing reasons it is hereby ordered that you notify peti-
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tioner of the action herein taken, and that you require him to make and
file with the local officers of the land office at Sitka, Alaska, within such
reasonable time as you may direct, satisfactory proof as to the true
location of the tract claimed to be occupied by him, and of its relative
position to the lands embraced in the reservation made by military order
No. 6, dated December 1, 1867, with directions. to said local officers to
forward, as soon as filed, such proof-together with such report by them
in connection therewith as the public interest may suggest or require-
to your office for appropriate action thereon.
COAL LAND CAI2M-APPLICATION-TOW5SHIP PLAT.
RosE v. DINNEEN.
The tinie within which a coal laud claim must be perfected bly purchase, where the
filing when first offered is properly rejected on accouit of a defective township
plat of survey, and is thereafter allowed on the correction of said plat, should
be computed from the date when the corrected plat is filed, and the land opened
to disposal.
The rule requiring notice of the filing of a township plat of survey, prior to the
allowance of entries of land embraced therein, is only applicable in the case of
an approved plat of survey, or where an amendment thereto adds to the area of
public lands included therein.
The possession of a coal land claim by an agent is the possession of his principal,
and all acts of said agent towards perfecting title will inure to the benefit of
the principal.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, JaWuIary
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
This is a contest for a title nder the coal land law to lots 5 and 12
section 31, T. 35 N., It. 9 W., Daango, Colorado, land office. On
March 7, 1892, William Dinneen, by Daniel J. Blackburn, his dly
appointed attorney in fact, offered for filing his coal declaratory state-
ment for lots 5, 6, 11 and 12 of said section, alleging possession since
May 1, 1891.. Said declaratory statement described the tract covered
thereby according to the legal subdivisions thereof as shown by the
latest plat of the township approved )ecember 22, 1891, and filed in
the local office March 7, 1892. It appeared, however, that parts of lots
11 and 12 were embraced in lot 4 of said section as that lot existed
by virtue of the- next preceding survey of the township approved
November 13, 1883, the plat whereof was filed in the local office
November 28, following, and that said lot four was embraced in coal
entry No. 13 ade January 4, 1888, by Anderson Shore and that
patent terefor issued June 25, 1888.
No segregation plat of the land thus patented had been filed and the
local office had no means "of identifying or describing the unsold por-
tions" of lots 11 and 12 and therefore, although specifically stating in
its decision that "no opposition appears to the filing so far as it seeks
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to cover lots five and six only," acting upon the declaratory statement
as an entirety, the local office rejected it. Dinneen duly appealed.
Pending the appeal a segregation plat, approved October 18, 1894,
showing the boundaries and areas of lots 11 and 12 was filed in the
local office October 22, 1894, thus removing the only objection which
had existed to Dinneen's offered coal filing.
On October 23, 1894, Dinneen, by his said attorney in fact, presented
a new declaratory statement for lots 5, 6,11 & 12, as shown by the seg-
regation plat, which statement was on the same date received and filed
as No. 204. Upon this state of facts your office on February 19, 1895,
stating that "there appears to be no further action in the case required
by this (your) office" dismissed Dineen's appeal and closed the case.
On October 1, 1895, Gust Rose filed coal declaratory statement No.
424 for the same land embraced in Dinneen's filing, alleging possession
thereof from September 30, 1895. On October 31, 1895, Dinneen, by
Maria C. Blackburn his duly appointed attorney in fact (Mrs. Black-
burn being the widow of his former attorney in fact then only recently
deceased) applied to purchase said lots 5 and 12 under his coal filing.
Notice of Dinneen's application was thereupon given Rose by the local
office under paragraph thirty of regulations under the coal land law
approved July 31, 1892, [1 L. D., 687] he being the only adverse claim-
ant of record for the lots last above mentioned. On December 3, 1895,
Rose filed a protest against the said application alleging in substance
that the application was not filed within the time allowed by law; that
the applicant had never been in possession of the land applied for, nor
opened any vein of coal nor niade any improvements thereon; that the
filing and application of Dinneen had not been made in good faith to
acquire title for his own use and benefit, but for the use and benefit of
another; and that protestant had been in the exclusive possession since
October 1, 1895, of all the land described in his filing and had opened
a vein of coal thereon and expended at least fifty dollars in opening
such vein and in making permanent improvements thereon with intent
to acquire title thereto under the coal land law. Hearing between the
parties was duly ordered, and was thereafter duly had before the local
office commencing January 15, 1896, which resulted in a decision by
that office on February 15, 1896, in favor of the applicant Dinuneen.
Said decision held that the evidence showed due compliance with law
by Dinneen and that he should be allowed to purchase the lots applied
for, and that Rose's protest should be dismissed and his filing as to
these lots canceled.
-Upon appeal by Rose your office on May 22, 1896, affirming the deci-
sion of the local office held specifically that Dinneen's application to
purchase was made in time; that he had been in due and regular pos-
session of the land; that no bad faith OD his part had been shown; and
that his expenditure of "something near two thousand'dollars in open-
ing up a coal mine on the tracts applied for" and in the systematic
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preparation for mining coal was affirmative evidence of his good faith.
From the decision of your office Rose appeals assigning numerous
errors of law and fact therein, all of which have been duly considered.
Section 2349 Revised Statutes provides that all claims for the exer-
cise of the preference right of entry of coal lands-
mnst be presented to the register of the proper land district within sixty days after
the date of the actual possession and the commencement of improvements on the
land, by the filing of a declaratory statement therefor; but when the township plat
is not on file at the date of such improvement, filing must be made within sixty days
from the receipt of such plat at the district office.
Section 2350 Revised Statutes provides, inter alia, that-
all persons claiming under section twenty-three hundred and forty-eight shall be
required to prove their respective rights and pay for the lands filed upon within one
year from the time prescribed for filing their respective claims; and upon failure to
file proper notice, or to pay for the land within the required period, the same shall
be subject to entry by any other qualified applicant.
Section 2351 Revised Statutes provides, inter alia, that-
In case of conflicting claims upon coal lands . . . . priority of possession and
improvements followed by proper filing and continued good faith, shall determine
the preference right to purchase.
The status of said lot 12 when Dineen sought to embrace it in his
offered filing in March, 1892, was somewhat peculiar. The public sur-
vey had long since been extended over the entire township. It was
therefore clearly surveyed land. There was no lot 12 in said section 31
until created by the survey approved December 22, 1891. That partic-
ular subdivision was made in ignorance apparentlyof the fact that part
of it was no longer public land, having been taken and patented as
part of lot 4 of the survey of 1883. A similar state of facts existed as
to lot 11 also embraced in said offered filing. Until a segregation plat
should be filed showing these lots as reduced by the patenting of said
lot 4 the local office could not allow a filing therefor. It was therefore
rejected, and the rejection was in effect affirmed by the dismissal of
Dinneen's appeal by your office. As soon as the segregation plat was
filed in the local office-the very next day-Dinneen filed his declaratory
statement No. 204. -His application to purchase was filed one year and
eight days after the filing of his declaratory statement. Was this
application, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,-filed within
the time allowed by law? The Department thinks it was. To hold
otherwise would work a forfeiture in this case. Forfeitures are not
favored and to avoid them the rule is to construe the law liberally in
favor of the party against whom it is invoked.
The law does not require that the purchase shall be made within one
year from the filing of the declaratory statement, but, as stated in said
regulations, paragraph 30,
One year from and after the expiration of the period allowed for filing the declaratory
statement is given within which to make proof and payment.
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In any case where the absence of the township plat prevents earlier
filing the period allowed for filing extends sixty days from the receipt.
of such plat, and the period for purchase therefore one year longer or
one year and sixty days from the filing of the plat. In this case while
the latest township plat was filed in March, 1892,.it was so defective
so far as affording a correct description of the public land remaining in
lots 11 and 12 thereof was concerned as to be unavailable for the
purpose of the disposal of that land. Dinneen's attempt to file was
denied ol that ground. The segregation plat was in effect supple-
mental to the township plat as to that land, and the same rule as to
time for filing therefor and for purchase thereof should be applied to
Dinneen's case as if no plat of the township had theretofore been on
file. Lot five as involved with lot twelve then so called, in Dinneen's
claim, should of course be embraced within the rule. The segregation
plat was just as essential i view of the peculiar conditions theretofore
existing and especially of the decision of the local office rejecting his
offered filing, and occupied the same status thereunder as the township
plat in an ordinary case.
Either the filing of the plat of 1892 or of the segregation plat of 1894
must be taken as the point from which to compute time under said sec-
tions 2349 and 2350 in this case, as Dinneen's improvements on the land
commenced before either was on file. The filing of the former cannot,
obviously be taken, and the latter must therefore be taken. Dinneen's
application to purchase having been clearly made within one year and
sixty days from the filing of the segregation plat is held to have been
made in due time.
The contention that Dinneen's filing should not have been allowed
until notice had been given that the said segregation plat would on a
day certain be filed in the local office has no foundation in the law, regu-
lations or practice of the land department. Such notice is only required
in case of the approved plat of the survey of a township, or where an
amendment thereto adds to the area of public lands included therein.
In relation to the possession and improvements of Dinneen, the
-Department finds the facts. to be substantially as stated in your office
decision. There can be no reasonable doubt from the evidence that
through his agents the Blackburns, Dinneen has been in possession
and entitled to the possession of the land in controversy since May,
1891, and that there had been expended thereon, through his said
agents, in his behalf, in the opening of a valuable mineof coal, in run-
ning a tunnel several hundred feet in length, building a shute and track,
and making other improvements thereon prior to the said hearing, not
less than two thousand dollars. Work is shown to have been done on
the claim under Blackburn's direction during the summer of 1895.
The good faith of Dinneen and not of the Blackburns is in issue in
this proceeding. His good faith is not impugned by the testimony of
certain persons who state that they were employed to work on the claim
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and paid by Daniel J. Blackburn and had no personal knowledge of the
relation of principal and agent between Dinneen and Blackburn. Such
testimony raises no presumption, as counsel for Rose seems to argue,
against the bona fides of such relation, nor does it shift the burden of
proof in the case in any respect from the shoulders of the contestant to
those of the contestee. As agent for Dinneen to perfect title to the
coal land claim of the former, all acts done by Blackburn in that direc-
tion would inure to the benefit of his principal. Blackburn having
accepted the agency could have no lawful possession of the land adverse
to Dinneen while the agency existed. The possession of the former
was the possession of the latter; and it will be presumed, in the absence
of clear proof to the contrary, that Dinneeni furnished the money used
by Blackburn in making improvemnents on the land. It is unnecessary
to discuss the acts done on the land by Rose. The foregoing disposes
of all the questions presented in the case.
The decision of your office is affirmed. Rose's filing will be canceled
as to the land in controversy, and Dinneen allowed to perfect title
thereto.
PRACrICE..-NOTICE-<ATOREY-DEPARTMENTAt JURISDICTION.
POWER Q7. OLSON ET AL.
Notice of a motion for review, and oral hearing thereon, may be given to an attorney
of record representing a party before te Department, and when so given is as
fully conclusive upon such party as though served upon him personally.
The case of Parcher v. Gillen, 26 L. D., 34, cited and followed.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898.
October 18, 1897, you transmitted to the Department a motion by
Guhder Olson, to vacate the departmental decision herein of July 28,
1897 (25 L. D., 77), so far as it relates to the S. 4 of SE. 4 of See. 34,
T. 136, R. 52, Fargo, North Dakota, land district.
The grounds upon which the Department is thus asked to vacate its
decision of July 28, 1897, are, briefly stated-
First. That said decision is not founded upon any hearing of which
Olson was served with any notice, and is therefore void;
Second. That the decision of Jily 28, 1897, by the present Secretary
reviewed and reversed a prior decision of October 16, 1896, by a pre-
ceding Secretary and that one Secretary is without authority to review
and reverse a decision by his predecessor.
Notice of the departmental decision of October 16, 1896, was duly
served upon the parties November 12, following, and on November 21,
Power filed a motion for review thereof, together with an application
for oral argument in support of such motion.
Rule 114 of rules of practice, provides that a motion for review,
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seasonably filed, "will act as a supersedeas of. the decision -until other-
wise directed by the Secretary," and further provides-
If the motion does not show proper grounds for review or rehearing, it will be
denied and'sent to the files of the General Land Office, whereupon the Commissioner
will remove the suspension and proceed to execute the jdgment before rendered.
But if upon examination proper grounds are shown the motion will be entertained
and the moving party notified, whereupon he will be allowed thirty days within
which to serve the same together with all argument in support thereof on the oppos-
ing party, who will be allowed thirty days thereafter in which to file and serve an
answer, after which no further argument will he received.
December 18, 1896, upon examination thereof; the Department enter-
tained Power's motion for review, granted. his application for oral argu-
ment, fixing January 11, 1897, as the time thereof, and directed that
Power "without delay, serve upon opposing parties a copy of the
motion for review filed in this case, and at the same time notify them
of the date fixed for the hearing."
Thereafter full and satisfactory proof was presented by Power show-
lug, among other things,,that S. G. Roberts, attorney for Gunder Olson,
had been duly served with a copy of the motion for review, with a writ-
ten notice of the time fixed for oral argument thereon and with a copy
of an application by Power for a postponement of the time for such
oral argument. This service was all had upon Roberts, personally, in
his office i Fargo, North Dakota, December 23, 1896. Roberts was
then, and had theretofore been, the. attorney of record for Olson, and
is the attorney who presented on behalf of Olson the motion Which is
now under consideration.
Notice of a motion for review and notice of a hearing may be given
*to an attorney of record representing the claimant before the Depart-
mient, and when so given is as binding upon the claimant as if made
upon him personally. Notwithstanding the notice to Roberts, his
attorney, Olson did not make any objection to the time fixed for oral
argument and neither did he file any brief in opposition to the motion
for review although that motion, as served upon Roberts, contained a
statement of the grounds upon which it was based and was accompanied
by an argument and a citation of authorities in support thereof.
Upon consideration of the proof of service upon Olson's attorney of the
motion for review, notice of hearing, and application for postponement
thereof, the Department granted the application for a postponement.
January 21, 1897, resident counsel for Power filed an additional, or
supplemental, argument in support of the motion for review, accom-
panied by satisfactory proof that a copy thereof had that day been
transmitted by registered mail to Roberts, attorney for Olson, and
since the filing of Olson's motion to vacate there has been filed in the
case the returned registry receipt, signed by Roberts, showing the
receipt by him of that brief.
April 23, 1897, resident counsel for Power. were, by letter of that date,
advised that the oral argument ou the motion for review would be heard
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May 26, 1897, and they were directed to serve notice thereof upon the
opposing parties without delay. Satisfactory proof of such service was
duly made, showing, among other things, that on April 29, 1897, there
was transmitted, by registered mail, to Roberts. attorney for Olson, a
copy of the letter fixing the time for such oral argument. Since the
filing of Olson's motion, now being considered, there has been filed in
the case the returned registry receipt, signed by Roberts,. showing the
receipt by hirn of that notice.
Olson made no response to the additional or supplemental brief filed
on, behalf of Power and neither was he represented at the hearing.
Pursuant to the last notice, oral argument was had and thereafter the
record and argumnents, both written and oral, including the written
arguments filed before the decision of October 16, 1896, were carefully
considered, resulting in the decision of July 28, 1897, which Olson now
asks to ble vacated.
Sufficient has been said to show that Olson had full notice of Power's
motion for review of the decision of October 16, 1896, and that he had
the fullest opportunity to he heard thereon, both by oral argument and
written brief: That decision was not vacated without notice to Olson
of the proceedings resulting in its vacation, and the decision of July
28, 1897, was not rendered without a hearing or without a full oppor-
tunity upon Olson's part to be heard. The alleged want of notice is
distinctly disproved by the record.
The second ground of the present motion, namely, that one Secre-
tary is without authority to review and reverse a decision by his pred-
ecessor, is not well taken. At the time of the last decision the legal
title had not passed from the government, and as to this tract the pub-
lie land laws were still in process of administration by the land
department. This matter was fully discussed and disposed of adversely
to Olson's contention in the recent decision of Parcher v. Gillen (26
L. D., 34).
It is not claimed in the motion to vacate that the decision of July
26, 1897, is erroneous either in its statements of fact or in its con-
clusions of law, the only contentions against the same being those
which are hereinbefore stated and discussed.
For the reasons given, the motion should be, and is, hereby denied.
RAILROAD GRANT-rNDEMNITY-SPECIFICATION OF LOSS.
BARNES . NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO.
Lands within the overlapping limits of the grants for the Northern Pacifice main and
branch lines, embraced within the act of September 29, 1890, forfeiting the grant
for the unconstructed main line, and excluded from the moiety. taken on behalf
of the branch line, can not be made the basis for indemnity.
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The company is not entitled to plead the protection extended by the order of May
28,1883, to indemnity selections made without designation of loss, if, after mak-
ing such selection, it assigns an insufficient basis therefor, and subsequently an
adverse right intervenes.
The case of Brown v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 24 L. D., 370, cited and followed.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, January
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Thomas M. Barnes and the Northern Pacific Railroad Company have
each appealed from your office decision of April 15, 1896, in which the
company's ideninity selection as to the S. 4 of the NE. I of Sec. 15, T.
17 N., R. 45 E., W. M., Spokane land district, Washington, is held for
cancellation with a view to the allowance of the homestead application
of Thomas M. Barnes and said application by Barnes is rejected as to
the N. of the NE. I of said section 15 for conflict with the indemnity
selection by said company.
The said NE. 4 of section 15 is within the indemnity limits of the
grant made to aid in the construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad
opposite the portion of its main line in the State of Washington; the
S. i thereof was included in indemnity selection list of December 17,
1883, and the N. 4 thereof was included in the indemnity list of March
20, 1884. Both of said lists were unaccompanied by a designation of
losses as bases for the selections included therein, the same being made
under departmental order of May 28,1883 (12 L. D., 196), which exempted
this company from the general reqirement that indemnity lists should
be accompanied by a designation of the losses on account of which the
indemnity is claimed.
On October 26, 1887, the company filed a list of losses on account of
the selection lists referred to, the losses being designated in bulk and
not arranged tract for tract, and on September 2, 1892, it filed supple-
mentary lists arranging the lost lands tract for tract with the selected
lands.
In the latter list, being the re-arranged list, the company designated
the N. - of the SW. I of Sec. 35, T. 9 N., R. 15 E., as a basis for the
S. -of the NE. 4 of said section 15 in dispute.
From the record contained in your office letter it appears that the
tract designated as lost to the grant is within the overlapping limits of
the grants for its main and branch lines and opposite the unconstructed
portion of the main line the grant for which was forfeited by the act of
September 29, 1890 (26 Stat., 496). Under the provisions of the sixth
section of the said act of forfeiture the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany was called upon to elect as to the alternate odd-numbered sections
it would take in satisfaction of the moiety for its constructed branch
line within the overlap above described, and the remaining odd-num-
bered sections within said overlap were directed to be restored to the
public domain (11 L. D., 625). Acting under this direction the company
excluded section 35, T. 9 N., R. 15 E., a portion of which was designated
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as a oasis for the selection of the said S. of the NE. I of section 15,
the land in dispute.
The company was clearly not entitled to indemnity for the tract
named, and this was the condition of the selection at the date Barnes
tendered his homestead application (October 19, 893) covering the
entire NE. of said section 15, and in support of his application alleged
that the land had been in the possession and occupancy of successive
settlers since October, 1879. Upon said allegation of continued occu-
pancy hearing was duly ordered, but upon the record made both your
office and the local officers concurred in the opinion that the showing
made did not evidence "a legitimate claim under the government
laws."
In view of the insufficiency of the basis assigned by the company as
to said S. i of the NE. X part of the tract in question, your office decision
holds that the company's selection was no bar to the allowance of
Barnes' application, but as to the N. of the NE. 1, for which a good
basis had been assigned, your office decision holds that the selection
was a bar to, arid for that reason rejected, Barnes' application as to
said tract. From said decision the company and Barnes each appeal
as to the portion of the tract awarded to the other.
Relative to the appeal by Barnes from the rejection of his applica-
tion as to the N. 4 of the NE.4 of said section 15, it is clear, under the
decisions of the Department, that the company's right to said tract,
under its selection before recited; dated back to the time of the filing
of the original list, on March 20, 1884. (Brown v. Northern Pacific
b. R. Co., 24 L. D., 370, and cases therein cited.) Further, that the
showing offered in support of the allegation of continued occupancy
evidences that one Alma Phelps resided upon and was in possession of
the quarter section to the north of that here in question, and his only
connection with the tract here in dispute was that a portion of his
improvements, covering a triangular piece of land, three or four acres,
was included in a corner of his enclosure that extended upon the quar-
ter section in question.
It is clear that the showing made does not evidence such a claim as
would bar the company's right of selection on account of its grant.
Relative to the company's appeal from so much of your offlice decision
as awarded the S. 4 of the NE. I of said section 15 to Barnes, the com-
pany claims that its rights are protected as of the date of its first selec-
tion list (December 17, 1883), which was protected by the order of May
28, 1883, and that any subsequent designation of a loss, although insuf-
ficient to support the selection, could not serve to invalidate the same.
This contention is not sound. While it is true that the original list of
1883 was protected by the order of May 28, 1883, yet by departmental
circular of August 4,1885 (4 . D., 90), railroad companies were required,
where indemnity selections have theretofore been made without speci-
fication of losses, to designate the deficiencies for which such indemnity
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is to be applied before further selections would be allowed. It was
evidently acting under this circular that the company filed these lists
of 1887 and 18923 before referred to. After filing the list of 1892 the
company stood upon the designation of losses as assigned, and if insuf-
ficienlt, it was unprotected by its selection unless a sufficient basis had
been designated prior to the intervention of an adverse claim. That
the basis assigned in the list of 1892, for the S. t of the NE. i of section
15, the tract in dispute, was insufficient, is clear, and as Barnes' home-
stead application was resented before a sufficient basis was amed,
your office decision holding that said indemnity selection was no bar to
the allowance of the application by Barnes must be, and is accordingly
hereby, affirmed. Barnes' application will therefore stand rejected as
to the N. of the NE. 1 of said section 15, and upon his completion of
entry, should he elect to enter the S. J of the NE. 4 of said section 15
within a reasonable time, to be fixed by your office, the company's selec-
tion will be canceled.
INDIAN LANDS-RESERYATION IN PATENTS.
CHIPPEWA PATENTS.
In the issuance of patents on Chippewa Indian allotments the reservation of the
right of the United States to reservoir sites, as provided by act of June 7, 1897,
should only be inserted in patents which cover lands included in the list of res-
ervoir lands furnished by the Secretary of War.
Assistant Attorney- General Van Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
January 29, 1898. (W. (,. P.)
I am in receipt by your reference, wit! requ st for an opinion on the
matter therein resented, f a letter from the Coimmissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office, dated December 21, 1897, in reference to the form of
patents for allotments to the Chippewa Indians in Minnesota.
The Commissioner refers to the fact that certain schedules of allot-
ments to the various baids of said Indians have been approved, quotes
a portion of the Idian appropriation act of June 7, 1897 (30 Stat.,
62-67), providing that lands acquired from the Chippewa Indians and
sold under the provisions of the act of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 642),
shall be subject to the right of the United States to construct dans for
creating reservoirs in aid of navigation, and submits his question as
follows:
I have, therefore, to respectfully request to be informed what construction of said
act this office shall adopt, andif it is held that the provision should onlybe inserted
in such patents as embrace lands shown by the map aforesaid to be overflowedlands,
the Secretary of War be requested to furnish such map for the use of this office.
The provision in question is found in a paragraph making an appro-
priation for completing surveys of the Chippewa lands inder the act
of 1889, and reads as follows:
Provided, That all lands acquired and sold by the United States under the "Act
for the relief and civilization of the Chippewa Indians in the State of Minnesota,"
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approved January fourteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, shall be subject
to the right of the United States to construct and maintain darns for the purpose of
creating reservoirs in aid of navigation, and no claim or right of compensation shall
accrue from the overflowing of said lands on account of the construction and main-
tenance of such dams or reservoirs. And the Secretary of War shall furnish the
Commissioner of the General Land Office a list of such lands, with the particular
tracts appropriately described, and in the disposal of each and every one of said
tracts, whether by sale, by allotment in severalty to individual Indians, or otherwise,
under said act, the provisions of this paragraph shall enter into and form a part of
the contract of purchase or transfer of title.
This law would apply to all lauds witlin its purview, .whether its
provisions were mentioned in the patents for such tracts or not, but
a wise policy would suggest its mention, and accordingly, on Septem-
ber 16, 1897, you, upon the suggestion of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs directed the Commissioner of the General Land Office to insert
the provisions of said act of June 7 1897, i "patents to be issued to
allottees under the act of January 14, 1889."
The Commissioner of the General Land Office now points out the
fact that the reservoirs in question are, as shown by the act of June
20, 1890 (26 Stat., 169), at the head-waters of the Mississippi and St.
Croix rivers in the States of Minnesota and Wisconsin, and the Chip-
pewa and Wisconsin rivers in the State of Wisconsin, and that a large
portion of the lands to be allotted under said act of 1889, especially
those on the White Earth and Red Lake reservations, have no connec-
tion with the head-waters of those rivers.
Nothing should be inserted in a patent from the United States that
suggests a cloud upon the title or an incumbrauce that has in fact no
existence. The law in question, however, is quite specific in its descrip-
tion of the tracts w"hich are to be affected. The Secretary of War is
to furnish a list of such lands, " with the particular tracts appropriately
described," and it is in the disposal "of each and every one of said
tracts" that the provisions of said law are to "enter into and form a
part of the contract of purchase or transfer of title." The provisions
of that paragraph should be inserted in those patents only which cover
lands included in a list furnished by the Secretary of War as provided
in said act.
Approved, January 29, 1898.
C. N. BLISS, Secretar-y.
SVAIP LAND CERTIFICATION-JURISDICTION-INDIAN OCCUPANCY.
STATE OF FLORIDA.
If it is made to appear that lands have been erroneously included in a certified swamp
land list, and patent has not issued thereon, the action of a preceding Secretary
of the Interior in approving such list may be corrected by his successor.
The status of the Seminole Indians, as occupants of public lands in the State of
Florida, is too indefinite in character to receive recognition in patents issued
under the swamp grant.
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Lands oceupied and cultivated by said Indians can not, however, be held as of the
character contemplated by said grant, and if, on due investigations lands so
occupied and improved appear to have been certified to the State under said
grant, the certification thereof should be revoked.
Assistant Attorney- General Vant Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
January 31, 1898. (W. C. P.)
May 28, 1S97, you referred to me a communication from the Acting
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated May 26, 1897, for
opinion as to the authority of the Secretary to modify the decision of February 13,
1897, approving the list of lands to be patented to the State of Florida, so as to omit
therefrom absolutely the particular tracts occupied by Indians, or upon which they
have improvements, and reserve the same for their use and benefit; and also to insert
a clause in the patents issued to the State expressly recognizing and preserving the
rights of the Indians to lands which they occupy, or upon which they have improve-
Ments, as recommended by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
The facts, briefly stated, are as follows:
February 13, 1897, your predecessor, Secretary Francis, approved
Florida swamp land list No. 87, which included certain unsurveyed
land in what is commonly known as the "Everglades." In March, 1897,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs addressed a letter to you relative
to the encroachment of a white settler upon lands said to be included
in this list, which it is alleged had been occupied and improved by
Indians. In that letter the Commissioner recommended that the
approval of said swamp land list be modified, so as to except the tracts
occupied and improved by Indians from the lands to be patented; and
that there be inserted in the patent to be issued to the State a clause
expressly reseriing the rights of the Indians to the occupancy of lands
possessed and improved by them at the date of patent.
From an examination of the opinion of Secretary Francis rendered
at the time he approved said swamp lan(l list (see 24 L. D., 147), it
appears that the matter of the occupancy of lands i the " Everglades "
by Indians had theretofore been referred by the Secretary to the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, and in response the Commissioner had
stated:
If the Indians noxv have the Tight of occupanlcy of the lands within the "Ever-
glades," and the United States should convey such lands by patent to the State of
Florida, I am of the opinion that the Stateu-rould take title subject to the right of
occupancy of the Indians (see Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S., 517, and the authorities
thercin cited).
This statement of the Commissioner was approved by Secretary
Francis in the following words:
The views of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs respecting the rights of any
Indians occupying the lands in question are concurred in.
The question as to the extent of the authority of the Secretary of
the Interior to review and modify a prior decision was presented and
fully discussed in the case of Parcher v. G-illen (26 L. D., 34). The pro-
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visions of law and the authorities bearing upon the question are cited
and quoted from and it is not deemed necessary to repeat them here.
The conclusion then reached is formulated as follows:
A consideration of these decisions interpreting the statutes defining the authority
and duties of the officers of the land department, clearly demonstrates that so long
as the legal title remains in the government the lands are public within the mean-
ing of those statutes, and the laws under which such lands are claimed, or are being
acquired, are in process of administration under the supervision and direction of
the Secretary of the Interior.
And again it was said:,
So long as the legal title remains in the government the Secretary of the Interior,
whoever he may be; is charged with the duty of seeing that the land is disposed of
only according to law.
The grant of swamp and overflowed lands made by the act of Sep-
tember 28, 1850 (9 Stat., 519), provides for the issuance of patents and,
therefore, until patent shall have issued the legal title remains in the
U-nited States and the Secretary has full power and authority to cor-
rect any mistake in the certification of lands as passing under this act.
In Michigan Land and Lumber Company v. Rust (168 U. S., 589,
decided December 13, 1897), in discussing a similar question arising
under the swai) land act of 850, the court said:
Generally speaking, while the legal title remains in the United States, the grant is
in process of administration and the land is subject to the jurisdiction of the Land
Department of the government. It is true a patent is not always necessary for the
transfer of the legal title. Sometimes an act of Congress will pass the fee. (Strother
v. Lucas, 12 Pet., 410, 454; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How., 319; Chouteau v. Eck-
hart, 2 How., 344-372; Glasgow v. Hortiz, 1 Black, 595; Landeau i. Hanes, 21 Wall.,
521; Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S., 78.) Sometimes a certification of a list of lands to
the grantee is declared to be operative to transfer such title (Rev. Stat., see. 2449;
Frasher v. O'Connor, 115 U. S., 102,) but whenever the granting act specifically pro-
vides for the issue of a patent, then the rule is that the legal title remains in the
government until the issue of the patent, (Bagnell v. Broderick, 12 Pet., 436450,)
and while so remaining the grant is in process of administration, and the jurisdiction
of the Laud Department is not lost.
It is, of course, not pretended that when an equitable title has passed the Land
Departmenthaspowertoarbitrarily destroythatequitabletitle. Ithas jurisdiction,
however, after proper notice to the party clahning such equitable title, and upon a
hearing, to determine the question whether or not such title has passed. (Cornelius
v. Kessel, 128 U. S., 456; Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S., 372-383; Parsons v. Venzke,
1641 U. S., 89.) In other Words, the power of the department to inquire into the
extent and validity of the rights claimed against the government 'does not cease
until the legal title has passed.
A patent has not yet been issued for the lands described in this
Florida list 87, and if it be made to appear that lands were included
in such certified list which should not have been so included, the action
of a preceding Secretary in approving and certifying the list may be,
and should be, corrected.
Said act of 1850 granted to the several States the " whole of those
swamped and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation,
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which shall-remain unsold at the passage of this at," and as been.
construed in. numerous decisions of the supreme court ad of this
Department as a grant in praesenti passing to the State the title to such
lands as should thereafter be identified as of the character ebraced
in the grant.
A question now presented is whether the occupancy of such Seminole
Indians as remained in Florida after the tribe, as such, was removed
to the country west of the Mississippi river, gives them any rights to
the land occupied, and, if so, its effect upon the grant to the State. If
the I ndians have any right at all to swamp and overflowed lands in
Florida, it is merely that of occupancy, and the only effect it could
have would be to delay the right of possession in the State. This
question was presented i the matter of The Stockbridge and Munsee
Indians v. State of Wisconsin, and, in my opinion of JJuly 12, 1S9i (25
L. D., 17), it is discussed and the authorities bearing upon it are cited
and quoted from. Upon further examiuation I find no reason for a
conclusion differing from the one then reached which is formulated in
said opinion as follows:
The only onclusion to be deduced from these authorities is that the State took the
fee to this land at the date of the grant of September 2, 1850, but that its right of
possession was held in abeyance until such time as the Indian right of occupancy
should be surrendered by them or otherwise ended by the United States.
If these Indians have any right of occupancy in any of the lands
which thus passed to the State of Florida,. that right can e determined
only by the United States. This doctrine was announced as early as
1856 i the case of Fellows v. Blacksmith et al. (19 How., 3(6), and has
has been accepted as the correct rule since that time. In Beecher v.
Wetherby (95 U. S., 517), speaking of the Indians' right of occupancy,
the following language is used:
But the right which the Indians held was only that of occupancy. The fee was in
the United States, subject to that right, and could be transferred by them whenever
they chose. The grantee, it is true, would take only a naked fee, and could not dis-
turb the occupancy of the Indians; that occupancy could only be interfered with or
determined by the United States.
Whether the government will issue a patent for lands to which an
Indian right of occupancy exists, is a question of executive policy
rather than of law. In the case of State of Wisconsifi (19 L. D., 519),
this Department refused to approve lists of lands in the Lac de Flam-
beau Indian reservation as passing under the swamp land grant, on the
theory that the Indians had a right of occupancy in said lands and that
nothing should be done which would tend to disturb or cloud that right while it
exists, or which might appear to evidence a greater right in the State than it really
has or can get at the present time.
The Seminole Indians, by the treaty of May 9, 1832, proclaimed April
12, 1834 (7 Stat., 368), relinquished to the United States "all claim to
the lands they at present occupy in the Territory of Florida," and
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agreed to emigrate to the country assigned to the Creeks, west of the
Mississippi river, within three years; This treaty contains no provi-
sions recoguiziiig the right of any of these Indians to remain in Florida
after that time. While the main body of the Seminoles was subse-
quently to said treaty, and before the grant to the State of swamp
lands, removed in accordance with the provisions of said treaty, yet
some were left behind and have remained in Florida until this time.
Some of these are said to be upon lands embraced in this list 87. The
government in its dealings with this tribe has, however, always recog-
nized those in the Indian Territory as the Seminole Nation and all pay-
ments inider said treaty have been made to them. In'later years, how-
ever, some recognition has been given those remaining in Florida by
the appropriation of money for their education and civilizatio . Appro-
priations have also been made for the purchase of homes for them. It
will thus be seen that the qestion as to what rights, if any, these
Florida Seminoles have in the lands which they are now occupying is
involved in uncertainty, and it seems to me that their rights are too
uncertain to justify recognition in patents isstied under te swaml) land
grant.
Another question has presented itself in the investigation of this
matter, which it seems proper to bring to your attention. From the
various cofnumunications pon which the report of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs of May 26, 1897, as made, it seems that these
Florida Seminoles have for many years had settlements and iprove-
ments upon different tracts of land which are apparently included
within said list 87. If it be a fact, as is indicated by these colimili-
cations, that portions of this land have been occupied and improved
by these Indians, the inference would be that such tracts are not of
the character contemplated by the granting act. It will be noticed
that the fact that any portion of the land in question is ctually occu-
pied and iproved is not adverted to in the decision of October 10,
1894 (19 L. D., 251), directing the issuance of patent when the State
should furnish a meander survey giving the exterior meles and bounds
of the " Everglades," accompanied by proofs that said survey did not
include within its lines any lands not of the character granted. The
proof furnished by the State as set forth i the decision of February
13, 1897 (24 L. D., 147), is general in character and nothing is said as
to whether there are tracts within the limits of the survey actually
ocenpied. From an extract from a report of the Conimissioner of
Indian Affairs found in said decision, it seems uncertain as to whether
the land occupied by the Seminole Indians is within the limits of the
survey made as a basis for a proposed listing and patent. The infor-
mation now furnished by the report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and the accompanying papers, strongly suggests that there is
land within said survey which is improved and cultivated and not
swamp and overflowed and therefore not of the character contemplated
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by the granting act. At least there seems to be sufficient in these
papers to justify a further investigation, so that the mistake, if there
be any, may be corrected before the Department by the issuance of
patents, shall have been deprived of the authority to make, such
correction.
I am of opinion that the matter is still within the jurisdiction of this
Department and that yog have anthority to revoke the approval of
said list for the purpose of correcting any mistake that may have been
made therein, and that the information furnished by the papers now
presented to me suggests the need of further investigation to deter-
mine whether any of the land embraced within the limits to be covered
by said patent is not of the character contemplated by the granting
act. If it be found that there is land within these limits which at the
date of the swamnp grant was not of the character embraced in the
granting act, then the location of such tracts should be ascertained so
that the same may be excepted from list 87 and from any patent issued
thereon.
Approved, January 31, 1898,
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
MINING CLAIM-PROTEST-JTJRIST)ICTION-DEPITY MINERIAL SUR-
VEYOR- .
FLOYD ET AL. V. MONTGOMERY ET AL.
A transferee of a mining claim, whose interest is acquired during the pendency of
departmental proceedings involving the status of said claim, takes no right
better than that possessed by his grantor.
In the case of proceedings had on a protest against a mineral application, where the
protestants, as shown by the record, are without interest and hence not entitled
to be heard as appellants, the Department may properly, by summary order,
direct the General Land Officeto forw. ard therecor(l, vithout awaiting the regular
course by appeal, from the decisions below, where such action seems necessary to
the tenination of vexatious litigation.
An order for a hearing limited to a charge that the entrynan had failed to expend
the statutory sum for labor and improvements prior to the expiration of the
period of publieatiou, is in effect an adjudication that the fact that the entry-
man had failed to file the surveyor-general's certifcate, as to such expenditLre,
during said period, is immaterial; where the failure to thus file such certificate
is admitted by the entryman, and the effect of such failure is brought in ques-
tion by the adverse parties.
Parties protestant, that allege an interest, and at the hearing assume without objec-
tion the burden of proof, will not be heard to say, for the first time when the
case comes before the Department for disposition, that the burden of proof was
wrongly placed on them.
The statutory expenditure required to be shown by section 2325 R. S., contemplates
that five hundred dollars' worth of labor shall have been expended, or improve-
ments to the same value made, for the development of the mining claim.
A deputy United States mineral surveyor is within the intendment of section 452 R.
S., and consequently disqualified, under the prohibitive provisions thereof, from
i-! acquiring title to a mining claim in which he was interested at the time of his
official report thereon, and at the date of application for patent.
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The fact that a deputy mineral surveyor is disqualified to report upon the expendi-
tures made on a mining claim, by reason of his interest in the claim at such time,
does not operate to impeach the certificate of the surveyor-general based on said
report, if the facts as to such expenditures are correctly stated i said report.
The cases of State of Nebraska v. Dorrington, 2 C. L. L., 647; Dennison and Willits
11 C. L. O., 261; andt Lock Lode, 6 L. D., 105, overruled.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the 0-neral Land O ce, February
(W. V. D.) 2, 1898. (G. B. G.)
On January 3, 1893, Gus Hull, 1. L. Stebbints, John Tompkins, W. H.
Craigue, and W. S. Montgomery located a mining claim known as the
Hull City Placer, in the southeast quarter of section 20, in township
No. 15 south of range No. 69 west of the sixth principal meridian, des-
ignated as lot No. 8106, embracing 38.894 acres.
On May 20, 1893, W. H. Craigue, "for himself and his co owners"
(the parties above named), filed in the United States Land Office appli-
cation for a patent, due notice of which was given by publication from
May 26, to July 28, 1893.
On August 24, 1893, a protest was filed against the allowance of said
placer entry, signed by W. W. Elliott, C. S. Elliott, J. E. McKinley, and
John Mears, but was not sworn to or corroborated. This protest is
known as the protest of W. W. Elliott et at., ad it alleged, substan-
tially, that they were the owners of the *'Chillicothe" lode claim; that
said lode claim conflicted with the placer, and was located prior thereto;
that said placer claim was not on placer ground, and was located for
the purpose of securing a townsite. The local officers took no action
on this protest.
On April 4,1894, final certificate of entry issued to W. S. Montgomery,
C. C. ilHthaway, John Tompkins, 1. L. Stebbins, Gus Hull, A. D. Craigue
and James F. Smith on the said Hull City Placer. It is recited in the
certificate that the parties above named
this day made payment to the receiver in full, amounting to the sum of nillety-seven
and - dollars, (and that) upon the presentation of this certificate to the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, together with the plat and field notes of survey of
said claim and the proofs required by law, a atent shall issue thereupon to the said
W. S. Montgomery, C. C. Hathaway, John Tompkins, I. L. Stebbins, Gus Hull, A. D.
Craigue and James F. -Smith.
On May 25, 1894, Mrs. J. B. Gedney, or herself and co-owners, filed
a protest in the General Land Office, alleging ownership in and prior
location of the "Scottish Chief" lode, and that a valid discovery of a
vein had been made on a part ofosaid lode in conflict with the placer.
On the same day, May 25, 1894, A. J. Lauterman, a stockholder and
officer in the Wilson Creek Consolidated Mining and Milling Company,
filed a protest on behalf of said company, alleging owenership of the
"Minnie Bell," "Little Effie," "Little Giant" and "Little Dessie" lode
claims, in conflict with said placer; that said lode claims were the prior
locations, and that the existence of said lode locations was well known
to the placer claimants at the time of their application for patent.
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On Jume 20, 1894, your office dismissed the two last naniec protests
for lack of corroboration, but, o the samle day and i the same letter,
the local officers were directed to allow Elliott et al. a hearing on due
application, and should a hearing be had that Gedney et al. and the
Wilson Creek Consolidated Mining and Milling Company he permitted
to intervene. July 23, 1894, Gedniey et al., and the Wilson Creek com-
pany respectively refiled their original protests and made application
to so intervene.
On the application of Elliott et al., of date August 16, 1894, the local
officers ordered a hearinig, ad set November 27, 1894, as the day of
trial. O that day the placer claimants and all of the protestants,
including the Wilson Greek Consolidated Mining and Milling Company,
appeared by counsel, and the hearing proceeded.
On March 8, 1895, the local officers rendered their joint ecision,
wherein it was recommended that all of said protests be dismissed,
and the placer entry be passed to patent.
Ol April 10, 1895, J. B. Gedney and the Wilson Creek Company
appealed, alleging substantially:
1. Error not to have found from the evidence that known lodes
existed within the territory covered by said entry at date of filing
application for patent.
2. Error not to have found that no facilities for placer mining exist
on said claim, and that said claim. was not located i good faith for
placer mining purposes.
3. Error not to have decided upon the evidence whether the entry
was placer milling ground.
In your office decision of June 18, 1895, ol these appeals, your office
held, in substance:
1st. That it did not appear from the testimony that any lode loca-
tion in conflict with said entry contains a valuable vein of mineral
bearing quartz or rock in place, and that not one of them is shown
to have been operated for mineral in place, nor does it appear that one
of them call be so operated with profit."
2d. That as to the question of placer mining facilities, the record
and evidence presented no question, except as to the question of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the water supply, and that it (lid not
appear ' im practicable for claimants to operate said mine at a profit
with existing facilities."
3d. -There is nothing in this case showing ad faith on the part of
the claimants,.or that said claim was originally located for other than
placer mining purposes."
4. Appellant's third exception is not well taken.
The entry herein was allowed upon application made under the placer mining
laws. The usual ex partse proofs were filed in support of said placer application in
consequence of which you allowed entry to be made.
None of the protests or affidavits filed against said entry charge that the land
entered is non-mineral in character. The charge. is that the land contains known
lodes or veins, and a decision is made on this issue.
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In the absence of a specific charge that the land is on-mineral in character you
were not called upon to decide upon this point nor to consider the evidence thereon
offered over the objection of contestees. However, in my opinion, the evidence
fails to show that said land entered cannot with existing facilities be operated for
the placer gold it contains.
On October 24, 1895, your office in its decision on motions for review
filed by the protestants said:
Upon examinig this case it appears that four material questions were raised by
the protestants, to wit: the existence within said placer claim of the lode claims by
them specified; that said lode claims embrace well defined and valnable veins bear-
ing mineral; thait said lode claims were known to exist at the time the application
for patent for the placer claim was filed, and that the land embraced in the placer
entry is not placer milling ground.
Upon each of said questions the decision complained of is, in effect, against the
contestants, and, upion a fertmer examination of the records, I still adhere to the con-
clusions announced in said decision, inasmuch as it has not been shown to my satis-
faction that there was any material error therein. 13 L. D., 562.
The Wilson Creek Company appealed to the Department, but the
other protestants did not.
The errors alleged on appeal were as follows:
1. Not to have found from the evidence that valuable known lodes were shown to
exist -within the placer limits at date of application.
2. Not to have found that the evidence was insufficient to prove the land valuable
for placer-mining purposes.
3. Not to have found bad faith on the part of the placer claimants.
4. Not to have therefore held the entry for cancellation.
On September 11, 1896 (unreported), the Department affirmed the
decisions of your office, and held:
1. That the only issue properly before the Department under the allegations of the
protest and involved in the hearing as ordered by your office, are the questions of
fact as to the character of the land already indicated.
2. That while the question of bad faith raised by -appellants' contention that
claimants were seeking title, not for placer mining but for townsite purposes, was
not embraced in the order for a hearing, it "was the subject of some testimony
thereat, which shows that the land had no value for towDsite purposes until long
after the entry was made," and that "your office properly held that bad faith in
that regard was not shown."
3. That the protest contained no allegation of any irregularity on the part of the
deputy surveyor, nor as to expenditure, nor was such an allegation considered by
your office. It is therefore not properly before the Department, and will not be con-
sidered here.
4. The Department fails upon careful examination to discover any error in the
findings of your office. The decision complained of is therefore affirmed. The entry
will remain intact, subject to such further examination and consideration of the
proofs as may be deemed necessary.
The Wilson Creek Company filed a motion for a review of this
decision, which was on December 3, 1896 (23 L. D., 476), denied.
Pending these proceedings six other protests were filed in your office,
only two of which need be mentioned here for reasons which will appear
further on-to wit: The protest of W. S. Floyd, filed in the local office
126 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
on September 18, 1896, and the protest of the Wilson Creek Consoli-
dated Mining and Milling Company, filed therein November 27, 1896.
These protests allege, substantially:
Ist. That the land is not placer mining ground.
2d. That said entry was not made in good faith, but for speculative
purposes.
3d. That the entrymen have not discovered mineral upon the land
embraced in said entry as required by the placer ining law.
4th. That the entrymen failed to expend the statutory sum of $500
for labor and improvements prior to the expiration of the sixty days of
publication.
5th. That said Hull City Placer as etered contains valuable lodes
known to exist piior to date of placer application.
Your office considered these protests, and had prepared a proposed
draft of a letter ordering a hearing thereon, when, on January 14, 189T
before the promulgation thereof, Mr. W. K. Gillette, one of te present
owners of the Hull City Placer, addressed a communication to my pred-
ecessor, Mr. Secretary Francis, petitioning hir to summarily dismiss
the pending protest as vexatious, and direct the immediate issuance of
patent on the placer entry.
The Department, on January 20, 1897, addressed a letter to your
office, referring to aid communication, and requested a report at once
as to the propriety of issuing the instructions asked for. I reply
thereto, your-office transmitted the proposed draft of your letter order-
ing a eariuug, above referred to.
An oral hearing was ordered before the Assistant Attorney-General
in the matter of Gillette's petition, at which hearing the protestants
and the placer claimants were represented by counsel, after which my
said predecessor issued an order directing a hearing before the local
officers, which order is as follows:
FEBRUARY 13, 1897.
The CoamissioNER Or THE GENERAL LAND OFrIc E,
SIR: Referring to your letter ("N") of January 21, 1897,whereby you transmitted
certain protests filed against the Hull City Placer, mineral entryNo. 4-21, Pueblo,
Colorado, land district, at the request of the Department, with the view of ascer-
taining if it were desirable to take sunmmary action in regard to said protests, I
have to say that on examination of te matter it is determined that your office be
instructed to order a hearing on the protests, for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the entrymen failed to expend the statutory sum of $500.00 for labor or improve-
ments prior to the expiration of sixty days period of publication.
The inquiry should be confined to this subject only, and you will so direct the
local officers.
The papers are herewith returned for your action in accordance with the above.
Very respectfully,.
(Signed) DAVID R. FRANCIS, Secuetary.
Pursuant thereto, on February 18, 1897, your office ordered a hearing.
All of the protestants hereinbefore named were notified by the local
officers of the day set for hearing, but all of said protestants, except
W. S. Floyd and the Wilson Creek Consolidated Mining and Milling
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Company, made default. This hearing was begun on May 27, 1897, and
was concluded June 5, 1897.
On October 29, 1897, the protestants who participated in the hearing
moved tore-open the case, on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
This motion was denied on November 1, 1897, on which date the regis-
ter and receiver in a lengthy decision held, in summ1llling up, as follows:
Entry having been made presupposes that $500 had been expenled for labor and
improvements, and that the entrymnen had complied Adith all the requirements of the
law, and it becomes necessary for the protestants to assume the burden of proof
and prove the contrary, if possible, by a preponderance of the evidence. 'his, in
our opinion, they have not succeeded in doing, utile on the contrary, the claimants
have shown by satisfactory evidence at least $680 t have been expended for labor
and improvements upon the placer prior to the expiration of the period of pub-
lication.
We accordingly recommend that the protests of the Wilson Creel Consolidated
Mining and Milling Company and A. H. Cronkhite, Scott Williams, William Driver,
C. L. French, Bell R. Graham, James M. Turner, WV. . Ansel, Ole Hanson, H. E.
Hoyt, Owen Prentiss, Robert Mann, John Hanghey, and Andrew 1-aughey, having
made default, their protests are therefore dismiissed.
6in November 30, 1897, the protestants filed an appeal from the
decision of the local officers refusing to re-open the case, and on
November 29,1897, an appeal from said decision on the merits of the
case.
In the meantime, on November 2, 1897, the local officers forwarded
the record n the hearing with their decision, which record your office,
on November 15, 1897, returned to the local office to await the time
allowed for appeal under the rules.
On ovember 13, 1897, the placer claimants again petitioned the
Secretary of the Interior, the general purpose of which is disclosed by
the following departmental order, issued on November 23, 1897, after
an oral hearing had on said petition:
On January 14, 1897 Mr. W. K. Gillett, one of the placer claimants herein, peti-
tioned-my predecessor, Mr. Secretary Francis, to direct the Commissioner of the
General Land Office to summarily dismiss as vexatious the four protests then pend-
ing against the Hull ity Placer entry, and to ordler the immediate issuance of patent
for the placer claim.
An oral argument on this petition was ordered and heard by the Assistant Attor-
ney General for the Department, and thereupon Mr. Secretary Francis made the
following order:
(This is the order of February 13, 1897, herein before set out in full.)
A hearing was had in pursuance of said order, and the evidence taken thereat has
been transmitted to your office, together with the recommendation of the local
officers thereon.
On November 13, 1897, counsel for the placer claimants filed another petition,
addressed to the Secretary of the Interior, praying the "exercise of the supervisory
power with which he is vested by statutes, to the end that immediate action may
be had in this cause and patent for said M. E. No. 421 issued under a special order."
An oral argument has been heard on this petition, all of the parties in interest
being represented by counsel.
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In, view of the premises, and for reasons which will be fnlly set forth in the deci-
sion of the Department on the merits of the case, I have to direct that the evidence
taken at the local office as aforesaid be examined by your office, and that it and all
the papers in the case be transmitted to te Department, together with the recom-
mendlation of your office upon the question upon which the hearing was ordered by
departmental letter of February 13, 1897. It is esired that this action be had at
the earliest time practicable, the matter being treated as special, to the end that
final action by the Department may be bad at an early lay.
In this connection, it is proper to give the reasons which controlled
the Department in directing your office to forward the record made at
the hearing held pursuant to the order of February 13, 1897, without
permitting the case to take the regular course of appeal from the deci-
sion of te local officers to your office, aid from your office to the Depart-
ment, and thereby probably postponing the ultimate decision for more
than a year.
It may be premised that there can be no doubt that the supervisory
control of the Secretary of the Interior over the public lands, may be
exercised directly and without reference to appeals. See Knight v.
Land Association (142 U. S., 162.)
The authority to make the order, supra, is conceded by counsel for
the protestants, but the propriety and justice of the order are denied.
It is thought that the action of the Department in this regard was both
proper and just, and that when the whole record is considered there is
little room for difference of opinion as to the correctness of this view.
The record history of this case shows that every material allegation
embraced in the pending protests goes to questions which have been
tried and determined in favor of the placer claimants, except the charge
that the entrymnen failed to comply with the law in the matter of
expenditure, and failed to file the certificate of the surveyor-general in
proof thereof before the expiration of the period of publication.
The Wilson Creek Company was a party to that litigation, and it
was largely upon the allegations of its protest that the issues therein
were framed, so that so far as that company is concerned the issues so
tried and determined are clearly res judicata. The entire interest of
the protestant Floyd rests in his ownership of the "Little Orphan
Boy," an alleged. lode claim in conflict with said placer. This lode
claim had been the property of the Wilson Creek Company since
August 10, 1895, including the time of the first hearing. It was con-
veyed to Floyd by the Wilson Creek Company September 15, 1896, and
his protest against the placer entry was executed and verified by him
on the following day and filed in the local office on the third day there-
.after. If the Little Orphan Boy embraced a known-lode within the
placer claim at the time of the first hearing, the Wilson Creek Com-
pany by its protest should have put that fact in issue along with the
other matters therein alleged against the placer claim. This it did not
do, and if instead of openly presenting its entire complaint against
the placer entry it purposely withheld this charge for a second or
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further protest, in the event of the failure of its other charges then
made, the company may very reasonably and justly be held to the
decision made upon the first hearing. The company's failure to men-
tion the Little Orphan Boy lode in its protest at that time, is'not
attempted to be justified or excused, and having thus voluntarily
rejected an opportunity to fully present all of its objections to the
placer entry it should be held to have waived such as were not pre-
sented. While again noting that no nention of the Little Orphan Boy
lode was made in the protest upon which the first hearing was had,
this statement should not be permitted to carry with it any inference
that the existence of that lode was iot a subject of actual controversy
at that hearing. The evidence then taken has been again exanined
and it shows that the alleged known presence of that lode within the
limits of the placer was made the subject of specific inquiry by both
parties in the taking of testimony. Te claim of the protestants in
that behalf was rej'ected by the decisions of the local office, your office,
and the Department, holding that there were no known lodes within
the placer claim. Under all the circumstances, te inference is strong
that the conveyance to Floyd was made for the purpose of introducing
a new party in the case, thereby destroying the identity of the parties
and escaping the effect of the previous decisions. However this may
be, it appears that Floyd's purchase of the Little Orphan Boy was
made after the departmental decision of September 11, 1896, and
before the decision on review of December 3, 1896, and therefore while
the matter was pending before the land department, of which proceed-
ings Floyd had constructive if not actual notice. Obviously, by the
conveyance to him, he obtained no better rights than were possessed
by his grantor, the Wilson Creek Company.
All of these protestants are therefore concluded by the record and
have the standing of protestants without interest, and as such have no
right as appellants in the sense contemplated by the rules of practice.
Even if it were established that there had not been five hundred dol-
lars worth of labor expended or improvements made in the develop-
ment of the placer that would not vitiate -or avoid the placer location
and the resulting right to its occupation and enjoyment as a placer
claim, however much it might avoid the existing entry and prevent
the issuance of a patent thereon. See Draper et al. v. Wells et al. (25
L. D., 550).
In this view, the propriety of departmental order of November 23,
1897, is manifest. The protests were alleged to be without merit and
purely vexatious, and, so far as the alleged interests of these protest-
ants were involved, this appeared to be so. Common justice to the
placer claimants, therefore, demanded that a decision be reached at
the earliest practicable time on the one allegation made which had not
been fully investigated by the government, the truth of which, if estab-
lished, would result in the denial of a patent to said claimants.
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The first question arising on the record as now presented is, the
effect of the order of February 13,1897, (supra). It instructed your
office
to order a hearing on the protests for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
entryman failed to expend the statutory sum of $500 for labor and improvements
prior to the expiration of the sixty days' period of publication. The inquiry should
be conHned to this subject only, and you will so direct the local officers.
In the first place, this order excluded all other questions of fact, save
the one specified. So much is not open to argamient. It is further
believed that it amounted to an adjudication in this case, that the fact
that the placer claimants had failed to file the surveyor-general's cer-
tificate prior to the expiration of the period of publication was not
material. This is believed to be so, because (1) the fact that it was not
filed within that time was admitted by the placer claimants; (2) the
contention of the protestants was that the failure to so file it was fatal
to the application for patent, and (3) if it was thus fatal there would
have been no occasion for a hearing.
If the Department had been at that time of opinion that the failure
to file this certificate was fatal to the application for patent, the end of
the case had then been reached; a hearing is not only not necessary,
but it would have been utterly useless to have ordered a hearing,
knowing at the same time that eventually the case must be decided
against the placer claimants on the indisputable and undisputed proofs
then before the Department. If it be said that this was a question of
law which was not considered at the time, but reserved for a final
decision on the whole case, the answer is, that the record precludes any
such theory, and it is remembered by law officers of this Department
who are familiar with the history of the case that it was not only
considered, but that it was determined that the effeet of the order
directing a hearing was necessarily sch that a decision in terms on
this question was unnecessary.
Moreover, if it were an undecided question in this case, the Depart-
inent has recently settled the principle involved against the contention
of the protestants in the case of Draper et al. v. Wells et al. (25 L. D.,
550). In that case it was said:
With the record in the present case are affidavits showing the expenditure of five
hundred dollars in labor and improvements on the claim before the expiration of the
period of publication, but these affidavits were filed several days after that period.
The first question presented in regard to these affidavits is whether they were filed
in time to authorize their consideration; in other words, is the provision of the
statute as to the time when proof of expenditure in labor and improvements shall be
filed mandatory or only directory. The thing to be accomplished, the essence of the
statutory requirement, is the development and improvement of the claim by the
expenditure thereon of a stated amount in labor or improvements by the applicant
or his grantors as a condition to patenting the claim. The proof thereof is required
for the information and guidance of the government and not for the information or
guidance of adverse parties. Differing from the annual expenditure of one hundred
dollars required by law, this five hundred dollar expenditure is not a condition to
the maintenance of a mineral location. It is only a prerequisite to a patent, the
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obtaining of which is not necessary to the continued occupation and enjoyment of a
mineral claim. The failure to make this five hundred dollar expenditure does not
subject the claim to the acquisition of rights by others and much less would a fail-
ure to furnish proof of such expenditure do so. The time of filing such proof does
not affect the rights of others prejudicially or at all.
Much argument has been submitted on both sides of this case on the
questiol of the correctness of the action of the local officers in placing
the burden of proof at the last hearing on the protestants. There can
be no doubt that the action of the local officers in this regard was justi-
fied by the order pursuant to which the hearing was had. The lan-
guage of Secretary Francis directing the hearing shows it was intended
that the burden of proof should be placed on the protestants. This,
probably for the reason that inasmuch as the placer claimants had sub-
nitted proof of the required expenditures which had been accepted by
the government as sufficient, the burden of proof should be placed on
any one alleging that said proof was false. The burden of proof rests
upon the party against whom judgment would be given were no proof
to be offered on either side. But it is not necessary to pass on the cor-
rectness of the proceedings in this regard. The protestants assumed
the burden of proof at the hearing without objection, and in their view
of the status they occupy in this litigation, if they are parties in inter-
est, they are concluded, and can not raise that question here for the
first time. From the standpoint of the government, it is not thought
material where the burden was placed. The only interest the govern-
ment has or had in this controversy is that a full, fair and impartial
investigation be made of the alleged failure of the claimants to com-
ply with the law in the matter of expenditures, and it is believed that
this has been done.
Another question, preliminary to an intelligent consideration of the
evidence adduced, grows out of the vagueness of the language used in
the departmental order (supra) directing the hearing.
The hearing was ordered
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the eutrymen failed to expend the statutory
stum of $500 for labor or improvements, etc.
This language might be construed to mean that it was contemplated
that, if proof of the expenditure of $500 was made on this claim for
labor or improvements, the requirements of the law had been met,
whether it was shown to consist of an expenditure of labor or improve-
ments or both, without regard to the actual value of the labor performed
or the improvements made, and without regard to whether such labor
performed or improvements made contributed in greater or less meas-
ure or at all towards the development of the placer claim.
Section 2325 of the Revised Statutes provides, among other things,
that:
The claimant, at the time of filing this application or at any time thereafter within
the sixty days of publication, shall file with the register a certificate of the United
States surveyor-general that five hundred dollars' worth of labor has been expended
or improvements made upon the claim by himself or grantors.
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It was not contemplated in the enactment of this statute that the
expenditure alone of $500 on a mining claim, either in labor or improve-
melts, or both, should be proof of a compliance with its requirements,
nor was it contemplated that work done or improvements made on the
claim, but not for the benefit of the laim in the development of its.
mineral resources, should be accepted as a proof of such compliance..
If this were not so, then the payment of $500 for one day's work, or the
expenditure of that amount for the building of a house for domestic
purposes would satisfy the requirements of the statute.
Labor and improvements within the mcaning of the statnte are deemed to have
been had on a mining claim .... when the labor is performed or the improvements
are made for its development, that is, to facilitate the extractioni of the metals it may
contain, etc. Smelting Company . Kemp, 104 U. S., 636.
The language of the statute considered, the order of February, 1897,
directing the ascertainment " whether the entrymen failed to expend
the statutory sum of $500 for labor and improvements," meant that the
inquiry should be directed to the ascertainment of the fact whether
the entrymen had expended "five hundred dollars' wcortlt of labor," or
made "five hundred dollars"' worth of improvements for the develop-
ment of the claim. In this view, te amount paid for the labor per-
formed, or expended for the improvements made, is not material, except
as these facts are valuable in ascertaining the worth of the labor and
improvements, for the purpose contemplated by the statute. Nor is it
material who actually performed the labor or made the improvements,
or whether it cost the claimants anything, if they are of value as placer
improvements, and were performed or made for the claimants.
The evidence has been considered with these general principles in
view. This consists of nearly one thousand pages of testimony detailed
by the witnesses at the trial, as shown in a number of exhibits.
The certificate of the United States surveyor-general, filed December
1, 1893, in the United States land office, at Pueblo, Colorado, is pre-
dicated upon a report of U. S. deputy mineral surveyor James F. Smith,
dated September 22, 1893, and shows the following improvements on
the Hull City placer:
(1) A shaft which bears from cor. No. 1 S. 15° 35' E. 800 ft., 4 x 6 ft., 10 ft. deep.
Value, $75.00.
(2) A circular well which bears from cor. No. I S. 140 45' E., 540 ft., 5 ft. diamn.,
24 ft. deep. Value, $240.
(3) A shaft which bears from cor. No. I S. 200 W. 750 ft., x 6 ft., 10 ft. deep.
Value, $75.
(4) A shaft which bears from cor. No. 1 S. 290 24' E. 348 ft., 4 x 6 ft., 10 ft. deep.
Value, $75.
(5) A circular well which bears from cor. No. 1 S. 30 59' E., 458 ft., 6 ft. diam., 17
ft. deep. Value, $170.
Shqcuft 3To* 1.
It was asserted by the protestants that this shaft never existed, and
their witnesses testified that there was no evidence on the ground to
indicate that there ever had been a shaft at the point designated on the
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offlcial plat. The evidence shows, however, that it was incorrectly
located on the plat, and that such a shaft as therein described was
found about one hundred feet from that point. It was sunk for the
placer claimants to a depth of ten feet, in January, 1893, by John
Tompkins ad Gus Hull, working eight or ten days each.
Circular Well No. 2.
Was stunk by Tompkins, Hull, Swanson and Bennett, for the placer
claimants, in January and February, 1893, to a depth of twenty-four
and a half feet.
$1hC1t No. 3.
Was sunk for the placer claimants fifteen feet deep, in January, 1893,
by Tompkins, Hull, Bennett and Berry.
Shaft No. 4.
Was sulk for the placer claimants by Hull, Bennett, and the McNary
brothers, during the period of publication, ten feet deep.
Well No. 5.
Was sunk to a depth of about ten feet before the Hull City placer
was located; afterwards and during the spring of 1893, it was stink by
Tompkius, Hull, Summers and Bennett, to a depth of seventeen feet.
In addition to these, it is shown that the placer claimants placed
other improvements on the claim after the third day of January, 1893,
and before the expiration of the period of publication. These are (lesig-
nated on exhibit 1, as " Trench A "C Out B," " Shaft C." " Trench D,"
"Shaft E," "Shaft northwest of 5." A" is shown to have been a
trench thirty feet long, 3 feet deep and 2t feet wide; " B " a cut 20 feet
long, 3 feet wide and 8 feet deep; " " A a shaft about 31 x 6 feet, 7 feet
deep; "D" a trench about 25 feet long, 1 to 3 feet deep, and 2 to 3
feet wide; "E " a shaft about 4 x 7 and 4 feet deep, and " Shaft north-
west of 5 " a hole in the ground 7 x 7 and 6 feet deep. This work was
done by John Tompkins, assisted by Isaiah Tompkins.
The foregoing statements of improvements are conclusions of fact
drawn from a searching examination of nearly one thousand pages of
testimony. Practically nothing is conceded by the protestants, and
the wide divergence of opinion of a large number of witnesses as to the
value of said improvements has made the examination especially diffi-
cult. The actual cost to the claimants of said development work is
conclusively shown to have been about $800. This is the positive testi-
mony of the locators, Tompkins, Hull and Montgomery, based on their
recollection of a settlement at a meeting of the locators in August, 1893.
Tompkins says it amounted to $800. Hull says he had a memorandum
of the work done upon which the settlement was made, and that it
amounted to $772. Montgomery says it was about $800; that
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Mr. Hull had a memorandum, a sort of time book, in which he had kept his time and
Bennett's time and the men he had employed. Tompkins put in his time as so many
shifts, I do not remember the number of shifts. I do remember the work they put
in and which we paid for at the time amounted to about $800. That was entirely on
account of work done on the placer between January 3, and July 28, 1893.
James F. Smith testified that lie was present at said meeting, and
that the settlement was made on the basis of actual time put in by the
parties who performed the work, and that it amounted to about $800.
Hull's memorandum book was not placed i evidence. He testifies
that it was in a trunk which had been stolen from the cabin O the
claim where he left it, and he knew nothing of its whereabouts.
There is no'evidence to contradict these statements. The concla-
sion is, therefore, that at least $772 was expended i the development
of the claim. Cost is an element in establishing value, and while not.
conclusive, strongly tends also to establish the good faith of the claim-
ants in making the expenditures. It cal not reasonably be presumed
that the locators of a mining claim would expend $800 in the develop-
ment thereof, unless they believed that the work done was reasonably
worth that amount.
The actual value of the work done on these shafts, wells and trenches
is estinated by the witnesses all the way frou two dollars to ten dol-
lars per foot, countilg labor at three dollars per day, which is shown
to have been the prevailing wages for miners' work in Colorado at that
time. These estimates are of little value, most of them being alto-
gather hypothetical, according to the assumed character of the ground
and the time of year that the work was done. The witnesses who did
the work testify that most of it was done in January and February,
when the ground was frozen, and they are corroborated to an extent
that it may be said that this fact is established beyond all reasonable
doubt.
The testimony of the men who superintended and did the work is the
best evidence as to when the work was done, the difficulties encoun-
tered in doing it, including the character of the ground, and the
amount of labor performed in days' work. These men are Hull, John
Tompkins, Stebbins, and the men employed by them. Their testimony
is positive and establishes the fact that considerably more than $500
worth of work was done on the claim for the development thereof, esti-
mated at the prevailing rate of miners' wages, at the time it was done.
An effort is made to impeach the testimony of these witnesses, by
showing that at another time they had all made a different statement,
under oath, as to the time when the work was done. This is shown,
but is not believed to be important, for the following reasons:
(1) These former statements, though incorrect, are shown not to be
inconsistent with good faith when made.
(2) The testimony taken as a whole shows conclusively that their
present statements are correct.
The facts are these: I December, 1896, Hull, Tompkins, and Steb-
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bins made affidavits, on file in this case, that part of this work, therein
specifically described, was done in the months of April and May, 1893.
They now swear that the same work was done in January, February,
and March, 1893. These affidavits were all drawn by Mr. Montgomery,
for use before the Department, to show that $5CO had been expended
in developing the claim before the expiration of the period of publica-
tion. Time was not of the essence of the controversy, except that it
was necessary to show that the work bad been done within the statu-
tory period, hence the affidavits were carelessly drawn.
The facts are thus stated by Mr. Montgomery, on page 822 of the
record:
Q. State in your own words the conditions and circumstances relating to said affi-
davits, and the preparation of same¶
A. At that time a motion was pending before the department in Washington to
dismiss the protest iled by Cronihite and others, and I received a letter from our
attorneys in Washington, asking that affidavits be prepared and sent to Washington
as quickly as possible, to show that the work claimed to have been done upon the
placer w is done prior to the expiration of the period of publication, which Was the
28th of July, 1893. During the next two or three days following the time I received
this letter from Thayer and Rankin I got several telegrams urging Me to expedite
those affidavits as much as possible; I went over to Independence; I saw Tonpkins
and Hicks, and several others, and told them what I wanted, and asked them in a
general way as to whether they could testify that the work was done prior to the
28th of July. They said they could. I returned to Cripple Creek and prepared the
affidavits. In preparing those. affidavits the details were stated as near as I rernem-
bered thlem myself at the time. And I found Mr. Stebbins in Cripple Creek I think a
few days after that; he had come up there for a day or two from Pueblo, and I asked
him to sign an affidavit to the same effect; I prepared his affidavit, lie looked it
over, and signed it I think jeist as I had prepared it. I prepared an affidavit for Gus
Hull and mailed it to him at Black Hawk, enclosing with it a letter asking him that
if the facts stated were substantially correct as he remembered them, to sign the
affidavit and return it to me, which lie did. The affidavits were hastily prepared,
and were prepared for the purpose of showing that the work was done prior to a
certain date, and for that purpose only.
The witnesses themselves swear that while they read the affidavits
before signing them, they gave no thought as to the specific time therein
stated, their attention only being specially directed to the fact that it
was a statement in general effect that the work specified was done
before the expiration of the period of publication.
This explanation is reasonable and sustained by the record. For
instance, Stebbins stated in his affidavit that "s Circular Well No. 27
was sunk by Bennett and Hull in May, 1893, that he was keeping a
boarding house at the time in Hull's camp, and that they boarded with
him while they were doing this work. Yet the testimony shows conclu-
sively that Bennett and Hull did do that particular piece of work, and
that they did board with Stebbins while they were doing it; that Steb-
bins was running a boarding house at Hull's camp during the months
of January, February and March; that he was not running such
boarding house during the mouth of May, but moved away from there
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during the month of April. The statement in his affidavit is thus
shown to have been an iadvertence, pure and simple. No motive is
shown to-influence any of these witnesses to make false statements at
the time these affidavits were executed, and it is believed that the
record shows that none of said statements were intentionally false.
From the testimony of these witnesses at the hearing, strongly cor-
roborated by eye-witnesses and valuable expert testimony, it is believed
that more than five hundred dollars worth of work was done by the
locators on the Hull City placer for the development of the claim after
the location thereof and before the expiration of the sixty days period
of publication.
One other question remains to be considered.
It is urged by the protestants that this entry should be vacated for
the reason, as alleged, that one of the entrymen, James F. Smith, was
interested in the original location of the claim, and was a part owner
therein at the time he executed his afflidavit of expenditures upon which
the surveyor-general's certificate was predicated, and that during this
period he was a deputy United States mineral surveyor.
On this question your office report of January 13, 1898, says:
It seems that sufficient reasons have been shown for the recommendation that this
survey should he set aside, because it was made in violation of law, and that Smith's
commission be revoked, under authority of section 452 U. S. Rev. Stat.
This section provides that-
The officers, clerks and employees in the General Land Office, are prohibited from
directly or indirectly, purchasing or becoming interested in the purchase of any of
the public lands; and any person violathig this section shall forthwith be removed
from office.
In Herbert McMicken et al. (10 L. D., 97, on review 11 L. D., 96),
Secretary Noble held that an officer, clerk or employee in the office of
a United States surveyor-general is an officer, clerk or employee in the
General Land Office within the meaning of this section; in Muller v.
Coleman (18 L. D., 394), Secretary Smith held that a deputy surveyor
is such an employee, and in the Neill case (24 L. D., 393), the present
Secretary held that a surveyor-general is within the inhibition so
declared. A circular of similar import was issued September 15, 1890
(11 L. D., 348). From an examination of these authorities and a con-
sideration of the language and manifest purpose of the section, it
seems clear that its prohibitive provisions embrace a deputy mineral
surveyor. In so far as the cases of State of Nebraska v. Dorrington
(2 C. L. L., 647); Dennison and Willits (11 C. L. O., 261), and Lock
Lode (6 L. D., 105), are in conflict with the views expressed in these
later cases they are overruled.
That Smith was such deputy mineral surveyor is admitted, so it only
remains to inquire whether he was interested in the original placer
location, and if hot, whether lie was a part owner of the claim at the
time of his report thereon as such deputy mineral surveyor.
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There is nothing in this record to show, or tending to show, that
Smith had an interest in this claim prior to May 20,1893. John Tomp-
kins testifies on this point as follows:
Q. When was this arrangement entered into that you, Hull and Stebbins were to
do the work, and Smith, Craigne and Montgomery pay for the patent?
A. About the time the location was made. 
Q. That was about the 3rd of January, 1893?
A. Yes sir, something near that, might have been afterward or before.
Q. If Mr. Smith w as not interested in the placer on the 3rd day of January, why
is it he was to help to pay for and help to obtain the patent?
A. I think at that time Mr. Craigne and Mr. Smith were partners together.
Q. You located on the 3rd of January, o the 4th you obtained a certified copy of
the location certificate, and applied for an order to survey it for patent?
A. I don't know anything about that.
Q. Who did that part of the business?
A. As I stated, Montgomery, Smith and Craigue I suppose.
Q. Explain to us why Smith was to help get a patent for it if he had no interest
init?
A. From what I learn, him and Craigne was partners and I suppose what one had
an interest in the other had.
There is nothing i this testimony indicating that Smith was an
interested party on January 3, 1893, except the very violent supposi-
tiol) of the witness. The fact that Craigue was interested and that
Craigue and Smith were partners in business is no evidence whatever
that Smith was interested in this mining venture.
The witness Montgomery testifies on this matter as follows:
A. At the time of the placer location and up until May sometime, I did not know,
and I do not believe any other of the placer claimants knew that Mr. Smith had
any interest directly or idirectly in the placer, and I do not think he had.
Smith himself positively disclaimis any interest in the claim, contin-
gent or otherwise, prior to May 20, 1893.
On that date, May 20, 1893, C. C. Hathaway conveyed an undivided
one-twuntieth interest in the claim to James P. Smith and W. H.
Craigue, by deed, which was recorded on July 1, 1893. Smith swears
in relation to this deed that he did not know at the time that the inter-
est had been sold to him; that Craigue paid for it with an assay outfit
in which he had no interest, or may have given Hathaway some money
in the trade, or Hathaway may have paid Craigue some- money in the
trade.
Q. Didn't you give Mr. Hathaway a check wheu that deed was delivered in part
payment for that interest?
A. I do not remember that I gave him a check, it is just as probable if a check
was given I gave it as Craigue.
Q. Then you did not know what you gave him the check fort
A. I knew I was giving him a check on Craigue's account if I did.
Q. You swear now that you probably gave him a check at the time the deed was
made conveying that interest to you, and if you did so you did not know you were
giving it as a part payment of the interest conveyed to you?
138 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
A. No, if I gave him the check I knew I gave him the check for payment of that
interest, but I was giving it on Craigue's account.
Q. Bat you did not know anything about it (the deed) until August you say?
A. No, I am not sure I knew about it before October.
Q. Was not the original deed returned to you after it was recorded?
A. Returned to my office.
Q. Didn't you have it recorded yourself?
A. That I do not remember; chances are even that either I or Craigue sent it
down for record.
Q. If you sent the deed down for record, you could not be ignorant of its existence ?
A. I may have been ignorant of the contents; we were sending a good many papers,
and do yet; Craigue iight have had some papers prepared and I prepared some.
No proof was ever offered of the existence of the check suggested by
the foregoing questions, and Craigue has not testified in this record.
Smith testifies that the August settlement hereinbefore referred to
was made in his office, and that he was present when it was made.
Montgomery swears that his understanding was that Smith was rep-
resenting Craigue at the settlement, but admits that he (Montgomery)
knew of Smith's interest at the time. In fact, it appears that the deed
conveying this interest was executed before Mr. Montgomery as a
notary public.
- It thus appears that at the date this deed was acknowledged, Hatha
way knew it, Montgomery knew it, and Craigue knew it; yet Smith,
who admits that he may have given a check in part payment for the
interest, that the chances are even" that either he or Craigue sent the
deed down for record, and that he participated in the settlement in
August, which the above-named interested parties attended, and at
which the estimates of work and improvements ol this claim were sub-
mitted and paid for, "thinks it was probably in October, 1893,?' that he
first knew he had any interest in the claim.
It is significant, too, that the application for patent was made on theI same day this deed was executed. It is believed that the record shows
I that Smith knew and that his co-owiners knew at the date of the appli-
cation for patent that he was interested in the claim. This being true,
what is the effect of it?
It is the duty of a deputy Jnited States mineral surveyor to report
to the surveyor-general, among other things, the value of the work
done and improvements made on a mining claiin, and this report forms
the basis of the surveyor-general's certificate.
In this case Smith's affidavit of expenditures upon the Hull City
Placer is dated September 22, 1893, and the surveyor-genieral's certifi-
cate issued September 26, 1893. Smith was disqualified, by reason of
his interest, to make a report in the matter of expenditures on this
claim, but it is not believed that this should operate to impeach the
certificate of the surveyor-general. The integrity of this certificate
does not depend upon the authority of Smith to make the report, but
depends upon the correctness of the fact stated in the report-to wit,
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that the claimants ad within the time provided by law made the
required expenditures and improvements. It was to determine this
that the last hearing was ordered and it was there shown, as has been
seen, that the law had been complied with.
The pending protests are hereby dismissed.
/ The law will not, however, permit the patenting of this claim to
James F. Smith. You are directed to correct the final certificate and
entry in this case by striking therefrom the name of said Smith, and
then to pass the entry to patent.
The matter of your recommendation that Smith's commission be
revoked, will receive the further attention of the Department.
SUPPLEMENTAL PrnOcEEDilGs-REFPORT OF SPECIAL AGENT.
FLOYD T AL. V. MONTGOMERY ET AL.
The result of proceedings against a mineral entry, in which the parties thereto have
had full opportunity to present evidence in support of their claims according to
the recognized rules of procedure, should not be disturbed or affected by the
report of a special agent on the entry involved.
Secretary Bliss to the Co'mmissioner of the General Land 'Office, February
3, 1898.
The protestants, Floyd et al., have filed a written application for an
oral argument herein and have also requested that the Department
consider a report of an investigation of this mineral entry recently
made by a special agent and said to be on file in your office.
An oral argument can not be granted and neither can any report of
a special agent be considered. This case was thoroughly examined in
the Department and was given personal consideration by me, after
-which a decision was rendered yesterday dismissing the protests of
Floyd et al., and directing that the entry be passed to patent. In that
decision it was held that the protestants were without interest in the
land in controversy and that their repeated protests were vexatious to
the extent that the mineral caimants were entitled to immediate and
decisive action thereon. The charges made against this mineral entry
by the, protestants have heretofore been the subject of inquiry and
investigation at hearings in the local office, openly conducted, where
both the protestants and the mineral claimants had full opportunity to
present the evidence 'in support of their respective claims and to test
the strength and character of opposing testimony by cross examina-
tion, impeachment, and otherwise, according to recognized rules of
procedure. It is believed that the result of these hearings should not
be disturbed or affected by the report of a special agent.
You will notify the protestants of this ruling ad'you will carry the
decision rendered herein yesterday into affect without delay.
Herewith is returned the application first above referred to.
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BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE CHOCTAW, CHEROKEE AND CIEEI
NATION.
OPINION.
Natural boundaries should control in the settlement of the boundary lines between
the Choctaw, Cherokee and Creek Nations, hence the boundary line of the
Cherokee Nation should stop where it first meets the Canadian river in its south-
ern course from the four mile post referred to in the treaty of May 23, 1836, and
from this point the river will mark the boundary between the Creek and Choc-
taw Nations.
Assistant Attorney- General T rn Devanter to the Secretary qt the Interior,
February 8, 1898. (F. W. C.)
I am in receipt, through your reference, of a letter fromi C. .11. Fitch,
addressed to the Director of the Geological Survey, wit h request for
opinion upon the question therein resented as to the true boundary
line between the Choctaw, Cherokee and Creek Nations.
In said letter it is stated that:
The only information in my possession bearing upon this question is contained in
a copy of the " 3ounndaries and Area of the Southern Tract of Cherokee Lauds" from
"Senate Document No. 120, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 2, page 952.?' In this
paper the boundary is defined and followed from the N.E. corner of the Creek
Nation, south to the Verdigris river; alongthe Verdigris river to the Arkansas river;
across the Arkansas river to a post on its south bank marked 38 mile post; from this
point in a south-westerly direction 34 miles, 28.80 chains to a post unarked 4 mile,
and from this latter post due south four miles to a post located at the mouth of the
North Fork of the Canadian river at its coufluence with the Canadian river; thence
down the Canadian river, on its north bank, to its j unction with the Arkansas river.
The three posts above mentioned have been fonu d and fully iden]tifled. No meander
corners were found on the river-where such corners should have been established
had the line crossed the river as indicated in the diagram, nor could any post be
found at the point where the 1st mile post should have been located. In fact there
is no evidence to show that the line was ever run across the river.
If the Canadian river, at this point, is the north boundary of the Choctaw Nation,
it will be seen that a north line froni the initial monument as a boundary line for
the Cherokees will precipitate a conflict. Again, if the north bank of the Canadian
river, down stream from the initial monument, is the southern boundary of the
Cherokee Nation, such north line from the same monument, as a boundary for the
same nation, must be in error, as it is in conflict with the boundary as defined by the
river. No good reason is apparent for extending this boundary further south than
to the point where it first intersects the river, just south of the 2nd mile corner.
If the line is extended due south from this point to the initial monument, about
three acres of land will accrue to the Cherokees adjoining and immediately north of
said monument. Should the river be taken as a boundary fom the initial point,
then the area of Cherokee lands will not begin until the point is reached where the
line intersects the river south of the 2nd mile post.
I may add that there is no evidence tending to show that any appreciable change
in the course of the river has occurred since the date of the original survey, and the
elevations, as shown by contour lines in the immediate vicinity of the river will
indicate the impossibility of any material change.
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In the treaty with the Choctaw Nation, proclaimed January 8, 1821
(7 Stat., 211), the United States ceded to that nation the country
bounded as follows:
- Beginning on the Arkansas river, where the lower boundary line of the Cherokee
strikes the same; thence up the Arkalnsas to the Canadian Fork, and up the same to
its source; thence due south to the Red river, thence down Red river, three miles
below the mouth of Little River, which empties into Red river on the north side;
thence a direct line to the beginning.
This clearly nade the right bank of the Canadian river a part of
the northern boundary of the Choctaw country.
Article of the treaty -ith the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations,
proclaimed March 4, 856 (Revisioni of Indian Treaties, p. 275), is as
follows:
The following shall constittte and remain the boundaries of the Choctaw and
Chickasaw country, viz: Beginning at a point on the Arkansas river, one hundred
paces east of old Fort Smith, where the western oundary line of the State of
Arkansas crosses the said river, and running thence due south to Red river; thence
up Red river to the point where the meridian of one hundred degrees west longi-
tude crosses the same; thence north along said meridian to the main Canadian
river; thence down said river to its junction with the Arkansas river; thence down
said river to the place of beginning.
This treaty established the right bank of the Canadian river as, part
of the northern boundary of the Choctaw country.
La the treaty with the Cherokee Nation, proclaimed May 3, 1836
(Revision of Indian Treaties, p. 67), is found the following:
Whereas by treaty of May 6, 1828, and the supplenentary treaty thereto of Feb-
ruary 14, 1833, with the Cherokees west of the Mississippi, the United- States guar-
anteed and secured to be conveyed by patent, to the Cherokee Nation of Indians,
the following tract of country:
Beginning at a point on the old western territorial line of Arkansas Ter, being
twenty-five miles north from the point where the territorial line crosses Arkansas
river; thence running from said north point south on the said territorial line, where
the said territorial line crosses the Verdigris river; thence down said Verdigris
river to the Arkansas river; thence down said Arkansas to a point where a stone is
placed opposite the east or lower bank of Grand river at its Junction with the
Arkansas; thence running south forty-four degrees west one mile; thence in a
straight line to a point four miles northerly, from the mouth of the north fork of the
Canadian; thence along saidfour-mile line to the Caadian; thence down the Canadian
to the Arkansas;- thence down the Arkansas to that point on -the Arkansas where the
eastern Choctaw boundary strikes said river, and running thence with the western
line of Arkansas Territory, etc.
In the treaty with the Creek Nation, proclaimed May 28, 1856 (Revi-
sion of the Indian Treaties, p. 105), the boundaries of their country,
being the same as those set forth in the treaty of February 14, 1833,
are described as follows:
The following shall constitute and remain the boundaries of -the Creek country, viz:
beginning at the mouth of the north fork of the Canadian river, and running nort7-
erlyfoeur miles; thence running a straight line so as to meet a line drawn from the
south bank of the Arkansas river, opposite to the east or lower bank of Grand river,
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at its junction with the Arkalnsas, and whicl iuns a coirse south, forty-four degrees
west, one mile, to a post placed in the ground; thence along said line to the Arkan-
sas and np the same and the Verdigris river, to where the old territorial line crosses
it; thence along said line, north, to a point tenty-five miles from the Arkansas
river, where the old territorial line crosses the same; thence runing west with the
southern line of the Cherokee country, to the north fork of the Canadian river,
where the boundary of the cession to the Seminoles defined in the preceding article
first strikes said Cherokee line; thence down said north fork, to where the eastern
boundary-line of the said cession to the Seminoles strikes the same; thence, with
that line, due south to the Canadian river, at the month of the Ock-hi-appo, or Pond
creek; and thence down said Canadian river to the place of beginning.
The difficulty in the matter of establishing these several boundaries
arises from an apparent misconception as to the actual location of the
Canadian river immediately to the east of the point of the junction of
the North Fork with that river. As it now appears a line drawn north
for four miles from the point of junction will, inside of two miles, cross
the river twice, thus leaving two small bodies of land in the bends of
the river, one to the east and the other to the west of that line. The
land to the west of that line is covered by the treaty made with the
Choctaws and it was clearly never the intention to include the same in
the Creek country.
As before stated, the Canadian river was intended to be the boundary
between the Choctaw and the Creek and Cherokee countries, ad the
natural boundary should control.
To the east of the four mile line before referred to, there remains
about three acres on the left bank of the Canadian river and clearly
within the Creek country.
If the boundary line of the Cherokee country was continued south-
ward for four miles, crossing the Canadian river twice, as-before stated,
these three acres would seem to belong to the Cherokee Nation, although
separated at some distance from the main body of their lands.
In this case it would seem that the natural boundary shall also con-
trol and these three acres be held to belong to the Creek Nation.
To carry into effect these views the boundary line of the Cherokee
Nation should stop where it first meets the Canadian river in its south-
ern course from the four-mile post referred to in the treaty, and from
this point the river will mark the boundary between the Creek and
Choctaw Nations. '
Approved, February 3, 1898,
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS: 143
PRACTICE-RECONSIDERATION OF DEPARTMENTAL ACTION-NOTICE.
MISSOURI VALLEY LAND Co. v. FITCH.
Prior to the reconsideration of final departmental action, de notice should be
given all parties adversely affected thereby, and intervening claimants called
upon-to show cause why their entries sho'Ifd stand.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W . D.) 3, 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter of August 5, 1.897, was transmitted an appeal
by the Missouri Valley Land Company, successor to the Sioux City and
Pacific Railroad Company, from the action of the local officers at
O'Neil, Nebraska, in rejecting its list covering the WJ of Sec. 29, T.
20 N., R. 11 W. and NWt Sec. 1, T. 21 N., R. 10 W., for conflict with
certain claims of record allowed under the decision of this Department
in the case of the Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company v. William
iR. Fitch (216 L. and R., 184), in which it was held that a school
indemnity selection made prior to any statutory authority therefor but
of record at the date of attachment of rights nder the grant, tnder
which this company claims, served to except the tracts included in
such invalid school selection from the operation of the railroad grant.
This decision has been specifically overruled as to said holding. See
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 17 L. D., 43; also Sioux City
and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Wiese, 21 L. D., 316.
In view of these latter decisions you transmit the appeal without
action, and request instruetions.
The entries of record do not appear to have been patented so that
this Department is not deprived of jurisdiction over the land, and as
the previous adjudications, so far s the school indemnity selections
made at a time when there was no authority of law therefor are held to
have been sufficient to defeat the attachment of rights under the rail-
road grant, are, in the opinion of this Department, erroneous and should
not be followed, you are directed to require the railroad company to
serve its appeal from the rejection of its lists upon the claimants of
record; and you will also call upon such persons, allowing them a rea-
sonable time, to be determined by your office, within which to show
cause why their entries should not be canceled as to any extracts, cov-
ered by their entries, not excepted from the grant for other reasons
than the existence of the invalid state selection, and at the expiration of
the time allowed, you will again submit the entire record with your recom-
mendation thereon for the frther consideration of this Department.
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TOWNSITE PATENTS-KNOWN LODE-J7ISIDICTIONT.
GREGORY LODE CLAUNI.
The issuance of townsitc patent for land known at the date of the townsite entry
to contain a valuable lode caim, does not pass title to Stch claim, but leaves it
in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction of the land department.
Secretary Bliss to the Conissioneo of the General lEand Office, February
(W. V. D.) 3, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
On September 18, 1890, your office, under authority of the decision of
the Department in the case of the Pike's Peak Lode claim (10 L. D., 200),
held for cancellation Central City, Colorado, mineral entry No. 1045,
made July 8, 1878, by Charles IT. Briggs, J. Smith Briggs and George
W. Briggs, for the Gregory lode claim, on the ground that the claim
was entirely within the limits of the townsite of Central City, for which
patent issued July 10 1876, whereby the jurisdiction of the land depart-
mentwas terminated as to all landwithii such limits. TheNew Gregory
Mining Company, as transferee of the entrymen named above, and pres-
ent owner of the Gregory lode claim, thereupon appealed to the Depart-
ment, contending that the claim was known to be valuable lode mining
property, and held and worked as such tnder local mining regulations
and mining laws of the United States long prior to the townsite entry,
and that therefore the land embraced therein did not pass under said
patent, nor the jurisdiction of the land department over the same thereby
terminate. Te papers in the case were forwarded to the Department
by your office inder date August 19,1890.
Extended discussion of the issue presented in this case is unneces-
sary. The application for patent to the said claim was filed November
11, 1873. The disposition of the case by your office was long delayed
by various causes not now deemed of sufficient importance to justify
recitation here. The delay in forwarding the appeal to the Department
appears to have been due to inadvertence. No one is now objecting to
the issue of patent for said claim, nor has any objection to such issue
appeared since the dismissal, August 13,1875, of the adverse suit insti-
tuted February 5, 1874, by the Camper Gold Mining Company, claimant
of the Dead Broke lode claim, against the Gregory lode claimants.
The doctrine of the Pike's Peak case, supra, relied upon by your
office, was overruled by the decision in the South Star case (20 L. D.,
204). These cases were cases of conflicting lode and placer claims, the
latter having been patented, but the law concerning the rights of the
lode and placer claimants, respectively, is very similar to the law rela-
tive to the rights of lode and townsite claimants, respectively, under
like conditions.
In the recent case of Pacific Slope Lode v. Butte Townsite (25 L. D.,
518), in. which all the material facts were essentially similar, in every
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respect, to those of the case at bar, the Department held (syllabus)
that-
A townsite patent that in terms provide that "no title shall be hereby acquired
to any mine . . . or to any valid mining claim or possession held under existing
laws of Congress," does not divest the Department of jurisdiction to subsequently
issue a patent for a lode claim within the limits covered by said townsite patent, if
at the date of the townsite entry such lode claim was known to exist.
* Cash entry No. 148, for the townsite of Central City, Colorado, which
embraces within its limits the Gregory lode claim, was made May 16,
1873. This entry was merged in cash entry No. 21 1., made May 27, 1874,
for the townsite of Central City, Colorado, which embraced additional
ground, and for which patent issued July 10, 1876. It is abundantly
shown by testimony adduced at a hearing held February 6, 1889, pur-
suant to direction of your office on its on motion, that the Gregory
lode claim existed and was known to be valuable for its mineral con-
tents as early as the year 1859, and that it had been held and worked
since, continuously, under local mining regulations and the mining
laws of the United States, and had yielded during that time large
quantities of gold. At te said hearing the mayor and city attorney,
representing the municipal corporation of Central City, Colorado, filed
a disclaimer of "all right, title and interest of, in and to the land
embraced Within the boundary lines of said Gregory lode claim, M. E.
No. 1045, survey No. 254," and frther declared therein that said
corporation "does not and will not object to the issuance of a patent
therefor."
Applying to these facts the law as stated in the decision of the
Department last above mentioned, the Department holds that no title
to the Gregory lode claim, or any part tereoft-passed by the patent
for the Central City towusite, but the same remained in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction of the land department thereof.
The decision of your offiee is accordingly reversed, and you will pass
the Gregory lode claim to patent if the proofs are otherwise regular.
MINING CLAIM-PUBLICATION OF NOTICE.
INSTRUCTIONS.
In the selection of a newspaper for thepublication of notice of a mineral application
a reasonable discretion may be exercised by the register in determining what is
a newspaper, and which of several papers is the one published nearest to the
claim, having in view the purpose of the statute in requiring publicationi
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the Geineral Land Offiee, February
(W. V. D.) 3, 1898. (W. A. E.)
By letter of April 29, 1897, your office asked for instructions relative
to the publication of notice under the mining laws.
12209-VOL 26-10
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Section 2325 of the Revised Statutes provides that:
The register of the land office, upon the filing of such application, phit, field-notes,
notices, and affidavits, shall publish a notice that such application has been made,
for the period of sixty days, in a newspaper to be by him designated as published
nearest to such claim; and he shall also post such notice in his office for the same.
period.
Paragraph 37 of the regulations under the mining laws, as they
existed at the time our office letter was written, provided that the
register should in all cases designate the newspaper of general circula-
tion that is published nearest the land, "geographically measured."
In the case of Bretell v. Swift (on review), 17 L. D., 558, it was held
that in the selection of a newspaper for the publication of notice of
mineral application the register, in the exercise of a proper discretion,
may designate a paper that he regards best for the purpose of giving
the greatest publicity to the notice, even though it may not be the
paper nearest to the land.
Your office letter calls attention to the apparent conflict between the
regulation and the decision above cited, and further stated that:
Prior to the regulation above cited, it was the practice of the office to allow the
publication to be made in the newspaper nearest to the claim as ascertained by the
most usually travelled route.
Since your office letter was written the regulations under the mining
laws have been revised, and the revised edition was approved Decem-
ber 15, 1897, 25 L. D., 561.
Number 52 of the new regulations provides that:
The register shall publish the notice of application for patent in a paper of
established character and general circulation, to be by him designated as being the
newspaper published nearest the land.
The words " geographically measured" contained in the old regula-
tions have been omitted from the revised edition.
The statute clearly seems to indicate that the register is given some
discretion in the selection of the newspaper. It may sometimes
happen, as in the case of Bretell v. Swift, that the newspaper nearest
the land, geographically measured, is not the paper nearest to the land
by the usually traveled route, and is not the paper best calculated to
secure publicity of the notice in the neighborhood of the claim. The
statute is not simply that the publication shall be in a newspaper
"published nearest to such claim," but is that the publication shall be
"in a newspaper to be by him (the register) designated as published
nearest to such claim." There are three elements in this requirement:
First, the publication shall be in a newspaper; second, that newspaper
shall be the one "published nearest to such claim;" and third, the
register shall designate and determine what newspaper is " published
nearest to such claim." As applied to newspapers, printing is not
the sole act of publication. To be published within the meaning of
this statute, a newspaper must be circulated, that is, it must be dis-
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tributed as a means of disseminating news. The performance of the
register's duty, nder the statute, requires the exercise by him of
reasonable judgment and discretion, both in determining what is a
newspaper and in determining which of several papers is the one pub-
listed nearest to the claim. He should not act arbitrarily or indif-
ferently in the matter, but should be guided by the purpose of the
statute in requiring publication, which is the diffusion of information
and notice respecting the applicatiou for patent in the vicinity of the
claim and among those whose residence or presence in that locality
bespeak their interest in the claim or their knowledge thereof. In
Condon et al. v. Mammoth Mining Co. (on review, 15 L. D., 330), in
discussing this statute, Secretary Noble said:
I am of the opinion that this means that the register shall publish the notice of
such application in a paper to be by him designated as being the newspaper pub-
lished nearest to such claim, not by actual measurement in a direct line between
newspaper offices in the same town or city, but in the nearest town or city in which
-a paper or papers of established character and general circulation is published.
Unquestionably, under this statute, when several newspapers are published in the
same town or city, the register may designate whichever in his jdgment will best
subserve the p abl ic interest and which will give the Widest notice to the public that
the entrymen are seeking title to a mine. From these views it follows, that in this
matter the register has some discretion in the designation of the newspaper, as to its
established character as a newspaper, its stability and general circulation and the
like. But it is a legal discretion and in its exercise his act is certainly subject to
review and control by your office and the Department, and where it is shown that
he has, abused such discretion, your office, as well as the Department, has the power
to set aside his action in order to avoid injustice or unfair discrimination, or an
ignoring of the provisions of the law and the rules and regulations of the Depart-
ment.
In this conclusion I fully concur.
RENSTATE MENT-NOTICE O D:ECISION-ADVERSE CLAIM.
MESStR V. ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND MANITOBA BY. CO.
On application for the reinstatement of an entry, the applicant should not be heard
to say that he did not receive proper notice of the decision holding his entry for
cancellation, where his failure to be heard on appeal is in no way due to the.
alleged insufficiency of such notice.
Reinstatement of a canceled entry will not be made, where negligence on the part of
the applicant in the assertion of his claim appears, and an adverse right has
intervened.
Secretary Bliss to te Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) ~ 4, 1898. (W. M. W.)
By your office decision of July 12, 1889, the timber culture entry of
Edward. P. Messer for the NW. of Sec. 15, T. 123 N., R. 45, Minne-
sota, was held for cancellation- for conflict with the claim of the St.
Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company, main line, subject
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to appeal to the Department, or to a right, within sixty days from receipt
of notice, to apply for a hearing to enable him to show that the railway
company's selection of the tract was improperly allowed. There being
no appeal and no application for a hearing, your office letter of March
10, 1892, declared the decision of July 12, 1889, to be final and Messer's
entry canceled.
February 3, 1896, counsel for Messer filed in your office a motion to
reinstate said entry and re-open the case, upon the following grounds:
1. That said case was closed without any proper service of notice on said Messer
of the decision of July 12, 1889, and that he has had no opportunity for either moving
for review thereof or appealing therefrom, intelligently.
2. That he has good and meritorious grounds for complaining of said decision.
By your office decision of April 1.8, 1896, this motion was rejected
and Messer appeals. He filed his affidavit in support of the motion,
stating, in substance, that he received a notice from the local land office,
at Marshall, Minnesota, purporting to be a decision by the local o fficers
holding his entry for cancellation and then saying:
That said notice contained no statement with reference to the Commissioner of the
-General Land Office having decided the case, and no mention of the Commissioner is
contained therein; that the letter containing said decision did not enclose a copy of
the Commissioner's decision, as required, and affiant was never served with a copy
of said Commissioner's decison.
The original letter thus referred to is attached to the affidavit as an
exhibit, is dated July 16, 1889, at Marshall, Minnesota, and is directed
to Messer. It recites the allowance of Messer's timber culture entry of
the land in question by the register and receiver, at Benson, Minnesota,
June 21, 1886, when the records of the local office showed that the tract
had been selected by the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway
Company October 16, 1883, states that the land is within the twenty-
mile indemnity limits of the above railroad, and holds that the railway
company's selection shown upon the official records was a bar to the
admission of any other class of entry, and that instead of admitting
Messer's entry the local officers should have permitted him to contest
the company's claim, by hearing, if so desired. Messer's entry is then
held for cancellation subject to his right to appeal to the Secretary of
the Interior, or to apply for a hearing to enable him to show that the
railway selection was improperly or illegally admitted, and it is stated
that-"A failure to apply for a hearing or file an appeal within the
usual time (60 days) will be deemed a waiver to further claim to the
land."
The affidavit states that within the time allowed for an appeal
Messer-
Employed T. M. Grant, Esq., a notary public, to prepare an appeal from said deci-
sion and forward the said appeal to the Interior Department at Washington, D. C.
That the said Grant was employed to make and transmit the appeal aforesaid, and
for no other purpose, and the said Grant was not at that time or any subsequent
time the attorney of this affiant in this matter, never entered his appearance as such
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in the case, and was not authorized to act for afflant in any way beyond preparing
of the appeal papers, which appeal was signed by this afflant, to the best of his
information and belief. That afflant never received any notice from the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office of the insufficiency of his said appeal to the Sec-
retary, and that if said T. M. Grant received such notice, it was not as the attorney
of this affiant in the case, and that any action (if any) of said Grant in forwarding
the appeal to the Hon. S. G. Comstock was without the knowledge or authority of
afflant. That affiant never employed the said Hon. S. G. Comstook as his attorney
in the case, and that said Comstock has not, with the knowledge or consent of
affi ant, entered any appearance for affiant in said case; that he has not been informed
by said Comstock of any action by the Commissioner with reference to said appeal,
and is therefore not bound by any notice to the said Comstook of the insufficiency
of the appeal.
That oil or about the 19th day of June, 1894, affiant was notified by Hayden
French, clerk of the district court of said county of the action of the Commissioner
of the General Land Office cancelling said entry unler late of March 1 (10), 1892,
and that said notice wYas the first information affiant had of the insufficiency of said
appeal; that notice given to said T. M. Grant or Hon. S. G. Comstock was not con-
structively notice to afflant, and that he should not be bound thereby.
That the information given affiant by Hayden French, as aforesaid, was obtained
from a letter from the land office at Marsball, Minnesota, the same being heretb
attached, marked "Z" and made a part of this affidavit.
This exhibit has endorsed upon it: "April 15, 1892 notified claimant
at Bigstone, Minu., and S. G. Comstock, at Moorhead, Minn., of the
cancellation."
'It appears from your office decision of April 18, 1896, that on Sep-
tember 10, 1889, Messer forwarded an appeal from your office decision
of July 12, 1889, which was returned to him at Ortonville, December
10, 1889, in care of T. M. Grant, for service upon the opposite party
according to the Rules of Practice.
December 17, 1889, Mr. Comstock returned to your office Messer's
appeal, without service, and December 19, 18>9, said appeal was
returned by your office to Mr. (Domstock, with full explanation of
Messer's case, and with the further information that the time within
which Messer's appeal could be perfected under the Rules of Practice
would expire December 29, 1889.
From Messer's affidavit it clearly appears that he received notice of
your office decision holding his entry for cancellation. The notice so
received was from the local office, stated that his entry had been held
for caucellation, gave the reason therefor, and informed hi-m of his right
to appeal to the Secretary or to contest the railroad company's selection.
The notice was informal, and did not literally comply with the rule
requiring a copy of a decision to be served upon the party against
whom it is rendered; but it gave the requisite inforination and Messer
evidently understood it, and acted upon it by causing an appeal from
your office decision to be prepared and forwarded. His appeal was not
questioned on account of any defect therein, but was returned for the
reason that it was not served upon the opposite party. In view of his
action, it is now too late for him to say that the notice of your office
decision was so defective that he could not intelligently appeal. He
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swears that he "never received any notice from the Commissiouer of
the General Land Office of the insufficiency of his appeal to the Secre-
tary." This may be true, for there was no suggestion that his appeal
was insufficient. He does not deny the fact that he was apprised of
the requirement of your office letter that he serve his appeal upon the
opposite party.
If it were conceded that Messer's first intimation that his appeal had
been returned for service was when he received notice of the action of
your office of March 10, 1892, his showing would still be insufficient to
justify the re-olening of the case. Your office letter of that date recites
the action of your office in the case from its inception. He received a
copy of it about June 19, 1894, and was then fully informed of all the
steps taken in the case, including the return of his appeal and the pur-
pose for which it was returned. He tool no steps to have the decision
canceling his entry reviewed or to have the original case re-opened, but,
knowing his entry was canceled, allowed te matter to rest from June
19, 1894, to February, 1896, when this application was made. In June,
1894, be knew that his appeal had been returned, the reasons therefor,
and that his entry had been canceled, as well as he did in February,
1896.
An informal inquiry at your office elicits the information that the
land involved herein is covered by the homestead entry of Edward C.
Jellison, made February 17, 1896, and this is a circumstance to be con-
sidered in determining the justice and propriety of allowing Messer's
application to re-open the case.
His application is accordingly denied.
SOLDIERS' HOMESTEAD-PERIOD OF, RESIDENCE.
PETER BORTLE.
In the computation of the time that may be deducted, uder section 25 R. S.,
from the period of residence required of a homesteader, it is only the time
actually served $hat can be credited to the entryman, unless he was discharged
for wounds received or disability incurred in the line of duty.
Secretary Btiss to te Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 4, 1898. (P. J. C.)
The record has been examined in the appeal of Peter Bortle from
your office decision declining to accept his final proof made on his
homestead entry of the W.i NW.1 Sec. 8, and E.J- NE.1 Sec. 7, Tp. 11
S., R. 2 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles, California, land district, for the
reason that his residence on the land, together with his service in the
United States Navy, made a total of only three years, one month and
twelve days.
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Your office directed that when the entryman
can show such additional residence, which, together with his residence and naval
service will make the full period of five years, he will be allowed to submit supple-
mental proof without readvertisenient, showing such additional residence.
The claimant insists that he should have credit for service from June
22, 1863 to July, 1867. It appears that his first enlistment covered the
period from June 22, 1863 to July 12, 1864; that he re-enlisted July 18,
1864 for three years, but was discharged July 4, 1865. It does not
appear that his final discharge was on account of WNounds received, or
disability.
Section 2305, Revised Statutes, provides that the time the homestead
settler has served in the Army or Navy shall be deducted from the time
required to perfect title,
or if discharged on account of wouds received or disability incurred in the line of
duty, then the term of enlistiueot shall be deducted from the time heretofore required
to perfect title, withont reference to the length of time he may have served.
it is true that the register of the local office by a letter written May
27, 1895, to the attorney for Bortle, informed him that Bortle would be
entitled to
credit for the full term of enlistment wrhether he is discharged before he serves his
full term, because of the close of the war.
This information was evidently relied on by the entryman, and proba-
bly under this view of the law the local officers approved the final.
proof. iut b.y the terms of the statute quoted the allowance of the
entry was clearly erroneous, It is only the time actually served that
can be credited to the applicant unless he was discharged for wounds
received or disability incurred in the line of duty.
Your office judgment is therefore affirmed.
CONTEST-SUFFICIENCY OF CHARGE-TIMBER LAND.
HARPER v. Eim'E.
To determine the sufficieccy of an affidavit of contest as the basis for a hearing it
is necessary to consider whether or not, if any one or more of the charges taken
singly, or all the charges taken together as a whole, are established, the entry
must be canceled.
A homestead entry made for the purpose of securing the timber on the land covered
thereby, and not for the purpose of obtaining a home, must be canceled.
Secretary Bliss to the Oonoissioner of the General Land Ofce, February
(W.V.D.) 4, 1898. (W.A.E.)
On March 8, 1895, Tormod T. Eiene made homestead entry for the
SW I of Sec. 15, T. 21 N., R. 9 W., Olympia, Washington, laud district,
and on July 5, 1895, after due notice, he submitted final proof before
H. M. Sutton, . S. circuit court cornmissioner at Montesano, Chehalis
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county, Washington.. It was alleged in this proof that he; had estab-
lished residence on the land in May, 1890; that he has since resided
there except for short absences, but that his family, consisting of wife
and one child, has never resided there owing to ill health and bad con-
dition of the road and rough weather; that his improvements consist
of a house fourteen by sixteen, a barn, three acres under cultivation,
three acres slashed, an orchard, some fencing, and a road, all valued
at $750, and that he has raised crops two seasons on one and one half
acres. This proof was approved and final certificate issued July 8,
1895.
On November 6, 1895, Jennie E. Harper filed in the local office an
affidavit of contest against said entry, alleging that the improvements
upon which the final certificate was based consist of the remains of a
small house twelve by fourteen feet and a small shed twelve by twelve
feet, both burned, and an acre of ground nderbrushed, with green
timber standing thereon; that the value of said improvements would
not exceed one hundred dollars; that both the residence and improve-
ments of the homestead claimant are the merest pretense; that said
tract is heavily covered with merchantable timber and is chiefly
valuable therefor; and that the same is wholly unfit for agricultural
purposes.
This affidavit was transmitted to your office with favorable recom-
mendation by the local officers, but by letter of May 21, 1896, your
office declined to order a hearing thereon, whereupon Miss Harper
appealed to the Department.
To determine the sufficiency of an affidavit of contest as the basis
for a hearing it is necessary to ask whether or not, if any one or more
of the charges taken singly, or all the charges taken together as a
whole, are established, the entry must be canceled.
Reading the allegations contained in this affidavit of contest together
as a wholes it seems clear that if they are established, this entry must be
canceled as fraudulent.
In the case of Wright v. Larson, 7 L. D. 555, it was held that while
lands chiefly valuable for timber and stone, and unfit for ordinary agri-
cultural purposes, are not excluded from settlement by the act of June
3, 1878, yet settlement on such lands should be carefully scrutinized as
the exception in said act is in favor of the " bona fide settler." See also
Porter v. Throop, 6 L. D. 691.
If the charges contained in this affidavit are true, the conclusion
would be that Eiene made this entry not for the purpose of obtaining
a home for himself and family, but for the purpose of obtaining the
timber on the land.
Your office decision is accordingly reversed, and you will direct the
local officers to appoint a day for hearing and notify the parties thereof.
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RAULROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY-SETTLEMENT RIGHT.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. V. KIRKPATRICK.
Within the indemnity limits of the grant to the Northern Pacific the company has
no claim, prior to selection, that will defeat the acquisition of a settlement
right.
ecretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 4 1898. (J. L. McC.)
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company has appealed from the de-
cision of your office, dated July 10, 1896, rejecting the indemnity selec-
tion of said company to the NE. of Sec. .11, T. 14 N., R. 43 E., Walla
Walla land district, Washington, and allowing the application of
William W. Kirkpatrick to make homestead entry of the same.
The land described is within the limits of the withdrawal upon the
line of amended general route of said road, the map showing which
was filed February 21, 1872. Upon definite location of the road the
tract fell within its indemnity limits on account of which an order of
withdrawal was issued by your office December 2,188(. Said with-
drawals, however, had no effect upon the status of the land, iasmuch
as they were unauthorized by law (Guilford Miller, 7 L. D., 100).
On November 13, 18S3, William W. Kirkpatrick applied to make
homestead entry of the tract, in his application alleging settlement
thereon "in the spring of 1879.' Your office, on March 28,1894, noti-
fied the railroad company that it would be allowed ninety days within
which to file affidavit showing- that Kirkpatrick did not make settle-
ment on said hind as he had alleged. Within the time prescribed the
company filed an affidavit; but as it failed to set forth facts tending to
show that Kirkpatrick had not made settlement on the land as alleged
in his application, your office refused to allow a hearing.
Within the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific Railroad Coin-
pany's grant, the company has no claim, prior to selection, that will
defeat the acquisition of a settlement right. (Northern Pac. l. i. Co. v.
Jackson, 20 L. D., 288; same v. Lillethun, 21 L. D., 487.)
Kirkpatrick having alleged settlement in the spring of 1879, which
allegation the company does not deny, his right acquired by virtue of
such settlement is not defeated by the company's subsequent selection
(on March 20, 1881).
The decision of your office holding said indemnity selection for can-
cellation is therefore hereby affirmed.
FLOYD ET AL. V. MONTGOMERY ET AL.
Motion for review of departmental decision of February 2, 1898, 26
L. D., 122, denied by Secretary Bliss, February 5, 1898.
154 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
RIGHT OF WAY PROCEEDING5-OFFICIAL RECEIVER.
THE GILA. BEND RESERVOIR AND IRRIGATION COMPANY.
The maps and papers pertaining to right of way proceedings may be delivered to
the receiver of au irrigation company, for purposes of ainendment, on dne show-
ing that he is oting under judicial authority.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Offce, Eebrvary
(W. V. D.) 7, 189S. (I.G.)
On December 16, 1895, your office was directed by this Department
to certify all proceedings in the above entitled matter for departmental
review, ad this order was complied with by your letter of April 8,
1896, enclosing all the papers in the case, including proof of service of
the departmental order upon the parties interested.
It appears from the record that the Gila Bend Reservoir and Irriga-
tion Company filed its application and accompanying maps and papers
for the right of way for an irrigating canal, under sections 18 to 21,both
inclusive, of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), in March, 1891,
but these maps were found defective by your office, and were returned
for orrection. The articles of incorporation were accepted by the
Secretary of the Interior, July 25, 1891, and are now on file in your
office.
The map was thereafter refiled several times and returned for correc-
tion, and, finally, upon March 27, 1894, the map, field notes and other
papers were returned for correction to the local office, at Tucson, Ari-
zona, with instructions to forward a copy of your officee letter, with the
enclosed map and papers, to the proper. officer of the company.
The local office, prior thereto, had been notified by the secretary of
the Peoria Canal Company that his company had purchased and had
a conveyance of the canal, dam and all property of the Gila Bend Res-
ervoir and Irrigation Company, but on April 19, 1894, the secretary of
the latter company made formal demand, i writing, for the map and
papers.
In response to a letter of inquiry from the register of the local office)
on April 22, 1894, James McMi]]an, as receiver of the Gila Bend Reser-
voir and Irrigation Company, the Arizona Construction Company, and
the Peoria Canal Company, asked that the map be delivered to him.
On April 23, 1894, the said register adVised the receiver that, in
face of the demand and protest of the Gila Bend Company, the maps
-would be held until the question of ownership thereto was settled, but
stating, however, that if the judge of the district court of Arizona,
appointing the receiver, would order that the map be delivered to the
receiver and not to the officers of the Gila Bend Company, such order
would be obeyed. It appears that the judge declined to make this order,
for the reason that he had no jurisdiction or control of the papers in
the custody of the land office.
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The request of the Gila Bend Company for the papers was denied
by the register, and the adverse claimants were notified of their right
to apply for a hearing within thirty days.
From this decision the Gila Bend Company appealed. Its appeal
was filed within time, but was not served upon the adverse parties, and
its attorney insists that no service thereof was necessary. Your office,
in reviewing the matter, o June 12, 1895, held that such service of the
notice of appeal was necessary, and under Rule 48 of Practice dis-
missed the appeal, recognizing the, decision of the register as final.
- Considering the proceeding upon. its merits, your office held that the
receiver of the Gila Bend and the other company was entitled to the
papers for the purpose of making the required corrections.
The matter is before the Departuenit upon the record of the proceed-
ings transmitted by your office.
It is contended that the register alone had no authority to decide the
matter and erred in his decision, and that as different suits anmd pro-
ceedings are pending in the courts of Ar izona and i the supreme court
of the United States, contesting the validity of the appointment of a
receiver, the status iln quo should be preserved, at least, and that pend-
ing such litigation no ruling shoadl be made by the Department that
would tend to confuse or prejudice the rights of any of the parties
litigant.
It is immaterial that the order appointing a receiv er may have -been
improper or erroneous. No one can interfere with the possession of
such an officer of. the court on the ground that the order appointing
him ought not to have -been made; it is enough that the order of the:
court is a subsisting order. 20 Aml. and Eng. Encyc. Law, 136, 142,
and cases cited. The order of the court appointing the receiver, a cer-
tified copy of which accompanies the paper, is broad enough to author-
ize him to demandthe papers, in order to perfect the title to the right
of way of the Gila Bend Company. He is appointed as. the custodian
of the court of all and singular the property, franchises, rights and
choges in action of the property of such corporation, including such
rights therein as lay be determined to Vest in the other corporations
and the individual parties to the suit. Ile is given by the order the
usual powers of receivers, and is directed to repair, rebuild and protect
the dam oil the property against loss or damage by flood, and to save
the same and all of the property from loss, and it is directed that the
possession of the-property be surrendered to him. He is admitted to
be in possession of the property, which is the possession of the court
appointing him. It would seem that he has clearly the right to pre-
serve, protect and use the property, and to prevent its waste or destruc-
tion, not only by making necessary repairs, but also to preserve its
franchise, and to secure its right of way, an import ant franchise, by
taking all required steps to perfect its application therefor. In all
things he is under the direction and control of a court having assumed
156 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
jurisdiction and control of the property in order to preserve the rights
of all of the parties litigant thereto, and it can not be considered that
his possession is adverse to the rights of any party to the suit, wherein
he was appointed. Occupying such a fiduciary relation as he does
toward the Cila Bend Reservoir and Irrigation Company and the other
litigants, whatever action he may take in the premises must be con-
sidered as a matter enjoined upon him by the court under whose direc-
tion and control he acts, and for the best interests of all of the parties
litigant according to their respective rights.
The decision in the local office was by the register alone, and objec-
tion is taken to its validity on that ground. This does not preclude
the Department or the General Land Office from deciding the proceed-
ing on its merits. Knight v. Deaver, 20 L. D., 387.
The decision of your office is affirmed, and the papers applied for will
be surrendered by the local office to- the receiver of the Gila Bend
Reservoir and Irrigation Company, upon his demand therefor, in case
he furnishes satisfactory proof that he is acting in that capacity..
RYAN vm. BAKER.
Motion for review of departmental decision of November 23, 1897,
25 L. D., 399, denied by Secretary Bliss, February 7,1898.
HEIRS OF NICHOLAS RODRIGUEZ.
Motion for review of departmental decision of December 11, 1897,.
25 L. D., 491, denied by Secretary Bliss, February 7, 1898.
RAILROAD GRANT-WITHDRAWVAL-SETTLEMENT RIGHT.
IOWA RAILROAD LAND CO. V. BEATLEY.
Prior to the filing of the aps showing the definite location of the modified line of
road, under the act of June 2, 1861, there was no authority for the withdrawal
of the even sections within the six mile limits of the original grant, and such
withdrawal, when made, was not operative upon lands included within home-
stead entries.
Lands thns excepted from the withdrawal made i aid of the act of 1864, are not
subject to selection thereunder, if at the date of such selection a qualified home-
steader is residing thereon.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the Geleral Land Ofice, February
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (C. J. W.)
The Iowa Railroad Land Company, successor to the Cedar Rapids
and Missouri River Railroad Company, has appealed fromt your office
decision of March 24, 1896, holding for cancellation its selection cover-
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ing the N. A of the NW. I and the NW. i of the NE. i of Sec. 2, T. 84 N.,
B. 44 WV., Des Moines land district, Iowa.
Said tract is within the six-mile limits adjusted to the line of location
nder the act of May 1 1856 (11 Stat., 9), and was selected under the
provisions of the act of June 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 95), on August 23, 1884.
The act of June 2, 1864, supra, authorized the modification of the
unconstructed portion of this road, and further provided that when the
map of definite location of the modified line and connecting branch
therein provided for shall be filed in the General Land Office " the Sec-
retary of the Interior shall reserve and cause to be certified and surveyed
to said company from time to time, as the work progresses on the main
line," etc., etc. As held in the case of Railroad Company iz. Herring
et at. (110 U. S., 27), the map of location contemplated by the act of
1864 was not filed until December 7, 1867.
In the opinion of your office it is stated that
these lands and other lands were withdrawn from market June 16,1864, and were
restored to homestead and pre-emption entry August 25, 1864. The lands were again
withdrawn June 7, 1865; and again restored November 1,1867. Once more withdrawn
June 12,1875, .... and they were finally restored May 22, 1891. St. Paul and Sioux
City R. R. Co. et c. (12 L. D., 541).
* One Seth Smith made homestead entry covering this tract September
23, 1867, which entry was canceled upon relinquishment December 21,
1870. William E. Otto made homestead entry covering this land Sep-
tember 1, 1871, which entry was canceled for abandonment July 15,
1884. John Beatley made homestead entry covering this tract August
30, 1890, alleging settlement April 3, 1882, which entry is still of record.
By your office letter " F " of January 27, 1894, a hearing was ordered
to determine the status of this tract at the date of the company's selec-
tion. Upon the testimony adlduced the register and receiver, on Decem-
ber 8, 1894, rendered a joint decision as follows:
1st. John Beatley, deceased, established his residence upon the tract of laud in
controversy April 3,1882, and with his family (until his death in 1891) continued to
reside upon and cultivate the same, and since his death his widow, Senea Beatley,
and family have resided upon and cultivated the land. That the improvements
thereon are worth about $1,000.
2nd. That on August 30, 1890, John Beatley's I. E. No. 1086, was allowed and
became of record.
3rd. The Cedar Rapids & Missouri River Railroad Co., on the 8th day of July,
1884, filed with the register and receiver their selection of this tract, with other
lands.
4th. That prior to November 18, 1887, llerdschel Van Shaak applied to enter as a
timber culture claim the tract in controversy.
We are of opinion that the selection of the C. R. & M. R. R. R. Co., should be
canceled for the reason that it was made at a time when the improvements and set-
tlement of John Beatley were so notorious as to confer no rights upon said company.
We are of the opinion that the attempted entry of Herdschel Van Shaak conferred
no right as against the settlement and improvements of John Beatley, and that the
same should be rejected.
We are of the opinion that H. E. No. 1086 is and should be held in full force and
effect.
Thirty days from receipt of notice is allowed for appeal.
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From this action the company appealed and on March 24,1896, you
sustained the action of the local officers and held for cancellation the
company's selection, from which action the company has appealed to
this Department. In its appeal the following assignments of error are
made:
(1) In failing to hold that the act of June 2,1864 (13 Stat., 95), amendatory of the
act of May 15, 1856 (11 Stat., 9), tinder which appellant claims, created a legislative
withdrawal of the land in question upon the definite location of appellant's modified
line of route, and that by reason of sch legislative withdrawal the NW. of the
NE. of said section, being then free from ay kind of claim or entry, became
reserved from settlement and entry, and hence was a bar to the snbseqnent home-
stead entry of William H. Otto and the claim of John Beatley, deceased husband of
said Senea Beatley.
(2) In failing to hold that upon the cancellation of homestead entry 404, made
September 23, 1867, by Seth Smith on December 21, 1870, the land included therein,
to wit, the N. of the NW. I, Sec. 2, aforesaid, became by reason of such legislative
withdrawal reserved from appropriation under the settlement laws, pending the
exercise of the right of selection by appellant or its vendor, the Cedar Rapids and
Missouri River Railroad company.
As thus presented the case is in all important particulars similar to
that of the Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Ertel (10 L. D., 176), in which
it was held that under the act of June 2, 1864, supra, the right of the
company to even section within the six-mile limits of the grant of Mray
15, 1856, does not attach until selection and that the right of selection
can not be exercised until after the definite location of the modified
line. It was further held in said opinion:
Until this entire line was established and the map showing such definite location
was filed in the General Land Office, there was no authority in the Secretary to
withdraw these lands beeause the direction in the act-that when the line is estab-
lished and definitely located the Secretary shall reserve the lands-is an implied
prohibition against the power to withdraw or reserve them before that time, and
-the withdrawal of the Secretary, when properly made, can not operate upon land to
which a homestead right bad attached but such lands were expressly excluded there-
from by the terms of the act.
At the time of the filing of the map showing the location of the
modified line as well as the date of the executive withdrawal which
followed the filing of said map, the lands in question were embraced
in homestead entries of record.
It must be held, therefore, that the tract in question was never
reserved on 'account of this grant, at least not prior to the filing of the
company's selection list, August 23, 1884.
The record made at the hearing ordered by your office clearly shows
that long prior to the filing of said list John Beatley, together with his
family, had begun a residence upon the land, which has since been
continued and the land improved to great.value..
.It is clear, under the decisions of the courts, that no title passes to
indemnity lands until the approval of the company's list of selections
by the Secretary of the Interior, and in view of the showing made in
this case your office decision is affirmed and you are directed to cancel
the company's selection of the tract in question.
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It appears from the record transmitted that Senea Beatley, widow
of John Beatley, deceased, has made proof upon the entry made August
30, 1890, and that final certificate issued May 5, 1896.
If said proof, upon examination, is found- regular and satisfactory,
patent will issue upon the entry.
APPLICATION TO GINTER-INTERVENING ADVERGSE CLAIM.
MCCoRNAcK V. VIOLET (ON REVIEW).
An appliction to enter embracing in part lind covered by the prior entry of another,
while pending, serves to protect the rights of the applicant as to the land open
to entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (C. J. G.)
This case involves lot 10 of Sec. 3, T. 11 N., R. 3 W., containing 16.24
acres, in Oklahoma land district, Oklahoma..
On December 4, 1895, (21 L. )., 451- there entitled McCormack v.
Violet), this Department rendered a decision in the case, affirming your
office decision of July 31, 1894, rejecting James M. McCornack's appli-
cation to make homestead entry of lots 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of section 3
aforesaid, for conflict with Oscar I. Violet's homestead entry No. 6695
of said lot 10. Te said decision contains the following paragraph:
The time prescribed by law for the exercise of MeCormack's preference right has
expired. Nevertheless, if there be no intervening adverse right under the rule pre-
scribed in Allen v. Price (15 L. D., 421), and in circular of March 30, 1893 (16 L. D.,
334), or otherwise, your office will permit McCormack to make entry of lots 6, 7, 8
and 9, of section 3, T. 11 N., B. 3 W., within thirty days after service of notice of
this decision, if he elect to do so.
On February , 1897, your office transmitted to this Department
McCornack's petition for reconsideration and modification of the fol-
lowing sentence contained in said departmental decision, to wit, "The
time prescribed by law for the exercise of McCormack's preference right
has expired." This petition was filed because your office, on November
28, 1896, in a decision ren dered in the case of Thomas J. Bailey v. James
M. McCornack (a copy of which was tiled with the petition), construed
the words quoted above to be an authoritative departmental decision
adverse to the exercise by McCornack of the preference right to enter
lots 6, 7, 8 and 9, which he claims as successful contestant in the case
of ichelberger v. Calhoun, McCornack, Bailey and Violet, finally
decided by this Department on July 12, 1894 (291 L. and R., 62). The
petition in effect asks for the construction or explanation of the true
intent and meaning of the decision complained of.
The case of Bailey v. McCornack aforesaid is now pending before the
Department on appeal by McCornack, which presents for adjudication
the same questions as are presented by the petition aforesaid. The
appeal and petition will therefore be considered together.
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The facts in this case are as follows: On April 23, 1889, Calvin A.
Calhoun made homestead entry for lots 6, 7, 8 and 9, of the NW. t of
Sec. 3 aforesaid, lying contiguous to each other on one side of the North
Canadian river, and lot 10of the same quarter-section on the opposite
side of said river. At that time the North Canadian was a meandered
stream and was so delineated on the official township plat; hence the
subdivision of the said quarter-section into lots. May 21, 1859, one
Theodore W. Eiclielberger filed affidavit of contest against Calhoun's
entry, and May 27th following, James M. McCornack contested both
Calhoun and Eichelberger. January 25,1890, one Robert H. Linthicum
filed a contest against Calhoun's entry as to lot 10, alleging that said
lot was not contiguous to the remaining lots of the entry, being sepa-
rated therefrom by a meandered stream, and that Calhoun had wholly
abandoned said lot 10. February 7, 1890, your office suspended Cal-
houn's entry and allowed him thirty days within which to relinquish
the land on one side or the other of the river. March 17, 1890, Calhoun
relinquished lot 10 and March 18, 1890, one Oscar HI. Violet, apparently
without objection from Linthicuim, made homestead entry therefor, and
Linthicumn no longer appears in the case. June 20, 1890, Thomas J.
Bailey filed a affidavit of contest against Calhoun, Eichelberger and
McCornack. October 20, 1890, a hearing was had, and upon the record
made up the local officers recommended the cancellation of Calhoun's
entry, the dismissal of the contests of Eichelberger and Bailey, and
the award of preference right of entry to MeCornack.
On May 29, 1891, in the case of Hattie Fuhrer (12 L. D., 556), this
Department held that the north fork of the Canadian river should not
have been meandered, and that thereafter it should not be regarded as
a meandered stream.
On Tune 8, 1892, your office on appeal by Calhoun, Eichelberger and
Bailey, affirmed the decision of the local office, and on November 22,
1893, this Department affirmed the concurrent decisions below, which
action was promulgated by your office on December 12, 1893. It was
stated in your said office decision that " the parties appear to have
acquiesced in the relinquishment of lot 10, included in the entry in
question, and the contest has proceeded in respect to the remaining
tracts; " and also, in the said departmental decision, that " the parties
to the record appear to have all acquiesced in said relinquishment, and
lot 10 is not now in controversy."
In the meantime, on August 14,1893, Violet made final proof, and on
December 29, 1893, was awarded final certificate for lot 10. January 2,
1894, McCornack made application to enter lots 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, which
was rejected for conflict with Violet's entry. January 10 and 16, 1894,
respectively, Bailey and Calhoun filed motions for review of depart-
mental decision of November 22, 1893, which were denied July 12, 1894.
On July 31 1894, your office affirmed the action of the local office in
rejecting MeCornack's application to enter all the land formerly covered
by Calhoun's entry, but allowed him the usual time for appeal or thirty
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days to enter lots 6, 7, 8 and 9. MCornack appealed. August 16,
1894, Bailey filed an application to enter said lots 6, 7, 8 and 9, which
was suspended to await final action on McCornack's appeal. Decem-
ber 4, 1895, this Department affirmed the action of your office in reject-
ing McCornack's application, concluding with the paragraph heretofore
quoted. December 23, 1895, but before the departmental decision was
promulgated by your office, McCornack filed a waiver of his appeal;
also an application for lots 6, 7, 8 and 9, which was placed of record
the same day. December 26, 1895, the local office rejected Bailey's
suspended application for conflict with McCornack's entry. From this
action Bailey appealed, and On. November 28, 1896, your office reversed
the said action and held McCornack's entry subject to Bailey's "supe-
rior" right. MCornack's appeal from your said office decision is now
before this Department, as hereinbefore stated.
Your said office decision of November 28, 1896, is as follows:
Bailey's application to enter was filed after the Department had directed the can-
cellation of Calhoun's entry. It was suspended pending MeCormack's application to
enter. He, MeCormack, allowed his preferred right of entry to expire as decided by
the Hon. Secretary in his aforesaid decision of December 4, 1895, 21 L. D., 451, and
his application to enter, filed December 23, 1895 bad no connection with the former
proceedings, or litigation. So far as that application is concerned, he stood as a
stranger. It was an independent transaction, an attempt by him to secure the land
separate and apart from his former attempts to secure the object. Bailey's rights
under his application of August 16, 1894, had intervened, and MeCormack's applica-
tion should, for that reason have been rejected.
The appeal assigns as error the whole of said finding.
It is obvious from the statement of facts in this case that upon
Calhoun's relinquishment of lot 10 and entry thereof by Violet, under
the circumstances stated, the said lot was eliminated from the con-
troversy. MCornack's application of January 2, 1894, was filed within
thirty days after notice of the departmental decision of November 22,
1893, which awarded him the preference right to make entry of lots
6, 7, 8 and 9. In view of the fact that he included in his application
lot 10, which at the time was not subject to entry, the question arises
whether said application, together with the appeal taken from the
rejection thereof, as a whole, can be considered as operative to with-
hold lots 6, -1, 8 and 9, which were subject to entry, from any other dis-
position, until final action on the appeal.
There can be no doubt that the application was properly rejected so
far as said lot 10 is concerned. But because of its rejection as a whole,
it does not follow that McCornack lost his rights thereunder as to lots
6, 7, 8 and 9. These lots were subject to entry, and the application was
therefore one which might have been allowed as to them and rejected
as to lot 10. See the case of Mc~reary v. Wert et al. (21 L. D., 145),
in which it was held (syllabus):
An application to enter conflicting in part with the prior entry of another may be
allowed as to the part not in conflict and rejected as to the remainder.
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And in the case of Lindsey v. Adams (21 L. D., 444), based on the
case of Cornelius v. Kessel (128 U. S., 456), it was held that-
The fact that an application to enter embraces in part land not subject to entry,
does not defeat the right of the applicant to such portion of the land as is open to
appropriation.
See also Duncansou v. Duncanson, 25 L. D., 108.
It is true that McCornack applied to enter the whole tract after lot
10 bad been expressly declared to be not subject to entry and after
he had been served with notice to that effect. But the Department
is inclined to the belief tat, under the circumstances, he took this
action in good faith. His contest was originally against all the land
embraced in Calhoun's entry, and Calhoun relinquished lot 10 because
the same was not contiguous to the remaining lots of the entry, being
separated therefrom by the North Canadian river, which was at that
time held to be a meandered stream. The Department subsequently,
in the case of Hattie Fubrer, supva, held that said river should not have
been meandered, thus reversing the holding upon which decision against
Mccornack was based. From this it may fairly be presumed that
McCornack was honestly misled into including lot 10 in his application,
in the belief that under the changed ruling he was entitled to that also,
which would have been the case butfor the intervening entry of Violet
in the absence of any claim by Linthicum.
McCornack's application of January 2, 1894, was a good and valid
application as to lots 6, 7, 8 and 9. The subsequent proceedings had
thereon were directed to the status of lot 10 merely, and upon their set-
tlement his right as to the remaining lots became effective as of the
date of said application. During the pendency of these proceedings,
as we have seen, said remaining lots were reserved from other disposi-
tion. Hence, Bailey's application of August 16, 1894, can not be
regarded as an intervening adverse right. The second application,
filed by McCornack December 23, 1895, was merely ancillary to the one
of January 2, 1894, and can not be held as a waiver of any rights there-
under, and the entry allowed will be treated as though allowed under
the former application.
The statement in the departmental decision of December 4, 1895, that
"the time prescribed by law for the exercise of McCornack's preference
right has expired," was unnecessary to the decision of that case and
will not therefore be regarded as an adjudication of that question.
The action taken with regard to lot 10 is final; the petition and
appeal do not seek a reversal of that portion of the departmental
decision awarding said lot to Violet.
Your office decision of November 28, 1896, holding McCornack's
entry subject to "Bailey's superior right of entry" is hereby reversed,
and MeCornack's entry will be allowed to stand. McCornack petition
is disposed of in his favor without the formality of entertaining the
the same, as opposing counsel had notice thereof, and filed briefs in
reply thereto.
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PRACTICE MOTION FOR REREARING-NEW CONTEST.
LARK v. LIVINGSTON.
A decision of the Department denying a motion for rehearing does not preclude the
General Land Office from directing an. inquiry, in the nature of a new contest
between the parties, to determine questions arising since the original hearing.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the Gen eral Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (C. J. W.)
On March 11, 1896, your office reversed the local officers in upholding
the homestead entry of Jessie C. Livingston, for the SE. 4 of Sec. 31,
T. 27 N., R. 5 W., made at Enid, Oklahoma, October 6, 1893, and held
said entry subject to the prior settlement of plaintiff, Joseph Lark, who
filed contest against the entry on the day it was made.
Defendant appealed from your office decision, and on July 27, 1897
[unreported], the case was considered here and your office decision
affirmed.
Defendant moved for review of said departmental decision, which
was denied on September 27, 1897. The defendant has filed a motion
for rehearing in said case, supported by affidavits tending to show the
abandonment of the land by plaintiff since the date of the hearing.
The acts charged are not proper ground for rehearing of the present
case, and the motion is denied, but, as held in the cases of Griffin V.
Smith (25 L. D., 329), and Corbin v. Dorman (ib., 471), the decision of
the Department denying the motion for rehearing does not preclude
your office from directing an inquiry in the nature of a new contest to
determine questions arising since the original hearing.
APPLICATION TO ENTER-ADVERSE CLAIM.
HASNINS v. ADDISON ET AL.
An application to enter, embracing in part land not open to entry, while pending,
operates to protect the right of the applicant as to such portion of the land as
may be subject to appropriation at the date of his application.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (W. A. E.)
On April 23, 1892, Eva Haskins filed homestead application for lots
1, 2, 5, and 6, of Sec. 17, T. 11 N., R. 7 W., Oklahoma, Oklahoma, land
district. This application was rejected by the local officers for conflict
with the homestead entry of Tilghman H. Addison, made June 17, 1891,
for lots and 2 of said section.
On April 27, 1892, William H. Wall filed a soldier's declaratory state-
ment for lots 5 and 6 of said section 17, being that portion of the land
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embraced in Haskins' application which was not covered by Addison's
entry.
On May 19, 1S92, Haskins appealed from the rejection of her appli-
cation, and this appeal was dismissed by your office on August 27, 1892,
for the reason that there was no evidence of service of the appeal upon
Addison, the adverse claimant of record.
On September 27, 1892, laskins filed motion for review of your office
decision dismissing her appeal. It was alleged in this motion that she
bad settled on the land applied for by her on April 19, 1892; that Addi-
son had abandoned his claim to lots 1 and 2; and that she had filed
affidavit of contest against Addison's entry. She therefore asked that
her application be accepted and suspended to await the result of her
contest, and that Wall's declaratory statement be held subject to her
right to make entry. It does not appear from the record when this
affidavit of contest referred to by her was filed. Notice thereof, how-
ever, was served upon Addison on September 5, 1892, but it does not
appear that a hearing has been had or any further action taken thereon.
On September 28, 1892, Wall made homestead entry for the lots cov-
ered by his soldier's declaratory statement.
On March 3,1896, your office denied Haskins' motion for review, and
on May 12, 1896, she filed appeal to the Department.
Haskins' homestead application was properly rejected by the local
officers so far as lots 1 and 2 were concerned-those lots being covered
at that time by Addison's entry. If she had any settlement rights on
those lots, her proper course would have been to contest Addison's
entry, secure its cancellation and then file her application. The prin-
cipal question, we have to consider here, then, is, whether or not that
application gave her any right to lots 5 and 6, which were vacant and
unappropriated at the time she filed said application;
In the case of McCreary v. Wert et al., 21 L. D., 145, it was held that
an application to enter conflicting in part with the prior entry of
another may be allowed as to the part not in conflict and rejected as to
the remainder. Again, in the case of Lindsey v. Adams, 21 L. D., 444,
it was held that the fact that an application to enter embraces in part
land not subject to entry does not defeat the right of the applicant to
such portion of the land as is open to appropriation.
It was error on the part of the local officers, therefore, to reject her
application as to the portion of the land not in conflict with Addison's
entry. She has preserved her right to said lots 5 and 6 by her succes-
sive appeals to your office and to the Department, and her claim to
those lots is superior to that of Wall, who entered subsequent to the
date of her application.
You will therefore call upon Wall to show cause why his entry should
not be held subject to Hlaskins's superior right to make entry for said
lots 5 and 6.
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IIOMESTEAD CONTEST- tESIDENCE.
FORSLOF V. CRARY.
Residence is not acquired by going upon and visiting land solely for the purpose of
complying with the letter of the law; the acts of going upon the land, and the
occupancy thereof, must concur with the intent to malke it a permanent home to
the exclusion of one elsewhere.
Secretary Bliss to the Comiissioner of the General Laud Office, FPebruary
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (J. L. McC.)
John H. Crary, on April 25, 1894, made homestead entry for the SW. -
of Sec. 15, T. 153 N., R. 62 W., Grand Forks land district,, North Dakota.
On May 5,1895, Andrew Forslof filed affidavit of contest (dated May
2, 1895), which was served on the 16th of the same month, alleging
that defendant had never resided on said lancl, and had wholly aban-
doned the same.
The hearing was had commencing June 17, 1895, before the judge of
the county court of Ramsey county, and occupied five days.
The local officers, on July 20, 1895, rendered decision in favor of the
defendant (Crary).
The contestant (Forslof) appealed to your office; which, on March
10, 1896, reversed the finding of the local office, holding that the entry-
man had not, prior to the service of notice in the case, established a
home or residence on the land in controversy to the exclusion of one
elsewhere; therefore it reversed the decision of the local officers, and
held Crary's entry for cancellation.
Crary has appealed to the Department.
He alleges two errors. The allegation that your office erred " in hold-
ing the entry of John H. Crary for cancellation" is not sufficiently spe-
cific to warrant consideration. There remains the single allegation that
your office erred in not holding "that the defendant had, prior to the
service of notice in this case, established residence upon the land in
eontroveusy to the exclusion of one elsewhere."
Coutnsel for the defendant, in his argument in support of his appeal,
lays great stress upon the fact that "the undisputed testimony" shows
that the defendant broke nineteen acres, plowe(l five acres that had
previously been broken, bought lumber, built a small house on the land,
afterward moved a larger house on to the land, put furniture into one
of the houses, hauled a load of firewood, etc. But inasmuch as your
office in no degree based its decision upon a failure to improve or culti-
vate the land, this I,"undisputed testimony" has no bearing upon the
question of residence.
The land in controversy is situated not quite one mile from the vil-
lage of Crary, North Dakota. The defendant, or his wife (it matters
not which), was proprietor of the leading hotel in said village; and the
contention of the contestant is that their actual home was that hotel,
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and that the defendant was keeping up a merely colorable residence
at his claim by visiting it occasionally while doing or overseeing the
doing of farm work upon it, and sleeping upon it at rare intervals.
The defendant testifies that he "established residence" upon the land
on November 14, 1894-six months and nineteen days after his entry
thereof-by going out to the land and sleeping in one of the houses
hereinbefore mentioned, upon blankets and quilts that he carried with
him from the hotel for that purpose. He slept there again (he thinks)
on the night of the 16th of November. He testifies further: "I spent
a part of the time from that time to the first of May ol the place"; but
whether such part of the time was day or night, workdays or Sundays,
he fails to state. One of his witnesses testifies that he staid with the
defendant on his claim one night in the winter. He says:
I used to work for him, and he wanted me to go out and keep him company. I
was awake often, aud put wood in the stove to keep it warm in there. waked up
to keep the fire from going out. I did not go out to sleep, but to keep company, to
play cards and eat and drink.
If this visit was not on the 14th or 16th of November, it would appear
to'have been shown by Crary and his Witnesses that le spent three
nights on his clainm between the (late of entry (April 25, 1894) and the
1st of May, 1895-a little more than twelve months.
It does not appear that, during this period, his wife or any member
of his family had been on the claim. The defendant testified that his
wife was sick, and could not with safety take tip her residence on the
land. In corroboration of this statement le introduced his family
physician, who testified to her illness, beginning the first week in
August, 1894. But upon being asked: "Would it have endangered
her health to be taken out to the farm and taken up her residence there
if the dwelling had been warm and comfortable?" he replied; "I refuse
to answer that question." This action on his part is mentioned in the
decision of your office, whereupon said physician makes an affidavit,
which is filed in sui)port of the appeal, in which he alleges he was in a
hurry to get away, and did not want to be delayed to answer hypothet-
ical questions.
Contestant Forslof, on May 1, 1895, went to Devil's Lake (about a
dozen miles from the land in controversy), and there arranged with an
attorney for the initiation of contest; he signed and swore to the con-
test affidavit on May 2nd; it was filed in the land office at Grand Forks
on May 5th; and service of the same was made on the defendant May
16, 1895. Tile defendant contends, in substance, that in case he can
not be considered as having "established residence " on the laud on the
14th of November, 1895, lie certainly did so on May ,1895, previously
to service of notice of contest, and thereby cured his previous laches
(if any).
This contention renders it important to consider with especial care
the testimony relative to the defendant's residence from May 1, 1895,
until the service of notice upon him.
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His own testimony relative to residence subsequently to May, 1895,
was as follows:
On the first day of May I moved my wife and family onto the land. My wife and
family have resided continuously on the land since May 1, 1895; They were absent
three nights; one night at Devil's Lake, Decoration night; and the other two nights
at Crary in the hotel; they were in town and got caught in the rain.
The above is all the defendant testifies to relative to residence on the
land after May 1st, not only until May 16th (date of service of notice),
but until the date of the hearing.
Several of Crary's witnesses testify to seeing Mrs. Crary on the land
on the morning of the 2nd of May. Possibly she was seen on the
land on the morning of the 3rd of May-but it appears probable that
there was a confusion of dates. At the most Mrs. Crary was seen on
the land twice between May 1st and May 16, 1895 (never before).
Contestant Forslof testified that between May 1st and May 16th,
1895, he was at the house upon the land in controversy three or four
times; that he looked into the house, but no one was there; it was in
the daytime-either forenoon or afternoon, not in the evening-when
he loked in; was not able to swear that somebody may not have slept
there nights.
Earl Parker testified that he owns and occupies a tract adjacent to
that in controversy; on the night of May 1, 1895, Mr. Crary and his
wife rode out to their claim, about eight o'clock; Crary put his horse
in witness's barn; they left next morning; has "seen themi going out
and coming in from the land in dispute three or four times a week";
"saw the little girl there once, but saw no other members of the family
there at any time."
Dan Boyd, harness maker, testified to seeing Mr. and Mrs. Crary
drive by his harness shop several times a week-going out toward the
land about 8 o'clock in the evening and coming back very early-in the
morning.
Caspar Bye testified to substantially the same thing as the preced-
ing witness.
Hans Anderson testified that, during May, 1895, he boarded atCrary's
hotel; Mr. Crary managed the hotel, and took pay of witness for his
board; Crary ate supper at the hotel-is not certain about breakfast;
his family were there, except when they would take a drive in the evening; when
they took a drive they went out to the farm; Mr. Crary told me so-that is how I
know; don't know ,hether they returned that night or not-they would be there
at the hotel in the morning.
Crary testified that, said hotel-land, building, and appurtenances-
belong to his wife. The register of deeds for that county was introduced
as a witness, who produced the records of his office, and testified that
they showed that said hotel property bad been deeded to " John H.
Crary," and that there was no deed from J. H. Crary to any other party
upon said records. Crary, upon being recalled, testified that he had
deeded it to his wife, but had not yet sent the deed to the county seat
1:68 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
to be recorded. Whether Crary, or his wife, was the real owner of the.
hotel is a question, however, of less importance than the defendant
appears to regard it-the question at issue being, not the ownership of
the so-called "Crary's hotel," but the residence of Crary.
Forslot's affidavit charged not only abandonment of the tract for
more than six months but failure to establish residence upon the land
up to the date of filing the affidavit. The evidence unquestionably
sustains the allegation of the affidavit of contest in this respect. There-
upon the burden of proof was on the defendant to show, by a clear
preponderance of evidence, that before he either had knowledge of the
proposed contest, or notice thereof, he had cured his default, by in good
faith establishing his residence on the land, to the exclusion of a resi-
dence elsewhere. This he utterly failed to do. He was manifestly
making a mere pretense of colorable compliance of the law by occasional
presence when cultivating or making improvements upon the land or
by visiting it at night-meanwhile making no change in his actual
residence, which continued to be at his hotel-in the village of Crary.
The Department has repeatedly held, as in the case of Dayton v.
Dayton (8 L. D., 248, syllabus), that
residence can not be acquired by going upon and visiting land solely for the pur-
pose of complying with the letter of the law; the act of going upon, and the occu-
pancy of the land, must concur with intent to make it a permanent home to the
exclusion of one elsewhere. (See also Sydney F. Thompson, ib., 285; Mary Camp-
bell, ib. 331; Gibbs v. Keney, 16 L. D., 22; and many other cases.)
The decision of your office holding Crary's entry for cancellation is
therefore affirmed.
RELINQUISIIMENT-INSANE ENTRY-MAN-INTERVENING CLAIM.
THORNTON V. HALE.
Where the relinquishment of an entry is procured from a person of unsond mind,
by one who is aware of the mental unsoundness of the entryman, the entry
must be reinstated; and the intervening entry of a third party, in such case, is
made subject to the right of the Department to investigate the circumstances
under which the relinquishment was obtained, and determine the good faith of
such party in connection therewith.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 9,1898. . (H. G.)
Carpus S. Hale appeals from your office decision of February 25,
1896, adverse to him, holding his homestead entry for the W. of the
NF1 and the WA. of the SW1 f Sec. 24, T. 10 N., B. 21 E. W. 1., in
the North Yakima land district, Washington, for cancellation and
directing that the homestead entry of John S. Thornton to said tract
be reinstated.
October 24, 1892, John S. Thornton made homestead entry for such
tract and on November 29, 1894, he executed a relinquishment of said
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entry. On the day following,, the said relinquishment was filed by
George W.. Merton, and the local officers canceled Thornton's entry and
Merton made homestead entry for said land. On January 16, 1895,
Merton relinquished his entry, and on the same day, Carpus S. Hale,
the contestee, made homestead entry for the tract.
On December 11, 1894, after Merton's entry and prior to that of Hale,
Thornton was adjudged unable to take care of himself and incapable
of managing his affairs, by reason of his infirmity of body and mind,
by the superior court of Yakima county, Washington, and his nephew,
William E. Thorton, the contestant, was by said court appointed
guardian of his person and estate. Thereafter, and on March 1, 1895,
John.S. Thornton was adjudged insane and was committed to the State
hospital for the insane.
On February 9, 1895, William E. Thornton, as guardian, filed in the
local office his application for the cancellation of the entry of Hale, and
the re-instatement of the homestead entry of his ward. The grounds
of this application are, in effect, that since his entry of the tract, John
S. Thornton had failed in health and his mind became so affected that
he was incapable of transacting business of any kind; that for some
time prior to November 29, 1894, the date of his relinquishment of the
tract to Merton, he was practically helpless and the victim of delusions,
and that while in his enfeebled and incapable condition, Merton pro-
cured such relinquishment, taking advantage of the condition of Thorn-
ton, and obtaining the same through fraudulent representations and
without any consideration; that Bale had full knowledge of the condi-
tion of Thornton at the time the relinquishment was made through the
fraud and imposition of Merton, and that Merton and Hale conspired
together to secure the relinquishment.
On April 15, 1895, a hearing was had upon these allegations, and
upon the testimony submitted thereat, the local officers recommended
that the entry be allowed to stand and that the contest be dismissed.
This decision was reversed by your office, and Hale appeals there-
from.
The evidence fails to disclose the alleged conspiracy between Merton
and Hale to secure by fraud the homestead of Thornton, and that alle-
gation of contest may be eliminated from the case.
The important questions to be determined are: Was Thornton of
unsound mind at the time he relinquished his homestead entry, and
did Merton know of this condition and take advantage of it?
The witnesses testifying to the mental infirmities of Thornton were
his nephews, one by blood and the other by marriage, his former
employer, those who had slept with him, and the people of the imme-
diate neighborhood, all of whom had frequent-opportunities to observe
his moods, actions and speech. In the spring of 1894, Thornton was
engaged as sawyer at a lumber mill, but was relieved from his employ-
ment because of his erratic condition. He would endeavor to perform
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useless and unnecessary work at the mill, although reasoned with and
directed to refrain from doing it. e became clumsy and awkward
around the saw, and was in danger of being injured. At one time he
fell near the saw which was in motion, and upon being remonstrated
with by his fellow workmen, declared that the sooner his head was cut
off the better. In the autumn of 1894, prior to the month in which he
relinquished his homestead, he would attempt to irrigate the roads, and
obstinately refused to cease his useless labors in that direction. He
talked incoherently on ordinary subjects, and was continually brooding;
he seemed afflicted with melancholia and wild delusions; be threatened
suicide; he talked earnestly of robbing banks and railroad trains; he
announced - his intention of writing to the President to secure the
amelioration of the condition of the poor; he believed that he was in
danger of prosecution for imaginary offenses, and he feared assassina-
tion; he wrote one witness to the effect that he had a boiafide proposal
of marriage from a young lady; on one occasion he did not know a
neighbor and friend during a conversation, frequently asked his name:
he talked about plowing and planting corn in the month of November;
he threatened the life of some of his friends, without the slightest
provocation; he declared that his cabin was infested with spiders and
tarantulas, not thousands but millions of them and he calked his dwell-
ing with rags to keep them in; he emptied a straw mattress and burned
the straw claiming that it was literally alive with spiders; he was
known in the neighborhood as "Crazy" Thornton. He was a man
sixty-two years of age, and had formerly been in vigorous health and
capable of performing skilled labor steadily and intelligently, but for
six months or a year prior to his relinquishment he became subject to
these illusions and delusions.
His condition was evidently well known to people in the neighbour-
hood and must have been known to Merton who resided near him.
One witness, a young lady, who was at the residence of Merton, when
he and Thornton were present, was told by Merton not to mind Thornton
as he was crazy, and after he latter left, Merton informed the witness
that her sister who was engaged as a domestic at his house "could
work him and get him to throw up his homestead," and then her father
could "jump it."' Tis conversation occurred about two weeks before
the relinquishment was executed.
Thorniton gave different reasons for making tie relinquishment. One
was that he must leave the State to avoid a threatened but groundless
criminal prosecution, and that Merton had agreed to take his claim and
hold it for him until he could safely return; another was that he was
living on the claim for the benefit of others, who had agreed to furnish
him with food but had not done so, and that he was tired of living there
alone, for the benefit of others. To another he stated that owing to
the presence of dangerous insects about the place he could not live
there. The consideration for the relinquishruent was three promissory
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 171
notes, aggregating $400 and due in unequal sums in one, two and three
years at eight per cent interest, an order on a local store for $25 and six
dollars in cash, which Merton said he advanced in order to make up
for the high prices for the goods charged at the store. These notes
could not be found and were apparently destroyed by Thornton prior
to his confinement in the insane asylum, as they were accessible to him
while living at his nephew's place, and hie had been caught destroying
like instruments due to him before. The noteswere payable to Thorn-
ton personally and were nonnegotiable, the words "or order" having
been erased from the printed form by Merton, his reasons being that
he knew Thornton was addicted to drinking to excess, and-might in
some debauch dispose of the notes for less than their face. It appears
that Thornton had no means at his command whene lie executed the
relinquishment and he probably spent the small sum paid him by Mer-
ton for liquor, as he appeared directly thereafter to be under the
influence of intoxicants, and attempted to borrow noniey from his
acquaintances. He was compelled to seek shelter with his relatives,
and seemed thereafter to utterly break down to such an extent that he
was placed under gardianship twelve days after executing the relin-
quishment and in an insane asylum about three months thereafter.
Merton's explanation of the circumstances attending the execution
of the relinquishment shows that he knew that Thornton needed pro-
tection at times, owin g to te form of the notes which was- changed at
his suggestion. He must have known the financial condition of
Thornton at the time, and that he was largely dependent upon his
relatives for food. He knew that Thornton was left with but the sum
of six dollars at his disposal, and was unable to perform manual labor,
for he refused to give him work on account of his incapacity, when
Thornton sought it, as he states, for the sake of obtaining board and
properly cooked food. He dealt with this enfeebled and helpless man
without consulting his relatives and his own testimony indicates that
he took advantage of one infirm of body and without mental poise.
He denies that he ever called Thornton crazy" in the sense the term
is attributed to him, but it is impossible to escape the conclusion from
the testimony, including his own, that he was dealing with one incapa-
ble of managing his affairs.
The testimony of his witnesses to the effect that Thornton was sane,
is of a limited character. They either had but occasional talks with
him, or saw him for a short time when he executed the relinquishment.
They had no opportunities to observe his demeanor for ny length of
time or to form any judgment based upon more than a cursory exam-
ination of his condition.
The great preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that Thornton
was incapable of managing his affairs and that his mind was affected
by general fatuity at the time he executed the relinquishment, and that
ierton knew he was dealing with a demented person at the time.
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It may be that the facts detailed by any one witness with reference
to the condition of Thornton previous to his relinquishment, considered
separately and apart from the statement of other witnesses, do not
show incapacity to transact business on his part, nor establish insanity,
either continued or temporary. Bat when all the facts are mnarslalled,
their combined effect is to lead irresistibly to the conclusion that if
Thornton was not afflicted with insanity for some time before the date
of the relinquishment of his homestead entry, his mind wandered so
near the line which divides sanity from insanity as to render anyimpor-
tant business transaction with him of doubtful propriety, and to justify
a careful scrutiny into its fairness. Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S., 506 ,508.
Upon au issue of insanity, where the validity or invalidity of the
acts of an insane party are under examination, the question is whether
by reason of mental disease, the party was unable to comprehend the
nature of the act, its relations, effects and legal consequences. Bus-
well on Insanity, Sec. 18. Thornton evidently knew that he was relin-
quishing his homestead, but his mental condition was so clouded that
he was incapable of contracting intelligently as to that matter, or any
other matter of business. The rule has sometimes been announced
that unless there is inadequacy of consideration, or some other evi-
dence of fraud, imposition or overreaching, any degree of insanity or
imbecility short of total business incapacity will not suffice to avoid a
contract. Jackson v. King, 4 Cowen, 207, and notes to that case in 15
Am. Dec., 363, with cases cited. It was held in that case, that while
weakness of understanding is insufficient to avoid a deed, it furnishes
grounds for suspicion of improper influence, and, therefore, wherever
fraud can be inferred from the circumstances of a transaction, equity
will interpose against it. The imbecility must be such as would justify
a jury, under a commission of lunacy, in putting the property and per-
son of the contractor under the protection of a chancellor. 1 Story on
Eq. Jur., sec. 237. This was done shortly after the transaction in ques-
tion, and the proceedings finally culminated in the confinement of
Thornton in an insane asylum.
The curator of an interdict, under the statute of Louisiana, filed a
bill to have the contract of the latter declared null and void, averring
that at the time of making it, the interdict was losing and to a great
extent had lost his capacity to attend to business and to manage his
affairs, and that his mind was seriously impaired to such: an extent as
to affect his understanding and judgment, ad so continued until he
was judicially interdicted or declared insane, but this averment was
held not to entitle the plaintiff to relief upon the ground that the inter-
dict was incapable in law of making a binding agreement under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the State. The proof failed to show
that the persons who at that time generally saw and conversed with
him, knkew or even believed him to be in a state of mental derangement
or that tie party who dealt with him had any ground whatever to doubt
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his capacity to contract, but on the contrary, disclosed that at the time
in question, he was not incompetent for the transaction of business,
although peculiar and at times eccentric. Stockmeyer v. Tobin, 139
U. S., 176, 187.' The time of the disputed transaction in that case
occurred in January, and in November of the same year the party was
judicially interdicted.
In the case at bar, but twelve days intervened between the chal-
lenged transaction and the judicially declared incapacity of Thornton.
This is not considered proof of his imcompetency to contract, but only
a circumstance leading to the conclusion that the witnesses for the
contestant had good grounds for their belief in his insanity, which does
not appear to have been a sudden overthrow of reason, but the result
of mental disturbance of at least six months prior to the time he was
placed under guardianship. It must e shown that he was insane at
the date of the rlinquishment, and subsequent judicial proceedings
which resulted in placing him under guardianship and restraint are not
conclusive, as the courts generally hold that a finding of lunacy upon
an inquisition, even prior to the contract, is merelyprignafacie evidence,
and is not conclusive in other proceedings. Beach on Modern Law of
Contracts, Sec. 1381.
The doubtful and uncertain point at which the sound and disposing
mind disappears and incapacity begins can be ascertained only by the
particular circumstances of each case, to be duly weighed and consid-
ered by the tribunal before which the matter is to be determined.
Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N. I., 531.
If a conveyance is obtained by the exercise of undue influence over
a man whose mind had ceased to be a safe guide of his actions, it is
against conscience for one who has obtained it to derive any advantage
therefrom. It is the peculiar province of a court of conscience to set
it aside. That a court of equity will interpose in such a case is among
its best settled principles. Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat., 125, followed
in Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S., 506, 511.
A careful review of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Thorn-
ton was non compos mentis at the time he executed the relinquishment
of his homestead,
He had given his notes for two thousand dollars to one of his rela-
tives two years before for the relinquishment of the tract and the pos-
sessory rights thereto. He receives for his relinquishment a consider-
tion of about $431.00, six dollars of which was cash and the residue to
the extent of $400.00 was in promissory notes, due at different inter-
vals, and these notes were unsecured. It appears by slight evidence
it is true, that Merton, the payee, was not possessed of any great
amount of property, and it is doubtful if these notes could be collected.
Rights of like character had been sold for about the same amount in
the locality, and the consideration can not therefore be said to be
grossly inadequate, but was not a fair price for the claim.
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It appears by a preponderance of the evidence that Merton knew of
the unfortunate condition of Thornton, and that he was taking an
unfair advantage of one who was demented and unable to care for him-
self, and whom he stripped of his possessions, leaving him with but a
small sum of money. This was done without consultation with the
relatives of the unfortunate man and with full knowledge that even
the small cash payment would be squandered in drink. Within forty-
six days after his entry, Merton disposes thereof by relinquishment in
favor of another. He did all he could to protect himself from innocent
transferees by making his obligations payable to Thornton personally,
and by furnishing him with but a small cash and merchandise pay-
ment. Such a transaction ought not to be supported. Although such
contracts are set aside on the ground of fraud, by the courts, fraud is
presumed from such conditions as exist in this case. 2 Beach on
Modern Law of Contracts, Sec. 1392.
Under the earlier English rule, a non compos, according to the strict
rules of law, was not allowed to stultify or "blemish" himself, yet a
party dealing with him was held to do so at his peril, for the contract
might be declared void, provided a commission issued before his recov-
ery, or by his heirs or devisees after his death. The party himself
could not obtain relief against his deeds or instruments conveying an
interest in property in a court of law, but a court of chancery always
had jurisdiction to relieve against the acts of such person of unsound
mind, which were exposed to the imputation of fraud, even where no
commission in lunacy had been issued. 1 Collinson on Law of Idiots
and Lunatics (Ed. 1812) 402, 409. And a court of equity might decline
to interfere to set aside a conveyance of a person non comnpos mentis, if
great hardship would accrue to the party against whom the decree was
sought. Ibid., 414.
The doctrine of the English courts, that a person of full age would
not be permitted to plead his mental incapacity to avoid his contracts,
is no longer the law in England and has been exploded in America.
Notes to the case of Jackson v. King, 15 Am. Dec., 361.
It appears to be the settled law in nearly all the American courts
that the deed of a lunatic who has not been placed under guardianship
is not absolutely void, but voidable. ovey v. Hobson, 53 Maine, 451-
89 Am. Dec., 705. However, in Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall., 9, it was held
that a power of attorney executed by a lunatic is absolutely void, and
the opinion seem is to lean to the position that all grants-and deeds of a
lunatic are void.
The question is not one of moment in this case, as it is sought to
have the relinquishment declared void by the representative of the
lunatic. The fact that third persons have acquired an interest under
the contract of one who is non compos mentis, in good faith for value
without notice of the infirmity, can not, of itself, defeat the right of
the insane person or his guardian to avoid the contract. This rule
applies to deeds and negotiable instruments as well as to other con-
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tracts, and it applies whether the contract be regarded as void or
merely voidable. To protect ona fide purchasers in such cases would
be to withdraw the protection from the insane person. Clark on Con-
tracts, 273. It has been well said that "if the acts of an insane per-
son can thus be made valid and binding, an easy method would thereby
be found for disposing of his property." Rogers v. Blackwell, 49 Mich.,
192. See also Anglo California Bank v. Ames, 27 Fed. Rep., 727, and
cases there cited; Hull v. Louth, 109 Id., 315; Long v. Fox, 100 Ill., 43.
A deed executed by persons incompetent to contract or convey passes
no title, even as against a purchaser for value without notice, notwith-
standing that the purchaser can ascertain the competency of the par-
ties only by inquiries in pais. Maupin on Marketable Titles to Real
Estate, 181. The contrary doctrine is announced in Odon v. Riddick,
104 N. C., 515, but that case was decided mainly upon the ground that
a purchase from an insane person of lands for value and without notice
of the mental incapacity of the grantor, is generally upheld, and that
an innocent purchaser for value of the grantee of such undeclared
lunatic would stand in the same position as his grantor, and that the
status in quo ante mst be preserved.
In this case Merton knew of the incompetency of Thornton when he
executed the relinquishment. Hale does not show that he was an ino-
cent party. The evidence does not disclose that he had any actual
knowledge or notice of Thornton's incapacity, but he was bound by
the public record in the land office, and before Merton relinquished he
had constructive notice by publication of the statutory notice of the
appointment of a guardian for Thornton.
This was sufficient to put him upon inquiry, if the various transac-
tions had been ordinary transfers of real property. Although put upon
the stand by the contestant and testifying that he did not know Thorn-
ton, the insane man, he did not offer his own testimony to show that he
was in the attitude of an innocent purchaser for value without notice
of the insanity of the former entryman. It nowhere appears that he
advanced any moneys to Merton, or that he paid anything for the relin-
quishment. The rule is that when it is established by -averment or
evidence that the grantor was a person of unsound mind, at the time
of the conveyance, the burden is upon the other party to the transac-
tion to show, among other things, that he accepted the conveyance.
in ignorance of such mental unsoundness. Riggs v. American Tract
Society, 84 N. Y., 330, cited and followed in Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind.,
315, 323. The same rule ought to apply to Hale, who stands in the
shoes of Merton, but it is not necessary that he should have had notice
of Thornton's incapacity at any time.
If the relinquishment was the act of an incompetent person, Hale
has no rights to preserve, for one can not be said to be an innocent
purchaser of public lands prior to the issuance of a patent therefor.
A purchaser of an entryman takes the same always subject to the
supervision of this Department. Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S.,
176 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
372. The departmental supervision has been exercised to the extent
of holding that a relinquishment executed by the guardian of an insane
person under the direction of a probate court is unauthorized by law
and invalid. Dyche v. Beleele, 24 L. D., 494.
A purchaser of a relinquishment can acquire no right by virtue of
his purchase. Bentley v. Bartlett, 15 L. D., 179, 181. The relinquish-
ment runs to the government, and the consideration passing between
the etryman and another therefor, is not a matter of departmental
inquiry, except as an incident tending to show, in connection with
other facts, that the etryman was fraudulently deprived of his land.
Winston v. Barnard, 22 L. D., 150. ale, therefore, made his entry
subject to the right of the Department to investigate the validity of
Merton's entry based upon the relinquishment by Thornton.
A relinquishment is not such a contract as can be enforced by the
Department. An entry made upon such relinquishment may be set
aside for fraud, and for the reason that the entryman was incapaci-
tated by intoxication or by dementia to such an extent that he could
not realize the nature, consequences and effect of his acts, and where
the unfortunate condition of the one who released his entry is known
to the one who profits by it, and who obtains it for the purpose of filing
on the land for himself or for another, and this power has been fre-
quently exercised by the Department.
The case of Alden v. Ityan, 12 L. D., 690, in which it is announced
that a tender must be made of the consideration for which a relinquish.
ment was made, before its validity can be successfully attacked, appears
to have largely influenced the decision of the local officers in this case,
and is relied upon by the contestee. The facts in that case are not
analogous to those of the case at bar.
It is only in cases where the sane party has acted fairly and in good
faith with the insane party with whom he contracts, without actual or
constructive knowledge of the other's insanity, that lie is protected on
an executed contract. Clark on ( ontracts, p. 263, et seq.; Bnswell on
Insanity, Sec. 413. Both of the elements of fair dealing and want of
knowledge of the incapacity of the other party must be present in such
a case to warrant a court in directing a restoration of the considera-
tion, or the maintenance of the status in quo ante where a restoration
cau not be had, or where the parties can not be reinstated to the con-
dition in which they were prior to the purchase. A tender could not
in any event be required by the Department as an antecedent condition
to the initiation of a contest in a case like the one at bar, where it
appears from the evidence that the sane party did not act in good
faith and knew of the mental derangement of the party with whom he
was dealing.
The decision of your office directing the cancellation of the entry of
Carpus S. Hale and the reinstatement of the entry of John S. Thornton
is, for the foregoing reasons, affirmed.
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JURISDICTION- SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.
CAG-LE V. MENDENIALL.
A change in the person holding the office of Secretary of Interior does not prevent
or defeat a review or reversal of departmental action, if the legal title to the
land still remains in the government, and the Secretary making the ruling or
decision, if still in office, would be in duty bound to review or reverse his own
action.
The supervisory authority of the Secretary may be exercised on behalf of a party
whose rights have been denied in a decision that has become final under the
rules of practice, but has been overruled in subsequent cases involving the
same question.
If an entry is relinquished pending attack by several parties alleging priority of
settlement, the question of priority should be determined before allowing either
of the parties contestant to make entry of the land involved.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 9, 1898. (P. J. C.)
January 10, 1897, counsel for Byron E. Cagle filed in this office a
petition for the exercise of the supervisory authority of the Secretary
of the Interior "to correct an error of the Department's own making in
a case where no error can be charged against" him (Cagle). This peti-
tion was preliminarily entertained, and by direction of the Department
was duly served upon the opposite party, who has presented his views
in opposition thereto in an extended written brief.
September 19, 1893, L. laskins made homestead entry of the NW.
of Sec. 22, T. 23 N., R. 1 W., Perry, Oklahoma, land district. October
14th, 1893, Mendenhall filed an affidavit of contest against this entry,
alleging prior settlement. November 16th, 1893, Cagle filed an affi-
davit against Ilaskins' entry, alleging settlement prior thereto, and
February 5, 1894, he filed an amended affidavit, alleging settlement
prior to Haskins, Mendenhall, and all others. March 15, 1894, Haskins
filed a relinquishment, and Mendenhall was permitted to make entry of
the tract. A hearing was then had between Cagle and Mendenhall
before the local officers, who held Deceinber 5, 1894, that Cagle was
entitled to the land by reason of prior settlement, and recommended
that the homestead entry of Mendenhall be canceled. Mendenlhall
appealed, and your office made the case special, and by decision of
February 5, 1895, affirme the action of the local officers. Mendenhall
appealed to the Department where the case was again made special
and by decision of May 16, 1895 (20 L. D., 446), the judgment of your
office was reversed and the entry of Mendenhall held intact. In this
decision the controlling question in the case was stated to be "whether
or not the contestant, Cagle, was disqualified because of his having
entered the territory from the west line of the Otoe and Missouria
Indian reservation," and it was answered in the affirmative and Cagle
held disqualified.
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That decision was adhered to upon motion for review August 8,1895
(21 L. D., 90), but it was overruled in Brady v. Williams, December 23,
1896 (23 L. D., 533; 25 i(l., 55).
There were quite a number of cases involving the identical question
raised in Cagle v. Mendenhall and Brady v. Williams, and the others
have been disposed of according to the decision in the latter case. Of
those who made the run from the Otoe and Missouria Indian reservation
side and effected a prior settlement, Cagle is the only one who has not
been awarded the benefits thereof where the claim was otherwise fee
from objection.
The finding of your office and of the local office was that Cagle was
the prior settler. The testimony taken at the hearing has been
te-examined and it is found that it amply sustains these concurring
decisions.
Cagle admitted having made the run from the Otoe and i1fissouria
side, and the ruling of the Department in his case was that this was
unlawful. That ruling was not based upon any controverted question
of fact, but solely upon what was subsequently and is now held to have
been a misinterpretation of the law and of the President's proclamation
opening the lands to settlement.
The parties to the present controversy and the subject matter are
the same as at the time of the original decision. The land has not
been patented and the legal title is still in the government.
This case was advanced upon the docket both in your office and in.
the Department, in' order that an early decision might be had upon
a question of law, which at that time was new and affected many
cases pending .in the land department. The case was advanced, not
upon the request of Cagle, but because it was deemed advisable by
your office and the Department that some one of the many cases pre-
senting that question should be selected as a test case, advanced to an
early decision, and made a precedent by which to determine the other
eases. As before stated, Brady v. Williams and the other cases involv-
ing that question were not disposed of according to the ruling in (agle .
Mendenhall but were disposed' of according to a decision expressly over-
ruling that case. If Cagle v. Mendenhall had not been thus advanced,
but had been permitted to keep its regular place upon the docket,
in all probability the ruling therein would have been exactly the reverse
of that which was actually made. That decision was not acquiesced
in by those interested in the question there discussed, but remained a
subject of contention in proceedings in the land department. Although
Cagle's motion for review was denied, he did not accept the ruling of the
Department but, it appears, has continued to reside upon the laud, and
has, in the local courts and otherwise, attempted to continue the asser-
tion of this claim thereto. Mendenhall has also resided upon the land,
has been in possession of the greater portion thereof, and has always
resisted the claim of Cagle, but whatever has been done by either
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Cagle or Meadenhall has been done with full knowledge of the continued
assertion of the claim of the other.
The question which is now presented is whether the law which has
been applied to all others similarly situated shall be also applied to
Cagle and Mendenhall, or whether as to them the original decision in
their case shall control the disposition of the land in controversy not-
withstanding that decision involves a manifest misapplication of the law
and the President's proclamation. As an incident to this is the further
question whether, the title to the land still remaining in the govern-
ment, the ruling of one Secretary can be reviewed and reversed by a
succeeding Secretary. The latter question was carefully considered
and discussed at length in Parcher v. Gillen (26 L. D., 34), where, in
conclusion, it was said:
The true rule drawn from an examination of all of the authorities is that the juris-
diction of the land department ceases where the jurisdiction of the courts commence,
viz: when the legal title passes, and that there is no hiatus between the termination
of the one and the beginning of the other. Under this rule the land will always be
within a jurisdiction which can administer the law and protect both public and
private rights.
The office of the Secretary of the Interior is a continuing one. Its incumbents
come and go but the office remiaimis. The powers and duties of the office are imper-
sonal, and operate uniformly at all times and upon all controversies without reference
to who may be exercising those powers or performing those duties. A change in the
person holding the office does not authorize, and should not invite, a review or
reversal of prior rulingsor decisions; andneither does such change prevent or defeat
a review or reversal in any instance where the Secretary making the ruling or ren-
dering the decision, if still in office, would be in duty bound to review and reverse
his own act. Administrative reasons as well as the principles of common justice
require that a secretary should not disturb or reverse prior rulings or decisions,
except where it is affirmatively shown that manifest injustice has een done or the
law clearly misapplied; but this is equally true of his own rulings and decisions,
and is not limited to those of his predecessor.
So long as the legal title remains in the government the Secretary of the Interior,
whoever he may be, is charged with the duty of seeing that the land is disposed of
only according to law. The issuance of a patent is the final act and decision in that
disposition and with it and not before does the supervisory power and duty of the
Secretary cease.
In Williams v. United States (138 U. S., 514-524), the court said:
It is obvious, it is common knowledge, that in the administration of such large
and varied interests as are intrusted to the Land Department, matters not foreseen,
equities not anticipated, and which are therefore not provided for by express statute,
may sometimes arise, and, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is given that
superintending and supervising power which will enable him, in the face of these
unexpected contingencies, to do justice.
In Osborn et al. v. Knight (23 L. D., 216), it was held (syllabns):
The doctrine of res judicata will not prevent departmental action where such course
is the only one by which substantial justice can be secured, and the subject matter
remains within the jurisdiction of the Department.
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In the same connection, see Gage v. Atwater (21 L. D., 211); Moores
v. Sommer (23 L. D., 514); Mullen v. Porter (25 L. D., 444) and Seixas
v. Glazier (26 L. D., 49).
In common with others, among whom was Mendenhall, Cagle law-
fully participated in the race for homestead claims on the day of the
opening and by reason of his prior settlement obtained the first and
better right to the land in question. Without fault upon his part the
Department, by its original and erroneous ruling herein, has unjustly
deprived him of that right. The original parties are before the
Department and the subject-matter is still within its jurisdiction.
Cagle is entitled to have the same law applied to him which has been
and is being applied to others similarly situated. He has not acquiesced
in the erroneous ruling but has been vigilant in the assertion of his
claim. The facts of the case call for the exercise of the supervisory
authority of the Secretary and the restitution ot the right which was
wrongfully taken from Cagle by the decision complained of.
The entry of Mendenhall will be canceled, and Cagle will be per-
mitted to make homestead entry of the land in dispute.
Attention is called to the fact that when Haskins relinquished his
entry of the tract in question there were then pending against that
entry two contests, each based upon alleged prior settlement; one by
Mendenhall, and the other by Cagle. Upon the filing of Haskins'
relinquishment the local officers permitted Mendenhall to make entry
at once. This was contrary to established rulings. Before an entry
by either of the contestants was allowed a hearing should have been
had to determine which had the prior and better right. A hearing was
actually had after the entry by Mendenhall and this hearing resulted
in Cagle's favor, so that the error of the local office in permitting an
entry by one of the contestants before it was determined which was
entitled to such entry, may have been without prejudicial effect.
Mendenhall has filed a motion for rehearing on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, and presents in support thereof several affidavits.
In opposition thereto Cagle presents the affidavits of eight persons and
also a certified copy of the testimony given in another case by some of
the witnesses whose affidavits are presented by Mendenhall. In this
other case these witnesses testified about the same subject-matter and
what was then said by them does not sustain their present affidavits.
An examination of all that is presented in that connection demon-
strates that the showing made does not warrant an order for a rehearing
and the motion therefor is denied.
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RIGHT OF WAY-STIATION GROUND-ADVERSE CLAIMI.
ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND MANITOBA RY. CO.
An intervening entry should not defeat the approval of a station lat, if the land
was open to appropriation under the right of way act at the date of filing said
plat.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner o' the General Land Office, Febrnuary
(W. V. D.) 9, 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter "F" of April 2, 1897, was transmitted an
appeal by the St. Paul,-Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company
from the action taken in your office letter of October 5, 1896, rejecting
its application, made under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875
(18 Stat., 482), for right of way for station grounds at Camden, ill sec-
tions 3 and 4, T. 29 N., It. 44 E., Spokane laud district, Washington.
The company's plat was filed in the local office June 29, 1896. On
July 9th following, Matthew B. Lyons made homestead entry for lot 1,
the S. J of the NE. 4 and the NW. of the SE. 1 of Sec. 4, T. 29 N., R. 44
E., and it was on account of said entry that the company's plat was
rejected, it being held in your office letter that
none of the tracts embraced in the application for station grounds are vacant public
lands, and that said application is not subject to approval by the Department.
As originally presented, the company claimed a right of way across
section 3. Said section is within the primary limits of the grant for
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and for that reason the appli-
cation was rejected as to said section 3.
The company has amended its plat waiving any claim to the portion
in section 3, so that the only question submitted or raised by the appeal
is as to the approval of the plat for the portion shown in section 4.
As before stated, the tract in section 4 was vacant at the time the
company's plat was filed, and the question arises: Can it be deprived
of its right to have the same approved, if satisfactory, by the subse-
quent entry of the laud covered by the plat before said plat is approved
by the Secretary of the Interior and noted upon the records in the
land office ?
The fourth section of the act of March 3, 1875 (supra), under which
the present application is filed, provides:
That any railroad company desiring to secure the benefits of this act, shall, within
twelve months after the ocation of any section of twenty miles of its road, if the
same be upon surveyed lands, and, if upon unsurveyed lands, within twelve months
after the survey thereof by the United States, file with the register of the land office
for the district where such laud is located a profile of its road; and upon approval
thereof by the Secretary of the Interior the same shall be noted upon the plats in.
said office; and thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass
shall be disposed of subject to such right of way: Proriled, That if any section of
said road shall not be completed within five years after the location of said section,
the rights herein granted shall be forfeited as to any such uncompletod section of
said road.
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In its appeal the company alleges that "the station grounds in ques-
tion have been in the occupation and possession of the company since
their selection for that purpose."
Where a company has complied with the law by filing its articles of
incorporation and due proofs of organization, it is clearly entitled to a
grant of the right of way over the public lands under the act of March
3, 1875 (supra). To secure this right, however, it must file maps of the
location of its road and plats of necessary station grounds.
It is true, the law makes the maps and plats filed by the companies
subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, and it would seem
that, until approved, no right is vested in the company thereunder.
After filing the maps and plats as required by the statute, the coIn-
pany has done every act necessary to be performed on its part.
Much time must necessarily elapse before these maps can go through
the regular course of examination and be presented to the Secretary of
the Interior for his approval.
Is the company's right in jeopardy, although it may be in the actual
use of the land, during this period, and can its right bemade to depend
upon the action of others, as would be the resultof youroffice decision?
It is not believed that such was the intention of Congress, but rather
that in determining whether a map should be approved the condition
existing at the time of its filing must control.
As no other objection appears to the approval of this plat than the
fact that an entry has been permitted to be made of the land covered
by the claimed right of way since the filing of the map, for the reasons
herein given the plat is approved, subject to any valid adverse right,
and is herewith returned, with accompanying papers, for proper action.
SWAMP JANDS-AfDJUSTMENT OF GRANT CONFIRIATION.
STATE OF MICHIGAN v. LSTZON. ET AL.
Where the field notes of the survey of a township have been made the basis of
a final adjustment of the swamp grant, and the State has accepted a patent
thereunder, it is estopped, while holding the lands so conveyed, from claiming
additional tracts ander a resurvey which also shows that a portion of the lands
patented were not of the character granted.
The act of March 3, 1857, did not confirm swamp lands to the State where the grant
had been adjusted as to any particular township, or townships, and sneh adjust-
inenthad become final and eonclusive by the acceptance, on the part of the State,
of a patent for the lands covered by such adjustment.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(AT. V. D.) ill 1898. (E. F. B.)
This appeal is taken by the State of Michigan from the decision of
your office of March 25, 1887, rejecting its claimn to certain lands in
township 31 N., R. 5 E., and 35 N., R. 4 E., Detroit, Michigan, under
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the swamp land grant. By said decision you. also suspended the fol-
lowing homestead entries for conflict with said claim, to wit:
No. 2379 made Aug. 11, 1884, for E. NW. j and NW. 41 NW. j Sec. 18, and W. frI.
SWi Sec. 7, T. 35 N.. R. 4 E., by Hermann Listzon, as to the W. + SW. See. 7.
No. 2215, made June 11, 1881, for N. i SW. Sec. 14, T. 35 N., R. 4 E., by William
Meden.
No. 1626, made Feby. 29, 1876, F. C. No. 833 issued Oct. 10, 1881, for NE. - SE. i
Sec. 17, T. 35 N., R. 4 E., to Johan Globlke.
No. 2401, made Feby. 2d, 1885, for NE. of Sec. 23, T. 35 N., R. 4 E., by Frank
Ostrofski, as to the NE. NE. i-.
No. 1683, made Sept. 23, 1876, for S. SE. Sec. 19, and N. N E. Sec. 30, T. 34 N.,
R. 5 E., F. C. No. 937 issued Oct. 31, 1883, to John Schalk.
No. 1654, made July 6, 1874, for E. i SW. i Sec. 18, and NE. iNW. I and NW. i NE. -
Sec. 19, T. 34 N., R. 5 E., F. C. 940, issued to Frederick Natzke, as to the SE. jSW. I
Sec. 18, and NE. i NW. 4 and NW. + NE. Sec. 19.
It appears from the record that the lands in controversy were not
included in the list of swamp and overflowed lands under the original
surveys of these townships, which was approved by the Department,
but subsequently, upon discovery that said surveys were erroneous,
new surveys were made of such townships, and after the resurveys,
new selections of swamp and overflowed lands in said township
embraced in supplemental list were made and transmitted to your
office, which was intended to abrogate and supersede all lists of swamp
and overflowed lands in said townships made prior thereto. Before
said supplemental list was received by your office most of the lands
selected by the State in said townships as swamp and overflowed were
patented to it upon the approved list of selections made under the old
or original surveys.
On June 18, 1864, your office addressed a letter to the local officers
at Detroit, Michigan, in which they were advised as follows:
rhe supplemental list "D " to which you refer, was made from the re-surveys5 and
was originally intended to abrogate or supersede the old lists in the townships con-
tained in said supplemental list "D," hut inasmuch as the selections under the old
surveys, in that portion of the Detroit district had been acted upon and carried into
patent, that course was found to be impracticable. As this office cannot recognize
two lists of swamp land selections for the same townships made from different and
conflicting surveys, and having, as stated, acted upon one, we must of necessity ignore
the other. You will therefore consider the origfinal list, made under the old surveys,
a copy in part of which was sent you on 15th April last, as being the only list to
govern you in the townships therein contained.
In view of this action your office on March 25, 1887, advised the
local officers "that the claim of the State thereunder, for the lands
herein (therein) described as being in conflict, is this day held for
rejection," from which action the State al pealed.
Townships 34 N., R. 5 E., and 35 N., . 4 E., were surveyed in 1841.
The tracts in controversy are shown by the field notes of this survey to
be dry lands, and were therefore not included in the original list of
swamp and overflowed lands embracing these townships, which was
reported to your office and approved Decelber 24, 1852.
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The lands included in this list were patented to the State June 1,
1854, but subsequent to the issuance of this patent the townships
embraced therein were resurveyed and a new and spplemental list of
swamp lands in said townships were received in your office February
24, 1857. Wile, by far the greater part of the lands embraced in the
supplemental list were also embiraced in the original list, for which
patent had issued,-some of the lands in the supplemental list which
are shown to be swamp and overflowed, by the field notes of the new
survey, (ike the lands in controversy) are shown by the field notes of
the original srvey to be dry and were therefore not embraced in the
original list. On the other hand some tracts embraced in the original
list for which patent has issued and which are shown by the field notes
of the original survey to be swamp and overflowed, are shown by the
field notes of the resurvey to be dry and not subject to the grant. The
result is that while the greater part of the lands in said townships
for which patent has issued are shown by both surveys to be of the
character contemplated by the grant, the State has received patent
for some lands which by the corrected surveys are shown to be dry,
and patent has been withheld for lands which by the resurvey are
shown to be swamp and overflowed.
The grant to the States made by the the act of September 28, 1850,
is " the whole of those swamp and overflowed lands made un fit thereby
for cultivation, which shall remain unsold, at the passage of the act."
It is, however, made the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to ascer-
tain the character of the lands granted, and the manner in which that
duty shall be discharged is left to his discretion. As a general rule
the mere fact that the State has received patents for lands in a par-
ticular township under an original survey which was afterwards dis-
covered to be erroneous, would not deprive it of the right to a patent
to other lands in the same township selected after a resurvey if the
lands are in fact swamp and overflowed. But in this case, the agree-
ment made between the State and the Secretary of the Interior to
accept the field notes of surveys as evidence upon which the character
of the lands should be determined, was intended to be a final and com-
plete adjustment of the grant as to the pal ticular township. As said
by the court in Michigan Land and Lumber Company v. Rust (168 U.
S., 589):
Undoubtedly the beneficiary of sch a grant is interested in its adjustment and
may properly be heard before the officers of the grantor in determining what lands
are embraced within it and any assent by the grantee to a determination made by
the officers of the grantor as to the lands passing within the grant would be bind-
ing pon it. In this case the grant was for the benefit of the State of Michigan,
but in the act of 1850, making the grant, Congress, as it had a right to do, clearly
indicated the officer of the State, to wit, the governor, whose action in the premises
should be the action of the grantee.
The errors in the original surveys of certain townships in the State
were well known at the time the State received the patent for the
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lands included in the original list which embraced the townships in
controversy, and the resurveys of such townships were made not only
with the knowledge, but upon the request of the State. Although it
was the itention of the Secretary of the Interior, as well as of the
governor of the. State, that the supplemental lists, made from the resur-
veys, should abrogate and supersede the lists made from the original
surveys, yet, as the list of selections of swanp and overflowed lands in
these townships made from the original surveys had been approved and
patented to the State long before the resurveys were made, the adjust-
ment of the grant as to those townships must be held to be final and
conclusive, and the acceptance of the patent by the State for such
lands a waiver of all claim to any other land in such townships. It is
within the power of the Department at any time prior to the issuance
of patent to review its action approving a list of lands as swamp and
overflowed, and it was equally within its power to have accepted from
the State a relinquishment and reconveyance of the lands embraced
in the patent issued June 1, 1857, i order that the grant might be
adjusted according to supplemental list D, made from the resurveys.
But no such offer was made by the State. It receive(l a patent for
the land embraced in the original list in 1854. The resurvey was
approved November 5, 1856, and the supplemental list of selections
made from this resurvey was received in your office February 24, 1857.
From an examination of the list it could be seen that the State had
received patent for lands to which it was not entitled according to the
field notes of the new survey, and that it was entitled to lands by that
survey which were shown to be dry by te original survey, and are not
included in its patent. These lacts were evidently lnowii to the State,
or could have been known as they were matters of record, but no
action was taken looking to a substitution of the supplemental list for
the original list, and in 1864, your office notified the local officers that
the original list must control as to the townships embraced therein,
and the supplemental list could not be considered as giving the State
any right to lands which were not embraced in the list upon which
patent issued.
Upon this authority Listzon and others made entries of the lands in
controversy, to which the State asserts a claim upon the ground that
as the surveys niade by the United States were agreed to be taken as
establishing the character of the land, the State is entitled to all lands
shown to be swamp and overflowed by any township survey that the
United States may see lit to make.
The case of the Michigan Land and Lumber Company v. Rust, cited
above, involved the question of the power of the Secretary of the
Interior at any time prior to the issuance of patent to correct an errone-
ous survey and to substitute a list of swamp land selections made upon
a resurvey of such township for an approved list made upon the errone-
ous survey. In that case the original approved list was set aside and
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the claim of the State adjusted upon the supplemental list made upon
the new survey upon which patent issued. As to the effect of this
patent by the State the court says:
This clearly shows an acceptance by the officer of the State, charged under the
act of Congress with the duty of so doing, of the resurveys, as within the authority
of the Land Department, and makes the adjustment of the grant upon the basis of
such resurveys final and conclusive. The act of the State in accepting the new and
corrected survey as the basis of adjustment is tantamount to a waiver of any claims
under the prior and erroneous survey, for it cannot be that a grantee accepting a
patent for lands which according to a final and correct survey are shown to be within.
the terms of the grant can thereafter be heard to say, Notwithstanling I have taken
all the lands shown to belong to me by this correct survey, I also claim lands which
by a prior and erroneous, if not fraudulent survey, appear to pass nder the grant.
He cannot i that way enlarge the scope of the grant, and after taking lands which
are finally determined to pass under the grant say, I also insist upon lands which
upon such final survey are shown not to be within te grant, simply because under
a prior erroneous survey they appear to be within its tens.
In the case cited the adjustment of the grant was made upon the
basis of the resurveys which the court said was final and conclusive,
and that the acceptance by the State of the new and corrected surveys
as the basis of adjustment, is tantamount to a waiver of any claim
nder the prior and erroneous survey. So in like manner, if the adjllst-
ment was made upon the original surveys as a basis, the State by its
acceptance of a patent for all the lands embraced in the original list,
selected upon the erroneous surveys is tantamount to a waiver of its
claim to any other lands, although the issuance of the patent may have
been inadvertent. It is the acceptance of the patent covering lands
shown by the resurvey to be dry which the State does not offer to recon-
vey,-that estops it from claiming lands shown to be swamp by such
resurvey.
In the 6th ground of error, it is alleged that the W. SW. 1 Sec. 7;
N. SW. Sec. 14; and NE. Sec. 23, T. 35 N., R. 4 E., are show to
be swamp land by the plat and field notes of the original survey as well
as by the resurvey, and it was therefore error to reject the claim of the
State to such lands.
In answer to this it is sufficient to say that these subdivisions are
clearly shown by the plat of the original survey to be dry lands and
were therefore not included in the original list upon which the patent
issued.
It is also claimed that as the lands in supplemental list D were
reported to your office prior to the passage of the confirmatory act of
March 3, 1857 (1 Stat., 251), said act has confirmed all such selections
and passed the title to the State.
The act of March 3, 1857, did not confirm to the State, lands embraced
in any list upon which affirmative action had been taken by the Depart-
ment, or where the grant to the State had been adjusted as to any
particular township or townships and such adjustment had been made
final and conclusive by the acceptance by the State of a patent for the
lands covered by such adjustment.
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The purpose of the act was to confirm selections of swamp lands
theretofore reported to the General Land Office, upon which the Secre-
tary of the Interior had failed to take action. As said by the court in
Martin v. Marks 97 U. S., 345,
It seems that, seven years after the passage of the swamp-land grant, this failure of
the Secretary to act had become a grievance, for which Congress deemed it necessary
to provide a remedy, by the act of March 3, 1857 (11 Stat., 251), which declares that
the selections of swamp and overflowed lands granted to the States by the act of
1850, heretofore made and reported to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office,
so far as the same shall remain vacant and unappropriated, and not interfered with
by an actual settlement nder any existing lav of the United States, be and the
same are hereby confirmed, and shall be approved and patented to the States in con-
formity to the provisions of said act.
As to the swamp lands within these townships the Secretary had
taken action and had patented to the State, all of such lands, upon an
adjustnent of the grant made by him, which was final and complete as
to such townsh ips. The adjustment of the grant upon the basis of the
original surveys and the acceptance of the patent by the State was tan-
tamount to a waiver by the State of. all claim to any further adjustment
upon the basis of the resurveys so long as it retained the benefits of the
first adjustment, and hence, within the meaning of the act of 1857,
there were no selections pending at the date of the passage of the act
upon which it could operate.
Again in the case of. Michigan Land and Lumber Company v. Rust,
supra, the court says:
Now, the obvious purpose of this act of 1857 was to ratify and confirm the various
steps taken by the Secretary of the Interior in the selection of swamp and over-
flowed lands. It was general in its terms, reaching to all the States, and the differ-
ent modes by which identification of the swamp and overflowed lands had been
attempted to be accomplished.
The decision of your office of March 25, S87, rejecting the claim of
the State to the lands in controversy is affirmed, and you will therefore
relieve from suspension the entries of Herman Listzon and others, and
take such action thereon as may be necessary.
GRADUATION EXNTUI2ES-CO:NFIURMATOIIY ACT OF JANTARY 18, 1898.
JOHN P. COOk.
Graduation entries, invalid on account of the failure of the local office to collect
the full price of the lands covered thereby, are confirmed, if otherwise regular,
by the act of Jannary 18, 1898.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. .) 11, 1898. (F. WAT. C.)
'With your office. letter "C" of August 20, 1897, was forwarded an
appeal, filed on behalf of John E. Cook. alleged to be the son of John
P. Cook, deceased, who, on October 24, 1854, made graduation cash
1898 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
entries, at Demopolis, Alabama, numbered 14, 618-19-20 (paid for at
the rate of seventy-five cents per acre), from your office decision of
March 8, 1897, in which it was held that there was yet due on account
of said entries an additional amount equal to twenty-five cents per
acre, said lands being properly rated at one dollar per acre at the date
of the above described sale.
In your said office decision it was stated that upon payment of the
amounts due upon said graduation cash entries the same would be
approved for patenting.
In view of the recent act of Congress, approved January 18, 1898
(Public No. 5), in which it is provided-
That all entries of the public lands made under the provisions of the act entitled
"An Act to graduate and reduce the price of the public lands to actual settlers andi
cultivators," approved August fonrth, eighteen hundred and fifty four, which are
illegal and invalid because of the failure of the registers and receivers to previously
collect from the settler the full price of the lands covered thereby, t e, and the same
are hereby, confirmed, if, upon examination by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, the same are found to be otherwise regular and in compliance with said
act and the acts supplemental thereto,-
it is unnecessary to consider the question raised by the appeal as to the
proper rating of these lands, as the entries would seem to be confirmed
by the act quoted.
The record is therefore herewith returned for your further c6nsidera-
tion and action in view of said legislation.
SECOND CONTEST-SUCCESSFUL CONTESTANT.
GRANFLADEN V. flADMILTON (ON REVI:EW).
A contest allowed during the pendency of prior proceedings involving the same laud
can not operate to confer ay right as against the successful party in said
proceedings.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) Fyebruary 12, 1898. (W. A. E.)
Fred Dede, intervening contestant, has filed motion for review of
departmental decision of November 17, 1897 (25 L. D., 384), in the case
of Thomas L. Graniladen . James Hamilton, involving the N. A of the
NE. ± and the SW. I of the NE. of Sec. 23, T. 106 N., R. 50 W.,
Mitchell, South Dakota, land district. -
The history of the case, in brief, is as follows:
February 10, 1880, Mary T. Jacobson filed pre-emption declaratory
statement for the land above described, but died before making final
proof and payment, leaving an infant boy, Lewis T. Jacobson, as her
sole heir.
September 8, 1893, T. J. Sangler made homestead entry for the
same land, and on April 25, 1895, James Hamilton filed affidavit of con-
test against said entry, charging abandonment.
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While this contest was pending and before decision therein, to wit,
on June 29; 1895, Thomas L. Granfladen, guardian of Lewis T. Jacob-
son, minor heir aforesaid, filed an application to make proof and pay-
ment under the decedent's filing. Tis application was rejected, and
Granfladen appealed to your office, which affirmed the action of the
local office, whereupon Granfladen filed further appeal to the Depart-
ment.
In the meantime, the local officers considered the contest of Hamilton
against Spangler, and recommended the cancellation of Spangler's
entry. No appeal from this action having been filed, your office, by,
letter of January 28, 1896, canceled said entry, and on February 6,
1896. Hamilton was allowed to make homestead entry for the land.
July 25, 1896, while Granfladen's appeal was pending before the
Department, Fred Dede filed affidavit of contest against Hamilton's
entry, alleging that said entry was speculative and fraudulent, and
that the entrynan had never resided upon or cultivated said land.
A hearing was had on this affidavit, at which Hamilton made default,
and the local officers recommended the cancellation of the entry, but
when the record reached your office it was at once forwarded to the
Department, without action by your office, for consideration in connec-
tion with Grantladen's appeal.
By departmental decision of November 17, 1897, it was held that fail-
ure to submit pre-emption final proof and make payment for the land
within the statutory life of a filing on unofiered land, does not defeat
all rights under the filing, but subjects the claim to any legal settle-
ment claim that may intervene; that as between a pre-emptor thus in
default and a homestead claimant for the same land, who is also in
default in the matter of settlement and residence, the superior right is
with the one who first takes steps to cure his default; and that a suc-
cessful contest against the homestead entry in such a case will not
defeat the right of a minor claimant under the pre-emption filing to
submit final proof, if, prior to the conclusion of said contest, applica-
tion is made to complete the pre-emption claim, and it appears that the
contestant had not made settlement on the land at such time, and was
aware at the tihe of initiating his contest, of the fact that the minor
with his guardian was residing upon and claiming the land. In regard
to Dede's contest, it was said: "As Dede's affidavit of contest, filed
July 25, 1896, is subsequent to Granfladen's application to make proof
and payment under Mrs. Jacobson's filing, any rights that Dede may
have in the premises are subject.to those of Granfladen."
Granfladen's application was accordingly allowed, Dede's contest
was suspended, and you were instructed, in case the proof submitted
by the guardian should be found satisfactory, to call upon Hamilton to
show cause why his entry should not be canceled.
Hamilton has not filed motion for review of said decision, but Dede
has filed motion for review of so much thereof as holds his rights sub-
ject to those of the minor heir of Mrs. Jacobson.
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Dede claims that as he has successfully contested Hamilton's entry,
he has a statutory preference right of which the Department can not
deprive him.
It was error on the part of the local officers to order a hearing on
Dede's contest while Granfladen's appeal, involving this land, was pend-
ing before the Department, and consequently his success in that con-
test can not give him any rights that would defeat those of the minor
heir.
His affidavit of contest was filed nearly thirteen months after Gran-
fladen's application, and is clearly subject to said application.
The motion for review is accordingly denied.
OKLAHOMA LANDS-ADDITIONAL, hO1MESTE AD-ACT OrF rEBRUARY 10,
1804.
c2ESAR V. SALES.
The right to make additional homestead entry under the act of February 10, 1894-,
cannot be exercised by one whose claim. to the land embraced in his original
entry was initiated after the passage of said act.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Qfice,
(W. V. D.) February 12, 1898. (J. L. MCC.)
Porter T. COsar, on June 25, 1894, made homestead entry of lots 3
and 4 of Sec. 15, T. 14 N.. R. 3 B., Guthrie land district, Oklahoma
Territory.
On June 17, 1895, he applied to enter lots 9 and 10 and the So- of the
SW of the same section, under the act of Febrnary 10, 1894 (28 Stat.,
37), which provides (under certain limitations attached):
That every homestead settler on the public lands on the left bank of the Deep
Fork river, in the former Iowa reservation, in the Territory of Oklahoma, who
entered less than one hndred and sixty acres of land, may enter, under the home-
stead laws, other lands adjoining the land embraced in his original entry, when
such additional lands become subject to entry, which additional entry shall not,
with the lands originally entered, exceed in the aggregate one hndred and sixty
acres.
The local officers rejected his application; and upon his appeal, your
office affirmed their action, holding that (irrespective of the fact that
one Benjamin Sales had made homestead entry of the tract on May 24,
1895,) the act of February 10, 1894, applied only in the case of persons
whose claim to the land embraced in the original entry had been
initiated prior to the approval of the act.
This conclusion is clearly i accordance with the language and intent
of the statute; furthermore, the departmental circular of May 18, 1895
(20 L. D., 470-1), instructing local officers how to proceed in the
enforcement of the act, directs that "no party' will be entitled to an
additional entry under said provision whose claim to the lands
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embraced in his original entry has been initiated since the approval
of said act."
The decision of your office is affirmed.
ITOMESTE-A-D-CITIZENSHIP-NATJRALIZATION.
MITCIELL v. BACKES.
A. slight difference in the spelling of the name as shown in the declaration of
intention to become a citizen, and the final papers, will not be held sufficient to
defeat a claim of citizenship on behalf of a homesteader, where from the testi-
mony it appears that he is the identical person referred to in each instance.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofice,
(W. V. D.) February 12, 1898. (G-. B. G.)
On April 26, 1889, John Backes made homestead entry for the NE. i
of Sec. 21, T. 16 N., R. 2 W., Gthrie, Oklahoma.
On November 3,1890, Willard P. Mitchell filed a contest against said
entry, alleging "soonerism" and speculative intent in making the entry.
After a hearing duly and regularly had, the local officers recom-
mended that the contest be dismissed and the entry of Backes held
intact.
On the appeal of Mitchell, your office, on May 17, 1895, affirmed the
decision of the local officers.
The case is before the Department on the appeal of Mitchell from
said decision.
It is urged, substantially, that your office erred in its conclusions of
fact, and further:
1. Error in not finding from the record in the ease and the homestead papers of
Joln Backes that the entryman has not shown thath be was a duly qualified home-
steader, and wholly failed to show that he was a naturalized citizen of the United
States, as sworn to in his homestead affidavit.
On the questions of alleged disqualification for 1sooneri sm and
speculative intent in making the entry, which were the only questions
in issue at the hearing, the record, by an overwhelming preponderance
of the testimony, sustains the concurring conclusions of your office and
the local officers. Moreover, since the trial herein, and since the
decision of your office was made, Joseph Turner, Charles Stoelting and
Walter L. Finch, three of the principal witnesses relied upon by the
contestant to establish the allegation of the premature and unlawful
entry of the defendant into the Oklahoma country, have been indicted
and convicted of the crime of perjury for their evidence given in this
case, Turner and Stoelting pleading guilty in answer to the indictments
against them.
The question of citizenship requires more extended consideration.
This question was first raised on appeal, and was not the subject of
investigation at the hearing.
Attached to the entry papers in this case is a certified copy of the
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declaration of intention of "Johann Bakes" to become a citizen of
the United States, made before the clerk of the district court in and
for Dodge county, Nebraska, dated June 30,1883, and i answer to the
appellant's contention that the said John Backes is not a citizen of
the United States, counsel for the defendant has filed a "n aturalization
final paper," issued from the United States district court for Logan
county, Oklahoma, December 15, 1890, wherein "Johann Backes" is
admitted to become a citizen of the United States. It is thus seen
that the surname in the certificate of naturalization differs from that
in the certified copy of the declaration of intention, it appearing in the
copy of the declaration as " Bakes " and in the certificate of citizenship
as " Backes." This discrepancy may easily be explained on the theory
that the spelling in the copy of the declaration is an inadvertence, and
that "Bakes" and "Backes" may be and is the name of the same per-
son. But the defendant herein writes his name as John Backes, and
the name so appears everywhere in the record wherever mentioned,
except i the papers above referred to. This might easily be explained
by the fact that Johann and John are the same Christian names, the
former being the German equivalent of the latter, were it not for the
further fact that the defendant has testified in this case that he had a
brother " Joahaun Bechas," who had been living in America but was
then dead. It will be observed that both the Christian and surname
are here spelled differently than appears elsewhere.
The record shows that John Backes s a man of good character, and
he swears that he filed his declaration of intention to become a citizen
of the United States in Dodge county, Nebraska, in the year 1883;
that he afterwards filed a copy of this declaration in the Guthrie land
office at the time he made entry for the land in controversy. It is
believed that he is the identical person named in the declaration of
intention and certificate of citizenship on file, and that he is a citizen
of the United States.
It is directed that his entry be held intact, subject to further com-
pliance with law.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
SOLDIERS ADDITIONAL HOWIESTEAD-CERTIFICATE OF RIGHT.
C. W. DA RLING.
Where a certificate of a soldier's additional homestead right has been located by an
assignee, and the location canceled in part, and patent issued for the remainder,
the assignee is entitled to a recertification, under the act of August 18, 1894, of
the additional right for the number of acres not secured under the original cer-
tificate.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) ebruary 12, 1898. (P. J. C.)
The question presented by the appeal of . W. Darling from your
office decision of June 18, 1896, may be briefly stated as follows:
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A certificate was issued by your office on December 12, 1878, to one
William Hughes, by which lie was held entitled to make a soldier's
additional homestead entry of 106.12 acres. Through his attorney-in-
fact, C. W. Darling, an entry was made, in 1879, of one hundred and
twenty acres in the Fargo, North Dakota, laud district. Without
going into detail, it is sufficient to say that this entry was finally can-
celed as to one forty acre tract included therein, for the reason that
there was a prior entry thereon, and the remainder, eighty acres, was
subsequently patented under said entry.
In 1896 Darling presented an application to your office to have a
recertification to him of the certificate to cover forty acres. He pre-
sented his own affidavit that he purchased said original certificate for
a valuable consideration and that he was and is the owner thereof He
also presented the affidavit of the surviving member of a banking firm
from whom he purchased this and other certificates, by which it is shown
that the bank did sell him the certificate. There as also furnished
the original irrevocable power of attorney from Hughes to Darling,
authorizing the latter to enter, convey, etc., the land included in the
entry.
By your said office letter it was decided:
Tlle entry, located under this certificate has been patented, and although said entry
failed in so far as one forty acre subdivision is concerned, yet the patenting of the
remainder thereof was in full satisfaction of the additional right of William Hughes.
Therefore the application for the recertification of the said certificate is denied,
and said certificate will be filed with the papers in said final certificate No. 408,
where it rightfully belongs.
From this decision Darling has appealed.,
The ruling of your office that the entry of eighty acres under the
original certificate was in full satisfaction of Hughes' right of entry
was probably based on the doctrine announced in Hiram S. Thornton
(3 L. D., 509), where it was decided (syllabus):
Under a fair construction of the original homestead act, and the legislation supple-
mental thereto, conferring the right, under section 2306 of the Revised Statutes, to
make an additional entry, such right is held to be exhausted when once used,
although for a less quantity than sufficient to make up one hundred and sixty acres.
But in the case of Webster v. Luther (163 U. S., 331) it was held by
the supreme court that no limitation could be placed on the right con-
ferred by the certificate, either in the hands of the ex-soldier or his
transferee; that this was a gratuity in the nature of a compensation for
past services to the country, and that it was not intended the right thus
conferred should be hampered in any way to defeat or impair its value.
In view of this decision by the supreme court of the United States, the
Thornton case will not be followed.
By the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 397), all soldier's additional
homestead certificates that had been issued were declared " good and
valid in the hands of bona fide purchasers for value." By circular of
October 16, 1894 (19 L. D., 302), assignees of these certificates were,
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prior to any entry by the assignee, required to present them to your
office for examination and additional certification. It also provided
that:
Holders of such certificates desiring to exercise a right of entry in their own names,
must file sch certificates in this office, together with satisfactory proof of owner-
ship and a bona fide purchase for value, If, upon examination, the proof so filed is
satisfactory, an additional certificate will be attached to the original authorizing
the location thereof, or entry of land therewith, in the name of the assignee or his
assigns. You Will allow no entries i the names of assignees except upon presenta-
tion of such additional certificates issued by this office. When sch additional cer-
tificates are presented, you will issue homestead papers and the final certificate
and receipt, in the name of the transferee, referring to him in said papers as the
"Assignee" of the soldier.
It appears that the right of entry by the certificate has not been
exhausted. The evidence presented is prima facie sufficient to show
that Darling is the owner of this certificate, having purchased it for a
valuable consideration. Under these circumstances it is clear that
under the law and the circular quoted, he is entitled to an additional
certification to the amount of the acreage that has not been covered by
the former entry under the original certificate.
Since, under the act of Congress, and the decision of the supreme
court, the transferee is vested with all the rights the original holder
had, there would seem to be no good reason why an additional certifi-
cate may not be issued to Darling for the number of acres not yet
dutered uder the original certificate.
Your office decision is therefore reversed, and you are directed to
issue to Darling an additional certificate for twenty-six and twelve one-
hundredths (26.12) acres.
HO1 ESTEA:D ENTRY-MARRIED WOMAN-WIDO -RESIDENCE.
LEONORA H. FORES.
In the case of a man and woman who make homestead entry of adjacent tracts and
thereafter marry, and maintain residence in a house built across the line divid-
ing their claims, the residence of the wife must be held to have been abandoned
from the date of her marriage; but, if the husband subsequently dies, the widow,
without forfeiting her right to perfect her husband's claim, may resume residence
on her own land, in the absence of any intervening adverse right, and perfect
title thereto after due compliance with law.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofie,
(W. V. D.) Tyebruary 12, 1898. (J. L. MeG.)
Your office, by letter of September 3, 1893, transmitted a letter from
Leonora I. Fores (formerly Leonora H. French), and suggested its con-
sideration as an informal appeal from your office decision of March 2,
1896, sustaining the action of the local officers in rejecting the final
proof offered by her in support of her homestead entry, made July 30,
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1889, for the S. of the NE. and the S. of the NW. 1 of Sec. 8,
T. 21N., R. 36 E., Spokane Falls land district, Washington.
On the same day July 30,1889) when Miss French made homestead
entry of the tract above described, Victor E. Fores made homestead
entry of the SW. 4 of the same section.
Said Victor E. Fores and Leonora H. French were married October
23, 1889; and the testimony shows that they lived in a house built
across the line between the two claims, and that both claims have been
cultivated each year since the entry.
It is also shown that Victor E. Fores died on October 6, 1893; and
that his widow, Leonora H. Pores, on January 10, 1895, made final proof
on her deceased husband's homestead ertry; that final certificate was
issued to her asfhis widow on that day; and that patent issued therefor
on June 8, 1895.
Your office, in its decision appealed from, says:
It has been frequently held by the Department that a single woman, who makes a
homestead entry and subsequently marries, and thereafter lives with her husband
(vho had filed on an adjacent tract) in a ouse built across the dividing linebetween
the two claims, by such residence abandons her own entry. See 17 L. D., 215, and
cases therein cited.
For the reason above set forth your office rejected Mrs. Fores' final
proof, and held her homestead entry for cancellation.
The final proof was unquestionably properly rejected; but it does
not necessarily follow that the entry in question should be canceled.
It may be conceded that,-during the lifetime of her husband, and
while she was residing with him, Mrs. Fores' residence on her own entry
was abandoned. But it is not a requirement of the law that she should
continue to reside upon his land, after his d eath, in order to make final
proof thereon. When she became a widow it was competent for her to
reside upon land of her own. No reason appears why (in the absence
of any intervening, adverse claim) she may not show that she estab-
lished residence on the tract formerly entered by her after her hus-
band's death, if such be the fact. It is true that between that date
(October 6, 1893, spra,) and the date when she made final proof
(December 5, 1895,) five years had not intervened; but no reason appears
why, after showing proper compliance with the requirements of the law,
she may not, if she so elects, commute said entry to cash, or continue
to reside thereon for five years and make the ordinary homestead proof.
The decision of your office is modified as above indicated.
DISCOVERY PLACER CLAIM V. MURRY.
Motion for review of departmental decision of December 9, 1897, 25
L. )., 460, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, February 14, 1898.
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MINING CLAIMv-PRA(CTICE-APPEAL-ANNUAL EXPENDITURE.
DAVID FOOTK LODE.
On appeal from a decision refusing to entertain a protest aainst a mineral entry,
the appellant is not required to serve notice of the appeal on the entrynian.
Annual expenditure is not required upon a mining claim after entry thereof.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Oommissioner of the General Land Offce,
(W. V. D.) February 1, 1898. (P. J. C.)
It appears that Frederick L. Sigel et al. made mineral entry No. 192,
David Foote lode mininig claim, Rapid City (formerly Deadwood), South
Dakota land district, on February 25, 1S85.
For reasons not material now. your office held the entry for cancella-
tion August S 1894, but on April 2, 1897, on a showing made to the
satisfaction of your office, the entry was reinstated ad approved for
patenting.
Subsequently Helen d. Stout filed a protest against the entry, which
your office dismissed. Stout filed an appeal, but did not serve the
same on the claimants. Your office thereupon sent the appeal back to
the local office, with instructions to have service of the same made on
the entrymei. Due notice of this action was served on Stout, but no
attenipt was made to comply with the order. Your office therefore, by
letter of January 31, 1898, forwarded the record to this office for con-
sideration under the authority of Hannon v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Company (11 L. D., 48).
Under the ruling in Henry C. Evans (23 L. D., 412) and Gladys A.
Mining Company v. Gross (24 Id., 349) the appellant was not required
to serve notice of his appeal from your office. decision dismissing his
protest, on the entrymen. As said in the first case, the rule requiring
service of notice of appeal on the opposite party "applies only to
cases in which jurisdiction has been acquired over the entrymnan. In
an application for a hearing, such jurisdiction has. not been acquired.
Since the case is before the Department under the rule requiring
the case, where there are defective appeals, to be sent up (Eimstad v.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 24 L. D., 230), and as this case is special
anyhow, under the special order of January 29, 1896 (22 L. D., 120),
the case will be considered on its merits.
The only grounds alleged in the protest are the failure of the owners
of the David Foote lode to perform annual labor thereon for the years
1887 to 1893, inclusive, and that by reason of such failure the claim
has been relocated.
Paragraph 17 of the mining circular of December 15, 1897, 25 L. D.,
563 (paragraph 5 of the old circular), specifically declares that annual
expenditure is not required on a mining claim after entry. In Benson
Mining and Smelting Co. v. Alta Mining and Smelting Co. (145 U. S.,
428) the supreme court held (syllabus):
When the price of a mining claim has been paid to the government, the equitable
rights of the purchaser are complete, and there is no obligation on his part to do
further annual work in order to obtain a patent.
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One of the questions raised in that ease was similar to the one
sought to be raised by the protest in the case at bar; The owners of
the Alta lode made entry in 1879, but failed to do the annual work for
1882, whereupon other parties relocated the ground as the Ben Butler,
and took possession thereof. The court held that the ground was not
subject to relocation.
It is clear, therefore, that there was no forfeiture of the David Foote
lode by reason of failure to do the annual work, and the ground was
not subject to relocation.
Your office judgment dismissing the protest is affirmed.
LAwRENCE v. SEEGEi.
Petition for re-review denied by Acting Secetary Ryan, February
14, 1898. See departmental decisions of May 25, 1897, 24 L. D., 477,
and November 12, 1897, 25 L. D., 377.
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS-HEARINGS-EVIDENCE.
F. ADINSON.
Evidence may be talen by deposition, as provided in the rules of practice, in the
case of hearings ordered on protest against a classification of lands under the act
of February 26,1895.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissionier of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) February 14, 1898. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt of a communication from Mr. F. Adkinson of Helena,
Montana, complaining of the action of your office in holding that tes-
timony to be used in hearings ordered under the act of February 26,
1895 (28 Stat., 683) providing for the classification of mineral and nn-
mineral lands, within the granit to the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany in certain districts in Montana and Idaho, can not be taken
outside of the land district, when the witnesses reside more than fifty
miles from the land office, but all such testimony must be taken before
the local officers.
The letter of your office of January 28, 1898, in which the ruling
complained f was made. is enclosed with the communication of Mr.
Adkinson above referred to. It does nor appear from this letter that
you notified Mr. Adkinson that the testimony to be offered in the ear-
ing could not be taken under the rules and regulations of the Depart-
melt, governing the hearing of contests involving the mineral or non-
mineral character of the land, because after quoting that portion of
the act which provides that where protests are filed against the accept-
ance of the classification as made by the commissioners
a earing shall be ordered by tind conducted before the said register and receiver
under rules ad regulations as near as practicable i conformity with the rules and
practice of such land office in contests involving the mineral or nion-mineral charac-
ter of the land in such cases
you say; "It would seem therefore that under said act hearings can be
held only before the local officers."
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There is no question as to the correctness of this proposition, but,
what the writer of the letter desired to know was-whether the testi-
mony to be submitted at said hearing could be taken under the rules
and practice governing contests.
The act expressly provides that the hearings shall be ordered and
conducted before the register and receiver iunder rules and regulations
as near as practicable in conformity with the rles and practice of the
land office i contests involving the mineral or non-mineral character
of the land. The Lules under which hearings are conducted embrace
rules for the taking of testimony to be submitted upon sch hearing,
and Rule 23-Rules of Practice, controls inl hearings ordered under this
act as well as in all other contest cases.
You will notify Mr. Adkinson that testimony in such cases may be
taken under said rule.
MINING CLAIM-ADVERSE CLAIM-NOTICE-APEX OF VEIN.
W-ODS V. HOLDEN T AL.
In the case of a common conflict between several mining claims, a relinquishment or
exclusion by the applicant for patent, in favor of one who did not adverse the
application, is of no effect, as against another adverse claimant who, prior thereto,
has prosecuted his adverse claim to a favorable judgment.
Where adverse proceedings involving a common conflict are filed and prosecuted,
that fact necessarily appears of record, and the parties in interest are charged
with notice thereof. It is then incumbent upon each adverse claimant to take
such action as will determine his right, not only as against the applicant for
patent, but also as against the other adverse claimants. Until this is done the
the stay of proceedings commanded by section 2326 R. S., is not relieved, and the
"controversy" is not "settled or decided by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Notices of application for patent which exclude stated areas "without waiver of
rights," do not require the filing and prosecution of adverse claims to the areas
thus excluded; and the fact that no adverse claims are filed in such a case does
not warrant the inclusion of said excluded areas in the entry.
An adverse claim filed and prosecuted successfully against a mineral application can
have no effect as to the areas expressly excluded from said application, or confer
any right thereto in such adverse claimant.
An applicant for the right of mineral entry, who expressly excludes from 'notice of
his application stated areas, is not entitled thereafter to make entry of such
excluded ground without due notice of such intention.
For the purposes of exploration, discovery, and purchase, the legal apex of a vein
that dips out of ground disposed of under the placer or non-mineral laws, is that
portion of the vein within the public lands which would constitute its actual
- apex, if the vein had no actual existence in the ground so disposed of.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) February 14, 1898. (P. J. C.)
June 18, 1894, Warren Woods, trustee, made application for patent
for the Hartford lode, survey No. 8839, Pueblo, Colorado, land district,
and during the period of publication the owners of the Mary Mabel,
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and the owners of the Sierra Nevada and Starlight'lode mining claims
filed separate adverse claims against the Hartford, and in due time
brought suits thereon. Upon the institution of these suits certificates
of the clerk of the disfrict court of El P-aso county, in which the claims
are situate, were filed in the local office, showing that such suits had
been commenced and were then pending.
During the pendency of these adverse suits, and on November 22,
1894, A. tM. Holden and David W. Rtawley made application for patent
for the Mary Mabel lode mining claim, survey No. 8912, in the same
land district. The posted and published notices of this application
contained the requisite descriptive matter and, without any words of
qualification, excluded the area in conflict with certain specified mining
claims. Tey also contained a clause "excepting and excludin~g the
conflicts with" certain other claims, "without waiver of rights." In-
cluded in the last exception is the Hartford claim and the Little Mon-
tana claim. No adverse was filed against the Mary Mabel during the
period of publication.
December 6, 1894, a judgment in the Mary Mabel's adverse suit was
rendered by the court in favor of the Mary Mabel and against the Hart-
ford, the latter having made default. The Hartford then filed a motion
to set aside the default judgnent, but January 23, 1S95, this motion
was denied and the former judgment confirmed. A certified copy of
-the judgment roll was filed in the local office February 11, 1895. Sub-
sequently it was discovered that there was a mistake in this judgment
in the description of the Mary Mabel, but this error was corrected by
a nunC pro tunc order October 7, 1895.
The Thanksgiving lode, which conflicts to a considerable extent with
both the Mary Mabel and the Hartford, at the westerly end thereof,
did not adverse the Mary Mabel. It filed in the local office an adverse
claim against the Hartford, but no suit was brought in support thereof.
After the rendition of the judgment in favor of the Mary Mabel in its
adverse suit against the Hartford, and on August 21, 1895, the appli-
cant for the Hartford patent, executed a paper in the nature of a relin-
quishulent to the Thanksgiving, by which he "releases and excludes
fronl his said application for the Hartford lode, all that portion of the
Hartford lode so in conflict with the Thanksgiving lode, Sur. No. 8827,
as appears from the official plat and field notes of the said claims."
Such a relinquishment and exclusion in favor of one wilo failed to
adverse is of no effect against one who did adverse and successfully
prosecuted his adverse claim to a favorable judgment.
March 27, 1895, the Mary Mabel owners made application to purchase,
excluding all the area in conflict mentioned in the notices of its appli-
cation for patent, except the Hartford conflict and a small portion of
the Little Montana conflict relinquished to the United States for the
use of the Mary Mabel. This application was allowed by the local
officers, and mineral entry No. 595 was-made April 2, 1895.
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June 18th, following, your office called the attention of the local office
to the fact that the Mary Mabe] conflicted with the Mt. Rosa placer,
which had been atented April 24, 1893, and stated that the placer
intersected "about seventy five feet of the assulmed lode line of the
Mary Mabel claim, thus dividing said lode into two non-contigulous
parts." It was then held by your office, under the authority of Silver
Queen lode (16 L. D., 186), " that a lode claim intersected by a prior
placer location can not be allowed to include ground not contiguous to
that containing the discovery;" and that therefore the right of the
Mary Mabel does not extend beyond the point where the lode line inter-
sects the west line of the Mt. Rosa placer. This ruling resulted in a
hearing i te local office to determine whether the Mary Mabel vein
or lode is intersected by the patented placer, in which proceedings the
owners of the Hartford and Thanksgiving claims appeared as protest-
ants. At the conclusion of the hearing the local officers divided in
opinion, the register holding that the Mary Mabel vein or lode departs
from its assumed course and passes to the north to such a extent that
it is not intersected by the placer, and the receiver holding that the
vein or lode is so intersected.
Both parties appealed, and your office April 7, 1897, affirmed the
decision of the receiver and held the Mary Mabel entry for cancella-
tion as to all that part thereof lying easterly from the point of inter-
section of the Mary Mabel lode with the westerly side line of the Mt.
Rosa placer. Thereupon the mineral claimants prosecuted this appeal.
The principal questions presented by the record are:
(1) Did the judgment in favor of the Mary Mabel upon its adverse
against the Hartford entitle it to the entry of the areas in conflict with
the Sierra Nevada and Starlight, while their adverse suit against the
Hartford was pending in court nndecided?
(2) Uuder the mining laws, do notices which except and exclude
stated areas "without waiver of rights" require the filing and prosecu-
tion of adverse claims to the areas thus excluded and can entry thereof
be made upon such notices where no adverse claim is filed?
(3) WVhat is the effect of two separate and conflicting judgments for
the possession of common ground?
(4) Is the Mary Mabel vein so segregated by the Mt. Rosa placer as
to avoid the location and entry of that portion thereof lying easterly
from the point of intersection?
Section 2326, Rev. Stat., provides that when an adverse claim is duly
filed-
all proceedings, except the publication of notice and mlaking and filing of the
affidavit thereof; shall be stayed until the controversy shall have been settled or
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, or the adverse claim waived.
At the time of the Mary Mabel's entry the adverse suit of the Sierra
Nevada and Starlight, involving parts of the ground entered, was
pending in court and this was shown by the records of the local office.
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To the extent of the areas in conflict i this suit, section 2326 stayed
all further proceedings in the land department, until the controversy
should be decided by the court or the adverse claim waived. October
27, 1897, there was filed i the Department a certified copy of a judg-
ment rendered in that suit- October 21, 1897, upon stipulation of the
parties. By tis judgment the owniers of the Sierra Nevada are found
to be entitled to the possession of a parcel of ground in conflict with
the Hartford, and the owners of the Hartford are found to be entitled
to the possession of a parcel in conflict with the Starlight. These
parcels are located in the eastern portion of the Mary Mabel.
The adverse suit of the Sierra Nevada against the Hartford having
resulted in a judgment in favor of the former, a somewhat anomalous
condition is presented. lere are two. separate judgments rendered by
the same court finding that, as against the Hartfor(l, the Mary Mabel
and the Sierra Nevada are each entitled to the possession of the ground
which is common to the three claims. There is no reference in either
judgment to the adverse claimo recognized i the other, ad the appar-
ent controversy between the two successful adverse claimants is left
wholly undecided.
Where adverses involvinog a common conflict are filed and prosecuted,
that fact is necessarily shown by the records of the local office and the
parties in interest are charged with notice thereof. It then devolves
upon each adverse claimant to see to it that such proceedings are had
as will determine his right, not alone against the applicant for patent,
who is the common defendant, but also against the other adverse claim-
ants. Until this is done, the stay of proceedings commanded by sec-
tion 2326 is not relieved and the "controversv" is not "settled or
decided by a court of competent jurisdictioni." The word "controversy >
used in this section includes broadly the right of possession to the area
in conflict against all who are contending therefor in the manner pre-
scribed by the statute.
The controversy growing out of the Starlight adverse had not been
decided at the time of the Mary Mabel entry, and the inclusion in that
entry of the area covered by this conflict, was in violation of the
statute directing a stay of proceedings, but since the controversy was
afterwvard decided by the court in favor of the Hartford against which
the Mary Mabel had previously obtained judgment for the possession
of that and other ground, the error in allowing entry thereof during
the period of suspension is not l)rejudicial. The controversy arising
from the Sierra Nevada adverse had not been decided at the time of
the Mary-Mabel entry, and, nuder the view of section 2326 herein taken,
that controversy is still undecided between the lary Mabel and the
Sierra Nevada., and the stay of proceedings continues as to this con-
flict, so that the error in the entry thereof has not been either cured or
rendered harmless.
The owners of the Sierra Nevada are not now before the Department,
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and for obvious reasons no opinion is expressed respecting any right
which they may assert under their judgment.
While the conflicts with the Hartford and the Little Montana were
not excepted or excluded from the MaryMabel's application for patent,
they were in its posted and published notices stated to be excepted and
excluded without waiver of rights."
One purpose in requiring notice to be given of applications for patent
is that owners of conflicting claims may be apprised of such applica-
tion and may have an opportunity to assert and protect their interests.
There is o right under such a notice which an applicant can reserve
by use of the qualifying words " without waiver of rights." He must
decide what ground he believes himself entitled to, or desires to apply
for, and must give notice accordingly.
Section 2325 Rev. Stat., provides that the applicant must file a " plat
and field notes of the claim," made under the direction of the United
States surveyor-general, showing accurately the boundaries of the
claim; that he must post such plat on the land and in the local office,
together with notices of the application; and that he must publish such
notice in a newspaper. Exceptions and exclusions of ground may be
made either in an application for patent, or in the notices thereof, but
when an exclusion is made "without waiver of rights" it is either abso-
lute, so far as that application or that notice is concerned, or it is mis-
leading and introduces into the proceeding an uncertainty inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute. It follows that the Mary Mabel did
not give notice of its application for patent to the areas in conflict with
the Hartford and Little Montana and that parties asserting a claim to
these areas were not required to adverse the Mary Mabel's application.
Canuck ode, 22 L. 1)., 711. The fact, therefore, that no adverse claim
was filed against the Mary Mabel application did not authorize the
inclusion of these areas in the Mary Mabel entry.
It is contended, however, by the Mary Mabel applicants that even if
the notices given of their application for patent did not include the
Hartford conflict, the judgment in the adverse suit of the Mary Mabel
against the flartford, according to the provisions of section 2326, fully
authorized the entry of that area without further notice than that given
by the Hartford. This wonld be true if it were not for the important
fact before stated that in response to the Hartford notice the Sierra
Nevada filed its adverse elain and proceeded with its prosecution in the
manner provided by law, and that this worked a suspension of further
proceedings, as to the ground claimed by the Sierra Nevada, until the
controversy should be adjudicated by the court or the adverse claim
waived.
The notices given of the application for the Hartford patent expressly
excluded the conflict with the Little Montana. An adverse claim could
not affect the area excluded by those notices, and hence the Little
Montana conflict, whlich was excluded from the Hartford notices, was
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equally excluded fron the Mary Mabel's adverse and from any judg-
ment rendered upon that adverse. As before stated, the conflict with
the Little Montana was also excluded by the notices given of the appli-
cation for the Mary Mabel patent; so that neither the Mary Mabel's
judgment against the Hartford nor the proceedings upon the Mary
Mabel's application, authorized the inclusion in the Mary Mabel entry
of any portioni of the Little Montana. This entry of a parcel of ground
without the giving of any notice whatever by any one, of an applica-
tion for patent to the saile, was manifestly erroneous. It is true, that
only a portion of the Little Montana conflict was covered by the Mary
Mabel entry and that this was relinquished by the claimed owners of
the Little Montana to the United States for the use of the Mary Mabel.
but, however this relinquishment may, as against the Mary Mabel,
operate to estop the Little Montana from thereafter asserting claim to
the ground relinquished, it is wholly without effect against other
adverse claims thereto. In the absence of any notice requiring the
filing and prosecution of sch adverse claims, it can not be-successfully
claimed, or authoritatively determined, that there are none such.
As wil be seen by the accompanying plat, the ground in conflict
between the Mary Mabel and the Hartford included much the larger
part of both claims. The Mt. Rosa placer, which was patented April
24, 1893, nearly a year before the Mary Mlabel was located, cut into and
segregated the assumed lode line of the latter.
Much evidence was taken at the hearing ordered by your office, to
determine whether the Mary Mabel vein or lode is intersected by the
-patented placer. The local officers reached different conclusions upon
this question; the register holding that the Mary Mabel vein or lode
departs from its assumed course an/l passes to the north of the placer,
and the receiver holding that the vein or lode does not depart from its
assumed course, and that it is intersected by the placer. Your office
adopted the conclusion of the receiver, and it is now insisted by the
protestants that the concurring findings of the receiver and your office
a-re supported by a preponderance of the evidence. It will be assumed
that these concurring indings are right, and that the course of the
vein or lode at its actual apex is intersected by the patented placer as
shown upon the plat.
If this intersection of the Mary Mabel vein or lode affected the Hart-
ford's right of possession to any part of the ground in conflict that
claim should have been asserted in the proceeding and in the tribunal
where alone the right to possession can be determined in cases of con-
flicting mining locations.
The placer does not extend across the Mary Mabel location so as to
divide it into two disconnected parts, but it does extend across and sever
the actual apex of the lode. The Mary Mabel discovery is to the west
of the placer, and the protestants urge that the Mary Mabel vein is
divided into two non-colitiguous parts, that the location can not law-
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fully include any part of the vein not contiguous to the discovery, and
that the right of the Mary Mabel can not extend easterly beyond the
point where its lode line is intersected by the westerly line of the placer.
Section 2320, Rev. Stat., in prescribing the extent of a lode location,
says:
A mining claim . . may equal but shall not exceed one thousand five hu n-
dred feet in length along the vein or lode; int no location of a mining claimrl shall
be made until the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located.
No claim shall extend more than three hundred feet on each side of the middle of the
vein at the surface, nor shall any claim be limited by any mining regulation to less
than twenty-five feet on each side of the middle of the vein at the surface.
The end-lines of each claim shall be parallel to each other.
Section 2322 Rev. Stat., defines the rights under a lode location as
follows:
The locators of all mining locations . . . shall have the exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their loca-
tions, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or
apex of which lies inside of such srface lines extended downward vertically,
although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in
their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side-lines of such surface
locations.
The undisputed evidence shows that the Mary Mabel vein dips to
the north, that only the apex and a small portion ot the vein upon its
dip is located within the placer and that in dipping to the north the
vein passes into that portion of the Mary Mabel location lying between
the northerly side line thereof and the placer. Along its course from
west to east the vein has an actual existence within the Mary Mabel
from one end line to the other, so that the location of that claim does
not involve or present a violation of the statutory requirement that a
lode mining claim shall be located "along the vein." The vein, after
dipping out of the Mt. Rosa placer, is either lawfully included in the
Mary Mabel claim, or a valid location thereof can not be made. This
latter part of this alternative proposition can not be recognized because
it has no support in any statute and is inconsistent with the express
provision of section 2319, Rev. Stat., which declares:
All valuale mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both sur-
veyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase.
There is no claim that the existence of this lode was known at the
time of the Mt. Rosa placer entry or patent, and therefore the portion
thereof within the placer passed to the placer claimants under the pro-
vision of section 2333, which reads:
but where the existence of a vein or lode in a placer claim is not known, a patent
for the placer claim shall convey all valuable mineral and other deposits within the
boundaries thereof.
It has been indisputably settled, and is admitted by protestants, that
a placer claimant can not follow a vein or lode beyond the surface
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bondaries of his claim extended vertically downward. The portion of
this vein lying outside of the placer is in lands belonging to the
United States," and under section 2319 is "free and open to explora-
tion and purchase." While the actual apex of the vein is within the
placer, the United States has dealt with and disposed of the placer
claim as non-lode ground, and for all purposes of disposition by the
United States under future exploration and discovery any vein or lode
in adjacent ground stops at the point of its intersection with the
boundary of the placer. Within the placer it is not subject to explora-
tion or purchase, except according to the will of the private owner.
For the purposes of discovery and purchase under the mining laws,
the legal apex of a vein like the Mary Mabel, dipping out of ground
disposed of under the placer or non-mineral laws, is that portion of the
vein within the public lands which would constitute its actual apex if
the vein had no actual existence in the ground so disposed of. Under
this view the apex of the vein extends throughout the entire length of
the Mary Mabel claim, if that be necessary to the valid entry thereof.
Protestant's contention that the Mary Mabel vein or lode is segregated
and divided into two non-contiguous parts by the Mt. Rosa placer and
that the location and entry of the easterly part is thereby rendered
invalid can not be sustained.
The Mt. Rosa being patented ground constituted no part of the Mary
Mabel location and was excluded from the entry thereof, so that the
westerly and northerly lines of the placer, where they come in contact
with the Mary Mabel, became a part of the southerly side line thereof.
Under this adjustment the two side lines are not parallel, but it is not
necessary that they should be. The provision upon that subject is by
its own terms confined to end lines. No portion of either side line as
thus constituted is more than 150 feet from the middle of the vein, and
protestant's assertion of an infraction of the Colorado statute limiting
the width of lode claims to 150 feet on each side is not supported by
the record.
Your office decision herein is reversed and-
(1) The Mary Mabel entry is hereby sustained except as to the areas
in conflict with the Sierra Nevada and the Little Montana.
(2) The entry of the area in conflict with the Sierra Nevada is hereby
canceled, subject to the right of the Mary Mabel to enter that area,
without giving further notice, should the controversy be adjudicated
by a court of competent jurisdiction in favor of the Mary Mabel or the
adverse claim of the Sierra Nevada be waived, but unless proceedings
to accomplish such adjudication are prosecuted with reasonable dili-
gence the right to make entry of this area will be lost.
(3) The entry of a portion of the area in conflict with the Little Mon-
tana is hereby canceled subject to the right of the Mary Mabel, within
a reasonable time, to complete its application for patent to this area by
giving notices thereof and otherwise complying with the law, and
mining regulations, and,
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(4) If, by reason of the cancellation hereby made there remains il
the Mary Mabel entry any non-contiguous area in the easterly portion
thereoft yodr office, will make such cancellation or dispositiin of such
nn-COitigUOUS ground as may be proper. This direction is m ade nec-
essary because there is in the record no plat showing the Sierra Nevada
conflict.
CONTEST-INDIAN LANDS-AiLOTMENT.
WILLIAM KALMBACHI.
In proceedings by the government to determine whether a application by an Indian
to select certain tracts as an allotment shall be allowed, a stranger to the record,
alleging prior settlement rights, will not be heard to set up his claim, bnat mlust
await the disposition of the pending action.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (II. G.)
April 4, 1895, William Kaimbach applied to make homestead entry
for the E. of SN. , the SW. 1 of SE.i, and the NW. of SW. of
See. 11, T. 66 N., R. 21 W., in the land office at Duluth, Minnesota.
His application was rejected by the local offle, for the reason that
the land applied for was covered by the following applications for
Indian allotments, filed September 15, 1894, by Louisa Christian, as an
Indian woman of the Lac Court Oreille band of the Chippewa tribe of
Indians, and the head of a family, viz: No. 249, for the N. A of SW. i
of Sec. 11, T. 66 N., R. 21 W., for herself; No. 248, for her minor child,
Martha Christian, for the S. - of SE. i of said Sec. 11; and No. 251, for
her- minor child, Flora Christian, for the S. of the SW. of said
section 11.
In his homestead affidavit accompanying his application, Kalmbach
alleges settlement on the tract embraced in his application May 23,
1892, and that he has lived thereon continuously since that time, and
has niade valuable improvements thereon, consisting of a comfortable
house, a clearing of one and one-eighth acres in a state of cultivation,
all of which are worth $140.00. Upon appeal from the rejection of his
application, Kaimbach contended that he showed prior settlement and
was entitled to enter the land under section 3 of the act of May 14,
1880 (21 Stat., 140), that the applications for Indian allotments did not
segregate the land, and that the local office should have ordered a
hearing to determine the rights of the parties.
November 30, 1895, your office held that the land applied for by him
was, at the time of his application, covered by the said Indian allot-
ment applications, and was, under the terms of section 4 of the act of
February 8, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), segregated from entry, and that, if
the said allotment applications ought to be canceled, such action could
be attained by a proper procedure on the part of Kalmbach or any
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interested party. Your office accordingly sustained tie action of the
local office in rejecting Kalmbach's application.
January 23, 1897, under the instructions of your office, the special
ailoting agent of the Duluth, Minnesota, land district, made his report
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs upon the sid applicatioii, No.
254, of Louisa Christian for her minor child Flora, in vhich he found
that the applicant was a quarter blood Chippewa ndian of the Lac
Court Oreille band, and was living at the time of her applicatio in
Flambeau, Wisconsin, where she has ever since resided, and. has never
lived in the State of Minnesota; that she has no personal knowledge of
the land, which was located for her by her husband, a white man and
a citizen of the United States; and that it was, at the time of filing the
application and at the time of the examination, chiefly valuable for the
pine timber growing thereon. From these findings, and in view of the
further fact that the said IDdian applicant had never made settlement
or improvement of the tract, it was recommended that the application
be disallowed and canceled. A like rep urt was made upon the individual
application of the same party, No. 249, and also upon her application,
No. 248, for her minor child Martha.
February 1.1, 1897, Kalmbach filed his verified and corroborated
application to contest the said Indiaii allotment applications, alleging
as grounds therefor, that the land covered by the applications is
wholly unfit for agricultural purposes, can not be cleared and put in
cultivation for less than twenty dollars per acre, and, when cleared,
will not, on account of its poor soil, afford a support as a farm for
either-of the allottees, should their applications be approved; that the
land is at least fifty miles from any railroad, and that the nearest
market to the land is about thirty miles; that the land contains about
one million feet. of good, merchantable timber standing thereon of the
value of fifteen hundred dollars; and that the land was selected as an
Indian allotment solely on account of the timber thereon and not for a
home for said Indian applicant and her minor children. The corrobo-
rative affidavit, verified by two witnesses, confirms these statements
generally, and contains a specific additional allegation that the land is
wholly unfit for farming purposes, and, if the timber were removed,
would not afford a support for the allottees, either for farming or for
stock raising, and that the land is very valuable for the timber growing
thereon.
April 30, 1897, your office dismissed this application to contest, as it
was filed subsequently to the order of this Department suspending all
allotments made in Minnesota, pending investigation thereof by special
agents. It appears by this decision that other parties, who had made
applications to contest these Indian allotment applications, and one
other, that of Henry Christian, a minor child of the said Louisa,
nearly two years before the application of Kalmbach was filed and
prior to the said departmental order, were allowed a hearing, but it
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further appears that by your office letter of October 27, 1897,addressed
to this Department, these parties contesting the applications prior to
the departmental order suspending them took no action" on your
order for a hearing, probably because of failure to serve notice on the
Indian applicants; the case was closed as to them, and the allotment
applications, which Kalmbach desires to contest, were transmitted in
said letter.
It also appears by the said letter of your office that the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, by his letter to your office bearing date March
26, 1897, returned the applications for allotments on behalf of the minor
children of said Louisa, numbered 248, 254 and 255, and recommended
that the same be severally held for cancellation, but no action of the
Office of Indian Affairs is reported on the personal application No. 249
of Louisa Christian, the mother of said children.
IKalmbach took no appeal from your office decision of November 30,
1895, rejecting his homestead application, and the sole question to be
determined is the action of your office in dismissing his application to
contest the allotment applications of Louisa Christian and her minor
children, Martha and Flora, which he raises by his appeal.
Considering his application to make homestead entry for the tract
upon which he alleges settlement with the application to contest the
applications for allotments, his good faith may well be questioned.
His affidavit in support of his homestead application alleges improve-
ments on the tract claimed by him and continuous residence for nearly
three years, yet in his application to contest he alleges under oath that
the land is chiefly valuable for timber, is unfit for a home, owing to the
fact that the soil is barren and would be of no value if cleared of its
timber, and when denuded of timber would be unfit for farming or
stock raising purposes; it is remote from a railroad and is distant from
a market, and is evidently-under his own showing-no more fit for a
home for Kalmbach than for the Idian allottees. Buckley v. Murphy,
24 L. D., 352.
In the proceedings by the government against an entry, a stranger
to the record alleging intervening settlement rights will not be heard
to set up his claim, but must await the disposition of the pending
action. (United States v. Alexander 11 L. D., 507.) This application
to contest is not against an existing entry, it is true, but is against an
application to secure to an Indian woman and her minor children,
severally, allotments of public lands lying outside of the limits of an
Indian reservation; but undoubtedly the same rule should be applied
as in contests against an entry under examination by the Department,
for the same reasons exist in the latter as in the former case, as the
rights of a third party; can not be determined in such a proceeding
against the applicants.
The same matters are involved in the reports of the special allotting
agent as are offered as a round of contest, and if the applications for
12209-VOL 264Q4 -
210 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
allotments are rejected, the tracts are open to entry. If the applica-
tions are approved, upon their approval and before issuance of the first
or trust patent thereupon, a contest can be initiated (24 L. D., 264,)
upon a proper showing, but not before that time.
The decision of your office, dismissing the application of Kalmbach
to contest the application of Louisa Christian and her minor children,
is affirmed.
CONTEST-tOSTS-RESIDENCE.
DAMAIMON V. SINCLAIR.
In a contest brought on a general charge of non-compliance with law, accompanied
by an offer topay the expenses of the hearing, the contestant should be required
to pay all of the costs of the hearing; and on his failure s to do, the case may
thereafter be treated as between the entryman and the government.
The continuity of residence is not interrupted by absences from the land, where good
faith and the intention to make a permanent home on the land are apparent.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (C. W. P.)
This case involves lots 1, 2 and 3 of Sec. 20, T. 39 N., R. 9 W., Eau
Claire land district, Wisconsin.
On December 20, 1890, Jeremiah D. Dammon made homestead entry
of the above described tract, together with lot 4 of the same section,
and on December 22, 1890, Francis L. Box and Jessie M. Sinclair pre-
sented applications for lots 1, 2 and 3, which were rejected for conflict
with Dammon's entry. On February 19, 1894, the Department held in
the case of said Box against Damwon et al., 18 IL. D., 133, that the said
Jessie IV1. Sinclair was entitled to make entry of said land, and on.June
4, 1894, Miss Sinclair's application to enter said land was placed on
record at the local office.
On March 26, 1895, said Dammon iled an affidavit of contest, charg-
ing abandonineht, failure to maintain residence and failure to improve
and cultivate-the land entered. A hearing was thereupon had before
the county judge of Sawyer county, Wisconsin, on February 10, 1896.
But before the hearing on Dammon's contest, Miss Sinclair, on Jan-
uary 27, 1896, made her final proof. Dammon appeared as protestant
and cross-examined Miss Sinclair and her witnesses, paying the costs
for taking the testimony on cross-examination.
At the hearing on the contest, the parties entered into a stipulation,
to the effect that Dammon should be allowed to introduce, as part of
his cross-examination of Miss Sinclair, the testimony given by her on
her final proof, and that said testimony should be considered as part
of her cross-examination in the contest case, and that the testimony
taken in the contest case should be considered as part of the testi-
mony taken on the final proof of Miss Sinclair, and that the evidence
offered in the contest case should be considered not only as evidence on
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the contest for abandonment, but, also, as evidence on the final proof
of Miss Sinclair, " so that no further hearing may be ordered, or had:
on said application to make final proof."
Testimony was thereupon submitted. During the taking of the tes-
timony Dammon objected to paying the costs of taking the testimony
of the contestee, under rule 54 of practice, alleging that he claimed the
preference right to enter the land in controversy by virtue of his settle-
ment right, without reference to the act of May 14, 1880, and under rule
57 of practice, and also claimed the preference right to enter said land
by virtue of his having paid for the taking of the cross-examination
of Miss Sinclair and her witnesses on the taking of her final proof,
And it was agreed between the parties that the question of the pay-
ment of these costs should be submitted to the local officers for their
decision. The local officers decided that " the parties should pay the
costs of the direct examination of their several witnesses and the costs
of cross-examination of their witnesses, respectively."
Upon the merits the local officers decided in favor of Miss Sinclair,
recommended the dismissal of Dammon's contest, and that Miss,
Sinclair's final proof be accepted.
On appeal, it was held by your office that Dammon had forfeited his
preference right under the statute and his own direct promise to pay
the expenses of the hearing; that the sole question presented by Dam-
mon's appeal was whether the testimony is sufficient to warrant the
cancellation of Miss Sinclair's entry in the interest of the governments
and from a consideration of the evidence your office held that the
entrywoman. has acted in good faith; that her final proof is suficient7
and that she is entitled to a patent, and you dismissed Dammon's
contest. Dammon has appealed to the Departnent.
That the decision of the local officers on the question of costs is
erroneous there can be no doubt.
Dammon, in his affidavit of contest, asserted no right to the land
but simply charged the entrywoman with non-compliance with the
homestead law, and offered to pay "the expenses of such hearing." In
such case it is held, in Thompson v. Smith, 22 L. D., 248, that the costs
should be assessed under rule 54 of practice, and that on the refusal
of the contestant to pay the same the contest may properly be dis-
missed. See also Roberts v. Stanford, 22 L. D., 419; and Heggen v.
Floyd, Id., 462, where it is held that under a contest instituted under
the act of May 14, 1880, and prosecuted until the charges in the affi-
davit of contest have been apparently sustained, should not be dis-
missed, though the contestant refuse to make further advances for
costs, or do any other act indicating his retirement from the case, but
treated thereafter as between the government and the entryman.
IDammon should have been required to pay all the costs of the hear-
ing, and if he had refused or failed to do so, the case would then have
been left to the government to continue the prosecution of the case.
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The testimony in the case is voluminous and conflicting. But it is
not disputed that Miss Sinclair settled on the land on December 20,
1890, and commenced permanent improvements; that she began to
reside on the land on May 22,1891, and lived thereon continuously until
August 29, following; that during the autumn and winter of 1891-1892,
she visited the laud on several occasions and did some clearing; that
from April 1 1892, to August 26, following, she was continuously resid-
ing on her claim; that during September, October and December fol-
lowing, she was on the land several times and did some work thereon;
that during March, April, and May and the summer months of the
year 1893, she made visits to the land, bt did not live upon her claim
continuously, until April 17, or 18, 1894, when she returned to the land
and lived there continuously during the spring and summer of 1894
leaving on September 17. She did not return to the land to live until
about March 28, 1895, but visited it on December 9 previous.
She erected three houses on the land, one built on December 20,
1890; another built in May, 1891, and a third in May, 1894. She also
built a log barn and dug a well, twelve feet deep. She has cleared
and broken, according to her witnesses, about two acres and a half,
and cultivated about two acres: according to the contestant and his
witnesses, she has plowed and broken about two acres and cultivated
about half an acre. She has constructed about three hundred and
twenty rods of wire fencing. 1er improvements are worth from $200
to $300. She is a teacher, and also a dress-maker and seamstress.
She is unable to make a living on the land, but she swears that it has
been her home ever since she established her residence thereon in May,
1891. She has spent most of the spring and summer months on the
land, with the exception of the summer and spring of 1893. The land
is situated in the northern part of Wisconsin, and the evidence shows
that the winters are long and cold, and that there is no farming work
to be done during that season of the year, and Miss Sinclair testified
that her absences from the land were for the purpose of making a sup-
port, to obtain means to improve the land and to meet the expenses of
her first contest, which was not decided until January 19, 1894.
It is true that during the autumn of 1893 and the winter of 1893-1894,
Miss Sinclair attended as a pupil the normal school at River Falls, but
it was for the purpose of better fitting her to make a living as a
teacher, and she swears that she had had no other place of residence
and that she settled on the land for a permanent home.
Under all the circumstances, it can not be denied that Miss Sinclair,
in spite of her long absences from the land, which (with the exception
of the summer of 1893) were at a season when no profitable work could
be done on her claim, has shown good faith and an intention to make
her permanent home on the land.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 213
In Sandell v. Davenport, 2 L. D., 157, it is said that:
The question of bona fide residence is equally one of intention as of fact. There
is no question touching his commencing his residence within the prescribed period,
and I take it that if the temporary absences in question are-as I think they.have
been-satisfactorily accounted for, then his residence has been constructively if not
actually sufficient. The Department has repeatedly held-audit invariably holds-
that where a claimant leaves his claim for the purpose of earning an honest liveli-
hood, coupled with the bona fide intent to maintain his residence upon and cultivate
and improve his claim, such absence is accounted a constructive residence upon the
same, and compliance with legal requirements.
And in Charles C. Boulton's case (6 L. D., 338) it is held that actual
residence being established, and permanent and valuable improvements
made, temporary absences at a season of the year when but little, if
any, work could be done on the land, are not inconsistent with good
faith in the matter of residence.
In Peter Weber's case (on review), 9 L. D., 150, it is said:
The absences in this case were for the purpose of gaining means to live and
improve his claim, and being for that purpose, were excusable; and no evidence of
an intent to abandon.
In Bomgardner v. Kittleman, 17 L. D., 207, it is said:
It is true that she (Miss B.) spent more time in working for others than she did at
home. But it nowhere appears that she had any other home, and the evidence
shows that she was dependent upon her own labor for support, and that it was,
necessary to work away from home for her own subsistence and to gain means to
improve her place. This she did, and the improvements she made on the place were
in themselves ample, under all the circumstances, to show her good faith.
In Fyffe v. Mooers, 21 I. D., 167, it is said:
Residence having been once established, the law does not prescribe how much an
entryman shall stay at home. After that date the question becomes one of intent
rather than of actual and uninterrupted residence, though the intent must be
accompanied and evidenced by such improvement and cultivation of the soil as will
in each particular case, give effect to the law. A citizen does not lose his residence
or domicile by leaving home so long as there is present in his mind an intention to
return, neither can it consistently and on principle be held that one who has entered
upon the public lands and established a residence thereon with the view of acquiring
a home from the government, abandons his purpose when he is called away by the
nature of his employment, by the necessities of his condition, or by other contin-
gency, and there is ever present in his thoughts the aeinius rerertendi.
And this is repeated in Tekseth v. Noben, 25 L. )., 147.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
PRACTICE-ORDER OF CNCELLATION\-REINSTATEMENT-TOWNSITE 
OAKES V. WEST RENO CITY.
Where an entry has bean canceled on account of an adverse claim, when it should
have been held intact subject to the perfection of said adverse claim, it may be-
treated, on application for reinstatement, as though the latter action had been
taken.
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A townsite entry cannot be allowed if the proof offered fails to show that the land
is occupied for the purposes of trade and business or settled upon and occupied
as a townsite.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (G. B. G.)
This case is before the Department on the appeal of Persie Oakes
from the decision of your office of June 15, 1897, dismissing her protest
against the allowance of townsite proof and rejecting her application
for reinstatement of homestead entry, No. 3489, as to the W. A of the
NE. 1 of Sec. 29, T. 13 N., R. 7 W., Oklahoma.
The case is "current work," under departmental order of June 11,
1896 (22 L. D., 675), ad will be disposed of as such.
With the record is a motion to dismiss the appeal, on the ground,
substantially, that all the issues now raised by the protestant have been
heretofore finally adjudicated against her, that she is a protestant
without interest, and therefore not entitled to the right of appeal.
The history of this case may be stated briefly.
The land is in the Cheyenne and Arapahoe country, which was opened
to settlement and entry at noon on April 19,1892. On that date Snow-
den, now-Oakes, made homestead entry for the whole of the NE. - of
said section, township and range. On April 20, 1892, one Rosa Goena,
wein filed a contest against said entry, alleging settlement prior to
snowden, or any other person.
On May 14, 1892, John Fox, probate judge of Canadian county,
Oklahoma Territory, applied to enter said quarter section, together
with lot 5 of Sec. 28, for townsite purposes, which application was
rejected for conflict with Stiowden's entry.
A hearing was ordered between Snowden and the townsite claimants,
and no hearing having been had between Snowden and Goenawein, the
latter was allowed to intervene.
The Department, o July 9, 1896 (23 Ls. D., 74), affirmed the decision
of your office, rejecting the claim of Goenawein, sustaining the claim
of the town site occupants as to the W. of the NE. 1 of said section
29, and holding Snowden's entry to that extent for cancellation. Snow-
den filed a motion for review of said departmental decision, which was
denied on October 3, 1896, and, accordingly, on October 30, 1896,
Snowden's entry was canceled as to the said W. 4 of the NE. 1, and the
ease closed.
On February 18, 1897, W. It. Brown, probate judge (successor to the
said John Fox), submitted townsite proof, covering the said W. . of
the NE. -4, under sections 2387, 2388, and 2389 of the Revised Statutes,
at the request and on behalf of the occupants of West Reno City.
Pending publication, pursuant to which said proof was made, said
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Persie Oakes, on February 8, 1897, filed in the local office a protest
against the proof so advertised to be made, wherein she alleged:
-That she is the identical person, who as Persie Snowden, made homestead entry
No. 3489, on April 19, 1892, for the NE. of section 29, township 13 north of range 7
west. That said eighty acres attempted to be proved up as a towusite in this pro-
ceeding, to wit, the west A of the said NE. is used only to a very small extent for
purposes of trade and business, from sixty-five to seventy acres of the same being in
the sole use, occupancy and possession of the affiant for agricultural purposes, about
fifty-five acres of the said eighty acres being in actual cultivation by this affiant by
virtue of her homestead entry thereon; that of the remaining portion of said eighty
acres, only from eight to fifteen acres in all is in the possession of the alleged town-
site settlers, by far the greater portion of this eight to fifteen acres, being used for
pasturage and agricultural purposes and only a small portion actually rsed either
for business or residence purposes.. That the entire population of said alleged
townsite consists of three heads of families, with their families, and one single man,
in all twelve persons. That your affiant therefore predicated upon the above facts,
says that said townsite is practically abandoned as such for purposes of trade and
business and is not used to such an extent for purposes of trade and business, and
the value of the improvements is not sufficient to show good faith as to render it
subject to entry as a townsite; and that said condition has existed for more than six
months last past and next prior to the date of this protest. Wherefore, your affiant
asks for the privilege as sch protpstant of appearing at the date of said final
proof, to wit, February 18, 1897, and of cross-examining the witnesses on the said
final proof and of introducing evidence if she desires in rebuttal of the testimony of
said witnesses and in support of this protest.
In the protestant's application for reinstatement of her entry, filed
in the local office on February 8, 1897, it is further urged:
That said pretended townsite settlers can not make proof on said eighty acres and
obtain title thereto, for the reason that said eighty acres is not actually used and
occupied for purposes of trade and business, and that the entry of this applicant
having been held for cancellation, not on account of any invalidity, but simply for
conflict with said pretended prior right of said townsite settlers, her homestead
entry should not have been canceled, but should have been held intact subject to
the consummation of said title in said townsite settlers by propef proof of the occu-
pancy of said land for townsite purposes, and that the cancellation of the said west
eighty of affiant's homestead entry was therefore premature and erroneous, and in
the face of the abandonment of said land by said townsite settlers, should be rein-
stated.
It is not thought that appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal of pro-
testant should prevail. It is true that the issue joined between Persie
Oakes and the townsite claimants has been heretofore ruled by the
Department in favor of the townsite claimants, and the entry of Oakes
canceled to the extent of the conflict. Her entry, however, should not
have been canceled, but held intact on the record, subject to the final
proof of the townsite claimants. This would have been the better prac-
tice, and the matter will now be treated as though that had been the
action taken in the premises. Treating the case, then, as though the
entry of Mrs. Oakes was still of record, she is a protestant with an
interest and as such entitled to the right of appeal.
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On the merits of the case, it is not believed that the proof offered by
the townsite claimants warrants the patenting of the land involved for
towpsite purposes. It is not occupied for the purposes of trade and
business and is not "settled upon and occupied as a townsite2
In reaching this conclusion the informal allegations and ex-parte
affidavits in the record, to the effect that many of the alleged inhabi-
tants of the so-called town have abandoned it since final proof was
offered, have not-been considered. The infirmity in the townsite pro-
ceedings is apparent without looking to these newly filed papers.
Your office decision is reversed, the townsite proof is rejected, and
it is directed that Mrs. Oakes's entry of the land in controversy be
reinstated.
MfINING CLAIM-HOMESTEAD ENTRY.
MONTGOMERY V. GILBERT.
The fact that a placer claimant has conducted profitable mining operations upon a
part of his claim does not, i itself, give him any right as against an adverse
homestead claimant for another part of such claim, lying in a different quarter
section, and that had been prior thereto adjudged non-mineral in a depart-
mental decision.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofce, February
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
The land involved in this case, comprising about thirty acres, is all
that portion of lot No, 46, mineral survey No. 2809, which is within the
SE. of section 18, T. 12 N., R. 9 W., Helena, Montana, land district.
Lot No. 46, known as the Buckhorn placer, embraces portions of sections
7, 8, and 18, said township and range, and contains fifty-six acres. The
placer claim was located April 17, 1889, by Lee Montgomery and four
other persons, and was surveyed January 11, 1890.
On May 6, 1889, one Clarence Christofferson filed his preemption
declaratory statement for said SE. . On January 21, 1890, Montgom-
ery, having acquired the interests of his co-locators in the BuclKhorn
placer, filed application for patent therefor. On January 22, 18902
Christofferson appeared to offer final proof, and at the same time Mont-
gomery appeared and protested, on the ground that a portion of the
land which Christofferson proposed to enter as a pre-emption claim was
mineral land and was embraced in his (Montgomery's) said placer min-
ing claim. A hearing thereupon followed, ending January 31, 1890.
Upon the evidence adduced the local office held the land in controversy
to be non mineral and dismissed the protest. On successive appeals
by Montgomery the decision of the local office was affirmed by your
office, and your office decision by the Department on July 26, 1892
(unreported: L. and IR., 249, p. 184). On August 29, 1893, Christofferson
executed and filed in the local office a relinquishment to the United
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States all right, title and interest in the land covered by his pre-emption
filing, which filing was therefore canceled by your office on October 3,
1893.
On May 29, 1895, Harris P. Gilbert made homestead entry for the
quarter section formerly embraced in Christofferson's filing. On July
18,1895, Montgomery applied to purchase, under his application filed
January 21, 1890;,the land embraced in his placer claim, which appli-
cation was denied on the ground that the portion thereof in the said
southeast quarter had been decided by the Department to be non-
mineral. On July 18, 1895, Montgomery filed his duly corroborated
contest affidavit, alleging, in substance, that his mining operations on
the land in controversy since. the closesof the previous hearing in Janu-
ary, 1890, had demonstrated the same to be more valuable for mining
than for agricultural purposes. A hearing duly followed, commencing
September 3, 1895, and ending October 15, 1895. 'On March 24, 1896,
the local office decided the case in favor of the homestead claimant and
recommended that the mineral application be canceled to the extent of
its conflict with the homestead entry. On appeal by Montgomery your
office, on June 20,1896, affirmed the decision of the local office. Mont-
gomery duly appealed from your office decision, assigning error as
follows:
First: It was error to hold that the evidence shows the land to be more valuable
for agricultnral purposes than for mining.
Second: It was error not to have held that as no practical value for agriculture
was shown and the land being absolutely necessary to carry on mining operations;
that it did not have a greater value for mining.
Third: It was error not to have held that as the land was appropriated for mining
purpose, before it was entered as agricultural laud, that it was incumbent n the
agricultural claimant to show substantial and paramount value for farming purposes.
In your office decision it is said:
The ground under consideration, as I j udge from the evidence, has no very great
value for any purpose. It appears to be situated at quite an altitude where frosts
are likely to occur in every month in the year, and is therefore not first class agri-
cultural ground. It appears, however, that portions of the land have produced fair
crops of hay. In view of the former departmental decision which fixed the charac-
ter of this land as non-mineral, and in view of the pending agricultural entry, it
devolved upon the contestant to prove not simply that the land has no very great
value for agricultural purposes, but that as a present fact it has a positive value for
mineral purposes, and that in excess of its agricultural value.
The chief use which the proof shows the contestant to have made of the ground
is for dumping purposes, and but a small area'thereof has been used for this pur-
pose. Active mining operations have not been conducted upon that part of the
Buckhorn Placer in conflict with Gilbert's homestead entry, so that the evidences
of mineral consist of the results of exploration and testing made by the various
witnesses.
There appears to be no question but that the ground in conflict contains some
quantity of fine gold in placer deposit, but as to the extent of this deposit there is a
wide variance between the statements of the witnesses for the contestant and those
of the homestead entryman.
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I conclude, however, that the explorations and testings made since the former
hearing have not been very extensive nor the results thereof very important, and
that they are certainly insufficient to show affirmatively that the ground is valuable
for its minerals.
Inasmuch as, in my judgment, the evidence fails to show, by a preponderance
thereof, that the land in conflict, nor any smallest legal subdivision thereof, is valu-
able on account of the mineral deposit therein contained I conclude that the con-
testant has failed to make a case.
After a very careful examination and consideration of the evidence
and the law applicable thereto, the Department finds no warrant to
disturb the decision of your office. Although it is shown, as stated in
the decision of your office, that a small area of the land in controversy has
been used for dumping purposes, or, more accurately speaking, used to
receive the tailings which are carried down upon it from the higher land
along the stream where the ground has been mined, it is not shown
that the possession or control of such area, nor of any part of the land
in controversy, by the mineral claimant, is necessary to the successful
mining of the portion of the placer which lies outside the said quarter
section.
The fact that the land in controversy was embraced in the Buckhorn
placer location prior to the pre-emption filing, or that when the filing
was canceled Montgomery again took possession of it as placer land,
claiming it under the placer location, gives him no right thereto as
against Gilbert's homestead entry, if in fact, as would seem to be the
case, the land is not mineral in character. Montgomery has had ample
time and opportunity since the close of the prior hearing, and espe-
cially since the cancellation of Christofferson's filing, to have demon-
strated the mineral character of the land, if mineral in quantity suffi-
cient to pay for its extraction from the earth exists thereon, as he
contends. He seems to have chosen, instead, to prosecute his mining
operations on that part of his location which lies within the northeast
quarter of said section, where he was more sure of a profitable return
for his expenditure of money and labor. He can not complain, there-
fore, if the result of such election is unfavorable to him in the present
contest. That he has conducted profitable mining operations upon his
location in the northeast quarter of the section, gives him, pso facto,
as against the homestead claimant, no right to the land in controversy,
which was prima facie non-mineral land under previous departmental
decision.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 219
APPLICATION TO ENTER-ABANDONIENT.
SHOOK v. DOUGLAS.
Pending.final action on an application to enter the land embraced therein is not only
reserved from any other disposition, but until the application is allowed a
charge of abandonment will not lie; nor is the applicant in such case required
to reside on the land covered by his application pending final decision thereon.
Secretary Bliss to tte Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (C. J. G.)
The record in this case shows that on September 28, 1891, John
Douglas made homestead entry for the N. W of NE. I and the E. of
NW. i Sec. 8, T. 3 N., R. 3 E., Humboldt land district, California.
On the same date Marion F. Shook made application to enter the E.
W of SE. i Sec. 5, and the N. i of NE. I Sec. 8, same township and
range, which was rejected by the local office for conflict with Douglas'
entry as to said N. of NE. 1 Sec. 8.
Upon Shook's appeal from this action a hearing was ordered, and
upon the testimony submitted thereat, the local office rendered decision
recommending the cancellation of Douglas' entry as to that part in
conflict with Shook's application.
Douglas appealed from this decision to your office, where, under date
of March 20, 1895, the decision of the local office was affirmed, his
homestead entry as to the N. of NE. I Sec. 8, being held subject to
the prior right of Shook. Douglas thereupon prosecuted a further
appeal to this Departftient.
On October 14, 1895, and during the penidency of Douglas' appeal,
his daughter, Georgia A. Douglas was allowed to make homestead
entry for the E. i SE. 1 ec. 5, embraced in Shook's application.
June 9, 1896 (22 L. D., 646), the Department affirmed your said office
decision of March 20, 1895.
October 3, 1896 (23 L. D., 331), the Departlnent rendered decision
denying a petition for rehearing in the above case, and on November 6,
1896, your office in promiilgating the said decision, closed the case and
directed the local office
to notify G. A. Douglas to show cause why her H. E. No. 3590, covering the E. of
SE. , See. 5, T. 3 N., R. 3 E., erroneously allowed pending inal disposition of the
application of Shook to enter said tracts of land should not be canceled, and Shook
allowed to perfect his application in accordance with departmental decision of June
9, 1896.
January 13, 1897, there was transmitted to your office the answer of
Georgia A. Douglas to the order calling upon her to show cause. The
substance of said answer is that at the time she made her homestead
entry the land included therein was vacant, public land; that Shook
had abandoned said land for more than six months priqr to the date of
said entry.
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March 1, 1897, your office held Georgia A. Douglas' said homestead
entry for cancellation "for conflict with the right of Shook to perfect
his application," and she has now appealed to this Department.
It is apparent from the record in this case that Georgia A. Douglas'
homestead entry for the E. W of SE. 1 Sec. 5 was erroneously allowed,
as the tract had been appropriated by the prior application of Shook
which was protected by the proceedings pending before this Depart-
ment at the date of her entry. She must have known of Shook's set-
tlement claim as well as his application to enter. A possible explanation
for the allowance of her entry may be found in the accompanying brief
filed by Shook. It is stated therein that when Shook's application of
September 28, 1891, was presented at the local office and rejected as to
the land in conflict with John Douglas' entry, there was a failure to
make entry in the tract-book or on the plat showing the acceptance of
Shook's application for the land in Sec. 5; or if ay memorandum
of ShookQs application was made it was by pencil which became erased.
Subsequently there was a change i the officers of the Humboldt land
office, and when Georgia A. Douglas applied to make homestead entry,
the land in question appeared to be vacant, public land.
An examination of Shook's application discloses the fact that it
covers the tracts in both sections 5 and S.
Pending final action on Shook's application, which, having been
made within three months after the plat of survey was filed in the
local-offlce, was equivalent to actual entry, the land in question was
not only reserved from any other disposition, but until his application
was allowed the charge of abandonment did nt lie. Neither was he
required to reside on the land embraced i his application, pending
final decision thereon. See cases of Griffin v. Pettigrew (10 L. D., 510);
Goodale v. Olney (12 L. D., 324); and Rice v. Lenzshek (13 L. D., 154).
Your office decision of March 1, 1897, is hereby affirmed, and Shook
will be allowed to perfect his application upon due showing of compli-
ance with law.
MINITfNG CLAIM-PROTEST-STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.
THOMAS ET AL. v. ELLING (ON REVIEW).
The Department may properly direct a stay of action, under an application for min-
eral patent, during the pendency of judicial proceedings, even though said pro-
ceedings are based upon a protest that does not require an adverse suit nder
the statute, if such stay of action is in aid of a proper disposition of said pro-
test by the Department.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter "N" of January 28, 1898, was forwarded a
motion, filed on behalf of Eenry Elling, for review of departmental
decision of December 13, 1897 (25 L. D., 495), in the case of William
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H. Thomas et al, v. Henry Elling, involving the disposition of a protest
filed against the application for patent by Henry Elling upon the
Spratt lode mining claim, survey No. 4766, Helena land district, Mon-
tana, in which protest it was claimed that protestants are the owners
of an undivided half interest in said location.
The grounds of error set forth in the motion are as follows:
I. Error in holding that action must be suspended upon the application involved,
during the pendency in court, of suit in the case of Thomas et al. . Elling, after
concluding as a matter of law, that said suit is not a suit on an adverse claim under
sections 2325 and 2326 U. S. Rev. Stat.
II. Error in holding, in effect, that possessory title to the Spratt lode claim must
be determined in court, in a proceeding other than such a one as is contemplated by
said sections 2325 and 2326, U. S. R. S.
III. Error in not directing the, allowance of entry by Elling, and the issuance of
patent to him, notwithstanding the pendency of said suit, in view of the fact that,
in the event of the issuance of patent to Elling, plaintiffs in said suit would still
have the same remedy which they are now pursuing.
IV. Error in suspending action upon Eling's application for patent, because of,
and during the pendency of, said suit, while at the same time holding that it is
doubtful whether or not any decision which may be rendered in said suit would be
"conclusive upon the Department."
V. Error in not finding from the record that the complete legal title in and to said
Spratt lode claim is vested in Elling, and that patent must therefore be issued to
him subject to any equities in the plaintiffs in said suit of Thomas et at. V. Elling.
After a review of te matter, the motion is denied.
It was not held in the decision under review that, on account of the
protest and suit of William H. Thomas et al., action upon Elling's
application for patent must be suspended; nor was it held, either
directly or in effect, " that possessory title to the Spratt lode claim mUst
be determined in court, in a proceeding other than such a one as is
contemplated by said sections 2325 and 2326, U. S. R. S."
Said decision held just to the contrary.
In referring to said protest byThomas et al., the decison states:
It follows, therefore, that the protest in question is not such a one as can be recog-
nized as an adverse claim necessitating the institution of proceedings thereon, in a
court of competent jurisdiction..
It was further held in said decision that:
It is the duty of the Land Department, excepting in controversies referred to the
courts by the statute, to determine before issuance of patent whether the applicant is
entitled thereto, and the fact that such controversies may be litigated in the courts
after issuance of patent does not relieve the Department of its duty in the premises.
Relative to proceedings not specifically referred to the courts by
sections 2325 and 2326, U. S. R. S., the opinion holds:
Where the matter has already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction,
the question may arise whether such a decision is conclusive upon the Department,
but without deciding that question it seems clear that where the dispute does not
involve the character of the land, or the qualifications f the entryman, or his
compliance with the law under which title is sought, the Department may properly
accept and follow the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, determining as
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between contending parties their respective rights to, and interests in, the land in
controversy. The Department is not required to await the bringing of suit, because
it is not so provided in the statute and because there is no obligation upon either
party to invoke the jurisdiction of a court as there is in the instance of an adverse
claim. Here suit has beeninstitutedin the local coLrtforthe purpose ofsettlingthe
question of joint ownership. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter may exist even
though not recognized by sections 2325 and 2326. The land department may there-
fore well await the result of that-suit before giving further consideration to the
protest.
It is the plain duty of this Department to determine whether Elling
is entitled to patent as applied for. Protest has been filed by others
claiming an interest, who have been excluded from the application for
patent.
A suit has been instituted and is now pending involving the question
as to the interest of the protestants in the Spratt location.
The land department can not ignore the protest. The decision under
review directed that action upon the application for patent be suspended
awaiting the determination of the case in the court, not that the
Department was required by law to wait, but that an adjudication by
the court would at least aid in the proper disposition of the protest.
No sufficient reason is assigned in the motion for revoking the
direction given; and the papers are herewith returned for the files of
your office.
SISSETON AND YANKTON hANDS-?AY-MENT ON COTAVAMUTED ENTRIES.
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA.
In the commutation of homestead entries in the former Sisseton and Yankton reser-
vations the entrymen are not required to pay one dollar and tweniy-five cents
per acre in addition to the price fixed by the acts of March 3, 1891, and August
15, 1894, opening said lands to entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 17, 1898. (W. M. W.)
On November 2, 1897, the agent of the State of South Dakota
addressed a communication to you claiming that homestead entrymen
of lands embraced in the ceded portions of the Sisseton and Yankton
Indian reservations, who commute their entries, should be required to
pay one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre for land covered by such
entries, in addition to the other payments required by law.
On November 17, 1897, you replied to said letter, and advised the
agent of the State that in the matter of payments in the cases referred
to in his communication your office is governed by approved depart-
mental instructions of March 22, 1892 (14 L. D., 302), and May 17,1895
(20 L. D., 435), opening the Sisseton and Wahpeton and Yankton res-
ervations; that under the act of March 3, 1891, each entryman of lands
in the Sisseton and Wahpeton reservation must pay two dollars and
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fifty cents per acre for the land taken, in addition to the fee and com-
missions on double minimum land provided by law; that under the act
of August 15, 1894, each applicant to enter land in the Yankton reser-
vation must pay for the land entered as the time of making his original
entry fifty cents per acre, and at the time of making proof the further
sum of three dollars and twenty-five cents per acre, in addition to the
fees required by law. You called the attention of the agent for the
State to the fact that homestead entries on the ceded portions of the
great Sioux reservation are commuted under a proviso in section 6 of
the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), while homestead entries on
the ceded portions of the Sisseton and Yankton reservations are corm-
muted under the general law. You also invited his attention to the
fact that under section 22 of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 898),
all payments made under said act for lands embraced in the ceded por-
tion of the great Sioux reservation are covered into the Treasury as a
special fund for the benefit of the Indians, while all moneys paid for
lands on the ceded portions of the Sisseton and Yankton reservations
are covered into the Treasury as receipts from public lands.
You also. informed said agent that the two dollars and fifty cents per
acre for Sisseton and Walipeton lands, whether paid on a commuted
or final homestead entry, and the fifty cents per acre paid at the time
of original homestead entry for Yankton lands, and the three dollars
and twenty-five cents per acre required to be paid on such lands at the
time of making proof, either final homestead or commuted, "are
included in the same general fund upon which the five per cent of net
proceeds due the State of South Dakota is computed."
The State filed an appeal.
The material contentions of the State are, that in commuted entries
of public lands in the Sisseton. and Yankton reservations the lands
have been disposed of for less than should have been charged for them;
that in all cases where the land has been paid for before the expiration
of five years, the entrymen should have been charged one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre, in addition to the two dollars and fifty cents
per acre charged in the Sisseson and three dollars and seventy-five
cents per acre in the Yankton reservations.
Under section 13 of the act of February 22, 1889 (25 Stat., 680), the
State of South Dakota is entitled to five per cent of the proceeds of
the sales of public lands lying within said State which may. be sold by
the United States since the admission of said State into the Union, after
deducting all the expenses incident to the sale.
It clearly appears from your letter to the agent of the State that said
State has received five per cent of the proceeds of all sales of public
lands, made up to the present time, in the Sisseton -and Yankton reser-
vations, ad that under the present practice it will continue to receive
the same on sales hereafter made.
It appears that the practice of your office respecting the amounts to
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be charged for public lands in the ceded portions of these reservations
has been and is in strict conformity with the instructions approved by
the Department governing the disposition of lands in said reservations
to eutrymen under the respective acts of Congress relating thereto.
A careful examination of said acts and departmental instructions
fails to disclose any error on the part of the Department in the
construction placed upon said acts at the time the instructions were
approved, and therefore there is no reason for any change or modifica-
tion of said instructions.
The action of your office in the premises, is therefore approved.
RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY-VESTED RIGHT-INDIAN RESERVATION.
SPOKANE AND PALOUSE BY. CO.
The grant of a railroad right of way across an Indian reservation, that has vested by
reason of compliance with the conditions precedent, is not lost through failure
to construct the road within the period specified (a condition subsequent),
where no advantage of such failure has been taken by the government.
Assistant Attorney- General Van Devanter to te Secretary of the Interior,
Pebruary 21, 1898. (F. W. C.)
I am i receipt, through your reference of the 8th instant, of a letter
from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated January 6, 1898, enclos-
ing letter dated December 21, 1897, from the United States Indian
Agent at the Nez Perces agency, relative to the rights of the Spokane
and Palouse Railway Company to, at this time, continue the construc-
tion of its railroad across the lands within the Nez Perces Indian
reservation.
It appears that the right of way across said reservation was granted
said railway company by act of Congress approved May 8, 1890 (26
Stat., 104). The third section of said act provides:
That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to fix the amount of com-
pensation to be paid the Indians for such right of way, and provide the time and
manner for the payment thereof, and also to ascertain and fix the amount of com-
pensation to be made individual members of the tribe for damages sustained by them
by reason of the construction of said road; but no right of any kind shall vest in
said ralway company in or to any part of the right of way herein provided for until
plats thereof, made upon actual survey for the definite location of such railroad, and
including the points for station buildings, depots, machine-shops, side-tracks, turn-
outs, and water-stations, shall be filed with and approved by the Secretary of the
Interior, which approval shall be made in writing and be open for the inspection of
any party interested therein, and until the compensation aforesaid has been fixed
and paid; and the surveys, construction, and operation of such railroad, including
charges of transportation, shall be conducted with due regard for the rights of
the Indians and in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary
of the Interior may make to carry out this provision: Pro?ided, That the consent of
the Indians to said right of way and compensation shall be obtained by said railroad
company in such manner as the Secretary of the Interior shall prescribe before any
right under this act shall accrue to said company.
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From the letters referred to it appears that the route was surveyed
and permanently established by the company during the year 1891;
that the company
acquired the right of way over the route named by actual purchase on May 2, 1891,
paying to the individual alioltees alongthe said route, proportionately, the daomages
sustained by them, amounting to $3876.06, to the government for damages to the
agency property the sum of $195.00, and the sun of $1414.00 to the Nez Perce tribe
for passing through their tribal lauls. It was also observed that the company
agreed to move off the said right of way the building standing thereon now occu-
pied as the agency office, replace with sufficient iron pipe the old mill flume to carry
water for mill purposes-the old flumne no longer belongs to the government as it was
sold at public auction to a private individual-and agreed to give free and open
access to this tribe to the tract of land reserved as a " boom " for the benefit of the
Indians.
The road has not, to this date, been constructed across the reserva-
tion, bat the agent reports that the company
contemplates the early extension of their road from the preseutterminus at Juliaetta,
Idaho, to Lewiston, Idaho, a distance of about twenty-five miles. This extension
should it be constructed as contemplated, will pass through twenty-four allotments,
will pass about mid-way through the tract of land reserved for agency purposes, and
through certain tracts formerly known as the tribal lands of the Nez Perce tribe.
'This is the route established in 1891.
The fourth section of the act of May 8, 1890 (supra), provides:
That said company shall not assign or transfer or mortgage this right of way for
any purpose whatever until said road shall be completed: Prorided, That the com-
pany may mortgage said franchise, together with the rolling stock, for money to
construct and complete said road: And provided furtier, That the right granted
herein shall be lost and forfeited by said company unless the road is constructed and
in running order across said reservation within two years from the passage of this act.
'The Indian agent states in his letter of .December 21, 1897:
By reference to office letter, dated April 24, 1895, Land 17043-1895, I find that John
Lane, Esq., special agent in charge of this agency, on that date, was advised that
the Spohane and Palouse Railway Company, had forfeited and lost the right of way
over this reservation granted it by the act of Congress of May 8, 1890, since it had
failed to complete the road within the two years time specified in the act, and that
since no renewal of the grant had been made by Congress, no recognition should,
on that account, be given the company of the lost and forfeited right.
The matter is therefore referred to me for "opinion as to the right of
the within named railway company to construct its line through the
Nez Perce reservation."
From the above recitation, taken from the letters referred' it would
appear that the conditions named in section three of the act of May 8,
1890 (supra), have been complied with and that consequently the grant
of the right of way has vested.
The provision in section four relative to the construction of the road
is clearly a condition subsequent, to be taken advantage of only by the
grantor. In what manner this reserved right of the grantor must be
asserted, depends upon the character of the grant.
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If it be a private grant, that right must be asserted by entry, or its equivalent; if
the grant be a public one, it must be asserted by judicial proceedings, authorized by
law, the equivalent of an inquest of office at common law, or there must be some
legislative assertion of ownership of the property on account of a breach of the
condition. Schulenberg . Harriman (21 Wall., 63), ad cases cited.
No action has been taken in the manner prescribed to enforce the
forfeiture, and in my opinion the right to construct under the grant
made by the act of May 8, 1890, continues.
Approved, February 21, 1898,
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
RAILROAD GRArNT-FORFEITURE-SETTLEMVIENT RIGHT.
ST. PAUL) MINNEAPOLIS AND MANITOBA Ry. Co. v. ANDERSON.
The conditions on which the extension of time was given by the act of June 22, 1874,
operate as a revocation of the grant to the extent of the rights of actual settlers
at the date of said act; and such revocation is operative though the lands may
have been patented under the grant.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. (F. W. C.)
I am in receipt of your letter of August 2, 1897, in the matter of the
case of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company v.
Thom Anderson, involving lot 5, the NE. - of the SW. i and the NW. i
of the SE. of See. 1, T. 146 N., R. 49 W., Crookston land district,
Minnesota.
This tract is within the primary limits of the grant made by the act
of March 3, 1871, to aid in the construction of what is known as the St.
Vincent Extension of said road, as shown by the map of definite loca-
tion filed and accepted December 19, 1871.
Under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1865 (13 Stat., 526), this
road was required to be completed by March 3, 1873, but by the act of
March 3, 1873 (17 Stat., 631), the time was extended to December 3, 1873.
The company failed to'comnplete the road within the time allowed, and
by the act of Jane 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 203), the time was again extended
to March 3, 1876, upon the following conditions:
That all rights of actual settlers and their grantees who have heretofore in good
faith entered upon and actually resided on any of said lands prior to the passage of
this act, or ivho otherwise have legal rights in any of such lands, shall be saved and
secured to such settlers or such other persons in all respects the same as if said lands
had never been granted to aid in the construction of the said lines of railroad.
Following the passage of this act, to wit, on October 8, 1874, Ander-
son was permitted to file pre-emption declaratory statement for this
land, in which he alleged settlement on May 3, 1872. Prior to this
time, to wit, on November 28, 1873, the company listed this tract on
account of its grant, which list was duly approved on April 30, 1874,
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and was patented to the State of Minnesota for the use and benefit of
said company January 14, 1875.
On March 8, 1SS2, Anderson Submitted final proof upon his filing,
against the acceptance of which the company duly protested. Upon
the hearing held upon the company's protest the local officers found
that Anderson was a qualified pre-emnptor and that his final proof
showed compliance with the pre-emption law.
By your office decision of July 20, 1883, it was held that Anderson's
claim was confirmed by the provisions of section 3 of the act of April
21, 1876 (19 Stat., 35),;under which decision the local officers permitted
Anderson, on August 3, 1883, to make payment for the land, upon
which cash certificate issued. The company appealed from said deci-
sion, however, and on June 12, 1895, this Department held that it was
error on the pait of your office in allowing Anderson to complete entry
of this land after the certification and patent on account of the grant,
and you were directed to call upon the company to show cause why it
should not re-convey the title erroneously conveyed on account of said
grant, as contemplated by the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556).
Your letter now under consideration reports that the company was
duly called upon, by letter of June 25, 1895, to which no response was
made by the company. You call attention, however, to the fact that
as Anderson was residing upon this land on June 22, 1874, the date of
the act extending the time for the completion of said road, it would
appear that his rights are saved and secured the same as though said
lands had not been granted, and refer to the departmental decision in
the case of Tronnes v. said company (18 L. D., 101).
An examination of the two cases shows that they are similar in all
important particulars, and as I can see no reason to depart from the
holding made in the Tronnes case, after a full consideration of the
matter, I have to direct that Anderson's entry, if otherwise regular and
satisfactory, be passed to patent.
EAILROAD GRANT-LAND EXCEPTED--STATE TITLE.
LOTT . NEW ORLEANS PACIFIC RY. CO.
The sale by a State of land to which it has no title, can not be recognized as except-
ing the land from the operation of a railroad grant.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General land Office, February
(W.V. D.) 1, 1898. (J. L. MCC.)
James H. Lott has appealed from the decision of your office, dated
May 26, 1896, rejecting his application to make homestead entry of the
N- of the NEI and El of the NWj of Sec. 11, T. 5 N., IR. 1 W., New
Orleans land district, Louisiana, on the ground that said land had
inured to the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company.
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The land is within thd primary limits of the grant to the company
named, opposite the portioa of the road that was definitely located
October 27, 1881; it was listed by the company November 13, 1883;
the Nk of the -El was patented Alarch 3, 188, and the EJ of the NW¶1
on August 8,1889. On October 1,1S94,Lott applied to makeloinestead
entry of the land.
The company protested, whereupon a earing was had, as the result
of which the local officers, and on appeal your office, found that the
testimony showed no sch occupation by a qualified actual settler at
the date of definite location of the road as would except the land from
the operation of the grant, or that it was i possession of such ettler
at the passage of the act of February 8, 1887, or in possession, at that
date, of the heirs or assigns of such a settler.
Lott has appealed. His first allegation is that your office erred
in holding that there is nothing in the testimony to show that the land in dispute
was occupied y an actual settler at the date of definite location of said road.
A careful examination of the testimony sustains the conclusion of
the local officers and your office in this respect.
He alleges that your office erred-
2. In not recognizing that the EL of the NWV/1 of said land was excepted from said
grant, as said land was entered by the father of claimant, as per receipt filed in the
testimony.
'Said receipt was issued by an officer of the State of Louisiana, ol
January 21, 1863-at a time when said State refused to recognize the
authority of the Federal government; and the sale, by said State, of
land to which she had no title or right, can not be recognized by the
United States as having effected a segregation of the land, or excepted
it from the operation of the grant to said railway company.
The decision of your office was correct, and is hereby affirmed.
RAILROAD LANDS-SECTIONS , AND 5, ACT OF MARCI 3, 1887.
LUEDTKE V. KRICKLAU.
A homestead applicant is not entitled to a reinstatement of his claim under section
3, act of March 3,1887, if it appears that he in fact never actually resided on the
land involved.
One who purchases railroad land with notice of a pending homestead claim is not
himself a bona fide purchaser in contemplation of section 5, of said act, but if his
grantor holds under a bona fide pnrchase, made prior to said homestead claim,
sueh purchaser succeeds to the right of his grantor and may perfect title under
said section.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Paul Luedtke has appealed from your office decision of June 8, 1897,
rejecting his homestead application, covering the SE. of the SE. i of
Sec. 11, T. 114 N., R. 28 W., Marshall Land district, Minnesota, with a
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view of allowing Johaln Kricklai to purchase said tract ander the pro-
visions of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556).
This tract is within the indemnity limits of the grant made by the
act of May 12, 1864 (13 Stat., 72), to aid in the construction of the St.
Paul anl Sioux City Railroad.
On May 14, 1857, one ichard Holden filed pre-emption declaratory
statement covering this land, together with adjoining tracts, in which
settlement was alleged on the 8th of that month.
On October 15, 1860, this tract was offered at public sale under execu-
tive proclamation, to which was attached a notice to pre-emptors,
requiring them, under penalty of forfeiture of their rights, to come up
and make proof and pay for the land on or before the day of offering.
Holdenl did not comply with this requirement.
Oil May 28, 1887, Kricklau applied to make homestead entry of this
tract; his application was rejected for conflict with the indemnity with-
drawal made under the grant of 1864. From such rejection Kricklau
appealed, alleging that the filing by Holden, which was not canceled
on the tract-books, operated to except the land from the effect of the
railroad withdrawal.
Upon appeal, your office held that Holden's rights under his filing
were extinguished by the offering of the tract at public sale in 1860,
and that therefore the land was free from claim at the date of the
indemnity withdrawal made under the act of 1864, and. was therefore
not subject to Kricklau's application presented, as before stated, March
28, 1887.
Onl ppeal, the action of your office was affirmed by departmental
decision of July 7, 1891 [unreported].
On May 22, 1891, the withdrawal for idemnity purposes made under
the act of 1864 was revoked by departmental order, an(l as no selection
of the tract had been made on account of the railroad grant, -prior to
this time, the land then became subject to selection or entry' by the
first legal applicant.
On June 1, 1893, Luedtke tendered homestead application for this
tract, which was rejected by the local officers for conflict with the rail-
road grant; from which action he duly appealed.
On October 19, 1893, the railroad company made selection of this
tract, which was permitted to go of record notwithstanding the pending
appeal by Luedtke from the rejection of his application.
On October 23, 1894, your office considered Lnledtke's appeal, reversed
the action of the local officers, and held that his application to enter
should have been allowed and, therefore, held for cancellation the
company's selection, with a view to allowing Luedtke's application.
From this action the company duly appealed.
During the pendency of this appeal, to wit, ol April 30,1895, Kricklau
filed in the local office an application for reinstatement of his homestead
claim, alleging that he was entitled to such relief under the provisions
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of section 3 of the act of March 3, 1887, supra. This application was
denied by the local officers, and Kricklau duly appeale(l to your office.
On March 11, 1S96 [unreported], your office decision of October 23,
1894, holding for cancellation the company's selection, with a, view to
allowing Luedtke's application, was affirmed, i so far as to direct the
cancellation of the railroad's selection; but in view of an allegation
made in the company's appeal, to the effect that Krichlau was i pos-
session of the land under purchase from the company' the case was
returned to your office for appropriate action.
Departmeiltal decision of March I, 1896, it appears, was promul-
gated by your office letter of June 12, 1896, in which the local officers
were directed to notify Kricklau and allow him thirty days within
which to show cause why Lnedtke should not be permitted to make
entry of the land under the homestead laws, as applied for.
Acting thereunder, Kricklau, on July 16, 1896, filed an affidavit in
which he alleged that his application presented in 1887 was erroneously
rejected because of the fact that the filing by Richard Holden excepted
the tract from the operation of the indemnity withdrawal, and that he
was entitled to reinstatement under the provisions of the act of March
3, 1887; further, that he was a bonafide purchaser of the land through
mesne coliveyances from the railroad company; that lie (Kricklau) was
a bonc fide settler on the land; that Luedtke did not make his applica-
tion to enter honestly or in good faith, for the purpose of actual ettle-
rment or cultivation, and that he had never resided or intended to
reside thereon aid had made no permanent improvements upon the
tract.
Upon this affidavit hearing was duly ordered and held, and upon
the testimony adduced, the local officers recommended that Luedtke's
application be accepted. Kricklau duly appealed to your office, result-
ing in the decision of June 8 1897, appealed from, ill which it was
directed that Luedtke's application be rejected "with a view to the
allowance of Johann Kricklan's application to purchase the land from
the government under the 5th section of te act of March 3, 1887."
An examination of the record does not disclose that Kricklau ever
made formal application to purchase the land under the 5th section of
the act of March 3, 1887. It is true that in his affidavit he alleges that
he was a bona fide purchaser of the land through the company, and
after petitioning for the reinstatement of his homestead application,
prayed that in event that such relief was denied him, he be allowed to
purchase or otherwise perfect title to the land.
The hearing was ordered to determine the respective rights of
Luedtke and Ericllau in the premises, and although no formal appli-
cation to purchase had been made, this will not defeat KTicklaul's
claim, if, upon the record as made, he is shown to be entitled to pur-
chase under the act of 1887.
The record shows that Kricklau lived upon land owned by him in
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the neighborhood of the tract in question, and while he cultivated a
part of this tract he never actually resided thereon, and cannot there-
fore be considered an actual settler within the meaning of the third
section of the aet of March 3, 1887 (suprct). His application for rein-
statement of his homestead application rejected for conflict with the
indemnity witldrawal is therefore denied.
Relative to his alleged purchase from the railroad company, the
showing offered at the hearing consisted of copies of a quit-claim deed,
executed June 29, 1891, by the railroad company and the trustees for
the bondholders, in favor of one Horace E. Thompson, conveying all
its claim, right, title and interest, both in possession and expectancy,
in and to certain described lands, covering about a thousand acres,
among which is the tract in question. The consideration named in
this deed was $3,400. Copy was also filed of a quit-claim deed, exe-
cuted November 14, 1891, by Horace E. Thompson and wife, in favor
of the Prince Investment Company. This deed covered about two
hundred acres, including the tract in question. The consideration
named therein is $109. Copy of a contract between the Prince Invest-
ment Company and Kricklau, dated August 22, 1894, having in view
the transfer of the land in question to Kriclilau, was also filed. A spe-
cial warranty deed, dated August 23, 1894, oiiveying this tract to
Kricklau in consideration of $500, is also with the record. There is
also an affidavitj made by one Moore, who was attorney for the railroad
company and also for the Prince Investment Company, in -which he
swears that the sms named in the several deeds referred to were paid
as stated.
This is all of the showing respecting the claimed right to purchase
under section 5 of the act of 1887. Nothing was offered on behalf of
Luedtke tending to attack the bona fides of these transactions.
Relative to Luedtke's connection with the tract, it appears that in
June, 1893, e built a house on the land, which was shown not to be
habitable during cold weather, and that he did a little breaking upon
the tract, but has never actually resided thereon, his residence being in
Arlington township, where he owns a farm. The house built upon the
tract by Luedtke was destroyed by fire about July 4, 1896, and had not,
at the date of the hearing, been rebuilt.
It is clearly shown that Kricklau purchased the land from the Prince.
Investment Company with full knowledge of the fact that Luedtke had,
prior to this purchase, applied to enter the tract under the homestead
laws. Kricklau stated, in his testimony, that he was induced to make
the purchase of the tract from information received at the local office
to the effect that Luedtke's application had been rejected for conflict
with the grant. It appears, however, that in answer to an inquiry
addressed to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a letter was
written him by your office, prior to his purchase from the investment
company, advising him of the pendency of Lnedtke's application, on
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appeal from the action of the local officers rejecting the same for con-
flict with the railroad grant. Charged with the knowledge, and also
with notice of the occupation of the land by Luedtke, it can not be
held that his purchase from the Prince Investment Company in itself
constitutes him a ona fide purchaser under section 5 of the act of
March 3, 1887, and i order to make him such a purchaser it is necessary
that there be a bona fide purchase from the colnpany antedating the
tender of Luedtke's application..
As before stated, Luedtke's application was made June 1, 1893, and
the conveyances from the railroad company to Thompson and from
Thompson to the Prince fnvestment Company were made June 29,
1891, and November 1, 1891, respectively. The proof submitted
respecting these conveyances constituted a y'igna facie showing that
Thompson and the Prince Investment Company were bona fide pur-
chasers, and Luedtke did not assail the bona fides of either of these
transactions. Kricklau succeeded to the rights acquired under these
conveyances and since they antedate Luedtke's homestead application
it would seem, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that
Kricklau holds under a prior bonafide purchase.
Further action upon Luedtke's application will therefore be sus-
pended for a reasonable time to afford Kricklau an opportunity to make
formal application to purchase, and, after due notice, to make proof as
required in the case of Samuel L. Campbell (8 L. D., 27). Since there
was no formal application to purchase and no notice of such an appli-
cation, the hearing heretofore had will not preclude further inquiry
into the claim of Kricklau as a bona fide purchaser nor will it relieve
hin from making proof in the regular way.
ALASKAN LANDS-SURVEY-CI-IARACTER OF OCCUPANCY.
ALFRED PACKEINNEN.
A survey of Alaskan land, as provided for in the act of March 3, 1891, is special in
its character, and there is no authority therefor except as preliminary to a pur-
chase, and it therefore follows, that before such a survey is made there should
be a plrimafacie showing of the right to purchase, and due compliance with the
departmental requirements regulating applications -for the survey of said lands.
The word " trade" as used in section 12 of said act is employed in its commercial
significauce, and Congress by its use in defining the character of occupancy
which would authorize a purchase of land, did not intend to include thereby
lands used for farming, cattle grazing, or fox raising.
Secretary Bliss to the Comrissioner of the General Land ff0ice, Webruary
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. (W. M. B.)
This Department has considered the appeal of Alfred Packennen
from the decision of your office of April 16, 1895, wherein was sus-
pended survey No. 86, executed July 9 and 10, 1894, by Frank H.
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Lasey, U. S. deputy surveyor, under provision of section 13 of the act
of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1100), and the rules and regulations of June
3, 1891 (12 L. D., 583).
The land ebraced in this survey, and which is sought to be pur-
chased by appellant under the provision of section 12 of the said act of
March 3, 1891, comprises a area of 29.93 acres, and is situated on Fox
Island in Uyak Bay, western coast of Kadiak Island.
Respecting the execution of this survey the record submitted fails to
show that certain prerequisites relating thereto were comiplied with by
appellant.
Section 13 of said act is as follows:
SEC. 13. That it shall be the duty of any person, association, or corporation enti-
tled to purchase land under this act to make an. application to the United States
marshal, ex officio surveyor-general of Alaska, for an estimate of the cost of making
a survey of the lands occupied by such person, association, or corporation, and the
cost of the clerical work necessary to be done in the office of the said United States
marshal, ex officio surveyor-general; and on the receipt of such estimate from the
United States marshal, ex officio surveyor-general, the said person, association, or
corporation shall deposit the amount in a United States depository, as is required
by section numbered twenty-four hundred and one, Revised Statutes, relating to
deposits for surveys.
That on the receipt by the United States marshal, ex officio surveyor-general, of
the said certificates of deposit, he shall employ a competent person to utake such
survey, under such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Secretary of the
Interior, who shall make his return of his fiteld notes and maps to the office of the
said United States marshal. ex officio surveyor-general; and the said United States
marshal, ex officio surveyor-general, shall cause the said held notes and plats of such
survey to be examined, and, if correct, apIprove the same, and shall transmit certi-
fied copies of such maps and plats to the office of the Coummissioner of the General
Land Office.
That when the said field notes and plats of said survey shall have been approved
by the said Commissioner of the General Land Office, he shall. notify such person,
association, or corporation, who shall then, within six months after such notice, pay
to the said United States marshal, ex officio surveyor-general, for such land, and
patent shall issue for the ame.
Paragrapls 1, 2, 3, 4 and 13 of the rules and regulations adopted
[June 3, 1891, 12 L. D., 583] under said act, are as follows:
1. Applications for surveys must e made in writing, by the person entitled to
purchase land under said act, or by the authorized agent of the association or cor-
poratiou so entitled. The application tmust particularly describe the character of
the land sought to be surveyed, and as accurately as possible, its geographical posi-
tion, with the character, extent, and approximate value of the improvements. If a
private survey had previously been made of the land occupied by the applicant, a
copy of the plat and field-notes of such survey should accompany the application
which must also state that the land contains neither coal, nor the precious metals,
with reasons for such statement; that Do part of the land described in the applica-
tion includes improvements made by or in possession of another, prior to the passage
of said act; that it does not include any land to which natives of Alaska have prior
rights, by virtue of actual occupation; that it does not include a portion f any
town site, or lands occupied by missionary stations, or any lands occupied or reserved
by the United States for public purposes or selected by the United States Commis-
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sioner for Fish and Fisheries, or any lands reserved from sale under the provisions
of this act. These statements must be verified by affidavit.
2. If, upon examination, the application shall be approved by the ex officio
surveyor-general, le will furnish the applicants with two separate estimates, one
for the field work, and one for office work, the latter to include clerk hire, and the
necessary stationery. The ex officio surveyor-general will be careful to estimate
adequate sums in order to avoid the necessity for additional deposits.
3. Upon receiving such estinates, applicaLnts may deposit in a proper United States
depository, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, on account of survey-
ing the public lands in Alaska, and expenses incident thereto, the sums so estimated
as the total cost of the survey, including field and office work.
4. The original certificate must in every case be forwarded to the Secretary of the
Treasury, the duplicate to the ex officio surveyor-genera], the triplicate to be retained
by the applicant as his receipt.
13. When the duplicate certificates of deposit of the aounts estimated for field
and office work, shall have been received by the e officio surveyor-general, the
requisite instructions for the surveys and making returns thereof, will e issued to
the deputy surveyor who may be designated to (lo the work. The anount of com-
pensation to the deputy surveyor must be stated in the instructions and the same
must not exceed the amount deposited for the field work. The land to be surveyed
under any one application, can not exceed one hundred and sixty acres, and it must
be in one compact body, and as nearly in square form as the circumstances and the
configuration of the land will admit,
Tlere there does not appear to ave been any application for the
survey, verified or otherwise; there does not appear to have been any
estimate of the cost of making the survey or of the cost of the clerical
work in the office of the ex officio surveyor-genieral; it does not appear
that this officer ever employed or designated any person or deputy
surveyor to make the survey, or issued any instructions for executing
this survey and making returns tereof. It is true that a deposit was
made to pay the cost thereof but the survey was executed on July 9
and 10, 1894, while the deposit was not made until December 6, 1894,
which was almost five months subsequent thereto. Where there has
been so gross a failure to comply with the law and regulations as is
here indicated the survey is certainly very irregular, if it is ot
altogether unauthorized.
The general laws- relating to surveys have not been extended to
Alaska-and the survey contemplated by the act and regulations under
consideration is a special survey which can subserve no purpose what-
ever if the land embraced therein is not subject to Purchase under that
act. There is no authority for the survey, except as a step toward a
purchase, and, therefore, to obtain the survey the application therefor
should make apr im7nafacie showing of a right to purchase.
It is evident that the information specified in paragraph 1 of the
regulations, was required to be submitted to the ex officio surveyor-
general in order that he might primarily determine whether the land
sought to be surveyed was subject to purchase under the act and
whether there was any occasion or authority for the survey thereof.
By the terms of sections 12, 13 and 14 of the act, only lands possessed
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and occupied "for the purpose of trade or manufactures" can be pur-
chased thereunder. The possession and occupancy of land for the
purpose of trade or manufactures can, in a measure at least, be deter-
mined by the character and extent of the improvements thereon.
No showing was made by the appellant either before or after the sur-
vey respecting the existence of improvements upon the land claimed,
or respecting its possession and occupancy. The only information upon
these points is contained in the report of the deputy surveyo-, which
forms a part of his return of the survey. This report states that the
"improvements are of the approximate value of 100 dollars and con-
sist of a frame dwelliug house 12x14 ft.;" that "the claimant has
built and lives i a frame house 18x21 ks. (12x14 ft.) and is engaged
in fishing, raising foxes and cattle, and trading with the natives," and
that "the claimant is in possession residing on the island when not
absent fishing and trading." It is oubtful whether the character of
these improvements indicates a permanent occupancy of the land for
any purpose, and certainly it does not indicate that the land is possessed
or occupied otherwise thanas an abode or habitation. The extent and
character of the fishing and of the trading with natives are not. shown,
but the report seems to indicate that the same are carried on by
claimant in part, if not altogetler, when he is absent from the island.
From the connection in vhich the matter is mentioned in the report it
is inferred that the locus of the fox and cattle raisin i dustry is upon
the island, although the statement of the deputy is somewhat indefi-
nite. If there are any fences; enclosures, or buildings upon the island
which are used in rstraining or earing for the foxes and cattle they
are not mentioned.
A question arises whether the raising of foxes and cattle is embraced
by the words "trade or manufactures" in section 12 wherein it is pro-
vided that-
Any citizen .... association . . .. and any corporation .... now or here-
after in possession of and occupying public lands in. Alaska for the purpose of trade
or mnlufactures, may purchase not exceeding one hndred and sixty acres .... of
such land.
Webster gives two definitions of the word "trade:" one is,
The act or business of exchanging commodities by barter, or by buying and selling
for money; commerce; traffic; barter; (and the other is,) The business which a per-
son has learded and which he engages in, for procuring sun)sistence, or for profit;
occupation; especially, mechanical employment as distingnished from the liberal
*arts, the learned professions, and agriculture; as, we speak of the trade of a smith,
or a carpenter, or mason, but not now of the trade of a farmer or a lawyer or a
physician.
An examination of the public land laws, shows that the word "trade"
was used in section 2258 Revised Statutes, wherein were excepted from
the right of pre-emption lands "occupied for purposes of trade and
business, ad not for agricuture" and is used in the act of May 14,
1890 (26 Stat., 109), which provides that townsite entries in Oklahoma
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may inelude lands occupied "for purposes of trade or bsiness;" but
it has never been siggested that under these statutes lands occupied
for raising either domestic or wild animals were for that reason excepted
from pre-emption or made subject to towusite entry.
From the definitions before quoted it is seen that the word " trade 
has two well defined meanings. In the one case it has a commercial
signification; while in the other it is the equivalent of vocation or
occupation.
From an analysis of the legislation of Congress, with respect to the
District of Alaska, and especially of the laws under which title to public,
lands in said district can be acquired, it appears that the word trade,"
as there employed is used in its commercial signification.
Section eight of the act of May 17, 1884 (23 Stat., 24), establishing a
civil government for the district of Alaska, provides:
The laws of the United States relating to mining claims, and the rights incident
thereto, shall, from and after the passage of this act, be in fulliforce and effect in said
district.
But nothing contained in this act shall he construed t pntjin force in said district
the general land laws of the United States.
This general provision, withholding from sale and entry all public
lands i the district of Alaska save those claimed for mining purposes,
continued in full force, without change or mnodification, until March 3,
1891, when by sections 11, 12 and 13 of the act of that date authority
was given for the entry of non-minieral public lands in said district for
townsite purposes and for the purchase of such lands when possessed
and occupied " for the purpose of trade or manufactures." None of the
public land laws authorizing the entry of lands for agriculture in any
of its forms apply to that district.
When the act of March 3, 1891, was adopted, certain portions of the
public lands in Alaska were possessedind occupied as sites for trading
posts and for canning and nanufacturing stations. At such posts
trading with the natives was carried on in the varions forms of nercan-
tile transactions, and at such stations salnon were prepared for market
andfish-oil and other articles were manufactured for donestic and
export trade. Suitable buildiigsand inproveinents had been and were
being erected at considerable expense in boih instances.
Considering the history of land legislation relating to Alaska and
the situation prevailing there when the at un(ler consicleration was
adopted, it is believed that it Wxas not the purVpse of ConAgress to author-
ize the purchase of land used for farming, or for grazing cattle, or for.
the domsticating and breeding of wild animals.
The appellant failed to make the required application for the survey,
and even if that fault were waived, the report of the deputy surveyor
does not show that the land is subject to purchase.
This survey enbraces an area of 29.93 acres, but does not include all
of the land upon the island, and should the harbor aud landing place
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at the easterly end of the same, which are completely covered by the
land surveyed, afford the only approach or access to the island, appel-
lant would obtain a complete monopoly of the se of all of the land
upon the island by the purchase merely of the particular portion
embraced in this survey.
By reason of the irregularities surrounding the survey, and the fact
that the land is not possessed and occupied for the purpose of trade or
manuf hctures, your office decision suspeadin -g survey No. S, is affirmed.
ABANDONED MrILITARY RESERVATION-TORT RANDALL.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Commissioner UHermnann to te register and receiver, Chain berlai', South
Dakota, February 21, 1898.
The Fort Randall military reservation was established by executive
order of June 14, 1860; said reservation was subsequently found to be
situated partly i Nebraska and partly in South Dakota. A portion
of the part in South Dakota was relinquished July 22, 1884, and pro-
vision was made for the disposal thereof under the homestead laws, by
the act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat., 648). The remainder, situated
partly in Nebraska and partly in South Dakota, was relinquished Octo-
ber 20, 1893, with fifty buildings, for disposal under the act of July 5,
1884 (23 Stat., 103). All of the buildings have been sold according to
aw.
The area of that portion of the reservation in South Dakota is
64,479.05 acres.
The act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 593), provides that all that por-
tion of the reservation in South Dakota may be selected by the State
within one year after the passage of the act, or the approval of the
survey, under the provisions of the act providing for the admission of
the State into the Union, approved February 22, 1889.
The plats of the survey of the lands in qestion were accepted
August 29, 1896.
By office decision of September 15, 1897, addressed to you, it was
held that as the State of South Dakota refused to make selections of
that portion of the land in Fort Randall abandoned military reserva-
tion situated in South Dakota, as provided by said act of March 3,
1893, said lands were opened to settlement under the act of August
23, 1894 (28 Stat., 491), and you were directed to give notice of the
filing of the triplicate plats of survey, fixing a date when entries for
said lands would be allowed to go to record. It appears that the date
fixed by you was October 25, 1897.
The lands in question have been appraised in order to facilitate their
disposal under said act of August 23, 1894, and the appraisal has been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
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On April 9, 1895 (20 L. D., 303), the Secretary of the Interior directed
this office to issue instructions under said act of August 23, 1894, as
follows:
That the homesteader be given the option in making payment upon his entry of
these lands, of making his payments in five equal payments to (late from the time
of the acceptance of his proof tendered on his entry and that the rate of interest
upon deferred payments be charged at the rate of four per cent. per annumn.
A copy of said appraisal has been filed in your office and upon the
request of entrymen you will inform them at what rate the lands
entered by them have been appraised.
In allowing entries for lands in. this reservation you will, in each
case, endorse on the applications "Fort Radall Reservation, Act of
August 23, 1894," and make the same annotation on your abstract of
homestead entries.
Under the provisions of the homestead law an entrynman has the
right either to commute his entry after fourteen months from the date
of settlement, or offer final proof under Sec. 2291 R. S. In entries
under said act of August 23, 1894, he may, at his option, commute after
fourteen months with fll payment in cash, or, after submitting ordi-
nary five year final proof and after its acceptance, e may pay for the
land the full amount of the appraised value thereof without interest, or
he may ake payment in five equal instalments, the first payment to
be made one year after the acceptance of his final proof and subse-
quent payments to be paid annually thereafter, interest to be charged
at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum from the date of the acceptance of
final proof until all payments are made.
In case the full amount is paid after fourteen months from date of
settlement you will, if the proof is satisfactory, issue cash certificate
and receipt; and, in the event that regular final proof is made and the
full amount then paid, you will issue final certificate and receipt; but
when partial payments are made the receiver will issue a receipt only
for the amount of the principal and interest paid, reporting the same
in a special column of the Abstract of Homestead Receipts and at the
time the last payment is made you will issue the final papers as in ordi-
nary homestead entries.
In issuing final papers you will make the proper annotations thereon,
as well as on the applications and abstracts, as before directed, to
show that the entry covers land in the Fort Randall reservation.
You are further advised that the same rule, as to the allowance of
credit for residence prior to entry and for military service, applies to
entries under said act of August 23, 1894, as to other homestead entries.
Where, upon submitting final proofs the entrymen elect to make pay-
ment for the lands entered in five annual instalments you are authorized
to make the usual charges for reducing the testimony to writing, but
as the final certificate and receipt cannot be issued until the last pay-
ment is made you cannot charge the final commissions until said final
certificate and receipt are issued.
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Where the entrymen submit final proofs and elect to pay for the
lands in instalments, you will not give said proofs current numbers and
dates but will, if they arc acceptable to you, make proper notes on
your records showing that satisfactory proof has been made and the
dates upon which the partial payments must be made and then trans-
mit said proofs to this office, in special letters, and not i your monthly
returns, for filing with the original entries.
There are no guarantees to be taken in order to secure the payment
of the instalments but if; when each instalment is due, any entryman
fails to pay the same you will report the matter to this office, when
proper action will be taken in the case.
Under date of January 28, 1898 (26 L. D., 87), the Honorable Secre-
tary of the Interior decided that school sections in abandoned military
reservations of more than five thousand acres, subject to disposal
under act of August 23, 1894 (28 Stat., 491), were not excepted from
the operation of said act where the grant to the State for school pur-
poses had not attached by reason of survey prior to the establishment
of the reservation; and further, that the lands within such abandoned
reservations were " not to be treated ' as public lands subject to all the
land laws of the United States, including grants for school purposes."'1
Under said decision you will allow qualified persons to make entry
for lands in sections 16 and 36 in the above reservation.
Appr.ovni.,
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
HOMESTEAD-CERTIFICATION-CONFIRlATION .
EDWIN F. FROST ET AL.
The right of purchase under section 2, act of Juhe 15, 1880, on behalf of an entry-
man, who after the passage of said act auil prior to his application for the exer-
cise of said right, had sold the land to another, cannot be recognized, nor is the
case of John D. Hay, 1 L. D., 74, authority therefor.
If a contest against a homestead entry fails, and more than two years have elapsed
since the allowance of the entry, it is confirmed under the proviso to section 7,
act of March 3, 1891, though under the body of said section the entry is not sus-
ceptible of confirmation.
The inadvertent certification of a State selection at a time when the land covered
thereby is included within an existing entry, made prior to the selection, is
inoperative, and constitutes no bar to the issuance of patent on said entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Offiee, February
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Mr. B. F. Hampton, as agent and attorney for the State of Florida,
has filed a motion for re-review of departmental decision of Decem-
ber 26, 1896 (24 L. D., 228), in which it was held that the inadvertent
certification of lots 3 and 4, Sec. 35, and lots 3 and 7, See. 36, T. 31 S.,
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R. 39 E., Gainesville, Florida, on Juue 28, 1895, said tracts at that time
being included in the entry of Edwin Frost, is inoperative and consti-
tutes no obstacle to the issuance of patent upon said entry.
The motion previously filed by Mr.- Hampton for review of said
departmental decision was denied June 15, 1897 (21 L. D., 525), because
it did not appear that he had complied with the regulations in regard
to the admission of attorneys to practice before this Department, and
his authority to represent the State was not shown.
It now appears that Mr. Hampton has been duly recognized, for a
numnber of years, both by your office and this Department, 'as the agent
of the State in the matter of the selection of its school lands, but no
sufficient reason is disclosed in the motion for reversing the decision in
question.
The facts relative to the entry made by Frost, covering the tracts in
question, have been several times recited in the previous decisions
of this Department, but will be briefly repeated here for the reason
hereinafter given.
Frost made homestead entry May 7, 1877. On August 25, 1883, he
purchased the tracts Itere involved under the provisions of the act of
June 1, 1880.
Prior to his purchase, to wit, on March 27, 1883, one D. C. Erwin
contested his entry for abandonment.
Said contest, after dragging along through a number of years, with-
out proceeding to a hearing, was dismissed by the local officers July 21,
1891, for want of prosecution, and by your office letter "" of Sep-
tember 25, 1891, the action of the 'local officers was affirmed and the
case closed.
Thereafter, to wit, on May 15, 1893, your office held Frost's entry for
cancellation, because Frost had, prior to final entry, deeded the land to
another; consequently there was nothing pon which to base his cash
entry, which was erroneously allowed by the local officers.
The transferee of Frost, one Cleveland, conveyed part of the land to
one Lowe, and the remainder to one Kessler. Lowe and Kessler
appealed from your said office decision, claiming (1) that the purchase
was a proper one, and (2) that the entry was confirmed by the pro-
visions of section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891.
Said appeal was considered in departmental decision of December 8,
1894 (not reported), in which the action of your office was affirmed and
it was held that the entry was not confirmed, because the purchase
was made before final entry.
A motion was filed for the review of said decision, but during the
pendency of said motion the State made selection of the lands covered
by Frost's entry as school indemnity, and the selection was approved,
as before stated, June 28, 1895.
The motion for review was considered in departmental decision of
July 6, 1895 (21 L. D., 38), in which it was held that at the time Frost
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sold to Cleveland the rulings of this Department permitted an entry-
man to make purchase under the act of June 15,1880, notwithstanding
he had sold the land, and therefore reversed the decision of December
8, 1894, and directed that patent issue upon Frost's entry.
This action was apparently taken regardless of the approval of the
list of school lands June 28, 1895.
To establish the prior ruling the case of John D. Hay (1 L. D., 74)
was referred to.
That was a decision made by your office, and in the case of Gunning
v. Herron (10 C. L. O., 273), in referring to said decision, it was stated:
The letter of this office to the register and receiver at Montgomery, Alabama, in
the case of John D. Hay, to which yo refer (9 C. L. 0., 132) as authority for holding
that transfer of a portion of the land is no bar to an application to purchase under
the act of June 15, 1880, was inadvertently signed, and in the broad sense in which
it maybe understood, is not in accordance with law nor with established rulings and
practice. Neither the letter of the law nor its legal intent can be understood as
implying a purpose by Congress to permit a party to sell his claim to a portion or
the whole of the land embraced in his entry, receive the purchase money, and then,
after his transferee has made the land valuable by labor and expenditure, to seize
and appropriate to himself or sell to another such possession and property through
a purchase under this act.
It was undoubtedly to protect bonafide purchasers from original entrymen against
the liability of this injustice of the necessity of a resort to the courts to enforce
specific performance, that the provision allowing purchase by attempted transferees
was incorporated into the law.
In this case there is a bona fide instrument in writing, drawn with more than usual
care, executed prior to June 15, 1880, proven in due form and recorded.
The conditions of the law being fully satisfied, the right of purchase from the
United States inures to Gunning for so much of the land as was embraced in Herron's
attempted transfer.
It would further appear that the sale referred to in the flay case was
one made prior to the act of June 15, 1880, and not subsequently
thereto, as in the case here under consideration.
On a re-examination, I am unable to find that it was ever held by
this Department that a purchase could be made under the act of June
15, 1880, by an entryman who had, subsequently to the passage of the
act and prior to his application to purchase, sold the land to another.
The reason given, therefore, for the reversal of the previous decision
of December 8, 1894, was not sufficient.
It does appear, however, that the contest filed by Erwin against
Frost's entry was dismissed and the case closed in 1891.
More than two years had then elapsed since final entry, and upon
the termination of said contest proceedings it would appear that the
entry was confirmed by the terms of the proviso to the 7th section of
the act of March 3, 1891. (Weyher v. Smith, 13 L. D., 489; Tyndall v.
Prudden, Id., 527.)
It is true that the entry could not be confirmed under the provisions
contained in the body of the section, because sale was made before
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final entry, but this did not defeat the operation of the proviso upon
the termination of the contest by Erwin.
It must therefore be held that the order for the cancellation of Frost's
entry contained in decision of December 8, 1894, was error, as said entry
was confirmed and should be patented, unless the inadvertent certifica-
tion on account of the school grant removed the land from the juris-
diction of this Department.
This was the very question considered in the decision of December
26, 1896, spra, for the review of which the motion under consideration
is filed.
That it was a pure inadvertence can not be doubted, as the land was
both at the time of the State's selection and the approval thereof
embraced in the entry of Frost, against which an order for cancellation
had been made, but which had not become effective.
The certification could therefore have no operative effect as against
said entry, and I have to direct that patent issue thereon as previously
ordered. (Weeks v. Bridgman, 159 U. S., 541.)
The motion for review is accordingly denied.
1HOiMTESTEAD ENTRY-WVIDOW-PATENT.
ANNA ANDERSON.
If a homesteader dies prior to compliance wiitl the requiiremelits of the law, and the
submission of final proof, and his widow thereafter submits final proof, the
patent should issue in her name; and a patent i such case issued in the name
of the homesteader is in violation of law, and o bar to the correction of the
final certificate and the issuance of patent thereon in the name of the widow.
Secretary Bliss to the Comgnmissioner of the General Land O e, February
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. --(V. B.)
The appeal of Anna Anderson, from your decision of May 18, 1896,
relating to the issue of patent for the NW. of Sec. 12, T. 112 N., R.
54 W., Watertown land district, South Dakota, is before the Depart-
ment for consideration.
It appears from the papers accompanying the appeal, that on May
20, 1884, Peter Anderson, husband of the appellant, made homestead
entry for said tract and thereafter died. Subsequently and on May 5,
1891, his widow submitted final proof, which was accepted, the fees
paid and final certificate was issued on same day in the name of the
deceased entryman and patent was issued thereon, October 14, 1891~
also i the name of the entryman.
This patent was returned to your office, on May 5, 1896, by Mrs.
Anderson asking that the same be corrected so as to be in the name of
the widow who made the proof. This you refused to do and from your
action this appeal was taken.
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The date of the death of Peter Anderson is not given in the papers
sent up, but it is stated in the appeal that he died " long prior" to the
making of the final proof.
The law, relating to the succession to the homestead right, in ease of
death of the entryman, prior to making final proof by him, is found in
Sec. 2291 Revised Statutes, and is as follows:
No certificate, however, shall be given, or patent issued therefor, until the expira-
tion of five years from the date of such ehtry; and if at the expiration of such time,
or at anytime withia two years thereafter, the person making such entry; or if he
be dead his widow; or in case of her death, his heirs, or devisee; ... ; proves by
two credible witnesses that he, she or they have resided upon or cultivated the
same for the term of five years immediately scceeding the filing of the affidavit
* . . . then in such case, he, she, or they, if at that time citizens of the United
States, shall be entitled to a patent as in other cases provided by laxv.
It is apparent under this statute that, in this case the law cast the
succession to said homestead upon Anna Anderson, the widow of the
entryman; and she having submitted final proof, which was accepted,
it was the plain duty of the local officers to have issued final certificate
in her name, and likewise the duty of your office to have issued patent
to her.
It appears that these plain requirements of the law were not com-
plied with but a patent has been issued in the name of the dead man
whereby, if valid, the widow is deprived of her rights; and the title to
the land, under See. 2448 R. S., "will enure to and become vested in
the heirs, devisees or assignees of such deceased patentee."
Your action, declining to change said patent as requested, so that it
stand in her name, was correct and is approved.
But when you say "Section 2448 R. S., covers this case" you are in
error.
That section reads as follows:
Where patents for public lands have been or may be issued in pursuance of any
law of the United States, to a person who had died or who hereafter dies before the
date of such patent, the title to the land designated therein shall inure to, and vest
in the heirs, devisees, or assignees of such deceased patentee, as if the patent had
issued to the deceased person during life.
A careful examination of this section shows that it is not applicable
to the case of Mrs. Anderson and suggests no sufficient reason why she
should not have proper relief in the premises.
It will not be questioned that at common law a patent issued in the
name of a dead person is ineffectual to pass title, and therefore inoper-
ative and void. Davenport v. Lamb (13 Wall., 418,427). By the act
of May 20, 1836 (5 Stat., 31), embodied in section 2448, sjn'a, Congress
modified the general rule, which had theretofore obtained, but did not
abolish it. The modifications made by Congress must be respected,
but that legislation being in derogation of the common law rule is not
to be carried further by implication or inference than was the plain
intent of Congress as disclosed by the language of its enactment.
244 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
It will be observed that said section only applies to cases where
patents were issued "in pursuance of any law of the United States"
etc. In this case patent was not issued i pursuance of law, but in
direct violation of section 2291 E. S., which required it to be issued to
the widow; and, in giving effect to the two statutes it should be noted
that both being found in the Revised Statutes are to be taken as
having been regarded at the time of the revision as not in conflict, and
that such constraction should now be followed if consistent with the
terms of the two sections. This view is especially forcible when the
contrary would operate to deprive the willow of a right and transfer
the same to "the heirs, devisees, or assigns" of the deceased entryman.
A fair and reasonable construction of section 2448 easily permits both
sections to stand together and each to operate upon the class of cases
to which they are respectively applicable.
Under this construction section 2248 is held to operate upon cases
where persons during life had earned the land and become entitled to
patent by compliance with the legal prerequisites to its issuance. In
other words, where the right to the patent itself was perfect before or
at the time of the death. In such case the modification by section 2448
operates and the title to the described land enures to and vests in the
heirs, etc. This case is not of that kind. The deceased entryma at
the time of his death, had not complied with the prerequisites of the
law and earned the right to the land and a patent therefor.
These views are not in conflct, but in harmony, with the rulings of
the Department in the cases of Joseph Ellis (21 L. D., 377) and Henry
E. Stich (23 L. D., 457). In the former case the entryman, before death,
had earned the right to a patent by complying with the essential pre-
requisites of the law and making proof thereof; and the Department
decided that patent should be issued in his name, the case being within
the modification of the common law rule, made by section 2448. In the
latter case, the entryman died after entry, before proof, which was made
by his widow; and it was directed that the patent should be issued in
the name of the widow.
The case under consideration, not coming within the modifications
made by Congress in section 2448, is governed by the common law rule;
and it follows, from what has been said, that the patent to the dead
man, issued not merely without authority of law, but in clear violation
thereof, is null, void and of no effect.
Entertaining these views, your judgment is reversed and you will
cause the final certificate to be so corrected as to stand in the name of
Anna Anderson, the widow, and have patent issued thereon.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 245
INDIAN LANDS-TREATY OF FE: BR1UARY 7, 1S6T.
LEVEL V. PAPE.
The preferred right to purchase the unallotted. Pottawatomie lands, conferred by the
treaty of February 27, 1867, upon the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. R.
Co., is not defeated by failure to make payment for a tract of such land within
the period specified in said treaty, where said tract was nsurveyed and hence
could not be conveyed by the government; and the said company having
attempted to convey such a tract, may, for the benefit of its transferee, perfect
title thereto by making the proper payment therefor.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. (C. J. G.)
On J-ly 3, 1895 (21 L. D., 290), the Department approved an applica-
tio n made by Frank Level for the survey of an island in the KaLsas
river situated in T. 11 S., R. 15 E., Topeka land district, Kansas.
It was stated in the departmental decision referred to that there was
with the record aletter from one Chas. W. Pape, claiuing thathe bought
the island sought to be surveyed by Level from one George W. Watson,
in 1882.
The survey was duly made, and the plat thereof, wherein the land is
described as lot 8 of section 29, containing seventeen acres, and lot 8
of section 30, containing 11.40 acres, T. 11 S., R. 15 E., was approved
in September, 1896.
On October 14, 1896, Frank Level was allowed to make homestead
entry of the above described lots, which entry was held for cancella-
tion by your office January 18, 1897, as having been erroneously allowed,
and was finally canceled March 27, 1897.
The land in question is within the old Pottawatomie Indian reserva-
tion. By article five of the treaty of November 15, 1861, liroclaimed
April 19, 1862 (12 Stat., 1191), it was provided that the Leavenworth,
Pawnee and Western Railroad Company should have the privilege of
purchasing the anallotted lands belonging to the Pottawatomie Indians.
It was farther provided in said treaty that:
In case said company shall not purchase said surplus lands, or, having purchased,
shall forfeit the whole or any part thereof; the Secretary of the Interior shall there-
upon cause the same to be appraised at not less than one dollar and twenty-five cents
per acre, and shall sell the same, in quantities not exceeding one hundred and sixty
acres, at auction to the highest bidder for cash, at not less than such appraised value.
In the amendments to the treaty of February 27, 1867, proclaimed
August 7, 1868 (15 Stat., 531), it was provided:
That the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company their successors
and assigns, having failed to purchase said lands, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe Railroad Company may, within thirty days after the promulgation of this treaty,
purchase of said Pottawatomies their said unallotted lands, except as hereinafter
provided, to St. Mary's mission, at the price of one dollar per acre, lawful money of
the United States, and upon filing their bond for the purchase and payment of said
lands in due form, to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior within the time
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above named, the said Secretary of the Interior shall issue to the last-named rail-
road company certificates of purchase, and such certificates of purchase shall be
deemed and holden, in all courts, as evidence of title ani possession in the said rail-
road company to all or any part of said lands, unless the same shall be forfeited as
herein provided. The said purchase-money shall be paid to the Secretary of the
Interior in trust for said Indians within five years from the date of such purchase,
with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on all deferred payments, until
the whole purchase-money shall have been paid; and before any patents shall issue
for any part of said lands one hundred thousand dollars shall be deposited with the
Secretary of the Interior, to be forfeited in case the whole of the lands are not paid
for as herein provided; (said money may be applied as the payment for the last
one hundred thousand acres of said land;) payments shall also be nade for at least
one-fourth of said unallotted lands at the rate of one dollar per acre, and when so
paid the President is authorized hereby to issue patents for the land so paid for;
and then for every additional part of said land upo the payment of one dollar per
acre. The interest on said purchase-money shall be paid annually to the Secretary
of the Interior for the use of said Indians. If the said company shall fail to pay
the principal when the same shall become due, or to pay all or any part of the inter-
est upon such purchase-money within thirty (30) days after the time when such
payment of interest shall fall due, thea this contract shall be deemed and held
absolutely null and void, and cease to be binding upon either of the parties thereto,
and said company and its assigns shall forfeit all payments of principal and interest
made on such purchase, and all right and title, legal and equitable, of any kind
whatsoever, in and to all and every part of said lands, which shall not have been,
before the date of such forfeiture, paid for as herein provided: Poided, loineer, 
That in case any of said lands have been conveyed to bona-fide purchasers, by said
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, such purchasers shall be entitled
to patents for said lands so purchased by then upon the paymneut of one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre therefor under such rules and regulations as anay be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Interior.
On Alarch 30. 1897, your office addressed a letter to this Department,
wherein, after referring to the treaties named and stating that the last-
named company also failed to purchase these lots, it was said:
As it appears, therefore, that the land in question should be sol for the benefit
of the Indians, I have the honor to recommend that this office be empovered to
direct the register of the land office at Topeka, Kansas, within a few miles of which
city the land lies, to make an appraisal of the land and to sell the same in accord-
ance with article five of the treaty aforesaid.
On April 1,1897, this letter was referred for report to the Commis-
sioner of Idian Afftirs, who, on April 20th following, recommnended
that the authority asked for therein be granted.
On April 28, 1897, your office forwarded to the Department a corn-
inunication from one Emma t. Pape, asking that patent issue to her as
the owner of the land herein described, under mesne conveyance from
the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, which said
company, she alleged, had purchased said island under the treaty of
February 27, 1867, supra, and offering, in the event said company had
not paid for this land as provided by law to do so.
On Jnne 7, 1897 (24 L. D., 513), the Depart'ment rendered a decision,
which, after quoting from the treaty of February 27, 1867, supra,
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including the last proviso of the amended second article thereof, con-
eluded as follows:
In this connection it is deemed proper to call to you attention the pplication of
Emma L. Pape, hereinbefore referred to. It is alleged that the Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe Railroad Company, on the third day of January, 1872, by warranty
deed, conveyed this land to Aaron Sage, and that by regular mesue conveyances this
land became the property of Emma L. Pape on the fourth day of November, 1891.
This showing is not sworn to, and the Department has not deemed it proper to pass
upon the question thus raised, it being te well-established usage of the Department
to await a determination by your office upon such questions before the taking of
final action here.
It is therefore determined that it would not be proper at this time to grant the
request of your office that the register at Topeka be authorized to have the lots in
question appraised in view of the fact that should it be determined that Emnma L.
Papa is entitled to patent for the land, the act itself (seipra) has fixed the price.
Should Emma L. Pape, after a reasonable time given her, to be fixed by your office,
fail to properly assert her claim, there appears to be no good reason why, at the
expiration of such time, the register at Topekashould not be authorized to have the
said lots appraised, and you are accordingly so directed.
On June 23, 1897, your office, in pursuance of the directions thus
given, instructed the local office as follows:
You are hereby directed to notify Emim L. Pape, through her attorney aforesaid,
that she must furnish an abstract of title from the officer having charge of the
records, before this office can pass upon her right to a patent. Sch abstract must.
show the date upon which the railroad company purchased or made application to
purchase the land in question in accordance with the treaty and the amendments
thereto aforesaid.
It appears from your office decision of August 28, 1897, that Emma
L. Pape, under date of July 29, 1897, transmitted an abstract of title,
certified on July 26, 1897, by the register of deeds of Shawnee county,
Kansas, showing that on January 3, 1872, the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Company, by warranty deed, conveyed to Aaron
Sage, with other real estate,-
A certain island situated in Kansas River between sections 29 and 30, containing
11.1 acres, be it more or less, being in T. 11, R. 15 East of the 6th P. M., in Sbawnee
Co., Kansas.
It was stated in your said office decision that while the area of the
island sold by the railroad company to Aaron Sage in 1872 was given
as 11.1 acres, more or less, it was evidently the same tract that was
recently surveyed.
The abstract of title referred to further shows that on November 4,
1891, Emma L. Pape acquired the said island by regular chain of title,
her grantor being Charles Wesley Pape. The abstract does not show,
however, when the railroad company purchased or that they ever com-
pleted their purchase of this land.
It is further set out in your said office decision that a bond dated
September 3, 1868, for $6S0,600 was duly filed with the Department by
the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, in accordance
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with the terms of the treaty of February 27, 1867; that on October 10,
1868, the Department approved the form of certificate showing that said
railroad company, upon a full compliance with the stipulations of the
treaty, would be entitled to demand and receive a patent for the uDal-
lotted lands belonging to the Pottawatomies, and directed a certificate
to be prepared accordingly; that such a certificate was prepared and
approved by the Department, and on October 20, 1868, receipt of the
same was acknowledged by the attorney for the railroad company; that
on February 5, 1869, by instructions from the board of directors, the
attorney and chief engineer of the railroad company requested the
cancellation of the original certificate and the issue, in lieu thereof, of
separate certificates for each quarter section or fractional quarter see-
tion of land included in the purchase under the treaty; that under
instructions from the Department, dated February 9, 1869, the original
certificate having been canceled separate certificates were issued, and
receipt of same was acknowledged by the attorney for the railroad com-
pany March 3, 1869; that a settlement was made with the railroad
company, and on August 28, 1869, a schedule was submitted to the
Department containing a description of the unallotted lands (338,766.82
acres) by legal subdivisions, as the same appeared on the tract books
on file in the Indian Office, which purported to embrace all the lands of
the Pottawatomie Indian reservation in Kansas at the date of the
treaty; and that upon'this schedule patent was issued September 16,
1873, to the railroad company. The island in question was not included
in this or any other patent to the said company.
In view of the facts as herein set forth it was concluded by your
office that, under the last proviso of the amended second article of the
treaty of February 27, 1867, Emna L. Pape is entitled to a patent for
the land in question, upon payment by her of the price fixed by said
treaty, viz: $1.25 per acre.
Frank. Level has appealed from your said office dcision to this
Department, it being alleged, inter alia, that the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Company never made application to purchase the
land in question, and therefore had no right or equity in said land;
that the only lands purchased or pretended to have been purchased by
the railroad company were included in the certificates and patents
issued to said company, and this land is not included in said patents;
that the railroad company never having made application for said
land, and no certificates or patents having been issued therefor, Sage
and each of the grantees in the pretended chain of title took with
notice; and that the land in question, being an island and never
having been surveyed until the appellant made application therefor,
neither Pape nor her grantors could acquire any rights until after such
survey had been made and a plat thereof filed in the'local office.
The, first article of the treaty of November 15, 1861, supra, author-
ized the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to cause the whole of the
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Pottawatomie Indian reservation to be surveyed in the same manner
as the public lands are surveyed. For some reason this island was
never surveyed until after application therefor was made by Frank
Level, though reference is made to it in the field notes, showing that
it was in existence at the date of the survey of the surrounding lands.
It therefore remained unallotted Pottawatoinie land which the Atchi-
son, Topeka and Sante Fe Railroad Company had been given prefer-
ence right to purchase, but which purchase they lid not and could not
complete on account of the samne never having been surveyed.
According to the language of the amended second article of the
treaty of February 27, 1867, supra, it was the evident intention to give
to the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company the privilege
of purchasing from the Pottawatomies all of their uallotted lands,
with certain specified exceptions; and it was provided that the Secre-
tary of the Interior, upon the filing of the bond for the purchase and
payment of these lands, should issue to said railroad company "cer-
tificates of purchase, and such certificates of purchase shall be deemed
and holden, in all courts, as evidence of title and possession in the said
railroad company to all or any part of said lands, unless the same shall
be forfeited as herein provided." Te laud in question was not included
in any certificates of purchase issued to the company, nor was it
embraced in the schedule of lands on which patents were issued to
said company. The reason of this omission is obvious. The tract-books
from which the schedule was made up contain only surveyed lands.
The railroad company therefore, is without that evidence of title pro-
vided for in the treaty, in the form of a certificate of purchase, to the
part of the unallotted lands in question.
The decision of your office, recommending the patent issue to Emma
L. Pape, was evidently based upon the theory that the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, having complied with the
requirements of the treaty for the purchase of all of these unallotted
lands, were justified in believing that they had the right to sell the
laud in question, and that the purchaser thereof from said company
was of the same belief. The Departmentis disposed to agree with this
view, but it does not concur in your office opinion that Emma L. Pape
is entitled to patent for this land under the last proviso of the amended
second article of the treaty. That proviso refers only to lands for
which certificates of purchase were issued to the railroad company,
and which the company may have failed to pay for. It is conceded
that the railroad company complied, within the specified time, with all
the requirements of the treaty as to those lands for which certificates
were issued: consequently, as the proviso contemplates a forfeiture on
the part of the company in the manner suggested, it is inapplicable to
the case- under consideration. The Department is of opinion that
Emma L. Pape must secure her title, if at all, through the railroad
company. It would seem, under all the circumstances of the case, that
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the only obstacle in the way of conferring sch title by the company is
the absence of evidence of a title in them. The question, therefore,
arises as to whether, y the terms of the treaty limiting the time for
payment, the railroad company is now debarred from making payment
for and perfecting title to the island in question.
As previously set out herein it was not due to the fault of the railroad
company, but failure on the part of the government to have this land
surveyed, that said land was not paid for and included in the patents
issued to the company. The records of the Department, in addition to
the facts set forth i your office decision, disclose that on the settlement
with the railroad company they were allowed a rebate on account of
excess of interest paid for the years 1869, 1870, 1871 and 1872, showing
that their bond was for a sUm larger than the number of acres for which
the company completed purchase and secured patents under the treaty.
Until this island was urveyed the railroad company could not know
what they were required to pay for the same. They secured the right
to purchase this land by fully complying with the treaty in other
reslects. That treaty gave this company the privilege of purchasing
the whole of the unallotted lands belonging to the Pottawatomie Ildians
at the date of said treaty, and the company can not be held to have
forfeited that right. It was the (luty of the government to have this
laud surveyed; hence, until it was surveyed and thas placed in such
condition that the comp aly might exercise their privilege of parcllas-
ing the same, the five years limitation as to payment provided by the
treaty could not reasonably be held to run against the company as to
this particular tract. The said company having attempted to convey
this land, without having paid therefor, your office will proceed to notify
the company that they will be afforded a reasonable time, to be pre-
scribed by your office, within which to consummate their purchase by
paying for this land; and in the event of their making the required pay-
ment for the land, patent will issue to said company in regular form.
If the said compaiqy should fail to thus consummate their purchase
within a reasoiable time, your office will make report to this Department.
It is apparent fom what has been set out herein that the land in
question has never been public land subject to homestead entry. The
entry of Frank Level, at whose instance the land was surveyed, was
therefore properly canceled as having been erroneously allowed. He
could gain no rights by such entry, although the allegations contained
in his appeal may be substantially true.
Your office decision of August 28, 1897, with modification suggested
herein, is hereby affirmed.
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RAILROAD "ANDS-RIGHT OF PTJTRCI{ASE-OiMESTEAD.
COOPER V. SCHERRER.
The amendment of section. 3, act of September 29, 1890, by the act of January 23,
1896, whereby actual residence as a pre-requisite to the right of purchase is Dot
required if the lands have been fenced or improved, can not operate to divest
the right of an intervening homesteader acquired nder the original act.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt of your letter of February 3, 189S, resubmitting for
consideration by the Departmnent, i view of the amendatory acts of
January 23, 1896 (29 Stat., 4) and February 18, 1897 29 Stat.; 535) the
application of John L. Cooper to purchase the W. of NW. , NE. 
NW. iam NW. I NE. Sec..21, T. IN., 11. 13E., W. M., The Dalles,
Oregon, under the third section of the act of September 29, 1890 (06
Stat., 496).
It appears from the record that John 1. Cooper filed in the local
office at The Dalles, Oregon, notice of intention to pnrclase said tract
under the third section of the actof September 29, 1890, but failed- to.
exercise his right of purchase within the time limited by the act of
September 29, 1890, and as extended by the act of January 31, 1893
(27 Stat., 47.)
On February 24, 1894, Markus Sherrer made homestead entry of
the land in controversy. Cooper contested the entry alleging that he
was in possession of the land at the date of the passage of the act of
September 29, 1890, and had improved the same with the intention of
purchasiiig the land from the railroad company when it earned it and
that it had not been settled upon by Scherrer nor cultivated by him.
The Department by decision of February 10, 1896 (22 L. D., 127),
affirning the decision of your office, held that as Cooper did not have
possession of the land under a deed, written contract, or license from
the railroad company, his right to purchase could only be based on the
seeond paragraph of the third section of the act of September 29, 1890,
which right is limited to two years from the passage of the act, which
was extended to January 1, 1894, by the act of January 31, 1893, supia.
Having failed to exercise his right of purchase within the time required,
his contest was dismissed, and as no testimony was introduced at the
hearing touching the allegation that Scherrer had not settled upon or
cultivated the tract no action was taken thereon.
As Cooper did not have possession of said lands under a deed, writ-
ten contract or license from the company, he did not come within the
first class provided by section 3 of said act, and as he had not estab-
lished a residence on the land claimed by him he did not come within
the second class, provided for by said section. This was the law in
force at the date of the rejection of his application and the allowance
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of the homestead entry of Scherrer. The amendment of said section
made by the act of January 23,1896, spra, which provides "that actual
residence upon the lands by persons claiming the right to purchase the
same shall not be required where such lands have been fenced, culti-
vated, or otherwise improved by such claimants " will not operate to
divest the right acquired by the homestead settler under the act as
originally passed, and prior to said amendment.
If however, it is true that Scherrer has not complied with the home-
stead law, which may be determined by a contest, I see no reason why
Cooper, upon the successful determination of such contest might not
renew his application to purchase under said section as amended.
HADLEY V. WALTER.
Motion for review of departmental decision of September 22, 1897,
25 L. D., 276, denied by Secretary Bliss, February 21, 1898.
2NATTRAIfZATION-RAILROAD GRANT-SECTION 5, ACT OF MARCH 3,
1887.
:NEILSEN . CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. Co. ET AL.
A declaration of intention to become a citizen filed before a clerk of a court in
1868 (prior to the revision of the United States Statutes) is valid, and qualifies,
in the matter of citizenship, the person taking such action, as a claimant under
the settlement law s.
The settlement laim of a qualified pre-emptor, existing at the date of the attach-
ment of rights under a railroad grant, excepts the land covered thereby from the
operation of the grant.
Rights under a pre-emption filing are forfeited by long continued failure to assert
the same in the manner provided by law.
The fact that a railroad company may have known of the existence of a settlemneut
claim that covered a tract of land at the date of its sale by the company is not
material in determining the right of purchase inder section 5 act of March 3,
1887, if the purchaser was not at such time apprised of said claim.
In the exercise of the right to perfect title under said section, it is not material
whether the purchase from the company was made before or after the passage
of the act, if made in good faith, believing the title to be good, and before the
land was held to be excepted from the grant.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner qf the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 21, 1898. (F. W. C.)
An appeal has been filed on behalf of the Central Pacific Railroad
Company from your office decision of August 15, 1895, holding that the
SE. 1 of See. 29, T. 10 N., R. 2 W., Salt Lake City, Utah, was excepted
from the operation of the grant made by the act of July 1, 1862, 12
Stat., 192, and July 2, 1864, 13 Stat., 358, and directing the cancella-
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tion of the company's list covering said tract. This tract is within the
limits of the grant, as adjusted to the map. of definite location filed
October 20, 1868.
A land office in the Territory of Utah was not opened until March 9,
1869, and the ordtr of withdrawal issued on account of the grant to
the Central Pacific Railroad was not made until May 15, 1869, so that
on May 14,1869, Lars Neilsen was permitted to file pre-emption declara-
tory statement for the above described tract, in which settlement was
alleged April 28, 1869.
-upon the application of the company made with the view of clear-
ing the record of Neilsen's filing, hearing was set for March 23, 1885,
of which it appears notice was given Neilsen by registered letter,
addressed to the post-office nearest the land. Neilsen did not enter an
appearance at the hearing, and on the ex parte testimony offered by
the company the local officers recommended the cancellation of Neilsen's
filing. No action was taken upon the record in said ease until August
15, 1888, when upon examination of the record the recommendation of
the local officers was sustained, and Neilsen's filing was ordered can-
celed. Thereafter, to wit: On November 19, 1888, the company included
the tract in its list No. 21. Said list remained unchallenged until on
January 10,1894, Neilsen filed a corroborated affidavit, alleging that at
the date of the attachment of rights under the grant he was in the
open, peaceable, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession of the
tract, occupying the same with the intention to claim the land under
the settlement laws. Upon this showing a hearing was directed by
your office, which was duly held. William F. House, one of the heirs
of Herman House, deceased, intervened flb the case,.alleging that his
father had been in possession of the land, cultivating and improving
the same since September 21, 1881; that his title came through a chain
of mesne conveyances from the Central Pacific Railroad company, and
he asked to be protected in his purchase and possession. He was
allowed to introduce testimony in support of his claimed right through
purchase from the company. Upon the record as made the local officers
found that while Neilsen was an alien when he went upon the land that
he cured his disability before the right of the company attached, by
declaring his intention to become a citizen on October 7, 1868, and held:
Our joint opinion is that on October 20, 1868, the SE. i of Sec. 29, T. 10 W., R. 2 W.,
Salt Lake Meridian, was not free from a valid pre-emption claim, and this land was
therefore excepted from the operation of the grant to the Central Pacific Railroad
Compainy.
From. this decision the railroad company appealed, and August 15,
1895, your office affirmed the decision of the local officers in holding
that Neilsen's claim as it existed at the time of the definite location of
the company's road excepted the land from the grant; but further held
that Neilsen had lost his rights by his laches. It was further held in
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your said office decision, in referring to the claimed rights of House,
intervenor, through purchase from the company, that-
the company well knew when it sold this land that under the established rulings of
the Department the settlement thereon by a qualified pre-emptor, October 20, 1868,
with the intention of acquiring a title to the-same from the government, reserved it
from the operation of the grant.... It is the opinion of this office tat pur-
chasers from a company, after the approvalof the act of March 3, 1887, are not
protected by the remedial provisions of section five of the act for the reason that
to hold otherwise the company would be enabled to put upon the market lands not
granted to it, and a purchase made under such circumstances will ot be regarded
as bona.fido within the terns made use of i the statute.
This decision, in effect, disposes of the claimed rights of Neilsen, the
railroad company and House, the intervenor. It would appear that
only the company has appealed. In its appeal, however, it alleges
error in holding (1) That the company knew or had reason to know
when it sold the land and Mr. House purchased it in 1891, that the
land was in possession of a qualified settler when its rights attached.
(2) Error in holding that Neilsen was, on October 20, 1868, a settler
on the land with the intention of acquiring title from the government.
(3) Error in holding that Neilsen had, prior to or on October 20, 1868,
declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and
(4) Error in holding the company's list for cancellation.
Relative to the company's claim to the tract under its grant; in the
record made upon Neilsen's application for a hearing, both your office
and the local officers concurred in finding that Neilsen went upon the
land in 1867, and was cultivating and claiming it at the time the map
of definite location of the company's road was filed.
You further find that Neilsen when he went upon the land was dis-
qualified by reason of not being a citizen of the United States, but that
this disability was removed before the attachment of rights under the
grant by the declaration of intention to become a citizen made by
Neilsen on October 7, 1868. It is clear that if Neilsen was a duly
qualified claimant of the land on-October 20, 1868, and filed his declara-
tory statement on May 14, 1869, within three months after opening of
the local office, his claim was one which, under the terms of the grant,
would except the land from the operation thereof.
The company in its second assignment of error denies the fact of
settlement and occupation as claimed by Neilsen at the date of the
attachment of rights under the grant; and while the testimony upon
this point is very conflicting, yet in view of the concurring opinions of
your office and the local office upon this question, I must sustain the
finding as made.
The question arises, therefore, has Neilsen shown himself to have
been a qualified settler at the date of the attachment of rights, under
the grant?
Neilsen's declaration of intention to become a citizen was made
before the clerk of the supreme court of the Territory of Utah.
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The company in support of its appeal says:
The naturalization laws-Section, 2165 R. S.-require the declaration of intention
to become a citizen to be made before "A oaert having a seal," etc., and not before a
clerk of a court.
In this case the declaration was made before the cleric of the court, and no seal is
attached. The clerk wals not authorized by law to take such a declaration, and
therefore Mr. Neilsen was not qualified on October 7, 1868, or on October 20, 1868, to
make a pre-emption claim.
We are aware that Congress by the act of February 1, 1876 (19 Stat., 2), author-
ized declarations of intentions to become a citizen of the United States to be taken
before a clerk of any court named in section 2165, and declaring legal all such declar-
ations heretofore made before a clerk of one of the courts named in said sdction.
Mr. Justice Field, after the passage of said act of 1876, I re Langtry (12 Saw.,
467), held that when a declaration of intention was made before the clerk of the
court, it, to be legal, must be made "in open court."
The question as to the effect of a declaration of intention to become
a citizen of the United States taken before a clerk of the court was
considered by the circuit court of the United States for the 1st circuit,
in the case of Thomas 1I. Butterworth (Woodbury & Minot, Vol. 1 p.
323; 4 Fed. Cas., 924, No. 2251), ill which the court says:
In this case, by the act of 14th April, 1802, eh. 28, (2 Stat., 153,) the alien must
have declared on oath, before some court, his intention to become a citizen, etc., two
years before he can be admitted. When that time has expired, he furnishes proof of
his good character to the court, and is, after proper examination and an oath of
allegiance, permitted to become a citizen, if the court is satisfied he has the proper
qualifications.
It will be seen, that no judicial duty is to be performed by the court till the time
of the taking of the second oath, and that the first one is taken and filed merely to
give public and recorded notice of the intention to become a citizen.
Taking it, then, before the clerk, and filing it with him, would seem to comply
with all the spirit of the act, as the court is there not required to do anything as a
court, but to have the oath administered and filed,,and those are both acts done
through or by the clerk.
But beside this reasoning in favor of that construction, Congress by act of May 26,
1824, h. 186, (4 Stat., 69), provided further, that the first declaration under oath,
"if the same has been made before the clerks of either of the courts," etc., " shall be
as valid as if made before the said courts respectively."
The only doubt now is, whether that provision was intended to cover future cases
as well as past ones of such oaths taken before clerks.
Though the language covers the past, and was meant to, when the act passed, I
think, for the reasons before named in favor of that oath being administered before
the clerk rather than the court, or the clerk: acting for the court for that mere min-
isterial purpose, Congress meant to provide if in any future time, the preliminary
declaration should be presented and sworn to before a clerk, it should be valid, etc.,
as if sworn to before a court.
There was as much reason for making it apply to future eases of that hind as to
past ones; and it would save inconvenient and renewed legislation on the subject, to
have it prospective as well as retrospective.
In addition to this, a cotemporaneous construction sprung up under it in many
cities, to make and file those declarations with the clerk alone; and non' to alter
that practice, after twenty years, suddenly and on doubtful reasoning, to the great
delay and loss of municipal and political rights, and much expense by many applI-
cants, would, in my view, be hardly justifiable.
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In Gordonl's Digest, both the old and new editions, the act of 1824 is treated as
changing that of 1802 in this respect for the fture. P. 435, ) 1488. See, also,
Conkling's Practice, p. 4l97.
The rest of the sections in the act of 1824 apply to the future as well as the past,
and all laws are to be construed as prospective in their operation even more than'
retrospective, on the ground, that a law is most legitimately meant to be a guide or
rule for future conduct.
I am corroborated in these views by what I understand to be the practice in sev-
eral other circuits of this court, where I have made inquiries.
Let the applicant be admitted to the final examination.
By the act of February 1, 1876 (19 Stat., 2), it was provided:
That the declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, required
by section two thousand one hundred and sixty-five of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, may be made by au alien before the clerk of any of the courts named
in said section two thousand one hundred and sixty-five; and all such declarations
heretofore made before any such clerk are hereby declared as legal and valid as if
made before one of the courts named in said section.
From an examination of the debates in Congress bearing upon. this
act, it would appear that its purpose was merely to supply an omission
occurring in the revision of the U. S. statutes.
The following will be found on page 470 of the Congressional Record
for the 44th Congress, 1st session:
Mr. Ashe, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported back without amendment
the bill (H. R. No. 626) to amend the Revised Statutes relating to naturalization,
with a recommendation that the same do pass.
The bill, which was read, provides that the declaration of intention to become a
citizen of the United States, required by section 2165 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, may be made by an alien before the clerk of any of the courts named
in said section, and that all such declarations heretofore made before anysuch clerks
shall be legal and valid as if made before one of the courts named in said section.
Mr. Ashe. I will now move the previous question on the bill.
Mr. Page. I would like to hear some explanation of the provisions of this bill. In
what way does it propose to amend the Revised Statutes e
Mr. Ashe. In this particular: It authorizes an alien to file his declaration before a
clerk of any of the courts named in the section of the Revised Statutes referred to.
Before the adoption of the Revised Statutes that was the law, but in the revision
of the statutes the word "clerk" was omitted. A number of immigrants in the
northwestern States especially, supposing there had been no change in the law, have
filed their declarations before the clerks of the courts. This bill is simply to put
back the law to where it was before the revision of the statutes was made.
Mr. Holman. I wish to ask the gentleman whether this bill goes to the extent of
curing the defect in the declarations already made?
Mr. Ashe. Yes, sir; it cures all such defects.
Again, on page 638, the following is taken from proceedings before
the Senate:
Mr. Howe. I am directed by the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred
the bill (H. R. No. 626) to amend the Revised Statutes relating to naturalization, to
report it without amendment; and inasmuch as the amendment will relieve from
great inconvenience at once a large class of people, I ask that the Senate will consider
it at the present time.
By unanimous consent, the bill was considered as in Committee of the Whole. It
provides that the declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States,
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required by section 2165 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, may be made
by anl alien before the clerk of any of the courts named in that section;. and makes
valid all such declarations heretofore muade before any sch clerk as if made before
one of the courts niamed in that section.
Mr. Whyte. I would like to ask the Senator who reports this bill whether it makes
any change except in allowing the clerk to take the affidavit instead of the court?
Mr. Howe. None whatever; it just restores the old law.
The bill was reported to the Senate without amendment, ordered to a third read-
ing, read the third time, and passed.
From a review of the matter I am of opinion that the declaration
made before the clerk in 1868, which was before the revision, was valid
and thereby Neilsen became duly qualified to assert a claim under the
settlement la..
The ease, In re Langtry (12 Sawyer, 467), referred to by counsel for
the company has no bearing upon the question in this case.
Your office decision therefore properly held, upon the showing pre-
sented by the record, that the claim of Neilsen existing at the date of
the attachment of rights under the grant, served to except the land in
question from the operation of the grant.
As before stated, your office decision held that Neilsen through his
laches had forfeited -l rights under his filing, and that any claim now
made to the land must be considered as a new claim, from which hold-
ing he failed to appeal, so that he is not now before this Department;
but the evidence upon this point has been examined and is found to
fully sutain your finding.
House never formally applied to purchase under the provisions of
section 5 of the act of March 3, 1S87 (24 Stat., 556), although his inter-
vention was evidently for the purpose of protecting such claim in the
event that the tract was held to be excepted from the grant.
Your office decision, as hereinbefore set forth, disposed of such
claimed right of purchase, holding, in effect, that the sale was .not
made in good faith because the company well knew when it sold the
land that it was excepted from its grant; further that the sale was
made after the passage of the act of March 3, 1887, spra, and was,
for that reason, not protected by said act.
House did not appeal, but, as before stated, he did not have an appli-
cation pending.
The company in the first ground of error set forth in its appeal,
alleges error in holding that it knew or had reason to know. when it
sold the land and Mr. House purchased it in 1891, that the land was in
the possession of a qualified settler when its rights attached.
It must be admitted that the company is interested in the determina-
tion of this question, and is entitled to protect its transferees, hence,
the question as to the character of the sale as disclosed by the record
will be considered upon its appeal.
The question as to whether the company had knowledge of the set-
tlement claim of Neilsen at the date of attachment of rights under its
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grant is not a material one. The sole question is, was House apprised
of a settlement claim at the time of his purchase.
It will be remembered that Neilsen's filing was made May 14,1869;
that the railroad company's rights under the grant attached by the
definite location of its road opposite this tract October 20,1868, and
that the date of Neilsen's settlement named by him in his filing was
April 28, 1869.
It was not until, in the affidavit made the basis of the present con-
troversy, which was filed in 1894, that allegation was made of settle-
ment antedating the filing of the company's map of definite location.
It cannot be held, as against House, upon the record in this case, that
his purchase was made with a knowledge that the land was in the pos-
session of a qualified settler at the time when the rights under the grant
attached, for the record of Neilsen's filing based upon his own allega-
tion, upon which House and all others had a right to rely, fixed the time
of his settlement six months subsequent to the definite location of the
road and the consequent attachment of rights under the grants
In so far as the holding of your office affected House's bona fides, the
same is set aside.
Relative to the fact that the sale was made after the passage of the
act of March 3, 1887, your attention is invited to departmental decision
of February 21, 1896 (Andrus et al. v. Balch, 22 L. D., 238), in which
it was held:
In the exercise of the right to perfect title under section 5, act of March 3, 1887, it
is not material whether the purchase from the company was made before or after
the passage of said act, if made in good faith believing the title to be good, and
before the land purchased was held to be excepted from the grant.
TUnder the view herein taken the tract under consideration was
excepted from the railroad grant, and in the light of the showing made
evidencing a sale by the company, you are directed to advise Mr. House
of this holding and that application to purchase should be made within
a reasonable time, to be fixed by your office, otherwise the land will be
disposed of i the usual manner.
Should application be made to purchase, the rights thereunder can
be adjudicated upon the proof offered in support thereof. At this time
Neilsen or any o her party will be permitted to. show, if he can, that
House is not a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of section 5
of the act in question.
With this modification your office decision is affirmed.
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HOMESTE-AD ENTRY-DEATI-I OF ENTRYMAN-MINOR HEIRS.
CURRAN V. WILLIAMS' HEIRS.
On the death of a homesteader, leavingminorheirs, the wife having previously died
such minors are entitled to patent on due proof of compliance with law on the
part of the etryman up to the time of his decease, the fact of minority at such
time, and the death of both parents.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 24, 1898. (H. C;.)
Hannibal Williams made homestead entry of the N. 2 of the NE. 4 and
the E. I of the NW. 1 of See. 18, T. 19 S., R. 3 W., within the land
district at Montgomery, Alabama, on December 10, 1882. He died in
March, 1885, leaving seven minor children surviving him, his wife hav-
ing died previous to his decease. The eldest of these minor children
was a son, sixteen years of age. The children were then taken care of
by relatives and others, and left the premises, with the exception of the
eldest son, who remained there about a year afterwards, and who
returned,' with his wife and younger brother, after the appointment of
the guardian, November 23, 1891, remaining on the premises until
ordered away by Curran.
Without knowledge, apparently, of the death of Williams, his entry
was canceled by your office, March 10, 1890, for the failure of the
entryman to make final proof within the statutory period of seven.
years, and Curran made homestead entry for the tract May 20,1892.
December 8, 1892, the local office transmitted to your office the peti-
tion and affidavit of Moses McCree, reciting the death of Williams and
the death of his wife prior thereto, his appointment and qualification
as guardian, under the laws of Alabama, of the following surviving
children of Williams: Mack, Wesley, James, Sarah, Louisa, Richard,
and Mary. The petition further alleged that Williams had resided
with his family on the land from the date of his entry until his death,
had made considerable iprovements thereon, and that his minor chil-
dren were living on the land at the date of his death, remaining thereon
until September, 1892, when they were ordered off by Curran, with
which order they complied, without the knowledge of the petitioner,
but subsequentlyreturned to the land at his direction. The petitioner
prayed for the cancellation of Curran's entry, that Williams's entry be
re-instated, and that as guardian of the said minor children he be
permitted to make final proof.
January 21, 1893, your office directed the local office to inform Curran
that he would be allowed thirty days after notice thereof to show cause
why his entry should not be canceled for conflict with the rights of an
actual settler with valuable improvements, and in case that the local
office should cancel Curran's entry that the entry of Williams would be
re-instated and the gaurdian permitted to make final proof.
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Upon the report; from the local office, that Curran had made no
response after due notice, your office held his entry for cancellation.
Curran appealed, and, on February 16,1895, the Department set aside
the decision of your office, evidently on the ground of the lack or
insufficiency of the notice to Curran, and directed an inquiry before the
local office, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts npon which to base
action, in accordance with the views expressed in the departmental
opinion.
These views were that, under the provisions of section 2292 of the
Revised Statutes, in case of the death of both father and mother leav-
ing an infant child or children, the right and fee of the land covered
by the homestead entry of the father enure to the benefit of such infant
child or children, and the immediate investiture of such "right and
fee" occurred on the death of the surviving parent, and the children in
such an event are entitled to patent on due showing of compliance with
law on the part of the entryman up to the time of his decease, the
death of both parents, and the fact of minority. (Curran v. Williams'
Heirs, 20 L. D., 109.)
This hearing was had, at which the heirs were represented by their
guardian and his counsel, and the contestant appeared in person
and by attorney. Thereafter the local office, upon a review of the
testimony taken at the hearing, found for the heirs and recommended
that the entry of Curran be canceled, that the entry of Williams be
re-instated, and that the guardian be allowed to make proof, provided
none of the heirs has reached his majority, and in such event that the
heir or heirs of lawful age be permitted to complete final proof for
the remaining heirs.
Curran appealed fron this decision to your office, which, on April 29,
1896, affirmed the decision of the local office and held Curran's entry
subject to the right of the heirs of Williams to submit final proof and
to have the entry of their deceased father re-instated within ninety
days after the decision of your office becomes final.
Curran appeals in person. His specifications of error are, in effect,
that te evidence at the hearing failed to show that the entrymnan com-
plied with the law as to residence and cultivation prior to his death,
and did not establish the grounds of contest, or that the heirs of Wi
liams resided on the tract, or that the same was cultivated for them
after the death of decedent, but does show that the said heirs left the
land and lived elsewhere after the death of their father, and returned
to the land only a short time bfore the initiation of the contest pro-
ceedings. The other allegations of the appeal are, that the evidence
fails to establish that Curran did anything to prevent the heirs from
living on the land, but discloses that from the time of the death of Wil-
liams (in 1885) until the entry of Curran (1892), no one was in posses-
sion of the lands or exercised any control over the same; and, further,
that no effort was made on the part of the heirs to secure the tract
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u ntil (Jurran had improved the same and expended about six hundred
dollars in improvements thereon.
In reviewing the evidence taken at the hearing, your office decision
says:
The evidence plainly shows compliance by Williams with the requirements of the
homestead law from date of entry to (late of his death; that the mother died before
the father, and that the children were all minors at (the) date of death of the sur-
viving parent; and thus the conditions are all established to entitle the heirs to this
land under the law.
These findings of fact and conclusions of law are correct. The evi-
dence establishes without much question that Williams resided with his
family on the tract from his entry until the time of his death, which
followed that of his wife, and that he had improved and cultivated the
premises.
It was not necessary that the heirs should reside upon and cultivate
the premises, after the death of their father, under the terms of the
statute applicable to the facts in the case. They did so, to a limited
extent, and some of them were on the premises before Curran made
entry. ile was bound to know the state of the record in the land office,
and his residence in the neighborhood and the testimony at the hearing
show that he knew that Williams lived upon the land, with his family,
prior to his death, and the improvements made by Ciirran were made
with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances developed at the
inquiry before lie made entry of the land. The case does not depend
upon such knowledge of Curran, however, but falls within the decision
in the case of Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S., 242, 247, wherein it is held
that, where there are no adult heirs, and only minor heirs, and both
parents are deceased, the requirements exacted in case the heirs are
adults and minors, or adults aloie,-viz: of proof of residence upon
the property, or its cultivation for the term of five years, non-alienation
except in cases specified, and the applicant's citizeusip,-are omitted
and i sale of the land within two years after the death of the surviving
parent is authorized for the benefit of the infants.
Referring to the case where the heirs are minors, it is said, in the
course of the opinion:
The fact of their being infant children and the death of their parents is all that
is required to establish their right and title to the premises and to a patent.
Section 2292, was, in our judgment, only intended to give to infant hildre the
benefit of the homestead entry and to relieve them, because of their infancy, from
the necessity of proving the conditions required when there are-only adults, or adults
and minors, mentioned in the previous section, and to allow a sale of the land within
a prescribed period for their benefit.
It seenis that some of the heirs, although all minors at the time of
the death of their surviving parent in 18S5, are now adults, but this
phase of the case does not alter the situation of the heirs or require
them to make further proof than that exacted if the proceedings for
their benefit had not been so long delayed in the appointment of the
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guardian and the subsequent initiation of the contest. They were
immediately vested with the "right and fee" to the premises entered
upon the death of their surviving parent, as there had been a compli-
ance with the law at the time of his death, and this only, with the proof
of the death of both parents and the fact of minority, is all that need
be shown. (Curran v. Williams' Heirs, supra.)
The proof may, therefore, be made in the manner provided for in
your office decision.
The decision of your office is, in all respects, affirmed.
MINING CLAIM-ORDER oE CANCELLATION-REINSTATEMENT.
LILLIAN LODE ET AL.
A mineral entry having been canceled, for failure to comply with certain spple-
mental requirements, should not be reinstated on the groulnd that such action
was taken without notice, if in fact the entryman had actual knowledge
thereof; nor should an order of reinstatement be ade, in the presence of an
intervening adverse claim, without opportunity given to such claimant to show
cause Why the application for reinstatement should not be allowed.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. 1).) 24, 1898. (P. J. C.)
It appears that applications for patent were filed in the Salt Lake,
Utah, land office, No. 2370 for the Lillian lode, survey No. 3054, on
March 15, 1896, by Frank L. Hines, and No. 2500 for the Little Joint
and other lode claims, survey, No. 3120, on February 17, 1897, by the
Silver Lode MiniDg and Milling Company.
It is stated by your office that
said surveys are shown by the records of this office to overlie surveys Nos. 13 and 15,
lots 49 and 51, the Emery nd Mormon Chief lode claims, embraced in mineral
entries Nos. 519 and 520.
The Emery was passed to patent April 14, 1897, so no further men-
tion of it need be made at this time.
The entry of the Moron Chief, No. 520, was made and final receipt
issued thereon to Samuel E. Rogers, November 10, 1880. By your office
letter of January 27, 1882, the evidence of the applicant's title was held
insufficient and he was called upon-to furnish additional evidence upon
that point. This requirement not being eonl)lied with, was repeated in
your office letter of November 28, 1890. By letter of March 28, 1891,
your office held the Mormon Chief entry for cancellation because of the
continued failure to furnish the additional evidence so required, and on
August 21, 1891, the entry was formally canceled.
As before stated, the Silver Lode Mining and Milling Company,
February 17, 1897, made application for patent to the Little Joint and
other lode claims covering the ground embraced in the Mormon Chief,
and proceeded with the posting and publishing of notice thereof. Dur-
ing the period of publication of this application, Rogers applied to your
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office for a reinstatement of the Mormon Chief entry. With the appli-
cation for reinstatement he furnished a part of the additional evidence
theretofore required by your office letters of-January 27, 182, and
November 28, 1890, but other parts thereof were not then and have not
since been furnisled. From January 27, 1882, to the time of this appli-
cation for reinstatement, a period of fifteen years, Rogers seems to have
taken no action whatever respecting the Mormon Chief entry, and dur-
ing that time does not seem to have taken a single step toward prose-
cuting the same to patent. The application for the reinstatement of
the Mormon Chief entry and the accompanying papers show that
Rogers at the time of making that application knew that your office
had required such additional evidence and ad canceled his entry
because of the non-production thereof, but these papers do not show
how or when he obtained this information. Without affording the inter-
vening adverse claimant any opportunity to be heard thereon your
office on June 27, 1897, reinstated the Mormon Chief entry, and on July
2, 1897, held the Silver Lode Mining and, Milling Company's application
for rejection to the extent of the conflict with the Mormon Chief. The
ground stated for the reinstatement of the Mormon Chief entry is that
the cancellation thereof was made without notice to the entryman and
was, therefore, unauthorized. In connection with Rogers' application
for reinstatement, the attention of your office is called to the fact that
he does not allege that he was without actual notice of the action of
your office in requiring additional evidence or in canceling the Mormnon
Chief entry for failure to furnish such evidence. He makes no state-
ment, sworn or otherwise, respecting such notice, the only reference
thereto upon his behalf being the contention of his attorney that the
record does not affirmatively show that your office letters were served
upon Rogers. Without reference to what appears in the record reslpect-
ing such service, it may be stated that if Rogers had actual knowledge
of the action of your office he was as much bound thereby as it' notice
had been formally served upon him according to the rules of practice.
The reinstatement of the Mormon Chief entry was erroneous in at
least two respects: First, it should not have been made without a
proper showing by Rogers respecting his knowledge of the action of
your office in requiring additional evidence and in holding his entry for
cancellation; and second, the intervening adverse claim being shown
by the records of the local office the Mormon Chief entry should not
have been reinstated without giving the owner of the intervening
claim an opportunity to show cause avhy the reinstatement should not
be allowed.
Under these circumstances, the reinstatement of the Mormon Chief
entry and the holding for rejection of the Silver Lode Mining and Milling
Company's application to the extent of the coifflict with the Mormon
Chief, is vacated, and your office is directed to order a hearing (1) to
enable Rogers to make such showing as he can respecting his knowl-
edge of the action of your office in requiring additional evidence and
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in holding the Mormon Chief entry for cancellation, and (2) to enable
the intervening adverse claimant to show cause, if any there be, against
the reinstatement of the Mormon Chief entry.
Pending this hearing and a determination of the questions there
presented, action upon the application for reinstatement and upon the
Silver Lode Mining and Milling Company's application for patent will
be suspended.
This case is before the Department upon a purported appeal taken
by the mining company from your office decision of July 2, 1897, sus-
pending its application for patent. The appeal was filed five days too
late and would be dismissed if the errors in the record hereinbefore
shown did not require the exercise of the supervisory authority of the
Secretary.
Accompanying this tardy appeal are a number of ex parte affidavits
tending to show that Rogers has not been i possession of the Mormon
Chief ground since about 1883; that from that time until 1892 it was
vacant and unoccupied; that in 1892, the cancellation of the Mormon
Chief entry being shown by the records of the local office, the appel-
lant's grantors relocated the ground, and that since then the appellant
and its grantors have been continuously in the open, notorious and
undisputed possession thereof and have made large expenditures in
the improvement and development thereof as a mining claim. Rogers
has also submitted an affidavit of the elpenditures made by him upon
the Mormon bhief prior to the entry thereof. Tese affidavits will not
be considered at this time and in so far as any of the matters therein
may be material they can be proven in the regular way at the hearing.
HOMKESTEAD CONTEST-NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT CLAIM.
BARNES V. MAGEE.
A settlement on land not subject thereto does not operate as notice, constructive or
otherwise, of a claim to other lanid in the same quarter section.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Offce, February
(W. V. D.) 24, 1898. (G. B. G.)
The appeal of Edward L. Barnes from your office decision of March
18, 1897, in the case of said Barnes v. David B. Magee, wherein is
involved the S. A of the NW. J of section 25, township 27, range 1 west,
Oklahoma Territory, has been considered.
On the 26th day of September, 1893, one J. W. Shipp made homestead
entry for the tract. On December 7tb, the defendant, Magee, filed an
application to enter said tract, together with the adjoining N. of the
SW. i of said section 25 and on the same day filed affidavit of contest
against the entry of Shipp, charging prior settlement.
On February 19, 1894, the said Magee filed Shipp's relinquishment,
together with his own application to make entry of the said S. Iof the
NW. and theN. of theSW.l.
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- In the meantime, however, on December 16, 1893, the contestant,
Barnes, filed an application by mail to enter the tract in controversy,
which ;tas rejected, for the reason that his application also covered the
N. of the NW. 1 of said section 25, which was an Indian allotment
not sbject to entry, aud, on March 5, 1894, he filed an affidavit of
contest, alleging prior settlement against both Shipp and Magee.
On March 20, 1894, the local officers canceled Shipp's entry, and
allowed Magee's entry for the land embraced in his application.
A hearing was had on December 12, 1895, the local officers recom-
mended that the contest be disnissed, and your office approved that
recommendation, and affirmed the decision.
The record shows that Barnes made the race on the day of the open-
ing of said lauds to settlement, September 16, 1893, and staked the N. W
of the NW. a of said section (all Indian allotment) on that day. This
stake was afterwards takien up and driven i another place, and on
September 20th lie moved his family and established residence, at a
point which the local officers and your office find was on the allotted
land.
This finding is controverted by the contestant, but the evidence so
shows. It is submitted that it was the intention of the contestant to
settle on the line between the Indian allotment and the S. i of the
NW. 1, with a view to asserting a right to the whole quarter section, it
being believed by him that said allotment was invalid.
In view of the fact that the record shows that his settlement was
made wholly on the allotted land, it is not material what his intentions
were. The land embraced in the allotijent was not subject to disposi-
tion, and a settlement thereon did not operate as notice, constructive
or otherwise, that lie claimed other land in the same quarter section.
Tle defendant, Magee, staked te land in controversy on September
l6th, after the contestant had driven his stake oIL the Indian allotment.
He established his residence thereon on the 28th of the same month,
and has since complied with the law.
Your office decision is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-TERMINAL POINT-ORDER OF, SUSPENSION.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
Directions given for the suspension from entry and patent of lands remaining ndis-
posed of in the odd-numbered sections within that part of the formerly recognized
limits of the Northern Pacific grant lying east of Duluth.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(WV. V. D.) 28, 1898. (F. W. C.)
January 20, 1898, a petition was filed oil behalf of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company for reconsideration of departmental comma-
.nication of December 13, 1897 25 L. D., 5011, denying an application
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by that company for the sspension from entry and patent of the lands
remaining tundisposed of in the odd numbered sections within that part
of the formerly recognized limits of the grant for said company lying
east of the terminus established by departmental decision of August
27, 1896 (23 L. D., 204).
The railroad company declined to acquiesce in the said decision of
August 27, 1896, and to secure a judicial determfiation in the courts of
the company's rights in the premises, this Department December 4,
1896, recommended to the Department of Justice the institution of a
suit for the recovery of the title to a tract of land theretofore patented
to said railroad company under its grant, and lying east of the termi-
nus established by such departmental decision. If the terminus so
established is a correct one, then the patenting of this tract was errone-
ous and the United States is entitled to recover fom the railroad the
title thereto. Pursuant to this recommendation such a suit was insti-
tuted under the direction of the Department of Justice, September 3,
1897, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Min-
nesota.
It appears that immediately following the departmental ruling of
August 27, 1896, the railroad company requested this Department to
cause the institution of a suit which would test the correctness of the
ruling establishing such eastern terminus and that being dissatisfied
with the delay in the institution of such a suit by the government, the
railroad company itself caused such a suit to be instituted January 11,
1897, in one of the State courts of Wisconsin, this latter suit involving
the company's right of way over a tract lying east of the terminus so
established.
Supplemental to its petition of January 20, 1898, the railroad com-
pany has since filed a communication stating that the company will
acquiesce in the selection of either the case pending in the State court
in Wisconsin or the case pending in the circuit court of the United
States, in Minnesota as a test case wherein the question in controversy
may be finally determined, and that if the government selects either of
these cases as such test case, the company will assist in expediting the
same to a final conclusion, and will assent to the other ease being held
in abeyance during the pendency of the one selected as a test case.
The greater portion of the lands now claimed by the company oppo-
site the line of location of its road east of the terminus as now estab-
lished, lies within the indemnity limits and it is claimed by the company
that if its grant east of that terminus is recognized by the courts, it
will need all of the lands which it has heretofore selected within such
indemnity limits, to satisfy the losses sustained by it in lands in place.
If the departmental ruling is not sustained by the courts and in the
meantime the Department continues to dispose of the lands in dispute,
under the general land laws,-such action will involve the railroad com-
pany and the persons attempting to acquire such lands in expensive
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and complicated litigation, resulting in irreparable injury to all con-
cerned.
As a matter of proper administration and of due regard to the inter-
ests of settlers and others attempting to acquire these lands, and as a
matter of due regard to the possible rights of the railroad company, it
is directed that the odd numbered sections available to the company's
grant within the primary limits, and those selected within the indem-
nity limits formerly recognized, to the east of the terminus established
by the departmental ruling in question, be suspended from entry pend-
ing the judicial determination in the courts of the question in contro-
versy. While entry of these lands will not be allowed during this
suspension, yet in all cases where entries have been heretofore allowed,
the parties' will be permitted to complete the same by making proof
thereon, but the issue of patent will be suspended until such judicial
determination.
This Department will at once communicate with the Department of
Justice respecting the selection of a test case, and urging that it be
advanced and expedited in every reasonable way to an early conclusion.
You will advise the local officers of this order.
PRE-EMPTION CLAIM-TRANSMUTATION.
HENRY WILD.
The right to transmute a pre-emption claim to a homestead entry can not be recog-
nized, where the applicant has perfected title to one hundred and sixty acres
nuder the homestead law, and his pre-emption claim was not initiated until
after the passage of the act of March 2, 1889.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the Geineral Land Office,
(W. V. D.) - February 25, 1898. (J. L. McC.)
Henry Wild has applied to transmute to a homestead entry his pre-
emption declaratory statement for the W. j- of the SE. 4 of See. 31,
T. 36 N., R. 8 B., Seattle land district, Washington.
From the records ofyouroffice it appears that the pre-emption declara-
tory statement embracing the laud in question was filed oi August 22,
1893, alleging settlement January S., 1891; that said Wild, on January
15, 1883, at Huron, South Dakota, made commutation of his homestead
entry, made November 17, 1881, for the SE. i of Sec. 23, T. 118, . 65,
containing 160 acres; that patent on said entry issued February 15,
18S4; and your office decision of June 29, 1896, holds that,
as Mr. Wild has perfected title to one hundred and sixty acres of land under the
homestead law, and as his pre-eniption- claim to the lankl no'W applied for was not
initiated until after the passage of the act of March 2, 1889, he is not entitled to
transmute said filing to a homestead entry.
From said decison Wild has appealed.
The decision of your office was correct, and is hereby affirmed.
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LEAVE OF ABSENCE--ABANDOXiMENT.
JACOBS V. BRIGHAM.
A leave of absence granted a homesteader under the act of March 2,1889, protects
the entry, as against a charge of abandonment, for the period of six months after
the expiration of said leave.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Oice,
(W. V. D.) February 25, 1898. (J. L. MeC.)
Carrie E. Brigham, on April 1, 1893, made homestead entry for the
SE. 4. of See. 13, T. 8 S., R. 37 W., Colby land district, Kansas.
Subsequently she applied for, and was granted, leave of absence from
December 27, 1894, to December 27, 1895.
On February 17, 1896, William R. Jacobs filed affidavit of contest
against her etry, alleging:
That said eDtryman obtained leave of absence from said land on the 27th day of
December, 1894, which leave of absence expired on the 27th clay of December, 189a;
that said entryman has not re-established her residence since the expiration of said
leave of absence.
The local officers rejected the application to contest; thereupon
Jacobs appealed to your office, which sustained the action of te local
officers, on the ground that the leave of absence "protected the entry
against contest for abandonment for six months after the expiration of
such leave"-citing in support of your ruling the departmental decision
in the case of Hiltoer v. Wortler (18 L. D., 331).
The dlel)artmental decision above cited holds (see syllabus):
Where a leave of absence is granted a homesteader under the act of March 2, 1889,
a charge of abandonment will not lie against the entry until the expiration of six
months after the time for which the leave of absence was granted.
Said decision is applicable to the case now under consideration. The
decision of your office in dismissing the contest was correct, and is
hereby affirmed.
PREFE RRED RIGHT-ADVERSE CLAIM-REASONABLE TIME.
CHARLEs A. PARROTT.
Where by the decision of the General Land Office the right to enter a certain tract
is recognized, but io time is fixed in said decision within which such entry
shall be made, the right so allowed may be lost if not asserted within a reason-
able time.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) February 25, 1898. (L. L. B.)
The record of the appeal of Charles A. Parrott, from the rejection of
his application to make homestead entry for the SW. of the SW. d
Sec. 10, and te E. tSE. and SE..1 NE. Sec. 9, T. 36 N., . 2 W.,
Lewiston, Iaho District, shows the following facts.
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December 19, 1895, the register and receiver by letter reported
favorably upon the application of Lawrence Tippie to make a new
entry for the E. t SE. and SE. 1 NE. j Sec. 9, Tpi 36 N. R.. 2 W.,
under the act of December 29, 1894 (28 Stat., 599) providing for a
second entry, when, through certain causes therein mentioned the first
entry had been forfeited.
By your office letter "C," of April 8, 1896, his application was
granted and the register and receiver vere directed to proceed under
the circular of March 23, 1895, regulating entries under said act of
December 29, 1894. In this letter no time was specified within which
the entry should be made.
June 1, 1896, Charles A. Parrott, appellant herein applied to make
homestead entry of the land first above described which includes the
land in Tippie's application and forty acres in section 10. His applica-
tion was suspended by the local office to await the action of Tippie on
the one hundred and twenty acres embraced in his application for
second entry and which had been allowed by your letter "C)." of
April 8, 1896.
From this action of the local office suspending his application, Par-
rott appealed, his counsel stating that-
the principal grievance of this appellant is that forty-four days have now elapsed
and the said Tippie has failed and neglected to file on said land or imprbve the
same.
July 2, 1896, your office sustained the action of the register and
receiver in suspending the application of Parrott on the ground that
the time within which Tippie was to make his entry " was not limited
by said letter of this office." No limitation as to time when Tippie
should make his entry was designated in this letter.
On the 17th day of August, 1896,'counsel for Parrott filed with the
register a paper designated by him as "An application for review to
the Honorable Secretary of the Interior from decision of the Honorable
Commissioner," in which he asks for a review of all the proceedings
had in the premises appertaining to and affecting the same by the Hon-
orable Commissioner and the register and receiver in passing upon and
denying said application. This paper was transmitted by the register
to your office August 18, 1896.
September 21, following, the register forwarded a report to the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office, showing that Tippie "has failed
to make entry of the land after due notice from this office," and enclosed
a registered return receipt signed by Tippie, June 19, 1896, morethan
ninety days previous thereto.
On the same day counsel for Parrott filed with the receiver of the
local office a protest against allowing Tippie to make entry of the land
until Parrott's case "is disposed of on appeal before the Honorable Sec-
retary of the Interior," for the reason that Tippie is acting in bad faith;
that he has failed to make his entry within a reasonable time; and that
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the "record will disclose the fact that the said Tippie is seeking to
defraud the government by speculating in this land."
Parrott's application for review was accompanied by his own. affrdavit
substantially corroborated by that of another witness stating that he
had placed improvements upon the land to the value of three hundred
dollars; that he is informed and believes that Tippie is not acting in
good faith, and that he is now and for some time past has been doing
some work and engaged in business in Pierce City, seventy miles away
from the land, and that it is not his intention to attempt to file on the
land, but lie is holding it for the purpose of speculation.
As appears from the foregoing, more than five months elapsed after
Tippie was allowed by the Commissioner to make entry and more than
ninety days elapsed after he received notice thereof when the receiver
reported that he had failed to make entry of the land."
It is true that in your office letter allowing his entry no time was
designated within which the entry should be made, but it is a rule of
law that when an act is agreed, or allowed, to be clone and the time of
performance is not specified it must be done within a easonable time.
What is a reasonable time in this ease?
The time allowed for the exercise of a preference right of entry given
a successful contestant is thirty days from date of notice. There is
nothing in the nature of this case that would seem to require a greater
length of time than that awarded to a successful contestant, and by
the custom of your office, when a time is limited at the discretion of
the Commissioner, more than thirty days. is rarely allowed, in which
to make entry, and when a homestead claim is initiated on surveyed
land by settlement, the claimant is required to make his entry within
three months from date of settlement. Certainly no reason appears
in this case why Tippie should be allowed more time in which to make
his entry than is allowed a homesteader who claims by settlement.
The local office was open to receive Tippie's filing from April until
September, and more than three months had elapsed after he had been
notified of the right to enter before the protest of Parrott was filed, and
still his entry papers were not presented, and for aught that appears
in the record he has not yet made entry of the land.
To allow him indefinitely to withhold this land from settlement and
entry, at his own caprice, would be contrary to the spirit of the laws
relating to the disposal of the public lands.
Your decision of July 24th, 1896, from which this appeal was prose-
cuted was right in view of the facts then before you, for the record
shows that at the time Parrott (the applicant for original entry) made
his application, Tippie had not received notice of the allowance of his
application by your office letter of April 8th? and the only notice shown
to have been received by him was of date June 19, 1896, and even this
notice was not before you when said decision was rendered.
By the record here presented, for the first time, however, it appears
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that Tippio received notice of his right to enter June 19, 1896, more
than thirty days prior to your office decision (July 24,) and, as above
stated, it was made known to this Department that his entry had not
been made September 21, 1896, more than three months after notice to
him of its allowance.
From the record thus presented, it would appear that Tippie has not
only negleted his rights but has shown a disregard of his duties and
lack of good faith in connection with his claim to the land, and this
Department might be jstified in reversing your office decision and
directing the allowance of Parrott's application to make entry for the
land claimed by him.
Inasmuch, however, as Tippie has not had notice of the proceedings
on the part of Parrott, this Department, in the exercise of its super-
visory authority, directs that you allow Tippie twenty days after notice
to show cause, if any he has, why he failed to make his entry within
ninety days after receipt of notice of your office letter of April 8, 1896,
and in default of such showing, you will direct his application to be
rejected and that of Parrott allowed.
The decision of your office is accordingly modified.
RAILROAD LANDS-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1887.
flINKELL v. HOWLAND.
A purchas i good faith of patented railroad land, based on a contract entered into
after the issuance of patent, entitles the purchaser to a patent under section 4,
act of March 3,1887, if it subsequently appears that the land was erroneously
patented under the grant, and the patent is set aside.
Section 3 of said act does not contemplate the recognition of entries made, or claims
initiated, after patent has issued under the grant and the land has been sold to
a bona fide purchaser, as against the right of such purchaser.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 28, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Joseph lintell has appealed from your office decision of June 7, 1897,
in which it was held that the claim made by James L. Howland for
confirmation of title under the fourth section of the act of March 3, 1887
(24 Stat., 556), to the SE 1 of See. 33, T. 1 N., R. 8 W., S. B. M., Los
Angelea land district, California, is superior to the claim set up by
Hinkell as a settler upon said tract.
This tract is within the conflicting limits of the grants for the Atlantic
and Pacific railroad and the grant for the Southern Pacific railroad,
on account of its branch line, which latter grant was made by the act
of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 573) It was patented to the Southern
Pacific Railroad company April 4, 1879, on account of the grant made
by the act of 1871, and was iirolved in the case of the United States v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Company et al. (146 U. S., 570). That suit
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was instituted April 21, 1888, and under the decree therein the patent
issued to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company was vacated and
annulled, and pursuant to instructions issued by your office the tract
was restored to the public domain November28,1894. After the decis-
ion of the court annulling the patent issued to the railroad company,
Rowland filed an application for patent under the provisions of the
fourth section of the act of March 3, 1887, spra, and after due notice
submitted proof in support of his application, against the allowance of
which. Hinkel protested, claiming superior rights in himself as a settler
upon the land. The local officers dismissed Hinkell's protest, approved
Howlanlds proof and issued him a certificate for the land. R11inkell
duly appealed, ad by your office letter " F " of April 5, 1895, the local
officers were directed to order a hearing in order to determine the
respective rights of the parties in the premises. Upon the testimony
adduced, the local officers found in favor of Howland, recommending
the dismissal of Hiinkell's protest. Hinkell again appealed to your
office, and by your office decision of June 7, 1897, before referred to, the
action of the local officers was sustained and Howland's right as a pur-
chaser from the railroad company was held to be superior to that of
Rin6kell, un(ier his settlement as shown
From said decision Rinkell has further prosecuted the case by appeal
to this Department, and in his appeal contends, in effect, that as the
land was excepted from the Southern Pacific grant there could be no
io nafide purchaser of the land through the company; and further, that
his claim as a settler is protected by the third section of the act of
March 3, 1887, supra, and that it has preference over the claim made
by Rowland under the fourth section.
Howland's claim is based upon a contract of purchase entered into
with the company July 30, 1883, by one Cyrus T. Mills, on account of
which part payment was made to the company. This contract was
afterwards transferred by Mills, or his legal representatives, and was
finally completed and deed issued thereon to Cassie L. Foss on June
20, 1887. The land has since been conveyed to Howland.
Rinkell's connection with the land dates back to settlement alleged
to have been made April 22, 1886. e first tendered a pre emption
declaratory statement for the land on June 10, 1887, more than three
months after the passage of the act of March 3, 1887, supra, and more
than eight years after the tract had been patented on account of the
railroad grant. Said application was rejected by the local officers on
account of the outstanding patent to the railroad company, fom which
action he duly appealed, and the action of the local officers being sus-
tained by your office he again appealed to this Department, resulting
in the decision of December 23, 1890, in which your office decision was
affirmed. He claims to have continued his residence upon the land
until ejected under a judgment of the supreme court of the State, made
September 14, 1891, upon a suit brought by Cassie L. Foss and her
husband.
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The suit brought for the recovery of title erroneously conveyed by
the patent issued on account of the railroad grant was instituted, as
before stated, April 21, 1888, nearly five years after the contract entered
into between Mills and the railroad company for the purchaseof this
land from the company. This contract of purchase was duly completed
and the land deeded by the company, lowland's claim being based
upon mesne conveyances through said contract of purchase, and there
is nothing in the record to show that the entire transaction looking to
the purchase of this land was made otherwise than in good faith.
In the case of the United States v. Winona and St. Peter R. R. Co.,
165 'U. S., 463, the supreme court, in referring to the fourth section of
the act of March 3, 1887, suprct, under which lowland's application was
made, say:
Section 4 of the same act, expressly referring to all other lands erroneously certified
or patented to any railroad company, provides that citizens who had purchased such
lands in ood faith should be entitled to the land so purchased and to patents there-
for issuing directly from the United States, and that the only remedy of the govern-
ment should be an action against the railroad company for the government price of
similar lands. It will be observed that this protection is not granted to simply bonza
fide purchasers (using that term in the technical sense), but to those who have one
of the elements declared to be essential to a bonda fide purchaser, to wit, good faith.
It matters not what constructive notice may be chargeable to such a purchaser if,
in actual ignorance of any defect in the railroad company's title and in reliance upon
the action of the government in the apparent transfer of title by certification or
patent, he has made an honest purchase of the lands. The plain intent of this sec-
tion is to secure him the lands, and to reinforce his defective title by a direct patent
from the United States, and to leave to the government a simple claim for money
against the railroad company. It will be observed that the technical term "bona
fide purchaser" is not found in this section, and while it is provided that a mortgage
or pledge shall not be considered a sale so as to entitle the mortagee.or pledgee to
the benefit of the act; it does secure to every one who in good faith has made an abso-
lute purchase from a railroad company protection to his title irrespective of any
errors or mistakes in the certification or patent.
The showing made by Howland in support of his application is suffi-
cient to warrant the allowance of the same, unless Hinkell's claim is
shown to be superior thereto. Hinkell claims, as before stated, that he
is duly protected by the, third section of the act of March 3, 1887, which
,provides:
Sec. 3. That if, in the adjustments of said grants, it shall appear that the home-
stead or pre-emption entry of any bona fide settler has been erroneously canceled on
account of any railroad grant or the withdrawal of public lands from market, such
settler upon application shall be reinstated in all his rights and allowed to perfect
his entry by complying with the public land laws: Provided, That he has not located
another claim or made an entry in lieu of the one so erroneously canceled: And pro-
vided also, That he did not voluntarily abandon said original entry: And provided
further, That if any of said settlers do not renew their application to be reinstated
within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the Secretary of the Interior, then all such
unclaimed lands shall be disposed of under the public land laws, with priority of
right given to bona fide purchasers of said unclaimed lands, if any, and if there be
no such purchasers, then to bona fide settlers residing thereon.
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As before stated, Hinkell's original application to file pre-emption
declaratory statement for this land was not presented until June 10,
1887, more than three months after the passage of the act of March 3,
1887, and nearly eight years after the patenting of the tract on account
of the railroad grant. His settlement was only made a year previous
to his application, to wit: April 22,1886.
The purpose of the third' section of the act of March 3, 1887, was to
reinstate homestead and pre-eniption entries made by bona fide settlers,
which had been erroneously canceled on account of a railroad grant or
withdrawal, and it provided that if the settler did not renew his appli-
cation to be reinstated within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the
Secretary of the Interior,
then all such unclaimed lands shall be disposed of under the public land laws,
wvith priority of right given to bona fide purchasers of said unclaimed lands, if any,
and if there be no such purchasers, then to bona fide settlers residing thereon.
The second section of the act directs suits to recover the title to lands
erroneously conveyed on account of a grant made to aid in the con-
struction of a railroad; and the third section, in its proviso before
referred to, leaves it to the Secretary to fix a time after the recovery of
title, where the lands had been patented, within which a settler whose
entry has been previously canceled for conflict with the railroad grant,
if any there was shown to be, should apply for the reinstatement of the
same. Such entries must of necessity have been entries made and can-
celed prior to the patenting of the. land on account of the railroad
grant; for, independent of the claim under the grant, by the issue of
the patent the Land Department was divested of jurisdiction over the
land, and it could not have been within the contemplation of Congress
to give recognition to entries made or claims initiated after the patent-
ing of the land and its sale to a bona fide purchaser, to the preference
of such purchaser who relied upon the patent issued.
Hinkell never had an entry upon this tract. Indeed, his whole con-
nection with the tract was predicated upon the settlement made many
years -after it had been patented on account of the railroad grant; and
for the reasons before stated he is clearly not within the contemplation
of said section three.
In the argument of the case reference is made to the provisos con-
tained in section five of the act of March 3, 1887, supr a; bat this can
have no influence or bearing in determining Howland's rights under
the fourth section of the act, for the fifth section of the act is limited
to "lands not conveyed to or for the use of such company," thus having
reference to unpatented lands.
After careful review of the entire matter, I am of opinion that the
showing made by Howland clearly evidences his right to a patent'
under -the fourth section of the act of March 3, 1887, and your office
decision' is. accordingly affirmed, and Hinkell's protest will stand
rejected.
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INDIAN LANDS-ALLOTAMENT-ACT OF JANUARY 14, 189.
ONAB OGAMAYBECK.
There is no provision made in the act of January 14, 1889, whereby an allotment of
lands, within the celedportion of the Red Lake Indian reservation in Minne7
sota, can be allowed, even though the claimant may have made improvements
on said lands prior to the passage of said act.
Prior to the act of January 14, 1889, the lands embraced in the ceded portion of the
Red Lake reservation were appropriated to use as an Indian reservation, and
were therefore not subject to allotment under section 4, act of February 8,1887;
and the special provisions for the disposal of said lands made by the act of 1889
take them out of the class of lands open to allotment -nder said section.
Assistant Attorney General IFan Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
February .28, 1898. (W. C. P.)
I am in receipt, by reference of First Assistant Secretary Ryan, of
the letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated March 20,
1897, and accompanying papers, relating to the right of Onab Ogamay-
beck, a Chippewa Indian, to certain lands within the ceded portion of
the Red Lake Indian reservation, in Minnesota. The matter is referred
tome
for an opinion as to the right of Onab Ogamaybeck to the land in question under
section 1 of the act of January 14,1889 (25 Stat., 642), by virtue of the improve.
ments and occupation thereof, it appearing that she did not make formal applica-
-tiou for allotment until after the cession of the land and the passage of the act
aforesaid.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs mentions the receipt of a letter
from chairman Baldwin of the Chippewa commission, stating that Onab
Ogamaybeck, a Chippewa Indian of the Red Lake band, has for more
than twenty years occupied the NE. X of the SW. L, the SE. i of the
SW. 4, and the NW. i of the SE. i of Sec. 12, T. 149, R. 36, and made
valuable improvements thereon, that this land is within the ceded por-
tion of the Red Lake reservation, that on October 27, 1893, she applied
at the local land office for an allotment of said lands, and expressing
the hope that she may be protected in the use and occupancy of said
lands as her home. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs then goes on
to say, that on November 7, S95, the General Land Office transmitted
to his office an allotment application made by this woman on October
18, 1893, under the fourth section of the general allotment act, for said
land, that his office reached the conclusion that the applicant was not
entitled to an allotment of these lands, on the theory that the Indians
had ceded all their right to all lands not included in the diminished
reservation and Congress had directed that such ceded lands be dis-
posed of in a specified manner. In support of this conclusion reference
is made to an opinion of this office of August 26, 1891, approved by the
Department, holding that lands which are to be disposed of at a certain
rate per acre are not subject to allotment. He suggests that the only
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way to protect this Indian is by reserving these tracts from sale until
congressional action can be had authorizing an allotment of them to
her, and recommends that this course be pursued.
It seems that one Oliver A. Lee was permitted to make homestead
entry for said land on May 15, 1896, and on December 7,1897, his attor-
neys addressed a communication to this Department insisting that said
land was not and is not subject to allotment, and that ay question as
to this Indian's right to said land under the homestead law can arise
only when she shall mate formal application thereunder. With this
letter are several affidavits, one of which is by S. 0. Bagley, who states
that he has known this land and the Idian claimant since 1883, and
that she never lived on the land prior to 1892, and that about that time
she or her husband, one Nevins, built a house on this land, that prior to
that time there was no evidence of any kind of residence by them and
no claim made by them of residence on the land, and that a large por-
tion of the improvements made there by Nevins were made after Lee's
homestead entry.
From this statement it will be seen that the assumption in the note
of reference, that there were improvements and occupation by the Indian
claimant prior to the cession of these lands, is disputed, and a further
investigation would seem to be necessary to decide as to the facts. If,
however, such improvement and occupation would not have vested in
this claimant a right to these lands as an allotment, then it would be
unjust to impose upon these parties, at this time, the burden of a hear.
ing to determine whether, in fact, she had occupied and improved the
lands as claimed. For the purposes of this opinion the hypothesis that
she occupied and improved these lands prior to the cession to the
United States will be accepted as correct.
By the treaty of October 2, 1863 (13 Stat., 667), the Red Lake and
Pembina bands of Chippewa Indians ceded to the United States all
their lands in the State of Minnesota and Territory of Dakota within
certain described boundaries. There was left to them a tract of land
within certain well-defined boundaries which was thereafter recognized
as set apart for their use and occupancy and designated as the Red
Lake reservation. Neither in this treaty nor in that of Aptil 12, 1864
(13 Stat., 689), supplementary thereto, is there any provision by which
individual Indians might take and hold land in severalty. The act of
January 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 642), mentioned in the note of reference to
me, provided for a commission to negotiate with the Chippewa Indians
of Minnesota for the cession of all their interest in all their reserva-
tions in Minnesota except the White Earth and Red Lake reservations,
and so much of those reservations as should not, in the judgment of
the commissioners, be required to make allotments required by that
and other existing acts. It is provided in the first section, that where
an allotment had theretofore been made to any Indian upon any of said
reservations, he should not be deprived of it except upon his individual
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consent, and in other sections, that all Chippewa Indians in Minnesota
except those on the Red Lake reservation should be removed to the
White Earth reservation, that allotments should be made to the Red
Lake Indians on the Red Lake reservation and to all others upon the
White Earth reservation, and that all allotments theretofore made to
any Idians npon the White Earth reservation should be ratified and
confirmed, with a further proviso that any Indian residing upon any of
said reservations might, in his discretion, take his allotment under said
act on the reservation where he lived at the time the removal therein
provided for should be effected, instead of being removed to, and tak-
ing his allotment on, the White Earth reservation.
The foregoing statement contains all the provisions of said act affect-
ing the question under consideration, and it will be seen that Done of
them provides for allotments to be thereafter made to Indians of the
Red Lake reservation of land within the portion that might be ceded.
Section , to which reference is made in the note of reference, relates
only to allotments theretofore made.
A comnission was appointed, as directed in said act, and secured
agreements with the various bands of the Chippewa Indians. The
report of this commission, giving in detail their proceedings and the
agreements made, is found in I. R. Ex. Doe. No. 247, 51st Congress, 1st
session.
The led Lake Indians ceded all their interest in so much of the Red
Lake reservation as was not included within certain described bounda-
ries,
which said lands embraced within the foregoing boundaries have been reserved by
the comissioners appointed under said act, and as therein authorized, for the pur-
pose of making and filling the allotments therein provided for.
This cession was made without reservation of any kind as to the ceded
lands, and there is no provision in the formal agreement for the protec-
tion of any Indian who might have made settlement or improvements
upon these ceded lands. I find nothing in the first section of said act,
or elsewhere in it, that authorizes this Department to allot the land in
question to the Indian claimant, even though she may have made
improvements thereon prior to the date of said act.
The allotment application is, hovever, made tinder the fourth section
of the act of February 8, 1887 (2 Stat., 388), as amended by the act of
February 21, 1891 (26 Stat., 794). The Commissioner of Indian Affairs
discusses the applicant's right under that law, and I have deemed it
proper to examine that question, although the question submitted to
me is limited in the note of reference to her rights under the act of
1889. The act under which the allotment application was made, com-
monly known as the " general allotment act," provides that when any
Indian not residing upon a reservation, or for whose tribe no reserva-
tion has been provided, "shall make settlement upon any surveyed or
nnsUrveyed lands of the United States not otherwise appropriated," he
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shall be entitled to have the same alloted to him. Prior to the cession
under the act of 1889, these lands were appropriated to use as an
Indian reservation, and were not therefore of the class contemplated
by said fourth section of the act of 1887, under which this application
is made. Whether this Indian applicant is within the terms of said
section, I have not discussed, because no facts are presented in the
papers now before me upon which a conclusion as to that question
could be based.
Said act of 1889 not only provided for procuring the cession of land,
but also directed the manner in which te lands thus ceded should be
disposed of. It was directed that they should be surveyed and classi-
fied as pine lands" and "agricultural lands," that the pine lands
should be appraised and sold at public auction to the highest bidder,
and that the agricultural lands should be disposed of to actual settlers
under the provisions of the homestead law, with the added proviso that
such settler should pay therefor the sum of one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre. The money realized from the sale of said lands, after
the payment of expenses, was to be placed in the United States Treas-
ury to the credit of said Indians.
Soon after this cession was made the State of Minnesota claimed the
swamp lands.within the ceded portion of the Red Lake reservation as
inuring to her under the grant of swamp and overflowed lands, but the
decision of this Department was adverse to the claim thus made. (State
of Minnesota, 22 L. D., 388.) It was there held that the ceded lands
did not become public lands of the United States in the sense that
they might be taken for any other purpose than that specified in said
act of January 14, 1889. The decision of the Department referred to
by the Comimissioner of Indian Affairs as sustaining his conclusion that
these lands are not subject to allotment, is evidently one made in a case
which arose in connection with the ceded lands of the Pottawatomlie
Indians, in Oklahoma. It was directed by act of Congress that those
ceded lands should be disposed of to actual settlers under the home-
stead and townsite laws, with the added proviso that each settler should
pay for said lands one dollar and fifty cents per acre in addition to the
fees provided by law. It was held that those lands were not subject to
allotment to non-reservation Indians under the fourth section of the act
of 1887 (David Trenkle, 13 L. D., 310).
After careful consideration of the matter, I am of the opinion tat
this land can not, under existing law, be allotted to this Indian claim-
ant either under the act of January 14, 1889, or under the allotment
act of 1887, under which her application was made.
Approved, February 28, 1898.
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
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RAILROAD GRANT-STATTITORY WITHDRAWAL-ORDER OF RESTORA-
TION.
PERRIN ET AL. V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
The withdrawal on general route, under the grant to the Northern Pacific, is not
defeated by an erroneous order of restoration made by the General Land Office.
ASecretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, February
(W. V. D.) 28, 1898. (L. . B.)
The record in this case shows that on November 27, 1895, Marie Per-
rin made homestead entry No. 967, for lots 5, 6 and 7, Sec. 16, and lots
7, 8 and NE. of NE. of Sec. 17, T. 46 N., R. 1 W., alleging settle-
ment in September, 1885.
December 2, 1895, Henry Rochat made homestead entry No. 983, for
lot No. 2, Sec. 22 and lots 5, 6 and W. t SE. j See. 15, T. 46 N., R. I
W., alleging settlement June 16, 1885. On the same day Caesar H.
Staniffer made homestead entry No. 981 for lots 9, 10, 11, 12, Sec. 177
T. 46 N., R. 1 W., alleging settlement June 15, 1887. All the tracts
are situated in the Oceur d'Alene land district, Idaho.
These lands are within the primary limits of the grant to the North-
ern Pacific Railroad Company and were included in the limits of the
withdrawal upon the map of general route of said road filed February
21, 1872, and also within the -withdrawal on definite location, the order
for which was not made until January 7, 1888. In the interim, to wit,
on the 22d of March, 1886 a diagram prepared in your office and errone-
ously purporting to show all amended forty-mile limit to the railroad
grant was forwarded to the local office at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. By
this diagram all these tracts fall without the limit of the grant, and
the local officers were directed by your office to be governed by said
diagram in allowing entries.
Counsel for the entrymen claim that they are entitled to the land by
reason of the amended diagram of the forty-mile limit forwarded
March 2, 1886, and the order of the Connissioner directing the local
office to restore to settlement, accept filings, etc., for all lands sh6wn
by said diagram to be beyond the limits of the grant. Your office
decision awards the land to the company..
The questions necessary to a determination of this case were settled
in the case of Pritchard v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (20 L. D.,
498), in which it was held that:
For such restoration there was clearly no authority of law and the rights of the
company in the premises can not be avoided by reason of said error on the part of
your office.
Counsel for homestead claimant says that:
In the case of Bernard et al. v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (departmental
decision September 3rd, 1895), the land there involved was in this district, and in
precisely the same situation as this land in reference to diagrams, withdrawals, etc.
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In that case the land was awarded to the homestead claimant.
It is sufficient to say that the attention of this Department was not
called to the withdrawal on general route of February 21, 1872, in the
Bernard case, your office decision in said case being based on thewith-
drawal on definite location, January 7, 1888. This would seem to be a
ease in which the company might be requested to relinquish, nuder the
provisions of the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 194), upon the filing of
which they would be entitled to select other lands within the limits
of their grant. Upon the refusal of the company to so relinquish, how-
ever, your office decision cancelling the entries as to the lands embraced
in the odd-numbered sections must be affirmed.
INDIAN LANDS-ADDITIONAL STATION GROUNDS.
GULF, COLORADO AND SANTA FE P. R. CO.
In the disposition of applications for additional station grounds under the act of
April 2, 1896, the Secretary of the Interior must first determine the question
as to the necessity for taking such ground, and, tereafter, if the company's
maps of definite location are approved, proceed as provided by said statute to
settle the question of compensation.
A statute that provides for action on the part of the Secretary of the Interior
"after allowing opportunity for all parties in interest to be heard before him,"
does not require such officer to personally hear the witnesses testify and listen
to oral arguments, if all parties have notice, and are permitted to submit evi-
dence and written arguments that are considered by him.
Assistant Attorney-General Tan bevanter to the Secretary of the Interior
March 2, 1898. (F. W. C.)
I am in receipt, through reference of the Eonorable Acting Secretary,
under date of February 12, 1898, for opinion, of a letter from resident
counsel for the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railroad Company, rela-
tive to the application made by said company, under the provisions of
the act of April 25<1896 (29 Stat., 109), for additional station grounds
at Dougherty and Ardmore, in the Chickasaw Nation, Indian Ter-
ritory.
In connection with said letter I have considered reports made by the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs inder late of January 17, and Febru-
ary 4, 1898, relative to said application for additional grounds. From
these papers it appears that upon the applications in question hearings
were ordered by the Idian Office before the United States Indian
agent of the Union agency, in order to ascertain the necessity for the
use of such additional grounds by the company; whether public inter-
ests would be promoted by the use of the additional lands, and the
question of compensation to be paid both to the tribe for the lands
applied for and the damage sustained by the individual occupant of
such lands.
At the hearings the tribe does not appear to have been represented.
The company it would appear has made a satisfactory adjustment
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with the individual occupants; but the tribe protests against the use of
further lands by the company.
It is claimed on behalf of the tribe that the location of the'road in
the first instance was in violation of treaty rights with the Nation and
that the granting of additional lands would be a further violation;
that there is no necessity for the use of additional lands by the company,
and if authority should be granted that the tribe should receive at
least $100.00 per acre.
The question as to the necessity for the use of the additional lands
applied for by the company is not passed upon by the Indian Office, but
the entire record made in each case is forwarded with a statement that-
Said act of April 25,-1896, provides that if the tribe shall not be satisfied with the
compensation therein provided, and the same cannot be amicably determined,
the amount to be paid by the company to the tribe and te necessity for the taking of
the lands shall be ascertained in the same manner as is prescribed by section three
of the act with respect to the compensation that shall be paid to the individual
occupants of the land.
* Section 3 provides that where te compensation cannot be agreed upon between
the company and the individual occupants, the company may apply to the Secretary
of the Interior, who shall thereupon appoint three disinterested referees who shall
determine the matter. In case the referees cannot agree, then any two of them may
make the award.
In view of these provisions of the act, it seems to be necessary for you to appoint
three disinterested referees, who shall determine the necessity of the continpanyfor the
takiny, and the amount that shall be paid the tribe for the lands involved, and I
accordingly recommend that such action be taken.
It is in this condition that the matter is referred to me for opinion,
without specification of the particular points upon whiclh my opinion is
desired.
It would seem from the letter bearing the reference that the question
first to be determined is one of procedure.
By the first section of the act of April 25, 1896, it is provided:
That any railroad company operating a railroad in the Inidian Territory may acquire
the right to use such additional ground as may be necessary for railway purposes at
stations nov existing, or for the establishment of new stations or depots, by making
it appear to the Secretary of the Interior that such additional ground is necessary
for railway purposes, and that the convenience of the people and the public interests
will be promoted thereby.
This section clear]y makes it your duty in the first instance to deter-
mine the question as to the necessity for the taking of such additional
ground.
The second section provides:
That the Secretary of the Interior may, when convinced that such application is
proper, and after allowing opportunity for all parties in interest to be heard before him,
grant the use of such additional lands held by the Indians in common as may be neces-
sary for depot purposes; but before taking possession of and using such lands the rail-
road company shall deposit with the treasury of the tribe to which the lands belong
compensation in cash at the rate of twenty-tive dollars per acre: Provided, That if
such tribe shall not be satisfied with the compensation herein provided, and the same
can not be amicably determined, the amount to be paid by such railroad company to
such tribe and the necessity for such taking shall be ascertained in the same manner
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as is prescribed by section three of this act with respect to compensation to be paid
individual occupants on any land so taken. Provided further, That before taking
possession of and using such additional lands the railroad company in interest shall
file a map of definite location of the same with the Secretary of the Interior, which
map shall be subject to the approval of such Secretary.
It will be seen that this section provides for compensation to the
tribe for the additional lands taken and makes provision for the filing
of a map showing the location of the lands, which map is subject to
your approval.
Relative to the compensation to the tribe, it provides:
That if such tribe shall not be satisfied with the compensation herein provided,
and the same can not be amicably determined, the amount to be paid by such rail-
road company to such tribe and the necessity for such taking shall be ascertained in
the same manner as is prescribed by section three of this act with respect to compen-
sation to be paid individual occupants on any jand so taken.
The third section of the act provides:
That when lands desired by a railroad company under the provisions of this act
are held by individual occupants according to the laws, customs, and usages of any
of the nations or tribes through whose lands the road is constructed, full compen-
sation, in addition to the compensation to be paid the nation or tribe herein provided
for, shall be paid to such occupant for all property taken and damage done by reason
of the occupancy of the lands by the company for station purposes; and where the
compensation can not be agreed upon between the company and the occupant, the
company may apply to the Secretary of the Interior, who shall thereupon appoint
three disinterested referees, who, before entering upon the duties of their appoint-
ment, shall take and subscribe, before competent authority, an oath that they will
faithfally and impartially discharge the daties of their appointment, which oath,
duly certified, shall e returned with their award. In case the referees can not agree,
then any two of them are authorized to make the award. Either party dissatisfied
with the finding of the referees shall have the right, within ninety days after the
making of the award and notice of the same, to appeal by original petition to the
United States court for the Indian Territory in and for the district wherein theland
sought to be so taken may be situate, where the case, both as to the necessity for
the taking as well as the amomit of damages, shall be tried de ?eoo. When proceed-
ings have been comnmenced in court, and the court has determined the necessity for
such taking, the railroad company shall pay double the amount of the award into
court to abide the judgment thereof, and then to have the right to enter upon the
property sought to be condemned and proceed with the construction of such depot
with the necessary tracks. Each of said referees shall receive for his services the
sum of four dollars per day for each day they are engaged i the trial of any case
submitted to them under this act, with mileage of five cents per mile for each mile
actually traveled. Witnesses shall receive the usual fees allowed by the court, and
all costs. including compensation of the referees, shall be made a part of the award
and be paid by such railroad company.
It will be seen that, under this section, when the compensation can
not be agreed upon, the company may. apply to you for the appoint-
ment of three disinterested referees, who shall make the award. From
such award appeal is allowed to the United States court for the Indian
Territory in and for the district wherein the land sought to be taken is
situated, and in the event of appeal the case may be tried de novo both
asto the necessity for the taking as well as the question of compensation
to the tribe or damages to the occupant.
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The duty of the referees is, however, limited to the question of coin-
pensation. In my opinion, therefore, it becomes your duty first to
determine the ecessity for the talking before referring the question of
compensation to referees to be appointed by you.
I therefore advise that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs be instructed
to report, after due consideration of the showing made, whether the
additional ground applied for is necessary for the railway purposes
named and whether the convenience of the people and the public
interests will be promoted thereby. If upon the receipt of the Coin-
missioner's report it appears to you that such additional ground is
necessary for railway purposes and that the convenience of the people
and the public interests will be promoted thereby, you should grant
the railroad company's application for the use of such additional
ground for the railway purposes named, and should approve the
railroad company's maps of definite location of such additional ground,
if they properly represent the lands applied for.
- If the showing made of the necessity for taking such additional
ground is not convincing to you or is not found to be satisfactory, no
question as to compensation need be considered, but if the necessity
for the taking is established, then upon the approval of the maps of
location, the question of compensation may be proceeded with as under
the law directed.
As before stated, the question as to the necessity of the taking may
be subject to re-adjudication, in the event of appeal to the court, but
this matter must be previously determined by you.
The statute provides that the Secretary's finding of the necessity for
the taking shall be" after allowing opportunity for ali parties i interest
to be heard before him." When all parties have notice and are per-
mitted to submit evidence and written arguments all of which are
transmitted to and considered by you, that constitutes a opportunity
to be heard and a hearing within the meaning of the law and it is not
necessary that you should personally hear the witnesses testify or listen
to oral arguments on behall of the parties.
Approved, March 2,1898,
C. N. BLIss, Secretary.
REPAYNMENT-DESERT LAND ENTRY.
LAFAYETTE D. MoDow.
The right of repayment can not be recognized on the cancellation of a desert land
entry for failure to submit final proof within the statutory period, when it appears
that the entry was not erroneously allowed.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofice, arch
(W. V. D.) 2, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Under date of November 10, 1897, there was filed in this Department
an application for repayment of the fees, commissions and purchase
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money paid upon the desert land entry No. 136, Susanville, California,
series 1879, made by Lafayette D. McDow, covering the SW. of the
SW. ' of Sec. 28,.the NE. l of the SW. I and the NW. of Sec. 33,
T. 30 N., R. 12 E.
This application was duly referred to your office, ad by your office
letter "M" of December 9, 1897, the same was returned with the rec-
ommendation that it be denied. In said report it is said:
I have to inform you that the records of this office show that the above-described
entry was canceled by office letter "IC " September 202,1885, because the entryman
failed to submit proof within the statutoryperiod, and that this land was subject to
desert land etry at date of entry, and was vacant land, except for the Lassen
county D. S., 369, of Lafayette D. McDow, muade on January 13, 1877, for the above-
described lnd, under the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat., 497.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the entry on account of
which application is made for repayment was not erroneously allowed
within the meaning of the act of June 16, 1880 ('21 Stat., 287), and the
application is accordingly denied and the papers herewith returned for
the files of your office. You, will advise the party accordinlgly.
REPAYINENT-ENTRY E RRONEO-USLY ALLOWED.
GEORGE M. DYER.
An entry is "erroneously allowed" within the meaning of the statute providing for
repayment, if the General Laud Office, in acting on the proofs accepted by the
local office, finds said proof insufficient, and cancels the entry for such reason.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Oce, iliarcs
(W. V. D.) 2, 1898. (J. L. McC.)
George M. Dyer has appealed fron the decision of your office, dated
July 22, 1896, rejecting his application for repayment of four hundred
and fifty dollars, paid upon his desert land entry, embracing three
hundred and sixty acres, to wit: the SE] of the SEI of Sec. 18; the
NE, and the S,- of the NW4, and the NEI of the NW of Sec. 19, T.
I N., R. 42 E.; and the SEA of the NE4 of Sec. 24, T. 16 N., 11. 41 E.,
Eureka land, district, Nevada.
Said decision was but a formal affirmance of your office decision of
January 27, 1886, in which the facts of the case are -set forth, in
substance, as follows:
Dyer filed desert-land declaration as above, on August 30, 1877.
On August 28, 1880, he made proof before a clerk of a court, and trans-
mitted the same, with $360-which, with the $90 paid upon filing his
declaration, amounted to $450, the full price of the land under the
desert-land act. Final certificate issued September 9, 1880.
Inasmuch as the proof wag not made before the register and receiver,
as required by law, and as it sowed the reclamation of only eighty-
five or ninety acres of the three hundred and sixty acres embraced in
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his entry, Dyer was advised that the certificate of purchase had been
issued without warrant of law; but that upon further compliance with
the law as to the reclamation of the land, and upon making proof to that
effect before the proper officers, lie might acquire title thereto. Dyer
declined to take any further action in the matter, and after consider-
able correspondence relative thereto, the entry was canceled July 3,
1885.
He applied for repayment, which your office refused, for the reason,
as set forth in said letter of your office of January 27, 1886 (suz~pra):
- That he did not afterward comply with the law is a matter of his own concern.
There was no adverse claimant, and no legal reason why he should not have perfected
his entry by further compliance with law in the matter of reclamation and proof;
and he was so advised, but ahsolutely declined to fulfill the requirements of the law.
An examination of the correspondence between your office and the
applicant discloses strong equities in behalf of the latter. In his letter
of April 16, 1883, to the register at Eureka, he says:
It is impossible for me to irrigate and reclair any more land than I have already
done. There is not sufficient water in the river, nor has there been for many years.
The register, under date of April 19, 1883, sends your office a state-
ment of the facts i the cases of Dyer and certain others named who
had made desert land entries in the same vicinity. He says:
I will state in behalf of the parties who have made such entries that I believe they
have acted in good faith, and have done all they could to irrigate and reclaim their
lands, and that they have labored hard and expended large sums of money to meet
the requirements of the law; that owing to the manner in which these lands have
been subdivided by the official surveys, they have been obliged to embrace land in
their entries which it is not possible to conduct water upon or cultivate-portions
of the same being elevated and above the source of the water used for irrigation,
other portions being so rocky as to render reclamation impossible, and other portions
still being sandy or gravelly, and will not produce crops though watered contin-
ually. These parties being required to enter lands in legal subdivisions, have to
enter eighty, or one hundred and sixty, or three hundred and twenty acres, when
perhaps not more than one-half, or one-third, or one-fourth, of the lands embraced in
their entries can be irrigated and rendered arable.... Other parties have suffi-
cient water to irrigate only ten or twenty acres, the eighty, or one hundred and sixty
acres, as the case may be, embraced in their entries; yet they hal to enter the eighty
or one hundred and sixty acres in order to secure the ten or twenty acres, owing to
the subdivision of the lands by the surveys. Must patent be denied these appli-
eants, must their claims be forfeited and their entries canceled, because the lines of
the surveys happened to fall to their disadvantage, and because of natural obstacles
that can not be overcome V If patents can not issue to the applicants who made
these entries in good faith, and who have labored and expended money in improving
and conducting water upon their lands in order to reclaim them from their desert
character, it seems to me no more than right that the purchase money paid by them
when they made their entries and final proofs should be repaid.
The equities in this case are far superior to those in some other cases
of a somewhat similar character in which repayment has been allowed.
In the case of W. WY. Wishart (13 L. D., 211), the claimant was a lawyer,
engaged in the practice of his profession at Devils Lake, about ten
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miles from his pre-emption claim. The local officers allowed him to
make entry upon his final proof, although it was very defective, in that
it showed upon its face that his so-called "residence" consisted of
periodical visits to his claim. Your office found the proof insufficient,
and directed that he be called upon to submit supplementary proof
within a reasonable time. This he refused to do. Thereupon your
office held his entry for cancellation. He appealed to the Department,
which on December 11, 1890, affirmed the judgment of your office; and
on August 27, 1891, reaffirmed it on review. Wishart applied for
repayment of the purchase money; this your office denied; he appealed
to the Department, which overruled the judgment of your office and
directed such repayment, saying (17 L. D., 489):
When the local officers decide that the proofs presented show a sufficient compli-
ance with the land laws, and a certificate is issued to that effect, and the money is
paid for the land, and a receipt is given therefor, and when a further examination
of the same proofs by your office or this Department results in a different judgments
showing that the local officers were in error in admitting the sufficiency thereof
and allowing the entry, the same has been "erroneously allowed" within the mean-
ing of the 2nd section of the act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287), and repayment in
such case is authorized. (Hudson Mining Co., 14 L. D., 544; Oscar T. Roberts, 8
L. D., 423).
The case at bar clearly falls within the above ruling.
- The decision of your office is therefore reversed; and the application
for repayment will be allowed.
PRACTICE-CONTEST-SERVICE OF NOTICE.
C OUNTRYMAN V. HERBERT.
Rule 60 of the Rules of Practice requires contestants to serve their own notices, and
one who fails to compily with this requirement will not be heard to complain if
his application r a hearing is dismissed.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner qf the General Land Office, lfarch
(W. V. D.) 2, 1898. (E. F. B.)
On September 13, 1887, Albert J. Herbert, filed pre-emption declara-
tory statement for lot 1, See. 1, T. 88 N., 1t. 45 W., 5th P. M., Des
Moines, Iowa. On the same day Lewis Countryman made timber
culture entry for the same land, and shortly afterwards filed a protest
against the declaratory statement of Herbert, asking that it be can-
celed. The local officers rejected said protest, but on July 16, 1888,
upon the appeal of Countryman they were advised that when Herbert
offered to make final proof Countryman should have an opportunity .to
contest Herbert's right of entry, and having an entry of record he
should be given special notice.
It appears that Herbert was allowed to make final proof July 5,1888,
and final certificate issued thereon, although no notice was taken by
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the local officers of Countryman's protest, nor was he specially cited
to appear.
On May 26, 1891, your office instructed the local office to order a
hearing upon Countryman's protest in which he alleged priority of
right and that Herbert was not a settler on the land at the time of the
filing of his declaratory statement. In conformity to, such instruc-
tions the local officers on June 19, 1893, ordered a hearing and notice
of such hearing was sent by them to Countryman with instructions to
serve said notice on Herbert i accordance with the Rules of Practice.
It is not denied that said notice was received by Countryman, but he
failed to take notice of it and thereupon the local officers dismissed
his protest and recommended the cancellation of his timber culture
entry, from which he appealed. Your office on March 18 1897, affirmed
the action of the local officers, and held the timber culture entry of
Countryman for cancellation, from which decision Countryman has
appealed to the Department.
The substance of his appeal is that your office erred (1) in not find-
ing from. the evidence submitted by Countryman at the time of his
protest that Herbert was not residing on the land at the time of the
filing of his declaratory statement. (2) In not holding that special
notice should have been given to Countryman as directed in the letter
of your office of July 16, 1888, and (3) In not- holding that it was not
the duty of Countryman to serve Herbert with notice of the hearing
but that such duty devolved upon the local officers.
This entire proceeding has been long delayed by a series of gross
irregularities in the local office. While the local officers properly
-rejected the protests of Countryman filed before Herbert offered to
make final proof, they should not have allowed him to make his final
proof without issuing special notice to Countryman. The letter of
your office of July 16, 1888, conveying such instructions to the local
officers, was written after the final proof had been allowed and hence
they could not comply with the instructions of that date, but the
rights of Countryman were not prejudiced thereby for the reason that
no action was taken on Herbert's entry, until Countryman had been
given an opportunity to submit proof showing that Herbert was ot a
settler on the land at the time of the filing of his declaratory state-
ment or any other fact in support of his alleged claim of priority.
All acts of the local officers in this case, prior to May 26, 1891,
whether of omission or commission, so far as they affected the rights of
Countryman may therefore be eliminated from the case, as his rights
were fully protected by the proceedings taken under your letter of that
date.
Rule 60 of Rules of Practice, provide that contestants must give
their own notices and pay the expenses thereof." The letter of the
local officers of June 19, 1893, ordering that the hearing be had before
the clerk of the district court of Woodbury county, Iowa, to take place
288 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
August 1, 1893, and final hearing before the local office August 8, 1893,
was received by Countryman June 22, 1893, as shown by the registry
return receipt. In this letter he was instructed as follows:
You are expected to serve the notice according to the rules laid down in the Rules
of Practice. We shall expect proof of service of notice with the return of papers.
The disregard of these instructions was at his own risk. He offers
no defence, or excuse for it except that such duty was not incumbent
upon him, but upon the local officers. IlThe pre-emption claim of Her-
bert was not subject to contest until he offered to make his final proof;
and there was no error in not finding from the evidence filed by Coun-
tryman with his protest that Herbert was not residing oti the land at
the date of the filing of his declaratory statement. His duty was to
have presented his testimony at the hearing, so that Herbert might
have had the opportunity of cross-examiDing the witnesses, and of
introducing testimony in his own behalf. The final proof of Herbert
shows that he was a settler on the land at the date of the filing of his
declaratory statement and long prior thereto.
Your decision dismissing the contest of Countryman and holding his
entry for cancellation is affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-FORFEITURE ACT-SETTLEMENT RIGHT.
CURTIS V. GREELY.
A settlement on railroad lands restored to the public domain by the forfeiture act of
March 2, 1889, after the passage of said act, and prior to the time when such
lands were opened to entry, is protected as against the intervening entry of
another, if the right of such settler is asserted within the statutory period.
Secretary Bliss to the Contmissioner of the General Land Office, March
(WV. V. D.) 2, 1898. ((J. J. G.)
The land involved in this controversy, namely, the S. J of the NW.
i of Sec. 29, T. 50 N., R. 38 W., Marquette land district, Michigan, was
granted to the State of Michigan to aid in the construction of certain
railroads; buit the grant was forfeited by the act of March 2, 1889 (25
Stat., 1008).
This forfeiture act provides:
That there is hereby forfeited to the United States, and the United States hereby
resumes the title thereto, all lands heretofore granted to the State of Michigan
- which are opposite to and coterminous with the uncompleted portion of any
railroad, to aid in the construction of which said lands were granted or applied, and
all such lands are hereby declared to be a part of the public domain.
October 18, 1894, 19 L. D., 307, the Department gave directions to
your office
that the lands in the common limits of the two grants referred to and not embraced
in the selection of the Onatonagon and Brule River Railroad Company on account
of its moiety, be restored to entry after due notice by advertisement.
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October 22, 1894, your office directed the local office to
cause to be published .... a notice that said lands .... are restored to the pub-
lic domain, and will be subject to entry on a day to be fixed by the notice.
January 10, 1895, in pursuance of the above directions, this land was
thrown open to entry, and on that date John Greely filed application
to make homestead entry therefor, which was allowed January 14, 1895,
and placed of record.
January 11, 1895, the local office received by mail an application of
Del Ray Curtis to make homestead entry for said land, which was
rejected .for conflict with the prior application of Greely.
Subsequently, the exact date not appearing, Curtis filed an affidavit
of contest, alleging that he was residing on this land when Greely
made his entry. This affidavit was executed February 6,1895, and cita-
tion issued thereon February 8, 1895, summoning the parties to appear
for hearing April 12, 1895. Upon the testimony submitted- at this hear-
ing, at which both parties were present, the local office rendered deci-
sion recommending that Greely's entry be canceled and that Curtis be
allowed to enter. Greely thereupon appealed to your office, where,
under date of July 30, 1896, the decision of the local office was affirmed.
Greely has prosecuted a further appeal to this Department.
It is contended in said appeal that defendant's entry is entitled to
precedence over plaintiff's settlement; that the land in question was
in a state of reservation and was exempt from legal settlement until
January 10, 1895; and that plaintiffs entrance upon this land was a
trespass and could not give him an advantage over defendant, who made
his entry in accordance with instructions from the Department. In
support of these contentions the cases of Smith v. Malone, 18 L. D ., 482,
and Crowley v. Ritchie et al., 22 L. D., 276, are cited.
The facts in this case are fully set forth in your office decision, show-
ing that Curtis settled on the land in question November 4, 1894; and
that he promptly followed up his settlement by building a house into
which he soon moved his family.
It will be observed that there is nothing either in the act of March
2, 1889, supra, or in the departmental order opening the land in ques-
tion to entry, expressly prohibiting settlement thereon. On the con-
trary, it was held in the case of Dillon et al. v. Hefferman, 19 IL. D.,
170, that (syllabus):
The railroad lands declared forfeited by the act of March 2,1889, and restored
thereby to the public domain, became subject to entry immediately upon the passage
of said act.
As was stated in that case, the local office was not directed to adver-
tise that the lands embraced within the forfeiture "would be," but
" are," restored to the public domain, and "will be " subject to entry.
In view of this fact the evident and only purpose of the departmental
order was to fix a time when claims to these lands could be made of
record and rights of claimants determined.
12209-vOL 26 19
290 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
In both the cases cited by appellant, the lands were not supposed to
be a part of the lands forfeited under the act of September 29, 1890,
but rather a part of the surplus Omaha lands; further, in those cases
the specific instructions of the Department were to the effect that no rights to any of
those lands, either by settlement or otherwise, could be acquired or would be recog-
nized as existing prior to the day on which they were thrown open to entry.
Notwithstanding the existence of this express prohibition, the
Department, on October 3, 1896, 23 L. D., 346, after ascertaining that
the lands were a part of those forfeited by the act of 1890, revoked the
decision in the case of Crowley v. IRitchie et at., one of the cases cited,
and awarded the land to the occupant, prior to the date of the opening,
as against the entry of record made thereafter, on the ground that
(syllabus):
Lands restored to the public domain by the forfeiture act of September 29, 1890,
are subject to settlement from the date of the passage of said act.
In the case of Mills v. Daly, 17 L. D., 345, which also has reference
to lands forfeited under the act of September 29, 1890, it was held
(syllabus):
A settlement on such lands, after the passage of said act, and prior to the time
when the lands were open to entry, is protected as against the intervening entry of
another, if asserted within three months from the time when said land is subject to
entry.
This ruling may very properly be applied to the case under consider-
ation, and as Curtis filed his application immediately after the land in
question was opened to entry, he will be allowed to perfect his said
application.
Your office decision is hereby affirmed.
REPAYMENT-RIGHT OF WAY PURCHASE.
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PATJL EY. CO.
Money paid to the Secretary of the Interior by a railroad company to secure a right
of way across an Indian reservation, under an agreement which thereafter
appeared could not be carried into execution without the ratification of Con-
gress, should be returned when Congress subsequently provides for the recogni-
tion of a preferred right of purchase on behalf of the company oh the performance
of certain specified conditions, and such right is thereafter forfeited on account
of the failure of said company to perform said conditions.
Assistant Attorney- General Van Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
March 3, 1898. (E. F. B.)
The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railwat Company has filed an
application for the return of a sum of money which was deposited by said
company, with- the Secretary of the Interior, amounting to $15,335.76,
to be applied in payment for certain lands in the Sioux Indian reserva-
tion under agreements mnade by said company with the Sioux Indians
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of Dakota, in 1881, which has been referred to me for an opinion as to
whether said application should be granted.
This is a renewal of a former application for the return of said sum
which was rejected by the Department October 21,1895 (21 L. D., 324),
the company now insisting that the law and facts controlling this
application were misconstrued in the decision of October 21, 1895, and
as this is a matter solely between the government and the company, it
asks that the application may be reconsidered.
The history of the initiation of this transaction will be found in the
records of the Indian Division, part of which is embraced in Senate
executive document No. 20- 48th Congress, 1st session, from which it
appears, that in 1880, the Sioux Indians in Dakota entered into four
several agreements with the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway
Company, granting to said company the right of way across their
lands, and the right to hold and occupy certain lands for railway
purposes, which were approved by the Secretary of the Interior,
January 3, 1881, with certain modifications, and on January 18, 1881,
the company filed i the Department a bond for the faithful perform-
ance of the agreements which was approved by the Secretary of the
Interior January 20, 1881.
These agreements were evidently entered into between the railroad
company and the Sioux Indians and were approved by the Secretery
of the Interior under the belief that the right and privilege therein
bargained for could be acquired under the stipulations contained in the
second article of the treaty or agreement made with the Sioux Indians
September 26, 1876, by Commissioners on the part of the United States,
and ratified by the act of Congress approved February 28, 1877 (19
Stat., 255) by which the Indians consented to the construction of roads
from accessible points on the Missouri river through their reservation-
to the country lying immediately west, not to exceed three in number.
If these agreements had been authorized by that stipulation, the ratifi-
cation of them by Congress would not have been necessary, in order to
authorize the railway company to enter upon said reservation and to
construct and operate its road, but the right would have become vested
and complete upon the payment of the amount stipulated in the agree-
ments. That this view was entertained by the comapany and the Secre-
tary of the Interior, at the time the money was paid is shown by the
following correspondence between General John Lawler, the agent of
the company, and the Secretary of the Interior.
WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 3d, A. D. 1881.
Hon. S. J. KiRWOOD,
Secy. of Interior.
I have the honor to direct your attention to certain agreements, approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, on the third day of Jany., A. D. 1881, granting to, the
Chicago, Milwaukee, and Saint Paul Railway Company, in consideration of certain
payments to be made, sundry specified rights upon the Great Sioux Indian Reserva-
tion in the Territory of Dakota. These rights may be summarized as follows: the
right to hold and occupy lands, for railway purposes, on the Missouri river, and at
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intervals along the line of the proposed railway; the right of way for the proposed
railway, of said company; and the right to open and control a wagon road, upon,
or, as near, as it shall be convenient and practicable, to said railway line, as surveyed
and located, and to use said right of way and wagon road, in the interest of the
Chicago, Milwaukee and Saint Paul Railway Company; for the transportation of
persons and property, to and from said railway, over and across the Great Sioux
reservation. I beg leave to state, on behalf of the railway company aforesaid, that
it now desires to enter upon said Indian reservation for the purpose of using and
enjoying the rights granted on said agreement, and it is now ready to pay for such
Tights the sum of money reqnired to be paid by said 'agreement before the com-
mencement of the work of construction,' to wit, 'one half of the full amount to be
paid for the use and benefit of said Indians,' being the sum, as it seems, from the
agreement, of eleven thousand five hundred and eleven dollars, the amount resulting
from a calculation based on a distance of one hundred and eighty and two tenths
miles, that said right of way and wagon road extends over and across said Indian
reservationas shown and located upon map of line filed with the Secy. of the Interior
and upon the cost of six hundred and forty acres of land on the Missouri at the rate
of five dollars per acre. Wherefore, I respectfully request the Secretary of the Interior
to receive said payment, or such other, as in his judgment, the agreement requires,
or, direct how the same shall be made, and thereupon to grant permission to the
Chicago, lilwaukee and Saint Paul Railway Company, its agents and servants,
contractors and laborers, its connecting transportation lines, and all whomsoever it
may designate as being or operating in the interest of said company to enter upon
the said reservation for the purpose of exercising and enjoying the rights set forth.
I have the honor to remain, Your Obt. Servt.,
J. LAWLER,
for the Chicago, Millwaukee and Saint Paul Railway Company.
Files. I. D., 2577-1881.
To this the Secretary of the Interior replied as follows:
OCTOBER 7, 1881.
Geul. JOHN LAWLE,
Genl Agent of the Chicago, Nil. 4A St. Paul By. Co.,
Washington, D. C.
SIR: In reply to your letter of the 3rd inst., asking that the first payment from
your company under its several agreements with the Sioux Indians for the right of
way and occupation of lands for railway purposes across the Great Sioux reservation
in Dakota (which agreements four in number were approved by the Department
iinder date of 3rd January 1881) you are respectfully informed that, calculating the
section of laud on the west bank of the Missouri River 640 acres at $5 per
acre . $3200.00
ten stations at 20 acres ea. 200 acres at $4 per acre ......................... 800. 00
90-,~- (half length) of railway tract at $110.00 per mile. ................. 9911. 00
$13911.00
the amount found due as first payment by your company upon the basis presented
is $13,911.00 taking your verbal statement of the averaged quantity of lands required
for way stations calculating ten stations at twenty acres to the station for the first
half of the road.
Upon the subject of the section of land on the west bank of the Missouri River it
is understood between your company and this Department that said section shall be
located immediately opposite to the section line between sections 29 and 30, town-
ship 104 N., R. 74 W., on the east side of the said Missouri River and that your
company will within sixty days from this date file a map of the location of the
said section, so taken to be occupied under the modified agreement with the Sioux,
giving the description and boundaries of said 'section to be in conformity to the public
surveys.
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With this understanding, upon the payment of the sum of 1$3,911.00 before noted
the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company will be allowed to enter
upon the Great Sioux reservation and construct and operate its wagon road and rail-
way under the provisions of the agreements noted.
The use of the temporary wagon road and railway, granted is permitted to your
company in accordance with the provisions of the agreement referred to, and is
intended to cover all legitimate privileges for traffic and travel consistent with such
agreements and the provisions and limitations of the intercourse laws.
Rules and regulations for the guidance of the said compan3 will be duly prepared
and transmitted to you.
Itis further understood that any default in the stipulations governing the authority
granted will be considered sufficient cause by the Department for the revocation of
this authority.
Very respectfully,
S. J. KiniwOOD, Seretary.
1951-I. 0.,1881. lud. Mis., No. 23-1881-page 422.
Subsequently the company made an additional deposit of $1,424.76-
part payment for the right of way through the Crow Creek reservation
and for the 188 acres east of the Missouri river, making in all the sum
of $15,335.76. Sen. Ex. Doe., 20.
The circumstances under which the money was deposited by the com-
pany and received by the government is shown by this correspondence.
It was not a deposit as earnest money, nor a paymeit conditioned, upon
ratification by Congress, but it was made in fulfillment of its obligation
under the terms of the agreements upon the express promise of the
Secretary of the Interior that upon the payment of such sum, the com-
pany would be permitted to enter upon said reservation and construct
and operate its wagon road and railway under the provision of said
agreements.
Prior to the approval of the agreements entered into between the
railway company and the ndlians, three wagon roads or routes, as
authorized by the second article of the agreement or treaty of Septem-
ber 26, 1876, had been designated by the War Department to be con-
structed and maintained through said reservation. In reporting upon
a letter addressed to the Secretary of War, relative to these wagon
roads, which had been referred to this Department, the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs on March 1, 1882, called attention to the agreements
with the railway company, which had been approved by the Depart
ment, and in submitting the inquiry as to whether the Indians in making
said agreements understood that they were only carrying out the obliga-
tion imposed by the second article of the agreement or treaty of 1876,
stated that it was certain the railway company based its application for
right of way upon that provision, although it was not referred to in
their agreements.
In transmitting this report, the Secretary of the Interior said:
upon full consideration of the subject I am of opinion that the three routes indi-
cated for wagon roads westward from the Missouri River from Bismarck at or near
Fort Pierre, and from the Yankton crossing of the Missouri are matters arising under
the second article of the agreement referred to and that the stipulations set forth
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in the treaty are a consideration for such concession. Further, that any subsequent
agreements for roads across said reserve wherein a valuable consideration is obtained,
is in addition to any former existing rights.
Ind. Mis., No. 29, 1882. P. 1M1.
From this time it was understood that the agreements could ot be
carried into execution without ratification by Congress, and a bill for
that purpose was prepared and submitted, but it failed to become a law.
As soon as it was ascertained that the government could not fulfill
its promise to the railway company, upon the faith of which the pay-
ment was made, the money, was then held by the government for the
use and benefit of the railway company and could have been with-
drawn, without violating any agreement with the Indians or obligation
to the government. Such was the condition of this deposit when the
act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 888), was passed, which provided for the
creation of smaller and separate reservations out of a portion of this
reservation and for the restoration of the remainder to the public
domain. The act took effect February 10,1890, having been accepted
and consented to by the Iudians and said acceptance and consent hav-
ing been made known by proclamation of the President, as therein
provided.
The 16th section of the act, declared that the acceptance of the pro-
visions of the act by the Indians should not affect any agreement
theretofore made with the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway
Company, for right of way through. said reservation, or for any lands
acquired by any sch agreement to be used in connection therewith,
except as therein provided:
But the Chicago Milwaukee and Saint Paul Railway Company and the Dakota
Central Railroad Company, shall, respectively, have the right to take and use, prior
to any white person, and to any corporation, the right of way provided for insaid
agreements, with not to exceed twenty acres of land in addition to the right of way,
for stations for every ten miles of road; and said companies shall also, respectively
have the right to take and use for right of way, side-track, depot and station privi-
leges, machine shop, freight-house, round house, and yard facilities, prior to any
white person, and to any corporation or association, so much of the two separate
sections of land embraced in said agreements; also, the forioer company so much of
the one hundred and eighty-eight acres, ad the latter company so much of the
seventy-five acres, on the east side of the Missouri River, likewise embraced in said
agreements, as the Secretary of the Interior shall decide to hav-e been agreed upon
and paid for by said railroad, and to be reasonably necessary upon each side of said
river for approaches to the bridge of each of said companies to be constructed
across the river, for right of way, side-track, depot and station privileges, machine-
shop, freight house, round-house, and yard facilities, and no more:
with the following proviso (1) That payment shall be made by the com-
pany according to the agreements for each mile of road and each acre of
land which the company may take and use for railway purposes. (2)
That the land, shall only be used for railway purposes. (3) That pay-
ment shall be made and the conditions performned within six months
after the-act takes effect, and (4) That the company shall within nine
months after the act takes effect definitely locate its line of road includ-
ing station grounds and terminals and within such time file with the
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Secretary of the Interior, a map of such definite location specifying
clearly the line of road, the several station grounds, and the amount of
land required for railroad purposes, and the Secretary of the Interior
shall within three months after the filing of such map, designate the
particular portion of said sections and of said tracts of land which said
railway companies may take and hold under the provision of said act,
and the company shall within three years after the act takes effect con-
struct, complete, and put in operation its line of road, and upon failure
to locate, construct, and operate the same within the time required by
the act, the lands granted for right of way, station grounds and other
railway purposes shall be forfeited and shall without further entry or
further action on the part of the United States revert to the United
States and be subject to entry under the other provisions of the act.
After providing for. the creation of certain separate reservations the
act (section 21), restored all other portions of the reservation, except
three islands therein named, to the public domain to be disposed of by
the United States to actual settlers only under the provisions of the
homestead law-but provided that the land so entered should be paid
for at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre for all lands
disposed of within the first three years after the act takes effect, at
seventy-five cents per acre for all lands disposed of within the next
two years thereafter, and at fifty cents per acre for the residue of the
lands then undisposed of, also that such of said lands remaining undis-
posed of at the end of ten years from the taking effect of the act shall
be taken by the United States at fifty cents per acre, which amount
shall be credited to said Indians as part of their permanent fund, and
shall thereafter be a part of the public domain to be disposed of under
the homestead laws and the provisions of said act.
The 22d section of. the act provided,
that all money accruing from the disposal of lands in conformity with this. act shall
be paid into the Treasury of the United States to be applied solely as follows:
First, to the reimbursement of the United States for all necessary actual expendi-
tures contemplated and provided for under the provisions of this act, and the cre-
ation of the permanent fnd hereinbefore provided; and after such reimbursement
to the increase of said permanent fund for the purposes hereinbefore provided.
Within the time required by the act, the company filed with the Sec-
retary of the Interior a map of definite location which was approved
subject to the conditions contained in the 16th section of the act, and
the $15,335.76 still being on deposit with the Secretary of the Interior,
its right to take and use prior to any white person- the land, specified
in the agreement and designated by the maps, for the purposes contem-.
plated by the act, became complete, subject only to forfeiture pon
failure to construct, complete, and put in operation, the road, within
three years from February 10, 1890. See King v. Chicago, Milwaukee
and Saint Paul Ry. Company 14 L. D. 167.
The company having failed to -complete the road within the time pre-
scribed by the act, caused a forfeiture of the lands reserved to it nder
the 16th section of the act of March 2, 1889, and they were declared
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by proclamation of the President to be restored to the public domain,
subject to the provisions of said act. See Chicago, Milwaukee and
Saint Paul Railway Company 19 IL. D., 429.
Its right to take and use the said lands for railway purposes prior to
any white person being thus forfeited, all lands covered by the agree-
ments, thereupon became subject to entry under the provisions of the
21st section of said act, and the money accruing from the disposal
of said lands after reimbursing the United States for the actual neces-
sary expenses in carrying out the provisions of the act, has been placed
or is subject to be placed, to the credit of said Indians as a part of their
permanent fund.
I By the decision of October 21, 1895, it was held that while the pay-
ment was originally in the nature of a deposit, when Congress ratified
the agreement, and the company accepted the conditions imposed by
the act, it became an executed contract, and the deposit was converted
into a payment. In other words it was considered as a purchase
under the agreement which was completed upon the filing of the maps
designating the land, and the payment of the money, subject to for-
feiture of the land so purchased upon failure to build the road within
the time prescribed by the act, and as the failure to build the road
within the time prescribed was solely the default of the company, it
cannot recover the money as the government was not in default.
* The plain purpose of the act was to confer upon the company the
right to purchase so much of the land covered by the agreements as
they might designate by maps of definite location subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior upon performing certain con-
ditions, but it would not have been compelled to purchase any part of
land that was not used and occupied by it, even if the conditions had
been performed. It was an option or privilege that it might have exer-
cised or not at its pleasure. The express language of the act is that
the company shall
have the right to take and use, prior to any white person; and to any corporation,
the right of way provided for in said agreements, with not to exceed twenty acres
of land in addition to the right of way, for stations for every ten miles of road; and
said companies shall also, repectively, have the right to take and use for right of
way, side track, depot and station privileges, machine shop, freight house, round
house, and yard facilities, prior to any white person, and to any corporation or
association, so much of the two separate sections of land embraced in said
agreements.
The conditions upon which the right of purchase could be exercised,
are that the company should within six months after the act takes
effect make payment for each mile of road and each acre of ground
taken under the agreement; that within nine months it shall locate its
line of road and designate the land it intended to purchase; and within
three years it shall construct, complete, and put it in operation. Upon
the performance of these conditions, the company would have been
entitled to purchase the land designated and not until then. If it
failed to perform any of the conditions within the time prescribed, the
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privilege to purchase was forfeited and the land which bad been held
in reservation was restored to the public domain. This is the plain and
obvious meaning of the act.
It will be observed that. the company was required to make payment
within six months after the act took effect, and yet it was allowed nine
months after the act took effect to designate the tracts it might have
the privilege of purchasing. If a deposit had been made sufficient to
cover the whole amount that would have been required in the event
that the company elected to purchase all the land covered by the
agreements, can it be pretended that it could not have withdrawn the
surplus, if within the nine months it should have designated a less
area. So it might within the three years have refused to purchase any
land except what it actually used in the construction and operation of
the road embracing the right of way as stipulated in the agreements.
The building of the road would have been a performance of the con-
ditions, and while the company would have been compelled to pay for
every mile of right of way taken and used for that purpose which
could have been appropriated from the sum deposited, to the extent of
the obligation thus incurred, it was under no obligation to purchase
the ground for station purpose, (unless used) or the one hundred and
eighty-eight acres on the east bank of the river, or the six hundred and
forty acres on the west bank of the river, but it would have had an
absolute right to withdraw all the surplus after paying for the right
of way.
INo appropriation of payment has ever been made upon this contract
or agreement. and the money deposited by the company to be appro-
priated in payment for the land whenever it had performed the condi-
tions upon which it could alone have obtained title was not subject to
be so appropriated until the company had performed the conditions,
and applied to purchase so much of the laud embiaced in their maps of
definite location as it might have desired to purchase. As before
stated, it was not bound to purchase' any of the land, but if it had
constructed, completed and put in operation its road within the time
prescribed by the act, it would have been entitled to purchase so much
of the land designated by its maps of definite location as it desired.
As it failed to construct, complete and put in operation, its line of road
within the three years, its right to purchase the same, prior to any
white person was forfeited, and the lands were by the very terms of
the act restored to the public domain to be disposed of under the pro-
visions of said act for the benefit of the Indians and the proceeds of
sale to be credited to the permanent fund.
The language of the act that- 
the lands granted for right of way, station grounds or other railway purposes .
shall revert to the United States and be subject to entry under the other provisions
of this act,
upon failure to perform the conditions, does not indicate that definite
location of the line of road, and the designation of the lands it intended
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to purchase was the completion of a right or that the contract was
thereby executed, because the complete construction and operation
of the road through the reservation was a condition precedent to the
company's right of purchase.
The two preliminary conditions were that the company should make
payment as a guarantee of the fulfillment of its obligation to pay for
every mile of right of way and every acre of ground taken under the
terms of the agreement, and that it should designate the lands it
intended to purchase. The performance of these two conditions within
the time required by the act reserved the land from the operation of
the other provisions of the act, or from any other disposition for the
period of time in which the company might perform all the conditions,
essential to its right of purchase.
: I have therefore to advise that the government has no right to retain
this money, and that it should be returned to the company, if it is still
under the control of the Secretary of the Interior and subject to be
withdrawn from the Treasury and disbursed by his direction without
the action of Congress.
Approved: March 3, 1898,
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
DESERT LAND ENTRY-ACT OF AUGUST 4, 1894.
EAGAN V. PATTLHAMUS.
The act of August 4, 1894, relieving desert entryMen from annual expenditure dur-
ing the year of 1894, is applicable to entries made in said year, and prior to the
passage of said act; and the year so given should be computed from the date of
the entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Cornoi ssioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) C, 1898. (P. J. C.)
The record shows that William H. Paulhamus made desert land entry
for the S of Sec. 22, T. 10 N., I. 22 E., North Yakima, Washington,
land district, March 30, 1894.
On November 20, 1895, John C. Eagan filed an affidavit of contest
against the sanie, alleging, among other things, that the entryman had
failed to expend one dollar per acre toward the reclamation of the tract,
prior to the date thereof.
A hearing was ordered and had before the local officers. The entry-
man admitted that no yearly proof had been made or filed since the
entry was made. The contestant offered testimony showing that
nothing had been done by the entryrnan toward reclamation; where-
upon the entryman moved to dismiss the contest for the reason, among
others that the same was prematurely brought, as he had until January
1, 1896, in which to make proof of annual expenditure.
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This motion was sustained by the local officers, in the following
language:
Following the instructions in circular of October 11, 1894, "" GI of Acting Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office, and approvedby the Honorable Secretary of the
Interior, the motion is sustained and the contest dismissed. The above motion con-
tains our finding of facts in the case.
The contestant appealed, and your office, by letter of June 12, 1896,
reversed the action of the local officers and held the entry for cancella-
tion, whereupon the entryman prosecutes this appeal, assigning error
as follows:
Ist: Error in holding that the contest herein was not premature.
2nd: Error in not holding that the proof failed to sustain the allegations of the
affidavit of contest.
3rd: Error in not holding that the affidavit of contest failed to state any sufficient
grounds for contest.
4th: Error in holding the entry of the contestee for cancellation upon the case as
made without giving contestee au opportunity to submit testimony.
5th: Error in not dismissing the contest herein and holding the entry intact.
The entry in question was made under the amendatory act of March
3, 1891. (Sec. 2, 26 Stat., 1095), requiring an annual expenditure of one
dollar per acre toward the reclamation of the land. The entry was
made March 30, 1894, and as the law then stood proof of the expendi-
ture of one dollar per acre should have been made on or before the cor-
responding date in 1895.
On August 4, 1894, Congress passed the following act:
That in all cases where declarations of intention to enter desert lands have been
filed, and the four years' limit within which final proof may be made had not expired
prior to January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, the time within which such
proof may be made in each such case is hereby extended to five years from the date
of filing the declaration; and the requirement that the persons filing such declara-
tions shall expend the full sum of one dollar per acre dring each year toward the
reclamation of the land is hereby suspended for the year eighteen hundred and.
ninety-four, and such annual expenditure for that year, and the proof thereof, is
hereby dispensed with: Provided, That within the period of five years from filing
the declaration satisfactory proof be made to the register and receiver of the recla-
mation and cultivation of such land to the extent and cost and in the manner pro-
vided by existing law, except as to said year eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and
upon the payment to the receiver of the additional sum of one dollar per acre, as
provided in existing law, a patent shall issue as therein provided.
TUnder the terms of this act the entryman laims that he was not
required to do any work on the land for the year 1894, but that time
began to run against him on January 1, 1895, and he had all that year
in which to comply with the law. Your office held, however, that, this
act was intended for the relief of those "who were in default at the
date of its passage, or who would be in default during the year 1894";
that this entry having been made in March 1894, it would not be in
default till March, L895, and the entrynuan Was therefore not entitled to
relief under the act.
This conclusion of your office seems to be in direct opposition to the
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circular of your office of October 11, 1894 (19 L. D., 298), which was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. In relation to the entries
made in 1894, it was said:
Under the terms of the act the annual expenditures for the year 1894, and proof
thereof are dispensed with, consequently parties who made desert land entries dur-
ing 1894, prior to the passage of said act are not required to make any expenditure
during the present year, but the year within which they will be required to make
such expenditures and proof will begin January 1, 1895.
This circular was in full force at the date of your office decision, yet
it is not referred to, although attention was directed to it, and the local
officers in sustaining the motion to dismiss the contest, did so on the
authority of the same.
While there may be some doubt as to the correctness of the construc-
tion of this statute, yet it is a well settled rule that the contemporaneous
construction of a doubtful or ambiguous law by those who are called
upon to act under the law is entitled to great respect. The construc-
tion thus given is of greater consideration when under it parties have
been induced to act in matters affecting property rights. Desert land
entrymen under circumstances similar to the one at bar were justified
under this circular in refraining from doing anything relating to recla-
mation for the year 1894, and doubtless many of them are in the same
condition as te one now under consideration.
Since the promulgation of this circular the Department has had
occasion to pass upon the question as to whether the act intended to
simply include the calendar year, or whether by its terms it meant the
entry year, and it was determined that Congress intended to relieve
the entrymen "for one year, and the entry year, and not the calendar
year, was meant." (Hodgson v. Epley, 23 L. D., 293; Randall t al. v.
Morton, 25 Id., 150.) To this extent therefore the circular has been
modified: that is, instead of the time beginning in every case arbitra-
rily to run from January 1, 1895, it will commence to run one year from
the entry year beginning in 1894. For instance, in the case at bar the
entry having been made in March, 1894, time would begin to run in
March, 1895, and the entryman would have one year from the latter
date, or until March, 1896, to comply with the law.
Your office judgment is therefore reversed.
WIGHT V. CENTRAL PACIFIC B. R. Co.
Motion for review of departmental decision of January 13, 1898, 26
L. D., 28, denied by Secretary Bliss, March 3, 1898.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-CITIZENSIP-SETTLEMENT RIGHT.
WEISNER V. CLEAI.
An alien who for the last three years of his minority resides in this country is quali-
fied, in the matter of citizenship, as a homestead settler, without previous
declaration of intention to become a citizen.
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The minor child of an alien, who, during the minority of such child declares his
intention to become a citizen, but does not complete his naturalization before
the child attains his majority, or thereafter, occupies under the homestead law
the status of one who has filed his declaration of intention to become.a citizen.
A homestead entry must be canceled on due showing of a prior adverse settlement
right.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 3, 1898. (C. J. W.)
Hiram. Clem made homestead entry, No. 3713, for the SE. of See.
23, T. 22 N., R. 3 W., at Enid, Oklahoma, on November 4,1893.
On November 6, 1893, George Weisner filed affidavit of contest
against the entry, alleging prior settlement.
A hearing was had, and on June 20, 1895, the local officers rendered
a decision, in which they found, in substance, that while plaintiff was
the prior settler, he did not follow up his initial acts of settlement in
good faith by improvements and the establishment of residence as
required by law.
From this decision Weisner appealed, and, on May 19, 1896, your
office reversed the local office, hol ding that Weisner was the first settle
and followed up his initial acts of settlement in good faith, and that
the entry of Clem was subject to the superior right of Weisner.
The case is before the Department on the appeal of Clem from your
office decision.
The error alleged is, substantially, that your office erred in the con-
clusions drawn from the facts.
One question is raised, and insisted upon now, which does not appear
to have been insisted upon either before the local officers or your office,
and that is, that Weisner's first acts of settlement were void, because
his status was, at the time of such acts; that of an alien, who had made
no declaration of intention to become a citizen. As this may be
regarded, as a preliminary question, it will be considered and disposed
of before the facts are stated in reference to acts of settlement and
improvement performed by the parties.
It appears that the plaintiff is foreign born. He was brought to this
country by his father at the age of twelve years, since which time both
father and son have been domiciled in this country. At the date of
the hearing the son was thirty-seven years of age.
They came to the United States in 1870. On April 27, 1870, John
Weisner, the father of plaintiff, made in the district court, which em-
braced Pottawatomie county, State of Kansas, his declaration of inten-
tion to become a citizen of the United States, in due form, which was
filed. It appears that the father, though continuing his residence in
the country, has not taken out second papers. The plaintiff states
that he has voted and exercised the rights of a citizen since his major-
ity, on the supposition that his father's naturalization had been com-
pleted during his minority. By advice of his counsel, when he learned
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his father had not taken out second papers, he declared his inten-
tion to become a citizen of the United States, which was sworn to and
filed before the clerk of the district court for 0 county, Oklahoma, on
October 27, 1893.
The contention of counsel for Clem is, that up to said 27th of Octo
ber, 1893, the status of George Weisner was that of an alien, and that
he took Do benefit fron the declaration made by his father, filed in
April, 1870.
The contention of counsel for Weisner is, that his status with refer-
ence to citizenship is not changed by his declaration of intention to
become a citizen, made and filed in October, 1893, but his status is the
same as that of his father, whose declaration of intention was made
and filed in 1870, and that the homestead law does not require that one
alien born, shall have, been fully naturalized in order to make an orig-
inal homestead entry, the qualification for such entry being the same
as for pre-emption filing-viz., a declaration of intention to become a
citizen. It is conceded that such person must complete his naturaliza-
tion before completing entry; but one in a position to entitle him to
full naturalization before a proper court may make homestead entry.
In the case of Meriam v. Poggi, 17 L. D., 579, it was held (syllabus)
that:
The residence of an alien in this country for the last three years of his minority
qualifies such person, in the matter of citizenship, as a pre-emptor, without previous
filing of declaration of intention to become a citizen.
The minor child of an alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen but
does not complete his naturalization before the child attains his majority, occupies
under the pre-emption law the status of a person who has filed his declaration of
intention to become a citizen.
George Weisner comes within the same rule, and it follows that his
acts of settlement, whatever they were, are entitled to just the same
consideration as if they had followed, instead of preceded, his personal
declaration of intention to become a citizen. Having settled that
plaintiff and defendant are upon terms of equality as to the right to
make settlement and entry of the public lands under the homestead
laws, it remains to consider what acts were performed by each, and in
what order.
The land in question is in the Cherokee Outlet, and was opened to
settlement, at noon, on September 16, 1893. George Weisner started
into the race on that day from the south line of the strip, at a point
six miles west of Orlando, and ran to this land, stopping on it about
one o'clock; jumped off his horse, and stuck a flag and stake, his name
being printed on the flag; hunted corners that day and slept there that
night; next day (Sunday) carried some dry poles to stake, and started
to Mulliall for his wagon; got the wagon, with some tools and provi-
sions, and got back to the land on the following Tuesday; got four logs
and drew them out on the claim about ten rods from the creek; notched
them and laid them in a square; dug a hole a foot deep, and about a
foot and a half wide, and set two posts-one large one about seven
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feet long, and a smaller one about four feet long; on Wednesday he
helped Mr. Boyle on the adjoining claim; got the number of his claim,
and started to Perry, Wednesday evening, to file; when he reached
there, found the laud was in the Enid district; he then went to Orlando
to meet John Boyle who gave him a letter from his-wife calling him home;
he arranged with Boyle to take his team and go to Enid and see about
filing, and then go to the claim and do some breaking; went home and
returned between the 15th and 20th of October; found that hiis logs
had been removed and he laid some two by four lumber on the ground
and plowed around it; went to Enid, and remained until he found his
claim had been filed on, when he immediately filed his contest and
returned to the claim; remained there four or five days, eating and
sleeping on it; procured more lumber and built a dugout; went back to
Kansas to make preparation to move; husked, his corn, hauled it to
market and sold what effects he could not move and prepared to move
early in February, 1894, but on account of a snow storm did not start
until the 25th of February. Had a car loaded with stock, implements,
household effects and corn, which reached Perry the 28th of February;
carried two loads to the claim on that day, and two each day for two
succeeding days. Plowed a half acre for a garden, and commenced a
frame house, which was completed the latter part of March. When he
left Kansas, in February, his wife went to stop with her parents, until
he reached the claim and prepared for her. The latter part of March
he received notice that his wife and child were sick, and went to look
after them. Found his wife and little boy confined to the bed.
Remained with them two weeks, and as soon as they were able to
travel carried them to the claim, reaching it April 24, 1894, where they
have since remained. Has a house, cellar, well, chicken house, unfin-
ished stable, pair of mules, two cows, two shoats, wagon and harness,
and two plows.
Clem was not in the' race for land,' but went upon this land, in com-
pany with A. J. Ferguson, the first time on October 3, 1893. On that
day he stuck three stakes, on which he nailed boards, with the words
written thereon: "'Taken by H. Clem, October 3, 1893." He claims to
have found no evidence of settlement upon it at that time. He remained
that night upon it, and returned to Enid next day. Came back the
5th, with two of his boys and Ferguson, and remained there in a tent
until the 11th or 13th of October. While there he commenced a cellar,
sixteen by eighteen feet, and dug it to the depth of about two feet.
Went to Pond Creek for provisions, and returned to the claim October
27th, and up to that time found no improvements, except his own, on
the land. Was on the land again November 2, 1893, and remained
until next day, when he saw a small plat of ground with two furrows
plowed around it. Mr. Ferguson told him the man who did the plow-
ing claimed the land. Saw a small hole dug. He returned to Enid,
and filed on the 4th of November. Did not come back till March 26,
1894, when he found' a dugout had been built, and some breaking was
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being done by a man by the name of Leathers. He (Clem) then com-
menced a dugout, which he completed and moved into himself April 14,
and moved his family in April18, 1894, where he has since resided. He
explains his absence from November 2, 1893, to March 26, 1894, by the
sickness and death of his daughter daring this interval, and his want
of means. He established residence April 18, 1894, a few days before
expiration of six months from his entry.
Weisner broke up his former home, and moved his effects into his
dugout about March 4, 1894, and his residence was established at that
date, although his wife and child did not get there until April 24,
1894, on account of their detention by sickness on the way. It appears,
therefore, from the record that he was the first to initiate a claim to the
land by acts of settlement and the first to establish residence upon it,
and that Clem had notice of a claim by some one else before he made
his entry and before he made any improvements of value.
Looking to the group of facts, which show Weisner's acts and con-.
duct in reference to the land from the time he started into the-race to
the time he established residence, nothing is found which manifests an
intention to abandon the claim, or justifies the conclusion that he was
acting in bad faith. His longest absence at any time was no longer
than that of Clem, and each accounts for such absence by showing
providential cause.
It may be said of the charge of aches in this case, that the facts
place the parties upon terms of equality, and-neither can obtain advan-
tage over the other on this ground.
Your office decision holding Clem's entry subject to Weisner's supe-
rior right to enter, upon proper application, is affirmed.
MADSEN V. CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. CO.
Motion for review of departmental decision of January 7, 1898, 26
L. D., 15, denied by Secretary Bliss, March 3, 1898.
PRACTICE-ORDER FOR 1HEARING-MOTION FOR REVIEW.
HACKNEY ET AL. V. THioxAs.
There is no authority in the Rules of Practice-,for the review of an order of the See-
retary directing a hearing; if a revocation of such orAer is sought, an application
therefor must be addressed to the supervisory authority of the Secretary.
Secretary Bliss t the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. . D.) 4, 1898. (C. J. W.)
On September 25, 1893, W. M. Thomas made homestead entry for the
SE. J of Sec. 32, T. 27 N., R. 2 E., at Perry, Oklahoma. Council G.
Crawford made application to enter the same land, by mail, which was
received at the local office September 23, 1893, but was not acted upon
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until after the entry of Thomas was allowed of record, when it was
rejected for con-dict therewith.
On October 21,1893, William M. Hackney filed affidavit of contest
against the entry, alleging prior settlement.
October 21, 1893, Council C-. Crawford filed affidavit of contest
against said entry, alleging both prior, application to enter and settle-
ment prior to that of any other person.
A hearing was ordered,, at which Thomas failed to appear and was
adjudged in default, and hearing proceeded between Hackney and Craw-
ford. The register and receiver, without a finding as to which party
settled first, recommended a division of the' land between the parties.
Both parties appealed, and, on April 4, 1896, your office considered the
case and expressed the opinion that it could not be determined who was
the prior settler as between Hackney and Crawford, and awarded a
division of the land between them. Both parties again appealed, and,
on January 6,1898, the Department, without final action on the appeals,
remanded the case for frther hearing.
Counsel for William N. Hackney has filed a motion for review of said
departmental order, which is an interlocutory order, and makes no final
disposition of the case.
It was decided in the case of Lee v. Kuhlman (24 L. D., 400), that
there is no authority in the Rules of Practice for the review of an order
of the Secretary of the Interior directing a hearing. If a revocation of
such order is sought, it must be addressed to the supervisory authority
of the Secretary.
Even if the present motion be treated as an application to the super-
visory authority of the Secretary, no satisfactory reason is shown for
the revocation of the order.
The motion is denied.
ALASKAN LAXNDS-CHARACTER OF OCCUPANCY-PAYMENT.
JOHN G. BRADY.
An entry of land in Alaska for purposes of trade and manufacture must be limited
to the land possessed and occupied for such purposes alone, when taken in the
form prescribed by the statute, and not include lands used for agricultural pur-
poses incidental to the business of the purchaser. -
Sections 2339 and 2340 of the Revised Statutes are part of the general land laws,
and are not operative in Alaska, except in so far as they relate to mining claims
and the rights incident thereto.
There is no statutory authority for accepting in payment for lands purchased for
trade and manufacture, the certificates issued on account of the deposit made to
secure the 'survey of said land.
Paragraph 5, of the circular regulations of Jane 3, 1891, 12 L. D., 583, revoked.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, Marchi
(W. V. D.) 4 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
This is an appeal by John G. Brady from your office decision of Feb-
ruary 19, 1896, in the matter of his cash entry No. 10, made May 2,
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1894, survey No. 6 of one hundred and sixty acres of land in the dis-
trict of Alaska, undeL sections 12 to 14, act of Alarch 3, 1891 (26 Stat.,
1095), which provide for the sale of lands in Alaska, then or thereafter
possessed and occupied " for the purpose of trade or manufactures."
Your office decision holds, that, as construed by the Department
(Instructions of May 4, 1895, 20 L. D., 434), the legislation above indi-
cated authorizes the sale of only such public lands in Alaska, as are
actually occupied for purposes of trade or manufacture; that the land
so occupied by Mr. Brady is only a small portion-about twenty acres-
of that entered; that he must limit the area of his entry to land cov-
;ered by his improvements and essential to the conduct of his business;
and that inl default of the necessary steps to secure a re survey and
restrict his claim to such area within sixty days from notice, his entry
will be canceled. It is conceded in the appeal that the land actually
occupied by Brady's improvements does not exceed twenty acres; but
it is represented that he needs the balance of the land entered for pas-
turage and the growing of hay for the hoises and cattle employed in
his business; and it is therefore contended that he is entitled under
the law to enter and receive patent for the entire one hundred and sixty
acres.
The land claimed by Brady lies about one half mile northwest of the
village of Sitka, Alaska, and fronts immediately on Sitka harbor for a
distance of nearly one half mile. Its shape is quite irregular, not only
bv reason of the identations of the coast line, but of an indentation
on the northwest corner caused by the claim of Hugh Patton, which
separates the northern portion of the Brady tract from the immediate
coast line, and of a very extensive indentation due to Swan La ke, a
meandered body of fresh water covering an area of between fifteen
and twenty acres, which penetrates the tract from the south for three-
fourths of the distance thence toward the north line.
The improvements of Brady at the date of the entry, except the
fences which enclose most of the land, consisted of a steam sawmill, a
lumber yard, boat house, blacksmith shop, the dwelling house occupied
by him and his family, houses for his foreman, head sawyer, and other
employees, stables for stock, and other small outbuildings. These were
valued in the final proof at $12,000, and the business done upon the
land, consisting of the manufacture and sale of lumber, was estimated
to amount to about $6,000 per annum. In a supplemental, corroborated
affidavit, filed here April 27, 1897, claimant states that he
has constructed at a great expense, a stone roadway, extending from his steam saw-
mill to the southwest corner of his claim, and to within a short distance of the town
of Sitka. He has also, by much hard labor, cleared much of the land from the
stumps, to enable him to fit up a meadow for the raising of hay, for the feeding of
his horses and eattle during the winter months. Much of theland embraced by his
claim, especially that portion lying immediately west of the artificial lake, known
as Swan Lake, is boggy with a heavy clay subsoil covered by a layer of peat, and,
since the heavy timber was cleared away many years ago, by the Russians, has
become a vast cranberry marsh yielding affiant, and the natives, a considerable
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revenue, the berries though small, being of the most excellent quality. Afflant is
now engaged in clearing the stumps from the dryest portions of the boggy land and
draining it for the purpose of converting it into meadow land. Tie other portions
of the claim which are not boggy or marshy and which are not used for manufactur-
ing purposes, affiant uses for grazing his animals, which e uses for hauling lumber
and timber from his steam sawmill to the wharves which he has constructed.
Affliant is enlarging his business by adding that of curing and packing cod, her-
ring, and halibut and the canning of salmon, all of which fish are very abundant in
the bay during the proper season, and affiant intends, in time, and as sooD as he can
raise sufficient capital, to engage wholly in the business of curing, packing, and
cauning fish, conducting the business upon the land embraced by said cash entry
No. 10. It will be, and now has becojite absolutely necessary for him to have tlie use
of the water supply upon-the 160 acres to successfully carry on his business, and he
has made arrangements for piping the water from the creek (which flows through.
-the northern part of his claim) to his mills, and packing and canning factories for
the proper cleansing of the fish, and for steam purposes, as well as for the purpose of
protection against fires and conflagrations.
It does not appear, however that claimant has actually engaged in the
packing or canning of fish on. the tract he claims, nor that he has made
any expenditure of money or labor in that direction. In claimant's
own testimony, taken December 8, 1893, being part of the final proof
upon which his entry was allowed, there appears the following:
Quest. 4: State what actual use and occupancy of said lands as a trading post or
for manufacturing purposes or a cannery or fishing station has existed since you have
known it and by whom?
Ans. 4: The only use of said lands known to the applicant has been for the purpose
of a steam sawmill owned and operated by myself.
The same question was answered in substantially the same language,
at the same time, by claimant's other witnesses. The evidence shows
that all of claimant's improvements, except portions of his fence, are
near the meandered coast line of Sitka harbor and are embraced within
a distance of about one quarter of a mile along such line; that is,
within but little more than one half the coast line included in his claim.
The law immediately in point is that part of section 12 of aid act
which reads:
That any citizen of the United States twenty-one years of age, and any association
of such citizens, and any corporation incorporated under the laws of the United
States, or of any State or Territory of the United States now authorized by law to
hold lands in the Territories now or hereafter in possession of and occupying public
lands in Alaska for the purpose of trade or manufactures,-may purchase not exceed-
ing one hundred and sixty acres, to be taken as near as practicable in a square form,
of such land at two dollars and fifty cents per acre.
The question at issue therefore, under the appeal, is whether claim-
ant's possession and occupancy are such as to entitle him to purchase
and receive patent for all the land claimed, or, in other words, whether,
for the purpose of manufacturing lumber and trading in lumber-for
these are the only manufacturing and trading shown to have been car-
ried on upon the land-clainant has been in aetual possession and
occupation of the entire one hundred and sixty acres.
That Congress intended to limit the amount of land which might be
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acquired in Alaska bya claimant under sections 12 to14ofsaid act,to the
area actually occupied, when taken in a square form or as nearly so as
practicable, seems to be clearly expressed bythe language used in section
12, and hereinbefore set out. This legislation was evidently adopted
to meet the exigencies of the then prevailing conditions in-Alaska-to
enable parties engaged in trade or manufacture to acquire the lands
possessed and occupied by them for such purposes. This legislation
was unique in the history of legislation relative to the disposal of the
public lands. Although the limitation as to the maximum quantity of
land which can be acquired thereunder is sufficiently liberal to meet
the largest reasonable requirement of trade or manufacture likely to
arise, still, it is evident from the language employed that the extent of
the purchase is in every case to be limited to the land which is pos-
sessed and occupied by claimant for these purposes. (Catholic Bishop
of Nesqually v. Gibbon, 158 U. S., 155.) The disposition of Congress
has been to restrict legislation relative to the disposal of the public
lands in Alaska to lands of a specific character, or used for specific
purposes. The laws relative to the possession,incident rights, and dis-
posal of mining lands, were made operative in that district in 1884, but
none of the numerous other laws relating to the disposal of the public
lands elsewhere were put in force there (section 8, act of May 17, 1884,
23, Stat., 24). In the judgment of Congress the conditions did not
require the extension of the agricultural and other public land laws to
that district.
There is no provision of law whereby title may be acquired to public
lands in Alaska for the purpose of growing fruit, wild or domestic, or
of raising any agricultural crop, such as grain, or hay, or of grazing
thereon horses or cattle. Such pursuits are horticultural and agricul-
tural in their nature and are not within the meaning of the words
"trade or manufactures." The horticulturist or agriculturist is not
regarded as a tradesman, nor does his pursuit class him with the trader
or manufacturer in the general and ordinary acceptation of these words.
Neither does the language of the act of 1891 warrant the conclusion
that-it was the intention of Congress to authorize the trader or manu-
facturer in Alaska to acquire, as incident to his business, any land in
that district for raising hay, grazing, or fruit-growing purposes, for
which purposes, as it would appear, claimant has entered, and now asks
patent to the major part of the land he claims. Claimant's entry must
therefore be limited to the land possessed and occupied by him for the
purposes of trade or manufacture, when taken in the form prescribed
by the statute. In harmony with these views, see paragraph 20 of cir-
cular regulations of June 3, 1891 (12 L. D., 583); Instructions of May 4,
1895, sitpra; McCollom Fishing and Trading Co. (23 L. D., 7); Charles
A. Johnson et al. (ibid., 283); South Olga Fishing Station (24 L.. D.,
314); and Alfred Paekennen (26 L. D., 232).
To limit the entry, however, to twenty acres of the land claimed, as
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your office decision proposes, and at the same time include all the
buildings claimant uses for the purposes allowed would not meet that
provision of section 12 which requires the land "to be taken as near
as practicable in a square form." No sufficient reason appears why
claimant should not be allowed to take enough land to include all his
buildings, in an approximately square form.. This can be accomplished
by permitting him to take the land bounded substantially as follows:
commencing at corner No. , thence following the meandered coast line
on the southwest to corner No. 6, thence by a line to be run to a point
oin the meander line of Swan Lake about 135 feet north of corner No.
16, thence southeasterly following the meander line of Swan Lake to
Corner No. 19, and thence southwesterly, by a line to be run, to corner
No. 1, the place of beginning. This will give claimant about fifty acres
of land and will also afford him access to the water supply of Swan
Lake. It will be necessary, of course, for him to have his survey
amended accordingly.
As this limitation of the entry of Mr. Brady will leave the source of
supply of Swan Lake unobstructed and will ot, so far as appears,
interfere with the use of the water of the lake by any other person, it
is only deemed necessary to refer to that part of your office decision
concerning the right to the use of such water claimed by Messrs W. R.
and W. P. Mills, for milling purposes (as set out in said decision and in
their letter of July 27, 1895), for the purpose of correcting error therein.
It is there held that " whatever rights Messrs Mills have may, it seems,
be insisted upon under the provisions of sections 2339 and 2340 U. S.
R. S." These sections are part of the general land laws of the United
States and are not in operation in Alaska except in so far as they relate
"to mining claims and the rights incident thereto.". To that extent,
only, they were made applicable to public lands in Alaska by ection 8
of the act of May 17, 1884, supra. In that section Congress expressly
declined to further extend their application. The legislation contained
in the act of March 3, 1891, supra, affords no warrant for any extension
of the application of sections 2339 and 2340 Revised Statutes, to public
lands i Alaska. These two acts contain all the legislation relative to
public lands in that district.
The papers in this case disclose the fact that there were accepted by
the local office, in part payment for the land entered, certificates of
deposit amounting to $358, issued by the Assistant Treasurer of the
United States at San Francisco, for money deposited, as required by
section 13 of the act of March 3, 1891, spra, to defray the cost of sur-
vey. The balance of the $400 necessary to pay for the land, that is,
$42.00, was paid in cash. These certificates were accepted and applied
in part payment-for the land in pursuance of paragraph numbered 5 of
the regulations of June 3, 1891, supra, which reads:
The triplicate certificate of deposit will be receivable in payment to the extent of
the amount of such certificate, for the land purchased, the surveying of which is
paid for out of such deposit, as provided in section 2403 of the Revised Statutes.
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As the result of a very careful consideration of the subject, the
Department is well convinced that there is nothing in the act of March
3, 1891, or in any other legislation by Congress, to authorize the fore-
going regulation, or the acceptance of said certificates as part payment
for the land. Section 13, after providing, in effect, that upon due
application the United States Marshal, ex officio surveyor general of
Alaska, shall make an estimate of the cost of survey of the land
claimed ad of the cost of the clerical work necessary to be done in
his office, further provides that on the receipt of the estimate the
applicant-
shall deposit the amount in the ijaited States depository, as is required by section
numbered tventy-four hundred and one, relating to deposits for surveys.
Continuing, the next paragraph of the same section provides for the
making of the surveyj after the receipt by the ex officio surveyor general
of the certificates of deposit, and for the transmittal of the approved
field notes and plats thereof to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office. Upon the approval of the field notes and plats by such Com-
missioner, and within six months after notice thereof, as provided in
the third paragraph of the same section, the applicant must pay for
the land "to the said United States marshal, ex officio surveyor general 7
The foregoing statement comprises, in brief, the provisions of section
13 relative to the survey of the land and payment, separately, of the
cost of survey and the price of the land. The price, as hereinbefore
appears, is fixed by section 12.
These provisions do not contain any authority for crediting the appli-
cant, toward the payment for the land itself, with any part of the fund
deposited by him to pay for the survey.. In the order laid down by the
statute, the applicant imust first pay for the survey, and, finally, upon
completion of the survey and within the time indicated, Must pay for
the land. In the absence of a plain provision of law to the contrary,
it would seem too clear to admit of cavil that Congress intended that
both the expense of the survey and the price of the land should be
paid by the applicant. Te reference in section 13 to section 2401,
Revised Statutes, and the connection between the latter section and
section 2403, Revised Statntes, upon which the regulation in question
would seen to be founded, do not warrant a different conclusion.
Section 2401 as it stood when the act of 1891 was passed, and thence
until A gust 20, 1894, reads:
When the settlers in any township, not m1neral or reserved by government, desire
a survey made of the same, under the authority of the surveyor general, and tile an
application therefor in writing, and deposit in a proper United States depository,
to the credit of the United States, a sum sufficient to pay for such survey, together
with all expenses incident thereto, without cost or claim for indemnity on the United
States, it may be lawful for the surveyor general, under such instructions as may be
given him by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and in accordance with
law, to survey such township and make return thereof to the general and proper
local land office, provided the township so proposed to be surveyed is within the
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range of the regular progress of te public surveys embraced by existing standard
lines or bases for the township and subdivisional surveys.
So much of section 2403 as is in point, and as it stood during the
same period, reads:
Where settlers mnake deposits i aceordance -%vith the provisions of section twenty-
four hundred antd one, the amount so deposited shall go in part payment for their
lands situated in the townships, the surveying of which is paid for out of such
deposits.
These provisions are part of the general land laws of the United
States. They present a general plan of operation which has never
been put in force in Alaska. The conditions there are still such-and
these conditions were known to Congress when the act of 1891 was
passed-as to absolutely pl)eclude the application of such plan to Alaska.
There are in Alaska no " existing standard lines or bases for the town-
ship and sabdivisional surveys." Without these, owvisliip lines could
not be run. There are hence no townships there. No such survey as
is conteml)lated by section 2401 can now be nade in Alaska. It is to
"deposits" m ade by "settlers .. . . . in accordance with the provisions
of section twenty-four hundred and one," and to-such deposits, only,
that the provision of section 2403, authorizing their acceptance "in
part payment," etc., applies.
Again, the provisions of these sections (2401 and 2403), both as to
surveys and deposits, as is also true of the amendments to them by the
act of August 20., 1894 (28 Stat., 423), relate only to lands taken, or to
be taken, by legal subdivisions, and not, therefore, to lands in Alaska,
where there are no legal subdivisions, and where lands can not be so
taken.
The extension of the regular system of the public surveys over the
public domain has long been regarded as a function of the government
and to be performed at the 1)ublic expense, and appropriations there-
for are annually made by Congress. When these public surveys are
extended at private expense, as is permitted to be done by section 2401,
itis recognized as only just and proper that the expense should be repaid
by the government, as is provided in section 2403. Differing from the
survey contemplated by section 2401, a survey under section 13 is no
part of the regular survey, but is special and isolated and serves no
purpose except that of identifying the particular land desired to be
purchased. It does not assist the government by diminishing either
the labor or the expense of making or extending the regular surveys in
that vicinity. In such case, as in the instance of a mining claim not
taken according to legal subdivisions, the expense is to be borne by the
applicant for the survey, and there is no authority for reimbursement
by the government.
The provision in section 13 directing the deposit is a. requirement
made upon the applicant for the survey, and at the same time is an
autbority under which the depositary must receive the deposit, and it
is nothing more. Stated fully, in view of the reference to section 2401,
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the requirement upon the applicant is that he "shall deposit in a
proper United States depository the estimated ' cost of making a survey
of the lands occupied . . and the cost of the clerical work necessary to
be done in the office of the . . . e officio srveyor-general,' without
cost or claim for indemnity on the United States." No reference, even
by remote implication, is anywhere made in the legislation under which
this entry was made, to section 2403, nor is there any other legislation
making any of the provisions of that section applicable to Alaska.
The regulation in question is accordingly revoked. You will require
claimant to have his survey and entry amended and to make payment
for the land in accordance with the views herein expressed, or, in.
default of compliance herewith within a reasonable time after notice,
you will cancel his entry. The decision of your office is modified
accordingly.
RAILROAD GRANT-INfDEMNITY SELECTIONS-SPECIFICATION OF LOSS.
HAGEN V. NORTHERN PACIFIC . R. Co.
A list of indemnity seleetions made under the order of May 28, 1883, waiving speci-
fications of loss, subsequently amended by designation of loss in bulk, under
the circular requirements of August 4, 1885; and thereafter rearranged, in
accordance with departmental decisions, tract for tract, with the losses specified,
is protected as against a settlement made after the designation in bulk and prior
to said rearrangement.
The filing of a list of indemnity selections initiates a claim on behalf of the company
that can only be defeated on clue cause shown why such elections should not be
approved.
Odd numbered sections embraced within the Yakima Indian reservation afford legal
bases for indemnity selections by the Northern Pacific.
The Northernl Pacific may take idemnity lands in one State fr losses sustained in
another, notwithstanding such losses might be satisfied froui lands within the
State where the losses occurred.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Comminissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) March 5, 1898. (L. L. B.)
The case of Nels Hl. lagen v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
involving the NW. i of Sec. 5, T. 26 N., R. 33 E., Spokane, Washington,
is here on the appeal of Hagen from the decision of your office of June
6, 1896, rejecting his claim to the land in question. The following facts
appear in the record:
The company included this land in its list of selections No. 5, pre-
sented May 14, 1885. This list contained no designation of losses.
October 21, 1887, an amended list was filed in which the losses for
which indemnity was claimed were designated in the aggregate.
September 2,18912, a rearranged list was presented in which the losses
were specified tract for tract with the lands claimed as indemnity there-
for. The land in controversy was embraced in all these lists. This
was the- status of the land on August 30, 1895, when Nels H. liagen
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filed his affidavit of contest against the company's selection alleging
his settlement in June 1888, and
That the Northern Pacific Railroad Company did not file any objections to the
allowance of his said application within thirty days after he made the same, nor any
other time, bt claimed the land nndera selection made May 14, 1885;
That said selection was not valid, and was of no effect to bar this contestant from
entering said land for the reason that it lid not designate the losses named, tract for
tract, with the selections in place, and was not protected by office circular of May
28, 1883; and for the further reason that it designated losses in Idaho, while the
selections AdWere made in Washington;
That said company, on the 2nd day of Sept. 1892, abandoned said former list of
18S5, and filed another list, selecting this same land, but designating different losses
and amounts from those named in the former list, ahd still not designating the losses
and selections in place tract for tract,-designating the selections by forty acre
tracts, while the losses were designated in bulk by entire sectional tracts of nsur-
veycfd land in the Yakima Indian reservation, and not adjacent to said selections;
That said land was excepted from the operation of the withdrawal formerly recog-
nized, (that of Nov. 17, 1880), for the reasoii that it was not covered by approved
selections when said withdrawal was revoked, and because said withdrawal was
unauthorized, and of no legal effect;
That this contestant has a prior right to said land, under his said settlement and
application therefor;
That since his said settlement he has continued to occupy, improve, and cultivate
said land, with the intention, and expectation of obtaining title to said land under
the United States land laws.
As the settlement of Hagen was alleged to have been made in Jane
1888, and the original selection of the land by the company was made
in May 1885, the register and receiver refused to order a hearing; but
on appeal by Hagen your office by letter of November 21, 1895, directed
a hearing to be had, holding then that the filing of the rearranged list
by the company, September 2, 1892, was an
abandonment by the ompany of its original list, and hence any rights which the
company may have had to the land involved herein, must also in the face of the
adverse claim of Hagen be held to have attached at the (late of the filing of the said
re-arranged list on September 2, 1892.
This hearing was to determine the date and bonea fides of Hagen's
settlement.
December 19, 1885, counsel for the company filed a motion for review
of your said office 'decision ordering a hearing wich motion was sus-
tained by your office letter of June (;, 1896, where it was held that the
alleged settlement of' Hagen in 1888, if established, at the hearing
would not defeat the claim of the road for the land, and Hagen's appli-
cation to contest was denied.
In the mean time (the Commissioner not having suspended the order
of hearing, pending the motion for review) the hearing was had before
the local office, in which Hagen fairly established his settlement in 1888,
and the company presented its clains, under the. selection of 1885, and
subsequent amended and re-arranged lists as heretofore indicated..
On this showing the register and receiver found, in favor of the com-
pany and recommended " that the contest initiated by Nels R. Hagen
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should be dismissed and that the selection of the company should
remain iiitaet."
From this action of the local office, Hagen also appealed and, by
your office letter of June 6, 1896, sustaining the motion to review your
former decision granting a hearing, the action of the register and
receiver rejecting the claim of Hagen was affirmed, so that all the ques-
tions involved in tie motion for review and on the appeal of Hagen
are here presented for consideration.
Counsel for Hagen), in his appeal specifies error in not holding that
the original selection was invalid for failing to specify losses; that it
was not approved by the register and receiver, before appellant's rights
attached nor before the company was required to specify particular
deficiencies, nor was it approved by the Commissioner or Secretary
before apl)ellant's rights attached; for that the losses designated in
the list of October 31, 1887, described lands in Idaho, for which selec-
tions were made in. Washington and that the list of 1887, did not
designate losses tract for tract with the indemnities claimed therefor.
That it was error to hold that the selection of 1885, was protected
by the order of May 28, 1883.
That it was error not to hold that the amendatory list filed Septem-
ber 2, 1892, worked an abandonment of the list filed in 1885, because
it specified different losses from those named i the fmirer list.
That sa-id list of 1892, was invalid because it designated losses in
unsurveyed lands and lands in the Yakima Indian reservation, and for
that said list did not specify losses tract for tract with the indemnity
selected, and that they were not selected from lands nearest the granted
sections in which the losses occurred and that neither of the lists had
ever been examined and approved by the Commissioner or the Secre-
tary.
Hagen's claim to the land is based on his settlement alleged in his
contest affidavit to have been made in June 1888, and inasmuch as the
company selected the land May 14, 1885, and filed an amended list in
October 1887, these selections, must be declared invalid before his claim
can attach, unless by the filing of its rearranged list of September 2,
1892, the company abandoned their former selection or unless second,
the land is not subject to selection by reason of its remoteness from
the land lost in place.
By circular of May 28, 1883, 12 L. D., 196, in order to expedite the
adjustment of the grant to this road, the company was allowed to
select indemnity without designating the losses for which the indem-
nity was claimed, and it was under the provisions of this circular that
the company selected this laud May 14, 1885.
August 4, 1885, your office by circular instructions, approved by Sec-
retary Lamar, directed local officers to "require preliminary lists to be
filed, specifying the particular deficiencies for which indemnity is
claimed," before admitting selections, which circular also directed that
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"when indemnity selections have heretofore been Inade without speci-
fication of losses, you will require the companies to designate the defi-
ciencies for which sch indemnity is to be applied before further selec-
tions are allowed," and required that the lieu selections should be made
from land within indemnity limits nearest the granted section in which
the loss occurred (4 L. D., 90.)
It was to comply with this circular that the company, October 21,
18S7, presented al amended list of selections designating the losses in
bulk for which the indemnity was claimed, this circular not requiring
the lost lands to be designated tract for tract with the selections made
therefor.
At the time this amended list was presented te land was clear,
Hagen's settlement not having been made until June, 1888.
June 10, 1891, this Department in the case of the St. Paul Minue-
apolis and Manitoba and St. Paul and Northern Pacific companies
(13 L. D.,349), required that lists presented for lost lands, should specify
each loss separately and designate the selection for each such specific
loss, which is otherwise and ordinarily described as a "specification
tract for tract."
It was to comply with this requirement that the company presented
its re-arranged list September 2, 1892.
This was the status of the land on August 30, 18')5, when Hagen
filed his contest.
The original selection of the land by the company, having been
made in conformity with the circular of May 28, 1883, which was then
in force, it was a legal selection and reserved the land from individual
claimants. Sawyer v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company,12 L.D., 448,
and as was said in that case:
The subsequent circular of Secretary Larnar of Angust 4, 1885 (4L. ). 90), requir-
ing a basis of loss for sllb selection, was not designed to invalidate selections tere-
tofore made, but req uirel the company to designate the losses in liel of which such
prior selections had been made, and directed the district officers not to receive any
further selections until sch order had been complied( with.
As we have seen, this order was complied with by the presentation
of the amended list, tiled October 21, 1887, some months before the
alleged settlement of Hagen. Hagen's settlement then was made,
subject to the rights of the company.
But it is insisted by counsel for Hagen that the rearranged list of
September 2, 1892, having been filed after Hagen's settlement rights
attached, his rights have priority to those of the company and he cites
the case of Hoefft v. St. Paul and Duluth Railroad Company, 15 L. D.,
101, as sustaining his position.
The facts in that case are different from those presented by the record
here. The selections in the case cited, contained no specification of
losses and were made while the circular of November 7, 1879, was in
force, requiring a specification of losses for which the indemnity was
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claimed, and were therefore not in accordance with the departmental
requirements then in force.
The language in said decision, quoted from John 0. Miller on review
(11 L. D., 428), to the effect that the circular of May 28, 1883, would
not avail to protect the company, even if the selection had been made
under said circular, is obiter dictum for it was not necessary to deter-
mine the issue involved; moreover, it is contrary to the rule in Sawyer
v. the Company, upra, Darland v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co. (12 L. D.,
195), and Clancey V. Hastings and Dakota Railroad Company (17 L. D.,
592), and which has been adhered to ever since. Any other rule would
seem to be unfair for, by the terms of the grant the selection of lands
in lieu of lands lost to the grant was left to the direction of the Secre-
tary of te -Interior; his directions in this respect have the frce of
law, and the beneficiaries under the grant are compelled to comply
with them so long as they are in force.
These directions and regulations may be changed when, in the
opinion of the Secretary, a change is required to more effectually, or
promptly carry out the purposes of the grant or protect the interests
of settlers within the indemnity limits, and these new regulations are
equally obligatory on the companies. To hold therefore that after a
full compliance with these regulations, their rights could be defeated,
because the requirements under the circulars in force at the date of
compliance, were different from or even repugnant to those imposed at
a later date would be unreasonable and unjust.
In the case at bar the original list embracing this land was filed in
conformity with the regulations in force at the time, and afterwards
changed and rearranged to suit the later directions of the Secretary.
The settlement of Hiagen was made at a time when the company was
not in default as to any of the requirements of the Department. His
settlement, then, was in clear violation of the rights of the company,
and the rights of the company so acquired could only thereafter be
forfeited by an abandonment of its selection; and the filing of a new
list under direction of the Secretary, designating the lost and lieu lands
"tract for tract" and embracing only the lands included in the former
list, is clearly not an abandonment of its former selection.
There is no force in the objection that "said selections had never
been approved by the Commissioner or the Secretary before the appel-
lants rights attached," for the filing of the list of selections with the
local office is the initiation of the claim of the company, and it can only
be defeated, by a subsequent settler, by showing cause why it should
not be approved.
It is also urged, by counsel for Hagen, that the selection was invalid
for the reason that lands in the Yakima Indian reservation were
designated "as the losses for which indemnity was claimed." This
question was decided adversely to this contention in Dellone v. Northern
Pacific Railroad Company (16 L. D., 229), overruling the Northern Pacific
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Railroad Company v. Miller (7 L. D., 100), cited by counsel in support
of his position.
His objection that lands in Washington were selected in lieu of lands
lost in Idaho, is answered in Northern Pacific Railroad Co., on review
(20 L. D., 187), in which this question was discussed at some length
and it was held that indemnity may be taken in one state for losses
sustained in another, notwithstanding such losses might be satisfied
from lands within the limits of the state in which the losses occurred.
In the same case it is also held that the fact that such reservation
was unsurveyed land, did not preclude the company from selecting
indemnity for its loss; that the surveys could readily be extended by
calculation over the reservation and the tracts lost thus specifically
designated.
The objection that the land selected is not nearest to the correspond-
ing tract lost in place is not supported by any showing upon the part
of counsel for Hagen, and it is not considered incumbent upon this
department to re-examine a list, which has received the approval of
your office, upon the bare assertion of counsel in his argument that the
and selected is remote from the land lost, unsupported by any showing
to the contrary.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ALIEN HEIRS.
PATTEN v. KATZ (ON REviEw).
The right of an alien heir to perfect a homestead -entry, where the entryman dies
without having earned title to the land involved, is not protected under a treaty
that makes provision for the protection of alien heirs on the death of a person
"holding" real property.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) March 5, 1898. (G-. B. G.)
D. Buchanan, administrator of the estate of Christian Katz, deceased,
and agent for the heirs of said Katz, has filed a motion for review of
departmental decision of December 4, 1897 (25 L. D., 453), in the case of
Wallace E. Patten v. The Heirs of Christian Katz, wherein is involved
the NW. i of Sec. 34, T. 19 N., I. 34 E., Spokane land district, Wash-
ingtonl, which motion has been this day considered.
The case is one of contest by Patten against the heirs of Christian
Katz, and it appearing that the said atz had entered the said land
and died before earning title thereto, and it further appearing that his
heirs were aliens, it was held that no authority of law existed for per-
mitting such heirs to perfect said claim.
The concluding paragraph in said decision is as follows:
The further contention that the alien heirs are entitled to the right of pnrchase
under the second section of the act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat., 237), is without
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force. It relates alone to entries made prior to the passage of the act, and if it were
prospective in its operation, its aplication to this case does not appear.
The specifications of error in the motion for review entitled to con-
sideration are as follows:
1st. The Honorable Secretary errs in his decisicn that alien heirs are not entitled
to purchase under the geneial laws in relation to purchase of homestead by heirs of
deceased entryinan.
2d. The Honorable Secretary errs in his decision in deciding that alien heirs are
not entitled to purchase the homestead of deceased entryman, except by the provi-
sions of the act of Congress approved Jne 15, 1880, and that if said act were pros-
pective in its operation, its application to this case does not appear.
In argumentative elaboration of these specifications, it is submitted
that the grounds upon which it was and is now contended that the heirs
of the deceased, Christian Katz, are entitled to purchase the land, have
been misapprehended, it being conceded, however, that such alleged
misapprehension is probably the fault of counsel. It is now contended
that thehomestead lawconfers two certain, well defined rights-namely,
(1) the right to enter upon and possess land covered by an entry, and at
the end of five years' lawful residence thereon, make final proof and get
title to the land, and (2) the right to coinmute or acquire title to said
lands by purchase in accordance with the provisions of section 2301 of
the Revised Statutes; that these two rights are both heritable rights,
and while admitting that alien heirs of a deceased entryman can not
make final proof, and perfect title to their deceased kinsman's homestead
entry, it is insisted that under the well-settled rulings of the Depart-
ment, under the law, and according to all equity, alien heirs have a
right to commute and so acquire the fruits of their delceased kinsman's
entry.
In support of this insistence no decision of the Department is cited,
but reference is made to a letter of May 21, 1883 (2 L. D., 98), from Coin-
missioner Harrison to the local officers at Taylor's Falls, Minnesota,
wherein those officers are advised that:
There is nothing in the statutes prohibiting aliens from purchasing lands subject
to private entry, and the effect of the second section of the act of June 15, 1880, is
to render lauds affected by it subject to private entry by the persons entitled to its
provisions.
Without stopping to inquire whether this was a correct exposition of
the law at that time, there are two apparent reasons why it has no
application-ist, the act of June 15, 1880, as was held in the decision
under review, relates alone to entries made prior to the passage of the
act, the entry here in question having been made on November 15, 1887,
and 2d, the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), withdrew all public
lands from private entry, except those in the State of Missouri. Hence,
if it be true that at the time said letter was written aliens had the right
to purchase lands subject to private entry, the land here in question is
not subject to private entry, and aliens are not entitled to this alleged
liberality of the private entry laws.
It is said that our treaties with all European nations, and especially
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with the Kingdom of Wurtemburg, of which country the heirs of
Christian Katz are subjects, recognize the heritable righ ts of all such
heirs.
Article II of the treaty of April 10, 1844, between the United States
and the King of Wurtemburg is as follows:
Where, on the death of ally person holding real property within the territories of
one party, sch real property would, by the laws of the land, descend on a citizen
or subject of the other were he not disqualified by alienage, such citizen or subject
shall be allowed a term of two years to sell the same,-which term may be reasona-
bly prolonged, according to circumstances,-and to withdraw the proceeds thereof,
without molestation, and exempt from all duties of detraction.
The terms of this treaty do not cover the present case. The right
guaranteed thereby is one of inheritance freed from the disability of
alienage. Prerequisite to an appropriation of the privilege conferred,
there must have died a person " holding real property."
'"H Holding,':relating to ownership i property, embraces two ideas:
actual possession of some subject of property, and being invested with
the legal title." (Anderson's Law Diction ay, and cases cited, page 5ll.)
The legal title to the land in controversy was not in Christian Katz.
He had not earned the same when he died. It did not belong to him,
but to the United States. If the legal title had been earned, it might
be held to be a case coming within the spirit of the treaty, but such is
not this case.
The law provides a manner whereby title may be earned after the
death of an entryman, but such a right is a privilege conferred by the
United States on its own citizens.
Section 2301 of the Revised Statutes confers the right to commute a
homestead entry to cash upon any person who has availed himself of
the benefits of section 2289 of the Revised Statutes. The benefit con-
ferred by said section is the right to complete entry. This right is only
given to a citizen of the United States, or one who has filed his dec-
laration of intention to become such.
On a careful examination of the whole subject, no statutory or treaty
right has been found whereby aliens may acquire title to the public
lands of the United States in such a case as is here presented.
The motion for review is denied.
PUBLIC SURVEYS-MEANDER LINE-RIPARIAN OWNER.
W. L. HEMPHILL ET AL.
Purchasers of lands bounded by an alleged meander line, have no vested rights that
will prevent the government from taking action to ascertain whether there was
in fact a body of water existing lpO wliich to base said line.
Secretary Bliss to te Oonirnissianer of the General Land Office, March,
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (C. W. P.)
By your office letter, dated January 26,1898, you transmit for depart-
mental consideration the application, and accompanying papers, of
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Edward Beatty, William Beatty, W. L. lemphill and Alex. Hemphill,
citizens of Palo Alto county, Iowa, for the survey of certain land situ-
ate in sections 19, 20, 29 and 30, in township 97 north, range 34 west,
5th P. X., in said State of Iowa, which, it is alleged in said application,
is more than five hundred acres, and has never been surveyed by the
United States government.
The application appears to have been served upon the owners of the
lots bordering upon the lake described in the official plat of the survey
of the land in question, and no protests- appear.
The applicants allege that the meander lines of said lake, as shown
by the official survey, are wholly wrong, and that, at the time the sur-
vey was made and the meander lines established, the line established
as the meander line of said lake running through sections 19 and 30
was from sixteen to forty-nine feet above high water mark of said lake
and above the true banks of said lake, and that the meander line of
said lake running throUgh sections 20 and 29 was from thirteen to
twenty-nine feet above high water mark and the true banks of said
lake; that the land embraced between the true banks of said lake and
the meander lines, as shown by the official survey, is high rolling land;
and the applicants call particular attention to a plat of a private survey
accompanying their application, wherein it is shown that this land is
from seventeen to thirty-six feet above high water mark. It is further
alleged that from the configuration of said land there is not now and
was not at the time of the official survey any reason or facts that could
possibly be construed as justifying the meander lines, as established
by said official survey, but that said survey is so wholly wrong as
to leave o doubt but what the parties who established said lines were, for some
reason, at that time wholly disqualified from establisbhig correct lines, or a very
grave unintentional mistake ha's been made.
Accompanying the application is the affidavit of . T. Painter, the
surveyor who made the private survey of said land, to the effect that
the land over which the meander lines of the official survey run is hilly,
rolling land, and that the lakes in said sections 19, 20, 29 and 30 do not
and never did cover the land, as indicated by the official plat; and that
the land between the meander lines of the official survey and the true
meander lines, as shown by the private survey, is " about 1/5 low dry
agricultural land, 1/20 low wet agricultural land, and 3/4 high dry
agricultural land, except about 3 acres pond water;" that "it is an
utter impossibility that the lakes covering portions of the aforesaid
section of land ever could have covered the landbetween the aforesaid
meander lines."
Attached to Mr. Painter's affidavit are the affidavits of eleven per-
sons, who swear that they have known the land in question from
twenty-four to forty years, and who corroborate the statements of Mr.
Painter and the applicants.
The applicants in their affidavits attached to the applications swear
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that they are residing on portions of the land in question, have valu-
able improvements thereon, and have the land under cultivation, with
the exception of a very few acres of pond water, and that" all of said
land can be cultivated to crops in any ordinary season."
- With your office letter are photolithographic copies of the official
plats of said township and a connected diagram taken therefrom, pre-
pared by your office, from which it appears that
the lake extends into part of four townships, viz: Tps. 96 and 97 N., Rs. 34 and 35
W., 5th P. M., Iowa, and is about five and one-half miles long, ranging in width from
about a half mile to about a mile and one-half at its widest part, and was duly
meandered, except a narrow portion denominated as "slough" in section 18, T. 97
N., R. 34 W., and that narrow part in sections 26, 27, 28, 35 and 36 of said township,
and where the lake was meandered the surveys were duly closed thereon.
- This township was surveyed in 1855 and the subdivisions in 1857.
The records of your office show that all the lots bordering upon the
lake in sections 19 and 20, except eighty-eight one hundredth acres in
section 20, and all the lots in section 29, bordering upon the lake, except.
lot 7, were patented to the State as swamp land, on May 15, 1862,
patent No. 2, and that this action was taken, based upon list 5, received
with surveyor-general's letter of March 27, 1860, approved by the Sec-
retary of the Interior, June 10, 1861, of lands selected by the State by
its agents, at the end of which list is the following certificate by the
surveyor-general:
SURVEYOR GENIERAL'S OFFICE,
Dubuque, Mareh 27, 1860.
1, Warner Lewis, surveyor general of the State of Iowa, do hereby certify that
the foregoing list is a correct transcript of the original lists of selections made by
county surveyors or State locating agents; that the same has been carefully com-
pared with the field notes, plats and other evidences on file in this office, and by the
affidavits of said county surveyors or State locating agents it appears that the
greater part of each smallest legal subdivision of the lands embraced in said lists is
swampy or subject to such overflow as to render the same unfit for cultivation, and
'it is therefore of the character contemplated by the act of 28th September, 1850.
WARNER Lrwis,
Surveyor General.
From which it appears, as stated in your office letter, that
the county surveyors and State selecting agents, as far back as 1860, found that the
greater part of each smallest legal subdivision of lands bordering on the Iace as ep-
resen ted upotu the official plat, in sections 19, 20 and 29, T. 97 N., R. 34 W., was subject
to overflow to such an extent as to render them unfit for cultivation,
and the inference is drawn by your office that
the lake was where it is represented by the official plats, and that the meander lines
established by the deputy surveyor in 1857, as shown upon the plat, are approxi-
mately correct,
and after an extended consideration of the case, your office submits it
to the Department without recommendation.
It appears that from 1890 to 1894 these applicants have, at different
times, applied to your office for a survey of the land in question, and
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that they have also applied to Congress for the passage of an act to
authorize a survey thereof; and that your office has refused to recom-
mend the survey of said land, or to recommend legislation looking to
its survey. But this action does not preclude favorable action upon
the present application, if a proper showing is made thereunder.
Timothy B. Case, 9 IL. D., 625.
The case of Grant v. Hemphill, 92 Iowa, 218, is cited in the brief of
the counsel for the applicants, which involves the greater part of what
was claimed to be said section 19-wherein it is held by the supreme
court of the State of Iowa, that the land therein in controversy "is not
now and probably never was, any part of a lake;" that there is no evi-
deuce in the case "'that, at or near the time of the survey, or since,
there has been any body of water anywhere on the land upon which to
base a meandered line; " that <'some of the land, like all bodies of land
in that country, is low, flat, and marsh land, but the evidence shows
that a greater part of the land .... is dry, tillable land, and that if
it had been surveyed it would not have passed to the State under the
swamp-land grant ;" that "all the land" therein "'in dispute is part of
the unsurveyed domain of the United States to which no one can
obtain title," except through the methods adopted by the general
government for the disposition of the public lands.
IIn the case of ilardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S., 371, it is held that
grants of the government for lands bounded on streams and other waters, without any
reservation or restriction of terms, are to be construed as to their effect according to
the law of the State in which the lands lie;
and in the case of Noyes v. Collins, 92 Iowa, 566, the supreme court of
-Iowa held that the title of the riparian owners upon a natural lake or
*pond, not navigable, does not extend beyond the natural shore. So
that if it should be found in the present case that there was no body
of water outside of the line of the public survey as made in 1855-1857,
upon which a meandered line could properly be based, the so-called
riparian owners could have no vested claim to the land outside of
said line, by accretion or reliction, or in any other manner.
In view of the showing made in the affidavits presented by the appli-
cants and the decision of the supreme court of Iowa in the case of
Grant v. Hemphill, supra, it is deemed proper to institute an inquiry
into the facts.. You are therefore directed to send a special agent to
the locality to make a careful examination of the lands in question,
and the position of the lake, past and present, and to obtain all the
information attainable, relating to the question at issue, and you will
submit his report when made to the Department, together with your
recommendations thereon.
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TOWNSITE ENT1RY-ACTUAL OCCUPANCY-ADDITIONAL TOWNSITE..-
TOWNSITE OF GLADSTONE 7V. GERIN El AL.
Actual occupancy of land for townsite purposes is a prerequisite to the right to
make an additional townsite entry thereof.
In all cases, either of application to make original, or additional townsite entry,
where the inhabitants of the land are less than one hndred in number, it is a
matter of executive discretion whether sch entry will be allowed.
Secretary Bliss to the Conmissioner of the Generat Land Office, M1arch
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (C. J. W.)
On April 15, 1895, at nine o'clock a. in., Patrick J. Gerin applied to
make homestead entry for lot 4 in the SE. 4 of Sec. 23, lots 5 and 6 in
the SW. 4 of Sec. 24, the SE. of the SW. 1 of Sec. 24, and lot 6 in
the NW. 1 of See. 25, T. 104 N., R. 72 W., containing 139.56 acres, in
the Chamberlain land district, South Dakota.
At 9:05 a. in. of that day Isaac N. Auld applied to enter as a home-
stead lots 7 and 8 in the SE. 4 of Sec. 24, the SW. i of the SE. i and
the SE. of the SE. 1 of Sec. 24, and lot 5 in the NE. J of Sec. 25, T.
104 N., R. 72 W., containing 163.62 acres.
On April 26, 1895, Lewis E. Church, county judge, applied to enter
lots 5, 6 and 7, the SE. 4 of SW. J and the SW. of SE. of Sec. 24,
and lots 5 and 6 of Sec. 25, T. 104 N., R..72 W., containing 231.25 acres,
as a townsite addition.
Immediately after the applications of Gerin and Auld, on April 15,
1895, John G. Bartine offered to file a townsite declaratory statement
in behalf of some townsite settlers, which had the effect of delaying
action on the applications of Gerin and Auld, but said application of
Bartine was rejected on April 23, 1895, and on April 26, 1895, the appli-
cation of Lewis E. Church, as county judge, was substituted for that
of Bartine. As the latter application was in conflict with the appli-
cations of Gerin and Auld, and charged priority of right over them,
notice was issued for a hearing between the respective parties, which
hearing closed July 31, 1895.
On September 7, 1895, based upon evidence taken at the hearing, the
register and receiver rendered a decision adverse to the application of
Church. An appeal was taken in the name of Church, county judge,
and a motion was filed by counsel for Gerin and Auld to dismiss it,
supported by an affidavit from the county judge showing that said
appeal was unauthorized by him.
On April 23, 1896, your office, by letter "0 G" sustained the motion to
dismiss the appeal, and passed upon and approved the rulings and
decision of the local office in the case.
Counsel for the tVnsite claimants moved for review of your said
office decision and for leave to amend the appeal.
On October 31, 1896, your office finally denied the motion and adhered
to the former decision.
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A petition for certiorari was filed and considered by the Department
January 18, 1897, and denied.
A petition under Rule 114 of Practice has since been filed by John
,G. Bartine, claiming to represent both the townsite claimants and the
county judge as attorney, invoking the exercise of the supervisory
authority of the Secretary, and praying for the consideration of the
-ease on its merits.- The homestead applicants have filed a motion to
dismiss this petition, chiefly on the ground that it is a second petition
for the exercise of supervisory authority and is filed out of time, and is
without merit, the petition for certiorari having invoked the exercise of
the same authority.
"The petition is open to some of the objections made, but it has been
found necessary to go through the record, including the evidence taken
at the hearing, in order to comprehend the present complaint, and it is
now deemed best to consider and dispose of the case on the whole
record as presented.
The lands in question are a part of those described in the proclama-
tion of the President of December 5, 1894 (19 T,. D., 431), and declared
~open to entry inder homestead laws, as provided by act of March 2,
1889, "whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall give due notice to
the local officers of this declaration of forfeiture." This notice took
effect on April 15, 1895, and at that date the lands were first subject
both to settlement and entry. They were a part of the ceded Sioux
Indian lands, claimed by the Chicago, i11 ilwaukee and St. Paul Railway
'Company under section 16 of said act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 888),
and were by its terms withheld from any sort of use or appropriation
under townsite laws. Whatever stel)s may have been taken prior to
April 15, 1895, looking to its ultimate appropriation to townsite pur-
poses, were of no effect, and could in no way become the predicate of a
future right. The contention that there was a townsite settlement and
survey upon the land on April 15, 1895, which served to appropriate
and except it from homestead entry, is not tenable. There was no sur-
vey and no settlement-which the law recognized.
The application of the county judge to enter the lands described as
an addition to the townsite of Gladstone, rests then upon the theory of
its actual occupancy for trade and business on and after April 15, 1895,
,and upon the assumption that Gladstone had not less than one hun-
dred inhabitants. The record has been carefully examined as to the
status and condition of the original toWnsite of Gladstone. The land
~applied for is contiguous to it. The original townsite contains an area
-of only 55.15 acres, but this seems to be more space than is actually
-used and needed by it. There was some discrepancy in the estimates
made by the witnesses as to the number of its inhabitants. The esti-
mates of those having the best opportunities to judge, and who were
apparently freest from interest in the result of this litigation, placed
-the number at from forty-one to fifty-four. The local office found the
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number to be less than one hundred. It is true an affidavit filed by
some townsite claimants, and which is part of the record, states in. gen-
eral terms that. Gladstone has more than one hundred inhabitants, but
when the persons who signed the affidavit came to be examined on the
stand, and to explain, it appears that many persons were considered as
inhabitants who were in fact not so, and they were unable to make out
the one hundred. There is no reasonable basis anywhere in the testi-
mony upon which the conclusion that it had one hundred actual inhab-
itants can rest, and the conclusion reached by the local office, that the
number was less than one hundred, is supported by the record and
approved as a finding of fact. Of its buildings, sixteen were occu-
pied and twelve unoccupied. This is not evidence of a town the growth
of which is restricted for want of space to accommodate the growing-
population and increasing business. There appears to have been some
lots left over, for which no purchasers were found. The conclusion is
irresistible that the additional territory applied for is not needed by
said townsite for any purpose connected with the legitimate pursuits
of its inhabitants. But it is insisted that if the toivusitg applicants are
not entitled to have this land entered as an addition to the townsite of
Gladstone, then they mnay enter it as an original townsite, or so many
subdivisions thereof as are occupied for trade and business, there being
no express statutory provision as to the number less than one hundred
who may make entry for this purpose.
Section 2387 of the Revised Statutes has reference to public lands
" settled upon and occupied as a townsite," and section 2388 declares
that a entry under section 2387 " shall include only such land as is
actually occupied by the town." The question of the settlement and
occupancy of this land for towusite purposes will be considered in
connection with other townsite statutes.
Section 2389 of the Revised Statutes, and the act of March 3, 1877
(19 Stat., 392), furnish authority for, and indicate the method by which
towns already founded may be added to on the basis of population.
The fourth section of the act of March 3, 1877, suprra, is as follows:
It shall be lawful for any town which has made, or may hereafter make, entry of
less than the naximum quantity of land named in section twenty-three hundred and
eighty-nine of the Revised Statutes to make such additional entry, or entries; of
contiguous tracts, which may be occupied for town purposes, as when added to the
entry or entries theretofore made will not exceed twenty-five hundred and sixty
acres: Provided, That such additional entry shall not together with all prior entries
be in excess of the area to which the town may be entitled at date of the additional
entry by virtue of its population, as prescribed in said section twenty-three hun-
dred and eighty-nine.
It is apparent that actual occupancy for town purposes is a pre-
requisite to the right to add the land so occupied to the original town.
In all cases, however, where the inhabitants of a town applying to
make additional entry, or the inhabitants of land of which original
townsite entry is sought to be made, are less than one hundred in num-
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ber, it becomes a matter of executive discretion whether such original
or additional entry will be allowed.
In the present case it is necessary to look to the showing made by
the townsite applicants to ascertain what claims they have, and with
what purpose the application is made. It appears that there are
eighty-seven lot claimants, and that most of them have contributed
about two dollars each, ostensibly for the purpose of paying the
expenses of a survey. Four of the eighty-seven were residents on
the land applied for on April 15, 1895, and five, according to some of
the witnesses, at the date of the hearing. Where the others were does
not appear. The townsite claimants were permitted to place their own
estimate upon the value of improvements. J. Wellman, who seems to
have managed most of their affairs, estimates all improvements at
$3000. Included i this estimate is a lumber office, near the river, with
the good-will of its business, estimated at $1000. The cost of the sur-
veys and of a race-track, which had been graded across the land applied
for, but which was grown up in weeds and grass at the date of the
hearing, was also included. Most of the buildings were such as had
been removed from the original townsite of Gladstone. J. Wellman,
the chief promoter of the new settlement, was a resident of Gladstone
and the owner of one of the blocks in that town. One resident in the
proposed addition sold lumber, near the river, one had a photograph-
car, or building in the shape of a car which could be loaded upol a
wagon, and there was a rough stable where stage horses were housed
and fed. It was claimed that many of the lot owners had dug founda-
tions, and in some instances had enclosed the lots claimed with wire
fencing, all of which was estimated as improvements.
As to eighty-two or eighty-three of the lot claimants, they were not
actual occupants, bt claimed lots by virtue of having contributed to
defraying the expenses of the survey and having made selection of
lots. These lots were not resided upon or used for business.
It appears from the affidavit of Judge Church, filed with the answer
of the homnestead applicants to the petition now under consideration,
with the record, that at the time it was filed there were but two actual
occupants remaining on the proposed addition.
There is no such showing of actual occupancy for townsite purposes
as will authorize the entry to be made either as an original or as an
additional entry for the benefit of the occupants.
It appears that Auld made settlement on the land claimed by him as
a homestead on February 10, 1893, and that Geri commenced building
on the land claimed by him as a homestead in the month of February,
1893. The first survey for the addition to the townsite of Gladstone
was commenced in May, 1893, and the last one in February, 1895. The
alleged acts of improvement by townsite laimants cover the period
between March 1, 1893, and April 15, 1895, and if settlement prior to
the latter date has any legal significance in the case, then the home-
stead claimants are entitled to priority.
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It is urged that the local officers erred in treating the applications of
Auld and Gerin as those of qualified homestead applicants, and that
your office erred in not finding that there was no affirmative proof of
their qualification.
Accompanying the record, and forming part of it, are the applica-
tions of the homestead claimants with the affidavits required by law as
to their qualification. These primafacie show them to be qualified, and
this prima facie showing was not overcome by any proof offered at the
hearing. It was not error therefore to treat their applications as those
of qualified entrymen.
It is now insisted that Auld and Gerin are seeking to enter for specu-
lative purposes and are not qualified. It is sufficient to say, however,
that this matter is not presented by corroborated affidavit, or specific
allegation, such as could properly be made the basis of a hearing on
that subject.
It is further complained that the local officers failed to cover the
issues in the case in their report, and that your office ignored them.
That report has been carefully examined and it contains a very coml-
plete and comprehensive summary of the facts, fairly and impartially
stated, followed by the statement of the conclusions reached based on
these facts. The report covers sixteen type-written pages and embraces
the material questions in the case. The local officers were not required
to pass upon irrelevant and immaterial matters, either of law or fact,
which found their way into the record. The report seems to have pre-
sented the record and the facts fairly and fully to your office.
It is charged that the county judge whose name is used as the
representative of the townsite claimants both in the application and
subsequent litigation, has sought to surrender the rights of those he
represents and is in collusion with the homestead claimants. The
Department declines to consider the personal controversy between
counsel for townsite claimants and the county judge, and has instead
considered the case on the whole record as though such consideration
was desired by said county judge, who at least nominally represents
townsite claimants.
The application of Lewis E. Church, county judge of Lymani County,
to enter an addition to the townsite of Gladstone, is rejected, and in
the absence of further proceedings the applications of Patrick J. Gerin
and Isaac N. Auld will be, respectively, allowed.
Your office decisions referred to in the petition, and departmental
decision of January 18, 1897, are modified to conform hereto.
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REPAYMENT-CANCELLATIO:N-JUDICIAL DECREE.
JOHN C. HOLLIST-ER.
The purpose of the act of June 16, 1880, in requiring the relinquishment of all claim
under the entry, and the cancellation thereof, prior to the allowance of repay-
ient, is to prevent any assertion of right under such entry after repayment; and
such purpose is fully satisfied where the applicant, who has received patent.for
the land, in obedience to a judicial decree executes a deed for the land to
another, who by such decree is adjudged to be entitled to receive the govern-
ment title.
Secretary Bliss to the Secretary of the Treasury, M711arch 8, 1898.
(W.V. D.)
May 27, 1897, the Commissioner of the General Land Office submitted
to this Department the application of John C. Hollister for repayment
of $412.70, purchase money and fees paid by him February 26, 1892, on
Seattle; Washington, timber and stone entry No. 16128, for the NE. i
of See. 24, T.37N.,iR.4E.
August 21,1897, the application was alloved and referred back to
the Commissioner for settlement, and was subsequently submitted by"
him to the Auditor for this Department to be certified for payment.
September 28, 1897, the Acting Auditor for this Department, by let-
ter of that date, returned the claim to this Department with the state-
ment that its allowance does not appear to be authorized by the act of
June 16, 1880 (21 tat., 287), because there is no evidence that the
Commissioner of the General Land Office has canceled the entry. The
Acting Auditor's letter submits that such cancellation is essential to
give the Secretary of the Interior lawful authority to cause repayment
to be made.
October 4, 1897, the General Land Office reported at length all of the
facts bearing upon the case. It appears therefrom that the land was
first entered July 5, 1884, by George W. Smith, who made timber land
entry No. 8677 therefor; that March 20, 1889, Smith's entry was can-
celed; that February 26, 1892, John C. Hollister made timber land
entry for the tract and the same was patented to him thereunder
August 8, 1892; that subsequent to the patenting of the tract to. ol-
lister the Stimson Land Company, as the grantee of Smith, the first
entryman, brought suit against bollister to quiet the title to said land,
and to have it declared that Hollister held the legal title thereto in
trust for said company; and that March 16, 1896, in the United States
circuit court, sitting at Seattle, Washington, a decree was entered in
said suit holding, among other things:
that the plaintiff, the Stimson Land Company, is the equitable owner in fee and
entitled to the legal title of all the lands described in its bill of complaint, to wit:
The north east quarter of section twenty-four in township thirty-seven north, range
four east, Willamette meridian; that the patent of the United States of America
issued to said defendant, John C. Hollister, for said above described land was
improvidently issued, and was issued without authority of law, and that said patent
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is a cloud upon the title of said plaintiff to the lands therein described and that said
cloud should be removed, and whatsoever title may have accrued to said defendant-
nder or through said patent is, by said defendant, John C. Hollister, held in trust for.
the use and benefit of said plaintiff, the Stimson Land Company;
-It also appears that this decree further directed that Hollister should
convey said tract to the Stimson Land Company within a time stated,
and that in pursuance thereof Hollister made the conveyance as
commanded.
By this decree it was determined in effect that under his entry and
purchase Smith acquired an equitable title to the land and became
entitled to a patent thereto; that the cancellation of that entry was,
unlawful; that the subsequent entry of the same land by Hollister
and the patenting thereof to him were unlawful and erroneous by rea-
son of the previous entry and purchase by Smith, and that the right
and title of Smith had passed to the Stimson Land Company.
The act of June 1, 18S0 (21 Stat., 287), relating to repayments,
provides:
In all cases where homestead or timber-culture or desert-laud entries or other
entries of public lands have heretofore or shall hereafter be canceled for conflict, or
where, from any cause, the entry has been erroneously allowed and can not be con-_
firmed, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause to be repaid to the person who made
such entry, or to his heirs or assigns, the fees and commissions, amount of purchase
money, and excess paid upon the same upon the surrender of the duplicate receipt
and the execution of a proper relinquishment of all claims to said land, whenever
such entry shall have been duly canceled by the Coumissioner of the General Land
Office.
This statute authorizes repayment where from any cause the entry
has been erroneously allowed and can not be confirmed. Here the .judg-
ment of the court determined that the entry of Hollister was errone-
ously allowed because of the prior and existing lawful entry and
purchase. of Smith and that by reason thereof the entry of bollister
could not be confirmed in him. The statute, however, makes the repay-
ment conditional Upon the srrender of the duplicate receipt, the exe-
cntion of a proper relinquishment of all claims to the land and the
cancellation of the entry by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office. Here the decree of the court and the conveyance of Hollister
thereunder operate as a surrender and relinquishment to Smith of all
claims by Hollister to the land.
According to the decree of the court Smith was entitled to the gov-
ernment title, and a surrender and relinquishment to him of Hollister's.
claim was as effective as would be a surrender and relinquishment to
the government itself, in a case. where it had not otherwise disposed of
the land. By- the decree of the court Hollister's entry and title, with
all the rights resulting therefrom, were effectually transferred to and
invested in Smith, s that no entry by Hollister remains to be canceled.
The purpose in requiring the surrender of the duplicate receipt, the
relinquishment of all claims to. the land and the cancellation of the
entry was to prevent any assertion of claim or right under the entry
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after such repayment. In other words, any possible cloud cast upon
the title by reason of the entry must be removed before the purchase
money and commissions can be returned. Here the purpose of the
statute has been fully satisfied by the complete transfer of all possible
rights under the Hiollister entry to one who has been decreed to
have succeeded to all of the rights of the government in the land.
I must, therefore, hold that Hollister's application for repayment
comes within the act of June 16, 1880, and that he is entitled to repay-
ment.
I trust that the objections presented by the Acting Auditor will be
obviated by a consideration of the matters herein presented.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-EFFECT OF REPEAL-SUIT TO VACATE PATENT.
JOSEPH W. BILBIE ET AL.
Rights lawfully acquired by homestead entry, under proceedings in the land office
authorized by existing law, may properly be perfected, though the law author-
izing such entry is subsequently repealed.
An application for suit to set aside a patent, based on a charge of fraud i securing
the entry, will not be entertained, where said charge was fully considered by the
Department, prior to the issuance of patent, and the alleged facts on which said
charge was made were found not to exist.
Suit to vacate a patent will not be advised on the request of a party, where it does
not appear that the government is under any obligation to him to take such
action, or that any rights, legal or equitable, of the applicant have been preju-
diced in the disposition of the land.
A patent will not be set aside by the courts on the ground of fraud in its issuance, if
by such fraud the entry is only voidable, not void, and the land so patented
has been sold to innocent purchasers without notice of any defect in the title of
the patentee.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March,
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (G. B. G.)
Joseph W. Bilbie and numerous other citizens of Hillsborough county,
Florida, and alleged residents upon lands in said county which were
formerly part of the Fort Brooke military reservation in said State,
have filed in this Department a petition, asking that suit be instituted
to set aside certain patents heretofore issued for said lands.
Said petition was duly entertained, returned for service, and the
parties in interest have filed their respective answers.
By departmental decision of July 24, 1894 (on review), 19 L. D., 48,
certain lands in said reservation were awarded to the parties in interest,
and patents issued in due course, as follows:
To the heirs of Lewis Bell, deceased, lot 8, Sec. 24, T. 29 S.
To the widow of Edward S. Carew, deceased, lots 9 and 10, same sec.
tion, township and range.
To Frank Jones, lot 16, Sec. 18, same township and range.
To Martha Stillings (now Turner), widow and heir of Andrew Stil-
lings, deceased, lot 12, Sec. 19, same township and range.
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To Julius Caesar, lot 13, Sec. 19, same township and range.
To E. B. Chamberlain, lot 14, same section, township and range.
These are the patents which the petitioners seek to vacate.
The history of the litigation and administrative procedure in the
Interior Department, which was finally closed, so far as lies within this
jurisdiction, by the issuance of the aforesaid patents, is briefly as fol-
lows.
Under instructions from the War Department in March, 1824, certain
lands in the State of Florida were occupied by the United States troops
in cantonment, and on December 10, 1830, the Fort Brooke military
reservation, covering an area of sixteen miles square, was established
by executive order. After various restrictions and modifications, the
remainder, containing 148.11 acres, was on January 4, 1883, duly relin-
quished, in writing, by the Secretary of War, and, on the 17th of March,
1883, a plat of the tract so relinquished was sent to the local office at
Gainesville, Florida, with Commissioner McFarland's letter of that
date, as follows:
Herewith inclosed transmit for the files of your office an approved diagram of
the subdivision into lots of the late Fort Brooke military reservation in Florida, in
Sees. 18 and 19, T. 29 S., R. 19 E., and Sec. 24, T. 29 S., 1. 18 E., relinquished by the
Secretary of War to this Department in writing under date Jannary 4, 1883.
The plat referred to was received at the local office at 4:45 o'clock
P. M., March 22, 1883. On that day, at 4:50 o'clock P. M., Edward S.
Carew made homestead entry, covering the whole tract.
On April 2, 1883, the Commissioner of the General Land Office
instructed the local officers, by telegram, to allow no entries upon any
land within said reservation.
On December 17, 1883, Commissioner McFarland, considering the
status of said land and the law applicable thereto, held that the land
released from reservation was, by the aet of August 18, 1856 (11 Stat.,
87), placed under the control of the General Land Office for disposal,
that the manner of disposition therein provided for was modified by
the act of July 2, 1861 (R. S. 2364), and the act of August 3, 1846 (B. S.
2455), and that it was not subject to entry under the homestead and
pre-emption laws, nor scrip location.
Pursuant to said decisitin, on January 22, 1884, said Commissioner
held for cancellation the homestead entry of Carew and the pre emption
declaratory statements of Clifford Hlerrick and Lewis Bell.
On appeal to the Department, Mr. Seeretary Teller, ol May 16, 1884
(2 L. D., 606), affirmed the Cmmissioner's decision, holding that the
entries and filings upon the tracts in question were premature, and did
not foreclose further action by the Commissioner under the provisions
of section 2364 of the Revised Statutes, and said:
I am further of opinion that section 2364 of the Revised Statutes is not inconsistent
with said act of August 18, 1856, and that, as it is a general statute, without restriC-
tion, it applies tothe disposition and sale of reservations in Florida as elsewhere ....
You sent the plat to the local office to be filed, but you neither instructed the offi-
cers to open the land for settlement nor to withhold them. Perhaps, you might have
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disregarded the provisions of section 2364 (considering them only as directory), and
instructed the local officers to receive entries and filings for the tracts. In the
absence of any instructions, I do not think the filing of the plat of itself foreclosed
any further action on your part, and precluded you from applying to the lands the
provisions of that section intrusted to your office.
The act of 1856 and section 2364 must be read together. Together they make the
general law for the disposition by you of these Florida military reservations, and
claimants are charged with notice of the whole law upon the subject.
On May 10, 18S7 (5 L. D., 632), Acting Secretary Muldrow considered
the application of Daniel Mather to make pre-emption entry of lots 8,
9 and 10, on said reservation, on the said Mather's appeal from the
rejection thereof, ad held that the disposition of lands in said reser-
vation was governed by the act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 103), and that
said act protected the rights of settlers prior to January 1, 1884, who
were qualified to make homestead entry.
On. June 4, 1887, the Honorable Wilkinson Call, a United States Sen-
ator, from Florida, filed in the Department a request that te said case
of Daniel Mather be reconsidered, for two reasons-one of which was
that a bill had been favorably reported by the committee o public
lands to donate said reservation to the town of Tampa.
The attention of Mr. Secretary Vilas was called to this report,
whereupon he ordered a hearing
for the purpose of determining whether said land is included within the limits of an
incorporated town, or occupied for the purposes of trade and business, and to deter-
mine the character of Mather's settlement, and whether it was simply as an occupant
by permission of the military authorities,
and to this end, all the papers before the Department in the case of
Mather, and also in the case of Lizzie W. Carew, were returned.
A hearing was had, at which all the conflicting alleged interests
were heard, and, on November 25, 1892 (15 L. D. 487), Mr. Secretary
Noble rendered a final decision on the record, rejecting all of the claims
to the land, among which were the claims of E. S. Carew, Daniel
Mather, Andrew Stillings, Julius Caesar, Louis Bell, E. B. Chamber-
lain, the Heirs of R. J. Hackley, deceased, and also the Mayor and City
Council of Tampa. It was held that the land had never been thrown
open to settlement and entry, and said:
Under the law as it now stands said reservation will be disposed of whenever the
Secretary of the Interior is of the opinion the public interests so require, under the.
provisions of said act of 1884 ... . Action looking to the disposal of said land
will be deferred until you are further advised by this Department.
Motions for review of this decision were filed, upon the consideration
of which the aforesaid decision of Secretary Smith of July 24, 1894,
was rendered, wherein it was held that from the time the aforesaid plat
was received in the local office, on March 22, 1883, until April 2, 1883,
when the telegram was received directing that no entries be allowed,
said land was subject to entry as other public lands, of the United
States; that the entry of Carew was a valid appropriation of the land,
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except as to prior adverse and subsisting settlement rights, which set-
tlement rights were recognized and award made, as heretofore appears,
and it was specifically held that there was no competent evidence in
the record tending to show that the entry of Carew was made in bad
faith.
The pertinent legal conclusions are set forth in the syllabus of said
decision, as follows:
The act of July 5, 1884, providing for the disposition of abandoned military reser-
vations, is limited in its application to military reservations that were in existence
at the date of its passage, or that should be thereafter created.
The disposition of a military reservation in Florida, abandoned and restored to
the public domain prior to the passage of the act of July 5, 1884, is governed by the
provisions of the act of August 18, 1856, and under said actthe Commissioner of the
General Land Office was authorized to dispose of such lands either at public sale or
under the homestead and pre-emption laws.
It is submitted by the petitioners that these lands have been dis-
posed of without authorization of law, and the various claims, espe-
cially the Carew claim, conceived and initiated in fraud, and perfected
by false pretense and perjury.
The act of August 18, 1856 (supra), provided:
That all public lands heretofore reserved for military purposes in the State of
Florida, which said lands, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, are no longer useful
or desired for suchpurpose, or so much thereof as said Secretary may designate, shall
be, and are hereby placed under the control of the General Land Office, to be dis-
posed of and sold in the same anner and under the same regulations as other public
lands of the United States.
The sixth section of the act of June 12, 1858 (11 Stat., 336), provided:
That all the existing laws or parts of laws which authorize the sale of military
sites, which are or may become useless for nilitary purposes, be, and the same are
hereby repealed, and said lands shall not be subject to sale or pre-emption under any
of the laws of the United States: Provided furtlier, That the provisions of the act
of August eighteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-six, relative to certain reservations
in the State of Florida, shall contiue in force.
The act of July 2, 1864 (supra), provided:
That whenever any reservation of public laids shall be brought into market under
existing laws, it shall be lawful for the Commissioner of the General Land Office to
fix a minimum price, not less than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, below
which such lands shall not be disposed of.
This act was carried into section 2304 of the Revised Statutes, but
there made to read, not that "it shall be lawful for the Commissioner,"
&c., but the Commissioner "shall fix a minimumn price, not less than
one dollar and twenty-fivecents per acre below which such lands shall
not be sold."
The act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat., 103), provides:
That whenever, in the opinion of the President of the United States, the lands, or
any portion of them, included within the limits of any military reservation hereto-
fore or hereafter declared, have become or shall become useless for military purposes,
he shall cause the same or so much thereof as he may designate, to be placed under
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the control of the Secretary of the Interior, for disposition as hereinafter provided,
and shall canse to be filed with the Secretary of the Interior a notice thereof.
Section 2 of this act provides for the manner of disposition, which is
"at public sale to the highest bidder for cash:"
Provided, That any settler who was in actual occupation of any portion of any
such reservations prior to the location of such reservation, or settled thereon prior
to January first, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, in good faith, for the purpose of
securing a home and of entering the same under the general land laws, and has con-
tinued in such occupation to the present time, and is by law entitled to make a
homestead entry, shall be entitled to enter the land so occupied, not exceeding one
hundred and sixty acres, in a body, according to the government surveys and sub-
divisions: Providedfurther, That said lands were subject to entry under the public
land laws at the time of their withdrawal.
Section 4 provides:
That the provisions of the act of August eighteenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-
six, relative to military reservations in the State of Florida, and the sixth section of
the act of June twelfth, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, relative to the sale of
military sites, be, and the same are hereby, repealed.
This legislation may be summarized as follows:
The act of 1856 provided that military reservations in the State of
Florida, no longer useful for that purpose, should be placed under the
control of the General Land Office to be disposed of and sold in the
same manner and under the same regulations as other public lands of
the United States.
The act of 1858 did not change or modify the act of 1856.
The act of 1864 (Sec. 2304 R. S.) made it lawful for the Commissioner
of the General Land Office to fix a minimum price, not less than one
dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, below which any reservation of
public lands brought into market should not be disposed of; and the
revision (See. 2304) made mandatory what was by the original act per-
missive and discretionary.
The act of 1884 provided for the disposition of all such lands at
public sale to the highest bidder for cash, but protected the rights of
settlers in actual occupation prior to the location thereof, or who set-
tled thereon prior to January 1, 1884, in good faith, for the purpose of
securing a home and of entering the same under the general laws, and
had continued in such occupation to the date of the act: Provided
further, "That said lands were subject to entry under the public land
laws at the time of their withdrawal," and the fourth section of said act
specifically repealed the aforesaid act of 1856.
Departmental decision of July 24, 1894, does not refer to the fact that
the act of 1884 repealed the act of 1856, but whether such fact was
overlooked or considered and not thought material, it is not now
believed that the fact of such repeal rendered the disposition of the
lands, as directed by said decision, unlawful or erroneous.
It is reasonably clear that prior to the passage of the act of 1884, the
act of 1856 was the only legislation governing the disposition of lands
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occupying the status of those here -involved. It was a special act pro-
viding for the disposition of lands theretofore reserved for military
purposes in the State of Florida, and that disposition was to be in the
same manner and under the same regulations as other public lands of
the United States. This included, at the date the lands in the Fort
Brooke military reservation were placed under the control of the Gen-
eral Land Office, homestead entries and pre-emption filings.
IThe same purpose was again expressed by Congress in the act of
1858, continuing in force the provisions of the act of 1856.
The act of 1864 was a general act, and whether it be considered as
permissive or mandatory, did not repeal or modify the act of 1856.
General statutes do not affect special ones, unless such is clearly the
legislative intention, and no such intention here appears, either express
or implied. Moreover, the fact that Congress saw fit to repeal the act
of 18567 in 1884, is legislative recognition of the act at that time as
existing law. If, therefore, rights had been lawfully acquired by home-
stead entry, and the proceedings of the land office had by virtue of
authority of the act of 1856, it was not unlawful to allow those rights to
be perfected under the homestead law, even though the act which
authorized the disposition of the land under the homestead law, had
been repealed.
At the time of the filing of the township plat aforesaid, at the local
office, the Land Department had full jurisdiction of the land, and was
authorized, as has been seen, to dispose of the same under the home-
stead and pre-emption laws. Under the practice at that time, a town-
ship plat was treated as officially received and filed at the moment of
time it reached the local office, and homestead entries and pre-emption
filings were recognized as valid made immediately thereafter. This
practice was changed in October 1885 (4 L. D., 202), but it was the
practice in force March 22, 1883. It results that, at that time the Gen-
eral Land Office having full authority to dispose of said lands under
the homestead law, the entry of Carew was such an appropriation
thereunder that subsequent legislation relating to the disposition of
like lands would not operate upon it, and this is true regardless of the
fact that part of the land was afterwards awarded to other parties in
the adjustment of equitable priorities.
On the question of the alleged fraud in making the entry, it may be
said that, conceding the United States to be under such obligations to
the petitioners as would authorize it to institute a suit for their benefit,
it is not believed that such suit could be successfully maintained eveni
though the fraud was perpetrated, as alleged.
It appears that the charge now made, that Carew and other parties
entered into a conspiracy to defraud the government of this land, was
specifically considered. by the Department in its decision of July 24,
1894 (supra), and it was therein found that said entry was made in good
faith, and that the evidence did not establish the charge of conspiracy.
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Whatever difference of opinion might exist as to the correctness of
-that finding, it is now conclusive of that issue, the land having been
patented in pursuance. of that decision. The Department is without
jurisdiction to reverse it, and inasmuch as it is a finding on a question
of fact, the courts will not review it. Fraud is a mixed question of law
and fact, but the Department has here found that the claimed facts
upon which the alleged fraud rested did not exist.
The general allegation by the petitioners of fraud in the submission
of final proof is not sustained by the record.
Moreover, it does not appear that the United States is under any such
obligation to the petitioners as would enable it to maintain a suit for
their benefit.
The supreme court of the United States, in the case of the United
States v. San Jacinto Tin Company (125 U. S., 285), says:
We are of opinion that since the right of the government of the United States to
,institute such a suit depends upon the same general principles which would author-
ize a private citizen to apply to a court of justice for relief against an instrument
obtained from him by fraud or deceit, or any of those other practices which are
admitted to justify a court in granting relief, the government must show that, like
the private individual, it has such an interest in the relief sought as entitles it to
move in the matter. If it be a question of property a case must be made in which
the court can afford a remedy in regard to that property; if it be a question of fraud
which would render the instrument void, the fraud must operate to the prejudice of
the United States; and if it is apparent that the suit is brought for the benefit of
some third party, and that the United States has no pecuniary interest in the remedy
sought, and is under no obligation to the party who will be benefited to sustain an
action for his use; in short, if there does not appear any obligation on the part of
the United States to the public, or to any individual, or any interest of its own, it
can no more sustain such an action than any private. person could under similar
circumstances.
There is nothing in connection with the proceedings had in the dis-
position of the land involved which has operated prejudicially on any
legal or equitable right of the petitioners. They are mere squatters,
and even if these patents were vacated, it does not appear how they
are to be benefited. In that event, the lands would have to be dis-
posed of under the act of 1884, supra, which is at public sale to the
highest bidder for cash.
Conceding for the sake of argument that the petitioners settled on
said land prior to Jantary first, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, in
good faith, for the purpose of securing a home and of entering the same
under the general land laws, and had continued such occupation to the
date of said act of 1884, they would not be protected by the proviso to
said act, for the reason that said lands were not subject to entry under
the public land laws at the time of their withdrawal, hence the pro-
vision in that act for the benefit of settlers has no application in the
disposition of these lands.
Another obstacle in the way of a successful maintenance of a suit to
vacate these patents lies in the fact, made to appear by affidavits and
exhibits, that all or nearly all of the land so patented has been sold
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and conveyed to third parties. The presumption is that such parties
are innocent purchasers for value and without notice of any defect in
the title of the patentees, on account of fraud or other infirmity. Even
if the patents were procured through fraud, unless they were abso-
lutely void on that account, such purchasers would be protected by the
courts.
The fraud here alleged even if permitted to be shown in the courts
after the proceedings had thereon in the Laud Department, is not of
the character that would authorize. a vacation of the patents as against
such purchasers. If the fraud as alleged were established, it would
render the patents voidable only, and under such a patent innocent
purchasers for value and without notice would take a perfect title.
It is not believed that the suit prayed for could be maintained.
The petition is dismissed, and the papers are herewith transmitted
for the files of your office.
PROCEEDINGS BY T HE GOVERNMENT-RELITQUISHMENT.
ALFRED A. ANSCODMB.
A relinquishment filed pending proceedings by the government tales effect at once,
and the land is thereafter open to the first legal applicant, subject only to valid
adverse claims.
Secretary Bliss to te Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W.V. D.) 8, 1898 (C. J. -.)
December 11, 1893, James Malone made pre-emption cash entry for
the NE. SE. , E. NE. and SW. NE. 1 Sec. 12, T. 67 N., R. 20 W.,
Duluth land district ,Minlesota.
August 25, 1894, on the report of a special agent, the above entry
was held for cancellation, it being charged that the entry was fraudu-
lent in that the entryman did not settle o this land until after the
repeal of the pre-emption law; that the said entry was made for the
purpose of obtaining the timber on said land; and that January 4, 1894,
the entryman entered into a contract with one Herbert Armstrong to
convey the land to him for a consideration of $1500.
January 11, 1895, your office, upon the application of the entryman,
directed that hearing be had on the above charges, which said hearing
was fixed for August 14, 1895.
July 31, 1895, Alfred A. Anscomb made timber and stone application for the same
land, and filed with said application a properly executed deed of conveyance from
said James Malone to Herbert Armstrong, quit-claiming all right, title and interest
in and to said land; also quit-claim deed from Herbert Armstrong and wire, Mary L.
Armstrong, conveying: all right, title and, interest in and to said land to the United
States of America; also an abstract of title, properly certified to, showing non-
incumbrance of said land.
On the last mentioned date the local office transmitted this applica-
tion to your office, together with an application by one Thomas M.
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McConnell, dated December 10, 1894, to purchase the land in question
under the timber and stone act, and recommended that Anscomb be
allowed to enter said land.
Your office took no action at the time on the applications referred to
on the ground that they were filed after action had been taken by the
government looking to the cancellation of Malone's entry, and prior to
final action thereon. Instructions, however, were telegraphed to the
special agent to proceed with the hearing.
The hearing was duly had at the time fixed therefor, and testimony
was submitted by the government, no appearance being made on the
part of the defense. The local office rendered decision holding that the
charges had been sustained and recommending cancellation of the entry.
Both the entrymen and transferee were duly notified of said decision,
but no appeal was filed.
April 25, 1896, your office, the record in this case having been sent
up, affirmed the decision of the local office and canceled the entry. The
local office was advised in regard to the applications of Anscomb and
McConnell that
inasmuch as proceedings had been instituted by the government, looking to the
cancellation of said entry for fraud, any other action concerning the land involved,
pending such proceedings, would be irregular and unauthorized.
April 29, 1896, the local office transmitted an application by Thomas
l. McConnell, filed on that date, to make timber land cash entry for
the land in question. At the same time attention was called to the
former application of McConnell and that of Anscomb, both of which
were then pending in your office.
May 21, 1896, your office rendered decision in which it was asserted
that the language employed in your office decision of April 25, 1896,
heretofore quoted, was in effect a rejection of the applications referred
to. The local office was further advised that
an application to enter lands included within the entry of another is not recog-
nized as the initiation of a contest; and where the application is rejected, and an
appeal is taken therefrom, a sbsequent relinquishment, (or final cancellation of the
entry of record,) will not inure to the benefit of the applicant.
In support of this holding the case of Swanson v. Simmons, 16 L. D.,
44, was cited. The local office was iistruLcted to advise the parties that
" they acquired no preference right of entry to the land should it again
become subject to entry, by the filing of said applications." The appli-
cation of McConnell, filed April 29, 1896, was returned without action.
- Anseomb has now appealed from your said office decision of May 21,
1896, to this Department, the errors assigned being as follows:
1. In not finding that the relinquishment of the Malone entry took effect as soon
as filed, and at once opened the land to settlement and entry without further action
on the part of the Commissioner.
2. In not finding that Anscomb made the first legal application to enter said land
after the filing of said relinquishment, and in not applying to the case at bar the
principles laid down in the case of Hertzog v. Demmer (13 L. D., 590).
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3. In applying the principles laid down in Swanson v. Simmons (16 L. D., 44) as
having any bearing in this case, as a relinquishment always takes effect as soon as
filed no matter what the status or conditiou of the entry may be.
It appears from the record that McConnell's first application was not
formally rejected until your office decision of May 21, 1896, and then on.
the ground that government proceedings bad been instituted looking
to the cancellation o[ Malone's entry. The said application should have
been rejected when presented, for the reason that the land was not
subject to entry, the same being embraced in Malone's entry of record.
But even if it had been so rejected and McConnell had appealed from
such action, it would not have been a pending application that would
have attached on the cancellation of Malone's entry. Maggie taird, 13
L. D., 502.
Your office rejected Anscomb's application also because the govern-
ment had already instituted proceedings against Malone's entry. There
is no doubt as to the authority of the Department to proceed with an
investigation of an entryman's good faith, or to take advantage of the
evidence submitted at a hearing, even after the withdrawal of a con-
test or the filing of a relinquishment. But in this case, under the first
section of the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140), Malone's relinquish-
ment took effect eoxinstccnti, and the land thus released became subject
to the entry of the first legal applicant. As hereinbefore stated McCon-
neil's application did not have the effect to initiate a contest or create
an adverse claim; hence there was no reason why Anscomb's applica-
tion, Malone having relinquished, should have been held to await the
proceedings instituted by the government. These proceedings looking
to the cancellation of Malone's entry for fraud, could not operate to
defeat the application- of Anscomb, who was not a party to the fraud.
The failure of the local office, therefore, to immediately act upon
Malone's relinquishment does not prejudice Anscomb's rights. The
latter's application, when acted upon, will relate back to the time it
was filed. The case of Swanson v. Simmons, supra, is applicable to the
case under consideration so far as the first application of McConnell is
concerned, but it does not affect the application of Anscomb which was
made after Malone had relinquished.
It may be remarked in this connection that an affidavit of cntest
is in the nature of an information, and where the charges contained
therein are sustained the land becomes subject to the preferred right
of the contestant. If a relinquishment be filed pending the contest
proceedings it takes effect at once and the land becomes open to the
entry of the first legal applicant subject to any rights the contestant
may have. There would seem to be no good reason for the application
of a different rule where the government itself has instituted proceed-
ings looking to the cancellation of an entry. As the land in question
was not subject to any preference right or other adverse claim at the
time Anscomb filed his application to enter, his said application will
now be favorably acted upon, if he is found to be otherwise qualified.
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McConnell's application eing subsequent to Anscomb's, is subject
thereto.
It is sufficient to say that Anscomb is entitled to perfect his entry
for his land because he is shown to have been the first legal applicant
therefor after Malone's relinquishment, without specifically discussing
the applicant's specifications of error.
Your office decision of May 21, 1896, is modified in accordance with
tile views expressed herein.
WRIGHT tv. GOODE.
Motion for review of departmental decision of January 6, 1898, 26
L. D., 1, denied by Secretary Bliss, March 8, 1898.
RATIROAD GRANT-INDEWI{NITY SELECTION--TRANSMUTATION.
NORTHERN PACIFIc R. Cit.O O. V. GUNTHER.
:An indemnity selection made for land included in a pre-emption filing, under which
residence has been dly established and maintained, will not defeat the right of
the pre-emptor to snbseqnently transmate his claim to a homestead entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofice, March
(W. V. D.) 8, 1898. (F. W. C.)
'The.Northern Pacific Railroad Company has appealed from your
office decision of May 27, 1896, holding for cancellation its indemnity
selection covering the El of the NE- and the Et of the SEI of See. 9,
T. 146 N., R. 85 W., Bismarek land district, North Dakota, with a view
to the allowance of homestead application of Jacob Gunther presented
therefor.
The above described tract is within the indemnity limits of the grant
to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and was included in its list
:of selections No. 50, filed July 14, 1890. It appears that prior to the
filing of said list of selections, to wit: on May 14, 1890, Jacob Gunther
had been permitted to file pre-emption declaratory statement covering
said land. On May 2, 1894, not having made roof UpOD his pre-
empton filing, he tendered a homestead application for the land, and
in his homestead affidavit alleged continuous residence and improve-
mnents upon the land since the spring of 1887. Upon said allegation
of settlement hearing was ordered and had, after due notice, and upon
the record made. at said hearing, both your office and the local officers
agree in finding that Gunther's allegation of settlement, residence
and improvements was fully sustained as alleged; and your office
decision therefore holds that the tract was not subject to the company's
selection on July 14, 1890, and said selection is held for cancellation
with a view of allowing Gunther's application, as before stated.
It is contended on behalf of the company that Gunther's claim to
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the land at the date of its selection rested solely upon his occupation
of the land, and that such occupation without a record claim was not
sufficient to bar the company's right of selection. This allegation is
not sustained by the record for, as before stated, on May 14, 1890, just
two months prior to the selection by the company Gunther had been
permitted to file pre-emption declaratory statement for this land. This
declaratory statement was regularly and properly allowed, and the
right of transmutation is an incident to every valid pre-emption filing..
The application by Gunther to make homestead entry of this land is,
in effect, a transmutation of his filing, as he claims credit for his res-
deuce and improvements antedating the filing of his pre-emption
declaratory statement. Having established his allegation of continuous
residence since prior to the filing of his pre-emption declaratory state-
ment, it must be held that no such right was secured by the company
under its selection made subsequent to Gunther's pre-emption filing as
would bar his right of transmutation as applied for.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed; and upon completion of
entry by Gunther the company's selection will be canceled.
HOMESTEAD-SETTLEMENT RIGI-ITS-PRACTICE-REHEAHING.
ROWAN . KANE.
If a contestant, who bases his claimon priority of settlement, fails to maintain his
resilence on theland during thependenicy of the contest, an intervening adverse
settlement will defeat his right to the land.
The remedy of a party who isnot ready for trial is by way of motion for continuance,
and not by application for rehearing filed after default and judgment.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 10, 1898. (P. J. (34
The land involved in this controversy is the SW. i of Sec. 20, T. 48 N.,
B. 9 W., Ashland, Wisconsin, land district, and was formerly embraced
in a railroad grant that was forfeited by act of September 29, 1890
(26 Stat., 496). By section 2 of said act it was provided that all settlers
in- good faith on the lands forfeited, at the date of the passage of the
act, if they were otherwise qualified, should be entitled to a six months'
preference right to enter the same under the homestead laws.
Anterior to the present controversy it is shown that one Leonard K..
Knox made homestead entry of the tract; that George W. Kane, the
defendant herein, initiated a contest against this entry, alleging settle-
ment thereon prior to September 29, 1890. As a final result of the.
hearing had between these parties, the Department, on September 23,
1893, affirmed the action of your office in. awarding the land to Kanei.
Motion for review of this decision was filed, and on April 26,1895, the
same was denied.
On February 16, 1895, before the decision by the Department in the,
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first case, Mary Rowan filed a affidavit of contest, alleging that
neither Kane nor Knox had resided on or occupied the land for two
years prior thereto, and that both had abandoned the same. On May
31, 1895, Rowan filed her application to make homestead entry of the
tract, alleging that she was residing thereon.
On June 6, 1895, and within thirty days from receiving notice of the
decision of the Department, Kane made homestead entry of the lands,
,and on June 10th following, Rowan filed another affidavit of contest,
reciting her former applications to contest and enter, alleging settle-
.ment on February 15, 1895; that she established her residence thereon
March 9, 1895; and that Kane had not cultivated or improved the
same, or resided thereon for more than three years. A hearing was
ordered, personal service made on Kane, and on the date set for the
hearing he made default. The contestant put in her testimony, and
the local officers decided in her favor.
Thereupon the entryman filed a motion for a, rehearing, alleging that
owing to his failure to get some money he was negotiating for, he was
unable to procure witnesses for the trial, or go himself; that each year
he had cultivated to crop a portion of the land; that he had made
his home on the land and had no other; that he kept up and main-
tained his improvements thereon; that he (lid not remain there con-
tinuously because of his poverty; that he had his house furnished with
all things necessary for house-keeping, and the same were stolen dur-
ing his absence. This affidavit is corroborated by the person with
whom he alleges he was negotiating a loan, and by two others, who
swear they know the contents of the affidavit made by Kane, and know
the same to be true. Tese affidavits were sworn to in Douglas county,
Wisconsin. The land in controversy is in Bayfield county.
The local officers overruled this motion: whereupon the etryman
appealed. Your office, hy letter of March 18, 1896, dismissed the con-
test for the reason that-
Pending this contest (Kane v. Knox) no rights could be acquired by any interven-
ing settler or applicant. No rights could sbsequently attach as against Kane by
settlement, or the iling of an application, by a third party, and while the land was
covered by an entry which he is contesting, he was not required to maintain his
residence thereon.
Motion for review of this decision was overruled July 16, 1896.
The contestant has appealed, assigning error as follows:
I. Error in holding that pending the former contest of Kane v. Knox, no rights
could be acquired by Mary Rowan as an intervening settler or applicant.
II. Error in holding that "while the land was covered by an entry which he
(Kane) was contesting, he was not required to maintain his residence thereon."
III. Error in finding that "he (Kane) had returned on June 16, and when notice
was served June 17, he was on the land."
IV. Error in dismissing plaintiff's contest.
V. Error in not holding that one who contests an entry by reason of his alleged
prior settlement must comply with the settlement laws and must maintain his resi-
dence on the land, even though it is covered by the entry he is contesting.
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The testimony submitted by the contestant shows that for a number
of years prior to his entry Kane had not resided upon, improved or
cultivated the land; that he did not reside in the same county, but
was employed in the police department of a town in another county;
that his house on the tract.was in an uninhabitable condition, and that
he was not even seen on the land for a long time prior to his entry. In
brief, the testimony shows that he did not reside upon the land after
the contest against Knox. It also shows that Rowan established her
residence thereon March 9, 1895.
The Department is unable to agree with the decision of your office
quoted above. It will be recalled that Kane based his right to the
tract, in his contest against Knox, on the fact that he was a prior set-
tler thereon, and it was decided, that he was, on this ground, entitled
to the land. But to avail himself of this right he must have main-
tained his residence and complied with the law. In Hall v. Stone
(16 L. D., 199) the Department laid down the general rule that-
A homesteader who claims priority of right by virtue of an alleged settlement,
must comply with the settlement law and can not defer the establishment and main-
tenance of residence until the allowance of his application to enter.
The doctrine announced in this case has been followed in all cases
where the party to the contest has relied on prior settlement. (McIlnnes
v. Cotter, 21 L. D., 97; Foote v. McMillan, 22 Id., 280; Benjamin v.
Eudailey, 25 Id., 103; Thompson et al. v. Craver, Id., 279; Griffin v.
Smith, Id., 329.) In the case of Johnson et al. v. Smith et al. (23 I. D.,
317), the facts are similar to those in the case at bar and the land situ-
ated in the same land district. It was there decided (syllabus):
A second contest may be entertained on the charge that the entryman has failed
to comply with the law since the hearing in the frmer suit.
If a contestant relying on his prior settlement does not maintain
his residence on the land during the pendency of the contest, then it is
competent for another to settle upon the tract and acquire a right
superior to the first.
The rule announced by your office would be sound where the contest
was based on mere default of the entrymen and when the latter had
possession of the land, but where one relies on his prior settlement it is
incumbent on him to maintain his residence and otherwise comply with
the law. This, apparently, Kane has not done. Hence the contest
should not be dismissed.
The order of your office, therefore, in dismissing the contest, is
reversed.
The motion for a rehearing, which the local officers overruled, is not
sufficient to warrant the re-opening of the case. Kane had full thirty
days' notice, in which to prepare for the trial. If for any sufficient
reason he was unable to proceed at the time set therefor, the hearing
would have been postponed on application. Instead of making an
application for a continuance, he elected to ignore the proceeding, and
344 DECISiONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
after judgment against him seeks to have a rehearing. This motion
must be treated the same as any other of a like kind and its sufficiency
determined by the rules governing new trials in courts of law.
Kane does not allege that he has lived on the tract during the period
of the former contest. He says he has made the same his "home and
have had or owned no other home";- that he has not remained continu-
ously thereon because of his poverty, and the expense of the former~
contest, and that he had to earn money by daily labor for his own sup-
port and that of his mother; that he has each year cultivated to crop
a part of the land, as his time and means would permit.
He does not state that he-can prove any of these matters if given an
opportunity, neither does he give the names of any witnesses by whom
he can establish any of the allegations, or set forth what he or any
witness would swear to if a rehearing was granted. The witnesses who
verify the affidavit do not pretend to know the land or the conditions
that prevailed, neither do they swear that they would be present and
testify.
The action of the local officers in denying the motion, and their
recommendation on the merits of the case, is therefore approved.
HOMESTEAD CONTEST-DEATH OF ENTRYMAN.
ROBEL V. GROvtER'S HEIRs.
In a contest against the heirs of a homesteader, on the ground that they have failed
to comply with the law, it is essential that the death of the entryman should
be alleged and proven.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, M1arch
(W. V. D.) 10, 1898. (H. G.)
James M. Grover made homestead entry, September 15, 1890, for the
SW. i of See. 24, T. 17 N., E. 1 W., within the land district at Olympia,
Washington. July 11, 1895, Michael Robel instituted contest proceed-
ings seeking a cancellation of such entry, alleging that Grover died in
the month Of Jule, 1894,
and that his heirs have wholly abandoned said tract and changed their residence
therefrom for more than six months since making said entry, and next prior to the
date herein, and that they have failed to improve said tract; that said tract is not
settled upon and cultivated by said heirs as required by lawer.
The affidavit of contest is corroborated by Otto Hoffman, who after-
ward appeared at the hearing as a witness for the contestant, and who
states in his corroborating affidavit that he knows from personal
observation that the statements made in the affidavit for contest are
true.
July 12, 1895, Robel filed an affidavit in the local office, which is to
the effect that so far as can be ascertained by inquiry, and from the
records in the office of the clerk of the court for the county in which
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the land is situate, there has never been any administrator appointed
for the estate of the deceased entryman; that his only heir resident in
said State, " so far as affiant can ascertain," is Mrs. Lucy Warriner, of
Whatcom county therein, and that he believed that all other heirs of
said decedent are non-residents of the State of Washington, as he made
diligent inquiry regarding the residences of the same from the neigh
bors in the vicinity of the land in question and also from the postmaster
at Olympia, Washington, the post-office address of the residents in the
neighborhood of the land. Upon this showing Robel requested, that
notice issue for publication, posting, and mailing, as provided by Roules
13 and 14 of Practice. Personal service of the notice was made upon
Mrs. Warriner, on July 16, 1895, by the deputy sheriff of Whatcom
county, Washington. It further appears that on said date the con-
testant deposited in the mails a registered letter, addressed to Mrs.
Elizabeth Cruikshank, at Oakes, Colorado, a sister of the deceased'
entryman, containing a true copy of the notice of contest, and he also
addressed a like letter to the heirs or legal representatives of James
M. Grover, deceased, at Olympia, Washington, and deposited the samea
in the post-office at Olympia, Washington, which was the post-office at
Which the entryman, Grover, received his mail. The contestant further
alleges in an affidavit filed by him that the residence of none of the
legal heirs or representatives of the deceased, who are non-residents of
the State of Washington, is known to him, except that of Mrs. Cruik-
shank, upon whom service by registered mail had been secured.
Notice by publication was ordered by the local office, and was pub-
lished, posted in the office of the register and in a conspicuous place
on the tract in contest, each for the prescribed period. .The heirs are
not named in the published notice.-
A hearing was had, and prior thereto Mrs. Elizabeth H. G. Cruikshank
caused a written appearance to be entered by her as sister and heir at
law of the deceased entryman. At this hearing the evidence offered by
the contestant was that of -himself and Otto Hoffman, which was taken
on printed blanks, and tese witnesses were cross-examined by the
attorney for Mrs. Cruikshank.
The contestant, Michael Robel, testified in chief, that he resided in
Xitsap county, Washington, about seventy-five miles from the tract
involved, and had been acquainted with the tract since about April 15,
1895; that he knew from personal observation that the heirs of Grover,
deceased, had not fenced, cultivated, built or resided upon, or in any
way improved said tract, except to slash about one and one-half acres
and to erect a small log cabin; that the said tract was then in its natu-
ral condition, except as stated by him, and that the present residence
of the defendants was unknown to him, except that of AIrs. Lucy War;-
riner and Mrs. Elizabeth Cruikshank, who were duly served with notice
of the contest;: Upon cross-examination, the contestant states, in sub-
stance, that he had been upon the land three times in April and July;
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that he was shown the land by one Seyfang, who lived near the cabin
on the tract; that none of the "slashing" was cleared, and that there
was no place where the tract could have been cultivated; and that the
cabin on the tract appeared as if it had not been occupied for three
years.
Hoffman testified in chief, corroborating generally the testimony of
the contestant, and stating that the present residence of the defendants
was unknown to him, except that of Mrs. Warriner and Mrs. Cruik-
shank, which he gives. Upon cross-examination, he states, in substance,
that he had been on the main part of the land three times the preceding
spring; that Seyfang showed him the corners, and from that fact and
because he had seen it on the map, he knew the tract visited by him to
be the tract in dispute, although -he could not give the section, town-
ship or range in which the tract is located; that he knew that there
had been no cultivation of the tract the preceding year, 1894, because
nothing had been done to the slashing and the land had not been
cleared; that one could not stay in the house, and that he would not
like to sleep there at night; " and that everything was "torn up around
there."
At the close of this evidence, the attorney for Mrs. Cruikshank, none
of the other heirs appearing, either in person or by attorney, moved to
dismiss the contest, for the reason that a prima facie case had not
been made out, and because the allegations of the contest had not
been proved. No further testimony was offered, and 'thereafter the
local officers held that the land embraced in the homestead entry of
Grover had been " wholly abandoned and not cultivated or improved
by the heirs of the deceased claimant in accordance with the homestead
law," and they recommended the cancellation of such entry.
Upon appeal by Mrs. Crikshank, your office, on May 2,1896, held
that the contestant had made out a prima.facie case, and affirmed the
decision of the local office. A further appeal by Mrs. ruikshank
brings the case to the Department.
She contends that the contestant did not establish by proof the alle-
gations of his contest and that the same should therefore be dismissed,
no just grounds being shown for the cancellation of the entry.
It is unnecessary to consider her rights in the premises, or any ques-
tion touching the sufficiency of the proof as to the identity of the land,
its abandonment, or the alleged failure to cultivate and improve the
same, inasmuch as there is a total failure of proof upon one of the essen-
tial allegations of the contest, namely, the alleged death of the entry-
man in the month of June, 1894. This allegation is not supported by
any evidence whatever. This omission is fatal to the contest, as there
must be both allegation and responsive proof as to the death of the
entrynan. where the charge of the contest is the failure of the heirs to
comply with the law after the death of the entryman. (Jenks v. Hart-
well's Heirs, 13 L. 1)., 337-338.)
The appearance of Mrs. Crnikshank, as shown by the record, is not
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sufficient to dispense with proof in this case of the death of the entry-
man. Other heirs, known and unknown, who were made parties by
service and by publication, are not bound by the record unless all the
essential allegations of the contest have been proven. The failure to
prove the death of the entryman having been brought to the attention
of the Department, and there being other parties who must be affected
by the result of the contest for whom no appearance has been made,
the necessary proof of the death of the eijtryman can not be dispensed
with.
The decision of your office is therefore reversed and the contest must
be dismissed.
SCHOOL INDEMNIITY-INDIAN LANDS.
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA.
Lands within the limits of the Great Sioux reservation, restored to the public
domain by the act of March 2, 1889, are subject to disposition only under the
homestead law for the benefit of the Indians, and cannot be taken as school'
indemnity; and the certification, therefore, of said lands under school indemnity
selections is wholly inoperative and conveys no title to the State.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the Geeral Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 10, 1898. (E. F. B.)
By letter of January 31, 1898, you submit for consideration two lists
of'indemnity school selections, heretofore certified to the State of South
Dakota, said lands being within the limits of the Great Sioux reserva-
vation and were selected in lien of losses occurring outside of said
reservation.
All lands within the limits of this reservation, which were restored
to the public domain by the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 888) are sub-
ject to disposition only under the homestead law upon the conditions
prescribed by the act, except the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections,
which by the 24th section of the act are expressly reserved for the
benefit and use of the public schools, whether surveyed or unsurveyed.
It was never contemlplated that these lands should be subject to selec-
tions by the State as indemnity to compensate for losses, occurring
either in the reservation or out of it, for the reason that the lands are
to be disposed of for the benefit of the Idians and the act provided
that payment should be made for every acre of land disposed of within
said reservation which should be applied to the permanent fund of said
Indians.
The act provides that all lands disposed of within the first three
years after the taking effect of the act shall be at the rate of one dollar
and twenty-five cents an acre, add at the rate of. seventy-five cents an
acre for lands disposed of in the succeeding two years, and thereafter
at the-rate of fifty cents an acre, and all lands, not disposed of at the end
of ten years are to be taken by the United States at fifty cents an acre
which sum is to be credited to the permanent fund of said Indians.
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The 24th section reserves the 16th and 36th sections for school pur-
poses, but provides that the United States shall pay said Indians for
said lands at the rate of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre for
all lands reserved under the provisions of said section.
The certification of these lands to the State of South Dakota being
clearly contrary to the express terms of the Statute, and in violation of
the solemn agreement entered into with the Indians as expressed in
the act of March 2, 1889, the certificate of the Secretary of the Interior
was wholly void and ineffectual to convey to the State any right, title
or interest i the same. Weeks v. Bridgman 159 U. S., 54L. There is
no authority to dispose of these lands except in the manner and for
the purposes provided for by the Statute and as rno conveyance of said
lands has been made by such certification, it is the duty of the Depart-
ment, to execute the trust imposed by the Statute and to dispose of the
lands for the benefit of the Indians.
But in view of the fact that the State may have disposed of some of
the tracts, since certification, the first being as early as September, 1892,
relief should be afforded through legislation authorizing the State or
its grantees to purchase said lands at the price for which the United
States is liable under the 21st section of the act of March 2, 1889.
In order that the State or its grantees, may have the opportunity of
securing such relief through congressional interposition, you will with-
hold from entry all lands embraced in such lists until further ordered by
the Department. In the mean time the State should be notified of this.
action, that it may take such steps as it may deem proper.
With reference to the decision of February 12, 1894, in the case of
the State of Nebraska (18 L. D., 124), to which you call attention, you
are advised that no other lists of selections of lands, within said reserva-
tion should be acted upon by you nder said decision until the attention
of the Department is specially called thereto.
PRACTICE-APPEAL-CERTIORARI-MINING CLAIM-PROTEST.
CROWN POINT MINING Co. v. BUCK.
When notice of a decision is served on counsel resident in Washington the rule does
not require a copy of said decision to be served.
Certiorari will not be granted where it is apparent, from the facts as stated by the
petitioner, that if the. appeal were before the Department it would be dismissed.
A protest against a mineral application will not be entertained during the pend-
ency of adverse judicial proceedings instituted by the protestant and others;
and this rule is especially applicable to a case where the matters alleged in the
protest may be made the subject of legitimate inquiry in the pending adverse
proceedings.
Secretary Bliss to te Commissioner of the General Land Office, M111arch
(W. V. D.) 10, 1898. (P. J. C.)
It appears from the record that W. M. Buck, in January, 1897, made
application for patent for the Louisa lode mining claim, survey No.
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10,532, in Pueblo, Colorado, land district, and during the period of pub-
lication ten different adverses were filed against the same, and suits
brought in support thereof, and are still pending.
After the commencement of these suits, and on May 24,1897, The
,Crown Point Mining Company, one of the adverse claimants, filed in
the local office a protest against the Louisa application, asking for its
rejection and cancellation, on the ground that the Louisa survey was
fictitious and fraudulent. -
The local officers dismissed the protest, and the protestant appealed.
Your office, by letter of September 9, 1897, sustained the action of the
local officers, for the reason
that all proceedings in the matter of said application must be stayed until such
time as the suits pending on the adverse claims shall have been determiued or said
adverse claims waived.
On the same day, resident counsel was served with notice of your
office decision. On November 13th following, resident counsel filed in
your office an appeal. It appears that the local officers forwarded
another appeal, filed in their office November 27th. Counsel for the
applicant moved that these appeals be dismissed for the reason that
they were not filed in time, and your office, by letter of December 24th,
sustained the motion, holding that the time within which appeal should
have been filed expired November 11,1897.
Counsel for The Crown Point Mining Company have filed in the
Department a petition for a writ of certiorari, praying that the record
may be forwarded to the Department.
A motion has been filed by the defendant to dismiss this petition, for
the reason that the right of appeal has not been denied, and therefore
the petitioner, under the decisions, has no right to a writ of certiorari.
Aside from the recital of the facts, substantially as set forth above,
the petition assigns no legal reason for the issuance of the writ. It is
alleged that the appeals should not be dismissed for the reason that a
copy of your office decision was not served until September 27th. It
is not denied that local counsel had notice of the decision of Septem-
ber 9th, or that he received such notice on that day. When notice
of a decision is served on counsel resident in Washington, the rule
does not require a copy o the same to be served. The reason for this
rule is fully set forth in Weed v. Sampsel (19 L. D., 461. See also
Porter v. Burns (20 Id., 8).
This notice to resident counsel is equivalent to service on the party
in interest, and appeal should have been filed within sixty days from
date of such service on them. The time for filing the appeal expired
prior to November 13th. It was not filed until November 13th.
* It is well settled that an appeal filed in your office without objection,
places the case to which it relates beyond the jurisdiction of your
office, and the question as to whether it is filed in tine, is ordinarily
one for the Department to determine. But, while this is true, it would
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seem to be unnecessary to require the record to be sent up in this
instance. (Rudolph Wurlitzer, 6 L. D., 315.)
It is apparent from the facts as stated by the petitioner, that if the
case were here the appeal would be dismissed, because of the tardy
appeal, and in such cases the writ of certiorari will not be granted.
(Nichols v. Gillette, 12 L. D., 388; King et al. v. Chicago, etc., 18 Id.,
452; The Currency Mining Co., 20 Id., 178.)
- Aside from this, however, the action of your office in dismissing the
protest is not alleged or shown to be erroneous. The most that can be
said is that the petitioner alleges that it will suffer material injury
because of vexatious and costly litigation ", in opposing an application
which must be canceled, sooner or later, no matter what the courts
may determine in the pending adverse proceedings." The "adverse
proceedings" were initiated by the protestant. The Crown Point Com-
pany and the other adverse claimants resorted to the local courts to
settle their respective rights to the ground in conflict, and if there be
merit in their claims it will be established by the judgment of the
court. In that event they will get all they could by any other means,
and in the event of their failure the question as to the validity of the
survey will be one simply between the government and the entryman.
Again, it is believed that the matters alleged in the protest may be
made the subject of legitimate inquiry in the adverse proceedings. If
there has been a fraud perpetrated on the government in making this
survey, as charged, it would be a fraud to the same extent upon those
who own or claim the ground in conflict. Te locus of the land laimfed
by the applicant for patent, and that for which he procured an order
for an official survey, is deemed to be an important element in deter-
mining the possessory rights of the parties to the litigation now
pending.
The petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
RAILROAD LANDS-ACT OF MARCH 3, 17-SETTLEMENT.
OLSON V. TRAvER ET AL.
The right to receive patent conferred by section 4, act of March 3,1887, on pur-
chasers of railroad lands, can not be recognized, where the contract of purchase
has been abrogated bya subsequent agreement, made prior to the application
for the exercise of such right.
A decision of the supreme court of the United States that annuls a patent for lands
issued to a railroad company, and restores the title to the government, renders
such lands subject to settlement, in the absence of any prohibition; but in such
case it is competent for the Land Department to determine when said lands
shall be opened to entry, and make due provision therefor.
One who settles on patented lands can gain no right thereto while the patent is out-
standing; but if the patent is subsequently vacated, and the lands become sub-
ject to settlement as part of the public domain, the right of such settler will
attach from such time, and must be protected, if duly asserted.
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An application to perfect title Linder the act of March 3, 1887, will not defeat the
right of the applicant to subsequently abandon such application, and assert a
claim to the land as a homestead settler.
Secretary Bliss to the Gommissioner qf the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 10, 1898. (V. B.)
This case comes before the Department on the appeal of Ole Olson
and Daniel L. Simpkins from your office decision of March 6, 1897,
affirming the action of the register and receiver in awarding to William
Traver the right to make homestead entry of the SE. I of Sec. 25, T.
94 N., R. 41 W., Des Moines land district, Iowa.
The tract in controversy is within the twenty-mile indemnity limits.
of the grant made by the act of Congress of May 12, 1864 (13 Stat., 79),
to the State of Iowa, to aid in the construction of a railroad from Sioux
City, in said State, to the south line of the State of Minnesota, which
grant was conferred upon the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Com-
pany; was withdrawn for the purposes of the grant September 2, 1867;
is opposite the constructed line of road; was selected by the company
September 2, 1867, and patented to the State for the benefit of said
road June 17, 1873. Subsequently suit was instituted by the govern-
ment to secure the cancellation of said patents and restore title to the
lands to the United States, which resulted in the decision by the
supreme court, October 21,1895, in the case of Sioux City v. United States,
159 U.- S., 349, awarding the land to, the government. Afterwards, by
order of November 18, 1895, the lands involved in that suit, including
the tract in controversy, were made subject to entry, on February 27,
1896, under the public land laws, pursuant to instructions contained in
said order. In said instructions it was directed that ninety days'
notice be given, during which period claimants of rights under the pro-
visions of the adjustment act of March 3, 1887, were required to give
notice of their claims in accordance with the circular of February 13,
1889 (8 L. D., 348).
On January 7, 1896, Ole Olson an(l William Traver both filed appli-
cations for said SE. l, under the provision of the said act of March 3,
1887. Whereupon a hearing was ordered for March 24, 1896. On Feb-
ruary 27, 1896, the day fixed for the opening of the lands to entry,
Simpkins and eight others presented applications to make homestead
entries of said SE ., and tendered the usual fees. On the day fixed
for hearing, March 24, 1896, Traver, tendering the proper fees, filed an
application to make homestead entry of said tract, declaring that his
former application had been made through inadvertence and misunder-
standing. Thereupon the trial proceeded, Olson, Traver and Simpkins
only being represented. The other applicants, not having then appeared
or subsequently appealed, are out of the case. Decision was made, as
before stated, by the register and receiver, and by your office, on appeal,
in favor of Traver.
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The case was elaboratelyargued here, has been fully considered, and
conclusions reached as hereinafter stated.
Olson claims a right to purchase the tract under the provisions of
section 4 of said act of March 3, 1837, and this claim will be first
considered.
Said section, so far as applicable to his claim, is as follows:
That as to all lands, except those mentioned in the foregoing section, which have
been so erroneously certified or patented as aforesaid, and which have been sold by
the grantee company to citizens of the Ijnited States, or to persons who have declared
their intention to become such citizens, the person or persons so purchasing in good
faith, his heirs or assigns, shall be entitled to the land so pnrchased, upon making
proof of the fact of such purchase at the proper land office, within such time and
under such rules as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, after the
grants respectively shall have been adjusted.
:Has Olson shown himself to be a qualified and bona fide purchaser,
of the tract in question, from said company, within the purview of the
section e To answer this question, in the view now taken of this case,
it is only necessary to state the following material matters, found in
the record, in addition to those already stated.
It thus appears that on March 21, 1887, Olson entered into a written
contract with the St. Paul and Sioux City Railroad Company, and
Drake and Wilder, trustees, to purchase the tract in question at and
for the sum of $2,240; the sum of $160 being paid in cash and the
balance to be paid in ten equal annual instalments, with interest on the
deferred payments. From endorsements on the contract, it appears
that two other payments were made prior to November 10, SS9, which
made the aggregate amount paid on the contract $686.00.
On October 1, 1894, Olson and -the railroad company made a sup-
plementary contract, wherein it is recited that, in a suit pending therein,
the United States circuit court for the northern district of Iowa had
decided that the company had no title to said tract of land, and that
the company had taken an appeal from this decision to the United States
supreme court, and it is then agreed that the former contract be so
modified as to postpone further payments thereunder until after the
decision of the supreme court in said case, and it is also stipulated:
That in the event of a decision in the above entitled action in the United States
supreme court adverse to said Sioux City and Saint Paul Railroad Company as to the
title to the said land above described, the said party of the second part will within
ninety days thereafter surrender said original agreement and this modification
thereof to the parties of the first part, at St. Paul, Minnesota, and receive therefor
from the said parties of the first part, or either thereof, the amount which has then
been paid on said agreement on account of principal and interest mentioned in said
original agreement, the same to be received and accepted by said second party in
full settlement of all his rights under said original agreement and this modification
thereof, and as a release of any and all claims suffered by said party of the second
part, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, by reason of the failure of the
title of said parties of the first part to said land.
Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the original, contract evi-
denced a purchase from the company, and that it is otherwise shown
)ECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 353
that Olson acted in good faith and was duly qualified as required, the
supplementary contract clearly provided for the annulling and sur-
render of the original contract and an abandonment of Olson's rights
thereunder, on the happening of a stated contingency, and for the pay-
ment to him of a liquidated sum for said surrender and abandonment.
After the supreme court, on October 21, 1895, decided that the com-
pany had no title to the land, under the terms of the supplementary
contract and within the time fixed therein, in contemplation of law, the
abrogation and annulment of the first contract, and the abandonment
of Olson's rights thereunder, became fixed, determined and complete.
In lieu thereof he had only the supplementary agreement with the com-
pany, which does not evidence a purchase by him from the company,
but an annulment of a claim of purchase.
It results then that, in the opinion of this Department, Olson was
not at the time of his application, on January 7, 1896, a purchaser of
the tract in question within the purview of the provisions of either the
act of 1887 or that of that of 1896.
This view eliminates the claim of Olson from the case.
It remains to decide between the claims of Simpkins and Traver.
As before stated, the record shows that Simpkins presented an appli-
cation to make homestead entry of the tract in dispute on February
27, 1896, the day of the opening of the recovered land, and tendered
proper fees and commissions.
In regard to this claim you say
As to Sinpkins, the testim)Olly shows that he filed his application on the day of
the opening of the lands to entry and prosecuted his claim up to this office. and that
is all his connection with the land:
and his right to enter was denied.
In his appeal here Simpkins alleges that he also presented an appli-
cation to enter said tract under the homestead laws on November 19,
1895, which application was rejected, and, on appeal, the rejection was
approved by your office "by direction of the Hon. Secretary."
The evidence shows that Traver was a qualified entryman, that he
purchased a small house from a prior claimant and settled upon the
tract in question Marheh 4, 1886, built another house, cornerib and
stable, dug wells, bioke about seventy acres that year and made other
improvements, cultivating and fencing the land from time to time there-
after, so that at the time of the hearing his improvements were esti-
mated to be worth $1000; that shortly after his settlement he applied
to make homestead entry, and from that time his possession of the
land has been continuous, open and notorious.
The fact of actual settlement and improvement by Traver as stated,
is not denied by Simpkins; but whether denied or not it is substanti-
ated by the evidence. How)ever, whilst not questioning the evidence
as to these facts, Simpkins denies their legal efficacy and asserts in his
appeal, in substance, that Traver has no superior right because of set-
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tlement, inasmuch as lie could acquire no priority of right by virtue of
said settlement in 1886, and continued residence since, the land then
being patented land and not subject to settlement under the land laws;
that, by his application to purchase the same under the act of March 3,
1887, filed January 7, 1896, and the published notice thereof, lie waived
and abandoned, and thus lost, any settlement rights that he may have
previously had; that he, Simpkins, was therefore the first legal appli-
cant for entry, and can not be deprived of his rights thus acquired by
the application subsequently preseirted by Traver, who, as against that
intervening right, is estopped fron] now claiming the laud as a settler.
In this connection, Simoplius states, in the specifications of error, that
all parties went to trial on March 24, 1896, submitted evidence, relying
upon the claim made and notice given by Traver, prior thereto, of his
right to purchase; and that he did not present his homestead entry
" until March 31, 1896," after the case " was closed;" that thus Traver
also lost his rights as a settler because lie did not present his applica-
tion within the time required by the act of Febriiary 18, 1891 (26 Stat.,
764), relative to settlers on forfeited lands.
Simpkins also insists that said land, either upon the rendition of the
decision of the supreine court, October 21, 1895, or by the order of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office of November 18, 1895,
was restored to the public domain and his homestead entry presented
November 19, 1895, should have been accepted as being first in point
of time; and that the application of Traver of March 31, 1896, was too
late to preserve any settlement right lie may have had, because not
presented within ninety days from the date of the restoration of the
land to the public domain.
The decision of the supreme court of October 21, 1895, whilst remov-
ing the cloud from the title of the lands in controversy in that case,
had the effect to restore them to the public domain in a certain sense.
But that decision did not have the effect of so restoring them as to
make them subject to entry without the co-operation of the Land
Department or to deprive it of its administrative function as to the
disposition of said land under the laws and-regulations applicable
thereto. After said decision, your predecessor proceeded to discharge
the duty which the law devolved upon him, in this respect, and by
letter of November 18, 1895, to the register and receiver at Des Woiues,
Iowa, directed that there be published, for the period of thirty days,
in the vicinity of the lands, a description of the same, together with a
notice that they are restored to the public domain and will be subject
to entry "ninety days from the date of the first publication," during
which period all parties claiming a right to purchase any of the lands,
under the provision of the act of March 3, 1887, must come forward
and assert their claims in accordance with the circular of February 13,
1889 (8 L. D., 348). And in order to avoid complications, which might
arise, and to enable rightful claimants to acquire title with as little
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delay as possible, it was further directed that notice be given at the
same time-
to all prior applicants, that their applicatiotis confer no rights pon them, and that
upon the day set by yon for the restoration, the lands will be open to entry and dis-
posal without regard to sch applications, which shall be held by the notice to be
rejected. That all such applicants may, however, have opportunity to present new
applications upon the expiration of the ninety days' notice, yon w ,ill notify specially
all parties shown by your records to have pending applications for these lands of
the rejection thereof, of the date of restoration, and of the necessity of presenting
new applications for the protection of their rights.
There can be no doubt that when by the decision of the supreme
court the legal title to the lands was restored to the United States they'
became part of the public domain, and subject to settlement, in the.
absence of any prohibition; as was the case with the Omaha lands, in
relation to which the decision in the cited case of Smith v. Malone (18
L. D., 482) was made. Bt it remained for the Department, and for it
alone, in the absence of congressional direction otherwise, to determine.
when and how they should be thrown open to entry. This authority
to regulate the time, place and manner of making entries of the public
lands is inherent in the Land Department, is essential to a proper
administration of the system, and is not to be questioned at this
late day.
In regard to these particular lands, the Department properly exer-
cised its authority, in directing that entries should not be received
therefor until the expiration of ninety days' previous notice by publi-
cation. This order, however, did not preclude the right to settle upon
the land and acquire rights thereby, as was forbidden when the Omaha
lands were opened.
Whilst, therefore, one who went upon the land and lived thereon and
improved the same during the period when the patent was yet out-
standing, could. gain no right by such acts, yet if he was there at the
time when the land became subject in duie order to settlement, and he
be otherwise qualified, he would acquire rights which ought to be pro-
tected, notwithstanding the fact that he may have previously trespassed
upon patented land, the land laws providing no penalty for such tres-
pass. It is not needed that decisions be cited for propositions so plain
and well settled as these.
It results,- then, from what has been said, Simpkins gained nothing
by his application made to enter the land on November 19, 1895, the'
local officers having no authority to allow his application, the land not
then being subject to entry.
It follows, therefore, that the only application by him, which remains
to be considered, is that presented on February 27, 1896, the day of
opening. As he has not shown that he made settlement upon or
improved the tract in controversy during the period of the published
notice, or at any time prior to the application of Traver, it would be an
entire misapprehension of the theory of estoppel to make it applicable
to him. in this case.
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It is considered utterly immaterial whether Traver filed his applica-
tion to purchase by mistake or deliberately. Nobody was prejudiced
by this action, and if he sought to correct his mistake or changed his
mind on the subject he had an undoubted right to do so, as the rights
of no one else had so intervened as to prevent it. From the fact that
shortly after settling upon the land in 1886 he made application to enter-
it under the homestead law, the inference is most reasonable that the
subsequent application to l)urchase the same made by him, was in some
way due to a mistake. This inference is strengthened by the evidence
in the record that the land was in fact sold by. the company to Olson,
and there is no pretense that there ever was such sale to Traver or any
negotiations between him-and the conpany relating to such sale.
However, whatever may have caused the Sling of the claim to pur-
chase, it is very clear that the subsequent presentation of his home-
stead application was a waiver and withdrawal of his claim to purchase,
and was so treated, properly, by the local office and your office.
As the settlement, improvements and residence on the tract by Traver
are clearly shown, and not controverted by Siinpkins, who claims only
through his applications, and Traver's application, though sbsequent
in date to that of the former, yet was presented within proper time
after the land was open to entry, the latter has the superior right to
the tract here in question, and your judgment o that effect is affirmed.
In this connection it is to be said that the forfeiture act of Septemn-
ber 29, 1890 (26 Stat., 496), and its amendment of February 18, 1897 (29
Stat., 535), relate to lauds described and forfeited by the first act and
has no application whatever, as contended by Simpkins, to the lands
involved iii this controversy, the title to which was restored to the
United States by decision of the court, not because the road was not
constructed opposite thereto, but because they had been erroneously
patented by the land officers.
The argument of counsel has taken a wide range and many questions
supposed to bear upon this case have been exhaustively discussed; but
the grounds upon which it has been disposed of render it unnecessary
to herein consider many of the questions presented.
WAGON ROAD GRANT-SELECTIONS-ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL.
WILLAMETTE VALLEY AND CASCADE IT. WAGON ROAD Co. V.
BRUNER (ON REvIEw).
Under the wagon road grant of July 5, 1866, it is the duty of the Secretary of the
Interior to see that the selections made in satisfaction of the grant are confined
to lands described in the granting act, but as between different sections, equally
subject to selection under said grant, and the order of withdrawal, the Secretary
cannot say which shall be taken.
An executive order of withdrawal made in aid of a Congressional grant, where there
is no statutory prohibition against such action, rests upon the general authority
of the Department, and no rights, either legal or equitable, can be acquired by
settlement or entry in violation of such order.
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The departmental decision herein of June 9, 1896, 22 L. D., 654, vacated on review.
Directions given for the restoration of lands -withdrawn for the benefit of this grant,
and not included in pending selections.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of1 the General Land ffice, arch
(W. V. D.) 10, 1898. (E. F. B.)
I have considered the motion of the Willamnette Valley and Cascade
Mountain Wagon Road Company asking a review and reversal of the
departmental decision of June 9, 1896 (22 L. D., 654). involving lots 1,
2 and 3, Sec. 31, T. 22 S., it. 32 E., Burns land district, Oregon.
The land is claimed by the wagon road company under the act of July
5,1866 (14 Stat., 891), and is claimed by Bruner under a homestead entry
made November 20, 1889.
The grant under which the wagon road company claiins provides:
That there be, and hereby is, granted to the State of Oregon, to aid in the con-
struction of a military wasgon road from Albany, Oregon, by way of Canyon City,
and the most feasible pass in Cascade range of monutains, to the eastern boundary
of the State alternate sections of public lands, designated by odd numbers, three
sections per mile, to be selected within six miles of said road: Provided, That the
lands hereby granted shall be exclnsively applied in the construction of said road,
and shall be disposed of only as the wvork progresses; and the same shall be applied
to no other purpose whatever: And provided further, I'hat any and all lands heretofore
reserved to the United States by act of Congress or other competent authority be,
and the same are, reserved from the operation of this act, except so far as it may be
necessary to locate the route of said road through the same, in which case the right
of Way is granted, subject to the approval of the President of the United States.
SEc. 2. Anid be itfurthe,' enacted, That the said lands hereby granted to said State,
shall be disposed of by the legislature thereof for the purpose aforesaid, and for no
other; and the said road shall be and remain a public highway for the use of the
government of the United States, free from tolls or other charge upon the trans-
portation of any property, troops, or mails of the United States.
SEc. 3. And be it fr ther eracted, That said road shall be constructed with such
width, graduation, and bridges, as to permit of its regular use as a wagon road, and
in such other special manner as the State of Oregon may prescribe.
SEc. 4. And be it frother enacted, That the lands hereby granted to said State shall
be disposed of only in the following manner, that is to say: that when ten miles of
said road shall be completed, a quantity of land not exceeding thirty sections for
said road may be sold coterminios to said completedl portion of said road; and when
the governor of said State shall certify to the Secretary of the Interior that any ten
continuous miles of said road are completed, then another quantity of land hereby
granted, not to exceed thirty sections, may be sold, coterminous to said completed
portion of said road, and so from time to time until said road is completed; and if
said road is not completed within five years, no further sales shall be made, and the
lands remaining unsold shall revert to the United States.
The State of Oregon, by act of its legislative assembly of Octobei
24,1866, conferred this grant upoD the Willamette Valley and Cascade
Mountain Wagon Road Company.
The granting act was supplemented by the acts of July15, 1870 (16
Stat., 363), and June 18, 1874 (18 Stat., 80), but their provisions are not
now material, excepting perhaps that the last act recognizes the trans-
fer of the grant by the State. Under section 4 of the granting act the
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completion of the road in the manner required by that act was certified
by the governor of Oregon in four several certificates, the first bearing
date April 1I,1868, and the last bearing date June 22,1871. Diagrams
or plats showing the location of the constructed road were filed in the
General Land Office and copies thereof also showing the lateral six mile
limits of the grant were transmitted to the local offices, accompanied
by executive orders of withdrawal containing the following instructions
to the local officers:
It is hereby directed that you will withhold from disposal the odd sections thus
falling within said designated limits, anti make note of such in your records.
These withdrawals were received at the local offices long before Bru-
ner made either settlement upon, or entry of, the lands in dispute.
The plat of the township embracing this land was approved by the
United States surveyor-general February 28, 1884, the survey having
been theretofore made in the field; the plat was filed in the local office
May 26, 1884; and this land was selected by the wagon road company,
under the grant, July 17, 1884. The land so selected is within the
limits of the withdrawal; is in au alternate section of public land; is
within six miles of the road; was not reserved to the United States or
otherwise disposed of before the date of the grant; and was free from
adverse claims at the time the withdrawal was received at the local
office.
The facts respecting Bruner's claim, taken from his own affidavit
which is a part of the record, are (1) that lie settled upon the land
about March 1, 1884, subsequent to the survey in the field and prior to
the filing of the township lat in the local office; (2) April , 1884,
he offered pre-emption declaratory statement for the land which was
rejected by the local office because the township plat had not been
received at that office; (3) about April 30, 1884, he again offered pre-
emption declaratory statement which was rejected because the land
was claimed by the wagon road company; (4) in April, 1885, he made
application at the local office to make timber culture entry of the land,
which was rejected because the land was claimed by the wagon road
company and also because it was claimed by te State of Oregon as
swamp land; (5) in September, 1888, he made application to make
homestead entry of the land whicl was rejected for the reasons last
named; (6) November 20, 1889, lie again made application to make
homestead entry of the land and the local officers, in violation of the
order of withdrawal, allowed the entry; and (7) he resided upon the
land continuously from his settlement up to the time of the hearing
had in the local office.
The consideration of this motion for review hasbeen postponed from
time to time in order that counsel for both parties could be heard in
oral argument. The oral argument has been had, both parties have
filed written briefs and the case has been carefully considered.
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In the decision under review (22 L. D., 654), it was held (syllabus):
While no rights are acquired as against the government by settlement on land
withdrawn in aid of a congressional grant, and entries of lands so rser\ ed should
not be alow'ed, yet, under the withdrawal for the benefit of this grant wherein no
rights to specific tracts are acquired prior to selection, and entries or filings have
beeii allowed, based on settlement prior to selection, in violation of said withdrawal,
the Department may, in its exercise of its supervisory authority, require the selection
of other tracts, if it appears that the grant can be fully satisfied from the remaining
lauds; and to this end entries or filings of snch character miay be suspenlded to await
the adjustment of the grant.
In that decision reference was made t the ruling of the Department
in the case of Willamette Valley and Cascade Mountain Wagon Road
Company v. Hagan (20 L. D., 259), in which the validity of the execu-
tive withdrawal made for the benefit of this grant and its effect in pre-
venting the sbsequeiit initiation of any claim to the lands withdrawvn,
were fully considered and determined.
In the case of Hagan, it was held that the company had the unquali-
lied right to select in satisfaction of its grant any of the odd numbered
sections within the limits of the withdrawal to which no adverse claim
had been initiated, prior to the receipt of the withdrawal at the local
office, and that settlement or entry of any of the lands so withdrawn
after the receipt of the withdrawal at the local office would not enable
the settler or entryman to defeat the company's right of selection, even
though it failed to appear at the local office and assert its right in
response to the usual notice of intention to offer final proof. It was
intended that this decision should control i the adjustment of this
grant. Its language is free from ambiguity and admits of but one
meaning. The purpose of the withdrawal was to withhold the lands
embraced therein from settlement and entry so that the State, or its
grantee, could take any of the odd numbered sections within the six-
mile limits in satisfaction of the grant.
If the withdrawal was valid it was as effective-to withhold the lands
from settlement and entry during its continuance as if it had been pro-
vided for in the granting act, and. the right of the State, or its grantee,
to select i satisfaction of the grant any particular tract covered by
such withdrawal was fully protected thereby. The right of selection
conferi-ed by the granting act can not be restricted or limited by the
Secretary of the Interior. It is his duty to supervise the administra-
tioji of this grant but his authority does not permit him to revise or
limit the laws of Congress. He is as much bound by the provisions of
the granting act as is either of the claimants in this case. It is the
duty of the Secretary to see that the selections uade in satisfaction of
the grant are confined to lands described in the granting act, which,
according to its language, are-" alternate sections of public lands
designated by odd numbers, three sections per mile, to be selected
within six miles of said road," excluding "any and all lands heretofore
reserved to the United States by act of Congress or other competent
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anthority" but as between different sections equally subject to selec-
tion under the granting act and the order of withdrawal, the Secretary
of the Interior can not say which shall be selected or which shall not
be selected, for in. doing this he would be denying the right of the
State, or its grantee, to make the selection. The supervisory authority
of the Secretary is not unlimited and can not be exercised arbitrarily
for the purpose of conferring rights upon one person to the detriment
of the ackniowledged rights of others. Cornelius v. Vessel (128 U. S.,
456).
However strong may be the disposition to exercise the executive will
in favor of settlers, the Department must recognize its duty to admin-
ister the laws according to the interpretation given to them by the
supreme court, and when that interpretation is expressed, it is the duty
of the executive to follow it in the administration of the law.
The power of the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw lands in aid
of a congressional grant, where there is no statutory denial of such
authority and the effect of such withdrawal in reserving the lands from
settlement and entry, has been so definitely settled by the decision of
the supreme court that it is no longer a subject of controversy. Such
power does not rest upon statutory provision expressly requiring or
authorizing it, but upon the general authority of the land department
to make a withdrawal in aid of the grant. Walcott v. Des Moines Co.,
5 Wol., 8; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S., 755; Wood v. Beach, 156
U. S., 548; pelicer v. McDougal, 159 U. S., 62; iley v. Wells, 19 U. S.,
1. ed. 548.
In the case lasteited the court said that a settlementupon land with.
drawn by executive order was-
without right, and the possession was continued without right; the permission of
the register to prove up the possession and iprovements, and to make entry under
the pre-emption laws were acts i violation of law and void, as was also the issuing
of the patents.
The effect of a withdrawal in jnreveii ting the acquisition of any legal
or equitable right to the lands withdrawn by occupation or entry
thereof after the withdrawal takes effect, is very forcibly and clearly
stated by the supreme court in the case of Wood v. Beach, supra.
There the land i controversy was withdrawn for indemnity purposes
in aid of a congressional grant. Wood went upon the land amid sought
to enter it as a homestead, all his occupation and settlement although.
made prior to selection by the railroad company, was-subsequent to the
withdrawal. When he made application to enter the land he was
informed that it was railroad lan(i and his applicatioL wa rejected. As
to the effect of the settlement of Wood, the court said: "If those
withdrawals were valid, no rights, legal or equitable, were acquired by
his occapatioii and settlement."
After stating that it is the settled rule of the courts and of the land
department that a withdrawal by the executive is sufficient to defeat the
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acquisition of any right by settlement, while the order is in force, the
court says:
Upon these admitted facts it is clear that Mr. Wood acquired no equitable rights
by his occupation and settlement. He went upon the lands which ere not open to
homestead or preemption entry, and can not make his unauthorized occupation the
foundation of a equitable title. le was not acting in ignorance, out was fully
informed both s to the fact and the law, He deliberately took the chances of the
railway company's grant, being satisfied out of lands withbin the place limits, or by
selections of lands within the indemnity limits other than this, and trusted that in
such event this tract would be restored to the public domain and e gain some
advautage by reason of being already on the land. But the event he hoped for
never happened. The party for whose benefit the withdrawal was made complied
with all the conditions of title and took the land.
The rule announced in these decisions is so clearly stated by the
supreme court and has -been so frequently followed and applied in
instances similar to the one at bar, that the Department can (o nothing
less than cancel the homestead entry of Bruner and sustain the selec-
tion of the wagon road company. Any other ruling would permit local
officers to set aside a withdrawal made by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office or the Secretary of the Interior, or even the Presi-
dent, and also to defeat a legislative grant.
The action of Bruner and others in settling upon anti making entries
of lands embraced within the existing withdrawal made for the benefit
of this grant. is perhaps explained when it is stated that from 1878
until 1889, there were frequent and serious complaints made to the
land department and to Congress of the alleged failure of the wagon
road company to construct or complete this wagon road, and that these
complaints resulted in the act of Congress of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat.,
850), directing the attorney-general of the United States to institute a
suit against the wagon road company ad all claimants of the land
granted
to determine the qestiou of seasonable and proper completion of said road in
accordance-with the terms of the granting act, either i whole or in part, and the
legal effect of the several certificates of the governor of Oregon of the completion
of the road, and to delare forfeited to the United States all land not earned in
accordance with the granting act.
In pursuance of this act and for the purposes stated, a suit wras insti-
tuted by te United States against this wagon road company and other
claimants of the land, in the circuit court of the United States for the
district of Oregon, which proceeding resulted in a decree December 16,
1892, in favor of the wagon road company and other claimants and
against the United States (55 Fed. Rep., 711). This decree became
final and precludes the United States and its land department from
now inquiring into any of the questions of fact or law determined in
that suit. Bruner and the other settlers probably hoped that the com-
plaints against the construction and completion of the wagon road
would be successful and that the land embraced in the withdrawal
would be relieved from the claim of the wagon road company, but their
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expectation was not realized. In making settlement upon and entry of
the lands withdrawn they took the chance incident to the contemplated
proceedings against the wagon road company, and lost.
It is contended by the wagon road company that this grant is one in
praeseati and that when, by the construction of the road and by the
company's selection, the sections granted are ascertained and identified,
its title thereto takes effect by relation as of the date of the grallt, and
that if no withdrawal had been made. or if made and disregarded, the
company's rights are not affected or defeated by any claim initiated
after the date of the grant, and as a part of this contention the com-
pany refers to the fact that the oy exception or eservation in the
grant is "any and all lands heretofore reserved to the United States
by act of Congress or other competdnt authrity." The o her matters
hereinbefore discussed flly dispose of the case and render a decision
upon this contention unnecessary.
The motion for review is sustained, the decision of the Department of
Junle 9, 1896, is hereby revoked and set aside and you will proceed with
the adjustment of the grant according to the views herein expressed.
In the Hagan case, suprta, the following direction was given to your
office:
While I recognize the propriety-of the withdrawal made by the executive to pro-
teat this company in the exercise of its right to make selection in satisfaction of its
grant, I am also impressed with the importance of requiring the company to make
the selections necessary to satisfy this grant as speedily as possible, in order that the
surplus relaiiing in the limits of this withdrawal may be restored to settlement
and entry. The reason alleged by the company for failure to make selections to
satisfy the grant is, that the government has failed to have the lands surveyed.
That reason no longer exists. The act of August 20, 189 (28 Stat.. 423), authorizes
the deposit of a sufficient sum by the owners of grants of public lands for the pur-
pose of havilg a survey of the townships within the limits of their grants. If this
company refuses to accept the benefit of this act, it wvill e required to mlake its
selections from the surveyed portion ot lands along the line of its oad, and the
withdrawal of tile uusnrveyed lands. along the line of its road will be revoked. It
-will, therefore, be notilied that a survey mast be made of auch lands as it desires to
survey, on or before November 1st, next, and to make all selections necessary to
satisfy its grant, within ninety days thereafter, and thereafter the withdrawals will
be revoked.
By departmental letter of October 26, 1895, the time within which the
company was required to complete its selections w as extended one year.
Your office letter of April 1, 1897, calls attention to the fact that the
time allowed the Willamette Valley and Cascade Mountain Wagon
Road Company within which to complete its selections has expired,
and you recommend that the withdrawals heretofore made be revoked.
The wagon road company has also expressly assented to the revocation
of the orders of withdrawal made for the benefit of the grant.
I have therefore to. direct that after due notice by publication you
restore all lands formerly withdrawn on account of this grant and not
included in pending selections.
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RELINQUISHIMENT-APPLICATION-VACANCY IN LOCAL OFFICE.
PRICE V. RILEY ET AL.
The tender of a relinquishment, accompanied by all application to enter, at a time
when there is a vacancy in the office of the register, and when, under the rulings
then in force, such papers should have been received and held to await the
resumption of business, entitles .the party making such tender to have said
papers treated as though filed, though in fact they we e returned on account of
said vacancy.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Comimnissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) M111arch 11, 18.98. (H. G.)
A hearing was ordered in this cause by departmental decision of
October 9, 1894, apon. the application of Willie C. Price upon his con-
test against the homestead entry of Francis M. Riley, made September
23, 1891, for the NW. 1 of See. 9, T. 9 N., R. 3 E., I. M., in the land office
at Oklahoma, Oklahoma Territory. (19 L. D., 175.)
The facts are detailed fully in the departmental decision, and it is
unnecessary to rehearse them at length.
At this hearing, ordered upon the contest of Price, all the parties
appeared. Francis M. Riley was called as a witness for Price, the con-
testant, and testified, in sbstance, that he made the entry of the tract;
that he had been the head of a family since his entry, but did not go
upon the tract with his family to live and make his home there; that
he never made any improvement thereon and had not cultivated any
part of it; that he made relinquishment of the tract i the mouth of
March, 1892, front six to ten days prior to the expiration of six months
after be made his entry, having sold out to Rodman for $250.00. No
further testimony was offered on behalf of Price.
Rodman testified, over the objection of Price, to the effect that he,
Rodman, was a married man and the head of a family, consisting of his
wife and three children; that he gave Riley $250 to relinquish the laud
so that he could file on it; that this transaction occurred in March,
1892, before he 22d of that month; that he attempted to file on the
land on the same day that he received the relinquishment, and pre-
seuted the same, with his application to enter the land, to the clerk in
the local office, who examined these papers and returned them to Rod-
man, informing the latter that the office could transact no business,
as there was no register; that Rodman had the money ready to pay the
land office fees at that tile; that this tender was renewed a week or
ten days later, but was not received, evidently because the office of
register was yet vacant; that the receiver of the local office then
informed Rodman that the latter had ninety days from the date of the
relinquishment within which to file; that he finally tendered the relin-
quishment on May 9, 1892, which was five days after the filing of the
contest by Price; that the same was accepted and Rodman was permit-
ted to make entry of the tract; that Rodman settled on the land in
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February, 1892, and had fenced eighty acres of the tract, built a house
and barn thereon, lug a well on the premises, and had twenty-five acres
of the tract in cenltivation; that his improvements were of the value of
$625.00, and that he ad made no other homestead entry and did not
own any other land. On cross-examination, Rodman testified that he
could not give the dates when he unsuccessfully presented. the relin-
quishment and his application to enter the land, but that he first offered
these papers the day the register resigned. He also stated that he did
not file the relinquishment in the interval between the second time
he attempted to do so and April 1, 1892, when the register appointed
to succeed Judge Btirford qualified, because he had already made two
trips for that purpose, was very busy on the claim, and did not desire
to make the third trip -until sch time as he knew the land office could
aet upon his papers, and as he had been informed that the land office
was besieged with applications for filing in another portion of the land
district just opened to settlement, which would compel him to remain a
day-or two at the office before his application could be acted upon. lie
further testified that he had not made all of his improvements upon
the tract before he was advised of the contest, but was dwelling in a
tent on the land, and had erected a storm house and was building a
permanent dwelling upon the tract at the time. Rodman learned that
a successor to the register who resigned had qualified two days before
he made~his last trip to the land office, when the relinquishment was
filed and his entry was made. He further offered in evidence the show-
ing formerly made by him and referred to in the former departmental
decision, the admission made by Price that the relinquishment nade
by Riley was not caused by Price's contest, and the records and files in
the case. At this stage of the proceedings, counsel for Price called
attention to the order addressed to Rodiman, to show cause why his
entry should not be canceled, issued by the local office at the time his
entry was allowed, aud requested Rodman to make any further showing
that he desired to make under said order or to introduce further evi-
dence in support of his entry. Rodman, in response to this request,
contended that he had fully complied with the order of your office, and
that of the Departlent.
Upon this evidence, the local office found that Price had sustained
the allegations of his contest, and held that the entry of Rodman should
be canceled.
Upon appeal from this decision, your office, on April 10, 1896, reversed
the decision of the local office and dismissed Price's contest, upon the
ground that it appeared that Register Burford had not vacated his
office at the time of the tender by Rodulan of the relinquishment of
Riley and the application of the former to enter the tract. In support
of this ruling, your office states that the evidence shows that Rodman
presented to the local office these papers on the day the register
resigned, March 22, 1892, which was the last day of his term of office;
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that the account of the receiver for the first quarter of that year shows
that the register had been paid his salary up to and including that day,
and that Burford " was therefore register of said office until the close
of said day, and said reliuquishnient ad homestead papers should have
been received when presented at your (the local) office for the first
time." Price contends that Register Burford, having been appointed
one of the judges for Oklahoma Territory, entered upon his duties on
March 22, 1892. the day on which Rodman- first tendered his papers,
but there is no evidence to support this contention.
Although Rodman's affidavit, made at the time he offered these papers
for filing, sets forth that he presented then on March 23, 1892, his sub-
sequent affidavit, submitted on the rule to show cause why his entry
should not be canceled, and quoted in full in the former departmental-
decision in this case (19 L. D., 176), fixes the date as March 22, 1892;
and his testimony is to the effect that such tender of the relinquish-
ment and application to enter. was ol the day the register resigned.
In the case of Smith v. McKerracher et a., 20 L. D., 276, a case analo-
gous to the one at bar, aild relating to the vacancy in the same laud
district, it appears that on
March 18, 1892, the register at said local office resigned and there was a vacancy in
the office of register until April 8, 1892, on which last (late the nlew register took
charge.
This statement was not a controlling one in the case from which it
was taken, and can not be resorted to i this case, but it throws some
doubt upon the meager proof relating. to the clay upon which the reg-
ister actually resigned.
The clerk of the local office declined to receive the papers presented
by Rodman, because there was "no register," but your office holds that
the register having drawn his salary for March 22, 1892, was in office
for the day, and that Riley's relinquishment and Rodman's application
to enter should have been filed for that reason; but the action of the
clerk of the land office and his declaration that there was no register
in office would imply that the position had been vacated at the time
Rodinan presented his papers.
It nowhere appears in the record that the resignation of the register
was accepted by the proper authority. It seems that to create a
vacancy in such a case there mnst not only be a resignation of the
office, but an acceptance thereof by competent authority. Edwards v.
U. S. (103 U. S., 477). Owing to the slight degree of proof present in
the case at bar on the question of a vacancy in the office of register, the
case will be disposed of on other grounds. It will be assumed that
the office of register was vacant when Rodman presented the papers in
the local office.
This leaves for disposition the question of the effect of sch tender,
if the office of register was vacant at the time.
No such question can arise under cases of like nature occurring since
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the issuance of the circular of June 12, 1896 (22 L.D., 704), which pro-
vides that upon a vacancy in the office of register and receiver all
business requiring the action of both officers must await the filling of
the vacancy, and while the office is kept open for the purpose of furnish-
ing general information, no action can be taken upon applications to
contest or enter lands in the district where the vacancy. occurs; and,
in such cases, applications to contest entries or to enter lands and all
other applications requiring the joint action of both otcers, presented
during the vacancy in the local office, are received, the time of presen-
tation noted thereon, and upon the resumption of business, such appli-
cations are to be disposed of in their order. Prior to the taking effect
of this circular, it was held that applications to enter lands received
.during a vacancy in the office of register at the land office at Guthrie,
Oklahoma, caused by the death of the incumbent of that office, must
be treated as simultaneous upon the resumptioln of business in the
local office, and where one of the applicants had settled upon and im-
proved the tract applied for and the other had not, the priority of right
should be accorded to the actual settler. (Hillebrand v. Smith, 22 L.
D., 612.) In the case just mentioned, the case of Williams v. Loew (12
L D., 297;) is cited, where it was held that "An application to enter
during the vacancy in the register's office is, in contemplation of law,
submitted for official action when the vacancy is filled," and this deci-
sion, it is said, has never been overruled. It is further said, in the
course of the opinion, that
when the vacancy is filled, the machinery of the oce resumes its work, and the
register and receiver in the exercise of official duty proceed to adjudicate all cases
on file and pending in their office.
The case of illebrand v. Smith, supra, is not in harmony with the
earlier decision in the case of Smith v. McKerracher et al., supra. In
the latter case, an application to contest an entry, sent by mail to the
local office during a vacancy in the office of the register, and there
remaining unacted upon during said vacancy, was held subject to a
similar application presented by another party on the opening of the
office to business; and in support of the ruling a number of depart-
mental decisions were cited.
The case of Armstrong v. Miranda (14 L. D., 133) holds that a
vacancy in either of the local offices disqualifies the remaining incum-
bent for the performance of the duties of his office during the period of
such vacancy, and that a relinquishment sent to the local office during
a vacancy in the office of register is not filed in contemplation of law,
and if returned to the entryman before said vacancy is filled, no action
could be subsequently taken by the register and receiver. In that
ease, the entryman filed his affidavit, to the effect that he was so itox-
icated at the time he executed the relinquishment as not to compre-
hend the character of the instrument, and demanded the return of the
same, which request was granted, and the decision is partly based
upon this fact, but mainly upon the ground that the relinquishment
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was not the voluntary act of the entrymnan, owing to his intoxication
at the time of its execution. It was said in that case that the relin-
quishment in question was received at the local office during a vacancy
in the office of register and while the machinery of the office was stop-
ped, and was therefore not filed thereini, and before the vacancy was
filled it was returned to the entryinan, so that when the office resumed
its work tere was nothing connected with such relinquishment for the
register and receiver to adjudicate.
In the case of Graham . Carpenter (9 L. D., 365) Graham presented
for filing an affidavit of contest, on the ground of abandonment of a
homestead entry, but the register of the local office refused to receive
and file it, on account of the vacancy in the office of receiver, caused by
the death of the latter officer. It was held that neither of the local
officers could operate independently of the other, and that when there
was a vacancy caused by the death of one of them, the machinery of
the office stopped at that moment, and could not be put in motion until
the office was filled. The case of Christian F. Ebinger, 1 L. D., 150,
was held as decisive authority in that case. The application for a tim-
ber culture entry was rejected in the Ebinger case, because there was
a vacancy in the office of the register, owing to the death of the incum-
bent, and that the subsequent application, renewed when the vacancy
was filled, was cut off by an intervening application.
It was held in the case of the l)ean Richinond Lode, 1 L. D., 545,
that in case of such vacancy in either of the local offices, the remaining
incumbent is disqualified for the performance of his own duties during
the period of such vacancy, except where by departmental order he was
directed to temporarily fill the vacant office as well as his own.
In the case of Williams v. Loew, supra, the acting register was noti-
fied that his term had expired because the appointee for that office had
not been confirmed, prior to the expiration of the Congress, at the last
session of 'which it had been sent to the Senate. The former incun-
bent was directed to act as clerk and receive applications to enter lands,
until a register should be appointed. During the vacancy, and while
the former register was so acting as clerk, the package containing the
application of a desert land applicant, with an enclosure of money to
pay the initial instalment on the land, was received and filed by such
clerk. The application was overlooked and another was permitted to
enter the land after a register had been appointed and had qualified.
It was held that the application for desert land entry being on file at
the time of the resumption of business, the same was, in contemplation
of law, submitted to the newly appointed register and to the receiver
for official action, and that being first in point of time should have been
allowed, even where the cash payment was required by cironlar issued
the same day to be double the amount tendered, the land lying within
railroad limits, as the applicant promptly paid the additional amount
required by the later circular, when advised of such requirement.
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From this resume of decisions, it is apparent that there is some con-
flict, but it may be gathered from these cases that prior to the depart-
mental circular of June 13, 1892, no business could be transacted by
any local office during a vacancy in either of the official positions
therein, except merely to receive papers tendered for future action
when the offices became filled, and the official quorum was present, but
such applications should be treated as simultaneous applications, with-
out preference or priority, when the office resumed business, and would
have precedence over others presented thereafter. Applying this rule
to the case at bar, it appears that had the application of Rodman been
received; accompanied by the relinquishment of Riley, it would have
been taken up anid regarded as filed at the time of the resumption of
the business of the local office, ol April 18, 1892. This was sixteen
days prior to the filing of the contest affidavit of Price, and would
therefore dispose of the question of priority. Neither the relinquish-
ment nor the application remained in the office, but this was not the
fault of Rodman. He tendered them twice, and stood ready to pay the
proper fees. He manifested his good faith by continuing the improve-
meuits he had already begun ol the tract after purchasing the relin-
quishment from Riley. Twice baffied in his attempts to file the
relinquishment and enter the land, laches can not be imputed to him
because he did not renew his efforts to make entry immediately after
the office resumed business, of which he had no official notice. He
appeared again at the land office about three weeks after it was opened
anew, a few days after having received information o the resumption
of business, and was but five days later than Price, who contested the
entry of Riley. Rodmani's excuse for this delay is reasonable. He had
heard that, owing to the rush to enter a tract of land recently thrown
open to settlement, a few days would elapse before he could present
his papers for the third time for ation, aid he was engaged at his
labors upon the disputed tract, at a time in the year when farmers are
unusually busy.
It must, therefore, be held, in the light of the rulings of the Depart-
ment in similar cases, as applied to the circumstances of this case, that
Rodman's efforts to file the relinquishment of Riley and his own appli-
cation to enter, which were presented by and returned to him-once on
account of an alleged vacancy in the office of register, and at a subse-
quent time by reason of an actual vacancy in said office-were tanta-
mount to a filing of these papers, because they should have been received
when offered, and held to await the resumption of official business. If
they had been so received, when the machinery of the local office had
been put in motiom by the qualification of a new register, they could
have been acted upon at once, as there were then no other applications
to enter the tract, or. to contest the entry then of record.
It was insisted at the hearing and is now urged that, under the former
departmental decision, the case was fully decided, and Price was per-
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mitted to establish the allegations of his contest against Riley, which
excluded from consideration the claim of Rodman.
A careful reading of the opinion does not sustain this contention.
Rodman had been cited to appear and show cause why his entry should
not be canceled for conflict with the prior contest initiated by Price,.
and he appeared and presented his affidavit, the truth of which was
admitted, to show that the relinquishment of Riley was not induced
by the contest of Price, as it was executed nearly two months prior to
the initiation of such contest. The former departmental decision did
not direct the cancellation of Rodman's entry, but evidently provided
that the entire case should be fully presented and not decided piece-
meal. At the hearing ordered it was competent for Price to prove the
allegations of his contest and disprove any allegations of Rodman not
admitted, and it was competent for Rodman to show his attempts to
make entry, that he acted in good faith and was not chargeable with
laches in making application to enter. This was evidently understood
by counsel for Price, who called upon Rodman to make any further
showing he desired to make under the foimer order to show cause why
the entry of the latter should not be canceled, or to introduce further
evidence in support of his entry.
The uncontradicted testimony of Rodman establishes his reasonable
diligence, evinced by two. attempts to file the relinquishment of Riley
and to enter the tract, and his good faith is shown by his continuous
residence upon the tract and his occupancy and improvement thereof
before the contest was initiated.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of your office is affirmed. The
entry of Charles M. Rodman will remainaintact, and the contest of
Willie C. Price is dismissed.
OKLAHOMA IOMESTEAD-QUALIFICATIONS Or HOMESTEADER.
MASON v. CROMWELL (ON REVIEW).
The limitation by section 20, act of May 2, 1890, of the right of homestead entry in
Oklahoma to persons who are not " seized in fee simple of one hundred and sixty
acres of land in any State or Territory" does not operate to disqualify an appli-
cant for such right who may at such time own a less amount, though the land
thus held may have been taken as a technical " quarter section."
The conclusive effect of the surveyor-general's return, as to the quantity of land in a
legal sub-division, is only operative While such sub-division remains public land.
The field notes of survey are part of the permanent official records of the General
Land Office, and as such may be resorted to upon any question, whereon they
have bearing, arising in any case before the Land Department.
The decision herein of March 15, 1897, 24 L. D!, 248, vacated on review.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) March 11, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
The above-entitled case comes again before the Department under
an order dated December 27, 1897, entertaining a motion for review of
its decision of March 15, 1897 (24 L. D., 248).
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Cromwell's claim to the land involved-the SW. of section 20,
T. 23 N., R. W., Enid, Oklahoma, land district-was initiated by home-
stead entry thereof on October 27, 1893; Mason's claim by alleged set-
tlement thereon October 13, 1893. Without deciding whether Mason
made settlement, in fact, as alleged, the Department held that he was
disqualified to make valid homestead settlement in Oklahoma by reason
of his ownership at that time of the NE. i of section 28, T. 9 S., R. 34
W., in the State of Kansas, containing one hundred and fifty-nine and
thirty-five one-hundredths acres. Under the motion for review and
entertaining order the question of aw is again presented whether the
ownership of that quantity of land disqualified Mason.
In section 20 of the act of May 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 91), among other
provisions relating to the disposal of public lands in Oklahoma Terri-
tory, is the following:
and no person who shall at the time be seized in fee simple of a hundred and sixty
acres of land in any State or Territory shall hereafter be entitled to enter land in
said Territory of Oklahoma.
This is the provision of la~w which, applied to the facts of the case,
the Department held disqualified Mason. It has not been proven that
Mason owned one hundred and sixty acres of land in any State or Ter-
ritory at the date of his settlement or since. The decision under review
concedes that as a matter of fact he did not then own that quantity of
land. He has steadily denied such ownership. He admitted at the
trial of the case in the local office that he had owned " a quarter sec-
tion" of land in Kansas, but claimed that he conveyed it by deed
executed a few hours prior to his alleged settlement. The Department
held, however, that no delivery of the deed prior to his alleged settle-
ment had been shown and that therefore the title to the land was still
in him at that time.
That Mason was the owner of the Kansas land above described at
the time of his alleged settlement may be regarded as settled by the
decision of the Department. But it was said, in that decision, in effect,
that the terms "a quarter sectio and " a hundred and sixty acres" as
used in legislation by Congress were interchangeable terms, meaning
the same thing, and that therefore as Mason owned "a quarter section"
of land it made no difference, upon the question of his qualification,
that the quantity of his land was " a fraction less than one hundred
and sixty acres," that is, in fact, nearly three-fourths of an acre less.
These are the propositions whose soundness is now in question.
It is true that in legislation fixing the maximum quantity of public
land which might be taken by one person under the homestead, pre-
emption- and certain other laws, Congress has frequently used the
foregoing terms interchangeably, but in no instance, so far as the
Department is aware, where the ownership of land is made a disqual-
ification for the exercise of the right, otherwise existing, to take public
land, is the quantity of the land stated in other terms than as a specific
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number of acres. Reasons for this difference in language are readily
found. Te present system of surveying and subdividing the public
lands was not adopted until toward the close of the last century.
Again, in several States the United States never held any public lands,
and the system of rectangular surveys now employed by the general
government was not extended to the State and private lands in those
States, so that the term " a quarter section" is without application to
the lands therein. A specific quantity of land expressed in acres is,
on the other hand, applicable to the conditions in all the States and
Territories, and a statute using such terms could not fail to operate
equally upon all persons owning the same quantity of land without
regard to its location. It would be unjust to hold disqualified one who
owned less than one hundred and sixty acres of land in, Kansas, and to
hold another qualified who owned the same quantity in Pennsylvania.
The law should operate equally upon all persons of the same class and
undoubtedly this was the intent of Congress in enacting the statute in
question. The words "a hundred and sixty acres of land" were here
employed in a sense which permits their equal and uniform application
to all persons coming within the purview of the statute in which they
are found, and in that sense they are not the equivalent of the words
"a quarter section," but are used to describe land according to its
extent and area in acres no matter whether located in oue tract or in
several tracts nor whether constituting a subdivision of land embraced
in the regular governmental survey or constituting a tract with irreg-
ular lines and embraced in a special or private survey.
But it is urged by counsel for Cromwell that as the proof that the
land owned by Mason was less than one hundred and sixty acres was
only brought to the attention of the land department after the case had
reached the Secretary, such proof is not part of the record and should
not be considered; and, at all events, it is further urged, that the
return of the surveyor-geueral of the said section of Kansas land as a
full section of six hundred and forty acres, is conclusive as to the quan-
tity of land in the section, and also in the quarter-sections thereof.
For purposes of the disposal of the public lands the law makes the
surveyor-general's return as to the quantity of land in a legal subdivi-
siou conclusive. See sections 2395 and 2396 Revised Statutes, espe-
cially paragraphs 5 and 3 respectively. Whether a section returned
as a full section contains more or less than six hundred and forty acres
of public land, according to actual computation from the field notes of
survey, it must, under the provisions of the sections last above cited,
be disposed of by the land department as containing just six hundred
and forty acres, and each quarter thereof as containing one hundred
and sixty acres. These provisions of law were enacted to facilitate the
disposal of public land. Under their operation such a quarter section
always contains, for the purposes of such disposition, exactly one hun-
dred and sixty acres. Infact it rarely ever contains just that quantity,
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but usually contains either more or less. This law is conclusive of the
quantity in a legal subdivision only while it remains public land. It
bas no such conclusive effectt after the land has become private prop-
erty. Applying this rule to the present case, it is conceded by counsel
for Cromwell, that the Kansas land falls short of one hundred and
sixty acres in actual quantity.
No evidence to show the precise quantity of Mason's Kansas land
was offered at the trial of the case. From an examination of the
official field notes of survey and computation therefrom by your office
it was found that the quantity of land owned by Mason was more than
one half an acre less than one hundred and sixty acres. These field
notes are part of the permanent official records of your office. Such
records may always be resorted to upon any question whereon they
lave bearing, arising in any case before the land department. If, as
would ndoubtedly be the case, the Department would be bound to
give due effect to anything in the official records of your office adverse
to the qualification of Mason, whenever the same should come to its
notice, it follows that it is equally bound to consider and give due
effect to evidence from such records when favorable to him.
The contentions of counsel in favor of the conclusive effect of the
surveyor-general's return, and against the consideration of the evi-
dence afforded by the records of your office, are therefore equally
unsound.
So much of the decision of March 15, 1897, supra, as is in conflict
with he foregoing views is accordingly overruled and vacated.
It becomes necessary, in view of the foregoing, to consider the ques-
tion of Mason's alleged settlement rights to the land in controversy.
The evidence shows that he made due settlement thereon on the date
he alleges, October 13, 1893; that he followed up the same promptly by
making permanent improvements on the land; and within a few weeks
had a house thereon, which has since been occupied as a home by himself
and family. le appears to have fully complied with the homestead law.
His settlement right is prior and superior to the entry of the land by
Cromwell. The entry of the latter should therefore be, canceled and
Mason be allowed to perfect title.
The decision of your office is reversed.
SAVAGE V. CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. CO.
Motion for review of departmental decision of January 18, 1898, 26
-L. D., 57, denied by Secretary Bliss March 12, 1898.
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MWINERA, LANDS-AGRICULTURAI CLAIM-SANDSTONE.
HAYDEN V. JAMISON (ON REVIEW).
Land muore valuable on account of the sandstone therein than for agriculture is min-
eral in character, subject to disposition under the mining laws, and a homestea4
entry thereof is unauthorized by law.
Departmental decision herein of May 5,1897, 24 L. D., 403, vacated on review.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, larch'
(W.-V. D.) 12, 1898. (G. B. G.},
This case is before the Department on a motion for review, made by
Hayden, of departmental decision of May 5, 1897 (24 L. D., 403), in the
case of Benjamin F. Hayden v. Thomas Jamison, wherein was involved
the SW. of Sec. 6, T. 3 N., R. 70 W., Denver land district, Colorado.
Said motion was entertained November 8, 1897, service was made,
and Jamison has answered.
The record shows that Jamison made a homestead. entry for this landl
on September 24, 1889; that on September 18, 1889, Hayden, with
others, made a placer location for one hundred and twenty acres of the
same land afterward entered by Jamison, and on the 10th day of Jan-
uary, 1890, having purchased the interest of the other locators, Hayden
presented mineral application therefor, which application was rejected
on account of said homestead entry, and the miyieral claimant thereupon
filed a protest against the entry, alleging, among other things, that the
land was more valuable for mining than for agricultural purposes; that
after a hearing on the issues thus made, the local officers dismissed the
contest; that your office, on appeal, found that the, land was more
valuable for te mineral it contained than for agricultural purposes and
held the entry for cancellation; and that the Department, on appeal by
Jamison, affirmed the action of your office (15, L. D., 276), which decision
was adhered to on review March 7,1893, but on June 21, 1893 (16 L. D.,
537), the case then being before the Department upon a motion for
re-review, reversed its former action and ordered a hearing to determine
the character of the land, its capacity for agriculture, and the nature, value and
extent of all deposits of a stone or Mineral character found therein, aud re-adjudicate
the question in the light of the evidence thus obtained:
it being said that this course was pursued because of the allegation of
the presence of valuable deposits other than building stone, as gypsum
and fire-clay,-and on account of representaions that the land was worth
$300,000 by reason of these alleged deposits.
After the second hearing the local officers recommended the dismissal
of the contest. Your office affirmed that action, and the Department,
on further appeal, by its decision of May 5, 1897, stma, affirmed the
decision of your office. By said last mentioned decision it was held:
Prior to the passage of the act of August 4, 1892, there was no authority to locate
and purchase lands chiefly valuable for building stone under the placer mining laas
(syllabus):
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And it was therein said:
An examination has been made of the voluminous record in this case. It is shown
that the chief value of the land is Ibr red sand stone suitable for building purposes,
paving, and curb stones. The attempt to show gypsum, limestone, or a deposit of
fire clay, is not supported by the evidence.
It is now alleged, substantially, that this decision is against both the
law and the testimony.
Counsel for the homestead claimant asks that the motion for review
be dismissed on the ground that it is not accompanied by an affidavit of
good faith and does not specifically point out the errors complained of.
The Department when it entertained the motion for review, thereby
waived these alleged omissions, and they can not now be urged in
objection to the consideration of the motion.
Inasmuch as it is practically admitted that this land is more valuable
for the red sand stone it contains than for agricultural purposes, it
remains to be seen whether it was subject to disposition nder the
placer mining law prior to August 4,1892. If it was, then the decision
under review was error and must be vacated, for the reason that a
mineral location thereof was made prior to the homestead entry of
Jamison and for the further reason that if it was subject to placer loca-
tion it is mineral land and title can not be acquired thereto under the
homestead law if its character is known prior to the issuance of final
certificate.
In the recent case of the Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pacific
R. IR. Co. et al. (25 L. D., 233) the mining laws of the United States, and
the decisions of the Department and the courts in construction thereof,
were reviewed at length. In that case, in conclusion of the discussion
of the question of what is a mineral within the meaning of the mining
laws, it was said:
The Department adheres to the rule: That whatever is recognized as a mineral by
the standard authorities on the subject, whether of metallic or other substances,
when the sne is found in the public lands in quantity and quality sufficient to
render the land more valuable on account thereof than for agricultural purposes,
should be treated as coming within the purviev of the mining laws.
Bainbridge in his work o the law of mines and minerals, page one,
says:
A mineral has been defined to be a fossil, or what is dug out of the earth. The
term may, however, in the most enlarged sense, be described as comprising all the
substances which now form, or which once formed, part of the solid body of the
earth, both external and internal, and which are now destitute of mind incapable of
supporting animal or vegetable life. I this view, it will embrace as well the bare
granite of the high mountain as the deepesthidden diamonds and metallic ores.
Unquestionably, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
sand stone is a mineral substance.
It having been found, and not being now questioned, that the land
in controversy is more valuable on account of its sand stone deposit
than for agriculture, this case comes squarely within the rule above set
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out, and it results that the homestead entry of Jamison as to the land
in conflict was and is unauthorized and can not be upheld.
Departmental decision herein of May 5,1897, op(ra, is hereby vacated,
and it is directed that the homestead entry of Jamison, as far as the
same conflicts with the prior location of Hayden, be canceled and the
mineral application of Hayden allowed, unless further objection appears.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTION-SETTLEMENT CLAIM.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. TRIPP.
An offer made by a settler to purchase from a railroad company lands within its
indemnity limits that are not protected by withdrawal, and have not been
selected, will not defeat the right of such settler to subsequently repudiate such
offer and assert his settlement right.
An indemnity selection of land not protected by withdrawal, and included within a
prior settlement claim, is no bar to the subsequent recognition of the settlement
right.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 12, 1898. (L. L. B.)
The appeal of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, from your
office decision of July 3d, 1897, rejecting the company's claim to the
N. NVV. and the N. NE. 4 of See. 3, T. 7 S., R. 2 ., Los Angeles,
California, and sustaining the application of Ozro . Tripp to make
homestead entry for the salne is here for consideration, and the follow-
ing facts appear in the record.
The tract is within the indemnity limits of the grant to the company
and was selected by the company July 13, 1885, without designating
the losses for which indemnity was claimed.
October 14,1887, another list was presented in which the losses were
designated, and on April 21, 1894, the company filed a re-arranged list,
-in which another and different base was designated for the land here in
controversy.
October 14,1890, Tripp applied to make homestead entry of the land
alleging in his application that he settled on the land April 30th, 1878;
this application, as above shown, was made between the presentation
of the lists of 1887 and 1894.
The register and receiver rejected his application and he appealed.
By your office decision of March 30, 1895, adhered to on motion to
review, July 22, 1895, the decision of the local office was reversed and
the company's selection held for cancellation.
The company appealed from said decision and this Department on
July 13, 1896, so far modified your office decision as to order a hearing
on Tripp's allegation of settlement.
On the hearing so ordered, the register and receiver recommended
the cancellation of the company's selection and the allowance of Tripp's
application to enter.
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By your said office decision of July 3rd, 1897, the action of the
local officers was affirmed, and the case is now here on appeal by the
company.
The specifications of error assigned by counsel for the company are
as follows:
Ist. That it was error to hold that Tripp acquired any right to make homestead
entry of this land under his application of October 1L4, 1890, on his alleged settle-
ment in 1878.
2nd. That it was error to hold that the company's selection which was admitted
to have been perfected October 14, 1887, was defeated by Tripp's alleged settlement.
3rd. That it was error not to have sustained the company's selection.
Inasmuch as this Department has held that an executive withdrawal
for indemnity purposes is in violation of the plain terms of the grant,
made for the benefit of this road (Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Kanaw-
yer, 23 L. D., 500), the company's right to the land in controversy can-
not antedate its selection made July 13, 1885; and inasmuch as Tripp's
settlement is alleged as of April 30th, 1878, it follows that if it is
shown that his settlement was of such a character as to except the
land from the claim of the company at the date of its selection, the reg-
ularity and legality of the said selection and all subsequent changes
and rearrangements of the company's list may be eliminated from con-
sideration here, unless it is shown that he thereafter abandoned his
settlement.
At the hearing Tripp alone testified; but it was admitted by counsel
for the company that two other witnesses then present would if sworn
and examined, corroborate him, 'in all essential particulars" as to res-
idence, cultivation and improvements. From his testimony it clearly
appears that he settled upon the land at the date alleged in his appli-
cation (1878) at which time he was nineteen years of age but otherwise
qualified to make entry; that thereafter he resided continuously on the
land for eight or nine years, and has since resided there " off and on D
but has never removed his household effects from his house on the land;
that his improvements are of the value of $600.00; that although he
used the land principally for grazing he ad grubbed about twenty
acres and broke about ten acres; that he settled upon it with the inten-
tion of making it his home and securing title under the land laws.
He admits that on January 8th, 1883, he applied to purchase this
tract, with some other land, from the railroad company; but says, the
reason he made that application was
to save trouble with the railroad company as I understood it would be better to buy
their right than to have litigation with them, intending, if I bought their right out,
to go ahead and prove up on my homestead afterwards.
These statements having been accepted by the company as true, it is
plain that Tripp's settlement was made with the intention of securing
title from the government, and although he afterwards applied to pur-
chase from the company, his reason therefor, is satisfactorily explained,
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and such explanation by no means makes him a tenant of the company,
but shows only that he preferred to purchase the railroad claim, rather
than engage in litigation with the company.
Moreover, the application to purchase was made in January 1883,
more than two years before the cornpany's selection in 1885, and the
withdrawal being invalid the question is brought directly under the
ruling in Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. McMahan (21 L. D.,
402), which holds that an offer to purchase from a railroad company,
made prior to the time when the rights of the company attach, may be
repudiated by the settler.
The objection that Tripp's residence was not continuous on the land,
is not supported by the evidence to the extent of showing an abandon-
ment of his claim. While it is true he spent considerable time in San
Jacinto, it is shown that his household furniture always remained in
his house on the land, and that he never has had a home elsewhere.
iHaving established his allegation of continuous claim to the land
based upon his settlement ante-dating the selection by the company,
such selection is no bar to the allowing of his homestead application,
and your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
PRACTICE-MOTION FOR REVIEW-ORDER FOR HEARING.
WALK v. BEATTY (ON REVIEW).
There is no authority in the rules of practice for the review of. a departmental deci-
sion ordering a hearing; and treating such a motion as a petition addressed to the
supervisory power of the Secretary, it will be denied, if it presents no question
that was not fully considered in the decision ordering the hearing.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 12, 1898. (G. B. C.)
The land involved in the case of Leffie W. Walk v. William W.
Beatty is the SW. i of Sec. 14, T. 13 N., B. 3 El., Oklahoma, Oklahoma
Territory, and by departmental decision of January 18, 1898 (26 L. D.,
54), a hearing was ordered between the parties to determine certain
questions therein indicated.
Counsel for Walk has filed a motion for review of this decision.
There is no authority in the rules of practice for filing a motion for,
review of a decision ordering a hearing.
Considered as a petition addressed to the supervisory power of the
Secretary, it is found that nothing is suggested that was not fully con-
sidered at the time said hearing was ordered; nor is anything urged
to cause the Department to doubt the correctness of the direction
thereby given.
The motion is denied.
378 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
MINING REGULATIONS-AMENDMENT OF RULE 83.
CIRCULAR.
Gom~ntissioner llermann to registers and receivers, March 14, 1898.
Paragraph 53 of the Mining Regulations approved December 15,
1897, 25 L. D., 561, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The claimant at the time of filing the application for patent, or at any time within
the sixty days of publication, is required to file with the register, a certificate of
the surveyor-general that not less than five hundred dollars' worth of labor has been
expended or improvements made, by the applicant or his grantors, upon each loca-
tion embraced in the application, or if the application embraces several locations
held in common, that an amount equal to five hundred dollars for each location, has
been so expended upon, and for the' benefit of, the entire group; that the plat filed
by the claimant is correct; that the field notes of the survey, as filed, furnish such
an accurate description of the claim as will if incorporated in a patent serve to
fully identifythe premises and that such referenceis made therein to naturalobjects
or permanent monuments as will perpetuate and fix the locus thereof; Provided,
That as to all applications for patent made and passed to entry before July 1, 1898,
or which are by protests or adverse claims prevented. front being passed to entry
before that time, where the application embraces several locations held in &ommion,
proof of an expenditure of five hundred dollars upon the group will he sufflcient and
an expenditure of that amount need not be shown. to have been made upon, or for
the benefit of, each location embraced in the application.
Approved:
(. N. BLISS, Secretary.
ALIENATION-TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-HEIRS.
GR AlAM v. APPLEGARTH'S HEIRS.
A contract of sale entered into by a timber culture etryman, to be consummated by
delivery of deed after the submission of final proof and the issuance of patent,
is in violation of law, and makes cancellation of the entrynecessary; and where,
after such alienation the entryinan dies, his heirs are entitled to no greater rights
under the entry than he had at the time of his death.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Conmissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) larch 14, 1898. (G. J. G.)
The defendants in the case of Robert E. Graham v. Henry W. Apple-
garth's Heirs have appealed from your office decision of May 9, 1896,
holding for cancellation timber-culture entry for the NE. i of Sec. 11,
T. 21 N., R. 46 W., Alliance land district, Nebraska.
November 19, 1890, Henry W. Applegarth made timber-culture entry
for the above described tract, and May 25, 1895, Robert E. Graham filed
affidavit of contest against said entry, alleging that the entryman had
failed to comply with the law as to planting and cultivation alnd that he
had entered into a contract to sell this land, the deed to be delivered
upon the submission of final proof and issue of patent.
The decisions of the local office and youn office were based upon the
last mentioned charge.
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It appears that the contract referred to was entered into by Apple-
garth September 26, 1893, less than three years after the date of his
entry. The entryman died in August, 1894. In July of that year pay-
ment of a sum of money was made to and receipt obtained from the
entryman's daughter, in pursuance of the terms of said contract.
It is-urged in the appeal, among other things, that as this contract
by the entryman was not ratified by the heirs and as the latter imme-
diately took possession of the land and proceeded to comply with the
timber-culture law; they thereby cured any violation of the law on the
part of the entryman in making said contract. It was said in the case
of Dixon v. Bell (12 L. D., 510).
When au entryman has sold his claim before final certificate has been issued, and
soon thereafter dies, no amount of cultivation or improvement by his heirs or legal
representatives will cre such entry, and a contest may be commenced at any time
after the fact of such sale is known.
Proof that Applegarth entered into a contract to sell his claim, that
fact not being denied by his heirs, is the factor that proves fatal to any
rights they might have; for, ordinarily, where the entryman who has
complied with the law dies before final certificate has been issued, the
right to perfect the entry descends to the heirs or legal representatives.
There is sufficient evidence in this case to show that there was a viola-.
tion by Applegarth of the letter and spirit of the timber-culture law,
as set forth in the affidavit filed by him at the time he made his entry.
The entryman having thus parted, contrary to law with his interest in
this land, the heirs are not entitled to any better rights.than be had at
the time of his death.
It is deemed unnecessary to discuss the other allegations contained
in the defendants' appeal.
The cases of Klock v. Husted, 2 L. D., 329, Williamson v. Weimer,
9 L. D., 565, and Palmer v. Stillman, 18 L. D., 196, were properly cited
in support of your office decision.
The said decision is hereby affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-EMPTION CLAIM-ENTRY.
SPIRLOCKI V. NORTHERN PAC IFIC R. R. Co.
The completion of a pre-emption entry for part of the land embraced within a
declaratory statement is an abandonmentof the filing as to the land not entered,
and such filing, as to said land, will not thereafter serve to except it from the
operation of a railroad grant.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of te General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) March 14, 1898. (F. W. C.)
On October 1, 1897, the petition invoking the exercise of the super-
visory power of the Secretary of the Interior to correct a misstatement
of facts in the matter of the decision in the case of James D. Spirlock
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v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, involving the W. t of the NW.
iof Sec. 5, T. 16 N., R. 1 W., Olympia land district, Washington, was
entertained and returned for service. It has since been served and
was forwarded with your office letter of October 19, 1897.
This case was first considered by this Department in. decision of
February 4, 1896 (22 L.-D., 92), in which it was stated that:
An examination of the records i your office shows that one Jeremiah Mabie made
a pre-emption fling with alleged settlement prior thereto, upon the NW. of the
NW. I- of said Sec. 5, township and range aforementioned, p revious to the date of
the grant to said railroad company; and that said filing was of record, subsisting
and prima facie valid at the date of said grant, which excepted said forty-acre tract
from the operation of the grant, and left Spirlock free to purchase the same in the
absence of any adverse right.
As to the SW. - of the NW. - of said Sec. 5, it was held tat, as the
record showed a perfect patent, duly enrolled, issued upon the private
cash entry made for said land by Spirlock, the same had passed beyond
the jurisdiction of this Department.
Subsequently, upon motion for review, in departmental decision of
December 26, 1896 (23 L. D., 588), it was held thatthis Departmenthas
authority to order the cancellation of the record of an incomplete patent
which was placed upon the record by mistake and which, in fact, was
never issued, but still remained in the custody of your office, and you
were therefore directed to cause the cancellation of such record.
The land covered by Spirlock's application is within the primary
limits of the grant made by the joint resolution of May 28, 1870, to aid
in the construction of the portion of the main line of the Northern
Pacific Railroad between Portland and Puget Sound. The map showing
the line of general route upon which there was a statutory withdrawal
was filed on August 13, 1870, and this tract was embraced within the
limits of said withdrawal. It afterwards fell within the limits as
adjusted to the map of definite location filed September 13, 1873.
After the filing of the map of general route, and before the receint of
notice of withdrawal at the local office, to wit, September 17, 1870,
Spirlock was permitted to make private cash entry of the land before
described. Upon said entry, as has already been adjudicated in the
previous decision of this case, he gained no right as against the com-
pany under its grant. But as to the NW. 4 of the NW. -1 of said sec-
tion 5, as before recited, it was held that the pre-emption filing of
Jeremiah Mabie, existing at the date of the grant to the railroad
company, served to except said tract from the operation of said grant.
The petition under consideration alleges that the filing referred to,
made by Viabie, was filed on January 12, 1861, and embraces, in addi-
tion to said tract in section 5, certain other tracts in the adjoining even-
numbered section, number 32; and that on June 16, 1863, Mabie per-
fected said filing into an entry as to the tracts in section 32, thereby
abandoning the filing as to the tract in section 5.
Since the filing of the petition your office has reported that the alle-
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gation relative to the partial completion of said filing is sustained by
the records of your office.
It is clear, therefore, that under the decisions of the courts and this
Department, said filing, as to the tract in section 5, can not be held
sufficient to defeat the operation of the grant, and the previous deci-
sions of this Department, in so far as they have held to the contrary,
are recalled and vacated, and you are directed to cancel the cash entry
by Spirlock as to said tract.
Nix v. Allen, 112 U. S., 129.
St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Ry. Co., 23 L. D. 539.
RIGHT OF WAY-CANAL-INDIAN RESERVATION.
BiO VERDE CANAL COMPANY.
The act of March 3, 1891, does not authorize the approval of an application for a
right of way for a canal across a Indian Teservation; nor will such right of
-way below said reservation be granted, if the canal is dependent for its water
supply upon the right of way asked for through the reservation.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land ffce,
(W. V. D.) March 14, 1898.
The record shows that on September 18, 1896, your office decision
was rendered in the matter of the application of the Rio Verde Canal
Company for a right of way to certain lands for the purposes of irriga-
tion, in the Tucson land district, Arizona.
In part in said decision you held as follows:
There are herewith the enclosed seven maps and seven sets of field notes, each in
duplicate, filed by the Rio Verde Canal Company, under Sees. 18 to 21, act of March
3,1891 (26 Stat., 1095), as part of an application for canal and reservoir right of
way, and transmitted with your two letters of May 23, and your letter of August
14, 1896.
The map numbered by the company sheet 3, transmitted wvith your letter of May
23, shows the location of the canal line on unsurveyed land, about thirty-six miles,
of which seven and one half miles lie within the Salt River Indian reservation.
It has been held that the right of way act does not apply to Indian reservations
(14 L. D., 265), and further that right of way for a ditch depending for water on a
ditch passing through an Indian reservation should not be approved (21 L. D., 356).
Your office decision therefore refused to grant a right of way to said
company for such portion of said proposed canal as lay within the Indian
reservation known as the Salt River reservation, and for such additional
part as lay beyond said reservation and depended for its water supply
upon the proposed route through such reservation. From this action
of your office appeal has been talien.
The act of March 3, 1891, supra, section 18 thereof, page 1101, is as
follows:
That the right of way through the public lands and reservations of the United
States is hereby granted to any canal or ditch company formed for the purpose of
irrigation and duly organized under the laws of any State or Territory, which shall
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have filed, or may hereafter file, with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its
articles of incorporation, and due proofs of its organization under the same, to the
extent of the ground occupied by the water of the reservoir and of the canal and its
laterals, and fifty feet on each side of the marginal limits thereof; also the right to
take, from the pblic lands adjacent to the line of the canal or ditch, material,
earth, and stone necessary for the construction of such canal or ditch: Provided,
That no such right of way shall be so located as to interfere with the proper occu-
pation by the government of any such reservation.
In the Florida Mesa Ditch Company (14 L. D., 265) the decision
concludes as follows:
F or the reason herein set forth, I am of the opinion that it was not intended by
said act of March 3, 1891, to grant the right of way for canals and ditches through
Indian reservations.
Without determining what the ruling would be if the question were
now before the Depaitment for the first time, the matter will be treated
as settled by the decision cited, which has been acquiesced in for sev-
eral years.
It is urged as a second ground of appeal that the appellant is enti-
tled to the approval of such portion of his map as lies beyond the Salt
River Indian reservation and outside of its limits, though dependent
for its water supply upon the right of way asked for through such
reservation.
This question was considered in the case of La Plata Irrigating Ditch
Company (21 L. D., 355), and it was held (syllabus):
A right of way for an irrigating ditch that traverses, among other lands, a mili-
tary reservation, and also an Indian reservation, will not be approved as to any part
thereof, where it appears that by the maintenance of said ditch the supply of water
necessary for the proper use of said reservations will be seriously impaired.
I assume that the true meaning of the act of March 3, 1891, which
requires the approval of this Department of the map of location,
imposes upon the Department the duty of requiring that it shall rima
facie appear, before approval of the map, that a source of water exists
which can be reached by the route selected.
The Department having refused to approve the right of way through
the Salt River Indian reservation, which is the necessary connecting
link between the two sections of the right of way asked for outside of
and on either side of said reservation, it follows that no source of
water could be secured by said canal company along its proposed
route on that portion of the canal which lies below the reservation.
The approval by this Department of a right of way upon any given
tract of land operates as an easement upon the land, and to that extent
is an impairment of the use of such land, and where no useful purpose
can be subserved by a grant of the right of way to a company whose
application upon its face shows an inability to secure water along the
proposed route, such approval would be vain and useless, apparently
creating an easement upon the land without any desirable object being
gained.
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I am therefore of the opinion that the company is not entitled to
have its map approved for such portion of its route as lies below the
Salt River Indian reservation.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
PRACTICE-PETITION FOR THE RE-OPENING OF A CASE.
GAIMON V. WEAVER.
When a decision of the Department has become final under the rules of practice,
has been long acquiesced in by the losing party, the lands involved have been
disposed of thereunder, and such disposition was not nlawful, a petition to
re-open the case will not be entertained, though the original decision may rest
on a construction of the law that no longer obtains.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) March 14, 1898. (-. B. G.)
The Department has received a "motion for re-review and petition
to reopen the case of Silas Gammon v. Henry Weaver, filed by counsel
for the said Gammon.
This case involved the application of Silas Gammon to make an
additional homestead entry under section 6 of the act of March 2, 1889
(25 Stat., 854), for lots 5 and 6 of Sec. 31, T. 20 N., R. 1 W., Perry
land district, Oklahoma.
Said application was denied by the Department on June 18, 1896
(unreported 3), on the ground that the original entry was made subse-
quent to the passage of said act, and it appears that Weaver has since
made a homestead entry of the land.
In the case of Nancy A. Stinson (25 L. D., 113), it was held (syl.
labus):
The right to make an additional homestead entry uinder section 6, act of March 2,
1889, extends to cases where the original entry was made either before or after the
passage of said act, if the applicant is otherwise within the terms of said section.
If this had been the rule at the time the case at bar was considered
here, the conclusion reached might have been different. But such was
not then the rule, and while the denial of Gammon's application is now
believed to have been erroneous, the fact that adverse rights have
attached, on the faith of the decision then made, precludes a favorable
consideration of the present petition.
When a decision of the Department has become final under the rules
of practice, has been long acquiesced in by the losing party, the lands
involved have been disposed of thereunder, and such disposition was
not unlawful, a petition to re-open the case will not be entertained.
The petition is denied.
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PBJACTICE-COSTS-CONTEST-I.ESIDECWE.
DAVIS v. EISBERT.
A party who files a protest alleging grounds sufficient to warrant the cancellation of
the entry, if proven, and offers to pay "the expenses of the contest," is properly
taxable with all the costs as a contestant, under rule 54 of practice; and if, after
a successful termination of such suit and the exercise of the preferred right by
the contestant, a rehearing is ordered on the original issue the obligation to pay
the costs thereof rests with the contestant.
The acts of a settler looking toward the establishment of a permanent home on the
land may be properly considered in determining the good faith of his residence
thereon.
An allegation of failure to comply with the law does not furnish a basis for cancel-
lation if not made until after the alleged default has been cured.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 15, 1898. (G-. . R.)
On April 25, 1884, Mihaley Eisbert filed his preemption declaratory
statement for the NW. 4 of the NW. 1, Sec. 23, and the N. j of the NE.
4 and the NE. 1 of the NW. , Sec. 22 T. 22 N., R. 3 E., Seattle land
district, Washington. On April 25, 1885, he transmuted his filing into
homestead entry, No. 7374, and on July 9, 1890, he gave notice of his
intention to make final proof before the local office on October 31, 1890.
On August 27, 1890, Charles E. Davis filed his sworn protest, alleg-
ing that Eisbert had not established his residence upon said land until
October 15, 1888; that subsequent thereto he had been absent from the
land more than half the time; that the land was not settled upon and
cultivated as required by law.
When, on October 31, 1890, Eisbert offered his final proof, Davis
appeared, but waived cross-examination of Eisbert's witnesses until the
hearing, which was had on his said charges on April 7, 1891. Upon the
hearing the register and receiver decided in favor of Eisbert; ol appeal,
your office reversed that action and held the entry for cancellation; on
further appeal, on March 3, 1894, the Department affirmed that action,
and on March 31, 1894 (unreported), denied a motion for review. The
case was closed, and Davis made entry of the land October 30, 1894.
On December 10, 1891 (unreported), the Department denied Eisbert's
motion for new hearing on the grounds of alleged newly discovered
evidence.
On March 7, 1895, Eisbert died.
On December 28, 1895 (unreported), the Department entertained a
.motion for review of the decision denying a motion for rehearing, say.
ing: There seems to be no legal obstacle in the way of resolving that
doubt by a further hearing, which may be had on terms fair to both
sides."
Hearing was had, and the register and receiver, on July 19, 1896,
recommended that Eisbert's final proof be approved and the protest of
Davis be dismissed.
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On appeal, your office, by decision dated December 9, 1896, affirmed
that action, and on November 10, 1897, denied a motion for review.
A further appeal brings the ase here.
Pending consideration of the appeal herein, Davis has filed a petition
asking a rule against the defendant (now Celia Eisbert, widow of the
entryinan,) compelling her to deposit with the register aild receiver
the sm of money necessary to reimburse petitioner herein on account of a deposit
which he was erroneously compelled by the register and receiver to make to cover
cost of adducing all the testimony of the ' further hearing' ordered by the Depart-
inent in said case.
While Davis's affidavit attacking the entry was in the form of a pro- 
test, yet in it he proposed "paying the expenses of the contest' and
for all that appears in. the record lie paid without question the expenses
of the first hearing, ad was awarded the right of entry, as herein
above shown. While his affidavit was styled "a protest," being filed
after Eisbert had given notice of his intention to submit final proof,
yet by his very terms and allegations Davis, to all intents and pur-
poses, became a contestant, since these allegations, if true, were suffi-
cient to bring about the cancellation of the entry attacked, and his
proposition to pay the costs of the contest, and his prompt compliance
therewith, would have given him the preference right of entry under
the second section of the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140), which, as
shown above, was actually exercised by him October 30, 1894, after the
Department (October 10, 1894,) denied Eisbert's motion for review, and
your office (October 19, 1894,) canceled Eisbert's entry and closed the
case. Davis was, therefore, a contestant, and the costs were properly
taxed under Rule of Practice 54. Emblen v. Weed, 13 L.D., 722;
Martin v. Barker, 6 L. D., 763; Thompson v. Smith, 22 L. D., 248; Den-
man v. Domenigoni, 20 L. D., 325.
After Davis had made his entry, the Department, on Eisbert's show-
ing for a rehearing, was in "doubt" "as to whether justice has been
done'the entryman," meaning, of course, Eisbert.
In allowing this motion, the Department says:
There seems to be no legal obstacle in the way of resolving that doubt by a further
hearing, which may be had on terms fair to both sides. I have therefore to direct
that a further hearing be ordered, at as early a date as practicable, at which Eisbert
shall be permitted to introduce the testimony indicated by affidavits, and which it
is alleged it was not in his power to produce on the first hearing; after which rebut-
tal testimony may be introduced-the question of fact to be determined being,
whether or not the entryinan had complied with the homestead law in reference to
residence and cultivation at date of offering final proof. Sch testimony, together
with that offered at the former hearing, will be considered, and a decision rendered
thereon,
Here a rehearing was ordered-not to determine what Davis had
done under his entry, but solely to determine whether Eisbert had com-
plied with the law. If Davis could maintain his allegations, Eisbert
would not be permitted a reinstatement; if he failed to sustain his
charges, Eisbert's entry would be reinstated and his final proof approved.
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Under all the showing, the Department was in doubt, and so ordered
a rehearing. The status of the controversy was precisely the same as
before Davis made his entry, the question of Eisbert's compliance with
the ]aw being the sole question at issue-that issue being raised by
Davis's contest. And so, when the rehearing was ordered, Davis was
still under obligation to pay the cost of the contest, if he would still
retain the status of contestant. French v. Noonan, 1 L. D 481. This
he appears to have done, although under protest.
The petition. asking a division of the cost, is, for reasons herein
given, denied.
The testimony taken at both hearings has been carefully examined;
it is voluminous and somewhat contradictory. It clearly shows that
Eisbert's family resided on the land with him after October, 1888;
indeed, there was very little effort made to show lack of compliance
with the law after that date. It was about two years after that date
before Davis attacked the entry, and then only when Eisbert adver-
tised to make final proof.
The principal issue tried was whether Eisbert was a bonafide resi-
dent on the land prior to the removal of his family thereto in October,
1888.
It is admitted that from date of entry, April 25,1885, to October,
1888-a period of over three years-his family (wife and three children)
did not live on the land, but did live in -Seattle, in a house which they
rented from month to month. It appears, however, that during that
period Mrs. Eisbert, from time to time, visited her husband on the
land, as did also his two minor sons. With the assistance of others,
he built a double log-house, one half of which was situated on his claim,
the other half on that of his daughter, who had a pre-emption claim
adjoining on the north; this was in 1884. The land was heavily wooded,
and he began to clear it off, grubbing out the stumps and burning the
brush. His daughter lived in one side of the house, and he in the other.
From year to year he cultivated such parts of the land, as he had pre-
pared, into oats, vegetables, etc. It is in evidence that he was not a
skilled farmer, but the proof shows that he used considerable diligence
in his efforts to make a farm.
The land is stuated on Maury Island, and is about a mile from a
landing called Point Robinson; from this landing Eisbert and others,
about the year 1885, carried the lumber on their backs to the house,
and put a floor in the house. He appears to have had much trouble in
getting water, digging in four different places. To avoid the expense
of taking the testimony of witness George W. Brittain on this point, it
was admitted that said Brittain would testify that Mr. Eisbert dug a
well upon the place, commencing in the year 1885 and continuing in
1887; that the well was dug two hundred feet deep, for which Eisbert
paid to witness over five hundred dollars in cash; that the well was
curbed with about three thousand feet of lumber, which had to be
carried on their backs from Point Robinson to the land, the price of
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the lumber not being included in the amount paid witness. Certain of
Davis's witnesses, while admitting the digging of the well, testified
that it added no value to the land, because it never furnished any
water.' While that is true, it speaks eloquently for Mr. Eisbert's good
faith.
The testimony shows that Mr. Eisbert did not bring his family to the
land any sooner because of his inability to get water; that he finally
dug and cenented a cistern, and secured water; then he brought his
family. The whole amount of clearing was small; Eisbert's witnesses
place the amount from four to six acres; Davis had it surveyed, mak-
ing the amount about two acres. However this may be, there can be
no question as to the amount of labor and money which Eisbert
expended upon the land. This, of itself, appears to be ample to dem-
onstrate his good faith. According to the testimony of certain wit-
nesses, the work Eisbert did was in excess of neighboring homestead-
ers on the island.
The testimony shows that he was frequently away from the land; on
some of these occasions he employed a neighbor to care for and milk
his cow.
He was a Jewish rabbi, being ordained to perform certain rites of
his church.
He was called away frequently to Seattle, Olympia, and other places
to perform these rites, and would necessarily be away upon each occa-
sion a few days. Again, he observed the Jewish holydays once or twice
each year, and would be gone from the land two or three weeks upon
those occasions. He also frequently went by boat to Seattle, where
his family lived; would remain over Saturday and Sunday, and return
to the land Monday.
An effort was made to show that Eisbert was engaged in the business
of a tailor, in the years 1885, 1886, and 1887, in the city of Seattle, and
in partnership with his son-in-law, one Finkelstein. The purpose of
this testimony was to show that his real business was in Seattle, and
not on the land. The fact that he might have been interested in such
a business as partner, or otherwise, would not, ipso facto, show that
his home was not in fact on the land, for the one is not inconsistent
with the other. But the testimony failed in its purpose; it was posi-
tively denied by Eisbert at the first hearing and by Mrs. Eisbert at the
second, and both were corroborated by other witnesses.
It will be noticed that Mr. Eisbert transmuted his filing into a home-
stead entry in 1885. He thus appears to have decided to live on the
land at least five years. It is in evidence that he was not without
means. Had he lived there under his filing only a few months, and
purchased the land, which he might have done with less than half the
money which he fruitlessly expended in digging for water, he might
have obtained title much earlier, and with less expense. The fact that
he did not do so, but voluntarily changed his filing to an entry, and
thus imposed upon himself the obligations which the law prescribes,
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-indicates that -he intended to make the land his home, and that the
entry was not uade for speculative purposes.
Much testimony was given as to his actual presence on the land for
much of the time before his family moved to it.' Witnesses who had
worked for him in digging the wells, clearing and grubbing the land,
and cultivating the crops, testify positively as to his presence on the
land as an actual resident. HEis furniture-household and kitchen-
was meager, but that he actually lived in the house there can be little
question, and all the circumstances connected with his extraordinary
efforts to procure water strongly corroborate the undisputed testimony
of himself and afterwards his widowP, that the late arrival of his family
upon the land was due to his failure to procure water for their use.
Again, in December, 1887, Mr. Davis, the contestant, appears to have
assumed the duties of a government officer, being a lighthouse keeper,
at Point Robinson. He was in a position to know something of Eis-
bert's relations to the land; indeed, he swears that in March, 1888, he
was on the land, saw Eisbert's house, shed, etc., but that no one was
residing there then. He postponed filing his contest, however, until
August 27, 1890, more than two years after he supposed no one was
living there. While alleging, in his affidavit, that Eisbert " did not
establish a residence on the land until on or about October 15, 1888,"
still he also alleges Eisbert's absence therefrom after that date " more
than one half the time," and that the tract " is not settled upon and
cultivated by said party as required by law."
As before seen, the proof wholly fails to show that Eisbert was in
default, in any particular, after his family moved to the land in Octo-
ber, 1888, hence in that respect the contest failed. Admitting even
that Eisbert was in default in the matter of residence prior to October,
1888, still the affidavit charging that default was not filed until nearly
two years after it had been cured by Eisbert's presence on the land
with his family; and until more than three years had elapsed since
Davis thought the land was wholly unoccupied.
In Montgomery v. Newton (21 L. D., 15), the defendant failed to move
on the land until nearly three years had elapsed after entry, still, as he
established his residence thereon before be was served with notice, the
contest failed.
It is a general rule that when a contestant fails to allege a default,
until the same is cured, showing good faith on the part of the entry-
man, the contest must fail, and the entry stands. Neal v. Cooley, 18
L D., 3; eptner v. McCartuey, 1 L. D., 4003 Davis v. Fairbanks,
9 L. D., 530; Hall v. Fox, Idem., 153; Stayton v. Carroll, 7 L. D., 198.
As above shown, the suit which Davis brought has all the elements
of an ordinary contest. It follows that, since the same was brought
after the default was cured-admitting even that there was a default-
it must fail.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 389
APPLICATION TO ENTER-ORDER OF SUSPENSION.
NEFF V. SNIDER.
An application to enter, suspended on account of defects therein, with notice of
such action to the applicant, operates to reserve the land from other disposition
until final action thereon.
The case of Lawson H. Lemmons, 19 L. D., 37, overruled.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner o the Gen eral Land Qffice, Mllarch
(W. V. 1).) 1.5, 1898. (W. M. W.)
The land involved in this case is the NW. of See. 2, T. 27 N., R. 3
W., Enid, Oklahoma, land district.
The record shows that on October 28, 1893, Anna Neff sent her appli-
cation to enter said land, by mail, and accompanied it with $14.00, the
usual fees.
On December 2,1893, the local officers suspended her application
because it was not signed and the money sent wfith it lacked live cents
of being enough to pay fees and commissions, as the quarter section
contained a fraction of an acre in excess of one hundred and sixty
acres. Notice of this action of the local officers was sent to Mrs. Neff
on December 26, 1893.
In her homestead affidavit Mrs. Neff stated that she made settlement
on the land October 16, 1893, and was residing on the land at the time
her application was made.
* On January 17, 1894, Elijah R. Snider was allowed to make home-
stead entry for the tract.
On May 19, 1894, the register and receiver issued a notice to Snider
to show cause why his entry should not be canceled.
A hearing was had, at which Snider and Neff appeared and sub-
mitted evidence.
The register and receiver found that Mrs. Neff was the prior settler
on and the first applicant for the tract, and recommended the cancella-
of Snider's entry. Snider appealed.
On May 2, 1896, your office reversed the judgment of the local officers,
oa1d ejected Mrs. Neff's application. She appeals.
The evidence shows that Mrs. Neff went upon the tract on the 12th
or 13th of October, 1893, and remained there in a tent until the 17th or
18th of said month, and during this time she caused about two acres to
be broken upon the tract and sowed to wheat. She then went to her
former home in Kansas, and returned to the land in question about the
28th or 29th of October, and established a residence in a tent, and con
tinued to reside on the tract for about two weeks, and then went back
to her former home in Kansas. She returned to the tract early in
April, 1894, and built a house, partly out of lumber and partly out of
sod, with two windows and one door; built a lien house out of sod, and
dug a well. She continued to live in the house and improve the land
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Up to the time the hearing was lad; at which time she had about four-
teen and a half acres broken on the tract and in crops.
Mrs. Neff swore that as soon as she received notice of the suspen-
sion of her application, she sent the five cents in a letter to the local
officers. She also testified that as a matter of fact she was sworn to
her homestead and other affidavits before they were mailed; that at
the time she made her application to enter she went to the local office,
but was physically unable to stand in line with the men and await her
turn. Her testimony on these points is not contradicted. Her appli-
cation was in due form, but was defective in that it was not signed by
or for her before it was filed.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, it is clear that at
the time Snider's entry was allowed Mrs. Neff's application was pend-
ing and operated to reserve the tract covered thereby from other dis-
position until final action thereon. Mallet v. Johnson et al., 14 L. D.,
658; Smith v. United States, 16 L. D., 352; Hudson v. Orr, 24L. ID., 429.
It follows that Snider's entry was improperly allowed, and must be
canceled.
Snider's first act of settlement on the tract was made a few days
before his entry, and his actual residence on it was established there-
after. He gained no rights under his settlement, residence and improve-
ments upon the tract, for the reason that at the time it was made the
land was embraced in Mrs. Neff's pending application to enter.
The case of Lawson H. Lemmons, 19 L. D., 37, is cited and relied
upon by counsel for Snider as applicable to and governing this case.
An examination of the authorities cited in support of that case shows
that they do not support the conclusion reached by the Department.
Said case, in so far as it conflicts with the views herein expressed, is
overruled.
The decision of your office appealed from is reversed, nd Mrs. Neff
will be allowed to make entry of the tract.
.RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTIONS-SETTLEIENT RIGHT.
VANDEBERG v. HASTINGS AND DAKOTA RY. CO. ET AL.
Conceding that the time within which a settler must assert his settlement claim
under the act of May 14, 1880, will not run while the land is embraced within a
pending indemnity selection, yet if such selection is subsequently relinquished,
and the intervening entry of an adverse claimant is allowed, it is then incum-
bent upon such settler, as against the adverse claimant, to present his claim by
contest or otherwise within three months thereafter.
The right of a settler who is residing on land covered by a prior indemnity selection,
and whose settlement is subject to such selection, will attach on the cancellation
of said selection, if the land is then open to settlement, and defeat the right of
the company under a subsequent selection.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 15, 1898. (F. W. C.)
The Hastings and Dakota Railway Company and John Vandeberg
haveeach appealed from your officedecision of May 20, 1896,in which the
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selection of the Hastings and Dakota Railway Company, covering the
W. I of the NE. of Sec. 35, T. 121 N., E. 41 W., Marshall land district,
Minnesota, was held for cancellation with a view to allowing the home-
stead application of John Vandeberg, as to said tract, and Vandeberg's
application was rejected as to the E. W of the NE. 1 of said section 35,
for conflict with the prior right recognized in John Woods, under his
additional homestead entry made December 31, 1892, covering said
tract.
The entire tract is within the indemnity limits of the grant to the
State of Minnesota, which was conferred upon the Hastings and
Dakota Railway Company, and was first selected by said company on
October 16,1883, which selection was canceled by departmental decision
of October 23, 1891 (13 L. D., 440), and the land declared to be subject
to selection or entry by the first legal applicant. Prior to the date of
said decision, to wit, on May 22, 1891 (12 L. D., 541), in accordance with
the provisions of the fourth section of the act of September 29, 1890
(26 Stat., 476), the indemnity withdrawal formerly made on account of
this grant was revoked ad the lands restored to the public domain.
On October 29, 1891, the Hastings and Dakota Railway Company again
selected this land, which selection appears to have been made in accord-
ance with the regulations then in force. Its relinquishment, executed
in favor of John Woods, as to the E. J of the NE. 1 of said section 35,
was filed on December 31, 1892, and the same day John Woods was
permitted to make additional homestead entry covering said tract under
the provisions of the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), as additional
to his homestead entry covering the adjoining tract, upon which proof
had been made and patent issued.
With the record transmitted is an affidavit made by John Vandeberg,
dated March 13, 1893, in which e alleges that he settled upon the
NE. i of said section 35 on April 15, 1891; that he built a house thereon
and has ever since resided upon the tract with his family and improved
the land to great value; and petitioned to be allowed to contest the
entry of Woods and the right of the Hastings and Dakota Railway
Company under its selection before referred to. The date of the filing
of this affidavit in the local office is not noted upon the papers.
In your office opinion it is stated that this affidavit was received with
the register's letter of January 27, 1894, and a hearing was ordered
thereon by your office letter of July 1, 1895. Following the forwarding
of said affidavit, to wit, on August 20, 1894, Vandeberg made formal
application to make homestead entry of the NE. 14 of said section, alleg-
ing settlement April 5,1891, and that he had made improvements upon
the land to the value of $1,200.
As the result of the hearing had, your office decision finds that Van-
deberg settled upon the laud, as alleged, in April, 1891, and that he
and his family have resided there ever since, his principal improve-
ments being upon the W. i of the NE. 4, and a portion of his breaking
upon the E. 4 of the NE. 4, embraced in Woods' entry.
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As regards the claim set up by Woods, your office decision finds as
follows:
Taking the testimony as a whole it establishes a prior claim for the E. A NE. I of
said section by John Woods, etc.
In view of the company's relinquishment of the E. of the NE. 1 the
controversy presented by the record, as to said tract, is between Van-
deberg and Woods, both of whom allege a claim to the land antedating
the filing of the company's relinquishment on December 31, 1892.
Admitting that the time specified in the act of May 14, 1880, within
which a settler must present his claim, i order to protect himself in
his rights under a prior settlement, did not begin to run while the
tract was covered by the railroad selection, yet pon the filing of the
company's relinquishment, and the allowance of Woods' entry, it
became incumbent uponVandeberg to present his claim, either by con-
test or otherwise, within three months thereafter. According to the
record transmitted, it would appear that no such action was taken by
Vandeberg until long after the expiration of the three months; and
without attempting to determine the rights of the parties under their
claims of settlement as alleged, it must be held that whatever rights
were secured by Van deberg were lost by his failure to present his claim
within the time required by law; and so far as your office decision
rejected Vandeberg's application and recognized the right in Woods
under his additional homestead entry, as to the said E. I of the NE. 
of section 35, the same is accordingly affirmed.
Relative to the W. A of the NE. 4, the contest is between Vandeberg
and the Hastings and Dakota Railway Company.
In its appeal the company alleges the following grounds of error:
I. Error of fact in holding that Vandeberg made settlement on the tract in con-
troversy in April, 1891, or had lawful settlement thereon at any time prior to the
selection of said land under the Hastings and Dakota railway grant of October 29,
1891.
II. Error of law in holding that such alleged settlement of Vandeberg in April,
1891, was i law prior or sperior to the claim and right of said railway company
and its assignee.
III. Error of law in recognizing the validity of any settlement alleged by said
Vandeberg in April, 1891, it appearing from the records and from said decision that
the revocation of the indemnity withdrawal for the benefit of the Hastings and
Dakota Railway grant was not made until Jlpril 22,1891.
IV, Error of law in holding th at said tract was at any time lawfully subjeet to the
settlement of said Vandeberg or any one else, the same being expressly excepted
therefrom by the said order revoking the said withdrawal, because at the date of said
alleged settlement, and foil many years prior thereto, and at all times thereafter,
the said tract had been selected under the grants for the Hastings and Dalkota and
the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Companies, and was not, therefore,
lawfnlly subject to settlement or entry by any one. -
In effect the contention is that the lands within its indemnity limits
were reserved from settlement until the order of revocation of May 22,
1891; that said order did not restore lands that were embraced in pend-
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ing selections, and that therefore no rights were acquired by the set-
tlement of Vanideberg that can be respected as against the company's
claim under its present selection.
A review of the matter will not sustain the comisany's contention;
for if it be admitted that no rights could be acquired by a settlement
made upon lands within the indemnity limits prior to the revocation
by the order of May 22, 1891, and that said order was not itended to
restore lands embraced in. pending selections, nevertheless, after such
revocation the company's claimn to any specific tract would depend upon
the legality of its selection then pending.
As before shown, at the time of the revocation of this indemnity
withdrawal the company had a selection pending which had been pre-
sented on October 16, 1883. Vandeberg's settlement was therefore
subject to the company's rights under this selection, which, as before
stated, was canceled on October 23, 1891, and the land declared to be
subject to settlement ad entry. Vandeberg's rights under his con-
tinued residence upon and claim to this land surely attached as a settler
upon the cancellation of said selection, and his claim, since maintained
and asserted in his application under consideration, is superior to the
right of the company under its pending selection made October 29, 1891.
Your office decision awarding Vandeberg the right to make entry of
said W. I- of the NE. t is accordingly affirmed, and upon ompletion
of entry by Vandeberg the conpany's selection will be canceled.
OKLAHONIA LANDS-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-FINAL PROOF.
NORTLI PEPRY ToWNSITE . LiNN.
Land in the actual occupancy of townsite settlers is not open to settlement and
entry inder the homestead law.
Presence within the Territory of Oklahoma, during the prohibited period, by which
an advantage over mothers is gained, operates to disqualify a claimant for land
in said Territory.
Notice of intention to submit final proof must be published in a reputable news-
paper having a geieral circulation.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Latnd Office, March 15,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (W. A. E.)
September 16, 1893, at 3: 58 o'clock P. M., as shown by the record,
*Henry Linn made homestead entry for the SE. of Sec. 15, T. 21 N.,
R. 1 W., Perry, Oklahoma, land district.
September 23, 1893, Anna L. Burks filed affidavit of contest against
said entry, on the ground of prior settlement.
September 25, 1893, Linn gave notice that. he would, on January 6,
1894, make proof that the tract is needed for townsite purposes, and
also show his compliance with law, with the view of acquiring title to
said tract for town site purposes, under section 22 of the act of Congress
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approved May 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 81). Notice of this intention was pub.
lished in the "Perry Rustler," which paper was designated by J. E.
Malone, the then register, as "the newspaper published nearest the
land described in said application."
At the time designated, Linn made final proof, and on January 10,
1894, the register transmitted said proof to your office, together with a
certified check for $1500 in payment for the land.
On the same day that the proof was transmitted, a petition for inter-
vention, signed by one hundred and sixty-eight persons, purporting to
be residents upon the land, was forwarded to this Department. Said
petition charged fraud and surreptitious conduct on the part of Linn
and the local officers in allowing the final entry without sufficient notice.
January 20, 1894, a paper signed by twelve persons purporting to be
townsite settlers was sent to the Department, asking that patent be
issued to Linn.
January 15, 1894, an affidavit, sworn to by Victor A. Lyles, John W.
Swearingen, and Robert W. Davis, was forwarded to the Department,
in which it was stated that the "' Perry Rustler " was not a newspaper
of general circulation; that it was printed on a small hand press in a
little bed-room in the back end of a restaurant out of the way and out
of the sight of the general public; that the paper is in the nature of a
real estate advertisement, advertising Liun's addition to Perry; that
it was the practice of the register and receiver to advertise final proof
notices in the Evening Democrat, Perry Times, Morning Sentinel, and
Cherokee Sentinel; that the issue of the "Rustler" of December 16,
1893, was the only copy of the paper either of the affiants had ever seen;
and that if said paper had been one of general circulation. afflants would
have known it.
Other affidavits of a similar character were also-forwarded to the
Department.
By ordinance, duly passed and approved, this land was included
within the corporate limits of the city of Perry on February 13,1894.
March 12, 1894, your office ordered a hearing to determine when the
land was first actually settled and occupied as a twnsite; when first
settled upon by the homestead claimants, and whether in good faith by
them for homestead purposes; the character and value of te improve-
ments; and the qualifications of the homestead claimants.
In accordance with the instructions from your office, a hearing was
begun June 13, 1894, and closed August 16, 1894. The patties repre-
sented at this hearing were the townsite settlers, Anna L. 3urks and
Henry Lian.
September 22, 1894, the register and receiver, without rendering a
formal decision, transmitted to your office the record in the case,
together with their report. From this it appeared that when the case
was called for trial-June 13, 1894, a purported dismissal of the contest
of the towusite claimants was filed in the local office. This paper was
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signed by John M. Gore, Clark and Enright, and Grant Stanley, as
agents for the townsite settlers. It was not shown, however, that these
parties were authorized to represent anything more than some of the
individual townsite settlers. Accompanying this dismissal was an
agreement, signed by several parties styling themselves residents,
occupants and claimants of lots on said land, to the effect that the con-
test of the townsite settlers against the homestead entry of Linn should
be dismissed, on condition that Linn should secure and file the relin-
quishment of all other homestead claimants to said tract, make com-
mutation proof under the townsite law, and upon receipt of patent
deed lots to the occupants thereof for not to exceed twenty-five dollars
per lot.
Sabsequently, attorneys for townsite claimants filed a motion that
their contest be reinstated, and the same was granted.
September 22, 1894, Anna L. Barks filed a formal dismissal of her
contest, and on the same day the said attorneys for townsite claimants
filed a second dismissal of said townsite settlers' contest. It was
therein stated that the reason the townsite settlers had applied for a
reinstatement of their contest was that Linn had failed to have Miss
Burks dismiss her contest, which he had agreed to do; and that as he
had now carried out his part of said contract by causing Miss Burks
to dismiss her contest, they were authorized, as attorneys for the town-
site people, to dismiss the townsite claimants' contest.
March 9, 1895, your office transmitted the record to the Department
with the recommendation that Linn's proof and entry be approved.
March 20, 1895, Messrs. Bascom and Johnson, attorneys claiming to
represent the townsite settlers, filed an informal application for rein-
statement of the townsite settlers' contest, alleging fraud and collusion
in the dismissal thereof. It was stated in said application that Linn's
representatives had paid a few individuals, who claimed to represent
the citizens, to withdraw the contest on the part of the townsite con-
testants, and leave Linn with clear sailing.
April 13, 1895, the Department, without formally passing on the
motion to reinstate the townsite settlers' contest, remanded the case for
a fuller investigation into the matter of the regularity of said entry
and the good faith of the entryman in making the same.
In accordance with these instructions, a further hearing was had,
commencing November 30, 1895, and ending January 6, 1896.
As a result of this hearing the local officers rendered their decision
recommending the cancellation of Linn's entry.
On appeal by Linn, your office, by letter of January 6, 1897, addressed
to the Secretary of the Interior, reversed the decision of the local office,
and held Linn's entry intact.
The entire record in the case was transmitted to the Department
with said letter from your office, and on January 18, 1897, it was
returned with instructions that your office decision be promulgated in
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the usual way; and that a copy thereof "be served on Linn, the mayor
of the city of Perry, and Messrs. Bascom and Johnson, attorneys repre-
senting the townsite settlers, with the usual right of appeal."
Service on all parties was duly made February 3, 1897, and February
11, 1897, an appeal was filed. This appeal was signed by Bascom and
Johnson, attorneys for the toWDsite settlers; A. 0. Holland, mayor of
the city of Perry; and W. M. Bowles, city attorney of Perry.
May 11, 1897, the attorneys for Linn filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal, and May 26, 1897, a reply to this motion was filed.
The motion to dismiss consists in the main of a general argument in
support of Linn's ent] y. It is alleged, however, in the course of the
argument, that all parties claiming adversely to Linn have withdrawn,
that the case has resolved itself into a matter between Linn and the
government, and that the decision of your office should be declared to
be final.
The townsite settlers' contest, as stated above, was dismissed, then
reinstated, and again dismissed, but it was not shown tha the parties
who filed the dismissals were acting for the body of the townsite set-
tlers. The mayor of Perry and Messrs. Bascom and Johnson, who are
now claiming to represent the townsite settlers, allege that the with-
drawal of the townsite settlers' contest was not in accordance with the
wishes of a na ority of said settlers. Moreover, the Department spe-
cifically directed, on January 18, 1897, as said above, that the mayor of
the city of Perry and 1'Aessrs. Bascom and Johnson, representing the
townsite settlers, be allowed the right of appeal, and this appeal was
taken in accordance with the order of the Department.
Again, Linn is attem)ting to obtain title to this tract for townsite
purposes, and it is necessary that his proof and entry be considered by
the Department, and approved or disapproved as the case lay be. The
dismissal of the townsite settlers' appeal would not have the effect of
rendering your office decision final.
As it is necessary, then, that the case should be considered by the
Department, with or without the appeal, and as the Department has
specifically di ected that the townsite settlers be allowed the right of
appeal, the motion to dismiss tMe appeal and declare your office decision
final is denied.
Cowing now to a consideration of the testimony, two questions nat-
urally present themselves: () Was this tract occupied by townsite
settlers at the time Linn made settlenient and entry? (2) Were Linn's
original and final entries obtained regularly and in good faith'
The first question was not passed upon by your office in the decision
from whicl this appeal was taken, for the alleged reason that
the Departmenit, with proof before it clearly showing the actual occupation of this
land by seventy-five to one hundred people at the time of Linn's settlement, did not
conclude that a segregation for townsite purposes had taken effect, but saw fit to
order a hearing to determine wholly different questions.
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It appears that a number of telegrams had been received by the
Department from a special land agent, alleging that the entry was
fraudulent in character and as the evidence already submitted on that
point was not very clear, a further hearing was ordered for the purpose
of more fully developing that phase of the case.
In the letter remanding the (case, however, it was said: "If the
rights of adverse claimants were the only question i issue, I should
have no hesitation iii deciding the (ase in favor of Liuni." It is argued*
upon the part of Lina that this was a decision of the question as to
whether or not this tract was occupied by townsite settlers at the time
Linn made settlement.
This statement was not a decision as to the rights of the towusite
settlers, but merely an expression of opinion on the part of my prede-
cessor, induced by the several withdrawals of the townsite and home-
stead settlers' contests. There has been no examination by the
Department prior to the present time of the evidence bearing on the
question as to whether or not this tract was occupied by ton site set-
tlers at the time Linn made settlement and that question still remains
to be decided.
The original towusite of Perry, as surveyed prior to the opening,
contained only three hundred ad twenty acres. On the day of the
opening many thousands of people rushed into Perry with the expecta-
tion of taking town lots. It was quickly seen that there would not be
enough lots in the original townsite for all comers, and consequently
there was an overflow upon the surrounding lands. The tract in con-
troversy adjoined the townsite of Perry on .the north, it was only a
short distance from the land office, and was well adapted to receive
this overflow.
It appears fron the testimony of Linn and his final proof witnesses
that he came in on the first train from the south, which reached Perry
at 12:38 p. in.; that he jumped from the train and ran immediately to
-the land in controversy, where he stuck a stake with his name on it;'
that he then ran to the land office; secured a place in line, and made
entry at 3:58 p. m. It is not entirely clear from the testimony of these
witnesses whether there were other settlers already on the land when
Linn reached it. A number of witnesses, however, most of whom came
in on horseback and reached Perry before the first train did, testified
on behalf of the townsite claimants that at the time the first train
arrived there were not less than seventy five or one hundred people on
the tract in dispute staking off town lots. Within a few minutes after
the arrival of the first and second trains there were hundreds of town-
site settlers ol said tract. There have been more or less changes among
these townsite settlers since the opening. Some of the original settlers
have left and others have come in, but at no time since the day of the
opening has the number of townsite settlers on said tract fallen below
several hundred. At the time of the first hearing in the summer of
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1894, the improvements oil the land in controversy were valued at from
$65,000 to $200,000.
By joint resolution approved September I, 1893 (28 Stat., 11), Con-
gress extended the provisions of the act of May 14, 1890 (26 Stat., 109),
to "the territory known as the 'Cherokee Outlet,' and now a part of
the Territory of Oklahoma." The first section of said act of May 14,
1890, provides:
That so much of the public lands situate in the Territory of Oklahoma, now open
to settlement, as may be necessary to embrace all the legal subdivisions covered by
actual occupancy for purposes of trade and business, not exceeding twelve hundred
And eighty acres in each case, may be entered as townsites, for the several use and
benefit of the occupants thereof, by three trustees to be appointed by the Secretary
of the Interior for that purpose, etc.
A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that when Linn made
settlement and entry this tract was already occupied and claimed by
townsite settlers. It has since been coltinuously used for towiisite pur-
poses.
This decision might properly be closed here, but in view of the
amount of testimony submitted in regard to the regularity of Linn's
original and final entries, a brief discussion thereof is not out of place.
Linn passed through the townsite of Perry several times during the
,prohibited period; he could see the land in controversy from the train;
and when he came in Oil the day of opening he leaped from the train
and ran without a moment's hesitation to the land in dispute.
The circular of July 31, 1884 (3 LID., 32), in regard to final proof
notices, reads, in part, as follows:
You are enjoined to exercise the greatest care and diligence to see that final proof
notices are published only in established bond fide newspapers, having an actual and
legitimate circulation in the vicinity of the land. The paper must be actually pub-
lished where it purports to be, and must be a reputable newspaper of general eircu-
lation and not a mere land. notice advertising medium without regular subscribers
or general patronage.
You are not to give the publication to papers that are not "reputable newspapers
of general circulation," upon the ground of being "nearest the land," The purpose
of the law is that general public notice shall be given of intention to make proof. A
publication that does not effectuate such notice is a defeat of the purpose of the law.
A. number of witnesses,-residents of Perry, among whom were four
or five newspaper men, testified that they never heard of the "Perry
Rustler' orsaw a copy of it until after this case arose. The newspaper
men in particular testified that had the "Rustler" been a reputable
newspaper of general circulation they would have known it. Several
business and professional men, whose advertisements appear in the
"Rustler," testified that they had never authorized the advertise-
ments and that no bills for advertising had ever been presented to
them by any one connected with the "Rustler." No attempt was made
by Linn to rebut this testimony and show that the "Rustler was a
reputable newspaper of general circulation.
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To sum up, then, the conclusions to which we come are, that at the
time Linn made settlement on said tract it was in the actual occupancy
of seventy five or one hundred townsite settlers, which number
increased during the day to several hundred, and has so continued;
that Linn, by his repeated trips on the train through the townsite of
Perry prior to the opening, acquired a special knowledge of this land
and an advantage which disqualified him as an entryman; and that the
sheet in which notice of his intention to submit final proof was. pub-
lished was not a newspaper at all.
Your office decision is accordingly reversed and Linn's entry will be
canceled.
On proper application the land may be entered for the several use
and benefit of the residents thereof under the townsite laws.
DE; TSH v. LEONARD.
Motion for a review of departmental decision of August 19, 1897, 25
L. D., 129, denied by Secretary Bliss, March 16, 1898.
CIRCULAR.
Rules and Regulations Governing the use of Timber on Non-mineral Public. Lands in
certain States and Territories, under the Act of March.3,1891 (26 Stat., 1093).
DEPART1?MENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. ., ikiarch 17, 1898.
By virtue of the power vested in the Secretary of the Interior by the
act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1093), the following rules and regulations
are hereby prescribed:
1. The act, so far as it relates to timber on-public lands, as extended
by the act of February 13, 1893 (27 Stat., 444), applies only to the
States of Colorado, Montana, Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming, Nevada, and Utah, the Territories of Arizona and New
Mexico and the District of Alaska.
The following rules and regulations do not apply to the District of
Alaska, for which rules and regulations are prescribed in a separate
circular.
2. The intention of the act is to enable settlers upon public lands
and- other residents within the States and Territories above named who
have not a sufficient supply of timber on their own claims or farms for
use thereon for domestic purposes and who are unable to procure the
'needed timber from private lands, or from public lands under other
authority of law, to secure from public lands, for said purposes, timber
to supply their immediate and pressing wants.
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Such being the case, it was not the intention of Congress to authorize
the taking of timber from public lands in said States and Territories to
serve as an article of merchandise and traffic, whereby profits might be
secured, not only from the labor bestowed in handling the timber, but
by charging for the timber itself, after obtaining the same free of cost
from the Government; which would practically open a door for specu-
lation in public timber, resulting in the holders of permits being in a
position to prevent competition and virtually control the market for
timber in their localities.
3. Settlers upon public lands and other residents of the States and
Territories above named who have not a sufficient supply of timber on
their own claims or farms for use thereon for such domiestic purposes
as firewood, fencing, or building purposes, or for necessary use in devel-
oping the mineral and other natural resources of the lands owned or
occupied by them, may procure timber, free of charge, from unoccupied,
unreserved, non-mineral public lands within said States and Territories
strictly for use oil their own claims or lands therein for the purposes
enumerated in this section (but not for sale or disposal, nor for use on
other lands or by other persons, nor for export from the State or Terri-
tory where procured), to an extent not exceeding, in stumpage valua-
tion, $100 in any one year.
It is not necessary to secure permission from the Department to take
timber from public lands as above allowed. The exercise of such privi-
lege is, however, subject at all times to supervision by the Department,
with a view to restriction or prohibition, if deemed necessary.
4. In cases in which the parties needing the timber are not in a posi-
tion to procure it from the public lands themselves, it is allowable for
them to secure the cutting, removing, sawing, or other manufacture of
the timber through the medium of others, agreeing with the parties
thus acting as their agents direct, in taking or otherwise handling the
timber, that they shall be paid a reasonable amount to cover their time
and labor expended and all legitimate expenses incurred in connection
therewith, exclusive of any charge for the timber itself
5. The uses specified in section 3 of these rules and regulations con-
stitute the only purposes for which timber may be taken, free of charge,
from public lands in said States and Territories, 1uder this act.
6. The cutting and removing of timber, free of charge, under said
act of March 3, 1891, is confined to unreserved, unoccupied, non-minerdl
public lands, in the States and Territories named therein, inasmuch as
the act specifically provides that the same shall not operate to repeal
the act of June 3 1878 (20 Stat., 88), which makes provision, in said
States and Territories, for the free cutting of timber on public lands
that are known to be of a strictly mineral character.
7. It is further provided in said act of March 3, 1891, that "nothing
herein contained shall operate to enlarge the rights of any railway com-
pany to cut timber on the public domain." Consequently, no timber
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may be taken thereunder from public lands for use by any railroad
company.
8. In order, however, that sufficient public timber may be placed upon
the hon market in said States and Territories, for all legitimate purposes
of trade, to such a reasonable extent as shall meet existing emergencies
in the matter of demand therefor, sales of timber on the unreserved
lands, in general, mineral and non mineral, in said States and Territories,
may be directed by the Department from time to time.
The sale of timber is optional, and the Secretary may exercise his
discretion at all times as to the necessity or desirability of any sale.
9. While sales of timber may be directed by this Department with-
out previous request from private individuals, petitions from. responsible
persons for the sale of timber in particular localities will be considered.
Such petitions must describe the land upon which the timber stands by
legal subdivisions, if surveyed; if unsurveyecl, as definitely as possible
by natural land marks; the character of the country; whether rough,
steep or mountainous, agricultural or mineral, or valuable chiefly for
its forest growth; and state whether or not the removal of the timber
would injuriously affect the public interests. If any of the timber is
dead, estimate the quantity in feet, board measure, with the value, and
state whether killed by fire or other cause. Of the live timber, state
the different kinds and estimate the quantity of each kind in trees per
acre. Estimate the average diameter of each kind of timber, and
estimate the number of trees of each kind per acre above the average
diameter. State the number of trees of each kind above the average
diameter it is desired to have offered for sale, with an estimate of the
number of feet, board measure, therein, and an estimate of the value
of the timber as it stands. These petitions must be filed in the proper
local land office, for transmission to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office.
10. Before any sale is authorized, the timber will be examined and
appraised, and other questions involved duly investigated, by an official
designated for the purpose;. and upon his report action will be based.
11. When a sale is ordered, notice thereof will be given by publica-
tion by the Commissioner of the General Land Office; and if the timber
to be sold stands in more than one county, published notice will be
given in each of the counties, in addition to the required general
publication.
12. The time and place of filing bids, and other information for a
correct understanding of the terms of each sale, will be given in the
published notices. Tlimber is not to be sold for less than the appraised
value, and when a bid is accepted a certificate of acceptance will be
issued by the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the successful
bidder, who, at the time of making payment, must present the same to
the Receiver of Public Moneys for the land district in which the timber
stands. The Commissioner of the General Land Office must approve
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all sales, and he may, in sales in excess of five hundred dollars in
value, make allotment of quantity to any bidder or bidders, at a fixed
price, if he deems proper, so as to avoid monopoly. The right is also
reserved to reject any or all bids. A reasonable cash deposit with the
proper Receiver of Public Moneys, to accompany each bid, will be
required.
13. Within thirty days after notice to a bidder of an award of timber
to him, payment must be made in full to the Receiver for the timber so
awarded. The purchaser iiust have il hand tle receipt of the receiver
for sch paymeut before he will be allowed to cut, remove, or otherwise
dispose of the timber in any manner. The timber must all be cut and
removed within one year from the date of the notice by the Receiver
of the award; failing to so do, the purchaser will forfeit his right to the
timber left standing o unremoved and to his purchase money.
14. Sixty days notice must be given by the purchaser, through the
local land office, to the Commissioner of the General Land Office of the
proposed date of cutting and removal of the timber, so that an official
may be designated to supervise such cutting and removal, as required
by law. Upon application of purchasers, permits to erect temporary
sawmills for the purpose of cutting-or manufacturing timber purchased
under this act may be granted by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, if not incompatible with public interests. Instructions as
to disposition of tops, brush and refuse, to be given through the super-
visors in each case, must be strictly complied with, as a condition of
said cutting and manufacture.
15. The act provides, that the timber shall be used in the State or
Territory in which procured, and, consequently, it may not be exported
therefrom.
16. Receivers of Public Moneys will issue receipts in duplicate for
moneys received in payment for timber, one of which will be given the
purchaser, and the other will be transmitted to the Commissioner of
the General Land Office in a special letter, reference being made to the
letter from the Commissioner authorizing the sale, by date and initial,
and with title of case as therein named. Receivers will deposit to the
credit of the United States all such moneys received, specifying that
the same are on account of sales of public timber on unreserved lands
under the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1093). A separate monthly
account-current (Form 4-105) and quarterly condensed account (Forn
4-104) will be made to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
with a statement in relation to the receipts under the act as above
specified.
17. Special instructions will be issued for the guidance of officials
designated to examine and appraise timber, to supervise its cutting and
removal, and for carrying out other requirements connected therewith.
18. Section 2461, United States Revised Statutes, is still in force in
the States and Territories herein named and its provisions may be
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enforced against any person, or persons, who cut or remove, or cause
or procure to be cut or removed, or aid or assist or are employed in
cutting or removing, any timber from public lands therein, except as'
allowed by law.
19. The Secretary of the Interior reserves the right to prescribe such
further restrictions as he may, at any time, deem necessary, or to revoke
the privileges granted, i any cases wherein he has information that
persons are abusing the same, or when it is necessary for the public
good.
20. The rules and regulations provided herein shall take effect April
1, 1898, and all rules and regulations heretofore prescribed under said
act of March 3, 1891, relating to the use of timber on public lands in
the above named States and Territories, are hereby revoked.
BINGER HERMANN,
Commissioner.
Approved March 17, 1898:
C a. N. BLISS
Secretary.
[Act of March 3,1891; 26 Stat.. 1093.]
AN ACT toamend section eight of an act approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one,
entitled "An act to repeal tim ber-culture laws, and Ior otter purposes."
Be it enacted by the Senate and Honse of Bepresenlatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That section eight of an act entitled "An act to repeal timber-
culture laws, and for other purposes," approved March third, eighteen hundred and
ninety-one, be, and the same is hereby, amended so as to read as follows:
"SEC. 8. That suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent hereto-
fore issued shall only be brought within five years from the passage of this act, and
suits to vacate and annul patents hereafter issued shall only be brought within six
years after the date of the issuance of such patents. And in the States of Colorado,
Montana, Idaho, North Dakota, and South Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of
Alaska, and the gold and silver regions of Nevada and the Territory of Utah, in any
criminal prosecution or civil action by the United States for a trespass on such public
timber lands, or to recover timber or lumber cut thereon, it shall be a defense if the
defendant shall show that the said timber was so cut or removed from the timber
lands for use in such State or Territory by a resident thereof for agricultural, min-
ing, manufacturing, or domestic purposes, nder rules and regulations made and
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and has not been transported out of the
same; but nothing herein contained shall operate to enlarge the rights of any rail-
way company to cut timber on the public domain, provided that the Secretary of the
Interior may make suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
act; and he may designate the sections or tracts of laud where timber may be cut;
and it shall not be lawful to cut or remove any timber except as may be prescribed
by such rules and regulations; but this act shall not operate to repeal the act of
June third, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, providing for the cutting of timber
on mineral lands."
[Aet of February 13,1893; 27 Stat., 444.]
AN ACT to extend the provisions of section eight of the act entitled 'An act to repeal timber-culture
laws, and for other purposes," approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, concern-
ing prosecutions for cutting timber on public lands to Wyoming, New Mexico, and Arizona.
Be it enaoted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Amnerica
in Congress assembled, That section eight of the act entitled "An act to repeal tim-
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ber-culture laws, and for other purposes," approved M1arch third, eighteen hundred
and ninety-one, as amended by an act approved March third, eighteen hundred and
ninety-one, chapter five hundred and fifty-nine, page ten hundred and ninety-three,
volume twenty-six, United States Statutes at Large, be, and the same is hereby,
amended as follows: After the word "Wyoning," in said act, insert the words
"New Mexico ad Arizona."
PUBLIC TIMBER IN ALASKA.
CIRCULAR.
Rules and Regulations Governing the use of Timber on Public Lands in the District
of Alaska, under the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1093).
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR.
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., i'1arch 17, 1898.
By virtue of the power vested in the Secretary of the Interior by
the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1093), the following rules and regu-
lations, governing the use of timber on public lands in the District of
Alaska, are hereby prescribed:
1. Miners, prospectors, agriculturists, and other settlers in Alaska,
who are citizens of the United States, and who have not a sufficient
supply of timber on their own claims or lands for use thereon for fire-
wood, fencing, or building purposes, or for necessary use in developing
the mineral and other natural resources of the lands owned or occupied
by them, ay procure timber, free of charge, from unoccupied,
unreserved public lands in Alaska, strictly for use on their own claims
or lands therein, for the purposes enumerated in this section (but not
for sale or disposal, nor for use on other lands or by other persons, nor
for export), to an extent not exceeding, in stumpage valuation, $100
in any one year.
It is not necessary to secure permission from the Department to take
timber from public lands as above allowed. The exercise of such
privilege is, however, subject at all times to supervision by the Depart-
ment, with a view to restriction or prohibition, if deemed necessary.
2. In cases in which the parties needing the timber are not in a posi-
tion to procure it from the public lands themselves, it is allowable for
them to secure the cutting, removing, sawing, or other manufacture of
the timber through the medium of others, agreeing with the parties,
thus acting as their agents direct in taking or otherwise handling the
timber, that they shall be paid a reasonable amount to cover their time
and labor expended and all legitimate expenses incurred in connection
therewith, exclusive of any chargefor the timber itself.
3. The uses specified in section 1 of these rules and regulations con-
stitute the only purpose for which timber may be taken, free of charge,
from public lands in Alaska, under this act.
4. In order, however, that the native timber of Alaska may be placed
upon the home market for all legitimate purposes of trade, to such a rea-
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sonable extent as shall meet existing emergencies in the matter of
demand therefor, sales of timber on public lands in Alaska may be
directed by the Department from time to time.
While such sales of timber are optional, and the Secretary of the
Interior may exercise his discretion at all times as to the necessity or
advisability of any sale, petitions from responsible persons for the sale
of timber in particular localities will be received by this Department
for consideration.
5. Such petitions must describe the land upon which the timber
stands as definitely as possible by natural land marks; the character
of the country, whether rough, steep, or mountainous, agricultural or
mineral, or valuable chiefly for its forest growth; and statewhether or
not the removal of the timber would injuriously affect the public inter-
ests. If any of the timber is dead, estimate the quantity in feet, board
measure, with the value, and state whether killed by fire or other cause.
Of the live timber, state the different kinds and estimate the quantity
of each kind in trees per acre. Estimate the average diameter of each
kind of timber, and estimate the number of trees of each kind per acre,
above the average diameter. State the number of trees of each kind
above the average diameter it is desired to have offered for sale, with
au estimate of the number of feet, board measure, therein, and an esti-
mate of the value of the timber as it stands.
6. If deemed necessary, before any sale is authorized, the timber will
be examined and appraised, and other questions involved duly investi-
gated, by an official designated for the purpose, with a view to action
being based upon his report.
7. When a sale is ordered, notice thereof will be given by publication
by the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
8. The time and place of filing bids, and other information for a cor-
rect understanding of the terms of each sale, will be given by published
notices, or- otherwise. Timber is not to be sold for less than the ap
praised value, and when a bid is accepted a certificate of acceptance
will be issued by the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the
successful bidder, who, at the time of making payment, must present the
same to the officer designated to receive it. The Commissioner of the
General Land Office must approve all sales, and he may make allotment
of quantity to any bidder, or bidders, at a fixed price, if he deems
proper, so as to avoid monopoly. The right is also reserved to reject
any or all bids. A reasonable cash deposit, to accompany each bid,
will be required.
9. Withit thirty days after notice to a bidder of an award of timber
to llim, payment must be made in full, as directed, for the timber so
awarded. The purchaser must have in hand the receipt for such pay-
ment before he will be allowed to cut, remove, or otherwise dispose of
the timber in any manner. The timber must all be cut and removed
within one year from the date of the notice of the award; failing to so
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do, the purchaser will forfeit his right to the timber left standing or
unrenioved and to his purchase money.
10. Notice must be given by the purchaser to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office of the proposed date of cutting and removal of
the timber, so that, if practicable, an official may be designated to
supervise such cutting and removal. Upon application of purchasers,
permits to erect temporary sawmills for the purpose of cutting or manu-
facturirng timber purchased under this act may he granted by the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office, if not incompatible with the public
interests.
11. No public timber sold as above prescribed may be exported from
the District of Alaska.
12. Special instructions will be issued for the guidance of officials
designated to examine and appraise timber, to supervise its cutting and
removal, and for carrying out other requirements connected therewith.
13. Sectiou 2461, United States Revised Statutes, is in force in the
District of Alaska, and its provisions may be enforced against any per-
son, or persons, who cut or remove, or cause or procure to be cut or
removed, or aid or assist or are employed in cutting or removing, any
timber from public lands therein, except as allowed by law.
14. The Secretary of the Interior reserves the right to prescribe such
further restrictions as be may, at any time, deem necessary, or to revoke
the privileges granted in any cases wherein he has information that
persons are abusing the same, or where it is necessary for the public
good.
15. The rules and regulations provided herein shall take effect April
1, 1898; and all rules and regulations heretofore prescribed under said
act of March 3, 1891, relating to the use of timber on public lands in
Alaska, are hereby revoked.
BINGEn HERMANN,
Commissioner.
Approved March 17, 1898
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
[Ant of March 3,1891, 26 Stat., 1093.]
AX ACT to amend section eight of an act approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one,
entitled "An act to repeal timber-culture laws, and for other purposes."
Be it enacted by the Senete and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That section eight of an act entitled "An act to repeal timber-
cilture laws, and for other purposes," approved March third, eighteen hundred and
ninety-one, be, and the same is liereby, amended so as to read as follows:
"Src. 8. That suits by the United States to vacate and annul any patent heretofore
issued shall only be brought within five years from the passage of this act, and suits
to vacate and annul patents hereafter issued shall only be brought within six years
after the date of the issuance of such patents. And in the States of Colorado, Mon.
tana, Idaho, North Dakota, and South Dakota, Wyominug, and the District of Alaska,
and the gold and silver regions of Nevada and the Territory of Utah, in any criminal
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prosecution or civil action by the United States for a trespass on such public timber
lands, or to recover timber or lumber cit thereon, it shall be a defense if the defend-
ant shall show that the said timber was so cut or removed from the timber lands for
use in such State or Territory by a resident thereof for agricnltural, mining, Mann-
facturing, or domestic purposes, under rules and regulations maade and prescribed by
the Secretary of the Interior, and has not been transported out of the same; bt
nothing herein contained shall operate to enlarge the rights of any railway company
to cut timber on the public domain, provided that the Secretary of the Interior may
make suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this act; and he
may designate the sections or tracts of land Where timber may be cut; and it shall
not be lawful to cut or remove any timber except as may be prescribed by such rules
and regulations; but this act shall not operate to repeal the act of June third, eight-
een hundred and seventy-eight, providing for the cutting of timber on mineral lands."
RAILROAD LANDS-SECTION 4, ACT OF MIARCH 3, 1887.
SCHNEIDER V. LINK1SWILLER ET AL.
The right to receive .a patent under section 4, act of March 3, 1887, extends to pur-
chasers holding under contracts of purchase, whether such contracts are fully
or only partially performed, if rights thereunder are acquired in good faith.
A purchase of land from a railroad company must be held to be in good faith, and
entitle the purchaser to a patent under said section, if the title thereto is there-
after declared by judicial decree to.be in the United States on account of the
company having reived, exclusive of said tract, an amount of land in excess
of its grant, where, prior to said purchase and the institution of said suit, the
land had been earned by construction of the road, and had been patented to the
State as provided by the grant, and where at the time of such purchase the State
is holding such title.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of te General Land Offce, March,
(W.V. D.) 18, 1898. (V, B.)
The Department has considered the appeal of John Schneider from
your decision of June 23, 1897, rejecting his application, under the
provisions of the adjustment act of March 3, 1887, for the NW. 1 of See.
5, T. 95, R. 42 W., Des Moines, Iowa, and awarding to Sterling P.
Linkswiller the right to make homestead entry of the same.
Said tract, situated in O'Brien county, Iowa, is within the primary
limits of the grant made by act of Congress of May 12, 1864 (13 Stat.,
79), to the State of Iowa, to aid in the construction of a railroad from
Sioux City, in said State, to the south line of the State of Minnesota,
which grant was conferred by the State upon the Sioux City and St.
Paul Railroad Company. It is also opposite to the constructed portion
of the road, and before January26, 1875, the United States issued patent
for this land to the State of Iowa for the use of the said railroad com-
paity; but no uatent was issued by the State to the company.
In October, 1889, suit was instituted by the United States, against
said company, to restore the title of the lands to the United States.
This suit resulted in a decision by the supreme court, on October 21,
1895, favorable to the United States (reported in 159 U. S., 349).
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Thereafter, on November 18, 1895, it was directed that the lands
involved in that suit be thrown open to entry after ninety days' pub-
lished notice to that effect, during which period parties claiming to be
purchasers of any of said lands from the company, were notified to
present their claims to the local officers, under the provisions of the act
of March 3, 1887, in accordance with existing rules and regulations.
By this advertised notice the day fixed for the opening of the lands to
entry was February 27, 1896. On January 15, 1896, Slneider fled
application to make purchase of the tract herein involved, and gave
notice of his intention to make proof on March 1, 1896. Linkswiller
applied to make homestead entry of the land on February 18, 1896,
which application was rejected and an appeal taken. He again applied
to enter on February 27, 1896, the day the lands were opened to entry,
on both occasions tendering the fees and commIlissions. On the latter
day Hugh Cain, Wilhelm Andres, William R. Spry and Randall
Bruning applied to make homestead entry of the land. On March 10,
1896, the day advertised, Schneider appeared and submitted his proof,
and a hearing was had, Cain, Linkswiller and Spry appeared, but there
was no appearance by the others.
Upon the evidence taken, the register and receiver decided in favor
of Schneider. Linkswiller alone appealed, and your office holds that
as to the others the case is closed. On June 23, 1897, you rejected
Schneider's application, holding that his purchase from the company
was not made i good faith.
From the testimony at the hearing it appears that Schneider claimed
said NW. i since 1881 or 1882; moved pon it in 1883 and lived there
continuously up to the hearing; and that in 1884 he applied to make
homestead entry of the same. On May 21, 1887, he contracted with the
railroad company for the purchase of the S. A of said tract, and there-
after, prior to June, 1889, paid on account of that contract $462.70. It
also appears that Frederick Singer, on June 27, 1887, contracted with
the company for the N. i of said quarter section, which contract he
assigned on July 16,1888, to Schneider, who has paid on account of the
same $613.35; that no part of the money thus paid on the contracts has
been returned, nor has any suit been instituted for the recovery of the
same or any part thereof.
Schneider claims to be the purchaser in good faith under section 4 of
the act of March 3, 1887, and if he sustains his claim his right will be
superior to that of others relying only Upon applications to enter when
the land became subject to such entry.
The case-has been exhaustively argued here and fully considered.
The matter to be determined now is whether Schneider did purchase
said tract, from the company, in good faith, within the purview of the
act of March 3, 1887, and amendments; and in order to reach a proper
conclusion it will be necessary to go at some length into the history of
this grant and legislative and judicial action relating to the same.
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If the inquiry were confined to the question whether the contract
exhibited in this case evidences such a sale as is contemplated by said
act, the matter might be disposed of more briefly, for the Department
has, since the passage of said act, passed upon many similar contracts,
and uniformly and invariably treated them as showing a sale or pur-
chase within the mneaning of the act. If the Department had held that
such sale or purchase must be absolute, in the sense of a fully consum-
mated and completed one, in order to be protected, the operation of the
act would have been very limited and circumscribed. It is a part of
the history of the times, that the land grant companies had sold much
of the land within the limits of the grants to immigrants and others,
and held out as inducements to such parties contracts giving long
credit and requiring moderate annual payments. It was through this
policy that vast bodies of land in the public-land States were disposed
of to actual settlers and many communities established and built up.
This was well knowII to Congress at the time of the passage of said act
and it seems certain that such contracts, whether spoken of as sales or
purchases; whether fully performed or only partially performed, con-
stitute a part of the subject with which Congress was dealing, and the
rights of the so-called purchaser thereunder are within the protection
of the statute, if acquired in good faith. If there be any doubt about
the correctness of this view of the purpose and intent of the act of 1887,
it is removed by a perusal of the amendment thereto of February 12,
1896 (26 Stat., 6), wherein Congress expressly recognizes partly per-
formed contracts of purchase, like that of Schunider. as constituting a
putchase within the meaning of the law.
It is therefore held that there was a " prchase" of the tract in ques-
tion within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1887..
It remains to ascertain whether said purchase was made in good faith.
The fourth section of the act of May 12, 1864, making the grant to
the State of Iowa, contains the following provisos:
That if the said roads are not completed -%within ten years from their several
acceptance of this grant, the said lands hereby granted and not patented shall revert
to the State of Iowa for the purpose of securing the completion of the said roads
within such time, not to exceed five: ears, and upon snch terms as the State shall
determine: Ad,? poridedfurt7ic, That said lands shall not in any manner be disposed
of or encumbered, except as the same are patented unrder the provisions of this act;
and sould the State fail to complete said roads within ive years after the ten years
aforesaid, then the said laus undisposed of as aforesaid shall revert to the United
States,
The grant was conferred by the State upon the Sioux City company,
and acepted by it September 20, 1866. Definite location of the line
of road was made July 17, 1867, and construction was commenced in
1872, at the Minnesota State line, and'continued southward to Le Mars,
a distance of 56.13 miles, but the road was not constructed beyond this
point to Sioux City, as required.
Prior to February 5, 1873, the governor of the State, in conformity
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with the provisions of the act of 1864, certified to the completion of
five consecutive sections, of ten miles each, of said road, southward
from the Minnesota State line, and the tract here in controversy is
within the primary limuits of said fifty miles of constructed road.
320,000 acres was the most which the company could claim for fifty
miles of constructed road, but notwithstanding this there were prior to
June 4, 1877, patented to the State for the benefit of said company,
407,870.21 acres. Of this amount the State patented to the company
322,412.81 acres, retaining the legal title to the balance of S5,457.40
acres. The tract here involved was not included in any patent from
the State to the company.
The amount patented to the company by the State was reduced by
a claim of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company,
allowed in pursuance of the decision of the supreme court reported in
117, U. S., 406. It is not necessary for the purposes of tis decision
to go into the details of that case. It is sufficient to say that, not-
withstanding the reduction because of the judgment in favor of the
Milwaukee company, a greater quantify of land was patented to the
State for the benefit of the Sioux City company than it had earned, and
that the State patented to that company more than it was entitled to
receive for the amount of road constructed. (159 U. S., 39, 36.1
In the meantime, on March 7, 1882, the attention of the governor of
Iowa was cal]ed, by direction of the Secretary of the Interior, to the
fact that the grant had lapsed by failure to complete the construction
of said road, and inquiry was made as to what action would be taken
looking to a surrender of the unearned lands which had been patented
to the State. Apparently, in response to this inquiry, on March 16,
1882, the General Assembly of Iowa passed the following act:
Section 1. That all lands, and rights to lands, granted or intended to be granted
to the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company by said acts of Congress, and of
the General Assembly of the State of Iowa, which have not been earned by said
railroad company by a compliance with the conditions of said grant, be, and the
same are hereby, absolutely and entirely resumed by the State of Iowa, and the
same be and are absolutely vested in said State as if the same had never been granted
to said railroad company.
Section 2. This act being deemed of immediate importance shall take effect and be
in force from and after. its publication in the Iowa State Register and the Sioux City
Journal, newspapers published in the State of Iowa.
As this act did not restore to the United States the title to the
unearned land, further correspondence ensued, and on March 27, 1884,
the Iowa legislature passed another act, the preamble of which recited
the grant by Congress, its acceptance by the State, and the act of 1882,
and then the act proceeded-
It is desirable that all land and rights to lands resumed by the State of Iowa, as
aforesaid, should be conveyed to and vested in the United States, to the end that
such lands shall be made subject to the use of actual settlers, as provided by the
acts of Congress relating thereto, now therefore:
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Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Iowa:
Section 1. That all lands and all rights to lands resumed and intended to be re-
sumed by chapter one hundred and seven (107) of the acts of the nineteenth General
Assembly of the State of Iowa are hereby relinqnished and conveyed to the United
States.
Section 2. The Governor of the State of Iouwa is hereby authorized and directed
to certify to the Secretary of the Interior all lands which hav e heretofore been pat-
ented to the State to aid in the construction of said railroad, and which have not
been patented by the State to the Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company; and
the list of lands so certified by the Governor shall be presumed to be the land relin-
quished and conveyed by section one of this act; roiided, That nothing in this
section shall be construed to apply to lands situated in the counties of Dickinson
and O'Brien.
Section 3. This act being deemed of immediate importance, shall take effect and
be in force from and after its publication in the Iowa State Register, a newspaper
published at Des Moines, Iowa, and the Sioux City Journal, a newspaper published
at Sioux City, Iowa.
Thus by the act of 1882 the State resumed the lands not earned by
the company by a compliance with the conditions of the grant, and the
first section of the act of 1884 relinquished to the United States the
lands so resumed by the State. The second section of the act of 1884
identified the lands relinquished by the first section as " all lands which
have heretofore been patented to the State to aid in the construction
of said railroad, and which have not been patented by the State to the
Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company," hut this identification
was rendered of at least doubtful application to the tract now in ques-
tion by the proviso " that nothing in this section shall be construed to
apply to lands situated in the counties of Dickinson and O'Brien."
In January, 1887, the governor reconveyed to the United States the
lands outside of Dickinson ad O'Brien counties, which had not beein
patented by the State to the Sioux City company. For the recovery of
the lands within those counties the suit heretofore spoken of was insti-
tuted, resulting in the decision in favor of the United States in 159 U.
S., 349.
In that case the court dwelt at much length on the subject matter in
controversy, reviewed the history of the legislation, State and national,
affecting said grant, discussed the law applicable to the subject, and
made a careful and detailed statement of the amount of land the Sioux
City company was entitled to, the amount received by the State for its
benefit, the amount the'company had received, and held that said com-
pany had received more land than it had earned and consequently the
United States was entitled to the lands yet remaining under the con-
trol of the State.
The foregoing somewhat lengthy review of matters bearing upon this.
case may be summarized as follows:
The tract in question was within the primary limits of the grant,
opposite constructed road as certified to by the governor; was, in fact,
of the lauds earned by the company, and should have been patented
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to it. That it was not so patented was the fault of the State authorities,
who, instead, patented to the company other lands in excess f the
quantity it had earned, and the United States subsequently recovered
the title to the land in question, because by such patenting of other
lands the railroad grant had been fully satisfied.
Schneider went upon the tract in 1881 or 882. He may at one time
have had some doubt as to the right of the railroad to the land, for
in 1884, he applied to make homestead entry of the same. It is not
said what became of this application, but presumably it was rejected
because the tract was then patented to te State as railroad land. He
built upon it, lived there, occupied,'improved and cultivated it for years,
during all the controversy in relation to its title, hoping and believing,
perhaps, that ultimately he would secure title either from the govern-
ment or the railroad com)aIiy. Doubtless he knew of the subsequent
agitation and legislation in relation to the title, but this fact, instead
of giving notice of the defect in the conpany's title may have tended to
confirm that title in his opinion.
The man was either utterly ignorant of the existing infirmity in the
title to the tract purchased, or he was misled by the action of the legis-
lative and executive authorities of the State. Whilst his testimony is
not apparently as direct, or as responsive, as it ought to have been, in
this respect,-he states that he always understood that it was railroad
land, and that he bought it as such; and the circumstances may well
be considered as justifying this statement.
As before said, the tract had actually been earned by the company;
the governor of the State had certified to the completion of the road
opposite thereto; the State had resumed only the unearned lands; this
tract was excepted from the apparent description of unearned lands
contained in the act of 1884 and from the State's reconveyance to the
United States; and the local land office had rejected Schneider's appli-
cation to enter it as public land. Why then should he not regard it as
part of the earned lands, as in fact it was? At all events, it seems fair
to assume that he acted under this conviction.
That this tract was not recovered by the United States upon the
claim that it had not been actually earned by the railroad company, is
shown by the opinion of the court in Sioux City &c. Railroad v. United
States, 159 U. S., 349, and especially by what the court says at page
370, viz:
the railroad company had, prior to the institution of this suit, received more lands,
on account of the fifty miles of constructed road, certified by the governor, than it
was entitled to receive, Under this view, it is unnecessary to inquire whether the
particular lands here in dispute should not have been assigned to the company,
rather than other lands, containing a like number of acres, that were, in fact, trans-
ferred to it, and which cannot now be recovered by the United States, by reason of
their having been disposed of by the company. If the company has received as
much, in quantity, as should have been awarded to it, a court of equity will not
recognize its claim to more in whatever shape the claim is presented.
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In this connection dates are important. After the construction of
the road opposite this land, after the tract wvas patented by the United
,States to the State for the benefit of the railroad company; after the
recited legislation by the State in 1882 and 1884; after the failure and
refusal of the governor in January, 1887, to reconvey the tract in ques-
tion to the United States on its demand; and before the institution of
suit by the United States in October, 1889, for recovery of the title
thereto, viz., on May .21, 1887, Schneider purchased the S. j of said
tract from the railroad company, paying $80.00 cash; thereafter, on
June 22, 1888, the sumu of $195.70, and on June 20, 1889, the sum of
$187.00; and, on July 16, 1888, he purchased the N. t of the quarter
section from Singer, who had bought from the company, paying him
the sum of $432.32, and afterwards to the company the further sum of
$181.03, making a total of $1,076.05 paid by Schneider for the land.
It is hardly reasonable to suppose that a man would thus voluntarily
pay so large a sum of money for a tract of land to which he believed
his grantor had no right.
When Schneider purchased of the company no one was claiming the
land under the settlement laws and he alone has been in possession
thereof since that time. Considering all the circumstances of the case
and the purpose and intent of the remedial act of March 3, 1887, the
judgment of the Department is that Schneider was a purchaser in good
faith of the tract in question from the railroad company, and as such
purchaser is protected by law.
Entertaining these views, your judgment is reversed and the appli-
cation of Schneider will be allowed if otherwise regular.
Having reached this conclusion it is not necessary to pass upon the
claims of the homestead applicants for this tract.
CHORMICLE V. HILLER ET AL.
Motion for review of departmental decision of January 7, 1898, 26
L. D., 9, denied by Secretary Bliss, March 18, 1898.
ALIENATION-COAL LAND ENTRY-FINA PROOF.
GULLETT ET AL. V. DRANGO LAND AND COAL CO. ET AL.
The sale of land embraced within a coal land entry prior to the time when final
proof has been filed in the local office, but after the actual execution thereof,
does not call for the cancellation of the entry in the absence of bad faith.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March 18,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (G. B. G.)
The Durango Land and Coal Company has appealed from your office
decision of June 15, 1896, denying the company's application to rein-
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state canceled coal entry No. 5, made August 16, 1880, by J. 11. Bow-
man and J. R. Stearns, at the Leadville, Colorado, land office, for the
N. of Sec. 33, T. 13 S., RI. 86 W., which tract was at the date of such
cancellation, and since has been in the Gunnison, Colorado, land
district.
It appears that the said John H. Bowman and John R. Stearns, on
February 24, 1880, filed their declaratory statement for said land. On
August 16, 1880, final proof was filed in the loeal land office, the pur-
chase money for the land-three thousand two hundred dollars-was
paid, and on that day Leadville, Colorado, coal entry N~o. 5 was allowed,
the land involved being at that time subject to sale at that office.
Almost five years thereafter, viz., May 9, 1885, your office, by letter of
that date, required the entrymen to furnish evidence to show whether
the land in question was, at date of entry, within fifteen miles of a
completed railroad, and by your office letter of November 28, 1890, the
entrymen were again required to furnish the evidence called for by said
letter of May 9, 1885. Notice of these requirements was given by reg-
istered letters addressed to the entrymen at their last known post-office
address, which letters were returned unclaimed.
By your office letter of April 13, 1891, said entry was held for can-
cellation, and notice thereof was sent to the entrymen, April 20, 1891,
in a registered letter, addressed to them at their last known post-office
address, which registered letter was returned unclaimed.
On July 15, 1892, the Durango Land and Coal Company's attorneys
filed in your office their request to be notified of any action affecting
said entry.
On July 16, 1892, the additional evidence called for not having been
furnished, your office canceled said entry, and said attorneys for the
Durango Land and Coal Company were notified thereof.
On October 22, 1892, the said Durango Land and Coal Company,
claiming to be the owner, by purchase in good faith of the land in ques-
tion, filed its application to reinstate said canceled entry, on the ground
of want of notice of the order of cancellation, and alleging that the
company was apprised of the order for the first time on August 13,
1892. This application was denied by your office, on November 12,1892,
on the ground that it was shown that said entry was not made for the
use and benefit of the entrymen, but for the use and benefit of said
Durango Land and Coal Company, and was therefore in fraud of the
coal land laws; and it was further held, in view of the bad faith shown,
the entry could not be reinstated, even though the evidence theretofore
called for should be furnished.
The company appealed, and on April 5, 1894 (18 L. D., 382), the De-
partment found that said entry was allowed in accordance with the
then existing regulations which did not require affirmative proof as to
the location of the land with respect to completed railroads, and held
that an entry so allowed should not have been canceled for the want
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of such proof. It was further found that the sale to said company,
although made before final certificate issued. was not made until after
the actual execution of the final proof, and it was held that
the sale of a coal land claimn after the execution of the final proof, but prior to its
filing and the payment of the purchase money, does not necessarily warrant the
conclusion that the entry was made for the se and benefit of another.
In the meantime, as is recited, on July 26,1892, Charles Gnl]ett and
John . Carlisle filed in the lat'd office at Gunnison, Colorado, their
coal declaratory statement alleging possession and improvement of the
same land on July 25, 1892, and o July 19, 1893, they tendered final
proof and purchase price of the land, which were rejected by the regis-
ter and receiver because of the pending proceedings on the application
for reinstatement. On appeal by Gullett and Carlisle to your office
from this action of the local office, the papers were transmitted to the
Department, to be considered in connection with the then pending
appeal of the Durango Land and Coal Company from the decision of
your office rejecting its application for reinstatement of the entry, and
the Department on the whole case pi esented by these two appeals, said:
In view of the introduction in this manner of an apparent adverse interest, and of
the fact that there has been no contradictory hearing below upon the real question
at issue, I think the ease should be remanded for that purpose .... You will
direct a hearing . . . . as to whether or not Bowman and Stearns made the entry
for their own use and benefit.
A hearing was had pursuant to this decision, and the local officers
found that Bowman and Stearns did not make said entry for their own
use and benefit, and recommended that said entry be canceled and that
Gallett and Carlisle be allowed to enter and purchase the land.
On the appeal of the Durango Land and Coal Company, your office,
in its decision on the case June 15, 1896, said:
The evidence . . . . fails to prove that the entrymen were guilty of fraud, but
on the contrary, in my judgment, shows that they acted throughout in good faith,
and made this entry for their own use and benefit, and not directly or indirectly for
the use or benefit of any one else.
The record, however, shows that the intervenors and contestants are claiming the
land in controversy adversely to said entrymen and said company, and that an
adverse claim intervened before application to reinstate said entry was submitted.
Said adverse claim having intervened as aforesaid, it is decided . . . . that the
application to reinstate said entry must be denied.
This conclusion is not believed to be correct.
The departmental decision, supra, of April 5, 1894, definitely held-
that the cancellation of this entry was erroneous. A hearing was
therein ordered to determine one question only, and that was, whether
Bowman and Stearns made the entry for their own use and benefit. By
necessary inference, it was held that if the entry was made for their
use and benefit it should be reinstated.
At the time of this departmental decision directing a hearing the
Durango Land and Coal Company and Gullett and Carlisle were, all
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before the Department. All the facts necessary to a determination of
the rights of the parties, outside of the good faith of Bowman and
Stearns-il making the entry, were shown by the record at the time the
hearing was ordered on the one question of good faith. There was no
occasion whatever to order this hearing, if because of other matters
then shown by the record the entry could not, as against Gullett and
Carlisle, be reinstated even if made in good faith.
The alleged adverse interests of Gullett and Carlisle must have been
considered by the Department at the time said decision ordering a
hearing was made, and the effect of it as against these parties was to
make their right to imake entry of the land contingent upon a showing
that the original entry under which the Durango Land and Coal Com-
pany held was made in bad faith. Gllett and Carlisle were duly
notified of that decision but did not ask a modification thereof, so they
are bound by it.
The evidence submitted at the hearing had purstant to this decision
shows that the final proof was regularly executed on August 10, 1880,
that said final proof was filed in the land office at Leadville, Colorado,
and payment made for the land on August 16, 1880; that on August
10, 1880, but after executing their final proof, the entrymen conveyed
the land to William A. Bell, trustee, who, on January 12, 1885, con-
veyed to the Durango Land and Coal Company.
There is nothing in the record to show bad faith on the part of the
entrymen. The sale of the land after final proof was executed is Dot
prohibited by statute, and assignments at any time of the right to pur-
chase are recognized. See paragraph 37 of rules and regulations
issued 1under the coal land law (1 L. D., 687, 693).
It not having been shown that said original entry was made in bad
faith, your office decision is reversed, with directions to reinstate the
entry.
HOSKIN v. CUPPAOGE.
Motion for review of departmental decision of October 20, 1897, 25
L. D., 334, denied by Secretary Bliss, March iS, 1898.
HOMESTEAD CON TET-RESIDENCE-JUDICIAL RESTRAINT.
WILLIAMS v. BLOCK.
A plea of "judicial restraint" will not be accepted as a sufficien f defense to a charge
of noncompliance with the law in the matter of residence and cultivation, if
the homesteader had not established residence and otherwise complied with the
law prior to the time when he was placed under such restraint.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Offlce, March, 18,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (J. L. MC.)
The Department has considered the case of John Williams v. Adolph
Block, involving the homestead entry of the latter for the El of the SEA,
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the SW' of the SE- and the SEI of the SW-1 of Sec. 25, T. 122 N., R.
56 W., Watertown land district, South Dakota.
Block made said entry on September 4, 1894. On March 11, 1895,
Williams filed affidavit of contest, alleging failure to reside upon or
cultivate the land.
A. heating followed, as the result of which the register found in favor
of the plaintiff, and the receiver in favor of defendant.
The -defendant appealed from the decision of the register.
Your office, on May 8, 1896, rendered decision in favor of the plain-
tiff, and held defendant's entry for cancellation. The defendant has
appealed to the Department.
The facts necessary to be taken into consideration in arriving at a
decision in this case are in substance as follows:
Defendant, at the time of making said entry, owned a house and lot
in the village of Webster, near said land, in which le resided, with his
parents, younger brothers, and a sister. He continued to reside there
until December 24,1891, when he was arrested, confined, and subse-
quently convicted of crime, for which he was sentenced to the peniten-
tiary for two years' and a half.
Defendant's counsel concede that he did not establish residence on
the tract in controversy prior to his arrest and imprisonment, but con-
tend that, inasmuch as his absence is the result of "judicial compul-
sion," a charge of abandonment and failure to reside will not lie against
him-citing Anderson v. Anderson (5 L. D. 6), and Bohall v. Dilla (114
U. S., 47); and that, inasmuch as he had six months after entry within
which to establish residence upon the land, of which only about four
months had elapsed when he was arrested, he will have two months
after the expiration of his term of imprisonment in which to establish
residence, before his entry will be subject to contest.
The cases cited fail to sustain this contention. In the case of Bohall
v. Dilla, the defendant, Dilla, filed pre-emption declaratory statement
December 26, 1873, alleging settlement March 25, 1865. Your office
and this Department found as a fact that Dilla and his family had
resided on the land there in controversy, and had otherwise fully com-
plied with the law, "from the time of his settlement in 1865, until
ejected in 1868" (114 U. S., page 49); and this finding the supreme
court accepted.
In the case of Anderson v. Anderson, cited by counsel for the
defendant, this Department found (5 L. D. 6-7):
Anderson had lived on this tractfor many years, and up to the date of his arrest had
complied with the requirements of the law as to residence and cultivation.
Another case of "judicial restraints cited by counsel for the defend-
ant is that of Cane et al. v. Devine (7 L. DR, 532). Devine made home-
stead entry for the tract there in controversy on May 23, 1873; he and
his family established residence on the land within the time prescribed
by law; he continued to reside upon, cultivate and improve the same
12209-VOL 26 27
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until October 1, 1S80, when l1e was sentenced to state prison; and dur-
ing his absence his wife and children continued to reside upon and
cultivate the land.
In the case of Arnold v. Cooley (10 L. D., 551), and Reedhead v. Hanen-
stein (15 L. D. 554), residence had been established and the law com-
plied with in other respects, prior to the compulsory absence of the
claimant because of "judicial restraint."
No case appears upon the records of the Department ini which judicial
restraint has been accepted as a sufficient reason for the failure of a
claimant under the settlement laws to fulfill the requirements of the
law, unless residence had been established and a commencement made
in the way of compliance with the laws in other respects, prior to such
"judicial restraint."
On the contrary, the Department, in the case of Gore v. Brew (12
L. D., 239), rendered a ruling which is in every respect applicable to the
case now under consideration:
In the case at bar the claimant had never established residence on the land; and
after his sentence, in contemplation of law, his residence is presumed to have
remained where it was at the time of his arrest and conviction-which was elsewhere
than on his claim.
The decision of your office was correct, and is hereby affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-LANDS EXCEPTED-SETTLEMENT RIGHT.
S31ITH v. NEW ORLEANS PACIFIC Y. CO.
An assignee of an alleged settler at the date of definite location who claims the
benefit of the protective provisions of section 2, act of February 8, 1887, is not
entitled thereto, if such settler is noT shown to have been qualified at such time
to assert a settlement claim.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March 19,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (G. B. G.)
The plaintiff, Willis H. Smilith, in the case of said Smith v. New
Orleans Pacific Railway Company, has appealed from your office deci-
sion of April 17, 1896, denying his application to enter the N. t of the
NW. , the SE. 4 of the NW. and the SW. -of the NE. 1 of Sec. 35,
T. 7 N., R. 1 W., New Orleans, Louisiana.
By the act of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 579), certain lands were granted
to the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksbnrg Railroad Company.
By the act of February 8. 1887 (24 Stat., 391), part of these lands were
forfeited to the United States, and by the second section of said act it
was provided:
That the title of the United States and of the original] grantee to the lands
granted by said act of Congress of March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-one,
to said grantee, the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company,
not herein dee]ared forfeited, is relinquished, granted, conveyed, and confirmed to
the New Orleans Pacific Railroad Company, as the assignee of the New Orleans,
Baton Rouge and Vicksburg Railroad Company, said lands to be located in accord-
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ance -with tle map filed by said New Orleans Pacific Railway Company in the
Departuent of the Interior October twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred ad eighty-
one and November seventeenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-twro, which indicate
the definite location of said road: Provided, That all said lands occupied by actual
settlers at the date of the definite location of said road and still remaining in their
possession or in possession of their heirs or assigns shall be held add deemed excepted
from said grant and shall be subject to entry under the public land laws of the
United States.
The tracts in controversy are coterm'linous with that portion of said
grant confirmed to the New Orleans PacificI Railway Company by the
act of February 8, 1887, supra; and with that portion of the road defi-
nitely located November 17, 1882, were listed by the company Novem-
ber 13, 1883, and patented Mareh 3, 1885.
The record shows that one John Valentine established residence on
the land in controversy in 1867, and continued to reside on and culti-
vate the same until some time in the year 1885, when he moved off the
land. In 1886 he rented it to one T. B. Rogers, and in 1894 said Val-
entine sold out to the applicant, Willis H. Smith.
It is not shown that Valentine was qualified to assert a settlement
claim at the date of the definite location of the road.
In the case of Pennington v. New Orleans Pacific Railway Company,
25 LI. D., 61, it was said, in referring to the condition of the act, " occu-
pied by actual settlers"-
This was evidently intended to embrace only those who had settled with an inten-
tion to make entry of the land at some future time under the provisions of the settle-
ment laws of the United States, and only those qualified to assert a settlement claim
to the land so settled upon would be embraced within the protection of said section.
It can not be presumed that Congress meant to except from the grant all lands that
might be in the oceupancy of persons without regard to their qualiflcations to make
entry at the time under the general land laws.
It not having been shown that Valentine was qualified to assert a
settlement claim at the date of the definite location of the road, it is
-held that the case as made is not sufficient to entitle Smith to the
benefits of the act of February 8, 1887.
In this view it is not necessary to pass on the question as to the
effect of the act, supra, o lands for which patent had issued.
The decision appealed from is afflrmed.
REPAYMENT-ENTRY ERRONEOUSLY CANCELED.
THIOxAs HAAIvONI).
The statutory provisions regulating repayment do not include the erroneous can-
cellation of an entry among the cases where a return of the purchase money may
be made.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, Mlarch 19,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
This is n appeal by Thoimas Hammond, as assignee of Clarence B.
Riggs, from the decision of your office dated July 3, 1896, denying the
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application of the former, filed June 10, 1896, for repayment of purchase
money in the matter of canceled timber land cash entry No. 2074, made
by the latter -September 10, 1883, for the SW. i of section 8, T. 6 N., R.
3 W., Oregon city, Oregon, land district.
It appearing from evidence adduced at a hearing had in June, 1885,
that Riggs had conveyed the land on August 25, 1883, sixteen days
prior to the entry, that the entry, though in the name of Riggs, was in
fact completed by another party, and that the laud, "4when cleared of
its timber, would be agricultural land and fit for cultivation," your
office, on August 27. 1886, held the entry for cancellation on the ground
that it was "illegal and fraudulent." On appeal by Hammond the
Department, on March 17, 1888 (unreported), finding the facts to be as
stated by your office, affirmed its decision. The entry was accordingly
canceled April 6, 1888.
The- application for repayment was denied on the ground that the law
governing the return of purchase money does not apply to a case of
this character. The appeal contends that Riggs had not conveyed the
land and that the entry was not completed by another person as found
by your office and the Department, and that under the decision of the
supreme court in Budd et al. v. The United States (144 U. S., 154), it is
no bar to the allowance of a timber land entry that the land when
cleared of its timber would be fit for agriculture. If these contentions
were all well taken, they might justify the conclusion that the entry
was erroneously canceled, and if the land was still public land and there
were no adverse rights thereto, might warrant the reinstatement of the
entry, but they would present no lawful ground for repayment of pur-
chase money. Money can not be repaid from the public treasury with-
out express authority of law.
Section 2362 Revised Statutes authorizes the repayment of money
paid for lands " erroneously sold by the United States, so that from any
cause the sale can not be confirmed," and the second section of the act
of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287), authorizes repayment of "the fees and
commissions, amount of purchase money, and excess paid" in cases of
entries of public lands "where, from any cause, the entry has been
erroneously allowed and can not be confirmed"; but these provisions
of law do not, according to the applicant's own contention, apply to
his case. Iis contention is that the entry was properly allowed and
erroneously canceled. There is ilo law authorizing repayment in such a
case. Upon the face of the papers the entry was properly allowed. It
was only as the result of a hearing that it was determined that its
allowance was fraudulent.
Whether or not the judgment of cancellation was warranted by the
law and the facts, is not now an open question. Such judgment is res
judicata. See in this connection the case of Falk Steinhardt (25 L. D.,
210). The decision of your office is affirmed.
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AMENDMENTS TO RWULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING FOREST
RESERVES.
CIRCULAR.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washin gton, D. 0., March 21, 1898.
The following amendments and additions to the rules and regulations
governing forest reserves, issued June 30, 1897, (24 L. D., 588) are
hereby prescribed and promulgated:
Paragraph 11 is amended to read as follows:
11. The right of way in and across forest reservations for irrigating
canals, ditches, flumes and pipes, reservoirs, electric power purposes,
and for pipe lines, will be subject to existing laws and regulations; and
the applicant or applicants for such right will be required, if deemed
advisable by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, to give bond
in a satisfactory surety company to the government of the United
States, to be approved by him, such bond stipulating that the makers
thereof will pay to the United States for any and all damage to the
public lands, timber, natural curiosities or other public property on.
such reservation or upon the lands of the United States, by reason of
such use and occupation of the reserve, regardless of the cause or cir-
cumstances under which such damage may occur.
Paragraph 27 is amended to read as follows:
27. Within thirty days after notice to a bidder of an award of timber
to him, payment must be mnade in full to the receiver for the timber so
awarded; or equal payments therefor may be made in thirty, sixty and
ninety days from date of such notice, at the option of the purchaser.
The purchaser must have in hand the receipt of the receiver for each
payment before he will be allowed to cut, remove, or otherwise dispose
of the timber covered by that payment. The timber must all be cut
and removed within one year from the date of the notice by the receiver
of the award; failing to do so, the purchaser will forfeit his right to the
timber left standing or unremoved and to his purchase money: provided,
that the limit of one year herein named may be extended by the Com-
missioner of the General Land Office, in his discretion, upon good and
sufficient reasons for such action being shown.
The following additional regulations are prescribed:
32. In order to meet the necessities of persons, firms, companies, or
corporations, whose business requires a large and continuous supply of
timber, it is hereby provided that where the annual consumption
exceeds one million feet of timber, board measure, application for the
succeeding year's supply may be made -in time to pernit the appraise-
ment and sale of the timber desired six months in advance of its actual
need.
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33. Where timber has been appraised and advertised for sale and no
satisfactory bid has been offered, a new appraisement and sale may be
ordered, from time to time, until an appraisement and sale has been
made, which sall receive the approval of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office.
BINGER HERMANN,
Commissioner.
Approved, March 21, 1898.
,C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
RAILROAD GRANT-WITHDRANVAL ON GENERAL ROUTE.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. (ON REVIEW).
The departmental decision of April 13, 1895, 20 L. D., 332, holding that the with-
drawal on general route for the benefit of the Northern Pacific grant is no bar
to the establishment of an Idian reservation within the limits of such with-
drawal, adhered to on review.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, .March, 23,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter " F" of May 31, 1895, was forwarded a motion,
filed on behalf of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, for review
of departmental decision of April 13, 1895 (20 L. D., 332), in which it
was held that (syllabus):
The withdrawal on general route for the benefit of the Northern Pacific grant is
"from sale, entry, and preemption" only, and does not debar, within its limits, the
executive from the exercise of its ordinary authority in the establishment of an
Indian reservation; and lands within said limits, so reserved at date of definite
location are excepted from the operation of the grant, and revert to the public
domain on cession thereof by the Indians:
and the Department refnsed to disturb the previous directions given
by your office, instructing the local officers to dispose of the lands
within the ceded portion of the Ceur d'Alene reservation without
regard to the claim of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to the
odd numbered sections.
The said motion was entertained March 3,1897, and on April 6th
following, cortsel asked that the case be decided on briefs theretofore
filed.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company filed in the United States
circuit court for the district of Idaho, northern division, a bill of com-
plaint against the settlers upon the odd numbered sections within the
ceded portion of the Ceur d'Alene reservation, alleging ownership
thereof under its grant substantially as claimed in this motion for
review, and sought to enjoin the settlers from exercising the rights
asserted by them to such lands under their settlement claims.
Upon a hearing, the circuit court refused the injunction, deciding
against the company's contention.
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The company appealed to the circuit court of appeals for the ninth
circuit, but thereafter withdrew its appeal, thus acquiescing in the
decision of the circuit court. (82 Feci. Rep., 1004.)
After careful consideration of the argument filed in support of the
motion for review the previous decision of this Department is adhered
to and the motion is accordingly denied and herewith returned for the
files of your office.
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS-ACT OF FEBRUARY 26, 195.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Iu classifying unsurveyed lands under the act of February 26,1895, where the entire
area of the tract, as designated by natural or artificial boundaries, is of the saine
character, the classification should be made without reference to the particular
section.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March 23,
(W.V.D.) 1898. (E.F.B.)
The Department is in receipt of your letter of February 23, 1898,
submitting for my approval list of lands classified during the month of
October 1897, in the Missoula land district, Montana, under the act of
February 26, 1895 (28 Stat., 683).
The list embraces the entire area of unsurveyed land included within
exterior limits determined by given distances from a corner established
by a government survey.
In view of the fact that the classification of even sections will have
to be noted upon the tract books of your office, and of the local office,
involving considerable additional work, and may also involve the right
of persons to enter said lands under the agricultural laws, and the
right of the State to sections 16 and 36, you ask to be fully instructed
in the premises.
The classification of unsurveyed lands i the manner shown by the
report of the commissioners, is not contrary to any provision of the
act of February 26, 1895, or of the instructions of the Department
issued at various times for the guidance of the commissioners in the
performance of their duties, imposed by said act.
The purpose of the act was to facilitate the adjustment of the grant
to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, by enabling the Secretary
of the Interior to ascertain, without delay, what lands within the
limits of the grant to said company in the States of Montana and
Idaho were mineral in character, and excepted from the operation of
the grant.
The approval by the Secretary of the Interior of the classification of
lands made by the commissioners, under the provisions of said act
shall be considered final only so far as it affects the right of the rail-
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road company under its grant, but as said by the Department in the
letter of November 30, 1897 (25 L. D., 446),
it does not prevent other disposition of the land, where returned as mineral, should
subsequent investigation prove the tracts to be not mineral in character, and an
entryman making entry of such lands under the mineral laws should establish the
mineral character the same as though such classification had not been marie.
A mineral return by the commissioners would not, therefore, prevent our office
from making such disposition of the land as is proper upon a subsequent shoving as
to its character, but the classification should be considered as of the same effect as
the return of mineral lands made by the government surveyor.
The instructions of June 25, 1895 (20 L. D., 571), did not abrogate any
part of the original instructions of April 13,1895 (20 L. D., 350), but
were supplemental thereto. As te purpose of the act was to provide
solely for the classification of the odd numbered sections within the
limits of the grant, the commissioners were so instructed, but it was
only intended that they should be restricted to the examination of the
odd sections in cases where the mineral character of such ections
could be satisfactorily ascertained, without resorting to an examination
of the adjacent land. Otherwise they were required to take into con-
sideration the min eral discovered or developed on adjacent sections, or
its geological formation for the purpose of ascertaining the true ehar-
acter of the odd section.
These instructions were not intended to control in the examination
of unsurveyed lands, because the locus of the odd sections could not
be definitely ascertained until after survey, and hence the act provides
that
if the lands examined are not surveyed, classification shall be made by tracts of such
extent, and designated by such natural or artificial boundaries to identify them, as
the commiissioners may determine.
The examination and classification of the commissioners, was made
in the manner directed by the act. When the entire area of any tract
of unsurveyed land designated by such natural or artificial boundaries
as may be readily identified, is of the same character, the classification
should be made without reference to the particular section. Any other
course would not only involve a loss of time, and much unnecessary
labor and expense, but it would also be impossible to designate accu-
rately the actual lines of the odd sections.
The only objection that can be urged to the approval of the report of
the commissioners is the uncertainty of the locus of the first mentioned
tract. It starts from a comminon corner of a government survey which,
they state, has not been accepted or approved. The report is therefore
returned to your office, and you are directed to suspend action thereon
until a definite starting point has been established, either by the
approval of said survey or otherwise, which will accurately designate
the land classified.
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REPAYMENT-M ORT1GAGEE-ASSIGNEE.
CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE, LOAN AND TRuST O. (ON REVIEw).
In the case of a mortgage executed prior to the cancellation of thu entry covering
the land, and a deed made to the mortgagee after such cancellation, for the pu1T-
pose of giving additional effect to the mortgage, the holder of such conveyances
may be regarded as an assignee within the meaning of the act of June 16,1880,
and as such entitled to repayment.
Secretary. Bliss to the Conmnissioner of the General Land Offee, iAiarch
(W. V. D.) 23, 1898. (G. B. G-.)
By departmental decision of March 15, 18 7 (24 L. D., 246), the
application of The California Mortgage, Loan and Trust Company, for
the repayment of the sum of four hundred dollars paid to the United
States by William B. Stewart, upon making his iare emption cash entry
of the NE. of Sec. 32, T. 4 S., R. 1 E., Los Angeles land district,
California, was denied.
It appeared that said cash entry was madeAJanuary 12, 1889, and
canceled on March 31, 189(, because the land had been, by executive
order of June 19, 1883, reserved from entry, for the benefit of the
Mission Indians; that on November 27, 1893, said company, claiming
as mortgagee, applied to have the entry reinstated, which application
was denied. Tereupon, the company made application for repayment
of the purchase money, and filed therewith a- certified copy of the
receiver's receipt; the adavit of the vice-president and general
manager of the company, setting forth that sai(l company, on July 28,
1889, loaned to said Stewart the sum of one thousand dollars, receiving
as security for such loai a mortgage on the land; a deed of bargain
and sale dated May 4, 1894, from Stewart to the company, duly
recorded; a quit claim deed from the company to the United States;
and an assignment by Stewart to the company of all right, title and
interest in the money paid by him to the United States for the land in
controversy.
In its decision of March 15, 1897, supra, the Department held that
a mortgagee is not an assigliee within the intent and meaning of the act
of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287), providilg for repayment, if the ort-
gage is merely a lien oil the laud, that the right of assignees to repay-
'ment is limited to assignees of the land, and does not extend to one
holding a assignment of the claim for the money paid on the entry,
and that no right of repayment is acquired by an assignee whose
interest in the land is not obtained until after the cancellation of the
entry.
A motion for review of this decision was filed by the company, and
on June 22, 1897, on examination of said motion, action thereon was
deferred for thirty days,
to allow the California Mortgage, Loan and Trust Company to produce and file the
mortgage deed aforesaid, or a duly certified copy thereof from the official records of
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Riverside county, California, and to show by proper evidence the relation, if ay,
which the said mortgage and the indebtedness thereby secured bear to said deed of
bargain and sale and said assignment; and to show by satisfactory evidence who is
the present holder and owner of said mortgage and the indebtedness thereby secured.
In response to this, the company on July 22, 1897, filed i the Depart-
ment a certified copy of the mortgage referred to, and te affidavit of
E. J. Swayne, the vice-president and general manager of te colpany,
wherein it is stated that the company loaned to said Stewart one
thousand dollars, on the 28tlh day of June, 1889, to secure which said
mortgage was executed, that the deed made by said Stewart, on the
4th of May, 1894, was without consideration, except the original in debt-
eduess evidenced by the mortgage, and that the real object and pur-
pose of such conveyance was to more frilly proteet and indenity said
company against loss than could otherwise be done by the mortgage.
It is further stated that Stewart is and has been for a long time insol-
vent; that he has never paid any part of said mortgage-either princi-
pal or interest; that the California mortgage, Loan and Trust Company
is still the owner of said mortgage, and is entitled to the principal debt,
with interest thereon from June 28, 1889, to the present time.
The mortgage referred to bears evidence of having been executed on
June 28, 1889, and appears to have been lodged for record on that day
and duly recorded.
Enough is shown in regard to the whole transaction to authorize the
finding that the company loaned Stewart one thousand dollars, on the
28th day of Julle, 1889, on the faith of his final certificate, taking a
mortgage upon the land to secure payment, and that after the cancel-
lation of the entry, the company took a deed from Stewart to the land
and an assignment of his claim against the United States for repay-
ment of the purchase money.
The bonafides of the whole transaction seems to be altogether free
from doubt, and the only question left for determination is, whether
the law authorizes a repayment of the money to the company.
Section 2 of the act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287), provides that:
In all cases where homestead or timber-culture or desert-land entries or other
entries of public lands have heretofore or shall hereafter be canceled for conflict, or
where from any cause the entry has been erroneously allowed and can not be con-
firmed, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause to be repaid to the person who made
such entry, or to his heirs or assignees, the fees aud commissions, amount of pur-
chase money and excess paid upon the same, npon the surrender of the duplicate
receipt and the execution of a proper relinqnishment of all claims to said land,
whenever such entry shall have been duly canceled by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office.
This entry was erroneously allowed, could not be confirmed, and has
been canceled. It is therefore a case in which repayment is directed
to be made to the entrymnan " or to his heirs or assignees,"~ upon the
surrender of the duplicate receipt and the execution of a proper relin-
quishment of all claims to said land.
It is believed that the California Mortgage, Loan and Trust Com-
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 427
pany is such an assignee. If it be conceded that a mortgagee is not an
assignee within the meaning of this statute, and that the right of
repayment is restricted to assignees of the land and does ot extend
to assignees of only the claim for money paid: and 'if it be conceded
that the right of repayment is acquired by an assignee whose interest in
the land is not obtained until after the cancellation of the entry, it does
not follow that the claim of this company should be denied. Inasmuch
as the deed executed by Stewart to the company i 1894 grew out of and
was the consummation of the mortgage transaction, it should be treated
as giving additional effect to the mortgage, which antedated the can-
cellation of the entry, and as converting the mortgage lien ito a claim
to the land itself in so far as Stewart or any assignee of his could have
such a clain after cancellation of the entry.
The entryman cannot make application for repayment, because he
has parted with whatever claim he had, both to the land and the money
paid.
The company having surrendered Stewart's duplicate receipt and
executed a proper relinquishment of all caims to the land, all the
requirements of the statute appear to have been met.
Departmental decision of March 15, 1897, is hereby vacated, your
office decision appealed from is reversed, and the case is returned for
repayment of the money applied for.
HONTESTEAD E:•TRY-INSTATEMENT.
JOHN F. NEr1IGoBUnS.
An entry canceled with the view to allowing the entrynian to make a second ntry
nay be reinstated, whbere o account of poverty he is Unable to nake the second
entry, and his good faith is manilest.
Secretary Bliss to the Comiissioner of the General Land Office, liarch 23,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (H. Cr.)
Joln F. Neighbours made homestead entry, September 13, 1893, for
the SE. i of Sec. 34, T. 13 N., R. 14 W., in the Oklahomna land district,
Oklahoma. Te local office, on April 23, 1896, transmitted the appli-
cation of the entryman for a second homestead entry for the E. W of the
NW. j and lots and 2 of Sec. 31, T. 13 N., R. 14 W., in the same land
district. This application was allowed by your office, June 6, 1896,
upon condition that the application should be amended by inserting
the correct description of the tract, and by changing the orthography
of the applicant's name to conform to that of the original entry, which
was canceled at the time of granting the application to make second
entry.
: The applicant inforned your office that he had been misinformed by
counsel, and ulderstood that he would not be compelled to pay the fees
and commissions for the entry of the second tract, and as he was
unable to meet the same, asked to have his original entry re-instated.
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This application was denied by your office, August 8, 1896, o the
ground that from the applicant's previous showing it appeared that he
would be unable to comply with the homestead laws on the land
covered by his previous entry. Neighbours appeals to the Departmient.
There can not be much doubt that the applicant's reason for aban-
doning his application for second entry was his poverty, for it appears
incredible that he should have abandoned his claim to the more fertile
tract, embraced in his application for a second entry, which had been
granted to him, for any reason than that advanced by him-his inability
to pay the sum required to meet the fees and commissions of tile local
office.
It appears fron his letters written to the Department ad to your
office that, although the land embraced in his original entry is situated
among sand-hills and is not wholly susceptible of cultivation, the
applicant has cultivated some thirty acres of the tract, and has made
improvements in the shape of a dwelling, barn, and other farm build-
ings, has dug a well from which he obtained water, and has resided on
the tract for three years prior to his application for second entry, and
is now residing thereon with his famiily, consisting of a wife and three
children. He claims that in spite of his crippled condition. having
lost the use of one arm, he has expended much toil and labor upon his
original claim, and ought not now to be deprived of it, because his
lack of means prevented him from perfecting his application for a
second entry. It seems a great hardship in this case to deprive the
applicant of the fruit of his years of toil in struggling to obtain a
home under such discouraging cir(umstaniees. It is true, that it appears
from his application to make second entry that the soil of the tract
entered by him is barren and can ot be successfully cultivated, but
his subsequent efforts in farming the tract have been fairly successful
and have resulted in the cultivation of thirty acres or more. He is now
content to remain upon the tract entered by him, and confidently
expects, with apparent good reason, to support his family thereon.
He claims that he was misled into making his application for a second
entry by the representations of the cattle owners in the vicinity, in the
midst of whose range his original entry was located, and also by his
attorney, who informed him that he could make the proposed exchange
without further payment of fees and commissions.
He was allowed sixty days within which to make his second entry
by your office, but without awaiting the expiration of this period, his
original entry was canceled; This cancellation was premature, as the
original entry should have been permitted to stand ntil the second
entry was consummated. The excuse of the applicant that his lack of
means prevented his consummation of his second entry is sufficient,
and in the opinion of the Department his original entry should be
reinstated.
The decision of your office is reversed, and the original entry of the
applicant will be reinstated.
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RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTIONS-SPECIFICATION OF LOSS.
ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND MANITOBA RIY.. Co. v. LA rB ECK.
Indemnity selections, acconipanied by designations of loss in bulk, made prior to
the deeision in the La Bar ase, operate o protect the right of the company, as
against subsequent applications to enter, filed prior to said decision and the
rearrangement of losses in aecordance therewith.
The failure of the company to rearrange its losses within the time specified in said
decision is a matter- between the government and the company,, and cannot
operate to the advantage of one whose settlement and application to enter were
made at a tihe when the lands were withdrawn and embraced within a pending
selection made prior to said decision, and where before any steps were taken by
the government looking toward the disposition of the land the company had
complied with the requirements of said decision.
Secretary Bliss to the Conmissioner of the General Land Offlce, March
(W. V. D.) 24, 1898. (G. B. G-.)
The land involved in this case, lots 16 and 17 of Sec. 7, T. 122 N.,
R. 31 W., St. Cloud land district, Minnesota, is within the indemnity
limits common to the grants for both the main line and the St. Vincent
Extension of the St. Paul, Minneafbolis and Manitoba railway; was
withdrawn from settlement and entry February'6, 1872, and was
included in the company's list of selections made on account of the St.
Vincent Extension, filed November 13, 1885. This list contained also
a list of lands alleged to have been lost to the grant equal in amount
to the selected lands.
On September 3 1891, Joseph Lambeck presented his homestead
application, which was rejected because of conflict with the company's
said selection. Accompanying his application were two sworn state-
ments, made by him, respecting settlements on the land involved. One
is, that he settled in the month of September, 1887; built a house
thereon, into which he moved his family, and has ever since continued
to reside. The other statement is, that during the years 1884, 1885, and
part of the year 1886, one Pick resided on said land with his family, and
claimed the same as his homestead, and that in 1886 said Pick aban-
doned the land.
On the appeal of Lamnbeck to your office fron the denial of his said
application, the coinpaly's indemnity selection of the land involved
was held for cancellation, with a view to allowing the homestead appli-
cation of Lambeck.
The company appealed to the Department, and, by departmental
decision of February 17, 1896 (22 L. D., 202), your said office decision
'was reversed, and it was held (syllabus):
Indemnity selections, accompanied by designation of loss in bnlk, made prior to
the specific departmental requirement that lost lands should be arranged tract for
tract with the lands selected, operate to protect the right of, the company as against
subsequent applications to enter, made prior to said requirement and the re-arrange-
ment of losses in accordance therewith.
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In said decision it was said:
Under the directions given by this Department in its decision in the case of La
Bar v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (17 L. D., 406), this company was, during the month
of December, 1893, called upon to re-arrange its indemnity selections so as to desig-
nate, tract for tract, the lands lost in place, in lien of which selections had been
made. Acting under this call the company on June 6, 1894, filed its re-arranged list
in which the same losses were used, but re-arranged to show the losses tract for
tract with the lands selected in its list filed November 13, 1885.
Your office decision holds that the company's selection as originally presented was
invalid, and, recognizes the intervening right of Lambeck.
Prior to the decision of this Department in this case of La Bar v. Northern Pacific
R. R. Co., spne, there was no specific requirement that the lost lands should be
arranged tract for tract with the selected lands, the circular of 1879 merely requir-
ing the designation of losses made the bases for the selections.
I am therefore of opinion that the company's rights were duly protected under the
selection as made in 1885, and as they have since complied with the requirements in
re-arranging their losses so as to show a specific loss for each tract selected, no
rights were acquired as against the grant by the presentation of Lambeck's applica-
tiou in 1891.
A motion for review thereof was filed by Liambeck substantially on
two grounds: (1) that it was error to hold that prior to the decision in
the La Bar case, there was no specific requirement that the lost lands
designated as the~bases of indemnity selections should be arranged
tract for tract with the selected lands, and (2) that this company's
re-arranged lists were not filed within the time allowed nder the
decision in the La Bar case.
This motion was considered by the Department on December 23, 1896
(23 L. D., 552), and without passing directly on the question whether
the statement that, prior to the decision of the Department in the La
Bar case, there was no specific requirement that the lost lands should
be arranged tract for tract with the selected lands, was a correct one,
it was said:
In effect, this decision held that where the company, within the time allowed
under the direction given in the La Bar case, re-arranges a list prior to said order,
the rights of the company are dly protected, and date back to the filing of the
original list. To this decision the Department, after due consideration of the mat-
ter, adheres.
It was further held, on the second proposition, however, that a rail-
road company is entitled to six months from date of actual notice of
the order issued under the La Bar case in which to file rearranged
indemnity lists, and the case was remanded to your office, in order
that the fact as to whether said company rearranged its lists within
six months from the receipt of such notice be ascertained, and it was
directed that appropriate action to that end be taken, and the case
disposed of in accordance with that view.
The Department now has the report of your office, wherein it is made
to appear that said company did not file its rearranged lists within six
months from actual notice of the requirements, supra, of the La Bar
case, unless the company is entitled to the benefits of the additional
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time allowed by rule 97 of the Rules of Practice for the transmission of
certain notices by mail. Counsel for both Lambeck and the company
have been heard orally on the questions presented since your said office
report was forwarded to the Department.
On behalf of Lambeek, it is insisted that the statement in the first
departmental decision herein, that prior to the decision in the La Bar
case there was no specific requirement that lost lands should be
arranged tract for tract with selected lds, was gross error, and it is
submitted that said statement should be corrected, generally, because
it threatens the settlement claims of hundreds of settlers, and, specific-
ally, because of its effect on this case. The further insistence of coun-
sel for Lambeck is, that inasmuch as it has been shown that the
company did not file its re-arranged lists within six months from date
of actual notice of the La Bar decision, the claim of Lambeck must
prevail, in accordance with the rule laid down in the decision (supra)
directing the investigations it not being 'conceded that rule of practice
No. 97 is applicable to a case of this character.
On the other hand, it is admitted by counsel for the company that
said lists were not filed within six months from actual notice of the
order in the La Bar case, unless the company is given the benefit of
rule 97.
In the matter of the requirement of the specification of losses tract
for tract with the selected lands, a most careful examination discloses
that, while the regulations in the matter of selection of indemnity
lands were, in several cases decided before the La Bar case, construed
to require such an arrangement of the losses, yet this requirement was
not made general or universal until the decision in that case; further,
the previous action of your office in accepting lists without requiring a
matching of the losses with the selections, was referred to in that
decision and recognition thereby given to such lists by permitting the
companies to re-arrange the losses previously assigned in bulk.
It was argued by counsel for Lambeck that prior to the first decision
of the Department in the case at bar, it had been held by the Depart-
ment that an assignment of losses in a railroad selection in bulk,
equally with a failure to assign any losses whatever, was no bar to the
acquisition of settlement rights, in the absence of a withdrawal, but
since that argument was made said counsel has filed a paper with this
case wherein it is admitted that such statement was error.
A distinction has always been made between cases of selections
where the loss was assigned in bulk and where no loss at all was
assigned, and it could not have been the purpose of the requirement
made in the La Bar decision to avoid indemnity selections before made
upon a designation of the losses in bulk which, as before stated, had
been respected by your office, but rather to require of the companies the
performance of labor thus imposed upon your office, viz., the matching
of the losses with the selections when it came to the submission of
clear lists for departmental approval.
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In changing a practice which had long been permitted if not actively
encouraged, by your office, it would have been altogether inequitable
to have permitted the intervention of adverse claims pending a revision
of lists whose only infirmity consisted of an informality which had
grown embarrassing to a safe and speedy adjustment of railroad giants.
Hence the decision in the case at bar, that indemnity selections, accom-
panied by designation of loss in bulk, made prior to the decision in the
La Bar case, operated to protect the right of the company as against
subsequent applications to enter, made prior to said decision, and the
rearrangement of losses in accordance therewith.
The Department adheres to this rule; and the remaining question is,
whether this case comes within it, in view of the fact that the adjust-
ment was not made within six months from date of actual notice of the
order in the La Bar case.
After a full and careful examination of the whole subject, the con-
clusiou has been reached that this is a question wholly between the
railroad company and the government.
It must be remembered that indemnity selections under these rail-
road grants are generally to be made under the direction of the Secre-
tary of the Interior; in fact; the courts have held that until approved
by the Secretary of the Interior no selection has been made within the
meaning of the granting act.
The companies have been required to formally select lands within
the indemnity belt and their rights have been adjusted, when conflict
occurred with the claims of others, upon the showing made as to the
status of the land at the (late of the initiation of such adverse claim.
In some cases the lands were reserved for the company by with-
drawals, either required by law or resting upon executive action.
In the present case the act making the grant required the withdrawal
of the indemnity lands, and they remained in reservation until restored
May 22, 1890 (12 L. D., 541).
At the date of Lambeck's alleged settlement the lands were so with-
drawn; further, the company had, prior to this time, presented its
selection list at the local office including this tract, and in the list
assigned tracts as lost to the grant, but not arranged tract for tract
with the lands selected.
Lambeek is presumed to have had full knowledge of the fact that
this tract was claimed to be needed in the satisfaction of the grant,
both at the date of his settlement and the tender of his application to
make entry, and said selection must in some way be avoided before
recognition can be given to his claim.
No objection is made to the selection, otherwise than that the
company was tardy in re-arranging the losses previously assigned.
Admitting the re-arrangement to have been a few days late, it can
not be held that this fact in anywise influenced Lambeck's actions in
connection with the tract, for he had long prior to the decision in the
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La Bar case settled upon and applied for the tract. His application
was properly rejected for conflict with the pending selection, and his
pending appeal therefrom only entitled him to a judgment upon the
question as to the correctness of the action then taken. He is not in a
position therefore to take advantage of the tardiness on the part of the
company in complying with the terms of the order made in the La Bar
case.
True, it was said that at the expiration of the six months, if a par-
ticular basis had not been assigned in the manner prescribed, all tracts
formerly claimed would " be disposed of under the terms of the order
restoring indemnity lands without regard to sch previous claim." It
might also be admitted that the land department would have been
authorized to so dispose of them after the expiration of the six months.
This was not done, and before any steps were taken looking to the dis-
position of the land, the company had complied with the order.
Upon what reasonable ground, then, can the company's claim be
avoided, especially when, as in the case of this grant, it is well known
that it can not be anything like satisfied from the available lands
within its indemnity belt.
For the reasons given the previous decision of the Department is
adhered to and Lambeck's application will stand rejected.
In this view discussion of the applicability of rule of practice No. 97
is not necessary.
NORTHERN PACIFIC . R. CO. V. KEMP.
Motion for review of departmental decision of January 11, 1898, 26
L. D., 17, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, March 25, 1898.
WILSON V. DAVIS.
Motion for review of departmental decision of December 20, 1897, 25
L. D., 514, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, March 25, 1898.
CONTESTANT-PREFERRED RIGHT OF ENTRY-PRE-EMIPTION.
WILLIAMS V. WINGATE.
A successful contestant who secures the cancellation of an entry on a contest begun
prior to the repeal of the pre-emption law, but not concluded until thereafter,
acquires thereby no right of entry under the pre-emption law, if, prior to said
repeal, he had not initiated a valid settlement claim to the land involved.
Secretary Bliss to the Gommissioner of the General Land Office, March
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (E. F. B.)
The land in controversy to wit: The S. J NW and lots 3 and 4, T.
I N., R. 28 W., McCook, Nebraska, was formerly embraced in the
12209-VOL 26-28
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homestead entry of Henry M. Bare which was finally canceled Feb-
ruary 26, 1890, upon the contest of James Williams who was awarded
the preference right of entry, but who failed to exercise the right.
After the action of your office holding the entry of Hare for cancella-
tion and prior to the decision of the Department upon the appeal of
Hare, Charlie Williams was allowed to make homestead entry of the
tract subject to the right of James Williams the contestant.
May 12, 1890, James E. Wingate, pre-emption claimant, who had filed
a second contest against the entry of Hare, contested the entry of
Charlie Williams upon the ground of failure to establish a bona fide
residence on the tract and that the affidavit upon which his entry was
allowed to remain of record was false and fraudulent. Upon this con-
test a hearing was had which resulted in the cancellation of the entry,
and the preference right was given to Wingate.
The decision of your office holding Charlie Williams entry for cancella-
tion was rendered March 10, 1892, which was affirmed by the Department
upon the appeal of Williams, June 15, 1893.
July 5, 1893, Wingate filed declaratory statement for the S. A NW. 1
and lots 1 and 2 T. 1 N., R. 28 W., which was evidently intended to cover
the tracts in controversy, but they were erroneously described therein.
August 16, 1893, Charlie Williams made homestead entry of the land
in controversy under the second section of the act of March 2, 1889
(25 Stat., 854).
October 23, 1893, Wingate published notice of intention to make
pre-emption final proof, describing the land as the S. - NW. and lots
3 and 4, with special notice to Williams who appeared and protested
against the allowance of said proof, alleging that he Williams was a
settler on the land, and that it was not subject to pre-emption entry
by Wingate for the reason that the pre-emption law was repealed prior
to any pre-emption filing or bona fide settlement by Wingate.
Upon the proof submitted, the local officers recommended the can-
cellation of the homestead entry of Willians-and the approval of Win-
gate's pre-emption proof, which was affirmed by the decision of your
office of May 8, 1896, from which decision Williams has appealed.
The controlling question in this case is whether the land is subject
to entry by Wingate under the pre-emlption law, the proof showing
that he commenced to reside on the tract July 23, 1893, maintained
residence from that time to the date of hearing, and that he has shown
sufficient improvement and cultivation of the tract during that period,
to warrant the allowance of his entry, if he is entitled to make such
entry.
Wingate ploughed and prepared a part of the land for planting in
1888, when he left the land, as ie claims for fear of personal violence
by the Williamses. In the spring of 1889, he again ploughed part of
the land, and planted it in corn which was ploughed up by the Wil-
liamses against his protest. From the spring of 1889, to the spring of
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1893, he did not reside on the' land or cultivate it,. nor make any-
improvements upon it.
From July 26, 1883, the date of Hare's entry until the decision of the
Department of June 15, 1893, affirming the decision of your office hold-
ing for cancellation the entry of Charlie Williams3the laudwas covered
by homestead entries, and no settlement right could be lawfully initiated
upon said land while it was so segregated.
Section 4 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26. St;at., 1095), repealed all laws
allowing pre-emptions of the public land but provided that
all bona ide claims lawfully initiated before the passage of thisb act, under any of
said provisions of law so repealed, may be perfected upon due compliance with law
in the same manner, upon the same terms and conditions, and subject to the same
limitations, forfeitures, ad contests as if this act had not been passed.
Even conceding that the entry of Charlie Williams which was improp-
erly allowed during the existence of the entry of Hare, did not have the
effect to withhold the land from settlement, it does not appear that
Wingate performed any acts of settlement after the cancellation of
Hare's entry until after the repeal of the pre-emption law. His contest
against the entry of Hare which was filed subsequent to the contest of
James Williams upon which the entry was canceled, gave him no right.
He did not contest either entry upon the ground of priority of settle-
ment, but upon the failure of the entryinan to establish and maintain
residence. I
The preference right to enter the land which he secured by his con-
test against the Williams' entry, was the right to enter the land under
existing laws. It gave him no right to enter it under laws no longer
in force unless he had lawfully initiated a bona fide claim under such
law before its repeal.
It is true as stated in the decision of your office that
settlement and residence on land subject to entry by qualified pre-emptor prior to
the repeal of the pre-emption law, is the initiation of a right protected by section 4
of the act of March 3, 1891,
but this land was not subject to either settlement or entry at the date
Wingate olaims to have made settlement thereon, and the cases cited
do not sustain the view entertained by your office in this case.
In the case of Dornen. v. Vaughan (16 L. D., 8) the homestead entry
of Dornen was canceled May 14, 1883, and the controversy was upon
the application of Dornen for the reinstatement of the entry, which
was refused, the decision of the Department being rendered January
5, 1893. The land was therefore subject to settlement under the
pre-emption laws from May 14, 1883, until the repeal of the law.
The case of Sielaff v. Richter's Heirs et al. (20 L. D., 396) involved
an issue formed between two contestants as to which contest should
be entitled to precedence. Upon the hearing, the heirs of Richter,
the entryman, made default, and the local officers recommended the
cancellation of the entry upon Bradhury's contest, and that Sielaff's
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contest be dismissed. December 12, 1890, your office held Richter's
entry for cancellation, whi ch became final, no appeal having been taken
from the decision of the local office, and from that (late the land was
restored to the public domain, subject only to the rights of Sielaff and
Bradbury as rival contestants.
In awarding to Sielaff the preference right of entry the Department
said:
The preference right awarded by the Department is such as attached to 8ielaff on
December 12, 1890-eighty-one days before March 3, 1891, the date of the act
repealing the pre-emption laws. Sielaff's settlement on the abandoned, land in 1887,
and so long as Richter's entry remained intact, was not a lawful initiation of a bonta
fide pre-emption claim. But the rights of a qualified settler intending to pre-empt
would attach to the land as soon as the entry was canceled. If Sielaff was a settler
on the land with intention to pre-empt it, on December 12, 1890, or afterwards before
March 3, 1891, his claim was lawfully initiated, and is protected by the saving clause
of section 4 of the act of March 3,1891 (26 Statutes, 1095). If such be the fact,
he will be permitted to perfect his said claim upon due compliance with law, as
prescribed in said section.
As Win gate had not initiated a right u nder the pre-emption law prior
to its repeal, there is no authority given by the act to allow his pre-
emption entry, but as be was permitted to file his declaratory statement
for the land in the assertion of his preference right, he will be allowed
to make entry of it under any existing law to which it is subject, if he
is qualified to make such entry.
You will therefore notify him that he will be allowed sixty days in
which to make compliance with this direction, and if such action should
be taken, the homestead entry of Williams will be canceled. If Win-
gate faiIs to comply, his declaratory statement will be canceled and the
homestead entry of Williams will remain intact.
HOM:ESTEAD ENTRY-WIDOW-RELINQUISHMENT.
STEBERG V. HANELT.
On the death.of a homesteader, leaving a widow and heirs, the widow takes the
homestead right of her husband free from any claim on behalf of the heirs,
and is vested with full power to complete the entry for her own benefit, or
relinquish the same if she so elects.
The case of Eliza Willis, 22 L. D., 426, overruled.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Offie, March
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
This is a contest for title to the S. of the NE. and lots 1 and 2 of
section 2, T. 135 N., R 35 W., Fargo, North Dakota, land district.
On July 5, 1883, Julius Kelm made homestead entry No. 13,182 there-
for, and about one year thereafter died, leaving a widow, Augusta Kelm,
and four children, the children being then aged about eleven, nine,
seven, and two years, respectively. In 1886, about one year and a half
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after Kelin's death, his widow, then still residing, with her children,
on the land, was married to William Hanelt, the defendant. anelt,
his wife, and said children, continued to reside together upon the land
until the death of his wife, formerly Mrs. Kelm, in 1891. Hanelt and
the children continued to live together on the land for sone time there-
after and until one of the children, Amelia Kelm, became the wife of
Anton Steberg, the plaintiff. In the mean time, on July 8, 1889, Kelm's
widow, then the wife of Hanelt, relinquished the land, the entry was
canceled, and on the same date Hanelt made homestead entry therefor.
ilanelt having given notice of his intention to make final proof on
August 29, 1896, there was filed, on July 28, 1896, the duily corroborated
contest affidavit of said Steberg, alleging, among other tings:
That on the >8th day of July, 1889, depouent is informed and believes that said
Augusta Kelmj then the wife of said William Hanelt, wilfully and without the
knowledge or consent of said minor children, and without the knowledge or approval
of the probate court of Ransom county, state aforesaid, the court from which she
received her authority as guardian, did conspire with her husband, William Hanelt,
to unlawfully and fradulently, with intent to cheat and deprive said minor children
of their rights under the law to said real estate, relinquish on said 8th day of July,
1889, said homestead entry, which had been made by her former husband on July
5th, 1883, to the United States, to enable her then husband, William Hanelt, to enter
the same as a homestead, thus cutting off said minor children from all rights to said
land.
That said William Hanelt did fraudulently and unlawfnlly conspire with his wife,
the guardian of said minor children, to bring about said relinquishment, which
enabled him to enter the land for the purpose of defranding said minor children or
their rights therein; and in pursuance of said conspiracy said William Hanelt pre-
sented, at the Fargo Land Office, at Fargo, N. D., the said relinquishment, on the 8th
day of July, 1889, and at the same time and place said William Hanelt entered said
land as a homestead.
It is prayed in said affidavit that affiant be allowed to contest lanelt's
entry, that the same be canceled, and that the entry made by Julius
Keln be reinstated and his heirs allowed to make final proof and to
have patent for the land. A hearing was duly had between the par-
ties, before the local office on September 30, 1896. The local officers,
on April 1, 1897, agreed in their separate decisions that the allegations
of fraud and conspiracy had not been proven. The receiver further
held and recommended:
It appears to me that the widow of Kelm, Augusta Kelm, later the wife of Hauelt,
derived from her husband only his inchoate or inceptive right to the homestead for
life, and that both law and equity dictate that the children of Julius Kelm, deceased,
should be allowed to complete the entry of the deceased entryman, their father, for
their own benefit, and in view of this opinion I recommend that the present entry of
William Hanelt be canceled, the entry of Julius Kelm reinstated, and the heirs be
permitted to submit final proof as by law provided.
The register, per ontra, held:
I am of the opinion that the widow of Julius Kelm had the right to make the relin-
quishment in this case. Whether she made the relinquishment with a full under-
standing of the consequences, so far as her children were concerned, or whether she
made it in pursuance or connection with some contemporaneous agreement by which
438 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
the children were to be in a measure protected-does not appear in this case. Fraud
has been charged, bt not proven-hence the relinquishment must stand as having
been executed by law, understandingly and for the simple purpose shown on its face,
viz., to return the land covered by the entry of Julius Kelm to the mass of the public
domain.
I am therefore of the opinion that the eutry of Hanelt should be allowed to stand
and that this contest must be dismissed. -
Upon appeal by Steberg, your office, on September 15,1897, affirmed
the decision of the receiver, held Hahelt's- entry for cancellation and that
in the event the decision became final KBeih's entry should be reinstated
and his heirs allowed to sutibniitfll; proof. ilanelt now prosecutes an
appeal to tilepartmeut. -
There is i evideue'to- support the allegations of fraud. It is not
even alleged fthatthe relincishi- ent was procured from the widow by
duress, or deceit. -There isnuothilng to show that it was not her free and
voluntary act. The; motives or reasons which induced it are' not dis-
closed. Upon the testimony adduced at the hearing, it stands unas-
sailed except as to the bare legal right of the widow to make the same.
The only question in the ease is whether the widow in her lifetime
could lawfully relinquish to the United States all claim to the land
under the entry of her deceased husband.
The right or privilege to take public land as a homestead is created
by the laws of the United States and can be exercised, and can ripen
into title, only in pursuance of those laws. From its inception until
the title to the land passes from the United States, into whosoever's
hands the right may come, it is still governed exclusively by the home-
stead laws of Congress.
Section 2291 Revised Statutes, which is a part of the homestead law,
provides:
No certificate, however, shall be given, or patent issued therefor, until the expira-
tion of five years from the date of such entry; and if at the expiration of such
time, or at any time within two years thereafter, the person making such entry; or
if he be dead, his widow; or in case of her death, his heirs or devisee; or in case
of a widow making such entry, her heirs or devisee, in caseof her death, proves
by two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have-resided upon or cultivated
the saume for the term of five years. immediately succeeding the time of filing.
the affidavit, and makes affidavit that no part of such land has.beei alienated,
except as provided in section twenty two hundred and &ghty-eight, and that he,
she, or they will bear true allegiance to the Government of the United States; then,
in such case, he, she, or they, if at that time citizens of the United States shall be
entitled to a patent, as in other cases provided by law; - -
This statute controls the present case. The person who made the
entry died. He left a widow, who under the statute succeeded to the
homestead claim. She did not hold it as a trustee for her-husband's
heirs or devisees. They had no right to the laud during the vidow's
lifetime. The father, in his lifetime, could have divested himself of the
homestead claim by relinquishment. Nothing in the law precludes the
widow from doing likewise. She succeeded to the right of herhus-
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band, nothing more and nothing less. If she elected to part with it,
her judgment and action were controlling. The right to the land was
inchoate and could only be kept alive by compliance with law. The
widow alone could determine whether this course was advisable. It is
true, that if the right is kept alive by the widow and she dies without
making final proof, the right passes to the heirs or devisee of the entry-
man, but here the widow, to whose judgment the further prosecution
of the claim was committed by law upon the death of the husband-
entryman, elected to relinquish the claim.
Instead of relinquisling, she might have made final proof and have
obtained the full legal title by the issuance to her of a patent for the
land. 11er right to have done this is beyond question. The land would
thereby have become her individual property and she might have con-
veyed it regardless of her husband's heirs or devisees. Since she could
have lawfully acquired the full legal title, and have conveyed it at her
pleasure, why should it be assumed that she could not relinquish the
claim if that seemed to her the better course? Unless the homestead
law precluded her from returning the land again to the government,
divested of the homestead claim, which was then in her alone, the
relinquishment can not be regarded as unauthorized. The statute con-
tains no such inhibition either in its words or in what is reasonably
implied by them.
The views announced i the case of Eliza Willis (22 L. ., 426) would,
if allowed to prevail, sustain the decision of your office; but they are
not in accord with the statute. The Department must administer the
law as it stands and can not read into the statute new provisions, by
arbitrary construction. In so far as the Willis case contains anything
contrary to the views expressed in this case it is overruled.
It is expressly provided by section one of the act of May 14, 1880
(21 Stat., 140)-
That when a pre-em pti on, homestead, or tiimber-culture claimant shall file a written
relinquishment of his clain in the local land-office, the land covered by such clain
shall be held as open to settlement and entry without farther action on the part of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office.
The widow was the only lawful claimant to the land in question when
her relinlcuishment was filed and under this section the land was
thereby freed from the former claim and opened to settlement and
entry.
Hanelt's entry was properly allowed, and he should be permitted to
perfect title thereunder. The decision of your office is accordingly
reversed. Steberg's contest is dismissed.
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WAGON ROAD GRANT--REINSTATEMENT OF SELECTION.
KNOX v. GRANDy.
A selection made on behalf of a woagon road company, and thereafter relinquished,
can not be reinstated for the benefit of a purchaser from said company, if it
appears that said company has already received an amount of land in excess of
its grant.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, March,
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (F. W. C.)
By your office letter 'F" of December 28, 1896, was transmitted a
communication from R. F. Knox, petitioning that patent issue to him
direct for the NW. of the SE. 4of Sec. 15, T. 27 S., R. 13 W., Rose-
burg land district, Oregon.
This tract was involved in the case of R. F. Knox v. John Grandy,
decided by this Department April 16, 1894 (18 L. D., 4(1).
From the statement of the case then made it appears that this tract
is within the indemnity limits of the grant to the State of Oregon made
by the act of March 3, 1869 (5 Stat., 30), to aid in the construction of
a military wagon road from the navigable waters of Coos Bay to Rose-
burg. The grant was by the State conferred upon the Coos Bay Wagon
Road Company.
Selection was made of the tract on account of the grant, June 12, 1874,
but said selection has never been approved.
On October 24, 1888, John Grandy was permitted to make homestead
entry for said tract, which he commuted to cash in 1889.
In July, 1891, a hearing was ordered between Grandy and the com-
panjy to determine whether the tract was excepted from the withdrawal
made on account of the grant in April, 1871.
Upon the day set for the hearing the company's relinquishment was
filed, upon which -its selection was canceled and Grandy's entry per-
mitted to remain intact upon the records.
In November following, Knox, claiming to be the owner of the land
thfoughi mesne conveyances from the company, asked for a hearing to
establish his right to the land, which was duly ordered, and upon the
testimony adduced it was found that the company sold the land to one
W. G. Schofield on May 2, 1873, before it had selected the tract, and
thereafter Schofield sold to Knox.
In the previous decision (18 L. D., 401) it was held that the land had
not been shown to be excepted from the withdrawal, and was further
embraced in a selection of record at the date of Grandy's entry, that
said entry was erroneously allowed and should be canceled and the
selection reinstated "in order that the same may inure to the benefit of
plaintiff Knox."
In accordance with said decision the selection was reinstated and
Grandy's entry canceled.
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This action was taken notwithstanding by departmental order of
February 1, 1892 (14 L. D., 121), your office had been directed to identify
the excess in the certifications already made on account of this grant,
amounting to 10,359.20 acres, with a view to the institution of suit for
the recovery of the same.
While the showing heretofore made on behalf of Knox presents a case
for favorable consideration, were it not for the excess, yet in view of
this excess, to which the Department's attention does not seem to have
been called, further certifications can not be made ol account of the
w, agon road grant, and it is not, therefore, seen bow the reinstatement
of the selection can inure to Knox's benefit.
The order made in the previous decision of the Department, direct-
ing the reinstatement of the wagon road selection, is therefore revoked,
and said selection will be again canceled and Gran dy's entry reinstated.
PRACTICE-MOTION FOR REHEARING-STJPERSEDEAS.
CUNNINGHAM V. SPPNGTON.
A motion for rehearing, ol the ground of newly discovered evidence, wili not be
granted if it does not appear therefrom that said evidence is of such character
as to necessarily mollify the former conclusion.
The Secretary of the Interior may, in the exercise of his supervisory authority, by
due order, make a motion for rehearing filed out of tine, or petition for
re-review, act as a supersedeas, but in the absence of such order, they should
not be so treated in the General Land Office.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioier of the General Land Office, M31arch 29,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (P. J. C.)
A motion for rehearing has been filed by Samuel E. Sappington in a
case involving the NW. I of Sec. 26, T. 26 N., R. 2 E., Perry, Oklahomna,
land district.
The Department formally affirmed the concurring-decisions below
awarding the land to Cunningham. Motions for review by Perryman,
who was also a party to the contest, and Sappington, and also Perry-
mal's motion for a rehearing, were denied December 13, 1897, and
January 29, 1898.
The ground of the present motion is newly discovered evidence, and
consists of affidavits alleging that there was a contract entered into
between Cunningham and one C. M. Flora, who was also one of the
original contestants, by which it was agreed that Cunningham. was to
conduct the contest against Sappington's entry in the interest of him-
self-Cunningham
and Flora, jointly, and, in the event of success, that the land was to be equally
divided between them and that said contest was prosecuted and the decision in
Cunningham's favor procured under this agreement, Flora paying a large part of the
expenses of the trial for Cuningham's benefit.
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Flora's affidavit is presented in which he verifies the terms of the
contract as above set forth and says further, that in pursuance of the
contract he left the land and was to return when the case was won and
take his half; that he paid the expenses of six witnesses and advanced
other money for the contest.
There is in the record in this case two affidavits made by Flora for
the purpose of obtaining a continuance of the trial before the local offl-
cers. He gives as a reason for a continuance the absence of material
witnesses, and swears that they are absent because he had "made all
preliminary arrangements for a compromise of said cause between him-
self and Cunninghamt;"' that because "of the agreement and under-
standing" he did not bring is witnesses; that on account of said
agreement he has been misled," and that Cunningham "wholly fails to
carry out the promises made by him tending toward a compromise."
If the statement made by Flora at a time when his memory ought to
have been entirely clear as to any contract between him and Cunning-
ham are to be taken as true, then his affidavit filed in support of the
present motion is, to say the least, strongly suggestive of a faulty
memory. The two statements are irreconcilable, except on the theory
that his first negotiations, as recited in his affidavits for continuance,
having failed, he subsequently made another. This, however, is not
claimed, and it would seem as if that were improbable. The affidavits
for continuance were sworn to August 23, 1894. In the present affi-
davit Flora says "that on or about July and August, 1894," Cunning-
ham proposed to make the agreement, and "just before the hearing" it
was consummated. The hearing began September 4, 1894, it having
been continued on Flora's application to that date. He appeared in
person and by attorneys, offered no testimony in his behalf, but took
the witness stand in Cunningham's interest.
In view of the rather erratic course Flora has pursued in connection
with this controversy it is not considered that his testimony would have
any considerable force, even if he would testify to all he now swears to.
He does not state that he will so testify if given an opportunity, and
from the statement made by Sappington. in his affidavit he seems to
have some doubt about it himself. At all events, he could not force
Flora to produce the alleged contract, as suggested in his affidavit.
The statements of the persons who make affidavits in relation to this
alleged agreement are based entirely upon conversations with Flora,
and between Cnnnigham and Flora, which were overheard. But from
all that appears, these may all have taken place prior to the time Flora
made his affidavits stating that the compromise had failed.
Cunningham and his brother testified at the hearing that they made
the run from the north line of the territory. Affidavits are now pre-
sented which tend to show that they made the race from the Osage
Indian reservation on the east, which would be a much shorter dis-
tance than from the north. This is alleged to be newly discovered evi-
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dence the effect of which would be to impeach Cunningham and his
witnesses. It is stated by counsel' that this of itself would not be suf-
ficient upon which to grant a re-hearing, but taken in connection with
the alleged contract with Flora " should be considered as going to Cnn-
niugham's good faith."
Since it is clear that Flora's testimony as to the alleged agreement is
not sufficiently satisfactory to warrant its serious consideration, it would
seem as if there was no necessity for discussing the question of the
place from which Cunningham ran.
The motion is therefore denied, and the papers are herewith returned.
In transmitting the papers in connection with this motion for rehear-
ing, it was said in your office letter of February 28, 1898:
Said motion is herewith transmitted and by letter of even date the local officers
have been directed to suspend all action regarding the land in question.
With your office letter of March 16, 1898, there is forwarded a letter
from counsel for Cunningham, which might be termed a protest against
the action of your office in ordering a suspension of all action regard-
ing the land. It is claimed by counsel that motions for re-review and
rehearing, not served upon the opposite party, do not act as a super-
sedeas and should not prevent further action unless the same has been
entertained by the Secretary of the Interior. It is asked that your let-
ter of February 28, 1898, be modified and the instructions amended.
The letter from counsel for Sappington objects to any such action in
the part of your office, and asks that the matter be referred to the
Secretary of the Interior for consideration. -
In transmitting these letters your office requests "that the case be
considered at your (my) earliest convenience and that this (your) office
be given specific instractions for its guidance in the future in similar
matters."
Rle 114 (23 L. D., 07) provides that motions for review and rehear-
ing must be filed
within thirty days after notice of the decisioi complained of, and will act as a
sitpersedeas of the decision until otherwise directed by the Secretary.
These two classes of motions are the only ones that the Rules of Prac-
tice cdntemplate should suspend further proceedings in relation to the
land, and then only when filed ", within thirty days after notice of the
decision complained of." When. these motions thus fled are finally dis-
posed of by the Department, there is no provision in the rules that the
filing of any other or further motion shall operate as a spersedeas. No
suspension can therefore take place except upon the express order of
the Secretary.; 
Role 77 (23 L. D., 603) allows motions for rehearing to be filed after
the expiration of thirty days from notice of the decision of the Depart-
ment, when based on newly discovered evidence. There is no specific
time fixed for the presentation of a petition for re-review. These are
addressed to the Secretary of the Interior, and are an appeal to his
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supervisory power. They should not be filed in your office, but in the
office of the Secretary. (Golden v. Cole's leirs, 25 L. D., 154; Dorn v.
Ellingson, Id., 292.) The Secretary of the Interior in the exercise of
his supervisory power, may, by order, make a motion for re-hearing
filed out of time, or a petition for re-review, act as a supersedeas, but
otherwise they should not be so treated in your office.
Inasmuch as the motion for rehearing in the case at bar is denied,
there exists no necessity now for modifying the order of your office,
notwithstanding it was clearly erroneous.
APPLICATION TO ENTER-REINSTATEMENT-HlOMESTEAD ENTRY.
EEDA-II . NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
An application to enter properly rejected by final decision of the Department, under
the rulings then in force, can not be reinstated with a view to favorable action
nnder a changed construction of the law.
Land settled npon and occnpied by townsite claimants is not subject to entry nnder
the homestead law.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of te General La1zd Offie, March
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (W. A. E.)
In accordance with the instructions of the Department, dated Octo-
ber 29, 1896 (23 L. D., 433), your office has transmitted the record ill
the case of John H. Needhain v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
involving the N. of the S. and the E. of the SW. X of See. 19,
T. 13 N., . 19 E., North Yakima, Washington, land district.
This land is within the limits of the withdrawal of June 11, 1879, on
amended general route of the branch line of the Northern Pacific Rail-
road, and on definite location of the road, as shown by map filed May
24, 1884, it fell within the primary or granted limits of said road.
January 29, 1881, John C. Mc(rimmon filed a timber culture appli-
cation for said tract, but this application was rejected by the local
officers on account of the withdrawal for the benefit of the railroad
company. McCriinmon appealed, and his appeal was pending before
your office at the date of the definite location of the road.
March 21, 1885, your office sustained the action of the local officers,
and on further appeal the Department, by letter of February 7, 187
(132 L. and R., 434), affirmed your office decision.
June 23, 1887, the railroad company listed said land.
February 6, 1891, John H. Needham filed his homestead application
for the tract in question, and this application was rejected for conflict
with the company's claim.
On appeal, the action of the register and receiver was affirmed by
your office on May 22, 1895.
Needham thereupon attempted to appeal to the Department, but
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owing to a misunderstanding on his part, this appeal was not- filed
until after the tine allowed for filing it had expired. Your office accord-
ingly declined to forward the appeal, an(l Needham applied for a writ
of certiorari, which was granted by the Department on October 29,1896.
It was held by the Department that the withdrawal on amended gen-
eral route of the Northern Pacific Railroad was without sanction of law
and invalid (citing Northern Pacific P. R. Co. v. Miller, 7. L. D., 100;
and Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cole, 17 L. D., 8); that McCrimnmon's
timber culture application was consequently filed at a time when the
land was subject to entry; that his appeal from the rejection of his
application pending before your office at the date of 'the definite location
of the road, excepted the land from the operation of the grant (citing
the case of Weeks v. Bridgman, 159 U. S., 541);.that your office deci-
sion rejecting Needham's application appeared therefore to be erro-
neons; and that where lands have been erroneously awarded to a
railroad company by decision of the General Land Office, the Secretary
of the Interior may review such action without regard to the manner
in which the matter is brought before him.
February 25, 1897, after the record i the case had been transmitted
to the Department by your office, but before further action thereon,
John C. McCrimmon filed an application for reinstatement of his tim-
ber culture application. He quotes from the decision of the Depart-
ment to show that said application was erroneously rejected, and invokes
the supervisory power of the Secretary in his behalf.
March 26,1897, the mayor and common council of the city of North
Yakima filed a petition asking that they be allowed to intervene in
said case and be made parties thereto. This petition is sworn to, and
shows service upon all the adverse claimants. It is alleged that the
Northern Pacific Railroad Compamiy platted the land in question into
lots and blocks in the year 1885, and has sold said lots and blocks from
time to time until the title to no part of said lands is claimed' by said
company; that the city of North Yakima was incorporated January27,
1886, and the land here involved'was included within the corporate
limits of said city; that said land has been settled upon and occupied
as a townsite since the last named date, and has many houses and
other valuable improvements thereon. Petitioners ask that they be
given an opportunity to prove these allegations, in order that if the
facts are found to be as alleged, entry may be made for said land.
under section 2387 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
It is unnecessary to say more in regard to the railroad conl pany's
claim than has been already said by the Department. The compauy's
list will be canceled as to the land here involved.
In the case of Frank Larson (23 L. D., 452), it was held (syllabus),.
that:
An application to enter properly rejected by final decision of the Department,
under the rulings then in force, can not be reinstated with a view to favorable
action under a changed construction of the law. The applicant in such case may
make a new application, if he is qualified and no intervening rights have attached.
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McCrimmon's timber culture application, having been rejected by
final decision of the Department, under the rulings then in force, can
not now be reinstated with a view to its allowance under a changed
constrUCtion of the law, and as the timber culture law has been
repealed, and intervening rights have attached to this land, he can not
be allowed to file a new timber culture application therefor. His
application for reinstatement is accordingly denied.
If, as alleged by the mayor and city council of North Yakima, this
land was settled upon and occupied by townsite settlers on February
6, 1891, when Needham filed his homestead application therefor, it was
not subject to entry under the homestead law.
You will therefore instruct the local officers to appoint a day for
hearing upon the question as to the status of the land at the time when
Needham filed his application, and notify the parties in interest thereof.
RIGHT OF WAY-HIGHWAY-SECTION 2477, R. S.
DOUGLAS COUNTY, WASHINGTON.
It was not itended by section 2477 of the Revised Statutes to grant a right of way
for highways over public lands in advance of an apparent necessity therefor.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the Gemeral Land Office, sMarch
(W. V. D.) 31, 1898.
With their letter of April 16, 1897, the local officers at Waterville,
Washington, transmitted to your office a certified copy of an order of
the board of county commissioners of Douglas County, Washington,
purporting to be an acceptance of rights of way claimed to be granted
by section 2477 of the Revised Statutes, and asking that the right of
way so granted and accepted be made a matter of reservation in. all
subsequent patents issued for lands affected thereby.
Your office considered the matter, on April 28, 1897, and held that
the statute does not authorize the exclusion of such right of way from
patents issued for lands subject to such an easement. The county
commissioners have appealed to the Department.
Section 2477 of the Revised Statutes is as follows:
The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved
for public uses, is hereby granted.
Claiming to act under authority of the laws of the State of Washing-
ton, the board of county commissioners of Douglas county, in that
State, passed the following order:
BE IT REMEMBE RED: That, on the th day of April A. D. 1897, at a regular
meeting of the board of county commissioners of Douglas county, State of Washing-
ton, said meeting being duly held and all members of said board being present, on
motion, it was ordered that the right of way for the construction of highways over
public lands, as granted by act of Congress (Section 2477 Revised Statutes), be
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accepted, and the same is hereby accepted, as far as said grant relates to said
Douglas county, that is to say to the extent of thirty feet (30) on each side of all sec-
tions lines in said county; it is hereby declared that all sections lines in said county
shall be, and the same are hereby declared to be, the center lines of highways and
public roads in said county, wherever said section lines are bounded by public lands,
and said highways are hereby declared to be sixty feet (60) in width; wherever any
such section line shall be found to lie between public land on one side and private
land on the other, such highway shall be sixty feet in width, and be wholly on such
public land and bounded on one side by such section line.
It is further ordered that E. K. Pendergast, prosecuting attorney, for said county
and state, file a certified opy of this order in the United States Land Office at
Waterville, Washington, and take all necessary steps to have the Hon. Commissioner
of the General Land Officq exclude such easement and right of way from all patents
issued for lands in said county, which shall be claimed or settled upon subsequent to
the.date hereof.
Dated this 6th day of April A. D., 1897.
It is urged on appeal that it is the duty of the land department of
the government to execute this statute, that it authorizes the exclusion
of the right of way thereby granted from patents isued for lands to
which an easement may have attached by virtue thereof, and that the
propriety of such action is manifest.
The declaration by the board of county commissioners, that high-
ways shall be extended along all section lines designated by the public
surveys in said county sixty feet in width, that where the section lines
are bounded on both sides by public lands, such section lines shall be
the center of the highway, and that where any such section line shall
be found to lie between public land on one side and private land on the
other, the highway shall be wholly on such public land and bounded on
one side by such section line, embodies the manifestation of a marked
and novel liberality on the part of the county authorities in dealing
with the public land.
There is no showing of either a present or a future necessity for these
roads or that any of them have been actually constructed, or that their
construction and maintenance is practicable. Whatever may be the
scope of the statute under consideration it certainly Was not intended
to grant a right of way over public lands in advance of an apparent
necessity therefor, or on the mere suggestion that at some future time
such roads may be needed.
If public highways have been, or shall hereafter be, established
across any part of the public domain, in pursuance of law, that fact
will be shown by local public records of which all must take notice,
and the subsequent sale or disposition by the nited States of the
lands over which such highways are established will not interfere with
the authorized use thereof, because those acquiring such lands will take
them subject to any easement existing by authority of law.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
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OKLAHIIOMA LANDS-SECOND ENTRY-SECTION 13, ACT OF MARCH 2,
1889. 
JAMES W. LOWRY.
In determiuing the qualifications of an applicant for the right to enter lands in
Oklahoma obtained from the Senduoles and Creek or Moscogee Indians, as pro-
vided for in the first proviso to section 13, act of March 2,1889,.the status of
the applicant at the date of his application must control; and if he has at ch
time. attempted to, bb for any cause failed to secure title in fee to a homestead
nder existing law, or shall have made entry under the commutation provision
of the homestead law, he is qualified to make entry under the provisions of said
section.
The cases of Miller v. Sebastian, 19 L. D., 288, and James T. 1Krigbaum, 12 L. D., 617,
overruled.
Secretar y Bliss to the Commnissioner of the General Land ffce,111arch
(W. V. D.) - 31, 1898. (G. B. G.)
This case involves the SW. of Sec. 28, T. 19 N., R. 11 W., King-
fisher land district, Oklahoma Territory, and is before the Department
on the appeal of James W. Lowry from your office decision of May 16,
1893, denying his application, styled an "Application for a restoration
of homestead right and to be allowed to enter another tract of land."
In that application, under oath and corroborated by three witnesses,
Lowry stated, in substance:
1. That on June 14, 1887, he made homestead entry for one hundred
and sixty acres of land in Kansas, at the Garden City land office.
2. That lie resided on and cultivated said tract in good faith, and
made valuable and lasting improvements thereon during the years
1887, 1888, and 1889, but for reasons given found-it impossible to main-
tain a home there, and therefore commnuted said entry and paid for the
land, and aterwards sold it for $300-a small part of what lie had
expended on it.
3. That afterwards relying upon the laws in relation to Oklahoma,
he settled upon the SW. of Sec. 28, T. 19 N., R. 11 W. (the land first
above described), and in April, 1892, moved thereon, with his family
and effects, and established his residence, which he has maintained
ever since, improving and cultivating the land in good faith.
4. And thereupon he prayed that said paper might serve as an appli-
cation to make entry of said tract of land "until such time as the
Honorable Commissioner can pass upon my application for a restoration
of homestead rights."
It appears from your office decision aforesaid that Lowry's commuta-
tion of his entry at Garden City was made on October 16, 1889; that
the tract urpon which Lowry alleged settlement in April, 1892, is part of
the land obtained by cession from the Muscogee or Creek Nation, and is
segregated by homestead entry No. 9877, of Nathaniel F. Brown, made
December 27, 1892, based on soldier's declaratory statement, No. 1347,
filed July 9, 1892.
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Your officerejected Lowry's application,
for the reason that he has exhausted his homestead right, having made a former
entry before, and commuted the same subsequent to the act of March 2, 1889.
Your office treated Lowry's application as "a petition to be allowed
to make a second entry," and the act of March 2, 1889, above referred
to, is the act of that date, entitled " An act to withdraw certain public
lands from private entry, andi for other purposes" (25 Stat., 854), gener-
ally known as the "' second entry act."
This act has no application to the real question here presented. The
Congress, however, passed another act on the same date, March 2,
1889 (25 Stat., 980-1005), entitled,
An act making appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian
Department, and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with various Indian tribes, for the
year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety, and for other purposes.
This act controls the question presented by the record. Section 13
of this act provides, that the lands acquired from the Muscogee or
Creek Indians shall be disposed of' to'actual settlers under the home-
stead laws only, except as therein otherwise provided, and enacts as
follows:
And providedfur-ther, That any person weho leaving attempted to, but for any cause
failed to secure a title in fee to a homestead under existing law, or smho made entry
under iwhat is known as te commnatted provision of the homestead tan, shall be qualified
to make a homestead entry npon said lands.
The land upon which Lowry alleges settlement and which lie now
desires to enter, being land acquired from the Muscogee or Creek
Indians, is under the terms of this proviso subject to entry by one
" who made entry under what is known as the commuted provisions of
the homestead law," and the question here presented is, whether Lowry
is within the statute.
The eutry referred to in the statute is the commuted or cash entry.
The original entry in this case was made before the passage of the act
and the commuted or cash entry afterwards.
Is Lowry one "who made entry". This depends entirely on whether
the word "made" refers to a time previous to the passage of the act
exclusively, or to a future time as well. Grammatically, the word indi-
cates past time; but what is past time depends upon the date of reck-
oning. Reckoning from the date of the act, the word would refer to
time previous to the act, but reckoning from the date of an application
under the act, it would refer to time previous to the application, which
would include tine subsequent to the act, as well as previous to it.
The proviso, taken as a whole, indicates that the qualifications of an
applicant should be determined from his status at the date of his appli-
cation. The word "heretofore" is not found in the proviso. In this
respect it is more liberal than the second section of the general second
entry act, as recently construed by the Department in the case of
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Hertzke v. Henermond (25 1,. )., 82). In that case it was held that
the word "heretofore" in that statute limited the ol)eratiou of the act
to cases in whieh the entry hal been made prior to the passage of the
act, but that the failure to perfect title thereunder might e a future
contingency for which the act provided.
The act here under consideration was passed on the same day, and
was or the same general purpose, but will not bear the construction
given tile act, spra, in te case of Hlertzke 11. Henerrond, for the
reason that if ay part of it relates exclusively to time prior to the
passage of the act, it all relates to such past time.
It is thought that ast time is meant to be reckoned from a future
time, and that the past timne contemplated by the act is the time prior
to the date of the application to make second entry. If, then, any
person has, at the (late of his application under this act, attempted to,
but for any cause failed to secure a title in fee to a homestead under
existing law, or shall have made entry under the commutation provi-
sion of the homestead law, he is by virtue of this act qualified to make
entry upon lands, in Oklahoma Territory, acquired from the Seminoles,
or from the Muscogee or Creek Indians.
It follows that Lowry is entitled to the benefits of the statute. The
cases of Miller v. Sebastian (19 L. D., 288), and James T. Krigbaum
(12 L. D., 617), are hereby overruled, in so far as they are in conflict
herewith.
Your office decision herein is reversed. A hearing will be ordered
between James W. Lowry and Nathaniel P. Brown, to ascertain their
respective rights in regard to the tract in question, in which the cor-
roborated affidavit of Lowry, now i the record, will be treated as an
affidavit of contest filed as of the date of its presentation, July 4,
1892.
CONTEST-DILIGEN\,CE IN PROSECUTION-SECOND CONTE ST.
GAUTERAU V. CHANEY.
The failure of a contestant to prosecute his sit, and a resulting order of dismissal
for want of prosecution, will defeat the right of such contestant to be after-
wards heard on a charge substantially the same as that presented in the first
instance.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Q)lce, Mlarch.
(W. V. D.) 31, 1898. (W. M. B.)
The laud involved herein is lots 2 and 3, and S. of NE. I See. 9, T.
15 S., R. 3 W., S. B. M., Los Angeles land district, California.
The record submitted discloses, as recited in your office letter, the
following facts: That Edward W. Chaney made timber culture entry
on July 7, 1887, for the above described tract of land; that on Novem-
ber 5, 1892, he gave notice of his intention to make commutation proof
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at the local office on )ecember 12, 1892; that Frances Gauterku on
November 19, 1892, filed protest and application to contest the entry
of Chaney, claimng preference right under act of May 14, 1880 (21
Stat., 140).
The protest against the allowance of Clalley's proof, and the appli-
cation to contest his right of entry, were based upon the ground that
said entryman had failed to comply with the requirements of the timber
culture law, alleging, substantially, wherein such failure consisted.
With respect to the proof and entry submitted ad made by the
entryman your office letter contains statement as follows:
Chaney made proof on the dayset a n Gauterau filed an affidavit asking that hear-
ing be had on his complaint at San Diego, Cal. A counter affidavit was iled by
Chaney. By agreement of the attorneys at Los Angeles, the cease vas continued to
Decemnber 21, 1892, before your office. Deceiuber 21, the claimant appeared and filed
a motion to dismiss for the want of prosecution, the plaintiff being in default. The
motion was sustained and the case dismissed. The next day the claimant made
C. E. No. 4959.
The above referred to action of the local office i dismissing the pro-
test of Gauterau and his application to contest for failure to prosecute
was, upon appeal, considered and sustained by deeision of your office,
of date January 23, 1891.
Appeal was taken from said decision to this Department, and after
full onsideratiou of the same the concurring decisions of the local
office and your office were approved and your office decision affirmed
by departmental decision of August 31, 1895.
A motion was made by (Gauterau for review of said departmental
decision of August 31, 1895, which was considered and denied by depart-
mental decision of December 16, 1895.
More than five months subsequent to said departmental decision, to
wit, on May 22, 1896, Gauterau filed a new contest application, and
asked for a hearing in the ease, which matter being considered some-
what at length the hearing requested was refused by your office decision
of July 8, 1898, upon the ground that nothing new or different was
alleged in the new Complaint from that set up in the former complaint,
and that Gauterau had failed to appear and prosecute under the said
former complaint at the time set for the bearing thereof1, and had
offered no excuse for such failure.
An appeal from the said decision of your office, refusing the new
hearing applied for, brings the case before this Department for the
third time.
A day having been set, as appears, for Chaney to submit final proof
upon his entry for the land in question, and for Gauterau to appear and
submit evidence against the allowance of the same, and he (Gauterau)
having failed, after due notice as to the time and place named for such
proceeding, and without giving a reason or excuse therefor, to appear
and show cause why such proof should not be accepted and Chaney
not allowed to make cash entry of the land involved, lost the right to
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be afterwards heard upon a complaint containing nothing new, but
which in fact set forth, substantially the same state of facts upon
which was based the application for the hearing originally asked for
by Gauterau and allowed in pursuance thereof. See case of Quirk v.
-Stratton, 5 L. D., 210.
For the foregoing reasons the decision appealed from, which refused
the application for the new or second hearing asked for, is deemed to
be without error, and the same is therefore hereby affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTIONS-MINERAL LAND.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
Lands excepted from the grant to the Southern Pacific by homestead entries that
-were existing at the date when the grant took effect, may be taken on behalf of
said grant in lieu of mineral lands, if at the date of selection such entries have
been canceled, and the lands are free from other claims or rights.
Secretary Bliss to tile Comm9nissioner of the General Land Office, liarch
(W. V. D.) 31, 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter of February 4, 1898, was forwarded with favor-
able recommendation, supplemental clear list No. 64, covering eighty
acres within the Visalia land district, California, selected on account of
the grant made by the act of July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 292), to aid in the
construction of the Southern Pacific Railroad, main line.
The lands selected are portions of odd numbered sections within
twenty miles of the line of said road and according to the certificate
attached to the list said tracts were covered by homestead entries at
the date of the attachment of rights under said grant, which entries
have since been canceled and the lands were, at the date of selections
under consideration, free from adverse claims.
These selections were made in lieu of certain tracts lost to the grant
by reason of their mineral character. Section 3 of the act of July 27,-
1866, supra, provides:
That all mineral lands be, and the sanie are hereby, excluded from the operations
of this act, and in lieu thereof a like quantity of unoccupied and unappropriated
agricultural lands in odd nubnbered sections nearest to the line of saidl road, and
within twenty miles thereof, may be selected as above provided.
It will be observed that the selections in lieu of lands lost to the grant
by reason of their mineral character are limited to the same sections
purported to be carried by the grant, namely, the odd numbered sections
nearest to the line of said road and within twenty miles thereof.
Without discussing this peculiar provision of the act, the selections
in question meet the terms thereof and as they are free from other claim
or right I have approved the list submitted which is herewith returned
as the basis for patent.
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.JURISDICTION-SURVEY-P-IPARIAN RIGHTS-SCRIP LOCATION.
HARvEY M. LA FOLLETTE ET AL.
The Secretary of the Interior, in the proper exercise of his supervisory authority,
may vacate a decision of the General Land Office and direct a reconsideration of
the case by said office, even though no appeal may have been taken from its
decision therein.
The jurisdiction of the Land l)epartment is confined to pblic lands, and does not
extend to lands that have passed into private ownership; hence if through mis-
take, or otherwise, a tract is surveyed as public land, when in fact it is private
property, such survey will not change the status of the land so that the Depart-
nint ivill thereafterbe prevented from taking proper action to protect the rights
of the private owner.
The survey of a tract of land and the approval thereof do not preclude the Depart-
nent from re-examining the matter at any time before the legal title to the land
has passed out of the United States, setting aside such approval. and annulling
the survey, if the facts disclosed by the re-examination demand such action.
The cases of Childress et al. . Smith, 15 L. 1)., 89, Case v. Church, 17 L. D., 578,
Gowdy i. Gilbert, 19 L. D., 17, California and Oregon Land Co., 21 L. D., 344,
overruled.
A scrip location confers no vested right that precludes inquiry on behalf of the
Department as to the status of the land, or as to any question affecting the
validity of such location.
Lines of survey mun along permanent bodies of water are run as meander lines, the
water itself being the true boundary line of the land to be sold, and all accre-
tions after survey rund prior to patent, pass under the patent wthenl issued, and
the goverimeut thereafter is not entitled to sbseqnent accretions.
Land lying between the meander line of a lake and -the water linethereof is not
jiablic land of the United States subject to location by McKee scrip, if at the
time of such attempted location the government has no interest in said land as
riparian owner.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General. Land Office, April
2, 1898. (W. C. P.)
Harvey M. LaFollette and Mathias Benner have appealed from your
office decision of May 26, 1897, rejecting their application to enter with
McKee scrip certain lands in. See. 10, T. 39 N., R. 14 E., 3rd p. m., Illinois,
claimed to be vacant public lands.
August 3, 1896, Martin M. Cooney and eight others, among them.
Harvey M. LaFollette and Mathias Benner, filed in your office their
application to enter the same land with the same scrip. This applica-
tion was accompanied by several affidavits by persons who claim to
have known the land fron 1850 to 1868, asserting in effect that the land
lies between St. Clair street in the city of Chicago and the waters of
Lake Michigan; that St. Clair street is on the east line of Wall's survey
of 1821, and stating that- there was quite a body of this land at the
time afflants first knew it which has been enlarged by filling in and
accretion and that there are no laid out streets on said tract and that
the same is vacant. This application was rejected by your predeces-
sor's letter of August 31, 1896, upon the ground, among others, that the
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land in question had been formed by the hand of man or by natural
causes subsequent to the survey of 1821. No appeal was taken from
that decision nor was there any effort to have the case reconsidered in
your office or to have the decision thus rendered modified or set aside.
September 18, 1896, there were filed in your office certain instruments
executed by all the original applicants including LaFollette and Ben-
ner, by which each for himself declared that he
hereby relinquishes all his right, title, and interest in and to the premises described
in an application for a patent under the McKee scrip, heretofore filed by them and
others, the receipt for which is dated July 15th, 1896, and each for himself hereby
files his relinquishment and withdrawal of his name from said application and pro-
ceeding for a patent therender pending before the United States Land Departuient,
and permission was asked to withdraw all papers filed in support of
that original application. There is nothing in the record before me to
show what action or in fact that any affirmative action was taken by
your office in respect to these relinquishiments and the application to
withdraw papers. On the 'same day, however, September iS, 1896,
Harvey M. LaFollette and Mathias Benner filed an application to locate
with the same scrip the same lands, and on September 21, 1896,
requested that the papers and maps filed with the former application
be withdrawn and te-liled and considered in connection with their new
application.
September 24, 1896, your predecessor recommended that certain
clerks in your office be detailed to survey as "nsurveyed public land"
the tract in question, and on the same day the detail recommended was
made, the language of the order following that of the recomnendation
as follows:
On the recommendation of the Commissioner, you are hereby detailed for dnty as
United States surveyor to survey a strip of nunsrveyed public lands lying between
the original meander line and the present shore of Lake AMichigan, in section 10,
township 39 north, range 14 east, 3rd P. M., Illinois.
September 27, 1896, N. K. Fairbanks et at., claiming to be owners in
possession of parts of the land applied for by LaFollette and Benner,
filed a protest against, and motion to set aside this order for survey,
upon the grounds that the United States had no title thereto, citing in
support thereof departmental decision of August 31, 1895 (21 L. D.,
131), rejecting the application of George W. Streeter to make homestead
entry of said laud for the reason
that such lands do not belong to the government, and therefore this Department has
no jurisdiction to direct their survey or disposal.
By letter of October 1, 1896, to your office and received there October
5, the attorney for the board of commissioners of Lincoln Park referred
to the fact that surveyors were then making a survey of said land as
public land, and to the application of LaFollette and Benner, objected
to the issuance of any patent for said land and asked permission to
show cause why patent should not be issued.
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October 12, 1890, notice was given by your office to the attorneys for
the applicants and to those for opposing parties that on October 27,
1896, the parties objecting to the issuance of patent to LaF'ollette and
Benuer would be heard.
October 15, 1896, LaFollette and Benner tiled al amended application
describing the land applied for as
Lot A of said fractional section 10, in township and range aforesaid, as described and
shown on the plat of the official survey of such lands approved October 15tb, 1896.
The reason for this amended application is stated as follows:
It being expressly understood that this application is intcnded as al amendment
to, and in lien of, the application to locate liled by the ndersigned September 18th,
1896, in the General Land Office. This amendnent being nade for the pillpose of
conforming to the description of the United States survey recently made, and
approved October 15th, 1896, and to incide all the land eumbraced therein it having
been the purpose of the original applicationl to covfer and include slch lands.
It seems, however, that the plat in question was not received in
your office on October 15, 1896, but was received October 16, and on
the samne day was formally approved by your predecessor.
On the next day, October 17, the applicants filed another amended
application saying-
It being expressly understood that this application is intended as a aendment
to the amended application to locate, filed by the undersigned October 157 1896, in
the General Land Office, anld is made for the purpose of giving the correct date of
the approval of the plat and field notes of the offlicial survey coveriug the land
applied for.
October 26, there were filed on the part of soule of those opposing
the survey of this tract as public land and the location of the scrip
thereon, separate protests vdrified and supl)orted by affidavits and ol
the next day yet other formal protests and affidavits were tiled. Octo-
ber 26, the applicants filed evidence of the assignment to LaFollette of
the scrip in question by the party to whom it was issued, and of the
assignment of an undivided one-half interest therein by LaFollette to
Bener and also proof of the naturalization of the latter.
November 6, those objecting to said survey filed a orinal motion for
the review and setting aside of the approval of the plat of said survey
filed and approved October 16.
Besides those objecting to the survey of this tract and the location
of this scrip, on the ground that the land is not public land of the
United States, others, Plaimiig the tract to be publie land but assert-
ing a right to enter-it under the homnestead law or to locate other
scrip thereon, also appeared and objected to the application of La Fol-
lette and Benner.
While the matter was still pending ill your office, N. K. Fairbanks
et al. addressed a communication to this. Department calling attention
to the fact that in the order detailing clerks in your office to survey
said laud it had been designated as "a strip of unsurveyed public
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lands" and that the attorneys for La Follette and Benner in their argu-
ment before your office had claimed that this language in the order of
detail constituted a determination by this Department that said tract
was public land of the United States and asled that said order be so
modified as not in any way to determnine or affect the controversy as to
whether or not said tract is public land of the United States. Febru-
ary 19, the Department addressed a letter to your office, which was
received there the next day (erroneously stated i appellants' brief to
be February 26), asserting that the Departmient did not intend to utter
any judgmient as to whether said land was public land, modified said
order by describing the land to be surveyed as "a strip of lands claimed
to be usurveyed public lands" and by adding to said order the words:
Nothiag herein shall be construed as deterininhig whether said lafids are public
lands of the United States. this quiestion aving been referred to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office for decision in the first instance and, according to ily
understanding, being now under consideration by him.
While your predecessor had announced that a decision in the case
would be promulgated February 23, 1897, it seems that a decision in
favor of La Follete and Benner received his signature February 20.
Upon February 22, and before the decision was promulgated, Secretary
Francis addressed and delivered to your predecessor an order directing
him to suspend judgment in said case until the further order of this
Department.
Respecting this purported decision of your predecessor the applicants
in their brief filed upon this appeal say:
Upon Saturday, February 20th, 1897, Comnmissioner Lamnoreux decided the case and
found the applicants entitled to atent. Learning this by their daily inspection of
the record, the attorneys for the applicants ordered and received a certified copy of
said decision-the copy given being a duplicate or carbon copy and probably made
with the original draft. They were then ifirined that all notices were preparing
and would be mailed out that day or the (office) day following.
Concerning the same matter, your predecessor, in a communication
dated March 11, 1897, to the then Assistant Attorney General of this
Departmenit, says:
On the twentieth I signed opinion and had inumber of copies made the same daIy
to be given to the press on the twenty third which date I had announced that the
decision would be prom nnlgated. One (if the copies on the twentieth I gave to a
party with permission for him to use it after the decision should be promulgated but
in no case to be used until promulgation. This was all-done on the twentieth. On
the twenty-second Secretary suspended promnulgation.
This decision of your predecessor was not prepared by hin or by any
one in the governmelt's service. Whei in advance of the time fixed
for its promulgation, lie gave to the attorneys for the applicants a cer-
tified copy and also gave a copy "to a party with peruission for him to
use it after the decision should be promiulgated" his decision had not
been placed aong the alers in this case, had not been noted in the
records of your office and had not been press copied, although all of
these acts usually precede giving publicity to your office decisions.
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Upon ascertaining this situation of the matter the present Secretary
issued to your office the following order, March 13, 1897:
It having been made known to me that there is in y our office what purports to be
an opinion signed i the matter of the application of Mathias Benner and Harvey
M. La Follette, to locate McKee scrip on what is known as the Lake Front of Chi-
cage, Illinois, and that a copy of said paper has been delivered to one of the parties
to the controversy before its rendition and promulgation, i flagrant disregard of
right and justice, in violation of the express order of my predecessor and the usual and
just rules of proced ure; now, therefore, in the exercise of the discretion and authority
conferred upon me by law I direct you to order a rehearing of such application at
such time as you niay designate, not later than thirty (lays from the date hereof, and
to imniediately notify all parties in interest of this order and of the time fixed for
the hearing.
All orders and acts of your department heretofore made or done in the matter of
such application are hereby rescinded, vacated and annulled to the end that said
application may be beard de ovo and true and equal justice done between the
parties.
A motion for review and revocation of this order presented by the
applicants was denied March 22, 1897.
The case was thereafter heard in your office, arguments being pre-
sented by all parties in interest, and a decision was rendered May 26,
1897, holding that the land in question is not public land of the United
States, denying the application of La Follette and Benner and setting
aside the approval of the survey and lat.
From this decision the applicants appealed to this Department and
the case was submitted upon printed briefs.
The land involved is a tract claimed to be otside and east of the
survey line of section 10, township 39 N., range 14 E. 3rd.p. II., Illinois,
as run by surveyor John Walls in June, 1821. By that survey section
10 was returned as fractional and that part of it lying north of Chicago
river was (lesigllate(l as the north fraction of said section and returned
as ebracing 102.29 acres. Alay-7, 1831, Eobert A. Kinzie made pre-
emption cash entry for said north fraction paying therefor at the rate
of $1.25 per acre. On March 9, t837, patent issued on said entry in
which the land is descrihed as follows:'
The jot or north fraction of section ten in township thirty-nine, north of range
fourteen east, in the district of lands muibject to sale (formerly at Padestine, no) at
Chicago, Illinois, containing one hundred aiid two acres and twenty-nine hundredths
of au acre, according to the official plat of the survey of said lands, returned to the
General Land Office by the surveyor-general, which said tract has been prehased
by the said Robert A. Kiuzie.
It is claimed by the applicants that a strip of land lying .outside of
the eastern line of said north fraction as established by said survey
and between that line and the waters of Lake Michigan was not in-
cluded in said survey and remained unsurveyed pblic laud of the
United States. However this may be, the fact is that large additions
have been made to the land as it then existed until now there is a tract
lying between the survey line of 1821 and the present water line of
Lake Michigan, estimated to contain over one hundred and sixty acres.
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These additions resulted in part from natural accretions and i part
from artificial causes. The addition was at first by way of atural
accretion which was afterwards accelerated by the building of piers
into the lake and by the dumpage of refuse from the city. About the
year 1891 the board of commissioners of Lincoln Park, under the
authority of a statute of Illinois, began the construction of a drive-
way i the lake some distance from the shore line as it then existed and
the filling in behind this drive-way has progressed rapidly until now
the body of land between the original survey line and the present shore
line has reached the area above mentioned. Two of the protestants
against the allowance of the application of LaFollette and Benier have
heretofore sought to acquire title to parts of this tract under the home-
stead law and by the location of scrip and still assert a right thereto
if the land be determined to be public. The other protestants gener-
ally claim to be owners of parts of said tract by virtue of the owner-
ship of the land bordering on the original shore line. All applications
heretofore made to acquire title to this land under any of the public
land laws have been denied upon the ground that the government had
no title thereto.
The specifications of errors made in support of the appeal are thirty,
but it does not seem necessary to quote them. It is insisted that the
order of this Department of February 22, 1897, directing a suspension
of judgment in this case and that of March 13, were without authority
and hence of no effect; and that the decision made February 20, not
having been appealed fron became finl], is in full force, and binding
upon this Department.
This question seems to be conclasively settled adversely to the con-
tention of appellants by the citation of a single authority. In the case
of Knight . United States Land Association (142 U. S., 161), a survey
had been made of the claim-of the Pueblo of San Francisco and had
been approved by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. No
appeal from this action was taken but the Secretary of the Interior
sent for the papers, examinied into the matter, and reversed the action
of the Commissioner. It was contended that there was no authority
for such action and of this contention Justice Lamar, speaking for the
court, said:
This contention is based upon the proposition that the Secretary of the Interior
had no authority to set aside the order of the Commissioner approving and confirm-
ing the Stratton survey, especially i view of the fact that no appealwes taken from
such order, and the authorities of the city acqiiieseed in that survey. This proposi-
tion is unsound. If followed as a rule of law the Secretary of the Interior is shorn
of that supervisory power over the pblic lands which is vested in him by section
441 of the Revised Statutes.
After citing the various sections of the Revise(l Statutes directing
that the Commissioner of the General Land Office shall perform certain
duties in relation to the public lands "under the direction of the Secre-
tary of the Interior," the court said:
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The phrase ulder the direction of the Secretary of the Interior," as used in these
sections of the statutes, is not meaningless, but was intended as an expression in
general terms of the power of the Secretary to supervise and control the extensive
operations of the Land Department of which he is the head. It means that, in the
important matters relating to the sale and disposition of the public domain, the
surveying private land claims and the issuing of patents thereon, and the adminis-
tration of the trusts devolving upon the government by reason of the laws of Con-
gress, or uder treaty stipulations, respecting the public domain, the Secretary of
the Interior is the supervising agen t of the government to do justice to all claimants
and preserve the rights of the people of the United States.
The court also quoted with approval a part of the decision of this
Department in the case of Pueblo of San F'rancisco (5 L. D., 483-494) a
part of which quotation reads as follows:
The statutes in placing the whole business of the Department uinder the super-
vision of the Secretary of the Interior, invest him with authority to review, reverse,
amend, annul or affirm all proceedings in the Department having for their ultimate
object to secure the alienation of any portion of the public lands, or the adjustment
of private claims to lands with a just regard to the rights of the public and of private
parties.
Such supervision nay be exercised by direct orders or by review on appeals. The
mode in which the supervision shall be exercised in the absence of statutory direc-
tion may be prescribed by such rules and regulations as the Secretary may adopt.
When proceedings affecting titles to lands are before the Department the power of
supervision may be exercised by the Secretary, whether these proceedings are called
to his attention by formeal notice or by appeal. It is sufficient that they are brought
to his notice.
Various decisions of the supreme court are then cited as authority
for this holding and as if to render more clear if possible the position
taken, the following language is used:
It makes no difference whether the appeal is in regular forum according to the
established rules of the Department, or whether the Secretary on his own motion,
knowing that injustice is about to be done by soine action of the Commissioner,
takes up the case and disposes of it in accordance with law and justice. The Secre-
tary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands. The
obligations of his oath of office oblige him to see that the law is carried out, and
that none of the public domain is wasted or disposed of to a party not entitled to it.
The doctrine thus announced has been adhered to in subsequent
cases, among which may be mentioned the following:
Orchard v. Alexander (157 U. S., 372);
Stoneroad v. Stoneroad (158 U. S., 240);
Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith (165 U. S., 28);
Michigan Land and Lumber Co. v. Rust (168 U. S., 589).
On the part of appellants, stress is laid upon the fact that Section
453, Revised Statutes uses the word"execultive"in describing the duties
pertaining to the survey and sale of the public lands which are to be
performed by the Commissioner of the General Laud Office under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and it is asserted that the
decision in Knight v. United States Land Association, supra,
at first reading might seem to hold that the authority of the Secretary is absolutely
coextensive with that of the Commissioner, but does not, in fact, so hold except as
to executive 0 ainisterial duties.
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There is nothing in the language used to justify this statement, but
on the contrary that language indicates that in the opinion of the court
the supervisory authority of the Secretary extends to all matters involv-
ing the disposition of the public lands. Not only is the language used
by the court broad and unequivocal, but there is a quotation from a
decision of this Department (5 L. D., 483-494) which can not be said to
restrict the supervisory power of the Secretary to any particular class
of cases. That quotation is in part as follows:
F or example if, when a patent is about to issue, the Secretary should discover a
fatal defect in the proceedings, or that by reason of some newly ascertained fact the
patent; if issued, would have to he annulled, and that it would be his duty to ask
the Attornev General to institute proceedings for its annulment, it would hardly be
seriously contended that the Secretary might not interfere and prevent the execution,
of the patent. I-lIe would not be obliged to sit quietly and allow a proceeding to be
consumuiated which it would he immediately his duty to ask the Attorney General to
take measures to annul. It would not be a sufficient answer against the exercise of
his power that no appeal had been taken to him and therefore he was without
authority in the matter.
The contention here is that the decision of the Conmissioner dated
February 20, 1897, not having been appealed from became final and
that the Secretary has nl authority to prevent it being carried into
effect by the execution of a patent, even though ie should find- that
the Department has no jurisdiction over the land in question, or that
the applicants are not for any other reason entitled to acquire it. This
is, in effect, just what the Secretary, in the above quotation, said. vould
not be seriously contended. In Orchard v. Alexander, st1pra, the ques-
tion was as to the finality of decisions of the local officers upon final
proofs i pre-emption cases which the statute (Section 2263, IRevised
Statutes) requires
shall be made to the satisfaction of the register and receiver of the land district in
which such lands lie, agreeably to such rules as may he prescribed by the Secretary
of the Interior.
The court, however, mentions te act of July 4, 1836 (5 Stat., 107),
which it says was substantially carried into the Revised Statutes as
Section 453 (quoted from above) and concluded that the power of super-
vision and control granted by said act, although in terms extending to
only executive duties, included the right to review a decision of the
local land officers as to the matter of sttlement and improvements, at
least in cases in which the proof before those officers was by ecx parte
affidavits, aid continuing the following argument is made:
And if the right of supervision and control over their decision exists under those
circumstances, it is difflcnlt to perceive any reason why it does not exist under all.
There is certainly nothing in'the statute Which in terms creates any distinction, and,
indeed, in the nature of things there is no foundation for any.
This argument may be applied with equal force to the case here under
consideration.
In the case then before the court the decision i Butterworth vx. Hoe
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(112 U. S., 50), was cited to support the contention that the Cominmis-
sioner had no authority to interfere with the decision of the local offi-
cers and it is cited here to support the proposition that the Secretary
has no supervisory authority over-the Commissioner except as to exec-
utive or ministerial duties. The court there said that an examination
of the opinion in Butterworth v. Hoe showed that it threw little light
on the question and after calling attention to the fact that there is a
special provision of law for an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents
to the supreme court of the District of Columbia, said:
This special provision for an appeal to a j udicial tribunal, with a declaration as
to the effect of the decision of such tribunal, was held to be conclusive so far as
respects proceedings in the department. Bt the difference between the two cases
is obvious. There is no special provision for an appeal from the (lecision of the local
land officers as to the mnatter of settlement and improvement; nothing to take the
case out of the general grant of power to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office and the Secretary of the Interior to control all matters in respect to the sale
and disposal of the public lands.
The contention that the supervisory power of the Secretary is limited
to cases involving only executive or ministerial duties of the Commis-
sioner can not be sustained. Under the authorities cited it must be
held that such power extends to all cases involving the disposal of pub-
lie lands except those, if there be any, where the law expressly declares
that the action of the Commissioner shall be final or provides for a
review by some other tribunal.
The authority of the Secretary to nake the order of February 22j
1897, directing the Commissioner to suspend judgment in this case
until further orders of this Department, and the effect of such order,
are discussed quite elaborately in the various briefs in the case. The
appellants clain that there was no authority for the order and that it
had no effect whatever. The subsequent action of the Department
renders this order entirely uimportant. If the decision of the Com-
missioner of February 20 had been regularly promulgated and not
appealed from, still the Secretary, as herein shown, would have had
full authority to send for the papers in the case, consider it and modify,
reverse and set aside that decision if the facts justified such a course.
His authority to direct a reexamination of the case in your office before
an examination by him can not be questioned. This course was the one
which, in the nature of things, would most surely result in a just con-
clusion and the proper adjudication of the questions involved. This
course was adopted and on March 13, 1897, the order quoted above was
given, directing a rehearing of -the case in your office and revoking all-
orders made or acts done in the premises by your office.
Another contention made by appellants is that the order for the sur-
vey of 1896 and the approval thereof was a final determination that
the land in question is public land and that thereby that question
became resjudicata and beyond the further control and jurisdiction of
the Department. They say, in effect, this land was surveyed as public
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land and the survey approved October 16, 1896, when they finally
located their scrip on it, by virtue of which the title thereto vested in
them, and after that neither the Comimissioner of the General Land
Office nor the Secretary of the Interior had any authority in the prem-
ises, except to cause a patent to issue to them and this notwithstand.
ing it might be subsequently shown that the land did not belong to the
United States, or that there were gross fraud and irregularities in the
survey. The departmental decisions relied upon to support the propo-
sition that by ordering a survey of a tract of land the Department
finally determines the character of that tract to be public land, and
thereafter is powerless to change that determination are-
Childress et al. v. Smith (15 L. D., 89);
Case v. Chnrclh (17 L. D., 578);
Gowdy v. Gilbert (19 L. D., 17);
California and Oregon Land Co. (21 L. D., 344).
In Childress t al. v. Smith the land involved was an island in White
river, Arkansas. By a survey made in 1821 the river was meandered
and the island, if it then existed, was omitted from that survey, but in
1854 the survey was extended to include it. It remained uncultivated
and apparently unclaimed until 1886 when Stuith made homestead
entry therefor against which Childress and Glenn protested, alleging
ownership thereof by virtue of owning the lands on the east side of
the river opposite to the island. Of the survey of 1854 Secretary
Noble said:
The ordering of the survey of 1854 was a determination by your office (the proper
tribunal) that the land belohged to the government.
It has been so held and considered for nearly forty years, and as such it was
entered by Smith. I shall therefbre not disturb his entry, but leave the contestants
to their remedy in court.
The Secretary did not discuss his authority to act in the premises,
but did say that because of the long lapse of time during which the
former departmental action had stood unquestioned he did not deem
it best to interfere.
In Case v. Church the -land involved was an island in Long Lake,
Mlichigan, which Case, who had been in possession thereof for some
years, applied to have surveyed. The survey was directed to be made,
the land ordered sold as an isolated tract, and so sold. Church becon-
ing the purchaser. Case protested against the issue of patent on that
sale and applied to enter the land under the pre-emption law. On
appeal to this Department, however, lie changed his position and
insisted that the patent should not be issued because the lands on
Long Lake had been patented, as a part of the riparian lands whereby
the government had parted with its title to the island and that lie,
Case by virtue of his long continued adverse possession had acquired
prescriptive title thereto. After a statement of the facts substantially
as above the Secretary said:
These are questions essentially for the courts to determine and have no proper
place in departmental adjudications. The question as to whether the land is, or is
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not, the property of the United States government became res adjudieate, so far as
the power of this Department extends, wheni it was ordered sold by the Secretary of
the Interior.
In Gowdy v. Gilbert the section embracing the land involved was
surveyed in 1839 ad upon a resurvey made in 1889 a additional lot
(6) was marked olt. Gilbert was allowed to inake entry of said lot,
whereupon Gowdy protested claiming the land by virtue of riparian
ownership. Upon these facts Secretary Smitl said:
This is a question that has passed beyond the jurisdiction of the Department, and
can only now be determined by the courts. The question as to the character of this
land was flly determined by the Laud Department before survey and when said
survey of lot 6 was ordered the question as to the character of the land becanile res
judicata. See Casc v. Chnurch (17 L. D., 578.)
The case of California and Oregon Land Comnpaly involved a large
body of lands on Goose Lakhe, Oregon. By a survey made i 1868 this
lake was meandered And in 18 settlers upon lands lying between the
original meander line and the waters of the lake, applied to have said
lands surveyed. Objection being made thereto by those clainling to be
riparian owners, a hearing was ordered " to deternine whether the lines
of survey were properly run or whether the land in dispute has been
formed by accretion since survey." A hearing was had as a result of
which it was decided, December 17, 1888, that the survey was made at
a time when the waters of the lake were much higher than the ordinary
water line by reason of which the true water line was not defiled by
the meander line fixed by said strvev. It vas held that the land between
said meander line and the true water line of said lake was public land
of the United States and a survey thereof was ordered (7 L. D., 527).
Afterwards the California and Oregon Laud Company as owner of cer-
tain lands bounded by the original meander line protested against the
disposal of the lands between that line and the waters of the lake
urging that inasmuch as the company was not a party to the former
hearing it should be given an opportunity to show its rights in the
premises. In passing upon this protest Secretary Smith said:
Without going over the various. questions presented in the able brief of counsel,
it is sufficient to say, that the judgment heretofore rendered with reference to these
lines by the Department was such a judgment as established the status of these
lines and as such was binding upon all persons, whether they were parties tothe
suit or not. It was therein determined that the meander line established was not
the true line, and that the reliction which occurred thereafter was not a reliction
from the shore line of the lake but was a relietion from the line erroneously estab-
lished as a shore line at a time when the lake was outside of its usual banks.
In addition to the views already expressed it was held in Go vdy . Gilbert (19
L. D., 17) syllabus: 'A. final decision of the Depaitment directing the survey of a
tract as public land precludes the subsequent consideration of a claim thereto based
upon riparian ownership.'
The action of the Department heretofore taken in this case is binding upon it
now, and the application for a hearing is accordingly denied. Whatever rights the
appellant may have can best be determined in the courts.
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These decisions seem to justify the contention of appellants and to
go to the extent of saying that when this Department has once ordered
a survey of lands as public lands it is afterwards bound by that
determination and is without power to cliange it. I am not inclined to
give the rule so broadly stated in said decisions my approval, even by
the inference that would be drawn from an attempt to distinguish this
case from those. The jurisdiction and authority of the land depart-
ment is confined to public lands, and does not extend to lands which
have passed into private ownership.
Appellants' proposition, carried to its legitimate conclusion, weans
that where the laud department by mistake, or otherwise, surveys as
public land a tract which both in law and in fact is private property
and subject to private disposition alone, the land thus surveyed
obtains, for the purpose of future proceedings in the land department,
a fictitious status whereby the officers of that department are power-
less to prevent the annoyance to the private owner and the clouding
of his title, which would necessarily follow the issuance to anuther of
a patent from the United States. Stated in other words: the claim is
that one unauthorized act of the land department requires that the
wrong thereby initiated be consummated by succeeding acts equally
unauthorized. A statement of the proposition accomplishes its
refutation.
Even public lands remain under the care and control of the land
department until patent issues, or action equivalent to the issue of pat-
ent is taken, and the power remains until that time to correct mistakes
in their survey or in the other steps taken by the land officers in the
process of disposing of them and to inquire into the extent and validity
of any rights thereto claimed against the government. This proposi-
tion is sustained by the judicial decisions hereinbefore cited respecting
the supervisory authority of the Secretary of the Interior, but it is most
specifically asserted in the case of Michigan Land and Lumber CO. .
Rust (168 U. S., 589), wherein the court said:
It is of course not pretended tat when au equitable title has passed the land
department has power to arbitrarily destroy that equitable title. It has jurisdic-
tion, however, after proper notice to the party claiming such equitable title and
upon a hearing to determine the question whether or not such title has passed.
Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U. S., 456; Orchard . Alexander, 157 U. S., 372, 383; Par-
sons v. Venzke, 164 U. S., 89. In other words the power of the department to inquire
into the extent and validity of the rights claimed against the government does not
cease until the legal title has passed.
Under these authorities there is no foundation for. the proposition
that this Department is precluded, by the fact that a survey of a tract
of land has been made and approved, from re-examining the matter at
any time before the legal title has passed from the United States, set-
ting aside such approval, and annulling the survey if the facts disclosed
by such re-examination demand such action.
The Department is not bound by action taken upon a mistaken view
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of its own jurisdiction. The cases of Childress et al. v. Smith, Case v.
Church (owdy V., Gilbert, and California and Oregon Land Co., relied
upon by appellants, in so far as they are in conflict with the views here
expressed, are overruled.
It is also claimed by appellants that the statutes under which the
McKee scrip certificates were issued
operated as a present grant of any vacant lands of the United States that they
might be located pon by the holders of the certificates and that the title thereto
vested at the. time of such location.
Unless they mean the legal title this assertion is without force, and
that they do mean the legal title is negatived by their present demand
*for a patent. A patent is the superior and conclusive evidence of legal
title and the general rule is that it is necessary to transfer the legal
title from the United States and that until its issuance the fee remains
in the government. Carter v. Ruddy (166 U. S., 493). There are excep-
tions to this rule and the appellants claim that the statutes authorizing
the issue of the McKee scrip constitute one of the exceptions because
of the words of present grant therein. That act of January 25, 1853
(10 Stat., 7-15), as to the question involved here, reads as follows:
And be it ferthter enlacted, That to each of the brphan children of the said McKee,
there shall be, and hereby is, granted one quarter section of land, to be located
upon any vacant land of the United States; and to be located where andjn such
manner as the President of the United States shall direct.
This act was amended by the act of Mharch 1, 1889 (25 Stat., 1307),
which reads s follows:
That the Commissioner of the General Land Office, to carry into effect the grant
of one quarter section eeh to the orphan children of William R. McKee, made in
the second section of said act, be and is hereby authorized and directed to issue to
the surviving children and grand-children of said McKee or to the owners or holders
thereof, other certificates for those they now hold, issued by authority of said act,
which new certificates they may enter and locate for themselves upon any lands
in satisfaction of said grant. of the class described in the act to which this is an
amendment. /
Without considering whether this latter act changes the scheme from
a grant of lands to a grant of scrip with which lands may be acquired,
the power, in any event, rests in the government to determine whether
the lands selected are vacant public lands and therefore of the class
contemplated, and this Department having in charge the public lands
must decide as to that. A valid location is necessary to the vesting of
a right or title and vacant public land is necessary to the making of a
valid location. If the land here claimed is not public land of the
United States no location thereon could give the owners of the scrip a
right thereto nor could the approval of such a location by this Depart-
ment or the issuance of a patent give them any right to the land. The
contention that appellants by reason of their location acquired a vested
right in this land, which precludes further inquiry by this Department
as to the status of the land, or as to any question affecting the validity
of such location, can not be sustained.
12209-VOL 26-30
466 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
This disposes of the preliminary questions presented by the appeal.
As to the merits of the case, the first question to be considered is
whether the -land in question is public land of the United States. If
that question be answered in the negative no examination of the other
questions aised by the arguments will be required.
As said before, the township in which this land lies was surveyed in
1821 and section ten thereof was returned s fractional. Robert A.
Kinzie made pre-emption entry for the north part of this fractional
section being that part lying north of the Chicago river. According
to the field notes and the plat made therefrom the southern, western
and northern boundaries of the section are shown to be the straight
lines usually run in dividing a township into sections. The east line
deviates from a straight course and is described by courses and dis-
tances. It is claimed by the appellants that this was a boundary line
and that all land lying outside thereof was excluded from the survey
and remained unsurveyed land of the United States. On the other
hand, it is claimed by those Opp)OSing this application that this line
Was run as a meander line to ascertain the quantity of land in slid
fractional section and that the waters of Lake Michigan constituted its
true eastern boundary. The plat in the files of your office, made from
the field notes of said survey of 1821, and which is referred to in the
Kinzie patent, does not show any land between the eastern line of
the section and the waters of Lake Michigan, but clearly indicates
that both the north line and the south line of the section were
extended to the waters of the lake as the eastern boundary, and-
that the eastern survey line was run as a meander line only. The
field notes show that the south line of the section was run east
from the corner common to sections 9, 10, 15 and 16 until it "struck
the bank of Lake Michigan" where a post was set as a corner of frac-
tional sections 10 and 15, that the north line of section 10 was run east
from the. corner common to sections 3, 4, 9 and 10, until it " struck the
bank of Lake Michigan" where a post was set to mark the corner of
fractional sections 3 and 10, and the line run between the two corners
thus established is spoken of as the " meanders of Lake Michigan. If
these field notes and the official plat made therefrom are to be taken as
conclusive, it must necessarily be held that said survey included all the
land then existing. The applicants file copies of various plats pur-
porting to show the formation of the land at and around the mouth of
the Chicago river, and also affidavits respecting the existence of land
at the date of survey, wvhich was not included therein. These other
plats were not made under the authority of the land department nor
were they made as a basis for the disposition or sale of the lands
platted. A map of the "mouth of Chicago river and plan of Ft. Dear-
born" made in 1818 in the engineer department of the United States
Topographical Bureau shows the river turning in a southerly direction
before emptying into the lake and leaving a strip or tongue of land run-
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ning south along the east side of the river, not shown by the survey of
1821. Another map made in the same bureau in 1830 shows the same
strip. Another map made in the same bureau in 1839 shows this strip
while one made in 1842, being a plan of Chicago harbor, shows the land
after the improvement of the harbor by the straightening of the river
and the building of piers. The plat of north fractional section ten as
Kinzie's addition to Chicago, recorded in 1834, purports to show a sab-
dividing and platting of all of the land to the waters of the lake. The
affidavits made by parties who claim to have known the land for many
years, some from before the date of Kinzie's entry, assert that there
was land between the original survey line and the waters of the lake,
the quantity thereof being estimated variously at from twenty- to fifty
acres. Without attempting to give here a detailed analysis of this
evidence, it is sufficient to say that the conclusion to be drawn there-
from is that the survey line of 1821 did not coincide exactly with the
actual water line. It seems to ,show the existence, at the time of the
original survey, of a small body of land on the north side of the nouth
of Chicago river, not shown on the official plat, but the size of this
tract can not )e determined with any certainty. So far as such a tract
is shown to have existed at that time, it appears to have been only a
sand bar and of no value. It may be doubted if this evidence is suffi-
cient to overcome the official return of the United States surveyor
respecting the true location of the water line represented to have been
meandered by him. It is clear, however, that the north line of the sec-
tion as well as the south line thereof, extended to Lake Michigan and
that the line between these two points was run as a meander line and
was not intended as a boundary separate and distinct from the water
line.
The law regulating the survey of the public lands at that time is now
embraced in sections 2395, 2396 and 2397 of -the Revised Statutes. It
is provided that in those townships made fractional because of abutting
on water courses, the boundary lines shall be ascertained by running
from the established corners due north and south or east and west lines,
as the case may be, to the water course, or other external boundary.
In such cases the law contemplated that the water should form the
boundary line. In this case the appellants lay great stress on the fact
that the field notes show that the north line of the section in question
ended at the banl of Lake Michigan, and cite numerous decisions
of State courts to show that a line described as reaching to or extend-
ing along the bank of a stream can not be held to extend to or to be
coincident with the water line. This question has, however, been con.
sidered by the supreme court of the United States in a case involving
the survey of public lands. The facts in Railroad Company v. chur-
neir (7 Wall., 272), are very similar to those presented here. There
the field notes showed that the lines running from- established corners
intersected the bank of the Mississippi river, the plat showed the river
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as the boundary line, and the land was sold by the United States and
described as lot 1, containing so many acres, "according to the official
plat of the survey." Afterwards it was shown that at the time of the
survey there was a considerable body of land between the line fixed
by said survey and the actual water line and this was surveyed by
the United States as public land. The railroad company claimed this
newly surveyed land under its grant. The contention made here is
the same as that made there, as is shown by the following statement
of the court:
Appellants contend that the river is not a boundary line in the official survey;
that the tract, as surveyed, did not extend to the river, but that the survey stopped
at the meander-posts and the described trees on the bank of the river. Accordingly,
they insist that lot I (lid not extend to the river, but only to the points where the
township and section lines intersect the left bank of the river, as shown by the
meander posts.
The court held that the line between the posts on the bank of the
river was a meander line, that the purchase of lot 1, took to the actual
water line and that the subsequent survey could not affect his title.
In the course of the decision the following language is used:
Meander lines are rn in surveying fractional portions of the public lands border-
ig upon navigable rivers, not as boundaries of the tract, but for the purpose of
defining the sin nosities of the banks of the stream, and as the means of ascertaining
the quantity of the land in the fraction subject to sale, and which is to be paid for
by the purchaser.
In preparing the official plat from the field notes, the meander-line is represented
as the border-line of the stream, and shows to a demonstration, that the water-coarse
and not the meander-line, as actually run on the land is the boundary.
In Hardin v. Jordan (140 U. S., 371) the line of the survey cut across
a tongue or strip of land extending into the waters of a lake and it was
claimed that this strip was excluded from the survey. This contention
was not sustained by the court and in the course of the decision it was
said:
The meander lines run along or near the margin of such waters are run for the
purpose of ascertaining the exact quantity of the upland to be charged for, and not
for the purpose of limiting the title of the grantee to such meander lines. It has
frequently been held, both by the Federal and State courts, that such meander lines
are intended for the purpose of bounding and abutting the lands granted upon the
waters whose margins are thus meandered; and that the waters themselves consti-
tute the real boundary.
In Mitchell v. Smale (140 U. S., 406), the same rule is again laid down
and in both these decisions many authorities are cited in support of
the proposition. The rule is also adhered to in subsequent decisions
of the court among them being Horne v. Smith (159 U. S., 40) and
Grand Rapids and Indiana R. R. Co. v. Butler (159 U. S., 87).
- That lines of the public survey run along permanent bodies of water
are meander lines run to determine the quantity of land subject to sale
and that the water line rather than such meander line forms the true
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boundary, has been held in numerous cases decided by this Depart-
inent:
Reuben Richardson (il C. L. 0.,284);
James H. May (3 . D., 200);
James lemphill ( L. D., 555);
John W. Moore (13 L. D., 04);
Watson H. Brown (20 I. D., 315).
In this pitent to Kiuzie the official plat made upon the survey of
1821 is referred to as part of the description of the land conveyed and
the rule is that where a plat is thus referred to in a deed, the elements
of identification shown thereby are to be as much regarded in ascer-
taining the true description of the land as if they had been specifically
stated in the deed, and this rule is applicable to patents from the United
States the same as to conveyances between individuals.
Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co. (134 U. S., 178).
It is claimed by appellants that even if the line of 1821 is held to be
a meander line, still the accretionsbelong to tlie United States because
it is a well settled rule of law that where the land entered is specifically'and fully
described by boundaries and the exact area is specified the entrynin takes tat
amiounjt of land and no more.
The case of Joijes v. Johnston (18 How., 150), is one of the cases cited
in support of this proposition. There the court lays down the rule
that a grantee can aciquire by his died only the lands described in it by metes and
boinids, and with snfficient Certainty to enable a person of reasonable skill to locate
it and can not acquire lauds outside of the description by way of appurtenance or
accession.
There the side lines of a certain lot were to run at right lines till they
intersected the lake shore and the court held that the lake shore as it
was a the date of the deed was the southern boundary and not as it
was at the date of the plat referred to in the deed, and that any alluvial
accretions after the date of the deed belonged to the grantee in that
deed. So here the north and the south line of section ten were
extended till they intersected the lake and the water line at the date
of Kiuzie's patent was the true boundary line and the alluvial accre-
tions after that belonged to him.
Gazzain v. Phillips (20 How., 372), is also cited in this connection by
appellants, but it does not sustain their contention. There a section
was rendered fractional by private claims, and this fractional part was
divided by a line running north and south through it laying off in the
west subdivision ninety-two and sixty-seven hundredths acres and in
the east one hundred and ten and fifty hundredths acres. A pur-
chased the west and B the east subdivision, the purchases being made
on the same day. The patent to A described the land as the southwest
quarter of the section, "containing ninety-two and sixty-seven hun-
dredths acres according to the official plat of the survey of said lands."
The court simply held that under these facts it was clear that A pur-
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chased and paid for only the west subdivision of said section and could
take nothing more. This is without special application to the question
here.
Horne v. Smith (159 U. S., 40), cited on this question is equally
inapplicable. There a survey of public lands was shown by the field
notes to abut on Indian river anl sections 23 and 36 were thereby made
fractional. It was shown, however, that the river was more than a
mile west of where the survey stopped and that the water which was
meandered as the west line of said fractional sections was in fact a
bayou between which and the river was a large body of land so that if
the river was held to be the boundary the lots which were shown by
the official plat to contain one hundred and seventy acres, would
embrace over seven hundred acres. The court mentions the lengths
of the various lines simply to show that a mistake must have been
made and that the bayou and not the river was the water that formed
the boundary line.
Directly in point and against the proposition that where land is spe-
cifically described by boundaries and the area is specified the entryinan
can take no greater amount, is the case of Jefferis v. East Onaha.
Land Co. (134 U. S., 178). In that case the land was surveyed in 1851
the Missouri river being the north boundary and a meander line being
run along the bank of the river. The land was entered in 1853 and
patent issued in 1853 describing the land as lot 4 in fractional section
21 etc. "containing 37.24 acres, according to the official plat." It was
shown that accretions had been made to this land until 1870 when
there had been added about forty acres. It was impossible to deter-
mine how much of this increase had been formed between-the survey
and the date of the patent. It is thus seen that te case was very
similar in this point to the one under consideration. There the court
said:
In the present case, the p]at was made in accordance with the statute, showing
the river as the northern boundary of fractional section 21 and of lot 4 therein; and
as the patent referred to the official plat of the survey, and thus made that a part of
the description of lot 4, that description made the river the boundary of lot 4 on the
north. .
After citing and quoting from Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, spiera, it was
said:
We are therefore, of opinion, that the patent of June 15, 1855, wbich described
the land conveyed as lot 4, according to the official plat of the survey, of which a
copy is annexed to the bill, marked Exhibit A, conveyed to the patentee the title to
all accretion which had been formed up to that date.
It seems that in this last case, the case of Jones v. Johnston, supra,
was cited for the same purpose that it is cited here, that is, to sustain
the proposition that a grantee can acquire by his deed only the lands
described in it by metes and bounds, and can not acquire, by way of
appurtenance land outside of such description, and of that contention
the court said:
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But that base holds that a water line, which is a shifting line and may gradually
and imperceptibly change, is just as fixed a boundary in the eye of the law as a per-
manent object such as a street or a wall; and it justified the view announced by the
circuit court in its opinion, that where a water line is the boundary of a given lot,
that line, no matter how it shifts, remains the boundary, and a deed describing the
lot by number or name conveys the land uip to such shifting line exactly as it does up
to a fixed side line.
The same question has also been considered by this Department and
ruled adversely to the contention of appellants.
In Gleason v. Pent (14 L. D., 373), the land involved was surveyed in
1815, by which survey section 19 was shown to be fractional because
abutting on a bay, and it was divided into lots numbered 1 and 2.
Gleason made entry for these lots in 1870 and patent issued to him in
1878. In 1875 another survey was madeand other lands were marked
on the plat as lying between the original survey and the water line, the
result of accretion. It was held that the original entryman took this
laud thus formed by accretion between the survey of 845 and that of
1875 and it was said:
The public surveys are the official description by which the public lands are dis
posed of by the government. When, therefore, the patentee made his original entry,
the ten-offdcial survey of 1845 was as claimed by counsel, an 'assarance of the pro-
prietor that a riparian estate was for sale.'
Such entry was a segregation ad a disposal of the land in accordance with that
survey ad rights thereby acquired, could not be impaired bly the subsequent suvey
of 1875.
The patent under which the appellant claims being based upon such original
entrytook effect as of its date, and conveyed the riparian estate described by the
first survey.
This case was cited and followed in Lewis V. Pierce (18 L. D., 328).
These decisions of the supreme court and this Department settle
beyond all doubt and adversely to appellants the question thus raised
by them. It is clear that the patent to Kinzie conveyed to him the
laud up to the water line as it stood at the date of that instruaent.
All accretion formed between the date of the survey and the date of
the patent became a part of said fractional section. There is no ques-
tiot here as to which of two bodies of water was meandered in the sur-
vey as was the case ii Hore v. Smith, supra. Neither was the laud,
if any, lying between the meander line and the water line at the time
of the survey of sufficient area or value to necessarily charge a subse-
quent purchaser with notice of material mistake or fraud in the survey,
and any question which might arise in such a case is not presented here.
It is not doubted that if the accretion had resulted i the formation
of a body of land sufficient to have justified such a course, the United
States before parting with the title to said north fraction, that is, while
they were still riparian proprietors, might have resurveyed and
replatted the land and have sold it according to such resurvey, but
that was not done nor do the facts indicate that the accretion was so
large prior to the sale to Kinzie as to have called for such a course.
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In. several cases before the suprerne court involving lands in tis
fractional section, or ripariau and water rights i connection therewith,
the question of the legal effeet of the Kinzie patent arose either directly
or indirectly, ad i every instance where a direct statement is made
by the court it is that te patent conveyed all te land to te water
line. In Jones v. Johnston, sujtra, both parties claimed under the
Kinzie patent,so that there Was no coiltroversy as to this question,but
the whole discussion was upon the theory that the Kinzie title embraced-
the lands to the water line an.d te same may be said of the later deei-
sion i the same case, reported fin 20 Howard, 209.
In Bates v. Illinois Central P. R. Co. (1 Black, 204), Bates, the grantee
of -Kin zie, claimned a ortion of a sand bar south of the mouth of the
Chicago river, as shown by t6 plat of te government survey anid sued
the railroad company to gain possession thereof. After statilg that
the land stied for was situated otside of ractional section ten, as its
boundary was described by the trial judge i his charge to tle jury, the
court said:
And this raises time questlim, by wh Iat rl e is the public surrey to Which te patent
refers for idemltity to be colst!iled ? Tie la(I grunted is 102.29-100 acres, ying north
of te Chicago river, bounded by it n the south ad by time lake Oa the east, The
iuoil th of the river being form], establishes te soath east corner of te tract. The
plat of the survey, aid the call for the mouth of the river in te iell-notes, show
that the survey of 1821 rem.ogimized tho eutrance of the river into the lake through.
the sand-bar i an almost direct line easterly, disregarding te channel west of the
saud-lar, where te river Inost usuially flowed before the piers were erected. It is
immaterial where the most usual nmomth of the liver was in 1821; nor whether this
northern mouth was occasional. or the flow of the waler only temporary at particu-
lar times, and this; ilow produeed to solne extent by artifici mmeauls, by a cut through
a bar, leaving te water to wash out an enlarged ciannel i seasols of freshets.
The public had the option to declare the true iomth of the river, for the pr)l)ose of
a sarvey and sale of the public lands.
It may be sail i passing that this case is quoted fr-on upon this
point in Horne v. Smith, supgra.
In Banks v. Ogdenm (2 Wall., 57), it was held tlat accretion from Lake
Michigan belongs to te proprietor of the land bounded by te lake, and
that the land in controversy tere, being a part of te tract involved
here, belolnged to Kinzie anid passed to his assignee in banlkruptcy.
In Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois (146 U. S., 387-437), wmllich
involved lands i said section tel, south of the Chicago rivers it was
sait:
The city of Chicago is sitated upon the southwestern shore of Lake Michigan
andl includes With other territory, ractional sections 10 anl 15, i township 39 north,
range 14 east, of the third principal meridian bordering uipon the lake which forms
their eastern boundary,
Tfllis Dejpartment has also had occasion to consider the status of
accretions to the land embraced in tle original survey of this section
in 1821. In John ilarson, decided Jane 8, 1883 (2 L. D., 338), an appli-
cation had been made to locate Valentine scrip on land in section 15,
and Secretary Teller said:
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The land in question is part of a sand bar lying opposite to Sees. 10 and 15, which
appears fron the record to have been formed of said fractional Se. 15, to the State.
The status of this sand bar in respect to its being public land of the United States
has been repeatedly considered in your office and by this Depaitment.
Again, referring to several cases w here the question had been con-
sidered, he said:
From the cases which I have already referred to, and the opinions which have pre-
vailed respecting the character of this laud from the thne of Connissioner Whit-
collb's letter ii 1.838 to the present, it wonld seem that it ought to be understood by
this tiue that the tract in question, including that part of it which lies opposite
Sec. 10, is not blic land of the United States, and therefore not the sublject of any
scrip location whatever.
In Nine et al. v. Fairbanks et al., decided August 31, 1895, (not
reported) application was made to locate a nilitary bounty land war-
rant on the land in controversy here and the Secretary in affirming the
decision of your office denying that application said:
The l;d applied for does not belong to the United States, being east of the
original meander line of the lake, as shown by the public surveys of 1821. As such
it is not subject to private entry, or any other kind of eiitry,-Lnider the public land
lavs.
In George W. Streeter et al. (21 L. D., 131), application was made to
mnake entry of the land lying east of the south half of fractional see-
tion 3 and also that lying east of the north half of fractional section
10, this last parcel being the land involved here and the Secretary
said:
The landL sought to be eteree is ofessedly to the, east of the meander line
between these two fractional sections and the lake and since the ]ale itself, and not
the meander line, is he east boundary of the two fractional sections, as shown by
the public survey, the lnd has long since been disposed of, and there is no land left
of which this Department has jurisdiction.
Thlus it is seen this Department has alwa ys heretofore when the ques-
tion was presented, held that the land in question does not belong to
the United States. If its status "s as left in doubt by the decisions of
the supreme court, which it is not, the hct that this Department has
more than once decided that the land is not public and does not belong
to the United States, would be entitled to great weight in determining
the present controversy.
The decisions of the supreme court cited herein cover every material
point involved in this case and the rulings are so clear and conclusive
as to leave no doubt of the status of this land. It is clearly established
that lines run along permanent bodies of water are run as neander lines
and that the water itself, and not such leander line, constitutes the
true boundary of the land to be sold, that all accretion after the date
of the survey upon which the sale is made and prior to the date of the
patent passes under such patent, and that the plat of public lands when
referred to in a patent becomes a part of such instrument and is to be
considered in determining what land is sold. The facts in this case are
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that section ten was made fractional by abutting on the waters of Lake
Michigan, that Kiuzie purchased the north fraction of the section, that
the plat was made a part of the description in the patent to Kinzie, and
that the plat shows the waters of the lake to be the eastern boundary
of the section. Applying the law declared in the decisions cited to the
facts shown, it must be held that the survey of 1821 and plat included
all the land between the western line of section ten and the waters of
Lake Michigan, that Kinzie by his purchase took all the land included
in the north fraction of the section, including accretions thereto prior
to his patent, and hat upon the issuance of that patent the govern-
ment ceased to be a riparian proprietor and is therefore not entitled to
subsequent accretions. It follows that the land here involved is not
public land of the United States and is not subject to location or entry
with McKee scrip.
For the reasons given the decision of your office of May 26, 1897,
rejecting the application of LaFollette and Benner is affirmed. Under
these circumstances, it is not ecessary to discuss the mnan~y alleged
irregularities in the survey of 1896, because the conclusion that this
tract is not public land of itself requires the annulment of that survey
and therefore your action in setting aside the approval thereof is also
affirmed and the survey declared to be of no effect.
Approved:
WILLIS VAN DEVANTER,
Assistant Attorney General.
TIMBER CULTURE CONTEST-REPEAL OF TIMBER CIULTURE LAW.
HENRY W. BUTCHER.
A successful timhber culture contestant whose suit is begun prior to the repeal of the
timber culture law, but not concluded until after said repea], is not entitled to
make a timber culture entry in the exercise of his preferred right, if no applica-
tiou to enter under said law was made by him prior to said repeal.
Secretary Bliss to the Conmissioner of tJ'e General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 2, 1898. (H. G.)
By epartmental decision in this case, of January 25, 1896, your
office was directed to afford Henry W. Butcher, the applicant for tim-
ber culture entry of the NE. of Sec. 34, T. 25 S., R. 23 E., within the
limits of the Visalia, California, land district, an opportunity to furnish
further evidence in the matter of his application, and upon receipt of
such evidence your office was directed to ender decision upon the same.
This additional evidence was transmitted to your office, and, upon
consideration thereof, your office on May 22, 1896, rejected the applica-
tion, as it did not show that Butcher had shown the filing in the local
office of a timber culture application-prior to the repeal of the timber
culture act. Butcher appeals.
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He brought contest against a timber culture entry for said tract, and
the same was canceled as the result of that contest by your office on
November 15, 1893. He was given the preference right of entry, but
your office letter, directing the cancellation of the contested entry, states
that there was no timber culture application on file in your office.
The local office reported that the records thereof do not show whether
or not Butcher filed an application with his contest prior to the repeal
of the timber culture act.
Butcher claims that he filed such application at the time of the con-
test, and his first showing was to the effect that lie had employed an
attorney, Who was son of the register of the local office, to draw up the.
contest papers, including a timber culture application for the tract
covered by the contested entry, and believes that such an application
was filed. He filed a number of corroborative affidavits of parties who
were with him at the land office at the time, who state that they know
or believe that the claimant intended to make timber culture entry, and
that they believed that he did so. The supplemental showing by
Butcher, under the authority of the departmental order, consists of the
affidavits of the receiver of the land office at the time the application
should have been made, that of claimant and of one Heise.
The former receiver states that Butcher came to the land office, with
the purpose, as he announced, of contesting a timber culture entry on
the tract, and making application terefor, ajid that soie time there-
after Bntcher inquired of the receiver if $5.00 had been paid in for him
on Ifis application by the attorney, and when informed that no money
had been paid, seemed much surprised, and from his manner the receiver
is positive that Butcher thought he had a timber culture filing on the
tract.
The affidavit of Heise is of no weight, and need not be considered,
as it states no facts, but merely the belief of the afflant.
The affidavit of Butcher is to the effect that he is unable to procure
the evidence of the attorney who acted for him; that he supposed that
the attorney was acting as clerk in the land office and made his offer to
draw up the papers "through kindness," and was surprised when a fee
of ten dollars was demanded for the services of the attorney, but was
informed that five dollars of the same went to the receiver.
He submits a leaf from his diary, showing the transaction of July 28,
1890, the day on which the contest was initiated, as follows:. i.Paid
$5.00 on land and $5.00 Budlong." The latter was, it is averred, a
partner of the son of the register who made oat the affidavits of con-
test and presented them to the local office.
Butcher has made valuable improvements upon the tract, to the
extent of one thousand dollars, including the sinking of an artesian
well, and asks that if there is any doubt as to his filing of the appli-
cation, it be resolved in his favor, as no adverse rights have intervened.
An inspection of the entire record in the contest case mentioned-
that of Butcher v'. Averill-shows that the five dollars mentioned was
476 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
paid as a deposit upon the initiation of the contest, and is so endorsed
oil the affidavit of contest. There was no timber culture application
subnitted, except one tendered by Butcher, on December 27, 1893, after
the contest had been decided. It further appears from the files of your
office in said contest case that Butcher addressed a letter to your office
oil November 30, 1893, in which, in substance, he states that he was
informed of the decision in his favor in the contest case, and of his right
to exercise his preference right of entry within thirty days. le asks
to be allowed to file a timber culture entry on the tract, as he filed his
contest about seven months before the act was repealed. Ie states
that he paid five dollars when he "started the proceedings," and was
informed that he could file a timber culture entry upon it, but' noW
the register wNill not take my (his) iliug." He asks to consummate his
filing (of contest) by '' planting a timber culture," and to coin in
under the old act." lie states that lie filed the contest July 28, 1890,
and requests an early answer, as lie then had but twenty-seven days in
which to file. Prior to the receipt of the answer of your office, which
was dated January 31, 1894, informing hin that "entries of public
land can only be made under the laws in force at the time the applica-
tion therefor is made, or at the time the right to make such entry
accrued," he made, on December 27, 1893, papplication to enter the tract
under the timber culture laws, then repealed, and this application was
rejected.
The evidence offered by Butcher is vague and uncertain. No one
pretends to testify that the application for a timber culture entry was
tendered by him or in his behalf at the date of the initiation of his
contest, oil July 28, 1890, or at any time subsequent thereto atd prior
to the repeal of the timber culture act. The money he claims was left
to apply on the filing was left as a deposit on his contest, and was not
the amount of the fees required for a timber culture entry. All doubts
as to the filing of such an application, or of tendering the same, are
dissipated by the admissions in Bntcher's said letter of inquiry, bearing
date November 30, 1893, addressed to your office. He states the date
of filing the contest, the amount of the deposit made by hin when he
"started proceedings," and that he waas informed that he "could" file
a timber culture application on the tract. It is clear that no such
application was filed by him at the time the contest was initiated or
prior to the repeal. of the timber culture act, aid that he was fully
cognizant of this fact at the time such letter of inquiry was written.
The preference right of entry given to hin was a right under the
laws a they existed at the time of tendering the application. No
application was made until December 27, 1893, long subsequent to the
repeal of the timber culture act. He could have exercised his prefer-
ence right to enter under his unused rights, sach as a desert land filing,
which he now seeks to make, if his present application is rejected.
The act repealing the timber culture act by its terms saved any valid
rights theretofore accrued, or accruing, "under said laws," and all bona
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fide claims lawfully initiated before the passage of the act were permit-
ted to be perfected uponidueeompliance with the law. (26 Stat.,1095.)
In the case of August W. Hendrickson, 13 IL. D., 169, 172, where the
saving proviso of the act was fully considered, it was held to include
as claims "lawfully initiated" those only where one qualified to enter
makes written application, accompanied with the requisite amount of
fees to enter the land that is subject to entry, and not to apply to one
who had not shown that he was qualified to make entry, and who had
not at the time of the repeal of the act offered a written application,
nor tendered the fees to the register and receiver, nor taken any steps
by which he could perfect a timber culture entry. . Such a failure to
file an application was held to leave the contestant remediless nder
his preferred right of entry secured to him by his successful contest.
The case of Frederick Tielebein, 17 IL. D., 279, cited by the applicant,
does not change this rule, but applies to a case where the affidavits
filed by the successful contestant made a prinafacie showiing that an
application to make timber culture entry was filed at the time the con-
test affidavit was filed. In the case at bar, it is clear from a careful
examination of the affidavits offered in support of the application, as
originally offered, and those tendered with the supplemental. showing
permitted by the Department, and an inspection of the entire record
in the contest case, where it is claimed that they were offered, together
with the letter of inquiry addressed to your office by the applicant,
that no application to enter the land as a timber culture entry was filed
by him at the time he initiated such contest proceedings.
The decision of your office is affirmed and the application will be
rejected.
GRINNELL V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO.
Petition of the railroad company praying for a revocation of the order
for a hearing, made in departmental decision of December 15, 1896, 23
D. ., 489, denied by Secretary Bliss, April 2, 1898.
SWVAMP LAND GRANT-EVIDENCE AS TO CAR1ACTER OF LAND.
ARCHER ET AL. V. WILLIAMS,
-In the adjustment of the swamp grant the burden of proof is upon the State to show
that the land claimed is of the character granted, where the field notes of sur-
vey do not show, such land to be swamp and overflowed.
Evidence as to the character of land since the date of the swamp grant is competent
as tending to show whether the land was in fact swamp and overflowed at the
date of said grant.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, A-pril
(W. V. D.) X, 1898. (G. B. G.)
By departmental decision of February 11, 1896 (22 IL. D., 168), in the
case of Williams v. State of Iowa, a hearing was ordered to determine
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the question whether the W. i of the SW. of See. 26, T. 96 N., R.
36 W., Des Moines, Iowa, " is in fact swamp, and such as to pass" by
the swamp land grant of September 28,1850.
It appeared that on December 15, 1893, Henry M. Williams made
homestead entry of said land, which entry was held in suspension on
account of conflict with the claim of the State of Iowa under its swamp
land grant; that on August 13, 1894, said entry was relieved from sus-
pension, in pursuance of circular of December 13, 1886 (5 L. D., 279),
under which the State of Iowa had received the required notice and
made default, and the claim of the State under its selection of Septem-
ber 21, 1S82, was rejected; that on September 25, 1894, C. T. Archer
filed in the local office a petition, alleging that lie bought the land of
Clay County, Iowa, and had been in possession thereof more than ten
years under a good and sufficient deed from said county; that the entry
of Williams was illegal; that he (Archer) had o notice of the entry
nor of the proceedings theretofore had in reference thereto, and that
the local office had no right or authority to allow the entry, the same
being swamp land.
In consideration of the premises, the aforesaid hearing was ordered.
That hearing was had, and the local officers found that the land was
not swamp and overflowed within the meaning of the law.
On September 24, 1897, your office affirmed that decision, and the
appeal of Archer brings the case to the Department.
It is urged, substantially, that the evidence shows that the land is
and was swamp and overflowed land within the meaning of the act of
1850, that it was error to hold the burden of proving its character was
on4the State or its grantees, and error in holding that evidence of the
dry character and condition of said land since September 28,1850, was
competent and material to show that it was not swamp and overflowed
land on September 28th, 1850.
The contention that the burden of proof was not. on the State to
show the character of the land is based on the idea that the swamp
land selection of the tract by the State in the year 1882, prima facie
fixed the character of the land. Said list appears to have included the
land here in controversy, and appears from the oath of two witnesses
to have then been " swampy as to a majority of each forty acres," and
it is further said, in a marginal note: "This tract was attempted to be
held as a homestead, but abandoned on account of its swampy character.'
This selection does not appear to have ever been approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, or certified to the State under its grant. No
question, therefore, of the jurisdiction of the Department over the land
arises.
In those cases where the State has accepted the field notes of survey
as the basis of adjustment under the swamp land act, such field notes
a primtafacie evidence of the character of the land, but this rule has
no application here, because the State of Iowa elected to make its
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selections in the field, and for the further reason, that the fie]l notes
of survey do not return this land as swamp land.
W1lere the field notes of survey do not show the tracts claimed to be
swamp and overflowed, the burden of proof is upon the State to show
such tracts to be of the character granted. Linu County, Iowa (19 L.
D., 126).
On the question of the admissibility of certain testimony it may be
said that there exists no reasonable doubt that evidence of the cbar-
acter of the land at any time since the year 1850 is competent as tend-
ing to prove its character as of that date, and in cases like the present
one, if the contention of the appellant in this regard were sound, he
having the burden, the ease must be necessarily decided against him,
without looking to the record frther than to ascertain that there is no
positive or direct. testimony going to show the character of the land
in 1850.
In nearly all cases the best evidence obtainable of the character of
land in the year 1850 is evidence of its character since that date, and
the best evidence obtainable is always competent to establish any
litigated fact.
True, land that was swamp and overflowed in teyear 1850 may have
since become dry agricultural land by natural rocesses, and land
which was not then swamp and overflowed may now be of that char-
acter, so that proof of the character of land at any time other than the
date of the granting act may, and in some cases probably does, lead to
error, but this is no sufficient argumicit for the rejection of evidence
which tends to establish the real fact in issue.
It is not held that evidence of the character of land since the year
1850 will be taken as conclusive proof of its character at that time, but
only that such evidence is competent as tending to establish the ipor-
tant fact upon which alone must rest an adjudication whether it passed
under the swamp land grant: viz., was it swamp and overflowed at the
date of the grant.
The evidence in this case has been carefully examined, and fails to
show that the land was swamp and overflowed in the year 1850. The
decided preponderance of the testimony is to the effect that it is now,
and has been for a number of years, good agricultural land, and the
only hindrance to its successful cultivation to crops is an occasional
overflow from the Little Sioux River, such overflows during the crop
season being of rare occurrence. The conclusion is, therefore, that it
was not swamp and overflowed at the date of the grant.
The- decision appealed from is affirmed.
With the papers in the ease is found what purports to be a decision
of the register and receiver at l)es Moines, Iowa, dated April 9, 1895,
in the case of C. T. Archer v. Henry M. Williams, involving this same
land, wherein it was held that "H. M. Williams, the entryman herein,
has failed to establish his residence and to live upon the land in contro-
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versy as contemplatel by law," and it is recommended that the entrv
be canceled.
As this decision appears to have been made before the departmental
decision, supra, ordering a hearing herein, and no reference being made
in said departmental decision to the fact of a hearing having been there-
tofore had between Archer .and Williams in reference to this land, its
pertinency to the present case does not appear.
The attention of your office is, however, called to this alleged deci-
sion, for the reason, if such decision was rendered under proper pro-
cedure and not appealed from, it would seem that the entry of Williams
should be canceled, notwithstanding the claim of the State has been
rejected.
STATE OF WASHINGTON V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co.
Motion for review of departmental decision of April 24, 1896, 22 L.
D., 482, denied by Secretary Bliss, April 2, 1898.
DESERT LANDS.
Regulations Concernaig the Miaking of Proof for Desert Lands Segregated
under Section 4, Act of August 18,1894 (28 Stat., 372-422), as Amended
by the Act of June 11, 1896 (29 Stat., 434).
The language of the fourth section of the act of 1894 is as follows:
SEc. 4. That to aid the public land States in the reclamation of the desert lands
therein, and the settlement, cultivation and sale thereof in small tracts to actnal set-
tlers, the Secretary of the Interior with the approval of the President, be, and hereby
is, authorized and empowered, upon proper application of the State to contract and
agree, from time to time, with each of the States in which there may he situlated
desert lands as defined by the act entitled "An act to provide for the sale of desert
land in certain States and Territories," approved March third, eighteen hundred and
seventy-seven, and the act amendatory thereof, approved March third, eighteen hun-
dred and ninety-one, binding the United States to donate, grant and patent to the
State free of cost for survey or price such desert lands, not exceeding one million
acres in each State, as the State may cause to be irrigated, reclaimed ocenpied, and
not less than twenty acres of each one hundred and sixty-acre tract cultivated by
actual settlers, within ten years next after the passage of this act, as thoroughly as
is required of citizens who may enter nuder the said desert land law.
Before the application of any State is allowed or any contract or agreement is exe-
cuted or any segregation of any of the land from the public domain is ordered by the
Secretary of the Interior, the State shall file a map of the said land proposed to be
irrigated which shall exhibit a plan showing the mode of the contemplated irriga-
tion and which plan shall be sufficient to thoroughly irrigate and reclaim said land
and prepare it to raise ordinary agricultural crops and shall also show the source of the
water to be used for irrigation and reclamation, and the Secretary of the Interior may
make necessary regulations for the reservation of the lands applied for by the States
to date from the date of the filing of the map and plan of irrigation, but such reser-
vation shall be of no force whatever if such map and plan of irrigation shall not be
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approved. That any State contracting under this section is hereby authorized to
make all necessary contracts to cause the said lands to be reclaimed, and to iduce
their settlement and cultivation in accordance with and subject to the provisions of
this section; but the State shall not be authorized to lease any of said lands or to
use or dispose of the same in any way whatever, except to secure their reelamation
cultivation, and settlement.
As fast as any State may furnish satisfactory proof according to such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, that any of said
lands are irrigated, reclaimed and occupied by actual settlers, patents shall be issued
to the State or its assigns for said lands so reclaimed and settled: Provided, That said
States shall notsell or dispose of more than one hundred and sixty acres of said lands
to any one person, and any surplus of money derived hy any State from the sale of
said lands in excess of the cost of their reclamation, shall be held as a trust fund for
and be applied to the reclamation of other desert lands in such State. That to enable
the Secretary of the Interior to examine any of the lands that may be selected under
the provisions of this section, there is hereby appropriated out of any noneys in the
Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, one thousand dollars.
In the act maling appropriations for sundry civil epenses of the
Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, and for other pur-
poses, approved June 1, 1896, there is, under the head of appropriation
for " Surveying public lands," the following provision:
That under any law heretofore or hereafter enacted by any State, providing for the
reclamation of arid lands, in pursuance and acceptance of the terms of the grant
made in section four of an act entitled "An act making appropriations for the sundry
civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five," approved August eighteenth, eighteen hundred and
niuety-four, a lien or liens is hereby authorized to be created by the State to which
such lands are granted and by no other authority whatever, and when created shall
be valid on and against the separate legal suhdivisions of laud reclaimed, for the
actual cost and necessary expenses of reclaination and reasonable interest thereon
from the date of reclamatien until disposed of to actual settlers; and when an ample
supply of water is actually furnished in a snhstantial ditch or canal, or by artesian
wells or reservoirs, to reclaim a particular tract or tracts of such lands, then patent
shall issue for the same to such State without regard to settlement or cultivation:
Provided, That in Do event, in no contingency, and under no circumstances shall the
United States be in any manner directly or indirectly liable for any amount of any
such lien or liability, in whole or in part.
1. In the circular of November 22, 1894, as amended March 15, 1898,
instructions are given for the designation of the lands by the proper
State authorities. Upon the approval of the map of the lands and
the plan of irrigation, the contract is executed by the Secretary of the
Interior and approved by the President, as directed by the act. Upon
the approval of the map and plan, the lands are reserved for the pur-
poses of the act, said reservation dating from the date of the filing, of
the map and plan in the local land office. Aduplicate of the approved
map and plan, and of the list of lands, is transmitted for the files of
the local land office, and a triplicate copy of the list is forwarded to the
State authorities.
2. By the Honorable Secretary's decision of January 22, 1898 (26
L. D., 74), it was held that the act of 1896 applies to all lands segregated
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under the act of 189.1, and patents will be issued for all such lands in
accordance therewith.
3. When patents are desired for any ainds that have been segregated,
the State should file in the local land office a list, to which is prefixed
a certificate of the presiding officer of the State land board, or other
officer of the State who may be charged with the duty of disposing of
the lands which the State may obtain under the law, Form 1, page 3;
and followed by an affidavit of the State Engineer, or other State officer
whose duty it may be to superintend the reclamation of the lands,
Form 2, page 4.
4. The certificate of Form 1 is required in order to show that the
State laws accepting the grant of the lands have been duly complied
with.
5. The affidavit of Form 2 is required in order to show compliance
with the provisions of the law, that an ample supply of water has been
actually furnished in a substantial ditch or canal, or by artesian wells
or reservoirs, to each tract in the list, sufficient to thoroughly irrigate
and reclaim it, and to prepare it to raise ordinary agricultural crops.
6. These lists will be called Lists for Patent, and should be numbered
by the State consecutively, beginning with No. 1. The list should also
show, opposite each tract, the number of the approved segregation list
in which it appears.
7. Upon the filing of such list, the local officers will place thereon the
date of filing, and, note on the records opposite each tract listed: List
for Patent No. , filed -, giving the date.
8. When said list is filed in the local land office there shall also be
filed by the State a notice, in duplicate, prepared for the signature of
the register and receiver, describing the land by sections, and portions
of sections wh ere less than a section is designated (Form 3, page 4). This
notice shall be published at the expense of the State once a week in each
of five consecutive weeks in a newspaper of established character and
general circulation, to be designated by the register as published nearest
the land. One copy of said notice shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in the local office during the entire period of publication.
9. At the expiration of sixty days from the date of the first publica-
tion, the State shall file in the local office proof of said publication and
of payment for the same. Thereupon the register and receiver shall
forward the List for Patent to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, noting thereon any protests or contests as to failure to comply
with the law or as to prior adverse rights, together with any recom-
mendations they may deem proper.
10. Upon the receipt of the papers in the General Land Office such
action will be taken in each case as the showing may require and all
tracts that are free from valid protest or contest, and respecting which
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the law and regulations have been complied with, will be certified to -
the Secretary of the Interior for approval and patenting.
F. W. MONDELL,
Acting Commissioner General Land Office.
Approved Mlarch 15, 1898:
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary of the Interior.
FORMS FOR VERIFICATION AND PUBLICATION O LISTS FOR PATENT.
[Form 1.]
I, , do hereby certify that I am the (designation of office)
of the State of ; that I am charged with the duty of disposing of the
lands granted to the State by section 4, act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 372-422),
and the act of June 11, 1896 (29 Stat., 434); and that the laws of the said State
relating to the said grant from the United States have been complied with in all
respects as to the following list of lands prepared on behalf of the said State for the
issuance of patent under the sai(l acts of Congress.
(Here add list of lands.)
[Form 2.]
To followv list of lands.
STATE OF
COUNTY OF 8:
*___- , being dly sworn, deposes and says that he is the
(designation of office) of the State of , charged with the duty of supervising
the reclamation of lands segregated under section 4, act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat.,
422), and the act of June 11, 1896 (29 Stat., 434); that he has examined the lands
designated on the foregoing list, and that an ample supply of water has been actually
furnished (in a substantial ditch or canal, or by artesian wells or reservoirs) for each
tract in said list, sufficient to thoroughly irrigate and reclaim it, and to prepare it
to raise ordinary agricultural crops.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this- day of -, 189-.
[SEAL]. ,
Totoky Public.
For vn forpublislhed iotice.
[Fori 3.]
UNITED STATES LAND OFFICE,
____  - , 189-.
To qChomn it say concern:
Notice is hereby given t at the State of has filed in this office the following
list of lands to wit: = and has applied for a patent for said lands under the
acts of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 372-422), and June 11, 1896 (29 Stat., 434), relating
to the granting of not to exceed a million acres of arid land to each of certain
States; that the said list, with its accompanying proofs, is open for the inspection
of all persons interested and the public generally.
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Within the next 60 days following the date of this notice, protests or contests
against the claim of the State to any tract described in the list, on the ground of
failure to comply with the law or on the ground of a prior adverse right, will be
received and noted for report to the General Land Office at Washington, D. C.
Register.
Receirer.
MINING CLAIM-AMENDED LOCATION-PROOF OF OWNERSHIP.
JOHN C. TELLER.
Rights under the amended location authorized by the Colorado statutes depend upon
the locator's ownership of the origiual location, and if at the time of such
amended location the original is owned, wholly or in part, by others, their title
will not be divested by the amended location.
A mineral entry allowed on insufficient showing of title in the applicant is properly
held for cancellation by the General Land Office; but where the applicant after
such decision obtains by proper conveyances a complete chain of title, and makes
a showing thereof before the Department which is satisfactory, as between him
and the government, the entry may stand and patent issue thereon.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Oice, April
(W. V. D.) 4, 1898.
It appears from this record that John 0. Teller made application for
patent for the Nellie Bly, Unique, Arkansas Traveller and Maverick
lode claims, lot No. 10,162, Gunnison, Colorado. land district, and after
due notice made entry No. 519, of the same, no adverse claim being
filed.
This entry was made June 1, 1896, and the abstract of title to each
claim was brought down to May 26, 1896.
-After examination of the papers your office informed the local officers,
by letter of November 24, 1896, that the abstracts of title did not show
title in John C. Teller, and directed them to notify him that he would
be allowed sixty days in which to comply with the regulations by show-
ing title in himself.
An effort was made by the entryman to show that lie had the possess-
ory title to the claims, but your office, by letter of May 17, 1897, held
that it was not shown that Teller, either at the date of entry, "or at
any time prior thereto had any interest in and to said lode claims," and,
for this reason held the entry for cancellation. The claimant thereupon
appealed, assigning error as follows: 
Because it is shown by the abstract of title filed with said application that said
appellant had duly located and preempted said property so applied for before mak-
ing said application, and that at the time of said application he was the owner
thereof, and had full right and authority to moake application therefor and entry
thereof and to receive receiver's receipt therefor.
Because the said application was duly advertised as by law required and as shown
by the papers on file herein, and that no adverse claim was filed in the land office
against said application.
Because appellant was at the time of making said application the owner of said
premises by right of purchase and conveyance to him thereof.
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Because no adverse claim or protest of any kind has been filed by any one against
said application.
Because appellant was at the time of making said application the owner of said
premises -and every part thereof, and ever since has been and now is such owner
subject only to the superior title of the United States.
The mining regulations of December 10, 1891, in force when this
entry was made, requiring the applicant to show his title, are as
follows:
31. Accompanying the field notes so filed must be the sworn statement of the
claimant that he has the possessory right to the premises therein described, in vir-
tue of a compliance by himself (and by his grantors, if he claims-by purchase) with
the mining rules, regulations, and customs of the mining district, State, or Terri-
tory in which the claim lies, and with the mining laws of Congress; such- sworn
statement to narrate briefly, bt as clearly as possible, the facts constituting such
compliance, the origin of his possession, and the basis of his claims to a patent.
32. This affidavit should be supported by appropriate evidence from the mining
recorder's office as to his possessory right, as follows, iz: Where he claims to be
the locator, or a locator in company with others who have since conveyed their
interest in the location to him, a full, true, and correct copy of such location should
be furnished, as the same appears upon the mining records; such copy to be attested
by the seal of the recorder, or if he has no seal, then he should make oath to the
same being correct, as shown by his records, Where the applicant claims only as a-
purchaser for valuable consideration, a copy of the location record must be filed
nder seal or upon oath as aforesaid, with an abstract o title from the proper
recorder under seal or oath as aforesaid, brought down as near as practicable to
date of filing the application, tracing the right of possessionby a continuous chain
of conveyances from the original locators to the applicant, also certifying that no
conveyances affecting the title to the claim in question appear of record in his office
other than those set forth in the accompanying abstract.
Under paragraph 32, when the applicant claims as locator he must
furnish a copy of his location, and when lie claims as a purchaser he
must furnish a copy of the location, together with an abstract of title
brought down as near as practicable to the date of the application.
In complyiig with paragraph 31, the applicant by his attorney-in-
fact, says:
Deponent further states that the facts relative to the right of possession of John
C. Teller, to each of said mining claims, veins, lodes or deposits and surface ground
so surveyed and platted are substantially as follows, to wit, by direct line of transfer
and amended location which will more fully appear by reference to the copy of the
original record of location and the abstract of title herewith filed.
Turning now to the abstracts of title presented before entry, it
appears (1) that the Nellie Ely was located March 6, 1890, by T. J.
Reed and Walter Reed; the Unique was located August 4, 1891, by
T. J. Reed; the Arkansas Traveller was located January 1, 1892, by
T. J. Reed and P. Fitzpatrick, and the Maverick was located April 12,
1892, by T. J. Reed and M. Reed; (2) that June 1, 1893, T. J. Reed,
by deed recorded Je 12, 1893, conveyed all of said claims to the
Red Jacket Mining and Milling Company; and (3) that December 9,
1895, John C. Teller filed an "amended location certificate" for each
claim.
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It thus appeared that at the date of Teller's entry (1) the interest
originally possessed by T. J. Reed was vested in the Red Jacket Ain-
ing and Milling Company; (2) no transfer had ever been made of the
interest of Walter Reed, in the Nellie Bly, or of the interest of P. Fitz-
patrick in the Arkansas Traveller, or of the interest of M. Reed in the
Maverick, and (3) Teller bad no interest i any of the claims, unless his
amended location thereof gave him title.
While the laws of the United States provide (Sec. 2324 Rev. Stat.)
that in default of the required annual expenditure in labor or improve-
ments, a mining claim " shall be open to re-location in the same manner
as if no location of the same had ever been made," they make no provi-
sion whatever for an amended location. Section 3160, Mill's Annotated
Statutes of Colorado does, however, and provides for an "'additional
certificate" of location, which is commonly kown as an "amended
location certificate." The section reads as follows:
If at any time the locator of any mining claim heretofore or hereafter located, or
his assigns, shall apprehend that his original certificate was defective, erroneous, or
that the requirements of the law had not been complied with before filing, or shall
be desirous of changing his surface boundaries, or of taking in any part of an over-
lapping claim which has been abandoned, or in case the original certificate was made
prior to the passage of this law, and he shall be desirous of securing the benefits of
this act, such locator, or his assigns, may file an additional certificate, subject to the
provisions of this act; Provided, That such re-location does not interfere with the
existing rights of others at the time of such re-location, and no such re-location or
other record thereof shall preclnde the claimant or claimants from proving any such
title or titles as he or they may have held nnder previous location.
It will be observed that it is the locator or his assigns to whom is
granted this privilege and that this amended location or " re-location,"
as it is also styled in the state statute, does not preclude the claimant
from proving aiy title held under the previous location. The amended
location so authorized by the Colorado law is essentially different from
the relocation authorized by section 2324 of the Revised Statutes. The
former is made in furtherance of the original location and for the pur-
pose of giving additional strength. or territorial effect thereto, while
the latter is a new and independent location which can only be made
where the original location and all rights thereunder have been lost by
failure to make the necessary annual expenditure.
Teller does not claim, and the form of his amended location certifi-
cate does not permit him to claim, that he relocated these claims within
the meaning of section 2324. This is shown by his amended location
certificates which state:
This firther amended certificate of location is nade without waiver of any pre-
viously acquired rights but for the purpose of correcting any errors in the original
location, description or record.
Teller's rights under the amended locations depend upon his owner-
ship -of the original locations and if at that time they were owned. or
partly owned by others their title was not divested or lost by his
amended location.
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Supplemental abstracts were filed in your office October 29, 189(,
and by these it is shown that (1) by deed dated July 5, 1894, and
recorded September 2S, 1896, T. J. Reed conveyed to J. C. Teller, ' all
his right, title and interest in and to" each of the claims, and (2) by
deed dated eptember 25, 1896, and recorded September 28, 1896,
Teller conveyed these mining claims to The Red Jacket Gold and Silver
Mining Company.
As shown by the original abstracts, Reed had conveyed all his inter-
est in the claims to The Red Jacket Mining and Milling Company,June
12, 1893, so that apparently he had no interest in the clains at the
date of his deed to Teller, but there was filed in your office April 21,
1897, a certified copy of a deed from The Red Jacket Mining and Mill-
ing Company to John C. Teller, dated February 11, 1897, and recorded
March following, conveying "all the right and intcrest" it "has now
or ever bad" in each of said claims.
Since te case came to the Department there have also been filed a
certified copy of a deed, dated April 4, 1896, and recorded September
17, 1897, from Fitzpatrick to T. J. Reed, conveying to the latter the
interest of the former in the Arkansas Traveller, and a certified copy
of a deed dated March 23, 1898, and recorded March 25, 1898, from
T. J. Reed, M. Reed and Walter Reed to John- C. Teller conveying to
the latter all their right, title and interest i the Arkansas Traveller,
Nellie Bly and Maverick. By the supplemental abstracts and addi-
tional deeds it is shown that John C. Teller has acquired and now holds
a fll and complete title to each of these claims, subject only to his
said conveyance thereof to the Red Jacket Gold and Silver Mining
Company, dated September 25, 1896.
Notice of Teller's application for patent to these claims was duly
posted and published. No adverse claim was filed and there is no
protest against Teller's entry.
It is shown by the affidavits filed since this appeal that at the time
of T. J. Reed's conveyance o these claims to the Red Jacket Mining
and IMilling Company, dated June 1, 1893, lie was i the peaceable and
exclusive possession and occupation of said clains, and continued in
such possession and occupation until his conveyance thereof to Teller,
dated July 5, 1894; that the Red Jacket Mining and Milling Company
did not comply with the conditions of its purchase from T. J. Reed,
and never had possession of or asserted any right to either of said
claims under Reed's deed; that at the time of his purchase from T. J.
Reed Teller also acquired all of the capital stock of the Red Jacket
Mining and Milling Company, thereby becoming practically the owner
of that company; that fom the time of his purchase from T. J. Reed
to the time of his entry, Teller was in the peaceable and exclusive pos-
session and occupation of said claims; and that at te time of Teller's
entry no right to either of said claims was asserted by the Red Jacket
Mining and Milling Company, P. Fitzpatrick, T. J. Reed, M. Reed or
Walter Reed. The statements in these affidavits are of course strongly
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corroborated by the conveyances subsequently obtained from all of the
parties named.
The action of the local officers i allowing Teller's entry upon the
proof of his title then before them was in conflict with rtle 32 of the
then existing mining regulations, and the action of your office of May
17, 1897, holding said entry for cancellation was fully jstified by the
incomplete showing of title then made. Since your office decision, how-
ever, Teller has by proper conveyance obtained a continuous and com-
plete chain of title from all of the original locators of these claims and
has made a showing which, as between him and the government, is suf-
ficient to relieve his entry from the cancellation which would otherwise
be required.
The Red Jacket Gold and Silver Mining Coml)any, to whom Teller
conveyed the claims after his entry, also asks that the entry be sus-
tained and patent be issued to him, and the showing now made seems
to fully justify this course, and it is so ordered.
FINAL PROOF AND PAYMVENT-SUSPENDED ENTRIES.
INSTRU01TIONS.
Instructions as to the manner in which payment may be made and final receipt
issued on the submission of final proof under entries made within the formerly
recognized limits of the Northern Pacific east of Duluth.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofce,
(W. V. D.) ANI 4, 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter "F" of March 31, 1898, is forwarded, without
recommendation, a telegram from the register at Duluth, Minnesota,
asking:
Will this office, after taling proof in homestead entry, timber and stone entry,
heretofore allowed, accept payment, issue final receipts and final cestificates?
Referring to suspended Northern Pacific land east of Duluth.
By departmental communication of February 28, 1898 (26 L. 1)., 265),
in ordering a suspension from entry and patent of lands remaining
undisposed of in odd-numbered sections within that part of the for-
merly recognized limits of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company lying east of the terminus established by departmental
decision of August 27, 1896 (23 L. D., 204), pending the judicial deter-
mination in the courts of the question as to the eastern terminus of
said grant, it was said:
While entry of these lands will not be allowed during this suspension, yet in all
eases where entries have been allowed the parties will be permitted to complete the
same by making proof thereon, but the issue of patent will be suspended until such
judicial determination.
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The question raised by the telegram from the register at Duluth is as
to his authority, upon the making of final proof upon entries heretofore
allowed, to accept payment and issue final receipts and certificates upon
such entries.
It is not the intention of this Department to require of these entrymten
that they make payment at the time of their offer of proof, due to the
pendency in the courts of the question as to the legality of the com-
pany's claim to these lands, but where the money is tendered the usual
final receipt and certificate still be issued if the proof is otherwise
regular and satisfactory; but upon the final certificate issued by the
register, and the duplicate final receipt given to the entrymen, will be
noted, in red ink, across the face of each, the following:
This receipt (or certificate) is issued under the order of the Secretary of the
Interior dated February 28,1898, subject to any claim the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company may have to the land herein described.
You. will issue appropriate instructions to the local officers in the
several districts in which these lands are situated.
RAILROAD LANDS-PURCHASER-ACT OF MARCH 2, 1896.
JoiiN H. BARTON itT AL.
The act of March 2,1896, prohibits the anulment of a patent erroneously issued on
account of a railroad grant where the lands covered thereby are held by a bona
fide purchaser, and confirms the right and title held by such purchaser under
the erroneons patent, and thereby avoidsthe necessity for the issuance of another
patent as required by the adjustment act of March 3,1887.
The word " purchaser" as used in the act of March 2, 1896, includes one who under
a subsisting contract of purchase, made in good faith, holds lands erroneously
patented or certified o account of a railroad grant, and title is confirmed in
suCh a purchaser, by said act, even though he may not have made all the pay-
ments called for under said contract of purchase.
On application for confirmation of the title held by an alleged bona fide purchaser,
as provided for in said act of 1896, the railroad company, or its successor in
interest, should be advised of said application, and allowed opportunity to show
cause why title should not be confirmed in the applicant.
If such application for confirmation embraces land which was covered by a home-
stead or pre-emption entry that has been erroneously canceled on account of
- the railroad grant, such entryinan should be notified and given opportunity to
apply for reinstatement under section 3, act of March 3, 1.887.
Secretary Bliss to ite Commnissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. D.) 6, 1898. (F. W. C.)
In your office letters of July 30, 1897, you make report upon the fol-
lowillg applications, filed in your office, for confirmation of title uinder
the provisions of the act of March 2, 1896 (29 Stat., 42):
John H. Barton, the NE. I of the SW. of Sec. 21, T. 21 N., R. 4 E."
Loretta E. Cosgrove and Chris Pendle, the N. of the NW. I of See.
21, T. 21 N., R. 4 E.;
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Alexander B. Ste-wart, the W. 4 of the NW. of See. 9, T. 23 N.,
R. 5 E.;
William D. Begg, the NE. - of the NE. of Sec. 33, T. 23 N., R. B.;
Walter Cooper, the SE. of the NW.4 of Sec. la, T. 24 N., R. 5 E.:
and
Alexander B. Stewart, lot 4, Sec. 19, T. 24 N., R. 5 E.; all in the
Seattle land district, Washington.
As the several applications presented are only submitted for instruc-
tions, the entire matter is disposed of in one paper.
Your said office letters report that the above described tracts are
within the primary limits of the grants for the branch line of the North-
ern Pacific llailroad as adjusted to the map of definite location filed
March 26, 1884. They are also vithiu the limits of the withdrawals
upon the map of general route filed August 15, 1873, and the map of
amended general route filed June 11, 1879, of said branch line. It also
appears that the tracts are within the limits of the withdrav al upon
the map of general route of the main line of said road filed August 13,
1870, but they fall north of the terminal established upon said main
line at Tacoma.
It is claimed that the tracts above described have all been erroneously
patented on account of the grant for said company; further that the
above parties have all contracted with the Northern Pacifie Railroad
Company for the purchase of the tracts described, but the conditions
named in said contracts have not all been performed, and as to some
of them the stated time for the performance of the conditions has-
expired, but no forfeiture of the contract has been declared by the com-
pany and there has been no repudiation thereof by the purebaser.
You call attention to the position indicated by this Department in
letter of May 3, 1897, returning the showing made on behalf of the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, successor to the
Missouri River Railroad Company, i support of an application for con-
firmation of title under the act of March 2, 1896, 8u spro, in which atten-
tion was called to the fact that a number of the tracts had only been
contracted for and that deeds had not been issued by the company; in
which letter it was stated
As the confirmation is only in favor of the purchaser, and can not be invoked
where the contract has not been completed or is surrendered, I have to direct that a
separate list be prepared of such lands.
In view of the position thus indicated, you submit the itatter with-
out recommendation for the consideration of the Department, and in
your letter state that
the railroad company has not been calleJ upon for any showing in these cases, and
in so far as this office is informed has no knowledge of these applications.
The act of March 2, 1896, is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and Rouse of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That suits by the Uuited States to vacate and annul any patent
to lands heretofore erroneously issued under a railroad or wagon road grant, shall
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only be brought within five years from the passage of this act, and suits to vacate
and annul patents hereafter issued shall only be brought within six years after the
date of the issuance of such patents, and the limitation of section eight of chapter
five hundred and sixty-oue of the acts of the second session of the Fifty-first Con-
gress and amendments thereto is extended accordingly as to the patents herein
referred to. But no patent to any lands held by a bona fide purchaser shall be
vacated or annulled, but the right and title of such purchaser, is hereby confirmed:
Provided, That no suit shall be brought or maintained, nor shall recovery be had for
lands or the value thereof, that were certified or patented in lieu of other lands cov-
ered by a grant which were lost or relinquished by the grantee, in consequence of
the failure of the government or its officers to withdraw the same from sale or entry.
SEC. 2. That if any person claiming to be a bona fide purchaser of any lands
erroneously patented or certified shall present is claim to the Secretary of the
Interior prior to the institution of a suit to cancel a patent or certification, and if it
shall appear that he is a bone fde purchaser, the Secretary of the Interior shall
request that suit be brought in such case against the patentee, or the corporation,
company, person, or association of persons for whose benefit the certification W as
made, for the value of said land, which in no case shall e more tan the minimum
government price thereof. and the title of such claimant shall stand confirmed. An
adverse decision by the Secretary of the Interior on the bon fides of such claimant
shall ot be conclusive of his rights, and if such claimiant, or one claiuing to be a
bona fida purchaser, but who has not subruitted his claim to the Secretary of the
Interior, is made a party to such suit, and if found by the court to be a bona fide
purchaser, the court shall decree a confirmation of the title, and shall render a
decree in behalf of the United States against the patentee, corporation, company,
person, or association of persons for whose benefit the certification was made for the
value of the land as hereinbefore provided. Any bone fide purchaser of lands pat-
ented or certified to a railroad company, and who is not nade a party to such suit,
and who has, not submitted his claim to the Secretary of the Interior, may establish
his right as such bona fide purchaser in any United States court having jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, or at his option, as prescribed in sections threeaDd four of chap-
ter three hundred and seventy-six of the acts of the secomd session of the Forty-ninth
Congress.
SEC. 3. That if at any time prior to the institution of suit by theAttorney-General
to cancel any patent or certification of lands erroneously patented or certified a claim
or statement is presented to the Secretary of the Interior by or on behalf of any
person or persons, corporation or corporations, claiming thatsuch person or persons,
corporation or corporations, is a boa fide purchaser or are bona fide purchasers of
any patented or certified laud by deed of contract, or otherwise, from or throoghthe
original patentee or corporation to which patent or certification was issued, no. suit
or action shall be brought to cancel or annul the patent or certification for said land
until such claim is investigated in said Department of the Interior; and if it shall
appear that such person or corporation is a bona fide purchaser as aforesaid, or that
such persons or corporations are such bona fde purchasers, then no suit shall be insti-
tuted and the title of such claimant or clainants shall stand confirmed; but the
Secretary of the Interior shall request that suit be brought in such case against the
patentee, or the corporation, company, person, or association of persons for whose
benefit the patent was issued or certification was nmade for the value of the land as
hereinbefore specified.
Prior to this legislation of March 2, 1896, the act of March 3, 1887
(24 Stat., 556), and its amendminent of February 12, 1896, furnished the
rule for the adjustmient of all claims to lands erroneously certified or
patented ol account of a railroad land grant. That act directed the
bringing of sits for the recovery of title to all lands so erroneously
certified or patented, and made provision for the protection of pur-
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chases in good faith of such lands from the railroad by citizens of the
United States, or persons who have declared their intention to become
such, and authorized the issuance of patents to such purchasers "which
shall relate back to the date of the original certification or pateuting."
In the execution and administration of this act it was held that the
title transmitted to the railroad company by the erroneous patent or
certification .must be recovered before the Department could recognize
the claim of the good faith purchaser and make the same good by the
issuance of a patent to him (6 L. D., 272, 276).
By the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095, 1099), the time for bring-
ing suits to recover title to lands erroneously patented, was limited to
five years from the date of that act, and this limitation would have
expired March 3, 1896.
It having been forud impracticable to adjust these grants within this
period, the act of March 2, 1896, saupra, was passed, extending the time
for bringing such suits but providing, in the first section, that "no
patent to any lands held by a bona fide purchaser shall be vacated or
annulled, but the right and title of such purchaser is hereby confirmed."
This extension therefore does not apply to " any lands held by a bogia
fide purchaser.''
The statute of March 2, 1896, embraces three sections and from. a
consideration of the entire act it is evident that one of its objects was
to relieve bona fide purchasers from the annoyance and delay incident
to suits for the, recovery of title under the act of 1887. In furtherance
of this object the act of 1896 prohibits the vacating or annulling of a
patent to lands held by a bona fide purchaser, and directly operates
upon and confirms the right and title held by such purchaser under
the erroneous patent and thereby avoids the necessity for the issuance
of another patent as required by the act of 1887.
The first -question which arises is: Who is a purchaser within the
meaning of the act of March 2, 1896. That act and the act of February
12, 1896 (29 Stat., 6), were adopted in furtherance of the general policy
first declared in the act of March 3, 1887, supra, of protecting those
who, in good faith, purchased lands of railroads on. the strength of
patents erroneously issued or certifications erroneously made.
The act of February 12, 1896, supra, provides:
That section four of an act entitled "An act to provide for the adjustment of land
grants made by Congress to aid in the construction of railroads and for the forfeit-
ure of unearned lands and for other purposes," approved March third, eighteen
hundred and eighty-seven, be, and the same is hereby, amended by adding thereto
thefollo-wingproviso: " PioridedWfurther, Thatwheresnchpurchalsers,theirheirsor
assigns, have paid only a portion of the purchase price to the company, which is
less than the government price of similar lands, they shall be required, before
the delivery of patent for their lands, to pay to the government a sum equal to the
difference between the portion of the purchase price so paid and the government
price, and in such case the amount demanded from the company shall be the amount
paid to it by such purchaser."
.DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 493
Here the word purchaser is used to embrace one who had "paid only
a portion of the purchase price."
The third section of the act of March 2,1896, supiwa, speaks of pur-
chasers "by deed or contract, or otherwise," thus including under the
term "purchasers" those who are without a deed passing the legal
title, but who are nevertheless deemed to occupy the statls of a pur-
chaser of the land.
It was a matter of common knowledge at the time of the passage of
this act that the lands claimed by railroads nder their grants were to
a great extent held and occupied by those who in good faith had entered
into contracts providing for the purchase of such lands and payment.
therefor in five, ten or some other nunber of annual istallmnents, and
conferring upon the purchaser the right to occupy, cultivate and improve
the lands from the date of the contract. For many years this had been
the prevailing method of disposing of railroad lands, both patented and
unpatented.
In common understanding the word "purchaser" includes those who
hold lands under such contracts, and the history of this legislation
seems to make it quite clear that the word was so used in the act of
March 2, 1896. The reasons for protecting those who have obtained
deeds but who have not made full payment, or for protecting those who
have made full payment but who have not obtained deeds,' apply with
equal force to those who, while they have neither made full payment
nor obtained deeds, have nevertheless made binding contracts to make
complete payment and hold the enforceable obligations of the railroads
to execute and deliver deeds and who on the faith thereof may have
made valuable and permanent improvements upon the land. This view
of the language employed insures the equal protection and benefit of
the statute. to those who from necessity purchased upon lng-time con-
tracts providing for small annual payments and who expected by the
cultivation and use of the land to obtain the means wherewith to make
ultimate payment therefor.
The Department is of opinion that one who, under a subsisting con-
tract of the character here described, in good faith, holds lands so
erroneously patented or certified, is a bona fide purchaser within the
meaning of the act of March 2, 1896, whose right and title are thereby
confirmed. The fact that the time for making some deferred payment
has not arrived, or that with the indulgence of the railroad some
deferred payment may have been passed, does not alter his status as a
purchaser, if, in good faith, he clajms the land under a contract which
has not been surrendered or otherwise avoided.
In the case of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Com-
pany, before referred to, the construction of the word "purchaser" was
considered, but in view of the act of February 12, 1896, and the act of
March 2, 1896, and upon further consideration, what was then said upon
that question is recalled.
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You call attention to an iformality or defect in the executio or
signing of the Cooper and Stewart contracts, but since only copies of
those contracts are. submitted and since upon inspection thereof it
seems moie than probable that the purported copies are not complete
transcriptions of the originals, the matter will not be noticed further
than to suggest that the attention of the aplicants be called to the
apparent defect in order that any error in the copying may be corrected.
In connection with those applications your attention is called to the
fact that it is first necessary to ascertain whether the tract involved
was erroneously patented or certified, and before any determination is
had of that question, the railroad company should be notified of the
application and be given an opportunity to make a showing. To that
end it is directed that, upon the filing of an application for confirma-
tion, the company, or its sueessor i interest, be advised thereof and
allowed thirty days within which to show cause why the tract involved
should not be held to have been erroneously patented or certified on
account of its grant and the title of the purchaser held, confirmed. It
is only where the title of the purchaser stands confirmed that demand
can be nade upon the company for the value of the land under the act
of March 2, 1896.
If any such application embraces land which was covered by a home-
stead or preemption entry, which has been erroneously cancelled on
account of the railroad grant or a withdrawal of lands in aid thereof,
the entryman should also be notified of the application and be given
thirty days as a reasonable time within which to apply for reinstate-
ment under the third section of the act of March 3,1887, in default of
which the land will be otherwise disposed of according to law.
RAILROAD LANDS-CONFIRMATION-ACT OF MARCH 2, 196.
CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RY. Co.
The distribution, under a plan of reorganization, of lands erroneously patented on
account of a railroad among the holders of mortgage bonds, issued by the com-
pany receiving the benefit of the grant, brings the parties receiving such title
within the confirmatory provisions of the act of March 2, 1896.
A demand under the act of March 2, 1896, for the payment of the government price
of lands erroneously patented on account of a railroad grant and thereafter dis-
posed of to bona fide purchasers, should not be made on a railroad company as
the successor in interest to the company receiving the benefit of the grant, if it
appears that, as such successor, said company received no benefit from the sale
of the lands erroneously patented.
Secretary Bliss to te Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 6, 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter "F" of March 23, 1898, is forwarded an
answer filed on behalf of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Com-
pany to the rule laid upon said company to show cause why reconvey-
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ance should not be made of certain tracts found by the adjustment
made by your office to have been erroneously patented.
The lands in question were patented on account of the grant made
by the act of June 3, 1856 (11 Stat., 20), to the State of Wisconsin, to
aid in the construction of a railroad from Fond du Lac, on Lake Winne-
bago, northerly to the State line, which grant was by the State con-
ferred upon the Chicago, St. Paul and Fond dn Lac Railroad Company.
It is not shown for what reason the lands included in the rule issued
by your office were held. to have been excepted froli the grant above
referred to.
From the answer filed on behalf of the Chicago and Northwestern
Railway Company it appears that all the lands covered by the rule,
except a forty-acre tract, were distributed to the holders of certain
mortgage bonds issued by the Fond diL Lac company prior to the incor-
poration of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company.
The Fond du Lac company defaulted, and the purchasers at the fore-
closure sale under the mortgage issued by the Fond du Lac company in
the re-organization became the incorporators of the Chicago and North-
western Railway Company. Said last-mentioned company, however,
never received any benefit from the sale of the lands embraced in the
rule under consideration, for the reason that it took a mere naked legal
title in the lands, ncumbered with the interests of the holders under
the mortgage bonds issued by the Fond du Lac company, for which due
provision was made in the plan of re-organization.
In submitting said answer your office letter states that:
The showing of bona fife purchase of the lands in my judgment is sufficient to
warrant a declaration by the Department of a confirmation of title in the purchasers
under the provisions of the act of March 2, 1896 (29 Stat., 42). There remains the
question as to the advisability for institution of suit for the recovery of the price of
the land. It is clear from the answer of the Chicago and Northwestern compaIy that
it acquired no interest or right in the lands guaranteed to the original holders of the
bonds secured by the mortgage made by the Chicago, St. Paul and Fond du Lac com-
pany under the plan of re-organization aforesaid, which was accepted by all parties
concerned, including said Chicago and Northwestern company; that said lands were
sold under the provisions of the fourth section of the granting act, which authorized
the sale of one hundred and twenty sections of land within a continuous limit of
twenty miles of the line prior to the construction of said road, and upon the comple-
tion of. any section of twenty miles of road, of additional lands not exceeding one
hundred and twenty sections for each twenty miles of road constructed.
This office has no other knowledge of the so-called re-organization spoken of in
the company's answer than is found therein, but the Chicago and Northwestern
Railway Company is the successor to the Chicago, St. Paul and Fond du Lac com-
pany both as to its railroad and the grants made in aid of its construction. It
secured the benefits of said grant and must be charged, I think, with the obliga-
tions thereof, and as the Chicago, St. Paul and Fond du Lac company is probably
not now in existence, and no other party or parties appear to be responsible for the
erroneously patented lands, it is suggested that instructions be given that demand
be made on said Chicago and Northwestern company for the government price of
such lands.
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After careful consideration of the showing made in the answer to the
rule, together with your letter submitting the matter, it seems clear
that all the lands covered by said rule have been disposed of to bona
fide purchasers, whose titles are hereby declared to have been confirmed.
Relative to the suggestion contained in your office letter to the effect
that demand be made upon the Chicago and Northwestern Railway
Company for the government price of such lands, there would seem to
be no good ground upon which such demand could be made of that
company for the value of the lands so erroijeously patented, for the
reason that it never received any benefit therefrom.
While it is clear that if the lands were shown to have been errone-
ously patented the right of recovery would remain in fie United States,
unless the lands were shown to be in the hands of bonafide purchasers,
yet any right of action in the United States for the value of the lauds
would seem to be limited to a suit against the company that received
the benefit from the sale of such erroneously patented lands, and it
would be necessary in sulch a suit to show that the company against
which the suit was brought received the benefit from the sale of such
erroneously patented lands. That the Chicago and Northwestern Rail-
way Company succeeded to the grant conferred by the State upon the
Fond du Lac company, and to such road, if any, as had been con-
structed by said company prior to the foreclosure proceedings before
referred to, is not a sufficient showing of a benefit derived by the
Northwestern railway company from the sale of the particular tracts
covered by the rule under consideration.
In the matter of the adjustment of the grant made under the act of
March 3, 1863 (12 Stat., 772), to the State of Kansas, to aid in the con-
struction of a certain railroad, which was by the State conferred upon
the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company, your
office letter of Jane 8, 1895, made report that certain lands had been
erroneously certified and patented on account of said grant, and for the
recovery of the same a rule was served upon resident counsel of said
company, to which counsel responded calling attention to the fact that
the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston company had passed out of
existence; that said company was succeeded by the Southern Kansas
Railway Company, and that the road at the time of the ansver was
operated by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company,
which latter company, however, disclaimed having received any benefit
from any of the lands covered by the rule, it being alleged that said
lands were disposed of by the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston
company before it passed out of existence.
This matter was considered in departmental communication of Feb-
ruary 21, 1895 (L. & R. Press Copybook No. 323, page 415), in which it
was held:
If the answer made by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company be
true, and as there is nothing to be found in the record which suggests the con-
trary, it follows that such railroad company never had any such connection with
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 497
the lands in question as would subject it to suit on behalf of the United States to
compel a re-conveyance of the land. The title to such lands, if the answer be truie,
'was never in the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company, and it therefore
follows that the company could not reconvey the lands to the government. The rule
to show cause is therefore discharged.
Upon inquiry at your office it is learned that no subsequent action
was ever taken looking to a demand upon the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railroad Company for the value of the lands shown to have
been erroneously certified and patented to the Leavenworth, Lawrence
and Galveston Railroad Company.
It would therefore seem that the construction placed upon said
departmental communication discharging the rule in effect relieved the
Santa Fe railroad company of any responsibility on account of the
lands shown to have been so erroneously certified and patented.
No sufficient reason appears why a like disposition should not be
made of the case in hand, and the suggestion contained in your office
letter under consideration, to the effect that-you be instructed to
demand of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company the value
of the lands covered by the rule to show cause, is not approved, and
the rule issued by your office is hereby discharged.
It might be stated that the answer to the rule admits that one tract,
covering forty acres, embraced in the rule, was sold by the Chicago
and Northwestern Railroad Company for oIle hundred dollars. As to
said tract there would seem to be no reason why suit might not be
instituted to recover the value of the same if it were established that
the tract was erroneously patented on account of the grant; but in
view of the small amount involved it is not deemed advisable to direct
proceedings looking to the institution of suit.
The showing submitted with your office letter of March 23, 1898, is
herewith returned to the files of your office.
INDIAN LANDS-ACT OF JULY 1, S92.
COLVILLE RESERVATION.
No part of the Colville Indian reservation restored to the public domain by the act
of July 1, 1892, should be opened to settlement and entry prior to the survey of
the entire tract, unless the Indians choose to take their allotments prior to the
completion of the survey; but if they do so elect, then all the lands so restored
to the public domain may-be opened to settlement, though a portion of them
may be unsurveyed.
Assistant Attorney- General Van Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
April 9, 1898.
I a in receipt, by reference from you, of a communication from the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, relating to the opening of a
part of the Colville Indian reservation under the act of July 1, 1892
(27 Stat., 62), in which he requests an opinion as to whether any part
12209-VOL 26-32
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of the lands restored to the public domain by that act can be opened
to settlement and entry by proclamation of the President in advance
of the survey of the entire tract so restored.
The first section of the act provides
That subject to the reservations and allotment of lands in severalty to the individ-
ual members of the Indians of the Colville Reservation in the State of Washington
herein provided for [a certain described portion of that reservation] is hereby,
vacated and restored to the public domain, notwithstandiug any executive order or
other proceeding whereby the same was set apart as a reservation for any Indians or
bands of Indians, and the same shall be open to settlement and. entry by the proc-
lamation of the President of the United States and shall e disposed of under the
general laws applicable to the disposition of public lands in the State of Wash-
ington.
The fourth section of the act provides for the allotments, ill severalty
mentioned in the first section, and contains the following directions
upon that subject:
That each and every Indian now residing upon the portion of the Colville Indian
reservation hereby vacated and restored to the public domain, and who is so entitled
to reside thereon, shall be entitled to select from said vacated portion eighty acres
of land, which shall be allotted to each Indian in severalty. No restrictions as to
locality shall be placed upon such selections other than that they shall be so located
as to conform to the Congressional survey or subdivisions of said tract or country,
. . . . Such selections shall be made within six months after the date of the Presi-
dent's proclamation opening the lands hereby vacated to settlement and entry, and
afterthe same have been surveyed, and when such allotments have been selected as
aforesaid and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the titles thereto shall be
held in trust for the benefit of the allottees respectively.
An examination of the sections mentioned shows that the restoration
to the public domain and the opening to settlement and entry by execu-
tive proclamation provided for in the first section are in terms made
subject to the Indian allotments in severalty provided for in the fourth
section. The latter section directs that the allotments shall be made
from the portion of the reservation restored to the public domain, that
they shall be selected by the individual Indians without restrictions
as to locality other than that they shall conform to the congressional
survey or subdivisions, and that
such selections shall be made within six months after the date of the President's
proclamation opening the lands hereby vacated to settlenient and entry, and after
the same have been surveyed.
The communication from the Commissioner of the General Land
Office shows that a considerable portion, but not all, of the tract so
restored to the public domain has been surveyed.
The Indian allotments provided for must "conform to the Congres-
sional survey or subdivisions," and therefore can only be made from
surveyed lands. They are not to be otherwise restricted in locality.
Having the entire tract, so restored to the public domain, from which
to make selection of their allotments, it follows that the Indians, under
the present legislation, can not be required to make such selections
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 499
until the-entire tract has been surveyed and thereby rendered subject
to selection.
Nothing in the act prohibits or prevents the making of allotments
before the executiveproclamation opening the lands to settlement and
entry. A consideration of the entire act shows that the period for
selecting allotments begins when any ortion of the tract is srveyed
and ends with the expiration of six months after the entire tract is
surveyed and opened to settlement and entry by executive proclama-
tion. While they can not be compelled to do so, the Idians may
choose to take their respective allotments from the lands now surveyed.
In that event there would be no objection to an executive proclamation
opening to settlement and entry the entire tract restored to the public
domain,'although a portion of it be unsurveyed. If, however, the
Indians are not disposed to select all of their allotments from the lands
-now surveyed tere would be serious objection to a proclamation open-
ing them to settlement and entry in advance of the completion of the
surveys. The objection lies in the fact that any ons settling upon or
entering any of the lands under such proclamation would do so subject
to the right of an Indian to select the same as an allotment at any
time before the expiration of six months after the entire tract had been
surveyed and opened to settlement and entry. The survey of the lands
now unsurveyed may, because of insufficient appropriations, or other-
wise, be long postponed and it would not be consonant with good
administration to invite settlement and entry of lands which at-some
indefinite time in the future may be taken for Indian allotments with-
out reference to the preceding settlement or entry thereof.
Approved, April 9, 1898.
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
DESERT LAND-ACT OF AUTGUST 4, 1894-CANCELEATION.
MAXSON V. CORY ElT AL.
-The act of August 4,1894, dispensing with annual expenditure on desert entries
for that year applies to entries existing at the time said act took effect, and
does not operate to revive entries rightfully canceled prior thereto.
The assignee of a desert entryman is not entitled to notice of action, on the part of
the government, adverse to his interests, if he has not prior to such time filed
evidence of the assignment.
The cancellation of a desert land entry without due notice of such action to the
original eutryman, with opportunity given him to show cause why such action
should not be taken, is unauthorized by law, and an entry so canceled prior to,
said act of 1894 must be held in law an existing entry, and therefore entitled to
the benefit of said act.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 9, 1898. (S. G.)
January 11, 1892, John D. Cory made desert land entry for the S. b
of See. 28, T. 8 N., R. 12 W., S. B. M., within the limits of the Los
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Angeles, California,land district. April 4. 1893, the entryman assigned
and transferred all his interest therein to W. HI. Holliday, who, there-
after, and on July 1, 1893, assigned ad transferred all his interest
therein to Matthew Maxson, the contestant.
January 28, 1893, (ory, the entryman, prior to his assignment of
said entry, filed his annual proof of expenditures to improve said land
for the first year, but no proof was filed of the expenditure for the
second entry year ending January 11, 1894.
April 30, 1894, the entry was canceled by your office for failure to
make annual proof for the second year, but, on March 16, 1895, the
entry was reinstated upon the application of M-axson, as assignee of
the assignee of the entrynian, because the parties in interest had not
been allowed an opportunity to appear and show cause why the entry
should not be canceled.
After the cancellation of the entry and before it was restored of
record, the following entries were made, wholly or partially, of portions
of the original entry of (Dory-namely: August 6, 1894, Abner D.
lelick made desert land entry for the SE.4 of the SE. 4 of said sec-
tion 28, T. 8 N., R. 12 W.; August 9, 1894, Kate A. Calkins made desert
land entry for the NE. 1, N. W of the SE. I SW. of the SE. i and the
SE. 4 of the SW. 4 of said section; and September 4, 1894, Bessie R.
Atkins made desert land entry for the W. I of said section.
A hearing was directed by your office, in order to determine the
rights of the claimants to the land, incliding any question affecting
the qualifications of the assignees, and the sufficiency, as ground of
cancellation, of the fact of failure to make yearly proof prior to the
expiration of the time prescribed for final proof.
This hearing was had May 27, 1895, at which all of the parties
appeared, either in person or by attorney. Dory and Holliday, the
original entryman and his assignee, waived all of their rights in favor
of Maxson, the assignee of the latter. The evidence taken at the hear-
ing was in behalf of Maxson, except the testimony of Melick, which
related solely to the state of the record and his ignorance of the right
of Maxson when he (Melick) made his entry. The local office found
that the entries of Melick, Calkins and Atkins were properly allowed,
on the ground that the land was opened to entry when they were sever-
'.ally made, and there was no record then showing any existing claim of
Maxson, although the good faith of Maxson was conceded.
Upon Maxson's appeal, your office, on April 24, 1896, reversed this
decision, and held for cancellation the several entries of Melick, Cal-
kins and Atkins, in so far as they conflict with the entry of Maxson.
Calkins and Atkins appeal. No appeal or other action was taken
by Melick.
The record and the testimony show that Cory, the entryman, assigned
his interest in his entry and the land involved therein to Holliday, and
that the latter assigned his interest therein to Maxson for six hundred
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dollars; that Cory filed in due time his proof of his first yearly expend-
iture of six hunlred dollars in boring an artesian well on the tract,
which flows twenty-five or more miners' inches of water, and the
expenses connected therewith; that Maxson was qualified as assignee
to hold the land, except as to his citizenship, which was not proved;
and that Cory informed Alaxsou that everything necessary was done
to hold the land for two years. No proof was submitted of the yearly
expenditure for the second entry year ending January II, 1894.
Under the act of August 4,1894 (28 Stat., 226), it was, among other
things, provided that where declarations of itention to enter desert
land had been filed prior to the taking effect of the act, the requirement
that the persons filing the same should expend the full sum of one dol-
lar per acre during the year toward the reclamation of the land entered
should be suspended for the year 1894, and such annual expenditure
for that year "and the proof tlereof" was dispensed with. Your office
held that, as this act was approved and took effect prior to the entries
of Melick, Calkins and Atkins, it applied to this case, and, that the
yearly proof for the second year was dispensed with nder the terms
of the statute, and was not due until January 11, 1895.
This is not the controlling question in the case. If the entry of Cory
was rightfully canceled by your office, on April 30, 1894, it is manifest
that at the time of the taking effect of the act of August 4,1894, which,
among other things, dispensed with the annual proof on desert claims
for the year 1894, the entry was not a subsisting entry, and the statute
did not apply to it. The act can apply only to entries existing at the
time of its taking effect, and can not operate to revive prior etries
rightfully canceled. (See Parsons v. Yenzke, 164 U. S., 89.)
The entry, although canceled prior to the approval of this act, was
thereafter reinstated by your office because the parties in interest had
not been allowed an opportunity to appear and show cause why the
entry should not be canceled. The record did not disclose the interest
of Holliday in the tract, nor does it appear that there was any evidence
of the assignment of Gory to him, until after the cancellation of the
entry and about the time Maxson filed his petition tin have the entry
reinstated, when he also filed the original assignment from ory to
Holliday, and the assignment from olliday to Maxson, which was
endorsed on the instrument. Holliday insists that the assignment was
filed directly after the saule was executed and d.eliverel to him, and it
appears that the fact that he was the assignee of Gory, the entryman,
must have been knowni to the local office, as he, Holliday, was the only
one who received notice of the contemllated cancellation of the entry
for failure to make annual proof for the second entry year.
No notice was given either to Gory the original entryman, or to Max-
son, as assignee of the entryman. Such notice to Maxson was not
required, as he had not disclosed his interest in the entry, by filing the
proper certified copy of the original assignment in the local office. It
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does not appear that there was ever any record of the several assign-
llents at any place, either at the local office or that of the proper
recorder of the county where the land is situate or elsewhere.
Generally, an assignee, to be in a position to deihand protection and
notice fom the local office, must inform that office of his rights. Van
Brunt et al. v. lammon, 9 L. D., 561; American Investment (Jo., 5
L. D., 603. The assignee of a desert land entry is reqnired to prove his
assignment by filing all affidavit and a certified copy of the instrument
under which he claims, and must make affidavit as to the amount of land
held by him. Circular, General Land Offi(e, 40. None of these require-
melts was observed, either by Cory or Maxson, the assignee, oing to
their ignorance of the law and departmental requirements.
But, although notice was given to _Holliday, to which he was not
entitled of record, but to which he was entitled if his interest had been
disclosed by a compliance with the ltw& on his part, and although notice
was not required to be given to Maxson, who had not complied with
the regulations in fling his affidavits and evidence of the assignment,
yet notice should have been, but was not, given. to the original entry-
man and assignor, Cory.
- This has always been required in the case of perfected entries, where
final receipt has issued, and where the tract covered by such entry is
held to be subject to alienation. United States v. Gilbert e at., 17 L. D.,
20; William A. Fowler, 17 L. D., 189; Lambert v. Lambert, 21 L. D.,
169; Drew v. Contisky, 22 L. ID., 174; United States v. Montoyn et al.
24 L. D., 52. As much reason exists in requiring notice to be served
upon the entryman of a desert land claim, under te law permitting
assignments before the entry is completed by fluial l)roof, as in those
cases where the tract may be transferred only after final proof. In
either case, the entrymljan should be afforded an opportunity to be heard
before the entry is canceled, in order to protect his rights growing out
of the assignment or transfer, and to conclude him by the proceeding.
It follows that the cancellation of the entry was not rightful, and
that it must be considered as an existing entry at the time of the taking
effect of the statute dispensing with yearly proof under that and like
existing entries. Subsequent to the decision of your office in the case
at bar, the rule was announced in the case of Hodgson v. Epley, 23
L. D., 29;3, 26, as to the computation of time under the statute, as
follows:
If the entrynian MUs in danlt for te year ending il 189, the act should e
applied to cre the default for tat Near. If not in default for the year ending in
1894, he should b excnied or the entry year beginning i 1894.
In this ease, the second entry year expired January 11, 1894, and
therefore the proof of the annual expenditure for the entry year pre-
ceding that (late was dispensed with by the statute, the entry must be
considered one falling within te terms of the statute, as its cancella-
tion had been illegal. The failure to file yearly proof for that year is
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not, therefore, a cause for the cancellation. of the entry now, as such
proof has been dispensed with by the express terms of the statute which
applies to entries existing at the time of its taking effect.
There is evidence tending to show that the assignment from Cory to
to Holliday was held as collateral security for a debt due from the for-
mer to a bank in which the latter was a large stockholder, bat this fact
does not invalidate the assignment. At any rate, Maxson purchased
the rights of flolliday in good faith and for a valuable consideration,
and with the knowledge and consent of the original assignor. The
failure of the parties to comply with the law in reference to filiug evi-
dence of their assignments and the affidavit of interest was not an
intentional disregard of the law and departmental requirements, but
was caused by ignorance of them.
The hearing supplies the omissions, except as to the citizenship of
lolliday and Maxson, the assignees. They will be permitted to file
their affidavits showing this fact, and the other facts required of
assignees. It is not intended by this decision to decide the matter as
to the yearly proof for the third entry year, as that matter is not in
issue. Maxson states that he is ready to furnish the same, but there
is, no showing that it had been made.
Upon furnishing this required proof the entry of Joln D. Cory will
remain intact, and so much of the entries of the parties to this pro-
ceeding as are adverse to such entry will be canceled.
JACKSON ET AL. V. GARRETT.
Petition for re-review denied by Secretary Bliss, April 9, 1898. See
departmental decision of September 22, 1897. 25 L. D., 273, also 26
L. ., 48.
RAILROAD LANDS-SETTLEMENT CLAIM-SECTION 5, ACT OF MARCH
3, 15S7.
TACOMA LAND Co. v'. NORTHERN PAcIFla R. P. Co. ET AL.
Lands embraced within homestead entries or pre-emption filings at the date of a
railroad grant, or at the time when said grant takes effect, are excepted from
the operation of the grant.
A corporation created and existingunderthelaws of a State is a citizen of theUnited
States within the intent and meaning of section 5, act of March 3, 1887.
A settlement within the corporate limits of a city can confer no pre-emptive right
on the alleged settler, where no steps are taken to subject the land to the settle-
ment laws nnder the act of March 3,1877, prior to the repeal of the pre-emp-
tion law.
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A settler who, inder the law as it stood at the time of his settlement, had exbasted
his homestead right by a prior entry, is not entitled to make a second or addi-
tional entry under the act of March 2, 1889, where prior to the passage of said
act, and prior to the initiation of a valid settlement claim, the land had been
sold by a railroad company as part of its grant, and the right of the purchaser
validated by the act of March 3, 1887.
Secretary Bliss to the Conmmissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 12, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Ten separate appeals have been filed from your office decision of
September 20, 1895, sustaining the action of the local officers in award-
ing to Abner Shrives, upon certain conditions, the right to make entry
of the SE. i of the SW. X of Sec. 5, and to the Tacola Land Company
the right to purchase under the provisions of Sec. 5 of the act of March
3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), the W. 4 of the NE. 4, the E. 4- of the NW. 1, and
lots and 2, Sec. 7, and the E. of the NW. 4 of See. 29; all in town-
ship 20 north, range 3 east, W. M., Olympia land district, Washington.
The several tracts involved are all within the limits of the grant
made by the joint resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat., 378), for that
portion of the main line of the Northern Pacific Railroad between
Portland, Oregon , and Puget Sound. The E. of the NW. 1 of said
section 29 is also within the limits of the grant for the branch line
of said road across the Cascade Mountains, as shown by the map of
definite location of such branch line filed March 26, 1884.
At the date of the passage of the joint resolution of May 31, 1870,
supra, the tracts above described in sections 5 and 7, were embraced in
subsisting homestead entries of record, which were, subsequently to
the passage of said resolution, canceled. The tracts were, therefore,
excepted from the operation of the grant made by said resolution.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Bardon (145 U. S ,535); Northern Pacific
R. R. Co. (20 L. D:, 514). The remaining tract in section 29 was
included in the pre-emption declaratory statement of Richard Martin-
dale, made February 27, 1869, alleging settlement on the 19th of that
month. This iling was of-record, uncanceled,,both at the date of the
passage of said joint resolution of May 31, 1870, and also at the date
of definite location of said ascade branch, March 26, 1884, and was
therefore excepted from the operation of the grants for both the main
and branch lines of said road. Fish . Northern Pacific, on review
(23 L.D., 15); Whitney v. Taylor (157 U. S., 585).
It therefore appears that all the land here involved was excepted
from, the operation of the grants for the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, Your office so held; from which the Northern Pacific Rail.
road Company duly appealed, and after a careful consideration of the
matter your office decision in this particular is affirmed.
It might be stated that all the land here involved is in close prox-
imity to Tacoma. It appears that a portion thereof has been within
the corporate limits of the city of Tacoma since February 3, 1875. It
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also appears that other portions of the land were included within the
city by the extension of its boundaries at a special election held April
17, 1891.
The Tacoma Land Company, originally known as the Southern
Improvement Company, was incorporated under the laws of Pennsyl-
vania in 1871, with authority to do business in the then Territory of
Washington, as provided for in its articles of incorporation, a copy of
which was filed and recorded in the office of the Secretary of the Ter-
ritory, on January 3, 1874. On October 20,1892, it applied to purchase,
under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1887, supra, all the lands
here involved, basing its claimed right upon a purchase made of the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company on December 30, 1874', of a large
body of land, including that here in question, as shown by certified
copy of the conveyance which was duly recorded in the county on
March 10, 1875.
It is insisted that the Tacoma Land Company, being a corporation,
is not a citizen of the United States or a person who has declared his
intention to become Such citizen, and is, therefore, not entitled to the
benefits of the remedial legislation contained in the fifth section of the
act of March 3, 1887. This question has frequeitly arisen in the land
department in the administration of this act. In Telford et al. v. Key-
stone Lumber Company, on review (19 L. D., 141, 145), it was said:
It will be noticed that the language of the section in defining the personal quali-
fications of purchasers, is: 'Citizens of the United States, or to persons who have
declared their intention to become such citizens.' Unlike the settlement laws, the
- further qualifications that they be over twenty-one years of age, or the head of a
family, are not included in the section. No personal act, such as settlelent resi-
dence and cultivation, is required, or could be interpolated into the statute, and the
acreage is not liniited that the citizen could purchase. It seems to me that in view
of this, it is not going too far in the construction of this section, to say that a cor-
poration, where the purchase is made in good faith, and under the conditions pre-
scribed, may have the benefit of the remedial statute, and that 'citizen,' as here
used, should be construed as including corporations.
Tn Daily v. Marquette, loughton and Ontonagon R. R1. CO. et at. (19
IJ D., 148), it was said:
This objection is pressed with much insistence, and a number of decisions are cited
to sustain the contention. An examination of those decisions shows that their pur-
port has been, in each instance, misunderstood and misconstrued. They only go to
the extent of holding that a corporation is not a citizen for all purposes. There is,
however, a long line of decisions which holds that a corporation is a citizen of the
State wherein it has a legal existence, and as such citizen can sue and be sued in the
courts of the United States. (Railroad Company v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 285; and
Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 118 U. S., 395'6, where the supreme
court refused to hear an argument on the question.) For a full discussion of the
question, reference is made to the case of the Louisville R. R. Co. v. Letson (2
Row., 497), where the court concludes, p. 558,-'that a corporation created by
and doing. business in a particular State is to be deemed to all intents and pur-
poses as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of the same State for
the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that State
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as much as a natural person.' And many other authorities to the same effect might
be cited. As such citizens of the State they are in contemplation of law citizens of
its laws. (inneapolis R. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S., 26.) The objection, on the
ground that the land company is not a citizen, is overruled.
See also Gasper et al. v. St. Louis River Water Power Co. (22 L. D.
587), Nevada Southern Railway Co. (22 1. D., ).
The departmental rulings upon this question have been uniform and
many tracts of land of great value are now held thereunder, the title to
which is wholly dependent upon these rulings.
In United States v. Northwestern Express Co. (164 U. S., 686), the
sole question presented was whether a corporation created under
the laws of the State of Minnesota was a citizen of the United States
within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 851), confer-
ring upon the court of claims jurisdiction to inquire into and finally
adjudicate "all claims for property of citizens of the United States"'
taken or destroyed by Iiidians nuder the circumstances specified in the
act, and at page 690, the court said:
-The act in question was a provision made by the United States as the guardian of
the Indians, controlling as well their persons as their property, designed to make
provision for the payment of the injuries committed by its wards. It certainly
contemplated that citizens of the United States, even strictly speaking, should be
made whole for the losses they might have sustained. But it is evident that cases
might arise, where, in order to make restitution to citizens of the United States, the
term in question would require a construction embracing Federal and state corpora-
tious. For, as the legal title to the property of a corporation is generally in the
corporation, claims for damages to such property could not be presented in the
names of the several stockholders. To deny relief to such a corporation would be
practically therefore to refuse redress to citizens of the United States.
It must have been contemplated, therefore, that a corporation thus chartered by
Congress was to be treated under the terms of the act herein referred to as a citizen
of the United States for the purposes thereof; and the same reasoning which thus
operates to bring a Federal corporation within the terms of the act, leads also to
the necessity of including corporations of the several States of the Union.
See also Sinyth v. Ames (159 U. S., 4v6).
The Tacoma LaId Conipa-ii being a corporation created and existing
under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, is a citizen of the United
States within the meaning of the act here in question and the decision
of your office to that effect is affirmed.
The numerous claims made for this land under the homestead and
pre-emption laws, and applications to locate scrip, are clearly set forth
in your office decision, and date back to March 21, 1884, when Donald
McRae tendered his homestead application to enter the SE. of the
SW. -4 of said Sec. . The case arising upon his application was duly
prosecuted to this Department, resulting iii the decision of September
20, 1887, reported in 6 L. D., 400, in which it was held that by the joint
resolution of May 31, 1870, spra, there was conferred pont the North-
ern Pacific Railroad Company a grant of lands for the line of its road
from Portland to Puget Sound, and for that reason McRae's application
was denied.
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Your office decision now under review denied all of the several appli-
cations to make filing and entry and locate scrip upon the lands here
involved, for conflict with the superior right of purchase in the Tacoma
Land Company, except the application of Abner Shrives, covering the
tract in section 5, above described. Shrives' application to make entry
of that tract under the homestead laws was presented on September
24, 1892. It appears that he went upon the land in 1S84, as the repre-
sentative of Mcdlae, whose homestead application for the land had been
rejected for conflict with the grant of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company aiid was then pending upon appeal iii your office. e resided
upon the land in a little house built by McRae, under an agreement
that McRae was to pay him a certain amount for occupying and making
improvements upon the land for Mcliae. It is claimed, McRae failed
to keep this agreement and in 1885 Shrives repudiated his relations
with McRae and set up a claim to the land in his own right. He has
since resided upon the same, and claims to have sought to make entry
thereof on several occasions.
The tract is part of an odd-numbered section within the limits of the
Northern Pacific grant, for conflict with which, Ilcelae's homestead
application had been rejected March 21, 1884, of which Shrives was
fully advised.
The land was at the time of the claimed settlement of Shrives and
still is, within the corporate limits of the city of Taconia, and no pro-
ceeding to subject the same to the settlement laws, under the act of
March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 392), was instituted or even requested so far
as the record shows, prior to the repeal of the pre-emption law on
March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095). Shrives, therefore, had not "lawfully
initiated" any claim to the land under the pre-emption law, which can
be recognized under the saving clause of the repealing act. Indeed,
his present recordclaim is asserted under the homestead law, and
respecting this it is sufficient to say that in 1869 he nade homestead
entry of eighty acres in Kansas, and was not, therefore, qualified to
snake another or additional homestead entry until the passage of the
act of March 2,1889 (25 Stat., 854), two years after the act of March 3,
1887, had given vitality and force to rights, like those of the Tacolla
Lrand Company, asserted under purchase of lands claimed under rail-
road land grants.
The record does not sustain the claim that Shrives initiated any
settlement right to the land prior to the act of March 3, 1887, upon
which the Tacomia Land Company's right to pnrchase is based. Upon
the passage of that act the land company's prior ineffectual purchase
from the railroad company, if bona fide, was converted into a lawful
right to purchase from the United States, and kowing that the land
was claimed by the-railroad company under its grant, and having at
least constructive notice of its sale to the land companly, as shown by
the recorded deed, Shrives could not thereafter initiate any settlement
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right which would defeat the land company's right to purchase under
the fifth section of the act. is settlement is not, therefore, protected
by the provisio to that section and his application to make homestead
entry will stand rejected.
Subject to the modification herein made, your office decision is
affirmed and the application of the Tacoma Land Company, if otherwise
regular, will be accepted and the company permitted to make the pur-
chase applied for.
RAILROAD GRANT-1,KDEMNITY--VITI{DRAfWAL-SELECTION.
IowA RAILROAD LAND Co. v. NEWELL ET AL.
The act of June 2, 1864, did not work a legislative withdrawal of the even nnrnbered
sections within the original six mile granted limoits, and in the absence of an
executive withdrawal of said lands no right of the company thereto can attach
prior to selection.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 12, 1898. (C. J. W.)
By your office letter of March 23, 1896, addressed to the register and
receiver at Des Mdoiness Iowa, it appears that the records of your office
show that the N. -J of the SW. 1 of Sec. 36, T. 85 N., R. 44 W., Des
:Moines land district, was embraced in homestead entry No. 616, made
by John Allen, August 22, 1872, and canceled for abandonment Sep-
tember 10, 1884; also that other filings were of record for the tract,
and amongst them declaratory statement No. 3585 of Nathan Newell,
filed February 5, 1884, alleging settlement January 15, 1884, and declar-
atory statement No. 3690 of Nathan Newell, filed May 8, 1889, alleging
settlement September 13, 1888. March 3, 1890, Newell offered final
proof, upon which cash certificate No. 21,721 issued.
On the presentation of the final proof, it appearing that Newell's
entry coDflicted with the selection of the Iowa Railroad Land Company,
successors to Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad Compally, filed
August 23, 1881, and said final proof appearing to be defective, a hear-
ing was ordered by your office, January 5, 1894, to determine whether
Newell's pre-emption cash entry, was valid on the final proof pre-
sented; also whether his claim as a settler could be established and his
settlement thus disclosed so exhibit his claim to the land as to be supe-
rior to that of the company.
The hearing was'duly had, December 18, 1894, at which W. W.
Ordway, as transferee of Newell's rights, appeared and was allowed to
intervene- and at which the railroad company appeared by agent and
counsel. Testimony was taken in behalf of the entryman and trans-
feree, upon which the local officers found that the failure of Nathan
Newell to sign his testimony (form No. 4069) was a clerical error or
oversight, and that the testimony was properly taken; also that he
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was a bonafide settler on said 'lauld on the 23rd (lay of August, 1884,
the date of the com1pany's selection, and that he had established his
residence on the land and. made valuable improvements upon it before
that date. They held his pre-emption cash entry intact and recom-
mended the cancellation of the company's selection, made August 23,
1884. The company appealed, and, on March 23, 1896, your office
affirmed their decision and held said selection for cancellation.
The company has appealed to the Department, in which the follow-
ing assignment of error is made, which presents the chief basis of its
claim, which is:
That your office erred in not holding that the act of June 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 9),
amendatory of the act of May 15,1856 (11 Stat., 9), under which appellant claims,
created a legislative withdrawal of the land in question upon the definite location
of appellant's modified line of route, December 1, 1867, and tat by reason of such
legislative withdrawal the land wivas reserved from settlement and entry when the
said Newell made his alleged settlement in January, 1881, as well as thereafter, thus
barring his right of entry nder the pre-emption law.
It appears that the land in controversy is within the six mile granted
limits under the before recited acts, but as the acts primarily granted
only odd numbered sections, and as it is a part of an even numbered
section, the only right the company could acquire to it was by its selec-
tion in lieu of odd numbered sections lost, and no right would attach
to it except upon its selection as indemnity land. No such selection
was made until after Newell's settlement.
The contention that the act of June 2,1864, operated as a legislative
withdrawal of an even numbered section would seem to be illogical and
not authorized by the act. In the case of Cedar Rapids, etc., Railroad
Co. v. Herring (110 U. S., 27), a similar question arising under the same
grant was considered, and it was, in substance, held that the grant did
not attach to the indemnity lands until the right of selection was
exercised.
It is insisted that it became the duty of the Secretary of the Interior
to withdraw a sufficiency of the lands, both within the primary and
indemnity limits of the grant, to cover losses of odd numbered see-
tions, upon the filing of the map showing definite modified line of the
road, December 1, 1867, and that the failure to make the actual with-
drawal did not prevent their withdrawal by operation of law.
The act of June 2, 1864, clearly contemplates the executive with-
drawal of lands for indemnity purposes, upon the terms and conditions
therein specified, but for the very reason that it directs such executive
action, it does not operate as a legislative Withdrawal. As there was
neither executive nor legislative withdrawal of the land in question
between December 1, 1867,. the date of the filing of the map of the
company's modified line, and January 15, 1884, the date of Newell's
settlement, it was subject to his settlement rights.
It is farther insisted that it was error to allow Newell to supplement
his final proof by proof offered at the hearing. There were sufficient
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grounds for ordering the hearing, and the proof then made, which is
set out i detail i your said office tter of larch 23, 1896, to which
reference is hereby made, was sufficient to cure the apparent defects in
the final proof, as well as to justify and support the conclusion reached,
that Newell settled and made improvements in good faith, and thereby
acquired rights to the land prior to the railroad company's selection
of it.
It is further insisted that it was error not to hold that Newell had
Abandoned the and, and that the rights of appellant attached upon
such abandonment. This contention is not supported by the record.
The record shows that Newell was residing upon the land at the time
final proof was made and final certificate issued, and had been from the
date of his settlement in January, 1884, and that when he went west he
rented it out and left a tenant upon it, and it was so occupied by his
tenant until Ordway, the intervenor, foreclosed his mortgage against it
and had it sold. The transferee, Ordway, seems to have acted honestly
and in good faith, and exhibits title acquired since the date of Newell's
final proof and final certificate.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
SCHOOL LAND-INDEMNITY SELECTION.
FREDERICK W. SCHROEDER ET AL.
A school section made fractional by the exclusion of "mud flats" from the public
survey, as shown by the returns of the surveyor general, constitutes a proper
basis for school indemnity selections in the absence of any proof of fraud or mis-
take in the survey.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 13, 1898. (C. J. G-.)
Frederick W. Schroeder et at., purchasers, have appealed from your
office decision of January 18, 1896, holding for cancellation school
indemnity selections numbers 4667, 4668, 4671, 4681, 4684, 4685, 4686,
4689, 4690 and 4691, San Francisco land district, California.
These selections are fully described in your said office decision and
are based upon an alleged deficiency in Sec. 36, T. 4 S., R. 23 E., S. B. M.
The said section is designated upon the plat of survey as "mud flats;"
but notwithstanding such return it was decided by your office that the
tract i question is school land in place, and that the said selections by
the State of California are therefore invalid for want of a proper basis.
It is alleged in the appeal to this Department that section 36, which
is named as the basis for the selection of indemnity land, is not subdi-
vided, and that the field notes show that it was never surveyed; that
it is part of the bed of the Colorado river and should have been so
represented upon the official plats, and that therefore it is not land in
place. The plat of survey shows that the olorado river to the north
of section 36, about the middle of section 26, divides into two well-
defined channels which come together again south thereof, about the
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middle of section 7, T. S., R. 24 E., S. B. M. The estimated area
between these two channels is 1100 acres, and is designated. on the
plat as "mud flats." The whole of section 36 falls within this area
with the exception of a small corner on the western bank of the river
containing 6.75 acres.
In support of the contention that the section in question forms part
of the bed of the Colorado river, a corroborated affidavit by surveyor
W. F. Benson is filled with the appeal, and is as follows:
I am the same W. F. Benson who made a contract with the government and
executed a survey of township 4 south, range 23 east, San Bernardino Meridian.
The township is hounded on the east by the Colorado 'river, which cuts off a
strip along the whole eastern boundary thereof. In the southeastern corner of the
township, I returned all of section 36 lying east of the westerly channel of the river,
as a 'mud flat."
At the time I made this survey, the water was quite low, and, directly north of
this'section, the river divided into two wel-defined channels, coming together again
about three miles south of the point of separation. I judge, from observation, that
what is now delineated upon the map as the western channel of the Colorado was
originally the main river. What is indicated on the plat as mud flats is, in fact, the
bed of the river, and is uncovered only when the river is running less than one-half
of its maximum volume. Between the eastern and western channels of the river, as
shown on the plat, and running through these so-called mud flats, there are numer-
ous smaller channels, which change every year. At the time I was there, the river
was low, and, in my report of the survey, I indicated the land that was uncovered
as a "mud flat." If I had considered it land in place, I would have surveyed it;
but it was nothing but a bed of silt brought down by the waters of the Colorado,
and left exposed during low water. If I had made any attempt, in my field-notes,
to return these mud flats, as they existed at that time, with the numerous channels
running through and dividing the same into saud-barts, it would not have been
correct the next year, because it is not the same two years in succession.
I have made a plat and attached the same to this affidavit, showing these so-called
''mud-fiats,' though it would have been snore correct to have returned them as
sand-bars or ridges. I have no hesitancy in stating that all of that portion of sec-
tion 36 east of the west bank of the river is a part of the natural bed of the Colorado
river.
The township plat shows that the western bank of the western chan-
nel of the Colorado river at this point has been meandered, and the
only land in section 36 outside of this meander line is the 6.75 acres
heretofore referred to. The eastern bank of the eastern channel,
which is within the limits of an Indian reservation, appears never to
have been meandered. From the most reliable data obtainable it
appears that the eastern channel is the main channel of the Colorado
river at this point, and it is so delineated upon the township piat.
The particular provision referred to in the appeal as authorizing the
indemnity selections made by the State, is found in the last clause of
section 2275 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the act of Febru-
ary 28, 1891 (26 Stat., 796), and is as follows:
And other lands of equal acreage are also hereby appropriated and granted, and
may be selected by said State or Territory to compensate deficiencies for school pur-
poses, where sections sixteen and thirty-six are fractional in quantity, or where one
or both are wanting by reason of the township being fractional, or from any natural
cause whatever.
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The returns of the surveyor-general and the record of survey made
under his direction are entitled to consideration as evidence, upon all
questions respecting which such returns and record are required to
speak. There has been no allegation that the plat of survey in this
case does not contain a true representation of the land in question,
and in the absence of mistake or fraud the return of the surveyor will
be acepted as correctly showing the true area of the 'land. As previ-
ously set out herein, the bank of the Colorado river bordering on the
so-called "mud flats" has been meandered, section 36 being returned
on the plat of survey as containing -6.75 acres. This undoubtedly
renders said section fractional, and being so returned, it will be con-
sidered as containing the quantity of land expressed in such return;
and the rights of' the State of California under the school grant will
be governed thereby. The lact that the surveyor did not survey these
so-called "mud flats" will in the absence of proof to the contrary be
accepted as establishing that it is not land in place. If the tract so
described is land in place it was the duty of the surveyor to extend the
lines of survey over it and so represent the same upon the official plat.
- The State has been governed by the field-notes of survey in making
its school indemnity selections in this instance; consequently the
Department will not be justified in canceling the selections i -the
-absence of some proof of fraud or mistake in the survey of the basis.
The swamp land grant takes precedence over the school grant, yet
the tract in question was never included in the list of swamp lands,
which would seem to indicate that it was regarded as the bed of the
Colorado river. -
It is well settled that by accepting indemnity in lieu of the deficiency
in section 36 shown by the survey, the State thereby relinquishes said
section and is thereafter divested of all right to the basis thus used.
Your office decision is hereby reversed, and the school indemnity
selections named will be approved.
ALASIKAN LAND-RIGHTS OF NATIVES-APPLICATION FOR SURVEY.
Louis GREENBAUM.
An entry of Alaskan land under the provisions of section 12, act of March 3, 1891,
should not be allo wed in such form as to include a trail or roadway between a
native village and a harbor landing, long used by the natives to reach said land-
ing, and necessary for their free access thereto.
Where a survey of Alaskan land, with a view to its purchase under section 12, of
said act, has been nade without written application therefor, as required by
departmental regulations, anu the amendment of such survey isfound necessary,
it will not be allowed until due application therefor has been made in conform-
ity with said regulations; and prior to the execution of such amended survey a
deposit of an amount sufficient to defray the expense thereof, and all expenses
incident thereto, must be made.
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Directions given that whenever a survey is desired of Alashan land due compliance
with the departmental regulations of June 3, 1891, i1 the matter of written
applications and otherwise, shall be exacted in each instance.
Secretary Bliss to the Comissioner o the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 13, 1898. (W. M. B.)
Louis Greenbaum, eiaimant and alleged owner; who seeks to purchase
and enter a parcel of land uder provision of section 12 of the act of
March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), has appealed from the decision of your
office of May 8, 1895, wherein was suspended survey No. 35, executed
by Albert Lascy, U. S. deputy surveyor, on July 28 and 29, 1892, which
said survey embraces an area of 3.92 acres of land situate at Port
Etches, linchinbrook Island, Prince William Sound, district of Alaska,
and which is claimed for the purpose of a trading post.
The survey was suspended, as stated in the decision of your office,
upon the ground that:
The survey in its present forn can not be accepted by this office for the reason that
all the land claimed by the appellant is not occupied and used for his business.
The plat shows that the land included in the survey "in its present
form" is remarkably irregular in shape, and that such irregularity is
not due to the configuration of the land. Said fact and the further
fact that the survey in its existing form apparently encroaches upon
certain rights of the natives of Alaska which are protected by the pro-
vision of section 14 of the act of March 3, 191, would of themselves
constitute a sufficient ground for suspending the survey, thereby pre-
termitting, at this time, the consideration of the question relating to,
the extent of appellant's occupation of the land claimed and the quantity
thereof to which he would be entitled by reason of such occupancy.
It appears from the plat that none of the improvements claimed by
appellant are located upon the larger portion or muain body of the land
embraced in the survey, which comprises an area of about .three acres,
but that all of said improvements are, situate upon a parcel of land
comprising an area of about one acre in the form of a parallelogram,
which projects from the main body which is in the form or shape
approximately of a square.
It is shown by the plat and field notes that there is a native village
to the north of and within a few yards of the lines of the survey which
embrace said narrow strip of land, and also "barrabarries," or huts,
to the east and south of, and as eqimally near to, said lines of survey.
Across the main body of the land included in the survey in its pres-
eut form-which lies between the landing on the harbor and the tract
upon which claimant's alleged improvements are situate-extends a
"trail," or narrow roadway, from the village to the landing on the
harbor, long used by the villagers to reach said lauding.
With regard to the use of this "tract" by the natives as a means of
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reaching the landing, Inspector A. P. Swineford in his report dated
Sitka, Alaska, August 6, 1895, to your office, says:
It is apparent that the survey cuts them (the native villagers) off from free and
unrestricted access to the river harbor, to which the trail delineated on the plat
thereof leads frons their habitations, and to the use of which they have fully as much
Tight as the real or fictitious claimant. It is undoubtedly the intention of the Alaska
Commercial Company (which is alleged to be the real claimant) to possess itself of
the harbor front to the exclusion of all others.
To permit purchase and entry to be made of the land embraced in the
survey in its existing form would give to the owner of the land the
exclusive use and control of said "trail "-as against the natives who
would appear to have a, prior right thereto-as a right of way, for which
reason the survey should not be approved in its present form.
Said right of way should be left open to the public, whereby appel-
]ant would, along with others, be entitled to the free use and enjoyment
thereof.
With respect to the infringenent by this survey upon the rights of
the natives, Inspector Swineford makes statement as follows:
My recollection of the location, corroborated and strengthened by that of several
persons who recently returned from a sojourn of some days at Port Etches, is that a
number of native habitations are included within the limits of this survey, though
none are indicated on the plat or mentioned in the field notes.
I am not prepared to say that any of the land embraced in the survey is claimed
by natives. It is not probable that they have the least conception of what the sur-
vey means; but if they have, and. really know that they have any rights in jeopardy,
they are too far remote to make any protest, and are without any representative
capable of speaking for them.
With regard to the rightful claimant or owner of the land embraced
in this survey, Inspector Swineford in his report, which he states is
based upon personal knowledge of the location and the most reliable
information, says:
The claimant is not in possession of the premises as alleged by the deputy sur-
veyor, nor has he ever occupied any of the buildings for trading or manufacturing
purposes. The improvements are owned and occupied by the Alaska Commercial
Company, and theirs is the only trading station on Hinchiubrook Island. Charles
Swanson, the agent of that company, is the only white resident in that locality, and
in view of that fact I do not see how it possibly can be true, as alleged by the deputy
surveyor, that "the location is used by the claimant as a trading post." There is but
one trading post at Port Etches (Natchuk), and as showing by whom it is owned and
maintained I enclose herewith copy of a hand bill, now conspicuouslypostedthrough-
out southwestern Alaska, and which I have marked "Exhibit A.' The Alaska Com-
mercial Company is, in fact, the real claimant of the tract embraced in the survey,
and Greenbaum a ere dummy" through whom it seeks to obtain title.
In the name of this or that one of its shareholders or trusty agents, it has preferred
claims under the act of March 3, 1891, to nearly all the best and most available har-
her frontage in western Alaska, together with the most eligible townsite and fishing
stations.
The hand bill referred to in the inspector's report (forming a part
thereof and marked Exhibit "A"), reads as follows:
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$1,000 Re ard Offered: For the apprehension and conviction of the party or par-
ties who on the 5th day of July entered the Alaska Commercial company's store at
Natchut, Alaska, and took terefrom 24 sea otter skins and $140.00 in money.
It appears that Said inspector's report was not made until about
three months subsequent'to the date of your office decision suspending
this survey.
Such application as is required by paragraph 1 of the rules of June
3, 1891 (12 L. D., 583), to be made for this class of surveys is not found
with the returns made of the survey under consideration, nor has any
such application been found with the returns of any survey of said
class of Alaskan surveys. Said paragraph 1 reads as follows:
Applications for surveys must be made in writing by the person entitled to pur-
chase under said act or by the authorized agent of the association or corporation so
entitled. The application must particularly describe the character of the land
sought to he surveyed and, as accurately as possible, its geographicalposition, with
the character, extent, and approximate value of the improvements. If a private
survey had previously been made of the land occupied by the applicant a copy of
the plat and field notes of such survey should accompany the application, -which
must also state that the land contains neither coal her preciots metals, with reasons for
such statement; that no part of the land described in the app]ication includes
improvements made by or in possession of another prior to the passage of said act;
that it does not inelude any land to which, natires of Alaska have prior rights by virtue
of actual occupation; that it does not include a portion of any town site of lands
occupied by missionary stations, or ay lands occupied or reserved by the United
States for public purposes or selected by the United States Commissioner of Fish
and Fisheries, or any lands reserved from sale nder the provisions of this act.
These statements must be verified by affidavit.
While the claim of Greenbaum should not be rejected upon the report
of the inspector without giving the claimant an opportunity to be heard
upon the statements of fact therein, there is in this instance especial
reason for giving attention to the inspector's report when we consider,
as before shown, that the claimant has not made any statement, veri-
fied or otherwise, of his relation to the land or of its occupancy and
improvement, all of which is required by the regulation cited.
In your office decision herein it was held that the present survey
would not be approved for the reason that, as shown by the surveyor's
return, not all the land claimed is occupied by claimant and it was sug-
gested that if the survey were amended in a manner therein pointed
out that it would receive consideration. It now appears that an amend-
ment of the survey in the respect suggested would avoid an encroach-
ment upon the right of the natives to reach the harbor by the "old
trail" and thus one of the objections mentioned by the inspector would
be obviated.
Before appellant should be permitted to have the survey amended
*according to the suggestion of your office he should be required to file
in the office of the surveyor-general for Alaska, within such reasonable
time as you may name, a written application therefor, conforming to
the regulations above quoted, and he should aso be required to file
516 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
with such application his affidavit showing particularly his relation to
the land and the state of its occupancy and improvement at the date of
the original survey and at the present time.
It is frther directed that the execution of an amended or new sur-
vey will not be authorized by the surveyor-general until appellant has,
in accordance with the provision of section 13 of the act of March 3,
1891, placed in a proper United States depository to the credit of the
United States an amounit sufficient to defray the total cost of such
amended or new survey, and all expenses incident thereto, without cost
or expense to the government.
By reason of the many irregularities found to exist in connection
with the execution of a large number of the surveys thus far executed
in Alaska under section 13 of the act of March 3, 1891, and especially
since no written applications appear to have been made for any of the
same, so far as is ascertained from the returns made thereof, it is
hereby ordered that in the future whenever a survey is desired by a
claimant or claimants, of land used and occupied for the purpose of
" trade or manufactures," the foregoing egulations and instructions
must be observed and strictly adhered to in every such case, without
further direction by this Department.
INDIAN LANDS-BOUNDARIES OF1 THE FIVE NATIONS.
OPINION.
In the treaties affecting the boundaries of the lands secured to the Five Nations
wherein a river is established as a boundary it was intended thereby to extend
the title and proprietorship of riparian claimants to the middle thread of the
stream.
Assistant Attorney General Vaz Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
April 13, 1898. (F. W. C.)
I have the honor to acknowledge your reference of a communication
from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated March 29, 1898, accon-
panied by two communications from Mr. C. U. Fitch, topographer in
charge of certain surveys i the Indian Territory, dated respectively
February 2, and February 9, 1898, all relating to the proper boundaries
of the country secured to the Five Nations, respectively, where, accord-
ing to the treaty calls, rivers form such boundaries.
In my opinion of February 3, 1898, (26 L. D., 140), respecting a part
of the boundary between the Choctaw, Creek and Cherokee Nations,
it was said that the treaty of the Choctaw Nation, proclaimed January
8, 1821 (7 Stat. 211), "clearly made the right bank of the Canadian'
river a part of the northern boundary of the Choctaw country," and
that Article 1, of the treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations,
proclaimed March 4, 1856 (Revision of the Indian Treaties, page 275),
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"established the right bank of the Canadian river as part of the
northern boundary of the Choctaw country.2' The real question dis-
cussed in that opinion is not what bank, or what portion of the Cana-
dian river, constitutes the boundary in question, but whether a stated
portion of that boundary is marked by a straight and artificial line or
by the Canadian river as a natural monument. The opinion holds that
the river and not the artificial line constitutes the boundary. What
was said, however, respecting the Choctaw treaty of Jauuary 8, 1821,
and the Choctaw and Chickasaw treaty of March 4, 1856, establishing
"the ight bank of the Canadian river" as a part of the northern
boundary of. the Choctaw country, would have been better expressed
and would have been free from ambiguity if, as in the concluding por-
tion of the opinion, the reference had been to the river itself and not
to the right bank thereof.
Where a conveyance of land is made by statute, treaty, patent or
private deed, in which the land conveyed is described as bounded by a
non-navigable river, the title and proprietorship of the grantee, in the
absence of some expression to the contrary, extends to the middle
thread of the stream. An examination of the several treaties affecting
the boundaries of the lands secured to the Five Nations, respectively,
shows that wimere in those treaties a river is established as a boundary,
it was intended thereby to extend the title and proprietorship of the
riparian claimants to the middle thread of the stream.
In running and marking actual surveys upon the ground it is not
convenient or even possible to run and mark lines along the middle
thread of a stream, and therefore such lines are usually run and marked
along the shore or water line.
The description i Senate Document No. 120, 25th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Vol. 2, page 952, of a survey made of the Cherokee country in which a
portion of the boundary line was surveyed " on the north bank of the
Arkansas river," to which Mr. Fitch makes reference i his communi-
cations, was not intended to limit or restrict the Cherokee title and
proprietorship to the north bank of the river. That survey was made
preliminary to the issuance of a patent to the Cherokees, and a patent
thus describing the lands conveyed would have carried the title and
proprietorship of the grantee to the middle thread of the river, espe-
cially when considered in the light of the treaty.
Approved, April 13, 1898.
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
ALASKAN LANDS-RIGHTS 01 NATIVES-VATER SUPPLY.
POINT ROBERTS CANNING CO.
A survey of Alaskau laud, with a view to the purchase thereof as a trading post,
should not be allowed in such form as to deprive native villagers of free access
to the surrounding country.
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Land upon which is located the fresh water supply of a native Alaskan village may
be regarded as land "actually occupied" by such natives, and therefore excluded
from entry for purposes of trade and manufactures under the act of March 3,
1891.
,Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General 1ancd Office, April
(W. V. D.) 15, 1898. (W. M. B.)
The Point Roberts Canning Company, a corporation, have appealed
from the decision of your office of May 10, 1895, wherein was suspended
survey No. 70, of a tract of land claimed by said company, containing
157.35 acres, situate on Kvichak River, Alaskan Peninsula, which is
used for a fishing and salting station.
Said survey was executed on July 20 and 21, 1894, by Clinton G-urnee,
Jr., U. S. deputy surveyor, under provision of sections 12 and 13 of the
act of March 3, 1831, (26 Stat. 1095) and the regulations of June 3,
1891, (1' L. D. 583).
The action of your office in suspending the survey is based, as appears,
upon the grond that " more land is claimed than is used by the claim-
ants in their business."
The contention of appellants pertinent to question at issue is:
That the tract as surveyed is practically in a square form, except the exclusion of
the Indian village.
That te inland extent of the claim is necessary for the fresh water supply of the
fishery station,
'lhe value and character of the improvements upon the tract claimed
clearly indicate that the same is occupied in good faith by appellants
for the purpose of "trade." But it also appears that the survey is
objectionable in its present or existing form upon the ground that it is
an infringement upon certain "prior rights" of the natives of Alaska,
to a portion of the land in question.
In his final oath to field notes the deputy states that the improve-
ments owned by the company consist of a ware house, -dwelling for
fishermen, residence, and a complete outfit for salting salmon, and that
such improvements are of the approximate value of $6,000.00.
The deputy in his general report states further that: "There is an
Indian village on the river adjoining on the north west of the claim of
about thirty huts."'
It appears from the field notes and plat that, beginning at corner
No. 5 on the south bank of Kvichak river, course five (a line to the
south west of the village, and between fifty and sixty yards from the
nearest cabin therein) runs S 41 45' E, a distance of 7.00 chs. to corner
No. 6; that from thence course 6 (a line to the south east of the village
and between sixty and sixty five chains from the nearest cabin) runs
N. 52 E. a distance of 15.00 chs. to. corner No. 7; and that from thence
course seven (a line to the north east of the village, and between fifty
and fifty-five yards from the nearest cabin) runs N. 4145' W. a distance
of 6.00 chs. to corner No. 8 on south bank of river.
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Thus it will be observed that the tract upon which is located the
Indian village is bounded on three sides by the land clained and sought
to be entered by appellants, and on -the fourth by the above named
river, whereby the native villagers would be shut in and deprived of
free egress and ingress from and to the said village and the adjacent
section; no communication with or outlet to the surrounding country
being possible except by trespassing upon the land claimed by appel-
lants and included in the survey in question, or save by crossing the
river.
Furthermore, there is upon the southeastern portion of the tract, as
delimited by the survey in its present form, a small fresh water lake
about 20 chains in length and about 10 chains wide, there being ol the
north-western portion thereof a small creek, which is very near the vil-
lage. Said lake and creek form the nearest sources of a fresh water
supply to the native village, from one or both of which the inhabitants
thereof obtained fresh water for domestic purposes at the time the sur-
vey was executed.
These fresh water privileges, appurtenant to the land occupied by
the villagers, are privileges or easements which are protected by pro-
vision of section 14 of the act of March 3, 1891, which reads as follows:
That none of the provisions of the last two preceding sections of this act shall be
so construed as to warrant the sale of aiiy lands . . .. to which the natives of Alaska
have prior rights by virtue of actual occupation.
Land upon which is located the fresh water supply of a native Alaskan
village, which is in such close proximity thereto, as appears in this par-
ticular case, may be regarded in the light of land "actually occupied"
by such natives to which they have a superior claim, by virtue of the
above quoted provisions of the said act of March 3, 1891, as against
those claiming the right to purchase thereunder.
For the foregoing reasons the decision appealed from suspending
survey No. 70, subject to emeudation in accordance with law and regu-
lations, is hereby affirmed.
PRACTICE-COSTS-HEARINGS ON SPECIAL AGENTS' REPORTS.
1NSTRUCTIONS.
The rule observed in apportioning costs of taking testimony in coutests arising under
Rule 5 of Practice should e followed in hearings ordered on special agents'
reports.
Circular of November 4, 1895, 21 L. D., 367, modified.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of te General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 15, 1898. (F. W. C.)
The attention of this Department has been called to the matter of
variance between the instructions relative to hearings ordered upon
special agents' reports contained in departmental circular of November
520 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
4, 1895 (21 L. D., 367), in the matter of taxation of costs for the taking
of testimony, and the rule established in contest cases.
In the circular referred to it is provided that-
The expenses of service of notice and the cost of taking the testimony of witnesses
for the government, including the government's cross-examination of witnesses for
the claimant, will be paid by receivers, who will estimate specially therefor,
referring to the date and initial of the letter ordering the hearings.
* * v * 'i V
The expenses of the claimant, including the pay of his own witnesses, the costs of
taking their testimony, and the cost of his cross-examination of witnesses for the
government, must be paid by himself, and a reasonable deposit for expenses of
reducing sch testimony and cross-examinations to writing may be required by the
officer taking the testimony.
In the case of Milum v. Johnson (10 L, D., 624), it was held that-
In contest cases, tender Rule 55 of Practice, each party must pay the cost of tal-
ing the testimony of his own witnesses, both in direct and cross-examination of said
witnesses. (syllabus.)
This rule has been repeatedly reaffirmed in many decisions by this
Department upon contest cases.
There would seem to be no reason for a different rule i the case of
hearings upon special agents' reports; and future hearings upon special
agents' reports will be governed, in the matter of taxation of the cost
of taking testimony, by the construction of Rule 55 of Practice as made
in the case of Milumn v. Johnson (pra). The circular of November 4,
1895, is modified accordingly. You vill advise the local officers of the
change.
The particular case to which the attention of this De)artment was
called in this mabter is that of United States v. Quirino Valesquez et al.,
pending at the Pueblo land office, Colorado, in which case hearing has
been continued to the 26th of this month. Information of the change
should be at once communicated to that office, so that the same may be
received before the date set for the bearing.
RIGHT OF WAY-ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1891, AND MAY 14, 1S96.
CHICALA WATER CO. v. LYTLE CREEi LIGHT AND POWER O.
On application for right of way for reservoirs and canals nder the act of March 3,
1891, the Department will not attempt to interfere with the control of the water,
or determine the rights of conflicting claimants thereto, except in so far as may
be necessary to ascertain whether such priuafacie right to the use of the water,
or to store the same, has been shown as will entitle the applicant to utilize the
grant for the purposes contemplated by the act.
Questions arising on allegation of damage to private property through the construe-
tion of reservoirs are matters within the jurisdiction of the State tribunals, and
are not to be determined by the Department.
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An application for right of way for a canal and pipe line under the act of May 14,
1896, to be sed for the purpose of generating and distributing electric power,
will not be denied on the ground of a prior appropriation of the water, if it is
made to appear tat the water can be used for said purpose, and returned to the
stream above the prior appropriator's intake, practically unimpaired in quality
and quantity.
Secretcry- Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 15, 1898. (E. F. B.)
With your letter of February 7,1898, you transmit the record in the
appeal of the Chicala Water Company from the decision of your office
of October 20, 1897, dismissing the protest of said company against the
granting of the application of the Lytle Creek Light and Power Com-
pany for right of way for reservoirs and canals through the San Gabriel
and San Bernardino forest reserves, for the purpose of generating,
manufacturing and distributing electric power, under the act of Aay
14,1896 (29 Stat., 120), and holding that the application of the Chicala
Water Company for right of way for reservoirs and canals under the
act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1095), is subject to the right of the Lytle
Creek' Light and Power Company by virtue of its prior appropriation
of the surplus waters of Lytle creek.
The Lytle Creek Light and Power Company filed an application for
right of way through the San Gabriel and San Bernardino forest
reserves, for the purpose of generating and distributing electric power,
under the act of May 14, 1896 (29 Stat., 120). It.also asked permission
for the use of ground for two reservoirs and canals and for power plant.
The Chicala Water Company protested against the granting of said
application, claiming that it has the prior right to the use of more water
than usually flows through Lytle creek during the irrigating season,
and that the use of any of the waters of Lytle creek by the Lytle Creek
Light and Power Coinpany could not be made available for the purposes
contemplated without seriously interfering with the development of its
system of irrigation. It also filed an application for right of way for
reservoirs and canal for irrigating purposes under the act of March 3,
1891 (26 Stat. 1095), with maps and accom1panyilg proofs, as required
by the act and the regulations.
The application of the Lytle Creek Light and Power Company was
rejected as to the right of way for reservoirs, for the reason that each
of the sites applied for covered an area greatly in excess of the area
authorized by the act of May 1-, 1896, which limits the right of way to
twenty-five feet and the use of the necessary grounds not to exceed
forty acres. It then being questionable whether the right of way for
canals and the necessary grounds could be used for electrical purposes
without the use of such reservoirs, the company-was allowed thirty
days to show cause why its application should not be rejected.
Within the time allowed by the rule, it amended its application so as
to exclude the reservoirs, and filed an amended map and field notes
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showing the survey and location of a pipe line and canal from Lytle
creek, at a point known as Miller's Narrows, the proposed intake of
said canal and pipe line, to the proposed site of the power house ol Sec.
6, T. I N., R. 5 W. Said line passes over sections 25, 26, and 36, in T.
2N., R. 6 W., and on nsurveyed land over what upon survey would
be See. 3, T. 2 N.,,R. 5 N., and Sec. 6, T. 1IN., R. 5 W.
The Chicala Water Company has also filed an amended map showing
the location of its reservoirs and canals, and has supplied the proofs
which it contends are in full compliance with the directions contained
in your letter of October 20, 1897. Besides its claim to the control and
use of all the waters that flow through Lytle creek during the irrigat-
ing season, it also claims the right, under notice of appropriation, to the
underfiow and flood waters of said creek.
The Grapeland Irrigation District, James A .Applewhit e, J. N. Miller,
C. H. Vosburg and C. B. Hughes have filed their several protests against
the granting of the application of the Chicala Water Company, alleging
substantially that said company has no right to ally of the surplus or
other waters of Lytle creek that can be beneficially used in connection
with the right of way for the reservoirs and canals applied for, without
destroying and rendering useless by the construction of such reservoirs
the vested property and water rights in said stream, which are prior to
the claim of the Chicala Company; that the construction of said reser-
voirs will destroy and render useless rights and privileges belonging to
the people of the State of California, and prevent the proper occupation
by the United States government of a large portion of said forest
reserves; that the application, maps and papers have been prepared in
a fraudulent and illegal manner, and not in accordance with the regu-
lations approved by the Department.
Protestants Applewhite, Miller and Ilughes further allege that the
granting of said application will seriously affect their rights as hone-
steaders and owners of land embraced in said reservoirs, and the pro-
testaut Vosburg claims that it will be a damage to land upon which he
has settled with a view to entering as a homestead.
In support of the allegation that said company has no right to any
of the waters of Lytle creek, they file their several affidavits, alleging
that the only claim of said company to any of said waters rests upon
notices of appropriation filed during the month of August, 1897, and
upon a contract entered into with the San Francisco Savings' Union,
for the conveyance of certain stock of the Lytle Creek Water Company
and of the Lytle Creek Water and Improvement Company, being merely
an option to purchase a claim or title which rests in said last named
companies until the terms of the contract have been fully complied with
and all the monley has been paid.
The Chicala Water Company claims to be the owner by purchase of
all the water rights in Lytle creek canon, except the first six hundred
and fifty inches, which it is now delivering under contract to the
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lessees of the owners of said right, as follows: One hundred inches to
the city of San Bernardino, and fifty inches to the city of.Mount
Verron, as lessees of John L. Campbell; five hundred inches to the
Lytle Creek Water Company, of which the Chicala Water Company
uses two hundred inches as owner of two-fifths of the stock of said
company. In support of this claim, it alleges that the superior court
of Los Angeles county, California, i the case of Lytle Creek Water
and Improvement Company against the G-rapeland Irrigation Company
et al., being an action brought by plaintiffs to determine the adverse
claims of various parties to the waters of Lytle creek, in which all of
said protestants, except Applewhite, were parties defendant, entered
up a decree by which it was adjudged that the flow of Lytle creek dur-
ing the irrigating season was under two thousand inches, and that all
the water flowing down Lytle creek canon to the extent of two thousand
inches over and above the six hundred and fifty inches above referred
to belongs to the Lytle Creek Water and Improvement Company; that
the Chicala Company is the owner byjpurchase-from the grantees of the
Lytle Creek Water and Imjrovemeiit Company of said right of two
thousand inches decreed by the court to belong to said cornpany, and
that it is also the owner by appropriations and use of the underflow and
flood waters of said creek.
A certified copy of said decree has been filed, from which it appears
that the court did award to the plaintiff in said suit the prior right to
the extent of two thousand inches, the usual flow of said stream in the
irrigating season after the subsidence of the winter floods, subject to
the prior right of John L.'Campbell and the Lytle Creek Water Com-
pany, as contended by said Chicala Water Company. It further
decreed that as against said rights defendant John N. Miller has no
title or interest in the waters of Lytle creek, except the waters rising
in the sulphur spring on his land; that C. H. Vosburg is not the owner
of or entitled to take, use or divert any of the waters of the middle fork
of Lytle creek, or the surface or underftow thereof, except the right to
use and enjoy for beneficial purposes the percolating water flowing in
a small ditch constructed by him, and also the percolating waters found
on the hillside garden opposite his house; that C. B. Hughes is not the
owner of or entitled to divert or use any portion of the waters of the
south fork of Lytle creek, except as thereinafter adjudged The court
then decrees that defendants, The Grapeland Irrigation District, C. H.
-Vosburg, C. B. Hughes, and John N. Miller, being claimants of rights
in the canon above the point of plaintiff'Is diversion ate the owners of
rights as follows: C. H. Vosburg of two thousand inches of the waters
of the middle fork of Lytle creek; C. B. Hughes of ten thousand
inches of the waters of the south fork of Lytle creek; The Grapeland
Irrigation District of not exceeding five thousand inches of the surplus
water flowing down Lytle creek other than those waters theretofore
appropriated and used by other parties to said action prior to the third
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day of March, 1892, the date of its appropriation by The Grapeland
Irrigation District and John N. Miller of sufficient of said waters of
the main stream of Lytle creek where they cross his lands to enable him
to irrigate the same and for household and, domestic purposes, not
exceeding one hundred inches. All of said rights are, however, decreed
to be subject to the paramount right of plaintiffs, who are entitled to
the first two thousand inches, which the court found is greater than
the usual flow of the stream through the irrigating season.
The Grapeland Irrigation District and all parties claiming any right,
title or interest- i the tunnel constructed under the bed of Lytle
creek were enjoined' from diverting any of the waters of said stream
that flow through or from said tunnel, or any of the waters from the
surface of said stream, until the paramount rights established by the
decree be first fully supplied.
The main ground of objection to the granting of this application
pertains to matters solely within the jurisdiction of the State tribunals.
The Department will not attempt to interfere with the control of the
water, and will not attempt to determine the rights of conflicting claim-
ants thereto, except in so far as may be necessary to ascertain wliether
such pi ima fcie right to the use of the water or to store the same has
been shown, as will enable the grant aliplied for to be utilized for the
purposes contemplated by the act.
The regulations adopted by the Department to carry into effect the
act of March 3, 1891 (18 L. D., 168), declare that
this act is evidently designed to encourage the much needed work of constructing
ditches, canals and reservoirs in the arid portion of the comtry by granting a right
of way over the public lands necessary to the maintenance and use of the same.
Hence, the law should'be so administered as to effectuate the purposes
intended, by authorizing the use of vacant public lands available as
sites for reservoirs, whenever it is shown that the stormf or waste waters
of any stream can be conserved by storage, leaving the condemnation
of private property and the control of the flow and use of the water to
local laws.
The control of the flow and use of the water is therefore a matter exclusively
under State or Territorial control, the matter of administration within the j nrisdic-
tion of this l)epartment being limited to the approval of maps carrying the right of
way over the public lands. (Regulations, spra.)
The Chicala Water Company has filed sufficient evidence of its right
to the control of the water rights in Lytle creek, formerly owned by
the Lytle Creek Water and Improvement Company, under the contract
with the San Francisco Savings' Union. While the protestants assert
a right to the use of the waters of Lytle creek, under the decree of the
court in the litigation between the Lytle Creek Water and Improve
ment Company and The Grapeland Irrigation District and others, such
rights were expressly decreed to be subordinate to the paramount
rights of the owners of the first two thousand inches, and that during
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the iriigating season there is no surplus after that two thousand inches,
or eveni less, has been supplied.
A surplus of water in Lytle creek can only be created by augmenitinig
the flow of the stream during the season when it is needed, and it is
apparent that this can only be accomplished by the construction of
reservoirs to impound the storm waters that are wasted between the
irrigating seasons, and by holding the underflow by means of dams
constructed upon the bed rock.
If this theory is well founded, and it appears so from the record, the
construction of the system of reservoirs and canals in the canons
through which the three forks o Lytle creek flow, as outlinedby the
Chicala Company, would materially increase the duty of the waters of
this stream, and would seem to be in strict accord with the purpose of
the act, which was designed to encourage the construction of reservoirs
in. the arid west, for the conservation of the waters that annually go to
waste between the irrigating seasons.
As to whether the company would have the sole right to the use of
the surplus water so stored, or whether it \vould be subject to the rights
of other appropriators, is not for the Department to determine.
The complaint that the building of these reservoirs would cover
private property and would affect the property rights of the owners of
adjacent lands, is also a matter within the jurisdiction of the State
tribunals. The rights of private owners and of settlers are protected
by the laws of the State, and the 19th section of said act of March 3,
1891, which provides that,
Whenever any person or corporation in the construction of any canal, ditch or
reservoir, injures or damages the possession of any settler on the public domain, the
party committing such injury or damage shall be liable to the party injured for such
injury or damage.
It is not shown wherein the construction of these reservoirs will be
detrimental to the interests of the United States, or the State of Cali-
fornia, or interfere in any manner whatever with the occupation and
control of the forest reserves. These reserves were intended mainly
for the conservation of the water supply.
No sufficient reason being shown why the application of the Chicala
Water Company should not be granted, the protests of the Grapelaud
Irrigation District, James M. Applewhite, J. N. Miller, C. B. Vosburg
and C. B. Hughes are therefore dismissed.
The papers are returned to your office, with istructions to examine
the amended map, and if said map has been amended in. accordance
with the directions contained in. your letter of October-20, 1897, you
will immediately retransmit it to the Department for approval.
The remaining question to be considered is, whether the application
of the Lytle Creek Light and Power Company should be granted upon
the amended application and maps, and upon the showing made in
answer to the rule to show that it can beneficially and successfully use
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the proposed canal and pipe line for generating and developing electric
power at the power house site, without the use of the reservoirs.
It contends-First:. The appropriation heretofore made of the water
of the stream has, withbout exception, been effected by a diversion of
the water from the stream below the place of intended use by the appli-
cant for power purposes. Second: That the proposed use of water by
the applicant will not diminish the quantity or in any manner ollute
the quality o the water, but, ol the contrary, will increase the normal
flow of the stream at the intake of the canals of the liprovement Com-
pany and The Grapeland District. Third: That said proposed use will
ill no manner affect, abridge or ipair to any extent the uses to which
the water of the stream has heretofore been appropriated or subjected.
It contends that a subsequent appropriator may use so much of the
water of a stream for manufacturing purposes as lie may choose, pro-
vided it is returned to the stream in the same quantity and quality,
without abridging or impairing the rights of others, and that the appli-
cation of this rule of law to the facts in this case would authorize the
approval of its application.
If it be true that the waters can be used for manufacturing purposes
and returned to the stream above the plaintiff's intake in practically
the same quantity and nupolluted, as contended by applicant, there is
no reason why the right of way applied for should not be granted, for,
so long as a subsequent appropriator does not injure or impair the prior
rights of others, he may use as much of the water of a stream as he
chooses. Kinney on Irrigation, Sec. 181, and authorities cited.
This principle will materially influence the action of the Department
in granting or withholding permission to use the public lands for
purposes provided for by the act of May 14, 1896.
But it is contended by the Chicala Water Company that it is impos-
sible from the proposed location of the power house of the Lytle Creek
Light and Power Company for said company to use the waters of Lytle
creek to develop power and then return the same to the intake of the
Chicala Water Company's cement ditch, without great expense for
pumping, for the reason that the proposed location of the power house
is about two thousand feet down toward the mouth of the canon, below
such intake, and is sixty-four feet lower in altitude.
The Chicala Water Company has filed an affidavit in support of its
contention, while the Lytle Creek Light and Power Company has filed
affidavits by John L. Campbell, the president of the company, and by
F. C. Finkle, a civil and hydraulic engineer, who state that the power
house of applicant has an elevation of several feet above the intake of
the Chicala Water Company's cement ditch, and that the water after
leaving the power house can be returned to the natural channel above
the intake of said cement ditch. F. C. Finkle is the engineer who pre-
pared the maps of the Light and Power Company. He states that the
conduit of the company will consist of canal and tunnel lined with
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cement, and iron or steel pipe of sufficient capacity to convey the aver-
age normal thow of the creek, and that by reason of the impervious
character of the proposed conduit, the waters will be conducted with a
much less oss from seepage and evaporation than when flowing in the
natural bed of the stream, and that said waters after being'conducted
through said canal and pipe line will be delivered in identically the
same condition above said intake as when diverted from said stream
at Miller's Narrowis.
The survey of the canal and pipe line and the location of the power
house do not appear to have been made with reference to the delivery
of the water above the intake of the cement ditch of the Chicala Com
pany after its se by the Light and Power Company, nor does it
appear that any survey has been made to ascertain the altitude of
these locations. If it can be satisfactorily shown that the waters,
after being conducted through the canal and pipe conduit of the Light
and Power Company, can be used for power purposes at the present or
a new location of that company's power house, and can be returned to
the bed of the stream at or above the itake of the Chicala Company's
cement ditch in the same condition as when diverted, the application
should be approved.
You are therefore directed to notify the Lytle Creek Light and Power
Company of this decision, and upon furnishing satisfactory proof, as
herein required, their application will be approved.
SETTEEMENT RIGHTS-NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT CLAIM.
JORDAN V. SMITE.
A claim of notice of a settlement right by reason of improvements on the land will
not be heard as against an adverse claimant, where, at such time, the settlement
and posted notice of the party claiming sch benefit of said improvements show
the assertion of a settlement right to another quarter section.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 15, 1898. (C. W. P.)
The record in this case shows that Robert Sith filed soldier's de-
claratory statement No. 237, for the SE. I of Sec. 3, T. 23 N., R. 7 W.,
Enid land district, Oklahoma, December 8, 1893, and made homestead
entry No; 7902, May 21, 1894; that Charles B. Jordan applied to enter
the W. of the SE. I and the S. of the SW. 4 of Sec. 3, T. 23 N., R.
7 W., January 11, 1894, which application was suspended, and marked
suspended application No. 1720, to await action on the application of
Wilkie J. Kruse to amend his homestead entry No. 6666, made Decem-
ber 30, 1893, for the SW. of said Sec. 3, so as to embrace in lieu
thereof the SW. of Sec. 29, T. 24 N., R. 7 W.; that Kruse's said entry
was canceled, September, 1894, and the local officers directed to sus-
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pend Jordan's application pending final disposition of his contest
against sai(l Smith.
The local officers rendered a decision in favor of the defendant, and
denied a motion for rehearing.
On ppeal, your office concurred in the decision of the local officers,
and dismissed plaintiff's contest.
The plaintiff appeals to the Department.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff lives on the S. A of the SW. -L
of said section, ad that he made a pasture of some three or four acres
in the W. of the SE. - of said section, by placing some poles and
brush at each end of the pasture, which was in a canyon, the sides of
which formed the sides of the pasture; that he also placed notices on
stakes about the lines of the W. - of said SE. 1, and made two or
thee small mouds thereon. Ie admits that he also placed stakes with
notices to keep off; signed with his name, on the N. J of the SW. 1
and on other parts of said See. 3. He says, in his testimony, that he
was trying to hold "the east half of section 3, a mile strip," for a son
who was not quite of age.
The witnesses for the defendant testified that there were no signs
of improvement on the W. J of said SE. on December 7, 1893, the
day before the plaintiff'Is soldier's declaratory statement was filed, and
it is not pretended that the defendant had actual notice that the plain-
tiff claimed the W. of said S. E. , but it is insisted that his use of
part of the canyon, which he had fenced in for a pasture, is such a
notice of plaintiff's claim to the W. J of said SE. 3 as bound the de-
fendant as effectually as if be had actual notice of the claim. This
would undoubtedly be so, were it not that the plaintiff also gave
notice by posting oil the N. 4- of the said SW. J "to keep off" said N. -
of said SW. 4, on the S. a of which he made settlement and established
residence on. October 12, 1893. It is well settled that notices describ-
ing the land claimed, posted on a tract of land in conspicuous places,
are quite as effectual in notifying others of the extent of the claim
as improvements placed on the different subdivisions. (Smith v.
Johnson, 17 L. D., 454; Sveet v. Doyle, Id. 197.) In the face of
an adverse claim, a settler should not be allowed to say, It is true I
gave notice by posting that I claimed the N. 4 of the quarter-section
on the S. of which I made settlement and established residence,
but I had a small pasture in the W. of another quarter section, and
I claim that half and not the N. of the quarter section on the S. 4
of which I settled and established residence.
For this reason, your office decision affirmino the judgment of the
local officers is affirmed.
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TIMBER 1AND PURCHASE-APPLICATION TO RE-ADVERTISE.
JAMEs N. TRUE.
The application of a timber land applicant to re-advertise, he having failed to sub-
mit proof and make payment in accordance with his first advertisement, can
not be allowed. where, pending action thereon, an application to purchase the
land is filed by an adverse claimant.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W.V.D.) 16, 1898. (C.J.W.)
January 24,1896, James N. True made timber and stone sworn state-
ment No. 2787, for lots 6, 7, 9, and 10, See. 2, and lot 1, Sec. 11, T. 69
N., R. 21 W. 4th P. M., at Duluth, Minnesota. He advertised to make
proof on June 2,1896, but failed to appear and sibmit final proof. On
June 16, 1896, he filed in the local office his application to re-advertise
notice of intention to make proof and payment under his said timber
and stone statement.
It appears from the record that on June 17, 1896, John J. Welch
filed timber and stone statement for the same land, which was held in
abeyance in the local office awaiting action on the application of True
to re-advertise, and your office treated the application of Welch as an
adverse claim within the meaning of the decision in the case of Caleb
J. Shearer (21 L. D., 492), and rejected said application; from which
action True appealed.
Two questions are presented by the case:
1. Is there any authority under the law by which the Department
may extend the time i which proof and payment may be made for
offered land under the timber and stone act of June 3, 1878 (20 Stat.,
89), as amended by the act of August 4, 1892 (27 Stat., 348) ?
2. Do the words, "in 'the absence of any adverse claims" as used in
the decision in the case of Caleb J. Shearer (21 L. D., 492) include
adverse claims arising after application to re-advertise notice; and is
said decision in conflict with the decision in the case of John M. Mc-
Donald (20 L. D., 559)?
The decision in the later case contains an express disclaimer of any
intention to overrule the former one. This being true, an application
to purchase by an intervenor pending an application to re-advertise by
the defaulting applicant, is such adverse claim as comes within the
meaning of said decision. Favorable action upon the application of
True to re-advertise notice, would have been no bar to the application
of Welch to purchase, made before proof and payment by True. It
was error upon the part of the local officers to hold the sworn state-
ment of Welch in abeyance pending action upon True's application to
re-advertise. The effect of such action was to withhold the land from
other disposition while True was taking steps to cure his default, which
withholding was unauthorized. (John M. McDonald, 20 L. D., 559.)
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True was not injured by the rejection of his application to re-adver-
tise, and he has no right to complain so long as the application of
Welch to prchase is pending. Your office decision is accordingly
affirmed.
DAMrION V. SINCLAIR.
Motion for review of departmental'decision of February 17, 1898, 26
L. D., 210, denied by Secretary Bliss, April 16, 1898.
MINING CAIMA-PROTEST-MXINING REGULATIONS.
MCFADDEN ET AL., V. MOUNTAIN VIEW MINING AND MILLING CO.
4 protest filed as the basis for adverse proceedings may be properly ejeeted as
insufficient if it fails to "show the nature, boundaries, and extent" of the
adverse claim in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs 83 and 84 of
the Mining Regnilations.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of te General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 16, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
On September 22, 1896, the Mountain View Mining and Milling Com-
pany filed application for patent to the Mountain View lode mining
claim, Spokane Falls, Washington, land district. On November 28,
1896, during the period of publication of notice, W. D. McFadden,
David O'Neil, and Charles W. Vedder, each for himself, and W. D.
McFadden as alleged agent for W. E. Harris, filed their joint affidavit
alleging themselves to be the owners and entitled to the possession of
the Columbia and the Kruger lode mining claims, sometimes known as
the Gray Eagle and Exchequer claims, respectively, and that the
Mountain View claim conflicted with the Columbia and Kruger claims
to the extent shown therein, and asked that proceedings in the matter
of the Mountain View application be stayed until the rights of the
parties could be determined in a court of competent jurisdiction.
McFadden, O'Neil and Harris, together with one Cox, were therein
alleged to be the locators of the Columbia and Kruger claims, and
Vedder to have acquired by purchase and conveyance the interests of
said Cox in and to these claims. Attached to the affidavit and referred
to therein as "Exhibit A," was a plat purporting to have been made
by one " E. P. Harrison, surveyor," and to represent the conflict above
referred to. Said affidavit and plat having been offered as an adverse
claim, the -local office, on December 14, 1896, rejected them as isuffi-
cient for that purpose, for the reasons that no copy of the location
notice of the Columbia and Kruger claims had been filed, as required
by paragraph 85 (now 83) of the regulations under the United States
mining la-Ws, and that it did not appear that the pat had been made
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from an actual survey by a United States deputy surveyor, as required
by paragraph 86 (now 84) of the said regulations. McFadden. et al.
appealed, and, pending the appeal, on March 15, 1897, iled evidence
showing that on December 28, 1896, they had commenced proceedings
in a court of competent jurisdiction to determine the right of posses-
sion as between themselves and the said applicant. On March 23, 1897,
your office affirined the decision of the local office. Protestants now
prosecute their appeal to the Department, contending that the papers
filed by them "show the nature, boundaries- and extent" of their
adverse claim, as required by section 2326 Revised Statutes and that
it Was error to hold them insufficient for the reasons stated.
The provisions of the United States mining laws relative to the
assertion before the land (lepartment of a claim to mineral land adverse
to that of an applicant for pateint, are fonud in section 232ii Revised
Statttes. In adlition to requiring that the adverse claim shall be
filed during the period of publication the statute further requires that
"it shall be upon the oath of the person or ersons making the same,.
and shall show the nature, boundaries and extent of such adverse
claim." Where this has been done the statute commands tat
all proceedings, except the publication of notice and making and filing the affidavit
thereof, shall be stayed until the controversy shall have been settled or decided by
a court of competent jurisdiction, or the adverse claimN waived.
It is made the duty of the adverse claimant,
within thirty days after filing his claim, to commeDce proceedings in a court of
competent jurisdiction to determine the right of possession, and prosecute the same
with reasonable diligence to final jLdgment;
and it is provided that
a failure so to lo sall be a waiver of his adverse claim.
Paragraphs 83 and 84 of the regulations above referred to read:
83. The adverse notice must fully set forth the nature and extent of the inter-
ference or conflict; whether the adverse party claims as a purchaser for valuable
consideration or as a locator; if the former, a certified copy of the original location,
the original conveyance, a duly certified copy thereof, or an abstract of title from
the office of the proper recorder should be furnished, or if the transaction was a
merely verbal one he will narrate the circumstances attending the purchase, the
date thereof, and the amount paid, which facts should be supported by the affidavit
of one or more witnesses, if any were present at the tine, and if he claims as a
locator he must file a duly certified copy of the location from the office of the proper
recorder.
84. In order that the "1 boendaries" and "extent" of the claim may be shown, it
will be incumbent upon the adverse claimant to file a plat showing his entire clai,
its relative situation or position with the one against which he claims, and the
extent of the conflict. This plat must be made from an actual survey by a United
States deputy surveyor, who will officially certify thereon to its correctness; and in
addition there must be attached to such plat of survey a certificate or sworn state-
ment by the surveyor as to the approximate value of the labor performed or improve-
ments made upon the claim by the adverse party or his predecessors in interest,
and the plat must indicate the position of any shafts, tunnels, or other improvements,
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if any such exist, upon the claim of the party opposing the application, and by
which party said improvements were made: Prorided, hosterer, -That if the applica-
tion for patent describes the claim by legal sbdivisions, the adverse claimant, if
also claiming by legal subdivisions, may describe his adverse claim in the same
manner without further survey or plat.
As already stated, the papers iled as an adverse claimi were filed
during the period of publication and are "upon oath of the persons
making the same." Judged by the language of the statute alone, and
disregarding the foregoing regulations, they would "show the nature,
boundaries and extent" of the adverse claim. They do not, however,
contain the evidences of title required by said paragraph 83, nor the
plat and certificates made by a United States deputy surveyor in con-
formity with said paragraph 84. Protestants' plat was made by a pri-
vate surveyor, and there is not attached thereto any showing as to the
value and ownership of labor and improvements upon the claim, as
required by that paragraph.
These requirements, though apparently known to protestants, were
simply ignored by them. They offer no excuse whatever for their failure
to observe the requirements of paragraph 83, and none which merits
any consideration by the Department for their failure to observe those
of paragraph 84. The local officers were botnd to respect and enforce
the requirements in question in passing upon the sufficiency of the
papers presented, and neither they nor your office could properly do
otherwise than take the action of which protestants complain. The
said requirements are of many years' standing, have repeatedly received
the approval of the Department, and have never heretofore, so-far as
the Department is aware, been modified or waived, except in a few
cases where compliance therewith was shown to be physically impos-
sible or could only have been made at great risk of life or health.
They are believed to be warranted by law and to be in conformity with
the statute, and hence to have, in accordance with well settled con-
struction, all the force and effect of law.
The Department finds no warrant to disturb the decision of your
office, and the same is accordingly affirmed.
PETER BORTLE.
Motion for review of departmental decision of February 4, 1898, 26
L. D., 150, denied by Secretary Bliss, April 19, 1898.
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ALASKAN LAND-SURVEY-TIDJE 1ANDS.
RED STAR OLGA FISHING STATION.
A survey of Alaskan land that embraces tide lands within its limits will not be
approved as there is no authority by which title thereto can be acquired under
the public land laws.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 19, 1898. (W. M. B.)
The Red Star Olga Fishing Station, a corporation and claimant, has
appealed from the decision of your office, of. date April 10, 1895,
wherein was suspended survey No. 49, executed by T. J. Dewoody,
U. S. deputy surveyor, on May 7, 1892, which said survey embraces a
body of land comprising an area of 41.03 acres, situate on the southern
shore of Olga Bay, Kodiak Island, district of Alaska, and used as a
fishing station.
It appears from the record submitted that said survey No. 49 was
accepted by your letter of date May 24, 1893, to the ex-officio sur-
veyor-general, but that after an examination thereof subsequent to
said date such acceptance was, to wit, on April 10, 1895, revoked. The
action of your office in revoking the former acceptance of the survey,
and suspending the same, was based, as stated in your above referred
to office decision, upon the ground:
That the survey includes a spit, or island, separated from the mainllanl. At both
ends of this spit Salmon river is open to Olga Bay. This river being more properly
a lagoon or arm of the bay, is undoubtedly affected by the tides, the openings or
mouths at the ends of the spit allowing the sea to flow in. The deputy should have
followed with his meander the line of ordinary high water mark along the shore
line of the mainland, thus excluding from the survey the tide water which, the gov-
ernment does not give title to, and the spit, for the reason that after the meander
line noted above had been run, the tract woulidnot be in "one compact" body as the
regulations require. '
The assignments of error by appellant, material to the issue in the
case at bar, are as follows:
2. That the field notes of survey do not suggest any sand spit or tract of land sep-
arate from the mainland; that if such is shown on the plat, it is a clerical error by
draftsman and not reported in the field notes. of the survey made on the ground.
3. That by the field notes no lagoon nor tide waters are shown, and so far as offi-
cially known, none exist.
4. That under the surveyor's manual no meanders need be made of streams less
than three chains in width.
5. That final entry having been made with the consent of the local land office upon
the approved plat by the surveyor-geueral, and Commissioner, the same should be
sustained, approved, and relieved from explanation.
Thus it is seen that the second and third assignments of error ques-
tion the correctness of the finding of your office decision, alleging, in
effect, that the same was not supported by the evidence furnished by
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field notes of the survey and the plat made therefrom in the office of
the ex-officio surveyor-general, as approved by said officer.
The allegation by appellant that no such spit and lagoon, as men-
tioned in the decision appealed from, are shown to exist by the field
notes of this survey, is disproved by the entries themselves made by the
deputy in his book of field notes, as appears from the transcript thereof
returned to your office.
I The following, among others, are the notes made by the deputy during
the execution of the survey in the field.
No Cor Chins.
3 N. 40 o .. ai9. 0 Set stone 22 < 10 XS-18 inches in the ground,
m arked AV. C. on side facing te claim: this
corner is on left bank of Salmon river.
20.40 Across Salmon river, course S. W.
21.09 To ordinary high water mark, on gravelly spit
on south shore of Olga Bay. Set stone 21 x 14
x 10, etc.
4 S. 420 W ---- IThenceslang shoreof lga hay folloving lineof
.5high waler markc. ariation 24-5' B.
9.50 Cross Salmon river 40 ls. vide, course from
N.E.
20.00 To point of beginning.
The plat of this survey, as made in the office of the ex officio surveyor-
general, approved by him, and forwarded to your office, is executed in
strict accordance with the foregoing field notes returned by the deputy
surveyor who executed the survey.
It will be observed from the above that i running course No. 3 the
south bank of what is known) as Salmon river-but what in reality is
only a short lagoon about 14.00 chs. or 308 yards long, as appears from
the plat-was reached at the end of 19.80 chs. from cor. No. 3, and at
the end of 20.40 chs. the opposite or north bank of said lagoon was
reached, showing the lagoon at that point-iear its junction with the
bay-to be 60 ks. wide. From the last nlamed point, the. locus of
which is ol the southern side of the so-called spit-which is nothing
more than a small sand bar-the said sand bar is crossed, and at the
end of 21.09 chs. a corner is established on the northerli side thereof.
The field notes, as copied and set out above, further show that from
said last named point, in runuiog corner No. 4, that at the end of 9.50
chs. the line of survey again crosses the lagoon at a point where its
waters connect with those of the bay-the lagoon being 40.00 lks., or a
little over 26 feet, wide at said point. It appears from the plat that
the sand bar is only 69 ks., or 45.50 feet, wide at point of greatest
breadth, that it is about 10.00 chs., or 220 yards, inl length, and that it
is completely surrounded by the waters of the bay and the lagoonl.
There can be no doubt but that the tide waters of Olga Bay reach
and wash that portion of the inainland-distant only 1.29 chs., or about
eighty-five feet, from said bay-embraced in the survey, through the
short lagoon which extends along its northern border. By reason of
said fact the contention of appellants that the lagoon is not meander-
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able, under the surveying manual, because it is less than t ree chains
in width, is without any force. Upon this subject the manual of June
30, 1891 (p. 56), contains instructions as follows:
Shallow streams, without any well-defined channel or permanent banks, will not
be meandered, except tide water streams, whether more or less than three chains
wide, which shall be meandered at ordinary high water mark, as far as tide water
extends.
The lagoon-which the deputy denominates as Salmon river in his
field notes-falls within the exception named in the manual, and the
deputy should have meandered the same, and thus have excluded from
the lines of the survey the sand bar, the lagoon and the tide land
adjacent to the line of ordinary high water mark extending along the
northern shore of that portion of the land claimed by appellants and
situatesouth of the lagoon, for the reason that it is not proper that tide
lands should be embraced in a survey, since there is no general or
existing legislation by Congress with respect to the public lauds whereby
title may be acquired to tide lands. See case of Shively v. Bowlby
(152 U. S.,): Mann v. Tacoma Land Cornpany (153 U. S., 273).
The consideration of the contention of appellants to the effect that
the survey should be relieved from explanation, and that the entry
should be allowed to remain intact, because the local officers permitted
final entry of the land designated on the plat of survey approved by
the ex officio surveyor-geneial and your office, is immaterial for the
reason that said appellants could derive no benefit from departmental
action affirmatory of that of the local office, in the particular named,
since patent could not lawfully issue for the tide land which constitutes
a part of their claim.
Furthermore, it may be observed that if the line of ordinary high
tide, extending along the shore of the mainland, to the south of the
lagoon, had been meandered, as should have been done, the tract
claimed, as embraced in the survey in its present form, would not have
been left in "one compact body" as required by paragraph 13 of the
rules and regulations of June 3, 1S91 (12 L. D, 583), wherefore it would
not be subject to purchase and entry under such circumstances since
the condition imposed by rules and regulations requires that the pur-
chase and entry of lands under the provisions of the act o March 3,
1891, for the " purpose of trade or manufactures," must be confined to
land which is in "one compact body." This con stitutes as essential a
condition with respect to the right to purchase and enter lands for the
stated purpose, as does the condition that lands so purchased and
entered must be taken in square form as near as "1 the configuration of
the land will admit."
For the foregoing reasons the decision of your office suspending sur-
vey No. 49-subject to emendation-is hereby affirmed.
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CoPE v. BRADEN
Motion for review of departmental decision of October 21, 1897, 25
L. D., 341, denied by Secretary Bliss, April 19,1898.
SCHOOL INDEMNITY SELECTIONS-FEES-SECTION 2238, R. S.
TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA.
School indemnity selections filed on behalf of the Territory of Oklahoma, under
section 4, act of January 18, 1897, should not be approved until payment of the
fees provided for in section 2238 of the Revised Statutes.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 19 1898. (G. B. G.)
The Department is in receipt of your communication of the 4th
instant, wherein it is said that the local officers at Mangum, Oklahoma
Territory, have reported to your office thd filing of application fr
indemnity by the territorial authorities, amokuting to 38,943.40 acres
selected under section 4 of the act of January 18, 1897 (29 Stat., 490),
and that no fees were tendered with said application, it being claimed
by the territorial authorities that none were required.
It is further said that under date of September 26, 1892, your office,
by letter to the register and receiver at Beaver, Oklahoma, advised
those officers that section 2238 of the Revised Statutes requires the
payment of fees "in the location of lands by states and corporations
under grants fron Congress," that the selections in the list then under
consideration (List 1, Beaver, 0. T.,) were made for the Territory of
Oklahoma, under the act of May 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 81), and section
2275:
that said act made no grant of the school sections, but simply reserved them for
schools, and indemnity lauds when legally selected are simply placed in a state of
reservation for schools, and that, therefore, the payment of fees was not required
in making school indemnity selections in Oklahoma.
There is no difference in principle in the case then under considera-
tion and that now presented, but doubt is expressed as to the ruling
of your predecessor, and the Department is asked for instructions in
the premises.
No question is mlade as to the authority of the territorial officers to
make these selections uinder section 4 of the act of January 18, 1897,
supra.
Section 2238 of the Revised Statutes provides, among other things,
that:
Registers and receivers, in addition to their salaries, shall be allowed each the
follow)ing fees and: commissions, namely:
* * : : : *
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Seventh. In the location of lands by States and corporations under grants from
Congress for railroads and other purposes, (except for agricultural colleges,) a fee
of one dollar for each final location of one hundred and sixty acres; to be paid by
the State or corporation making such location.
It is clear that the location of school indemnity lands is a "final"
"location of lands" within the meaniing of this statute. It is within
the ordinary import of the language used, and the special exception of
locations "for agricultural colleges" lends additional force to such
construction.
Whether it is a location by a State or corporation under a grant from
Congress is a more difficult question. A Territory is not a State within
the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution (New Orleans v.
Winter, 1 Wheaton, 94; Campbell v. Read, 2 Wall., 198), but it is a
State in the general sense of the term "political society."7 Watson v.
Brooks, 13 Federal Reporter, 540.
In "The Ullock" case (19 Fed. Rep., 211), wherein was involved a
construction of the act of Congress of March 2, 1837 (5 Stat., 153), mak-
ing certain regulations in regard to vessels carrying trade " upon waters
which are the boundary between two States it was said:
It may be admitted that the Columbia river is not a boundary between two
"States" in the sense in which the word is used in the Constitution, but it is the
boundary between one sch State ad an organized territory of the United States.
The case is within the mischief intended to be remedied by the act of 1837. The
subject is wholly within the power o Congress, and it may apply the rule contained
in the act to the case of a water forming the boundary between a State and a Terri-
tory, as well as between two States of this Union. The Territory of Washington is
an organized political body, a State in the general and unqualified sense of the term.
A Territory is also a public corporation with municipal functions. A
public corporation is such corporation as exists for political purposes,
and
a public corporation created by the governnelit for political purposes anti having
subordinate and local powers of legislation; an incorporation of persons inhabitants
of a particular place, or connected with a particular district, enabling them to con-
duct its local civil government, .... an agency instituted by the sovereign for the
purpose of carrying out in detail the objects of government,
is a municipal corporation. (Anderson's Law Dictionary, page 263, and
cases cited.)
The organized Territory of Oklahoma comes squarely within this
definition. It was created for political purposes, has subordinate and
local powers of legislation, is an incorporation of the inhabitants of a
particular district, has a local and civil governent, and is an agency
instituted by the sovereignty of the United States for the purpose of
carrying out in detail the objects of government. In this regard it
bears substantially the same relation to the federal government as a
eoanty bears to a State government.
It is believed therefore that Congress used the words "States" and
"Territories" in the sense of "bodies politic," and that a Territory is
both a State and a corporation within the meaning of the statute.
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But does a reservation of school lands for the benefit of the State to
be thereafter erected out of the Territory of Oklahoma come within
the term "grants from Congress I?
Such a reservation is equivalent to a grant, in so far as it reserves
the land from other disposition and segregates it from the general
public domain. The faith of the government is pledged to this end,
and the fact that Congress has already authorized indemnity selections
for lands lost to the contemplated grant to the State to be erected out
of the Territory of Oklahoma, shows that it is being treated as a grant.
Moreover, if the people of the Territory are to have the benefit of
indemnity selections at this time, it is not believed that they should be
permitted to evade the payment of these fees by the technical plea that
no grant of Congress has ever been made of these lands.
These fees are part of the revenues of the government, in the sense
that they are paid into the United States Treasury; they constitute
part of the emoluments of an officer of the United States, and it is the
duty of the governmnent o require the payment thereof as a condition
precedent to the approval of final locations of land within the spirit of
the act allowing such fees.
Your office is therefore instrncted accordingly.
RAILROAD GR-ANT-WITHDRAWAL-SETTLEMENT RIGHT.
HASTINGS AND DAKOTA RY. C. . ARNOLD.
A decision of the Department directing that a tract of land, that had been embraced
in a railroad indemnity selection, should be held "subject to entry by the first
legal applicant" operates to restore such tract to the public domain as effectu-
ally as though restored to settlement and entry.
A settlement on land covered by indemnity withdrawal attaches at once on the
revocation of the withdrawal, and will operate to exclude sch tract from sub-
sequent selection on behalf of the railroad grant; and the failure of the settler
to assert his laim within three months after notice that the land is open to
entry can not be taken advantage of by the company.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the eneral Land O)lce, April
(W.V.D.) 20,1898. (G-.B.G.)
The land in controversy in this case is the WE.4 of Sec. 23, T. 122 N.,
R. 43 W., Marshall, Minnesota, and is within the indemnity limits com-
mon to the main line of the St. Paul, Minneapolis a(l Manitoba Rail-
way, and the Hastings and Dakota Railway.
It appears that this tract was selected October 10, 1883, by the St.
Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Coinmpany, which selection
was canceled by departmental decision of October 23, 1891 (13 L. D.,
440), wherein it was said:
The designations upon which the selection of October 16, 1883, are now based can
not be recognized, and in rejecting the designations the selectiois, being nsup-
ported. must be canceled.
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The orders of withdra-wal of indemnity lauds for these companies having been
revoked (12 L. D., 51), and there being o valid selection of the lands by either
company, you will hold the same subject to entry by the first legal applicant, or to
selection by the company first presenting application therefor, in the manner re-
scribed hy the regulations governing sch selections.
On October 29, 1891, the Hlastings ad Dakota Company selected
the said tract, with others, designating a proper basis therefor.
On June 6, 1894, the St. Vincent Extension of the St. Pau, linne-
apolis and Manitoba Company filed a re-arranged list, describing the
lost lands tract for tract as a basis for its said selections of October 16,
1883, which had been anceled by the departmental decision, supra, of
October 23, 1891.
In the meantime, however, on February 27, 1894, Paul Arnold filed-
in the local office an application to make homestead entry for the land
in controversy, and therewith he also filed a corroborated affidavit,
upon which he asked a hearing, alleging that he made settlement on
the land in the month of October, 1890, and had lived thereon contiiui-
ously ever since, llaving laced on the land certain iprovements,
therein set out, wich he valued at one thousand dollars.
The Hastings and Dakota Comlpany filed a protest, on May 19, 1894,
against the allowance of Arnold's said application, Upon which a hearing
was had May 25, 1894, upon testimony taken before a notary public
designated by te local officers and appointed for tat prpose, both
parties in interest being represented thereat.
The record was transmitted to your office Sel)tember 20, 1894, under
instructions, without action by the local officers.
Your office held:
1st. That the list filed by the St. Paul, Minnieatpolis and Manitoba
Company is without force as against te claim of the lastings and
Dakota Company, and held the first named company's list for cancel-
lation, to the extent of the land involved.
2d. That Paul Arnold, a qualified omestead claimant, was al actual
settler on the land in controversy, with valuable improvements, at the
date of said selection by the Hastings and Dakota Company., that he
has resided thereon and cultivated the same as a homestead ever since,
and the company's selectionk was held for cancellation, to the extent of
the tract in question, " ith a view to the allowance of Arnold's home-
steai applicatioll."
From this decision the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Company
did not appeal, but the Hastings and Dakota Company has appealed
to the Department, assigning the following specifications of error:
1st. Error to hold that the occupation of this land by Arnold at date of Hastings
and Dakota selection determined the right of the company to select same as indem-
nity land.
2d. Error to hold that oonpation without application to enter was sufficient,
under the Secretary's decision of Qetober 23, 1891, to. defeat the company's selection.
3d. Error not to hold that the application and selection of record of the Hastings
and Dal~ota Company and te Manitoba Company were effectual bars to entry of
these hinds.
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No question is made of Arnold's qualifications, nor of the fact of his
settlement in the year 1890, and his continuous occupation and cultiva-
tion since that time. It therefore only remains to be seen the effect of
it on the selection of the company.
It was not the purpose of departmental decision of October 23,1891,
supra, to hold the land in reservation for an indefinite or any length
of time for the benefit of "the company first presenting application
therefore" Instead, it was in terms held "subject to entry by the first
legal applicant." The effect of this was to restore it to the body .of
the unappropriated public lands of the ITnited States, as fully and
effectually as if it had been directed that it be restored to settlement
and entry. All public lands of the United States " subject to entry"
under the homestead law are subject to settlement, and they nay be as
effectually appropriated for the time being by settlement as by entry.
At the date of Arnold's settlement, this land was embraced in an
indemnity withdrawal for the benefit of both the roads named, but
when that withdrawal was revoked, May 22, 1891, his settlement right
attached. If Arnold failed to present his claim to the land within three
months after notice at the local office that it was subject to entry, that
fact can not operate to his prejudice in this case. A failure to file an
application to enter lands within three months after settlement for-
feits the claim to the next settler in order of time, but such default
is not one that can be taken advantage of by a railway company.
In The essentially similar case of Vanderberg v. Hastings and Dakota
Railway Company et l., 26 L. D., 390, it was said:.
Vanderberg's settlement was therefore subject to the company's rights under this
selection (October 16, 1883), which, as before stated, was canceled on October 23,
1891, and tile land declared to be subject to settlement and entry. Vauderberg's
rights under his continued residence upon and claim to this land surely attached as
a settler upon the cancellation of said selection, and his claim, since maintained and
asserted in his application under consideration, is superior to the right of the com-
pany under its pending selection made October 29, 1891.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, the company's selection is
hereby canbeled, and Arnold will be permitted to make entry for the
land.
MINING CLAIMS-EXrENDITURE--LO CAL REGULATIONS.
HUGHES ET AL. V. OCHSNER ET AL.
On a showing made of an expenditure for the common benefit of several locations,
embraced in one application, the Department u-ill not undertake to determine
whether such plan of development will be effective or not, if it appears that the
expenditure is made. in good faith, and for the purpose alleged.
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Compliance with local laws and regulations in the location of mining claims, in the
matter of posting notices thereon, will be presumed, in the absence of any show-
ing that such question is of material importance in the case.
Se cretary Bliss to the (Jommissi oner of the General Land Ofce, April
(W. V. D.) 20, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
This is an appeal by Thomas B. Hughes, B. Leppel, John Healey and
A. G. Verhofstad from the decision of your office dated April 9, 1896,
dismissing their protest filed December 24, 1895, against the issue of
patent to M. H. Ochsner and Frank B. Klock for their lode mining
claim, survey No. 5786, embracing the Crouse, Nichols, Michael, Salina,
,St. Jacobs, Fryer Hill, Union Bank, Nelson, Lumsden, Brink, Clark,
'Hopkins, Charles and Silver Cave lode locations, Leadville, Colorado,
land district. Your said decision also dismissed the protest of N. N.
Robertson and George S. Curtis; and their appeal therefrom was dis-
missed by the Department on February 13, 1897 (unreported).
Application for patent to this entire group of fourteen lode locations
was filed on September 2, 1891; notice thereof was published from
September. 4, to November 5, 1891, inclusive; and entry No. 3993 was
made therefor on December 14, 1895. It appearing that the discovery
shaft of the St. Jacobs location was on ground excluded from the entry,
and the applicants electing not to comply with the requirement of your
office in the premises, the entry was formally.caneeled as to that location
on August 17, 1896.
The protest alleges, among other things, that, protestants are the
owners of a great portion of the premises claimed by the applicants
for patent, such portion being embraced in the Blackbird, Verhofstad
and Sam Randle lode claims; that there was no discovery by applicants
or their grantors of any lode or vein in place bearing mineral upon any
one of the group of locations first above indicated; that the discovery
shafts upon these locations were not sunk to the depth of ten feet, nor
were notices of the locations posted thereon; that the annual assess-
ment work bad not been done on any one of these locations for any
year since location, and that applicants had not expended $500 for
labor or improvements upon any one of the said locations nor upon the
entire claim. Your office considered the allegations of the protest in
detail and in its said decision held that the showing made by the prot-
estants did not warrant a hearing, and so, as already stated, dismissed
the protest. The appeal assigns several errors of law and of fact.
Numerous affidavits, pro and con, have been filed by protestants and
applicants, going to each of the above allegations, since the decision of
your office. There have also been filed the field notes and plat of an
amended survey of the claim as now constituted, made in April, 1896,
under the supervision of the United States surveyor-general for Colo-
rado, and approved by him on September 11, 1896; also two additional
certificates of the said surveyor-general as to improvements, dated
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September 11, 1896, and February 15, 1898, respectively. The first
official survey of the entire claim, whici then included the St. Jacobs
location, was made in December, 1889, the several locations having
been made in June, 1888. The field notes of this survey show specific-
ally that there was then a (liscovery shaft ten feet deep on each loca-
tion. The first certificate of the surveyor generl as to improvements,
and the only one on file when the entry was allowed, is dated May 23,
1890, certifies, in the usual form, to an expenliture of $500 on the
claim, and tat the improvements consist of eighteen shafts. A second
certificate of the surveyor-genleral, lated January 31, 1896, shows that
the improvements on the claim consist of nineteen shafts valued at
$3,040, to eighty-horse- power boilers, a fifteen-horse-power hoister,
and a building to enclose them, valued at $4,000, making a total
expenditure of $7,040. It is further certified therein that one of these
shafts, which is on the Salina location, one hundred and forty feet deep,
timbered, and valued at $2,500, was not credited to the applicants in
the former certificate for the reason that the ownership thereof was
then in dispute, and that such ownership is now "settled and concluded
to the claimants herein ;1 and also that the first one hundred feet of
this shaft, value $1,50), was sunk prior to August 1, 1891.
The field otes of the amended survey show eighteen shafts on the
claim, and other iprovements consisting of building, boilers and
hoister, as above mentioned. The timbered shaft on the Salina loca-
tion was then two hundred and fifty feet deep and valued at $5,000.
The total valuation of improvements at that time was $9,510. The
certificate of the surveyor-general dated September 11, 1896, which is
the third filed in the case, is in the regular form, to the effect that
$500 have beeii expended in labor or improvements on the claim and
that i lie improvements consist of the eighteen shafts, building, boilers,
and hoister, as set out in the field notes. The certificate of February
15, 1898, shows a total expenditure of $12,510 on the claim, credited to
eighteen shafts and the other improvements already repeatedly men-
tioned. The timbered shaft on the Salina had then reached a depth
of three hundred and seventy feet and was valued at $8,000. It is also
certified therein concerning this shaft:
This shaft last described is so located and has been sunk to be sed for drainage
and development of the entire claim. It is situated near the lowest portion, geo-
logically, of the claim and by thus draining the entire claim, it thereby enables the
veins of each location to be economically and advantageously developed and worked
to a great depth, the work in said shaft being credited pro rata to each location
embraced herein.
The same language, in substance, as to the situation of this shaft
and its use and adaptability for draining the entire claim is found in
the amended field notes and in the certificate of January, 1896.
The adaptability of this shaft for draining and otherwise aiding in
the development of the claim as a whole, is controverted in affidavits
filed by protestants. On the other hand, affidavits filed by the appli-
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cants-support the field notes and certificates of the surveyor-geueral.
The evidence convinces the Department, however, of the good faith of
the applicants. Whether this shaft shall aid in the develol)ment of the
entire claim to the extent applicants now assert, or not, it is not denied
that they have expended their money in sinking the shaft. Civil
engineers and persons experienced in mining operations may honestly
differ as to the probable results to be had from a plan of development,
and these may be involved, as is often the case in such operations,
in considerable uncertainty, but if money or labor is expended in good
faith, in furtherance of the plan, the Department will not look beyond
the fact of such expenditure.
It is shown affirmatively, in affidavits filed by the applicants, that
silver ore assaying from three to twelve ounces per ton has been found
in the discovery shafts of the various locations now comprising the
said claims. This is sufficient upon that point, in the absence of any
adverse claim or any claim by a party asserting the. land to be of a
different character from that under which applicants seek title thereto.
See Tamn et al. v. Story, 21 L. D., 440.
The general allegation in the protest that notices of location were
not posted on the several locations embraced in the claim, is without
corroboration in the affidavits filed in support thereof. Such notices,
presumably required by the local laws or regulations, are among the
initial steps in the location of a mining claim, and are at most for a
temporary purpose only. While there is no showing on this point in
the applicant's proof, still, it is not shown by protestants to be a matter
of material importance in this case. In the absence of such latter
showing it must be presumed that the local laws and regulations have
been complied with.
Relative to annual expenditure or assessment work upon each of said
locations prior to entry of the claim, applicant's proof shows that affi-
davits to the effect that such expenditure or work 'had been made or
done by applicants or their grantors for the years 1889 and 1890 were
duly filed. that such expenditure was made for each location save the
Fryer Hill (the omission of that name from the affidavit being probably
due to inadvertence) for the years 1891 and 1892, and that good faith
notices, in lieu of annual expenditure, covering each location, for the
years 1893 and 1894, were duly filed pursuant to the provisions of the
acts of November 3, 893 (28 Stat., 6), and July 18, 894 (28 Stat., 114).
These notices would seem to be sufficient, upon the question of annual
expenditure, to have justified the allowance of the entry..
Among the affidavits filed by protestants subsequent to the decision
of your office, is one tending to show that Albert J. Rupp, who, as the
duly authorized attorney in fact of the applicants for patent, made the
affidavit that plat and notice remained posted on the claim during
the time required by law, was not in the State of Colorado during that
time._jIt is not necessary to discuss at length here the effect of this
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charge. It goes to a question not raised by the protest and not con-
sidered by your office. It furnishes no ground for a direction by the
Department that a hearing be ordered. If you shall deem the affidavit
of Rupp insufficient upon the point of continuous posting of notice,
you will call upon the applicant for additional evidence in the premises.
Applicant's proof satisfactorily shows that such notice was duly posted
on September 1 1891.
The affidavits filed by protestants have been carefully examined and
considered. In the face of the strong affirmative proof made by the
applicants covering all the points embraced i the protest, with the
apparently immaterial exception aforesaid, the Department does not
think the showing by the protestants justifies the ordering of a hear-
ing. The Department is of the opinion that the applicants have in
good faith complied with the essential requirements of the mining
laws, and the protest is therefore dismissed. This conclusion renders
it unnecessary to consider the appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
COMMUTATION OF HOMESTEAD-ACT OF JUNE 3, 1896.
CIRCULAlR .
Acting Commissioner Best to Registers and Receivers, JTaly 9,. 1896.
GENTLEMEN:
Your attention is invited to the act of Congress, approved June 3,
1896 (29 Stat., 197), entitled "An act relating to commutations f
homestead entries, and to confirm such entries when commutation
proofs were received by local land officers prematurely" a copy of
which is hereto annexed.
The first section of the act provides for the confirmation of cash
entries based on commutation proofs made under section 2301, Revised
Statutes, as amended by section 6 of the act of TMarch 3, 1891 (26 Stat.,
1095), where at least six months' actual residence prior to commutation
has been shown and there is no objection to the entry except that
fourteen months' compliance with the homestead law after the date of
entry has not been shown.
The cases now pending in this office, coming under the provisions of
the act, where the cash certificate has not been canceled, will be taken
up for consideration without application by the parties in interest.
Where the cash certificate in a case coming within the provisions of
the statute has been canceled, it will be necessary for the parties in
interest, if they desire the reinstatement of the same and the confirma-
tion of the entry, to file in the proper district land office an application
for such action. You will forward the application to this office for con-
Not heretofore reported.
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sideration, accompanied by a full report as to the status of the tract of
land embraced in the entry, the confirmation of which is desired.
The second section of the act modifies the provisions of section 2301,
Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of March 3, 1891 (supra), so
as to permit the commutation of homestead entries upon a showing of
fourteen months' compliance with the homestead law after the date of
settlement, instead of after the date of entry, as formerly required.
Constructive residence from the date of the entry will be recognized
where settlement is made and residence established within six months
thereafter.
The provisions of said section 2 are not intended to change existing
special laws which permit commutations in less than fourteen months,
but are applicable only in cases where the commutation is made under
the general homestead laws.
Approved:
HOKE S1:nil,
Secretary.
(PUBLIC-NO. 173.)
AN ACT relating to commutations of homestead entries, and to confirm such entries
w-vhen commutation proofs were received by local land officers prematurely.
Be it enacted by the Senate and -House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever it shall appear
to the Commissioner of the General Land Office that an error has here-
tofore been made by the officers of any local land office in receiving
premature commutation proofs under the homestead laws, and that
there was. no fraud practiced by the entryman in making such proofs,
and final payment has been made and a final certificate of entry has
been issued to the entryman, and that there are no adverse claimants
to the land described in the certificates of entry whose rights originated
prior to making sch final proofs, and that no other reason why the
title should not vest in the entrymau exists except that the commuta-
tion was made less than fourteen months from the date of the homestead
settlement, and that there was at least six months' actual residence in
good faith by the-homestead entryman on the land prior to such com-
mutation, such certificates of entry shall be in all things confirmed to
-the entryman, his heirs, and legal representatives, as of the date of
such final certificate of entry and a patent issue thereon; and the title
so patented shall inure to the benefit of any grantee or transferee in
good faith of such entryman subsequent to the date of such final
certificate: Provided, That this act shall not apply to commutation and
homestead entries on which final certificates have been issued, and
which have heretofore been canceled when the lands made vacant by
such cancellation have been reentered under the homestead act.
12209-VOL 26 35
546 DECISIONS RELATING TO TE PUBLIC LANDS.
SEC. 2. That all commutations of homestead entries shall be allowed
after the expiration of fourteen months from date of settlement.
SEC. 3. That all acts and parts of acts in confict with any of the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
SEC. 4. That this act shall take effect and be in force from and after
its passage and approval.
Approved June 3, 1896.
RAILROAD GRANT-WAGON ROAD GRANT--WITHDRAWAL.
OREGON AND CALiFORNIA R. R. CO. V. WILLAMIETTE VALLEY AND
CASCADE MT. WAGON ROAD CO.
A withdrawal of lands for indemrnity purposes under the grant to the Oregol and
California R. R. Co. is in violation of the statute making the grant to said
company, and no bar to the subsequent withdrawal for the benefit of the: wagon
road grant mnade y the act of July 5, 1866, and during the existence of the
latter withdrawal the lands embraced therein are not subject to selection under
the railroad grant.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Ofce,
(W. V. D.) April 21, 1898. (E. F. B.)
The lands in controversy, to wit: the N1W. of the NE. and the NE.4
of the NW. 4 of Sec. 29, the N, j-of the SE. , the NE. 4 of the SW. and
the N. g of See. 35, T. 14 S., R. 1 E., Roseburg, Oregon, are within the
iudemnity limits of the grant to the Oregon and California Railroad
Company, made by the act of July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 239), and are
included within the limits of a withdrawal ordered for the benefit of
said company by letter of your office of April 7, 1870. Tey are also
vithin the limits of the withdrawal for the benefit of the Willainette
Valley and Cascade Mountain Wagon Read Company, under the grant
made by the act of July 5,1866 (14 Stat., 89), ordered by letter of your
office of June 2, 1871.
Said lands were selected by the California and Oregon Railroad
Company as indemnity, December 27, 1895, per list 56, and said selec-
tion was held for cancellation by your office by letter of April 14, 1896,
upon the ground of conflict with the rights of the wagon road company,
fron which decision the railroad company appealed.
The controlling question in this case is as to the validity of the
withdrawal of April 7, 1870, made for the benefit of the railroad
company.
If the grant contains no prohibition against the right of withdrawal,
the exercise of such right by the executive would have the effect to
reserve the lands, although such withdrawal might not have been
contemplated by the grant; hut the Department has held that the sixth
section of the act making the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad
prohibits the exercise of such authority, and a withdrawal made in
violation of such statutory provision is without effect, except as notice
of the limits within which the company may make its indemnity selec-
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tions. Northern Pacific i. R. Co. v. Miller, 7 L. D., 100; same v. Jennie
L. Davis, 19 L. D., 87.
The grant to the Oregon and California Railroad Company contains
a provision similar to the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, and forbids the withdrawal of lands for indemnity purposes.
Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Engram, 7 L. D., 240; Central Pacific R. R.
Co. v. Hawkins, 20 L. D.., 123.
The withdrawal for the railroad company being nanthorized and
without effect, said lands were, at the date of withdrawal for the benefit
of the-wagon road company, subject to such withdrawal, which took
effect immediately upon receipt of notice at the local office, and reserved
the lands for the benefit of the last namued company.
It appears that the Willamette Valley and Cascade Mountain Wagon
Road Company applied to select the NW. of the NE.4 and the NE.4
of the NW. of. said Sec. 29, February 8, 1896, which application was
rejected on account of conflict with said selection of the Oregon and
California Railroad Company.
The decision of your office, holding for cancellation the selections
made by the railroad company in said list 56, is affirmed as to all lands
therein which were selected by the wagon road company prior to March
10, 1898 (Willamette Valley, etc. v. Bruner, 26 L. D., 356), when the
withdrawal for the benefit of the wagon road company was revoked;
but the selections by the railroad, of lands in list 56, not selected by
the wagon road company prior to Mareh 10, 1898, and not at that date
embraced in pending applications to select by the wagon road company,
will be examined without reference to the withdrawal for the wagon
road company.
NEILSON V. CENTRAL PACIFIC R. R. CO. ET AL.
Motion for review of departmental decision of February 21, 1898,
26 L.D., 252, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, April 21., 1898.
TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-EQUITABLE ACTION.
ALVIN LAW.
A timber culture entry allowed prior to the expiration of the statutory period of
cultivation, may be equitably confirmed, in the absence of any adverse claim,
where it appears that after the issuance of final certificate the land was con-
veyed to another for value and without notice of the defect in the final proof,
and subsequent compliance with the law in the matter of cultivation, duly
appears.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) April 21, 1898. (L. L. B.)
Alvin Law has appealed from your office decision of March 30, 1896,
denying his application to relieve from suspension the timber-culture
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entry of Samuel Mason made May 25, 1885, for the SE. of Sec. 34,
T. 9 S., R. 23 W., Colby, Kansas, uponi which final proof was made and
final certificate issued June 18, 1890, and praying that patent may issue
for the land einbraced therein.
The facts are clearly and concisely stated in your said office decision,
and for convenience are here transcribed:
On May 23, 1885, Samuel Mason made timber-culture entry No. 10241, for the SE. ,
Sec. 34, T. 9 S., R. 23 W.
On June 18, 1890, a little more than five years from date of entry, he made final
proof (under the act of June 14, 1878), which proof was premature by about three
years as proof cannot be made, under the act mentioned, in less than eight years
from date of entry. However, final certificate No. 638 was erroneously issued there-
upon by the local office June 20, 1890.
It was shown in the proof that the entryman did not plant any timber, but had
cultivated, protected, and kept in a healthy growing condition up to the date of his
proof, or for years five and twenty-seven days, 7,620 trees that had been planted on
ten acres of said tract by a former entryrnan who had relinquished his rights in the
tract just prior to the date of Mason's entry.
In view of the proof being prematurely made, this office (letter "C "), on Septem-
ber 23, 1890, rejected it and allowed said certificate to stand subject to new proof to
bemadeatthe proper time; of which action Mason was dulynotified. Ashe did not
appeal therefrom, the action of this office rejecting the proof, became final (letter
"G") January 28, 1892. The final certificate, as before stated, was allowed to stand
subject to new proof to be made at the proper time.
I am now in receipt of the application of Alvin Law (transmitted with the regis-
ter's letter of January 25, 1896), who claims to be the owner of said tract, and asks
that the entry be relieved from suspension and passed to patent.
Law sets up in his affidavit that he has been acquainted with said tract for the
past sixteen years; that during the years 1890, 1891, 1892 and 1893, there was grow-
ing thereupon at least ten acres of living and thrifty trees; that there was growing
upon each acre of said ten acres at least seven hundred and fifty living and thrifty
trees, and that said trees had been growing at least eight years prior to May 23, 1893;
that they were planted and cultivated in accordance with the timber-culture laws;
that there are eighty acres of said tract under a good and excellent state of cultiva-
tion, seventy-two acres of which were cropped to corn during the year 1895; that
there are, with other improvements thereupon, a good well, and a good one-story
frame house with a kitchen attached; that after said Mason, the entryman, made his
final proof, he conveyed the tract to one George W. Callison, on September 15, 1890,
who afterwards conveyed it to Margaret J. Wormald, and she, subsequently, conveyed
it to applicant, who claims to have had no knowledge at the time of his purchase
thereof that said entry had been suspended; that he is ignorant of the whereabouts
of the entryman, Mason, he "having left the country in the year 1891," and has not
been seen or heard from since. Applicant asks that the entry, nder the circum-
stances, be passed to patent.
By letter "G" of July 20, 1895, this office, in response to a letter of H. J. Harwi,
who was then acting as attorney in the matter for applicant, held that the proof
required can be furnished only by the entryman, his heirs, or legal representatives;
that this office is not authorized by law to accept proof offered by the "transferee"
of a timber-cnlture entry where compliance with the law was not shown by the
entryman, as in this case; that the local officers had no authority to accept the
proof offered by Mason, inasmuch as the act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stat., 113), pro-
vides that no final certificate shall be given, or patent issued, for the land so entered
until the expiration of eight years from date of such entry, that Mason was not,
therefore, in a position to transfer the land entered by him, and the " transferee'"
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gained nothing by the attempted transfer; that while Law may have acted in good
faith, the records of the local office, and the provisions of the laws relating to
timber-culture entries, were open to his inspection and should have put him on his
guard; that the roof required must be furnished by the proper party as stated
above.
From the foregoing it appears that the transferee and the govern-
nent are the only parties in iterest; that the requiremnents of the law
as to the culture and growth of trees have at this date been fully corn-
plied with, and that the applicant is an innocent purchaser for value
and without any actual notice of the defect in Masob's final proof;
that all transfers of the claim were mnade after final certificate was
issued, and, presumably, upon the evidence furnished by such certifi-
cate that the law had been complied with.
Rule 33, appertaining to the Board of Equitable Adjudication, l)ro-
vides that-
All homestead and timber-culture entries in which good faith appears, and a sub-
stantial compliance with law, and in which there is no adverse claim, but in which
full compliance with law was not effected, or final proof made, within the period
prescribed, or residence established on the land, in homestead entries, within the
time fixed therefor by statute, or official regulation based thereon, and in which
such failure was caused by ignorance of the law, by accident or mistake, by sick-
ness of the party or his family, or by any other obstacle which he could not control,
may be referred to the Board for equitable actions
The " good faith of the petitioner is shown-here and a " substantial
compliance with law," although a "full compliance with law was not
effected" when final certificate was issued, because the entryman had
shown only five years' cultivation when eight years' was required, and
"such failure was caused by ignorance of the law," or "by mistake,"
or both.
This Department is clearly of the opinion that the entry should be
referred to the Board of Equitable Adjudication with the recomnenda-
tion that it be passed to patent; which is accordingly done.
The decision appealed fron is mnodified to this extent.
SECOND HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ACT OF DECEMBER 29, 1S94.
PATRICK El. GUTHREY.
The right to make a second homestead entry under the act of December 29, 1894,
will not be defeated by the fact that the etryman sold the improvements on
the land covered by his first entry, and relinquished his claim thereto, where it
appearsthat, on account of aprotracteddrought, suchaction was madenecessary
to secure the means of subsistence.
Acting Secretary Byan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) April 21, 1898. (H. G.)
Patrick E. Guthrey made hornestead entry for the NE. -x of Sec. 18,
T. 18 N., R. 3 B., I. M., August 9, 1889, which he relinquished Novem-
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ber 22,1889. He made application JuLLe 22, 1895, to enter the SW. - of
the SE. I of Sec. 18, lots 1 and 2 of Sec. 19, and lot 4 of See. 20, T. 20 N.,
R. 9 E., as a second homestead entry, which was transmitted by the
local office to your office.
On December 21, 1S95, your office held that the reasons given in sup-
port of this application 'for a second entry and for relinquishing the
first entry and abandoning the tract thereby covered, were insufficient,
and rejected the application therefor. No appeal was taken from this
decision and it was declared final and the case closed.
On January 23, 1896, Guthrey made application to enter as a home-
stead the S. t- of the SW. of Sec. 17, and the NE.4 of the SW. I of See.
17, and lot 4 in See. 20, T. 20 N., R. 9 E., within the limits of the land
district at Perry, Oklahoma. This application was apparently intended
as an application for a second entry, but makes no showing as to the
former entry except that Guthrey had made a homestead entry in Payne
county, Oklahoma, in 1889, bt never perfected title to said tract, and
that he was at the time of making such application an actual settler
on the tract applied for as a second entry.
On March 13, 1896, this application was transmitted by the local
office to your office, together with a number of subsequent applications
to enter tracts embracing wholly or in part the tract which Guthrey
had applied to enter and which were severally suspended to await
action upon his prior application to enter.
On June 12, 1896, your' offlce rejected this application, stating that
Guthrey had made no showing whatever therein as to his former entry
and also for the same reasons set forth in the former decision of your
office of December 21, 1895, which rejected his first application to make
second entry.
Upon appeal to this Department Guthrey for the first time presents
a formal application to make second entry of the tract applied for
by him.
This showing is nade upon affidavits of himself and others, and it
appears therefrom that his reasons for renewing his application for
second entry are that the land embraced in his first application there-
for was not properly',described or covered therein and that he was
advised by counsel to abandon his- first application and not to appeal
from the adverse decision of your office thereon but to make a second
application correctly describing and embracing all the land that he
desired to enter; that Guthrey is a resident upon the tract now applied
for and has made valuable improvements thereon for the purpose of
making it a home; that these improvements include a house, stable
and hen-house, the breaking of twenty-five acres and the planting of
twenty acres of corn and five acres of cotton; and that no other per-
son has resided upon the tract or attempted to nake improvements
thereon except one James McCulver, who remained there only for a few
weeks and made no improvements thereon.'
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Gutlirey states that the tract which e originally entered, which is
situated some distance from the tract now applied for, was settled upon,
inhabited and improved by him for the period of about one year; that
the improvements consisted of a good frame house of three rooms, the
enclosure of a pasture containing about ten acres, the plowing and
attempting to cultivate from eighteen to twenty acres, the planting of
a number of fruit trees and the building of a pond for the purpose of
securing water for live stock; that he made the entry in good faith for
the purpose of securing a home, and not for trade or speculation; that
during the year of entry and the following year his financial condition
was extremely poor, and his only means of support came to him -from his
daily labor; that during those seasons a severe drought prevailed in that
territory and that his condition and that of other people of the county
wherein the laud entered is situated was such as to compel them to
accept the aid extended to them by the government; tat he was with-
out means with which to cultivate and improve the tract, without seed
and the means of procuring it, and owing to the extreme poverty of
the people in the vicinity he was unable to secure employment to sup-
port himself in that locality; that he had no friends or relatives in that
vicinity to whom he could apply for aid or support; and owin g to these
circumstances, he sold his improvements at a considerable sacrifice and
relinquished his homestead entry.
The application is made apparently under the act of December 29,
1894 (28 Stat., 599), which permits second entries in certain enumerated
cases which, under the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), thereby
amended, are made sufficient reasons for the granting of leaves of
absence to settlers. These are where the settler by reason of a total or
partial destruction or failure of crops, sickness or other navoidable
casualty~ is unable to secure a support for himself or those dependent
upon him, from the lands settled upon. The application for such entry
is governed by the regulations contained in the departmental circular
of March 23, 1895, (20 L. D., 432), wherein the method of procedure is
minutely prescribed. It was not observed in this case, as the applica-
tion should have been addressed to the local office, setting forth the
reasons for making it, and following the form and method prescribed
in the circular. The only application made was one for a homestead,
which contained the statement that the applicant had made a former
entry, but which did not furnish the data required by the departmental
circular.
However, your office was advised of the fact of former entry by the,
papers in the case which contained the first application for a second
entry, and which appears to have been orderly made, but which was
rejected by your office and abandoned by the applicant, and this appli-
cation sets forth substantially the grounds contained in the second and
present application for a second entry. Under the circumstances, and
as no prior adverse rights intervened at the time of the formal appli-
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cation to enter the land which called attention to a former entry, the
application will be considered, although not orderly presented.
The rule is under the general act of December 29, 1894, relating to
second entries, that the right of second entry will not be accorded to
one who relinquishes his prior entry "solely" on account of a money
consideration or its equivalent (North Perry Townsite et al. v. Malone,
23 L. D., 87, 91); and it has been held that a right to make a second
entry under such general act will not be allowed on account of the
worthless character of the land covered by the first entry, i it was
made without examination o the land (Alix Heipfner, 26 L. D, 23);
but a right to a second entry has been recognized when the first was
relinquished on account of the arid and unproductive character of the
soil, successive drought for three years and the sbsequent filure of
the entryman to secure a crop from the land covered by the entry
(Tonyes H. Linlleinann, 20 L. D., 308).
In the case now under consideration, it appears. that the applicant
was compelled to sell his improvenents at a sacrifice, and even part
with his work stock in order to secure means of support during a period
of protracted drought, and was compelled to seek labor in ;another
locality as he could not obtain work in the vicinity of his homestead.
Although accompanied with a relinquishment, his parting with his
right to the land was not voluntary but forced owing to unforeseen
vicissitudes, and his relinquishment was not made for the purpose of
gain but was made at a sacrifice to secure means of a livelihood.
The subsequent applications transmitted with the application of
Guthrey for a second entry are not adverse rights, as they do not dis-
close priority of settlement or right to enter. Guthrey's application
was filed at the time these subsequent applications were made, and
although his showing as to a first entry was not as specifically made as
it should have been under the terms of the departmental circular, his
application discloses the fact that he made a former entry. His settle-
ment and residence upon, and his improvement of the tract now
applied for by him were prior in time and senior of right to those of one
of the sulbsequeut applicants whrlo evidently has made no improvements
of a substantial or permanent character upon the land. None of the
other applicants appear to have attempted settlement or improvement
of the tract.
The decision of your office is reversed and the application of Guthrey
to enter the tract applied for by him as a second entry will be allowed,
and the subsequent applications in so far as they conflict with his appli-
cation will be rejected.
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APPLICATION-ADVERSE CLAIMS-QUALIFICArIONS OF APPLICANT.
BRADLEY V. PE IRINS.
In the case of an application to inake entry, filed subject to prior adverse applica-
tions, the qualifications of such applicant should not be determined before an
adjudication of the relative rights of the parties in interest.
Acting Secretary Rycan to the Commissioner of the General Land Qt0 ce,
(Ws V. D.) April 21, 1898. (G. B. -.)
On Septemllber 22, 1891, one S. S. Price made homestead entry for the
SE. I of See. 18. T. 9 N., R.4 E., Oklahoma City land district, Oklahomia.
Said entry was contested by one H. D. Baker, and as a result thereof,
on March 14, 1893, your office held said entry for cancellation.
On July 2, 1894, the Department affirmed said decision, and, on
November 20, 1894, the ease was closed and the entry canceled.
OiL June 2, 1894, and while that case was pending on appeal before
the Department, the plaintiff herein, James H. Bradley, filed an affidavit
of contest against Price's entry, charging the said Price with abandon-
ment and his contestant, Baker, with soouerism. Said affidavit of
contest was not considered; the entry which it attacked being canceled
very soon afterwards on Baker's contest.
After the departmental decision -of July 2, 1894, canceling Price's
entry had been promulgated, but before the caicellation had been
entered of record on November 20, 1894, applications to make home-
stead entries of said tract were filed, as follows:
(1) By Nathaniel Perkins, on October 3, 1894.
(2) By Robert P. McCornack, October 3, 1894.
(3) By John Et. Surber, November 9, 1894.
(4) By James H. Bradley, November 13, 1894.
The first three applications were suspended and held to await the
result of Baker's attempt to exercise his preference right. But Brad-
ley's application was rejected by the local officers, (1) because the
applicant is disqualified, nd (2) for conflict with suspended applica-
tions of Perkins, MeCornack and Srber." From that decision Brad-
ley appealed to your office.
On March 8, 1895, your office denied Baker's application to make
entry in the exercise of his preference right, and on April 24, 1895, he
waived his preference right, and his right of appeal from your said
office decision.
On-May 13, 1895, Bradley filed an application to have his homestead
rights restored, ad simultaneously a second application to make home-
stead entry of the tract i controversy. In his said application for a
restoration of his homestead right, lie alleged under oath that le made
homestead entry for lots 1 and 2 and the S. - of the NE. 1 of Sec. 3, T.
12 N., R. 2 W., at Guthrie, on April 29, 1889; that he settled on the
land and made improvements thereon of the value of $400; that his
,55 4 DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
entry was contested because he was within the territory during the
prohibited period; that the local officers decided against imai, and that
your office affirmed their decision; that thereafter, be'ng without funds
to further prosecute an appeal, " and believing that he would ulti-
mately lose said tract by reason of his having entered the Oklahoma
country during the prohibited period," he re]inquishled his entry with-
out pay therefor.
Thereupon your office, on An gust 24, 1895, held:
According to his own admission and according to the finding of this and the local
office, Bradley is disqualified to make entry, and his application to enter is therefore.
rejected . . . The applications of Perkins, TMcCornack, and Surber will e held
to await the final disposition of Bradley's application.
Bradley has appealed to the Department, the whole of his conten-
tion being substantially embraced in his first specification of error, as
follows:
The Hon. Commissioner erred i refusing to restore the homestead rights of said
James H. Bradley, for the reason that said Bradley had never had the benefit of the
homestead law,s of the United States.
Without passing on the questions raised by this appeal, it may be
said that on te record before the Department Bradley would not be
entitled to make an entry of the land applied for, assuming him to be
in all respects qualified. ie took nothing by his contest against Price's
entry. That entry was canceled on the contest of Baker, and even if
Baker was a sooner, as alleged, that fact did not affect his status as a
contestant. Before Bradley filed his application to enter the land in
controversy, three several applications were filed, as has been seen, by
Perkins, McCornack and Surber. The presumption is that these par-
ties are qualified applicants; at least there is nothing in the record to
the contrary, and inasmuch as Bradley does not allege prior settlement,
any one of these applications would have precedence over his appli-
cation.
Your office therefore erred in passing on Bradley's qualifications in
advance of an adjudication of the relative rights of the parties in
interest. The conclusion reached was a correct one on the present
record, without reference to the ground upon which it was put.
Inasmuch as an application to make a second entry will only be con-
sidered by the Department in connection with an application to enter
a designated tract of land, to pass on Bradley's right in this regard
would, in the present state of the record, be a decision on a moot case,
and is not permitted under the rulings of the Department.
The decision of your office, in so far as it holds Bradley disqualified
to enter the land applied for on account of soonerism, is hereby vacated,
and the cause remanded for such proceedings as may be found neces-
sary to determine the relative rights of tleparties. Inasmuch as Sur-
ber has alleged under oath that he was a settler on the land prior to
the date of ay of the applications to enter the same, it may be found
necessary to order a hearing. In such event Bradley wyill be heard
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thereat i support of his application to enter, and if he shows himself
otherwise entitled to the land, the question of the effect of his alleged
soonerisin will e hereafter adjudicated.
DAvIS V. EISBERT.
Motion for review of departmental decision of March 15,1898,26 L. D.,
384, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, April 21,1898.
SOLDIERS' ADDITIONAL HOMESTEAD-CERTIFICATE OF RIGHT-
ASSIGNEE.
JOHN MW. RANKIN.
On application for the recertification of a soldier's additional homestead right, for
the benefit of an assignee under the act of August 18, 1894, and the regulations
thereunder, the applicant should be required to make such a showing of the
facts and circumstances attendant upon the transfer of the soldier's right, and
applicant's alleged ownership thereof, as will establish the fact that said appli-
cant is a bona fide purchaser for value of said right.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) April 21, 1898. (W. AI. W.)
By your office letter of February 18, 1898, you submitted the appli-
cation of John M. Rankin for additional certification in his name, as
assignee, under the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., 397), and the regu-
lations thereunder (19 L. D., 302), of a certificate of soldiers' additional
homestead right, issued to John M. Hewlett, and requested instruc-
tions whether the evidence submitted by Mr. Rankin shall be regarded
as satisfactorily establishing the fact that he is the owner and bonafide
purchaser, for value, of said certificate, and entitled to such additional
certification thereof.
Mr. Rankin filed with his application the original certificate, dated
February 9, 1884, issued by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, certifying Hewlett's right to make an additional homestead
entry of not exceeding eighty acres.. In support of his application for
additional certification Mr. Rankin submitted his own affidavit, stating:
That he is the true and lawful owner of the soldier's additional homestead certifi-
cate for eighty acres which was issued to one John M. Hewlett, on February 9,1884.
Affiant says that he purchased the same in good faith and for a valuable consid-
eratioD, and that if there is any fraud practiced upon the goverument in procuring
the aforesaid certificate, he was not a party thereto and had no knowledge thereof.
The act of August 18, 1894, provides-
That all sldiers' additional homestead certificates heretofore issued under the
rules and regulations of the General Land Office under section twenty-three hun-
dred and six of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or in pursuance of the
decisions or instructions of the Secretary of the Interior, of date March tenth,
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eighteen hundred and seventy-two, or any subsequent decisions or istructions of
the Secretary of the Iterior or the Commissioner of the General Land Office, shall
be, and are hereby, declared to be valid, notwithstanding any attempted sale or
transfer thereof; and Where snch certificates have been or mnay hereafter be sold or
transferred, such sale or transfer shall not e regarded as invalidating the right,
but the same shall be good and valid in the hands of bonafide purchasers for value;
and all entries heretofore or hereafter made ith such certificates by such pur-
chasers shall be approved, and patent shall issue in the name of the assignees.
The circular issued thereunder to registers and receivers, October
16, 1894, 19 L. D., 302, provides:
To enable assignees of these certificates to exercise in their own names the right
of entry confirmed by this statute, it is directed that the certificate itself shall, in
each instance, prior to any entry by the assignee, be presented to this office for
examination and additional certification covering the fact of assignment. Holders
of such certificates desiring to exercise a right of entry in their own uanes, miust
file such certificates in this office, together with satisfisetory proof of ownership
and of bona ftde purchase for value. If, upon examnination, the proof so filed is satis-
factory, an additional certificate will. be attached to the original authorizing the
location thereof, or entry of land terewith, in the nanse of the assignee or his
assigns You will allow no entries in the namesof assignees except upon preseuta-
tion of such additional certificates issued by this office. When such additional
certificates are presented, yo will issue homestead papers and the final certificate
and receipt, in the naie of the transferee, referring to him in said papers as the
"Assignee" of the soldier.
Under the said act and circular, all that a holder of one of these
certificates is required to show to obtain an additional certification in
his own name as assignee, is that he is a bona. fde purchaser thereof
for value.
The construction of this act has heretofore received consideration in
several departmental decisions, and property rights have attached
thereunder to such an extent as to forbid a re-examination of the con-
clusion announced in those decisions. The rulings have been that the
act is remedial in cbaracter, that the purpose of Congress was to make
valid and effective these certificates of soldiers' additional homestead
rights when held by bona fide purchasers for value, irrespective of any
irregularity in their procurement, and notwithstanding the then exist-
ing departmlntal rlings did not recognize transfers or sales thereof;
and that one who, relying upon the action of your office in issuing the
certificate, has made purchase thereof in good faith and for value,
comes within the protection of the act. (John M1. Rankin, on re-review,
21 L. D., 404; Henry N. Cop]), 23 L. D., 123; John H. Howell, 24 L. D.,
35; Robards v. Lakey et al., ibid, 291.)
Under this interpretation of the act, where the original certification
-was improvident, or unauthorized, the burden of the injury and loss
must be borne by the governmentwhose agents committed the mis-
take, if the certificate is in the hands of a bonafide purchaser for value
who purchased upon the assumption that the certificate was lawfully
issued.
Whether in. any stated case the applicant for additional certification
is a bona fide purchaser for value, must be determined upon the facts
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in that ease. The possession of the original certificate by the appli-
cant is strong evidence of his purchase but is not con trolling or conclu-
sive because, in exceptional instances, his possession may have been
wrongfully obtained or may have been rightfully obtained but not by
way of purchase. In the case presented by your office letter the app]i-
cant states under oath, as before shown, that he is the true and lawful
owner of the certificate; that he purchased the same in good faith, for
a valuable consideration and without knowledge of any wrong prac-
ticed upon the government in the procurement thereof: When the
purchase was made, from whom made, for what consideration, and
whether this or any preceding transfer is evidenced by a written assign-
ment or memorandum signed by the soldier, are hot stated. In other
words, the applicant has given his own conclusions (and they may be
correct) instead of stating the facts and permitting your office to de-
termine therefrom the character of his alleged purchase. Your office
letter states that it was formerly the custom, as is well known, to trans-
fer or sell these certificates by delivering to the purchaser the original
certificate, together with two powers of attorneys, one to locate laud
under the certificate and the other to sell the land when located, and
that these powers of attorney were usually in blank, the name being
supplied by the ultimate transferee who used the certificate in locating
land. As a -result of this manner of dealing in these certificates, cases
may arise where the applicant for additional certification in his own.
name, as assignee, may be a remote transferee and a bona fide purchaser
for value, although the soldier in parting with te certificate did not
receive value therefor, or otherwise failed to proteethis interests. Thus
there may be cases where the certificate has been wrongfully obtained
from the soldier or has been disposed of contrary to his direction, and
yet the present holder may be a bona fide purchaser for value., It with-
out fault upon the part of the soldier his certificate has passed into the
hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, whose rights thereunder are
protected by the act of August 18, supra, the government and not the
soldier must bear the loss, because the additional homestead right is
given by law and will not be defeated by the act of August 18, s'apra, in
the absence of some action by the soldier calculated to have that effect.
Your -office letter calls attention to the case of Henry N. Copp, supra.
wherein Mr. Copp, claiming to be a bona fide purchaser for value of such
a certificate, and alleging that the original certificate and the accom-
panying powers of attorney transferring it to him had been lost, made
application for the issuance in his name of a duplicate of the original
certificate, and wherein the Department, after directing the issuance
of a duplicate certificate in the name of the soldier, in lieu of the lost
certificate, said:
The lost powers of attorney have nothing to do with the ase. The Department
was in no sense connected with them in their inception and can make no order
respecting them. They originated between the soldier, Mitchell, and his attorney
or attorneys, and all matters relating to then must be settled outside of the
Department.
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In view of the fact that in that case the relief asked and granted
was the issuance of a duplicate of the original certibcate, which of
course must have been issued in the name of the soldier, and in view
of the fact that no additional certification in the name of Mr. Copp, as
assignee, was asked, the powers of attorney were immaterial and, as
said, had nothing to do with the case, but if it had been intended
thereby to hold that such powers of attorney could not be considered
or examined in determining whether an applicant for additional certifi-
cation in his own name is a bonafide purchaser for value, then the hold-
ing could not be reasonably sustained and would have to be revoked.
Where the soldier's transfer of the certificate is evidenced by powers
of attorney or other written memorandum executed by him, the appli-
cant for additional certification in his own name as assignee, should be
required to produce such written evidence of the transfer, or to satisfac-
torily account for its non-production, and where evidence of a transfer
in writing is not produced the applicant should be required to state
the present address of the party from whom he purchased and of the
soldier if known, in order that your office, if deemed best, may take
steps to give the soldier an opportunity to be heard.
The application of Mr. Rankin which accompanied your office letter
is herewith returned for appropriate action in harmony with the views
herein expressed.
ALASKAN LAND-SURVEY-RIGHTS OF NATIVES-RAILROAD.
PACIFIC STEAM WHALING CO.
A survey of Alaskan lanl with a view to its purchase under section 12, act of March
3, 1891, will not be approved if it operates as ala eneroachment upon lauds
occupied by native villagers.
The provisions of the act of March 3, 1891, contain no authority for the purchase of
Alaskan land to be used and[ occupied for railroad purposes.
A survey of Alaskan land is required by the law and regulations to be in a square
form as near as practicable.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General land Office, April
(W. V. D.) *2-2, 1898. (W. M. B.)
I have considered the appeal of the Pacific Steam Whaling Company,
an alleged corporation, from the decision of your office of May 8, 1895,
wherein was suspended-subject to an emendation thereof-survey No.
101 (adjoining survey No. 100), executed by Albert Lascy, U. S. deputy
surveyor, on August 4th and 6, 1892, which embraces a tract of land
having an area of 30.67 acres: situate on the easterly shore of Prince
William Sound, known as Orca Station, District of Alaska, and used,
as alleged by Deputy Lascy, for cannery, fishing and trading purposes.
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The survey was suspended upon the ground as stated in your said
office decision, that
The survey i its present form cannot be accepted by this office for the reason
that the strips of land conftaining the railroad infringes upon the rights of the native
villages surrounding, which is to be reserved for their use, and that the main body
of the survey includes more land than appears to be i actual occupancy by the
claimants.
The deputy states in his report that the estimated value of the
improvements is $50,000, and that the same consist of the buildings
nhecessary to constitute a complete cannery plant, and a railroad used-
in connection with the cannery business. What is designated by the
deputy as a railroad appears to be only a tranway which is over one-
half mile in length, and extends from the cannery building, fonting on
Prince William Sound, to the wharf at the landing on Lake Eyak.
That portion of the tract embraced within the lines of the survey lying
between the main body of the land surveyed and the landing at the
west end of Lake Eyak, and upon which the referred to tramway is
located, is a long narrow strip of land more than one-fourth of a mile
in length, being just wide enough to embrace or include the road bed
-of the said tramway.
This (No. 101) survey is to the south of and adjoins survey 100, which
latter includes a tract of land claimed (as reported by Deputy Lascy-
who also executed said survey), by the Pacific Packing Company.
There is also located on the tract included in the last named survey a
railroad or tramway extending westerly from the cannery building
thereon to a wharf oni the coast of Prince William Sound, and easterly
from said cannery building to the landing at the west end of Lake
Eyak.
A considerable portion of the tramway lying within the lines of
survey No. 100 is also located on a long narrow strip of land extending
front the main body of the tract included in this survey to the landing
at the west end of Lake Eyak.
While the, two tracts located by the claimant and alleged owners
thereof, as Marked off by the two surveys, font on Prince William
Sound, a distance of 74.50 chs. (1639 yards), and while the distance
across the narrow contiguous strips of land upon which the railroads
or tramways are located is only 2.25 chs. (49.50 yards) at the point of
smallest breadth, yet the two exterior lines within which is included
said narrrow strips of land deflect and widen as they approach Lake
Eyak sufficiently to cover the shore line of said lake a distance of 12.30
chs. (270.60 yards).
While the lines of the two surveys, within which are embraced the
referred to narrow strips of land, were run so close together, for the
purpose, presumably, of passing through the village of the natives to
Lake Eyak without including within such lines any of the buildings or
huts of the villagers, yet said lines pass so close to said huts-being
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distant only a few feet from some of the same, as appears from the
field notes and plats of the surveys-that the surveys can be regarded
in no other light than an encroachment upon lands occupied by the
natives for village purposes, which is a violation of the provisions of
section 14 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1095), which reserves
from survey, purchase, and etry all lands ' to which the natives of
Alaska have prior rights by virtue of actual occupations 
Lake Eyak comes to a narrow head at its western extremity and the
end lines of the said two surveys were extended around the same, in
manner shown, for the apparent purpose of shutting off approach
thereto by the natives aid the public generally, save at the will or
pleasure of the corporations which seek to purchase the land border-
ing upon the lake.
Though it appears from the plat and field notes that the survey
(No. 101) under exarnination'encroaches upon lands apparently occu-
pied by native Alaskans, nevertheless inspector Swineford, in his
report upon that subject, made subsequent to your office decision and
filed with the papers in this matter of survey, expresses the opinion
that sch is not the case.
When an issue of this kind is made by the record submitted such ques-
tion can only be determined at the time of submitting final proof under
provision of subdivision of paragraph 20 of the rules and regulations
of June 3, 1891 (12 L. D., 583), or at a hearing specially ordered to
consider and adjudicate such question.
The narrow strip of land included in survey No. 101 in its existing
fort, and occupied by the road bed of the tramway or so-called railroad
bed, was surveyed with a view to the purchase and entry of the same
by the claimants thereof, for railroad and tramway purposes, but it
may here be observed that section 12 of the act of March 3, 1891, under
which appellants ask to purchase, contains no provision for the pur-
chase and entry of lands to be occupied and used for railroad purposes.
Furthermore, it may be observed, as becomes apparent from the
facts herein related, that this survey was not executed conformably to
law and regulations with respect to square form, and that if it was
amended so as to include the cannery plant of appellants, and at the
same time a body of land as near as practicable in a square form, the
strip of land upon which is situate the tramway, as also the land occu-
pied by the native villagers adjacent thereto, would be excluded from
the lines of an amended survey executed as suggested in your office
decision, whereby would be removed from the survey the objectionable
features with respect to its nonconformity with law and regulations as
to square form, and its conflict with the rights of native Alaskans to
the use of certain lands, as herein pointed out, by reason of occupation
thereof.
For the foregoing reasons the decision of your office suspending sur-
vey No. 101-subject to amendment in conformity with law and regula-
tions-is hereby affirmed.
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IOlVIESTEAD ENTRY-COMIMAUTATIONACT OF JUNE 3, 1896.
KUEPPER . TRIPP.
A homestead entry prematurely commuted is confirmed under the subsequent act of
June 3, 1896, in the absence of any adverse claim arising prior to final proof,
and where it appears that the entryman actually resided on the land for six
months prior to commutation, and in good faith made his inal proof.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 23, 1898. (F. C. D.)
On April 22, 1891, Fred R. Tripp made homestead entry No. 6291,
for the fractional NE' See. 10, T. 39 N., R.. 6 E., Wausau, Wisconsin,
land district; and on August 2, 1891, Tripp submitted commutation
proof and final certificate issued thereon.
On November 22, 1894, your office held that the commutation proof
was prematurely made and therefore canceled said cash certificate but
the original homestead entry was allowed to remain intact, subject to
future compliance with law.
On July 1, 1895, Harmon Kuepper tiled an affidavit of contest against
said entry alleging abandonment, change of residence and failure to
settle on and cultivate the land.
After a hearing duly had, at which Tripp made default, the register
and receiver rendered their decision finding that the entry had been
abandoned and recommending cancellation of the same.
On July 20, 1896, upon appeal your office affirmed the decision of
the local officers, and held the homestead entry of Tripp for cancella
tion, and from that decision Tripp has appealed to the Department,
the same having been received in your office on September 22, 1896.
On November 2,1896, a duly served application by Tripp, dated Sep-
tember 29, 1896, for a re-hearing, and for re-instatement and confirma-
tion of his said cash entry, under act of Congress of June 3, 1896 (29
Stat., 197), entitled "An Act relating to commutations of homestead
entries, and to confirm such entries when commutation proofs were.
received by local land officers prematurely," was received in your office,
the same having been filed in the local office.
It is provided by the first section of said act of June 3, 1896-
that whenever it shall appear to the Commissioner of the General Land Office that
an error has heretofore been made by the officers of any local land office in receiving
premature commutation proofs under the homestead laws, and that there was no
fraud practiced by the entryman in making such proofs, and final payment has been
made and a final certificate of entry has been issued to the entryman, and that there
are no adverse claimants to the land described in the certificates of entry whose
rights originated prior to making such final proofs, and that no other reason why
the title should not vest in the entrymnan exists except that the commutation was
made less than fourteen-months from the date of the homestead settlement, and that
there was at least six months actual residence in good faith by the homestead entry-
man on the land prior to such commutation, such certificates of entry shall be in all
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things confirmed to the entryman, his heirs and legal representatives, as of the date
of such final certificate of entry and a patent issue thereon; and the title so patented
shall inure to the benefit of any grantee or transferee in good faith of sich entryman
subsequent to the date of such final certificate: Provided, that his act shall not
apply to comurntation and homestead entries on which final certificates have been
issued, and which have heretofore been canceled when the lands made vacant by
such cancellation have been re-entered under the homestead act.
On July 9, 196 (26 L. D., 544), this Department approved a circular
issued by your office construing said act of June 3, 1896, and it was
further provided therein that
where the cash certificate in a case coming within the provisions of the statute
has been canceled, it will be necessary for the parties in interest, if they desire the
re-instatement of the same and the confirmation of the entry, to file in the proper
district land office an application for such action.
With this requirement Tripp has complied. I his said application
for reinstatement and confirmatiou of his cash entry, Tripp alleges
that after having made final proof and receiving final certificate there-
for, he sold said land to one S. M. lutchinson. - This fact affords no
grounds for reversal of the decision holding the entry for cancellation.
(Anders G. lasselquist, 24 L. 1., 351).
It appearing from the evidence herein, that Tripp submitted his final
proof in good faith, showing settlement on the said land on December
20, 1890, and residence thereon from that date to time of making said
proof; that the local officers erroneously received said proof and issued
final certificate to the entryman; that no fraud is apparent in making
said proof; that there are no adverse claims to the land in contro-
versy that-originated prior to final proof; that there is no other reason
shown why title should not vest in the entryman "except that the
commutation was made less than fourteen months from the date of
homestead settlement;" and that the entryman in good faith actually
resided six months on the land prior to commutation; it is apparent,
therefore, that the said cash entry of Tripp is confirmed under the pro-
visions of the said act of June 3, 1896, and the same should be
re-instated and passed to patent, if otherwise satisfactory. It is so
ordered. Your decision of July 20, 1896, is set aside. A rehearing
does not appear necessary. Although the said act of June 3, 1896,
was in force at the date of said decision of your office, the case does not
appear to have been considered thereunder.
INDIAN LANDS-PATENT-SECTION 24 48 R. S.-CONYEYANCE.
OPINION.
In the case of a patent issued under a grant of land, made by a treaty in which no
provision appears for the issuance of patent, the fact of the grantees' death prior
to the issuance of patent is imaterial, for if title under said grant did not pass
without patent, then the issuance thereof was in pursuance of law in the meaning
of section 2448 R. S., and the title, under the provisions of said section, vested
in the heirs, devisees, or assignees of the deceased patentee as if the patent had
issued in his lifetime.
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On application for the approval of deeds executed by alleged ludian heirs, proof of
such beirship, and of the possessory rightof tbeparties claiming under said con-
veyances to the land involved should be duly furnished before favorable action
is warranted.
Assistant Attorney- General Tan Devanter to the Secretary of the iterior
April 23, 198.
By your reference of the 21st ultimo, I aIn in receipt of a communica-'
tion from the Acting Comnissioner of Indian Affairs. dated January
21, 1898, recommellding approval by the President of certified copies
of' deeds executed by the claimed heirs of Augelique (a child of John
Baptiste Pacquette, a Winnebago Indian), conveying to the grantees
therein certain lands in Sec. 14, T. 9 N., R. 7 E., Mineral Point land
district, Wisconsin. You request my opinion whether the sales evi-
denced by these certified epies of deeds should receive the approval
of the President as recommended by the Idian Office.
It is claimed that section 14 was granted to Angelique by the United
States under the fifth article of the treaty of August , 1829, (7 Stat.,
323), with the Vinnebago Indians. That article, so far as it is mate-
rial to the present inquiry, is as follows:
And it is further agreed, that, from the land hereinbefore ceded, there shall be
granted by the United States to the persons herein namled, (being descendants of
said Indians,) the quantity of land as follows, to be located without the mineral
country, under the direction of the President of the United States that is to say:
.. . .to John Baptiste, Pascal, Margaret, Angelique, Domitille, Therese, and
Lisette, children of the late John Baptiste Pacquette, each one section; .. . .
all which aforesaid grants are not to be leased or sold by said grantees to any person
or persons whatever, without the permission of the President of the United States;
Pursuant to this provision of the treaty, section 14 was located as the
land granted to Angelique, and, June 8, 1838, the selection was
approved by the President. May 17, 1860, a patent was issued to
Angelique wherein it is provided, following the terms of the treaty,
that the land is "not to be leased or sold by the said grantee to any
person or persons whatever without the permission of the President of
the United States." The time of Angelique's death is not stated but it
seems to have occurred a few years prior to the issuance of the patent.
This fact, however, is not material and does not affect the present title
to the land. At common law a patent issued in the name of a dead
person was ineffectual to pass title and therefore inoperative and void
(Davenport v. Lamb, 13 Wall., 418, 427), but by the act of May 20, 1836
(5 Stat., 31), now embodied in Section 2448 of the Revised Statutes,
Congress modified the general rule by providing-
That in all cases where patents for public lands have been or may hereafter be
issued, in pursuance of any law of the United States, to a person who had died, or
who shall hereafter die, before the date of such patent, the title to the land des-
ignated therein shall enure to, and become vested in, the heirs, devisees, or assignees
of such deceased patentee, as if the patent had issued to the deceased person during
life; and the provisions of this act shall be construed to extend to patents for lands
within the Virginia Military District in the State of Ohio.
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The treaty did not make express provision for the issuance of a patent
and it may be that upon the location and identification, under the
direction of the President, of the land granted, the grant became
operative so as to vest in the grantee the full legal title to the section
located. If, however, a patent was necessary for the transfer of the
legal title, as is generally the case (Carter v. Ruddy, 16G U. S., 493),
then one was issued in pursuance of law within the meaning of section
2448, and the patentee being dead at the date thereof the title to the
land designated therein enured to and vested in the heirs, devisees, or
assignees of the deceased patentee as if the patent had issued to her
in her lifetime.
It appears by the papers submitted that two of the claimed heirs of
Angelique (Amelia Legree and Joseph Legree), sold their respective
interests in a portion of section 14, by deeds approved by the President
September 21, 1865. Others of the claimed heirs appear to have made
conveyances of their respective interests in portions of the section, but
these conveyances do not appear to have ever received the President's
approval, and certified copies thereof are now submitted for such
approval.
There is no proof of the intestacy of Angelique nor of the heirship
of those making these deeds nor of the possession and occupancy of the
land under the deeds, by the guarantees therein. In the papers sub-
mitted it is suggested that probate or partition proceedings or both
have been had in the local courts, wherein it was determined that
Angelique died intestate and that the grantors in these deeds were her
heirs, but certified or exemplified copies of these judicial determinations
are not presented. If it were shown that Angelique died intestate,
that the persons making the deeds, approval of which is now sought,
were heirs at law of Angelique, and that those claiming under these
deeds have been -in the continuous and undisturbed possession and
occupancy of the land, I am of the opinion that you should recommend
the President's approval as requested. The papers now presented do
not, however, justify that course. It is probable that the applicants
for approval can supply further evidence upon the point suggested and
I recommend that opportunity therefor be given them.
Approved,
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
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CITIZENSHIP-NATITRALIZATION-APPLICAIIO1N.
ANDREW J. Iz3REZEE ET AL. v. HUTCINSON'S HlERS.
A presni lption1 as to the continuiity of alienage, when once showna, ay l)e overcome,
where no record of naturalization is found, by plresumption of citizenship
growing ot of a long continued exercise of the rights and duties of a citizen;
and the son of an alien, i such case, is entitled to the bellefit of such presunp-
tion of citizenship, where no record of the naturalization of the father duaring
the minority of the son call be produced.
An applicant for the right to make homestead entry of a tract covered by a donation
claim is not entitled, on appeal from the rejection of his application, to raise a
question as to the citizenship of the donation claimant.
Secretarij Bliss to the Cmmissiou,,er of the Geteral LanEd Office, April
(W. V. D.) 23, 189i8. (El. -.)
Andrew J. Brezee ad Thomas M. White severally appeal from the
decision of your office of March 14, 1896, affirming that of the local
office and rejecting the applications of said parties for homestead
entries, covering the donation claim of William Hatehinson, now
deceased, the application of Brezee being for fractional SW. of See.
4, and fractional W. A of See. 9; '2. 7 N., R. 2 WV., W. ., or all the
east halt of (the) William Hutchinson donation claim," and the appli-
* cation of White being for the fractional SE. I of Sec. , and the frac-
tional E. e of Sec. 8, T. 7 N., R. 2 W., "or all the west half of (the)
William -ntchiinson donation claim.' within the limits of the Van-
conver, Washington, and district.
The specific ground of appeal in each case is that "William Hutch-
inlson (now deceased) had not in his lifetime complied with the naturali-
zation laws, as to becoming a citizen, or in declaring his intention to
become a citizen," as the claimant stated in his donation notification
for the tracts involved, that he wasborn i Englanid in the year 1819,
and as there is no record proof of any kind to show that the doIlation
claimant ad made any declaration to become a citizen of the United
States, or had become a citizen thereof. It is further asserted that
final proof has been made by the administrator of the estate of Wil-
liam Hutchinson, deceased, and therein no attempt is made to show
that said decedent was ever a citizen or had declared his intention to
become a citizen, and that it must be presumed, in the absenee of such
proof, that he was not a citizen. The appeals further severally state
that a protest is now pending by. the above applicants against the
issuance of a patent for said donation claim.
The local office rejected said applications on the day each was pe-
sented, on account of their conflict with the donation claim of Hutch-
insol, and your office affirmed such action; but required spplementary
proof as to the citizenship of Ilutchinsoii.
In another ease, that of Christopher Kalahan v. William Hutchiusou,
et uA., deceased, decided by the l)epartment February 25, 1896 (unre-
ported), the decision of your office of January 7, 1895, was affirmed.
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In that case, your office held tat the charge of abandonment i the
affidavit of contest was disproved, and that as to the charge of alienage
of the donation claimant the contestant was not interested, and had no
preference right of entry, nor any legal right to have said donation
claim canceled, even if it should appear that Hatchinson Was not quali-
lied to make said entry, as the question of cancellation is one between
the said donatiun claimants and the government alone. The case of
Platt v. Vachon, 7 L. D,, 408, is cited in support of this ruling. The
Department held on affirmanee that the allegation as to alienage had
not been originally a ground of contest, and the contestant had no right
to complain of that lack of qualification, as he had elected at the hear-
ing to rest his rights upon his affidavit of contest.
As to the matter of citizenship in that case, it appeared that William
Hutchinson, the claimant, was born in England in 1819, and when four
years of age came to the United States, where his father settled at or
near Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and subsequently, in about 1832,
moved with his family to the State of Illinois, where he (the father)
purchased and held real estate and continued to live until his death.
He claimed to be a fll citizen of the United States, and voted at all
elections. is son, the donation claimant, continued to reside with his
father until he arrived at his majority, when he purchased land in
Wabash county, Illinois. He married thereafter, removed to Oregon,
and from thence to Washington, and settled upon the tracts in contro-
versy i 1855, remaining there for ten years, six years in excess of the
time required for residence upon a donation claim, and then removed to
Oregon, where he died i the year 1893. His first wife died, and he
afterward married Amanda Hutchinson, who is now his widow. He
voted at all elections, served as a member of the Territorial legislature
of Washington in 1858, and in 1889 was county commissioner for Union
county, Oregon, and died in the honest belief that he was a citizen of
the United States, understanding that his father had been naturalized
prior to his majority. His children are native citizens, and one of them
is now acting as administrator of his estate. In the case of Hauen-
stein v. Lynham, 100 U. S., 483, it was remarked, in the course of the
opinion, that where a citizen of Switzerland removed from his native
country to the State of Virginia, where he lived and acquired property
in controversy, which he had a right to hold under the terms of the
treaty between the United States and Switzerland, and where there was
no proof that he denationalized himself or ceased to be a citizen and
subject of his native country, that his original citizenship was presumed
to have continued. But .in that case, except as to the acquisition of
property, it does not appear that Hauenstein had exercised any of the
duties of citizenship. In the case of Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S., 135,
180, where the facts in the case are somewhat similar to those of the
case at bar, the court said:
It is true that naturalization under the acts of Congress known as the naturaliza-
tion laws can only be completed before a court, and that the usual proof of natural-
ization is a copy of the record of the court.
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But it is equally true that where nlo record of the utu~tralizatiolu can be produced
evidence that a person; having the requisite qualifications to become a citizen, did
in fact and for a ong time vote and hold office and exercise rights belonging to iti-
zens, is sufficient to warrant a jury in inferring that he had been duly naturalized
as a citizen.
It will therefore be seen that the presumption of continuity of alien-
age, when once shown, is overcone by the presumption of citizenship
by the conduct of the father of the claimaiit in exercising for so many
years the duties of citizenship, in case no record of his naturalization
while the son was a minor can be found.
However, the applicants are in no position to contest the citizenship
of the donation claimant, as at the time of their application there existed
of record the donation notification of William Hutchinson, the decedent.
It is incumbent upon the heirs of the decedent and the administrator
of his estate to show that the claimant was a duly naturalized citizen,
or that his father w as naturalized dring the minority of the son, if
such record can be produced. If it call not be obtained, owing to
lapse of time, the destruction of the records, or the failure to preserve a
record of such naturalization proceedings, or from any sufficent cause,
the facts already established may be deemed sufficient to establish the
presumption of the naturalization of the elder Hutchinson while his
son, the clainant, was a minor. Some showing must be made, however,
that the record of the naturalization of the elder Hlutchinson, the father
of the donation claimant, can not now be produced.
The heirs of the claimant lo not appeal rom the decision of your
office requiring this suppleinentary final proof, and as to them the case
must be considered final, particularly as the decision of your office
calling for such proof is correct.
* The decision of your office rejecting the applications of Brezee and
White is affirmed.
CONMUTATIOW OF OKLAMWONIA HiOMESTEANDS-ACT OF APRIL 11, 1898.
CIRCULAR.
Coulnissioner Hermann to Registers and Receivers, Guthrie and Okla-
hom21a, Oklahoma, April 25, 1898.
Your attention is called to the provisions of the act of Congress,
approved April 11, 1898 (Public No. 60), entitled Au Act extending
the right of commutation to certain homestead settlers on lands in
Oklahoma Territory, opened to settlement under the provisions of the
Act entitled 'An Act to ratify and confirm the agreement with the
Kickapoo Indians in Oklahoma Territory, and to make appropriations
for carrying the same into effect."'
Persons desiring to perfect their entries prior to the expiration of
five years from date of their entries under the provisions of the above
act, will be required to give notice of their intention so to do, the same
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as in five year cases and, also, at time of making proof, file their appli
cations to purchase (form 4-001). Such applications the register will
retain in his office. See Sec. 2355 B. S.
A cash certificate and receipt (forms 4-189 and 4-131 respectively)
will be issued, if the proof is satisfactory and the same will be reported
on the regular monthly abstracts of lands sold. The proofs and final
affidavits in such cases, will be made on the regular homestead blanks
modified as the circumstances require, and in each case an affidavit
(form 4-102 c), changed so as to refer to the above act, must be
furnished.
Approved.
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
(PUBLIC-No. 60.)
AN ACT Extending the right of cominutation to certain homestead gettlers on lands in Oklahoma
Territory, opened to settlementuder the provisions of the Actentitlcd "An Acttoratify andcon-
fim the agreement with the Kiekapoo Indians i Oklahoma Territory, and to make appropriations
for carrying the samie into effect."
Be it enacted b the Senate and House of Bepresentatires of tte United Statee of Averica
in Congress asseibled, That the right of commutation is hereby extended to all bona
fide homestead settlers on the lands in Oklahoma Territory, opened to settlement
under the provisions of the Act of Congress entitled "An Act to ratify and confirm.
an agreement with the Kickapoo Indians in Oklahoma Territory, and to make appro-
priations for carrying the same into effect", approved March third, eighteen hundred
and ninety-three, and the President's proclamation thereon, after fourteen months
from the date of settlement, upon full payment for the lands at the price provided
in said Act.
Approved, April 11, 1898.
ALASKAkN LAJND-SU1VEY--I MPROY1E3MEsNT-OCCUPANCY.
G. P. HANSEN.
On the survey of a tract of Alaskan land with a view to the purehase thereof under
section 12, act of March 3, 1891, articles of personal property should not be
included in the estimated value of improvements on said land.
The occupancy of land solely for domiciliary purposes, by one who is engaged in the
business of fishing, is not an occupation of the land for the purposes of "trade
or manufactures." within the meaning of said act.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D,) 26, 1898. (W. M. B.)
Clinton Qurnee, as attorney for G. P. Hansen, claimant, appeals from
your office decision of May 14, 1895, wherein was suspended-with sug-
gestion of an emendation thereof as therein described-survey No. 62,
;executed June 14, 1894, by Clinton Gurnee, Jr., U. S. deputy surveyor,
and which embraces a tract containing 97.49 acres, situate on Ugashek
river, western shore of the Alaskan Peninsula; used and occupied by
the claimant, according to the report of the deputy surveyor, as a fish-
ing ground or station.
Your letter transmitting the papers in the matter of survey No. 62
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gives the name of appellant as 'H. P. Hansen," while it appears to be
G. P. Hansen in the decision appealed from, as also from the field notes
and plat returned by the deputy who was employed by appellant to
make the survey. It will be presumed that the deputy gave the name
correctly. At any rate, the survey can be considered and disposed of
regardless of appellant's correct name, as his claim can be sufficiently
identified by the number of the survey, the quantity and locality of the
land embraced therein, and the deputy who did the work.
The survey was suspended by your office decision upon the ground
that it was not executed conformably to law and regulation with respect
to square form, and for the further reason that more land was included
in the survey than was occupied by the claimant for his business.
An examination of the field notes and plat returned by the deputy
shows that the survey embraced a parcel of land considerably'longer
than broad. It also appears that the front or shore line of the survey
1could have been shortened and the survey extended further inland and
so executed as to embrace a tract of land more nearly in square form
than the one included in the original or existing survey. That more
land is claimed than is used or occupied by appellant for the purpose
of the business engaged i is shown upon the face of the returns by
the deputy.
If these were the only facts in the case your office would have com-
mitted no error in suspending the survey subject to emendatio as
suggested.
There are facts, however, disclosed by the record submitted which
Would appear to warrant an absolute rejection or suspension of the sur-
vey without the right, on the part of appellant, to an emendation
thereof., The principal among these is the fact that the land included
in the survey does not appear to be used and occupied for the purpose
named in section 12 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1100), under
the provision of which appellant seeks to purchase and enter the land
in question. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 12. That any citizen of the United States twenty-one years of age, and any
association of such citizens, and any corporation incorporated under the laws of the
United States, or of any State or Territory of the United States now authorized by
law to hold lands in the Territories now or hereafter in possession of and occupying
public lands in Alaska for the purpose of trade or manufactures, may purchase not
exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, to be taken as near as practicable in a
square form, of such land at two dollars and fifty cents per acre.
At the date of the passage of the said act of March 3, 1891, a numl-
ber of individuals, associations and corporations were using and occu-
pying certain public lands in Alaska for the purpose of trading with
the natives and for manufacturing purposes. Trading posts and manu-
facturing plants had been established upon said lands by the erection
thereon at large cost-said cost amounting in some instances to
$50,000, $60,000 and $75,000-the necessary buildings and other im-
provements needed for the conduct of mercantile transactions, for the
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salting and canning of salmon and other fish for export trade, and for
the manufacture of fish oil, and other commodities. It was the purpose
of Congress to enable those idividuals, associations, and corporations
who hall, in good faith, improved any of the non-mineral public lands
in Alaska, not reserved, or occupied by the natives of said territory,
and who were using and occupying the sime-or those who might
thereafter be in possession and occupation of said ands -at such time
for the purpose of "trade or manufactures," to acquire title thereto,
and to that end the legislation set forth in section 12 of the said act of
March 3, 1891, was enacted.
WThether the land claimed by the appellant, as embraced in survey
No. 62, is used and occupied in good faith by appellant for the purpose
prescribed by law must be determined by the facts disclosed by the
record.
Before entering upon a consideration of that particular question,
however, it may be well to observe at this place that the deputy states in
his report, attached to his field notes, that this survey was executed in
pursuance of a request of the claimant G. P. Hansen, made while they
were upon the ground. Hence it follows that the said survey was not
made in pursuance of an application to the ex officio surveyor-general, as
is required by paragraph 1 of the rules and regulations of June 3, 1891
(General Land Office Circular, p. 104). A survey executed under such
circumstances is made without the proper authority, and is not, there-
fore, a lawful survey. See case in re Alfred Packennen (26 L. D., 2 2).
In numerous instances, however, where surveys of this class have
been made in the absence of the required application, and in contra-
vention of law and regulations as to "square form," your office has
:suspended said surveys with recommendation, as in the present case,
of an emendation thereof in conformity with the requirements of law,
and such practice of your office has so far been sustained by this
Department where the character and use made of the improvements
located upon the land sought to be purchased bore evidence of the fact
that the land was occupied for the particular purpose required by law.
The application, required to be verified by affidavit, not having been
made for this survey, appellant's relation to the land surveyed at his
verbal request was not shown prior to the execution of the survey; nor
is there with the papers in the case any affidavit made by him subse-
quent to the survey which establishes his relation thereto, or which
shows the "character, extent, and ap proximate value of the iprove-
ments" thereon.
Recurring to the subject respecting the purpose for which appellant
occupies the land, and with regard to the improvements thereon, it
may be stated that no evidence is found in relation thereto, save that
furnished by the deputy's returns. In his report which constitutes a
part of his said returns the deputy says:
He (Hansen) has improvements which I estimate did not cost less than $1500.00,
being a frane lodging and store house filled up with bunks, stove and utensils,
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piling for handling fish, boats, nets, etc.; he is engaged in catching salnon for the
Bartlett Bay Packing Co., ad employs a number.of employees.
In his final oath, attached to his field otes, the deputy states that
the claimant's improvements " consist of a house twelve by fourteen
feet, nets, boats, etc." Te plat of the survey shows the- only improve-
ment upon the land to be the small fishermen's cabin twelve by foui teen
feet in dimensions.
As will be seen, the deputy states that he estimates the value of
appellant's improvements to be not less than $1500.00. Boats, nlets,
piling, and other personal property, however, which the deputy regards
as part of the improvemnents upon the land, and the value of which
enter ito his total estimate, can in nowise be considered as improve-
ments upon the land included in the survey. The only improvement
thereon, which can be regarded as such, consists of the referred to
cabin, and structures of the imensions of the said cabin have been
erected at different points on the Alaskan coast, as shown by the
returns of other surveys, at a cost of from one hundred to two hundred
and fifty dollars.
All the material facts disclosed by the record have been. fully set out
herein and it does not appear therefrom, as seen, that a trading post or
manufacturing plant has been established upol the land sought to be
purchased and entered by appellant, or that there is upon the land any
salting or canning establishment whereat salmon or other fish are pre-
pared for domestic or export trade. It may be stated, in short, that no
business of any kind is carried on upon the land.
The only business engaged in by appellant, according to the report
of the deputy, consists in catching fish in waters in that vicinity for
the Bartlett Bay Packing Company, while it appears that he uses and
occupies the land in question for domiciliary purposes, alnd the storage,
perhaps, of articles of personal property, in the way of nets and seines,
in the small cabin used as a lodging place.
Engaging in the business of fishing for a livelihood or profit by one
-who seeks to purchase and enter land under the provision of section
12 of the act of March 3, 1891, where such land is used and occupied,
as in the present case, only for the purpose of a domicile, will not be
deemed an occupation of the land for the purpose of "trade or mann-
factures" within the meaning of said act.
In view of the facts and reasons herein contained survey No. 62 is
rejected absolutely, and the decision of your office-wherein the same
was suspended subject to emendation-is accordingly nodified.
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TELEGRAPH LINE-RAILROAD RIG-iT OF WAy.
POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO.
All railroads in operation are by statutory provision "post roads,"' and as such their
right of way is subject to the use of any telegraph company which accepts the
provisions of the act of July 24, 1866, and desires to use such right of way for
its line in such manler as will not interfere with the operation of the road.
Assistant Attorney- General Van Deranter to the Secretary of the Interior,
April 27, 1898. (G. B. G.)
By your reference of April 16, 1898, I am asked for an opinion as to
the right of the Postal Telegraph-Cable Company of Texas to erect a
telegraph line along the right of way of the Missouri, Kansas and
Texas Railway Company, through the Indian Territory.
Sections 5263 and 5268 of the Revised Statutes are as follows:
SEC. 5263. Any telegraph company now organized, or which may hereafter be
organized, under the laws of any State, shall have the right to construct, maintain,
and operate lines of telegraph through and over any portion of the public domain
of the United States, over and along any of the military or post roads of the United
States which have been or may hereafter be declared such by law, and over, under,
or across the navigable streams or waters of the United States; hut such lines of
-telegraph shall be so constructed and maintained as not to obstruct the navigation
of such streams and waters, or interfere with the ordinary travel on such military or
post roads.
SEC. 5268. Before any telegraph company shall exercise any of the powers or priv-
ileges conferred by law such company shall file their written acceptance with the
Postmaster-General of the restrictions and obligations required by law.
I note, i the first place, that questions of administration, arising
under procedure looking to the appropriation of the privileges conferred
by section 5263, are by section 5268 brought within the jurisdiction of
the Postmaster-General. There is therefore no question submitted as
to the legality or regularity of the steps taken by said Postal Telegraph-
Cable Company toward the establishment of said line.
The question here is as to the application of section 5263 to lands
within the geographical limits of the Indian Territory, and more spe-
cifically to the lands covered by the right of way of said railroad com-
pany across said Territory.
Whether lands in the Indian Territory are part of the public domain
of the United States within this section need not be discussed.
By section 3964 of the Revised Statutes " all railroads or parts of rail-
roads which\are now or hereafter may be put in operation" are estab-
lished post-roads; and the right to maintain and operate lines of
telegraph, "over and along any of the military or post roads of the
United States," does not depend upon whether or not such road is upon
the public domain.
The grant is not limited to such military and post-roads as are upon
the public domain, but "evidently extends to the public domain, the
military and post roads and the navigable waters of the United States.
These are all within the domain of the national government, to the
extent of the national powers, and are, therefore, subject to legitimate
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congressional regulation." Pensacola Telegraph Company v. Western
Union Telegraph Company (96 U. S., 1-11).
It can make no difference therefore whether the right of way of the
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company across the Indian Ter-
ritory is upon the public domain, nor is it material by what tenure it is
held. If that road is in operation, it is a post-road, and as such its
right of way is subject to the use of any telegraph company, duly
incorporated, which accepts the provisions of the act of July 24, 1866,
14 Stat., 221 (Revised Statutes, sections 5263 to 5268, inclusive), and
desires to use such right of way for its line in such manner as will not
interfere with the operation of the road. See United States v. Union
Pacific Railroad (160 U. S., 1-49).
I am therefore of opinion, if the telegraph company in question is
entitled to the benefits of said act, it will have the right to make the
necessary agreements with the railroad company for the construction
of a telegraph line upon the right of way.
I express no opinion as to questions of condemnation and compen-
sation, i the event such agreement can not be made. The. federal
law is paramount as to the location and right of way of telegraph
lines, but the statute makes no provision for condemnation. In the
case of Postal Telegraph Cable Company v. Morgau's, La,, Co. (21 So.
Rep. 183), it was held that State process might be resorted to for that
purpose. See Gould and Tucker's notes on the Revised Statutes,
Vol. 2, page 624.
This is essentially a question for the courts, and calls for no admin-
istrative action.
Approved,
C. N. BLISS,
Secretary.
MIIN;G CLAIM-SI OWN LODE WITHIN PLACER-PROTEST.
ELDA MINING AND MILLING Co. . MAYFLOWER GOLD MINING CO.
The protest of a lode claimant against a placer entry on the ground that said entry
embraces lodes or veins known to exist at the date of the placer application,
presents no question for departmental determination, where it appears that the
protestant did not adverse said application, and that said application did not
include any lodes or veins, for, under the terms of the statute, all lodes or veins
kn~ow to exist at ate of placer application, and not applied for at that time by
t acer applicant, are excepted from the placer patent, and such exception is
expressly recognized in the language of the patent; nor does a protest in such
a ease call for a determination as to the extent of the snrface area that will be
so excepted from said patent.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(V. V. D.) 27, 1898.
Due consideration has been given to the appeal of the Elda Mining
and Milling Company from your office decision of July 28, 1897, dis-
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missing that company's protest against the inssuance of patent to the
Mayflower Gold' Mining Company for Beaver Springs placers Nos. 1
and 2, Cripple Creek mining district, Colorado.
Application for patent for both placers was made July 13, 1895, and
mineral entry thereof' (No. 697, Pueblo, Colorado,) allowed October 12,
1895. April 26, 1896, the Elda Company filed a protest against the
issuance of patent upon the placer entry as allowed, alleging, substan-
tially, that said company is the owner of the Jacob, Jr., Lizzie and
Luck Sure lode mining claims, which conflict with said placer claims,
and that at the time of the application for the placer patent each of
said lode claims was dly located and recorded, and embraced a
known lode or vein. The protestant asks that the placer entry be
canceled to the extent of the conflict with these lode claims.
May 11, 1896, your office ordered a hearing, which resulted in a deci-
sion by the local officers recommending the dismissal of the protest,
which, on appeal, was affirmed by your office July 28, 1897.
The placer claimant (lid not mention or claim either of said lodes or
veins in its application for the placer patent, and the lode claimant did
not adverse that application nor is it now making application for patent
to the lode claims.
Lodes or veins known to exist within a placer claim at the date of the
application for the placer patent, and which are not applied for at that
time by the placer applicant, are by operation of law excepted from the
placer patent, and a clause fully recognizing this exception is inserted
in all placer patents without previous inquiry by the land department
into the existence of any such lode or vein.
Whether this exception extends to the entire surface area of the pro-
testant's said lode claims (see Pike's Peak Lode, 10 L. D., 200, 203), or
whether by reason of protestant's failuie to adverse the application for
the placer patent the exception embraces only the known lodes or veins
and twenty-five feet on each side thereof (see Shonbar Lode, 1 L. D.,
551; Id., 3 L. D., 388; Becker v. Sears, on review, 1 L. D., 577), or only
the known lodes or veins and so much of the adjoining surface area is
is necessary to the occupation, use, operation and enjoyment of the lode
claims by their owner (see Aurora Lode v. Bulger Hill and Nugget Gulch
Placer, 23 L. D., 95-105), need not now be considered or determined
because, if in fact such lodes or veins were known to exist at the time
of the application for placer patent, the exception, whatever its extent,
is embraced and included in the reservation which forms an essential
part of the terms of a placer patent, both by operation of the statute
making the exception and by the recognition of the exception in the
express language of the patent.
The rights of the protestant as a lode claimant whatever they may
be, will not be affected by the issuance of a patent pon the placer
entry as allowed, but will be preserved and protected as fully as if now
determined and specifically excepted from the operation of that patent,
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and the subsequent issuance of lode patents to the protestant covering
its rights to the known lodes or veins, if there were such at the date of
the placer application, will not be prevented or hindered by the placer
patent. (South Star Lode, on review, 20 L. D., 204).
It is therefore unnecessary at this time to pass upon the matters
alleged by protestant, and for the reasons herein given the dismissal of
its protest by your office is affirmed.
WEISNER V. CLEV.
Motion for review of departmental decision of March 3, 1898, 26 L.
D., 301, denied by Secretary Bliss, April 27, 1898.
SURVEY OF MINING CLAIM-COMTPENSATION OF SURVEYOR.
RICHARD G. ANDBRSON.
In case of an order made for an anended survey of a mining claim there is no author-
ity for requiring the deputy ujineral surveyor to execute such survey without
further compensation.
Secretary Bliss to the Commnissionzer of the General Land Ofce, April
(W. V. D.) 27, 1898. (G. B. G.)
Richard G. Anderson, a deputy United States mineral surveyor, has
appealed from your office decision of February 18, 1898, whereby he is
required to make an amended survey, "without expense to the claimn-
ant," of the Rattler Lode claim No. 220, Huron, South Dakota, to
describe its conflict with the excluded Chief of the Hills No. 2 lode
claim, lot No. 221.
Counsel for James Milliken, claimant for said Rattler Lode Claim,
has filed a paper with the case suggesting that if this appeal by the
deputy mineral -surveyor is proper practice, parties interested in the
final adjustment of title to the property should not be subjected to
the delays incident to the regular course of appeals from decisions of
your office, and asks that the matter be disposed of at once.
This presents a proper case for immediate action, and the case will
be considered as special.
The action of your office in ordering a resurvey of public lands is a
matter of administration, with which the Department will not ordina-
rily interfere. There does not appear to have been any abuse of dis-
cretion in this regard in the present case. It is said in the decision
appealed from that the corners, of said Rattler Lode Claim have not
by previous surveys been correctly ascertained, and that until this is
done, the conflicts of the Rattler Lode with lot No. 221 can not be
properly described. No sufficient reason is urged to cast-doubt upon
the correctness of this statement.
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It is submitted, however, that if there are iaccuracies and lack of
definiteness in the survey made by Anderson, such defects are not due
to any fault of his, but to a previous erroneous survey made by another
surveyor; that his instructions were carried ot in a proper manner,
and that he ought not to be required to make another survey without
compensation.
The facts shown by the record are too meager to authorize a finding
upon this contention.
It is believed, however, that the order of your office, i so far as it
directs a resurvey to be made without cost to the mineral claimants,
is without authority of law.
Section 2334 of the Revised Statutes provides that:
The expenses of the survey of vein or lode claims shall be paid by the
applicants, and they shall be at liberty to obtain the same at the most reasonable
rates, and they shall also be at liberty to employ any Uinited States surveyor to
make the survey.
TUnder this statute the mineral claimant may employ any deputy
mineral surveyor to do his field work. He may also contract on the
basis of such compensation as may be agreed upon between the con-
tracting parties, subject only, to the limitation of a maximum charge
which is fixed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. It
therefore is a private contract between the parties. If the claimants
have been injured by the incompetent or inaccurate work of Anderson.
they are not without remedy on the contract. Inasmuch as he is an
officer of the United States, proper administrative action on the part
of your office would seem to be a due consideration of any charge of
official misconduct which. may be made against him in connection with
this matter, and after giving him a full and fair opportunity to be
heard thereon to make such recommendation to the Department as the
circumstances of the case appear to warrant.
Your office decision is modified, in so far as it requires Anderson
to make the survey in question without compensation, and the case
remanded for proceedings consistent with the views hereinbefore
expressed.
PRIVATE CLAI-RELINQUI5HMENT-ADJSTMENT OF BOU:NDARIES.
JOiN HOUSTON . CLINCH.
In the adjustment of the interests of the government in a confirmed private claim,
where aportion of said claim has been relinquished and other land taken in lieu
thereof, the boundary lines of said grant, as judicially approved in the final
decree of confirmation, should be recognized as determining the true extent of
the grant, as between the grantee and the government.
The decision of July 13, 1896, 23 L. D., 130, modified.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land ffice, AIprit
(W. V. D.) 27, 1S98. (E. F. B.)
This is a petition, filed by John Houston M. Clinch, asking for a recon-
sideration and modification of the decision of the Department of July
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13, 1896 (23 L. D., 130), which was re-affirmed on motion for review,
July 12, 1897.
The decision complained of was rendered upon the appeal of said
John Houston M. Clinch from the ecision of your office of February
3, 1887, refusing to issue to im, as executor and heir of Duncan M.
Clincht, assignee of George J. F. Clarke, a patent for a traet of land
known s the mill grant of George J. F. Clarke, Gainesville land dis-
trict, Florida, upon the ground of excess of area in the survey.
This grant was located and surveyed by Burgevin, the Spanish sr-
veyor-general, in three parts-one of eight thousand acres on the west
shore of the St. John's iver, at the place nained in the grant; one of
five thousand acres at a l)lace called Lang's HI-amlock; and one of three
thousand acres at a place called Cone's Hammnock.
The superior court for the eastern district of Florida, under the act
of May 23, 1828 (4 Stat., 284), confirned the grant according to the
three separate surveys of Burgevin, but upon appeal the spreme court
of the United States, while affirming so mnuch of the decreee as adjudged
the claim of the petitioner to be valid, and so fr as it confirmed the
same to the extent and agreeable to the boundaries of the survey of
fburgevin of the eight thousand acres, reversed it so far as it confirlued
to the petitioner the lands embraced in the two other surveys, and
directed the court below to cause the remaining eight ttousand acres
to be surveyed on vacant lands within the limits of the giant, and that
the title to the land so surveyed be contirined.
In conformity with this mandate, the superior court for the eastern
district of Florida ordered that said eight thousand acres be surveye(l
by John Lee Williams on any land then vacant within the limits of the
grant.
A survey was made in accordance with said order, a(1 the plat of
survey was returned to the July term, 1835, of said court, which was
examined and aprovedjand thereupon the court, November 2, 1835,
decreed:
That te said tract of eight thousand acres is hereby con firmed to the said George
J. F. Clarke, as part and parcel of the sixteeen thousand acres originally granted to
him at that place.
The superior court of East Florida had ample and complete jurisdic-
tion to ascertain and determine the validity, the locus and the extent
of the grant, aid having by its decree confirmed the same according
to the survey of Willianis made under its order, which upon examina-
tion was found to be correct and was approved, its action decreeing
confirination of the grant according to the boundaries of such survey
was a final determination that the lands embraced within such limits
were never public lands of the United States, and there is no authority
to fix the limits of said grant by any other survey. Hence, the Depart-
tneut in said decision of July 13,1896, held that it was the duty of
the Jepartmnent in 1835 to issue a patent for all the land included
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within the boundaries of the Williams survey, "and such is yet the
duty of this Department, unless that duty has been modified by subse-
quent events.
After the decision of the supreme court in said case, Duncan L. Clinch
and John H. Mcintosh purchased the interest of Clarkie in the mill
grant, and thereafter an act was passed by Congress, which was
approved July 2, 1836 (6 Stat., 676), authorizing the sid Duncan L.
Clinch and John H. McIntosh, assignees of George J. F. Clarke, to
purchase at the minimum price for which public lands are sold the
three thousand acres in Cone's or Moody Hammock as surveyed by
Burgevin, upon which they had made their settlements, in lieu of the
same quantity of land confirmed to them by the decree of the supreme
court.
The terms of the act having been complied with, Duncan L. Clinch,
who had acquired all the right, title and interest of McIntosh, was
allowed to purchase said tract of and, amounting to 3,0108.34 acres,
and received patent for the same, dated March 10, 1845, but the land
relinquished to the United States in the mill grant was not at that time
nor has it since been segregated and set apart. It was therefore held
that the relinquishment by Clinch of three thousand and eight and
thirty-four one-hundredths acres in the mill grant diminished the grant
to that extent, and your office was directed to cause to be surveyed and
cut off from said mill grant 3,008.34 acres, exclusive of the one thou-
sand acre tract (another grant which had been included within the
limits of the Williams survey), by locating and marking a line which
appears upon the official maps as the southern boundary of said mill
grant, and to cause the public surveys to be adjusted and closed upon
the new line so located and marked.
In view of the fact that the government neglected to have said relin-
quished land segregated and set apart at the time the patent to Dun-
can L. Clinch was issued for the 3,008.34 acre tract, and closed the
government surveys upon said grant without cutting it off, after hold-
ing the relinquishment for more than twelve years, the petitioner asks
that the order of the Department may be so modified as not to include
within the area to be segregated lands which he has sold and conveyed
by warranty deeds.
If the relinquishment executed by Clinch did not designate a par-
ticular tract of land that could be identified, but merely relinquished
his right, title, claim and interest in a quantity of land in the mill
graut equal to the land purchased from the United States, such relin-
quishment would convey to the United States no title to any particular
part of the mill grant, but it would only invest; it with an equitable
interest in the entire grant, to the extent of the land purchased by
Clinch, under the act of July 2, 1836.
Under authority of an act of Congress, approved June 28, 1848 (9
Stat., 242), directing the surveys of private claims or grants in Florida
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which had been duly confirmed, David El. Burr was appointed by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office a deputy surveyor, and
assigned to the survey of this grant. It was not contemplated that
another survey should be made of this grant, except so far as to retrace
the lines of the survey according to which it was confirmed, and for
the purpose solely of closing the lines of the public surveys upon the
grant. The Williams survey was a finality, and the government had
no authority either to diminish or enlarge the grant by making a dif-
ferent survey.
Prior to the commencement of the surveys made under the authority
of said act, notices were issued requesting all persons holding claims
to any of said grants, or who may have knowledge of the lines and
corners of their respective claims, to produce such title paper and evi-
dence of locality as may be in their power to produce.
Acting under such notice, Williams, who made the survey of this
grant under the order of the court, and who had since become the rep-
resentative of Duncan L. Clinch, conferred with Burr, and pointed out
the corners of his (Williams') survey. Burr objected to the line as-run
by Williams, and began a new line several degrees farther north,
against the protest of Williams. The survey of Burr was, however,
approved, and all the land lying south of and adjacent t the south
line of the Burr survey has been disposed of as public land.
It seems to be unquestioned that Burr in making the survey of 1849,
closing the lines of the public surveys upon this grant, did not retrace
the lines of the Williams survey, and he had no authority to make any
other survey.
In the decision of your office of February 3, 1887, it is said:
The southerly line of this survey of 1849 runs from a place designated as "Narrow
Bay" on a course north-720 west, 521 chains to Buckley Creek, or 36 chains shorter
than Williams' south line.
Commencing at the Narrow Bay, designated on the survey of 1849, and using the
courses and distances given by said Williams' survey, I find that the north line S.
680 E. 510 chains, will not reach the St. Johns river by about 45 chains; and only
barely touches the northeast corner of said 1000 acre tract; but if this north line is
carried far enough south so as to cut the 1000 acre tract, as shown upon said Will-
iams plat, and the other lines of Williams followed, the north line will be some
distance south of Picolata; and the Narrow Bay found by Williams will lie much
further south than the Narrow Bay shown by said survey of 1849.
The field notes of the United States survey of the 1,000 acre tract show that Will-
iams pointed out to the surveyor the northeast corner of the 1,000 acres as found by
him; and the surveyor adopted this corner as his beginning corner, thus showing
that he retraced the lines made by Williams of this tract; and if he had found Nar-
row Bay at the point where Williams located it, his survey would have included a
much larger area than the present United States survey contains.
This fact was evidently known by the then owner of the mill grant at
the time of the survey, when he, through Williams who represented
him, objected to the line as located by Burr. But he acquiesced in it,
and can not now be heard to deny the validity of the Burr survey, or
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that it was a correct retracing of the Williams line, so far as it affects
the right of the purchasers, or their transferees, of the lands disposed
of by the government, south of said line, as public lands.
But while the petitioner would be estopped from denying that the
survey of Bnrr in 1849 was a correct retracing of the Williams' line, so
far as it might affect the right of purchasers from the government of
lands lying south of said line, he would not he estopped from asserting
his right to have the southern line of the Williams survey re established
as the southern boundary of the grant, for the purpose of adjusting the
right and interest of the government growing out of the relinquisbment
of Duncan L. Clinch to a interest in all the lauds within the limits of
the mill grant as surveyed by Williams, to the extent of 3,008,34 atres.
The embarrassing situation in which this petitioner is no0w lAced is
due in a great measure to the failure of the government to adjust its
i nterest ill the grant when the public surveys were closed upon it. He
came into possession of this property after said survey, having pur-
chased more than one half of it in 1880, over thirty years tereafter.
Upon further consideration of this application, the Department is
satisfied that the decision of July 13, 1896, should be so far modified as
to direct a different node for the adjustment of the right and interest
of the government in said grant by excluding all lands that may have
been sold and which are within the iinits'of the original survey by
Williams. To this ead, a resurvey of the grant should be made, so far
as may be necessary to locate the southern line as run by Williams,
for the purpose of ascertaining what lands, if any, lying north of the
southern line as surveyed by Williams, have already been disposed of
by the United States as public lands, and after deducting such amount
from the 3,0OS.34 acres, being the: interest of the United States, the
residue of said 3,008.34 acres will be cut off from -said grant, taking in
such limits as will include the full balance due, excluding therefrom all
land which may have been sold and conveyed by said John iVI. Houston
Clinch.
MINING CLAIl-PIROTEST-LOCATION-EXPENDITURES.
AMERICAN CONSOLIDATED MINING AND MILLING Co. v. DE WITT.
A protestant, who fails to adverse an application for a lode patent, will not there-
after be heard on a charge that the claimed discovery of the lode applicant is
in fact on land appropriated by the prior location of the protestant, or that the
labor and improvements shown by said applicant should be credited to the
protestant.
Secretary Bliss to the Comzmissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (P. J. C.)
November 7, 1894, F. G. De Witt made application for patent for the
Maryland lode mining claim, survey No 8875, Pueblo, Colorado, land
district, and notice of the application was dily given by posting and
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publication, but no adverse claim was filed during the period of publica -
tion. Mineral entry of the claim has not yet been allowed.,
March 27, 1895, the American Consolidated Mining and Milling Coln-
pany filed a protest alleging. that the Maryland is not a valid mining
location, in tat the discovery therein was o the Orbit lode claim, a
prior anid subsisting location, and not upon. unappropriated public
land; that the Orbit vein is the only one discovered within the limits
of the Maryland; that a large part of the improvements and labor upon
the N1 aryland clain were laced there by lessees of the protestant under
a lease of the Orbit, and were not placed there by the applicant for
the Maryland patent nor by his grantors; and that a large part of the
Maryland is within the Orbit, which is the property of the protestaht
under a prior location.
A hearing was had before the local officers, and they found the evi-
dence not sufficient to warrant the rejection of the Maryland applica-
tion. On appeal your office affirmed that decision, whereupon the
protestant prosecutes this appeal, alleging, first, that five hundred dol-
lars' worth of labor has not been expended, or improvements made,.
upon the Maryland by the applicant for patent thereto or by his grant.
ors; and, second, that the Orbit was a valid and subsisting mining
claim at the time of the location of the Maryland, and therefore the
area in conflict was appropriated and was not subjectto further location.
Whether the grouind which includes the Maryland discovery is a part
of the Maryland, or a part of the Orbit, and whether the Maryland is
the superior claim to the ground in conflict, are questions which were
open to determination by adverse proceedings in the local court and
which are now determined adversely to protestant's contention, by rea-
son of its failure to adverse the Maryland application (Section 2325,
R. 8.).- 
It appears that the Maryland claim and the Orbit claim were both
leased and bonded to John P. Young, by their respective claimants, in
April, 1894, the lease of the forner antedating the. lease of the latter
by twelve days. These claims overlap, and the discovery shaft of the
Maryland is i the ground in conflict. I his lease of the Maryland,
Young agreed to "enter upon said mine and work and develop the same
in good and workmanlike manner," and "to commence work thereon
within fifteen days froma the date hereof and to prosecute work dili-
gently and continually during the term of this lease," and his lease of
the Orbit provided that he should work at least twenty shifts of two
men each i the developinent and iprovement of said property for
each and every month during the term of this lease." The develop-
ment work under these leases was done by Young, as lessee, in the
Maryland shaft. This labor and improvement are credited to the Mary-
land by the surveyor-general's certificate and by your office decision,
but the protestant insists that this was error. It being settled under
the statute that the Maryland claim to the area in conflict is the bette
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one, it follows that such expenditure in labor and improvements was
made upon the Maryland by the lessee thereof, under a lease providing
therefor, and that the owners of the Maryland and not the owners of
the Orbit, are entitled to the credit thereof. Young, knowing of the
conflicting claims to the land, took leases from both claimants to fully
protect himself in the premises, but this will not deprive the Maryland
claimants of the benefits of the labor and improvements which they had
a right to exact under the terms of their lease.
Your office judgment is therefore affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-MItNXESOTA ACT OF IARCH 1, 1877.
ELLINGS(N V. ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND MANITOBA RY. 0.
(On Review.)
The act of iareh 1, 1877,. of the State legislature of Iinnesota, providing that the
railroad company taking the benefits thereof should not acquire any title or
right to any land to which "legal and full title" had not theretofore been per-
fected, and to which there was an existing settlement claim, contemplated in the
use of the words "legal and full title," a perfect or complete title which could
not be suecessfu]ly assailed; hence a conveyance of lands by the State to the
eompany in excess of the amount to which the company was then entitled, and
prior to the passage of said act, is no bar to the State's reconveyance to the
United States of a tract embraced therein for the benefit of a settler as provided
by said act.
Secretary Bliss to the Coomnissioner of the General Land Qfce, April
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (F. W. C.)
Consideration has been given to the motion forwarded with your office
letter of November 12, 1895, filed on behalf of the St Paul, Minneap-
olis and Manitoba Railway Company, for review of departmental deci-
sion of September 28, 1895 (21 L. D., 254), in the case of Ole Ellingson
v. St. Paul, Minneapolis and ManitobaRailway Company, involving the
NW of Sec. 15, T.132 N., R. 39 W., St C]oud land district, Minnesota.
This tract is within the indemnity limits of the grant for the St Vin-
cent Extension of the St Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway
Company, under the act of March, 1871, (16 Stat., 588).
The line of the company's road was definitely located opposite this
land December 19, 1871, but that section of road was not constructed
until after the act of Minnesota of March 1, 1877, infra and was not
certified as constructed until 1880.
The tract in question was selected by the company November 25,
1873, and was certified to the State April 30, 1874, and was patented
by the United States to the State January 14, 1875.
During the year 1880 the governor of Minnesota relinquished the
tract to the United States for the benefit of Ellingson, assuming the
right to do so nder the provisions of the act of the legislature of Min-
nesota of March 1, 1877 (Special Laws of Minnesota 1877, page 257).
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Said, act provides:
Sro. 10. The Saint Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, or any company or corpora-
tion taking the benefits of this act, sball not in any manner, directly or indirectly,
acquire or become seized of any right, title, interest, claim, or demand in or to any
piece or parcel of land lyiig and being within the granted or indemnity limits of
said branch lines of road, to which legal and full title has not been perfected in sail
Saint Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, or their successors or assigns, upon which
any person or persons have in good faith settled and made or acquired valuable
improvements thereon, on or before the passage of this act, or pon any of said
lands upon which has been filed any valid preemption or homestead filing or entry-
not to exceed one hundred and sixty acres to any one actoal settler; and the gov-
ernor of this State shall deed and relinquish to the United States all pieces or par-
cels of said lands so settled pon by any and all actual settlers as aforesaid, to the
end that all such actual settlers may acquire title to the lands upon which they actn-
ally reside, from the United States, as homesteads or otherwise, and upon the accept-
ance of the provisions of this act by said company, it shall be deemed by the governor
of this State as a relinquishment by said company of all such lands so occupied by
such actual settlers; and in deeding to the United States such lands, the governor
shall receive as prima facie evidence, of actual settlement on said lands, the testi-
mony and evidence or copies thereof, heretofore or which may be hereafter taken in
cases before the local United States land offices, and decided in favor of such settlers.
In the decision under review it was held -that the act of 1877 took
cognizance of the company's default in the construction of its road,
and exteuded the time for such construction upon condition that exist-
ing settlenent claims to lands within the grant and to which the com-
pany had not perfected "legal and full title" should be protected and
saved; that to the extent of the land covered by such settlement
claims the act operated as a pro tanto forfeiture in favor of the settlers,
and that in this case the title was conveyed to the company in advance
of construction and had not been earned at the date of the act of 1877,
and hence was not a "legal and full title" and did not prevent the set-
tler claiming the benefits of that act under the governor's relinquish-
ment for his benefit.
In the motion for review it is urged that the tract in question is not
within the scope of the act of 1877, for the reason that the act only
saves and secures settlement claims to lands "to which legal and full
title has not been perfected" in the company, and that before the date
of that act the company had secured such title to this tract.
It is set up that on February 22, 1877, just prior to the passage of
the act before referred to, the governor of the State of Minnesota
conveyed the land in question to the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad
Company, and it is urged that by reason thereof and of the patent
previously issued by the United States to the State, legal and full
title was perfected in the company prior to the passage of said act.
In support thereof the decisions of this Department i the cases
of St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Co. v. Fogelberg
(9 L. D., 509), and Rowe v. same company ( 2 L. D., 354), are referred to.
In the Rowe case the land was in the granted limits and was opposite
road constructed in 1873, so that the facts inl that case are not similar
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to those presented herein. In the Fogelberg case, however, the land
was in the indemnity limits and whether opposite constructed or uncon-
structed road at the date of the act of 1877 is not stated in the decision.
In considering the contention of the company there made, which was
similar to that made in the motion for review under consideration, it
was held:
If this deed weas duly and regularly executed under proper authority it operated
to pass to the grantee therein legal and full title to the land described therein, and
such land was not affected by the act of the State legislature of March 1, 1877, being
expressly excepted from the operation thereof by the phrase limiting said act to
those tracts" to which legal and fll title has not been perfected in said St. Paul and
Pacific R. R. Co. or their successors or assigns."
The case was then returned to your office with direction that the
settler be allowed an opportunity to show whether the deed from the
State to the company was "duly and regularly executed nder proper
authority," so as to prevent the exercise of all further jurisdiction by
the land department.
In the case at bar the company does not contend that the act of
1877 is not binding poi it, and in the case of said company against -
Greenalgli (139 U. S., 19), in construing said act it was held:
The road of the plaintiff under consideration here was not completed till Novem-
ber, 1878, and consequently the rights granted to the company were subject to for-
feiture, or at least the company was subject to hostile proceedings, for breach of
this condition attached by law to the grant. A mere breach of condition does not
of itself work a forfeiture of a grant; sonte other proceeding must be taken by the
grantor to indicate his dissatisfaction with the breach and his intention to exercise
his rights to revoke the grant and take possession of the property in consequence
thereof. While in this case no specific action was taken by Congress to work a for-
feiture of the grant, or by the State, yet the continued possession and use of the
property by the company were, in fact, subject to the condition that the rights of
settlers upon the lands at the time should ndot be interfered with, where such settle-
ments had been made in good faith, as was the case in the present instance. And it
would be in the highest degree inequitable to allow the company to have all the
benefits of the extension of time to complete its road, so as to avoid any forfeiture
of its privileges and franchises, witlout at the samne time holding it to the condi-
tions affecting the rights of settlers upon the lands of the company, in consideration
of which the extension was nade.
The act of 1877, asLereinbefore qoted, provided that the company
taking the benefits " of that act, should not directly or indirectly,
acquire any right, title, interest, claim or demand to any land to which
"legal and full title" had not been theretofore perfected i the comn-
pany, and to which there was an existing settlement claim. The words
"legal and full title" were evidently employed as meaning a complete,
or perfect title the right to which could not be successfully assailed.
A naked legal title obtained and held without right would not be
regarded as a 4 full title" or as beyond successful assault.
The construction of the road in stated sections was a condition prece-
dent to the transfer to the coupany of the title to the granted lands
lying opposite thereto and was the consideration for the passing of title.
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When, terefore, ti'e company obtained the State's deed in advance of
construction it did so without right and i violation of law. A deed
thus obtained certainly does not convey a fll title, and under the rul-
ings i Sehulenbergv. flarrinian, 21 Wall., 44-59; Farnsworth v. Minn.
& Pac. R. It. Co., 92 U. S., 49-65; and New Orleans Pac. Ily. Co. v,
United States, 24 U. S., 124, it is doubtful whether it conveyed any
title at all. The deed to the company was at least subject to success-
ful attack by either the State or the United States. Doubtless, per-
forimance of the condition, a delivery of the consideration before
forfeiture was declared on account of the default in construt tion, would
have perfected the title and rendered it full and unassailable, but here
the defaultwas taken advantage of by the act of 1877 to the extent of
the lands covered by existing settlemeiit claims, before the title to this
tract was perfected and by that act subsequent erfection of the title
was prohibited as against the settler.
It is contended by the company that indemnity lands are in this
respect upon a footing different from granted lands.
By the act of March 3, 1871, supra the St. P'aul and Pacific Railroad
Company was authorized to change the location of its branch line, and
on account of the'altered line it was to have "the same proportional
grant of lands to be taken in the same manner, along said altered lines,
as is provided for the present liies of existing]law."
The existing law here referred to is fouad in the acts of March 3,
1857 (11 Stat. 195);- March 3, 1865 (13 Stat. 526); and July 1, 1866
(14 Stat. 97).
By the act of A1857 a grant was made to the Territory of Minnesota
of six sections in width on each side of the roads therein provided for,
the lands to be disposed of in the following manner:
That a quantity of land not exceeding one hundred and twenty sections for each
of said roads and branches, and included within a continuons length of twonty
miles of each of said roads and branches, may be sold; and when the governor of
said Territory or future State shall certify to the Secretary of the Interior that any
twenty ontinuons miles of any of said roads or branches is completed as aforesaid,
and included vitbi.a continuous length of twenty miles of each of said road s or
branches, may be sold; and so from time to time until said roads and branches are
conipleted.
It will be noted that the coterminons principle is: here applied, the
sections of road-being of twenty miles each .
By the act of' 1865 the grant of 1S57 was increased from six sections
per mnile to ten seetiols per mile and the following mode of disposing
of the land was provided for:
When the governor of said State shall certify to the Secretary of the Interior that
any section of ten consecutive miles of said road is completed in a good, substantial,
and workmanlilie manner, as a first-class railroad, and the said secretary shall be
satisfied that said State has complied i good faith witl this requirement, the said
secretary of the Interior shall issue to the said State patents for all the lands granted
and selected as airesaid, not exceeding ten sections per mile, situated opposite to
and within a limit of twenty miles of the line of said section of road thus completed,
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extending along the whole length of said completed section of ten miles of road,
and no further. And when the governor of said State shall certify to the Secretary
of the Interior, and the Secretary shall be satisfied that another section of said road,
ten consecutive miles in extent, connecting with the preceding section or with some
other first class railroad, which may be at the time in successful operation, is com-
pleted as aforesaid, the said Secretary of the Interior shall issue to the said State
patents for all the lands granted and situated opposite to and within the limit of
twenty miles of the length of said section, and no further, not exceeding ten sec-
tions of land per mile for all that part of said road thus completedl under the provi-
sions of this act and the act to which this is an amendment, and so, from time to
time, until said roads and branches are completed.
By the act of July 13, 1866, suprda, it was provided:
That all the lands heretofore granted to the Territory and State of Minnesota to
aid in the construction of rail-roads, shall be certified to said State by the Secretary
of the Interior, from time to time, whenever any of said Toads shall be definitely
located, and shall be disposed of by said State in the manner and upon the condi-
tions provided in the particular act granting the same, as modified by the provisions
of this act: Provided, That when the original quantity granted to aid i the cou-
struction of any road has been increased, the quantity authorized to be sold from
time to time shall he increased correspondingly: And providedflrtier, Tat on the
completion of any ten miles of road, the State may sell one-half the quantity of
lands which said State is authorized to dispose of on the completion of twenty
miles.
That the lands granted by any act of Congress to the State of Minuesota, to aid
in the construction of railroads in said State, specifically, lying in place, on any
division of ten miles of road, shall not be disposed of until the road shall be com-
pleted through and coterminous with the same: Provided, howvever, That this provi-
sion shall not extend to any lands authorized to be taken to make up deficiencies.
It is clear that the sixth section of the act of Alarch 3, 1863, spra,
under which this company claims, specifically limits the patenting of
lands, to those which are coterminous with sections of constructed
road.
It is urged, however, that the clause in section four of the act of
July 13, 1866, supra, which reads-" This provision shall not extend to
any lands authorized to be taken to make up deficiencies," permits the
selection and patenting of indemnity lands opposite the unconstructed
portion of the road.
This contention need not be ruled upon because if it be admitted, it
is still necessary to determine whether the company had earned and
was rightly entitled to the land in question prior to the State act of
March 1, 1877, for, unless it was, it did not have "legal and full title"
to the same.
During the year 1873 the governor certified to the construction of
that portion of the St. Vincent Extension from East St. Cloud to Mel-
rose, a distance of thirty-five miles, and from a point in section 35,
township 135 north, range 46 west, and a point in section 7, township
154 north, range 47 west, a distance of one hundred and five miles.
No further report of construction was made until the year 1879. The
distance between these constructed portions of road was more than
one hundred miles.
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Under the recent decision of the supreme court in the case of Sioux
City and St. Paul Railroad Co. v. United States (159 U. S., 349), it was
held that where a road is required to be completed in sections of ten
miles, the State could not, without completing the entire road, demand
patents on account of the construction of less than a section of ten
consecutive miles; and that in ascertaining the extent of the grant,
the United States is under no legal obligation to make good the loss
occasioned by a fractional section of land coming within the limits
granted, designated by an odd number.
Supposing, however, that within the limits of the grant now in ques-
tion, there existed ten sections per mile and that each section contained
six hundred and forty acres, the company by the building of three
sections of road of ten miles each from East St. Cloud to Melrose,
entitled itself to 192,000 acres of land on account of such construction.
Upon inquiry at your office it is found that in the list of selections of
indemnity land filed by this company November 25,1873. on account of
the constructed road just referred to, and embracing the tract in ques-
tion, 200,602.46 acres were selected.
January 5, 1874, two further lists of indemnity selections on- account
of the construction named, were also filed, aggregating more than seven
thousand acres. Thus selections were made as indemnity on account
of the construction between East St. Cloud and Melrose, far in excess
of the total amount to which the company had entitled itself by the
building of the road between those points.
It is further shown that within the primary limits opposite the road
from East St. Cloud to Melrose, the company listed, during the years
1873 and 1874, more than twelve thousand acres, and has since listed
more than five thousand acres.
It is clear, then, that selection was made by the company, on account
of the construction between East St. Cloud and Melrose, of many thou-
sand acres more than it was justly entitled to, upon the construction
reported. Can it be said that by the approval and patenting of the
lands listed and selected by the road, and the subsequent conveyance
thereof by the State to the company, legal and full title was perfected
in the company to all of said lands? Suppose no frther construction
had been reported, would the company have been entitled to hold all
of said lands Clearly not. The certifying and patenting of the lands
in excess of the amont to which the company had entitled itself, was
so clearly wrong that the company while thereby obtaining the legal
title would have been compelled in equity to surrender the land upon
the suit of the State or the United States. Any claim that it is impos-
sible to separate the lands in excess, would fall in the light of the rul-
ing in Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Co. v. United States (supra),
wherein it is said:
It isl nnecessaryto inquire whether the particular lands herein dispute, should not
have been assigned to the company, rather than other lands, containing a like num-
ber of acres, that were, in fact, transferred to it, and which can not now be recovered
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by the United States, by reason of their having been disposed of by the company.
If the company has received as much, in quantity, as should have been awarded to
it, a court of equity will not recognize its claim to more, in whatever shape the claim
is presented.
It is therefore hel that the company had not "legal and full title"
to all the lands certified and patented on its account prior to March 3,
1877, ant as the provisions in favor of settlers in the State act of that
date are binding upon the company, its receipt of the benefits of' that
act operated as a relinquishment of its claim to the lan(ls occupied by
settlers and to which the company had not perfected legal and full title.
The governor was authorized to deed the land in question to the United
States to the end that the settler might acquire the same under the
homestead law.
The motion for review is accordingly denied.
HOMESTEAD APPLICATION-COMPLIANCE AVITH LAW.
ALCOIRN ET AL. v. BARLOW.
Prior to the allowance of a homestead entry an applicant for such right, who relies
on his application, is not bound to reside on the land, or to make any compli-
ance with the requirements of the homestead law.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. (C. W. P.)
This appeal is brought by Mary W. Alcorn from the decision of your
office of July 14, 1896, affirming the action of the local officers in reject-
ing her homestead application to enter under the homestead law the
NE. i of See. 14, T. 20 N., R. 1 W., Perry land district, Oklahoma Ter-
ritory, and allowing the homestead application of Lucian H. Barlow
for said tract.
The record shows that on November 10, 1893, Lucian Hd. Barlow filed
homestead application for said land, and that his application was sus-
pended on account of the loss of his booth certificate; that on Septem-
ber I, 1894, yur office notified the local officers that said Barlow
received booth certificate, No. 6500, but that owing to the fact that on
November 16, 1893, Alexander House filed a protest, together with his
soldier's declaratory statement, for said lan(, alleging prior settlement,
and that said Mary W. Alcorn filed an application to enter said land
under the homestead law on May 12, 1894, which was rejected, and from
which rejection she appealed on June 14, 1894, a hearing was ordered
to'determine the rights of said parties.
The case was submitted upon the folloving agreed statement of
facts:
1st. That said Barlow stands upon his H. A. No. 263, filed November 10th, 1893,
and is also qualified as above stated, and that said House stands upon his S. D. S.
No. 0 (suspended) filed Nov. 16,1893. 2nd. On May 12th, 1894, Mary W. Alcorn
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settled upon said land and had some three or four furrows plowed, and in June began
the construction of a box house. 3rd. That during the fall of 1894, said Mary W.
Alcorn bad from fifteen to eighteen acres broken, eight enclosed, and put a plank
roof on the house, the same costing $25.00. 4th. Said Mary W. Alcorn has never
made her actual residence on said land, but has made improvement on the same, as
above stated; has worked on the land and directed the labor of others all through
the spring and summer of 1895. At the present time has about twenty-five acres
under cultivation and sonic five acres broken that bas no crop on it. 5th. That she
now resides in the city of Perry and has resided there ever since September 16th,
1893.
The local officers recommiended the rejection of the homestead appli-
cation of Mary W. Alcorn and the soldier's declaratory statement of
said House, and the allowance of said Barlow's application.
Mary W. Alcorn appealed. Your office said:
Her contention seems to lie that Barlow was legally bound to reside on the land
pending the allowance of his application. To so hold would in many instances
compel an applicant to. do a vain thin, that is, reside on and improve land which
he could not under the law enter,
and affirmed the decision of the local officers. Mary W. Alcorn appeals
to the Department.
It is well settled that prior to the allowance of a homestead entry an
applicant relying upon his application is not bound to reside upon the
land, or to make any compliance with the homestead law, until his
entry has been allowed. Fletcher et al. v. Brereton, 14 L. D., 554;
Rice v. Lenzshek, 13 L. D., 154; Goodale v. Olney, 12 L. D., 324
Your office decision is therefore affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTION-ASCERTAINED DEFI-
CIENCY.
NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. V. STREIB.
The Northern Pacific is not entitled to invoke the protection of the order. of lay 28,
1883, waiving specification of loss, where it assigns an insufficient basis for a
selection in the presence of a contest involving the right to enter the selected
tract; nor can a subsequent assignment of a sufficient basis avail the company
as against the right of the contestant in such a case.
There has been no departmental recognition of an ascertained deficiency in the
Northern Pacific grant; nor has the company been relieved, on account of sch
deficiency, from the specification of losses in making indemnity selections.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 29, 1898. - (F. W. C.)
The Northern Pacific Railroad ompany has appealed from your
office decision of June 5, 1896, holding for cancellation its indemnity
selection covering the NE. I of See. 11, T. 15 N., It. 43 E., Walla Walla
land district, Washington, with a view to the allowance of the home-
stead application of George Streib.
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This tract was included in the company's list of selections filed
1)ecember 17, 1883. Said list was unaccompanied by a designation of
losses as bases for the selection, the same being made under depart-
mental order of May 28, 1883 (12 L. D., 196), which. exempted this
company from the general requirement that indemnity lists should be
accompanied by a designation of the losses on account of which indem-
nity is claimed.
On October 26, 1887, the company filed a list of losses on account of
said selection list, the same being given in bulk and not arranged tract
for tract with the selected lands; and on September 2, 1892, it filed
supplementary lists arranging the lost lands tract for tract with the
selected lands.
In the list of September 2, 1892, there was specified as a basis for the
selection of the tract in controversy a part of Sec. 15, T. 7 N., R. 15 E.,
the same being unsurveyed land and supposed to be included in the
Yakima Indian reservation.
It appears from your office decision that a recent survey of the west-
ern boundary of said Indian reservation evidences that the land speci-
fied as a basis for the tract under consideration is without the limits of
said Indian reservation. Further, that it is also within the overlapping
limits of the grants for the main and branch lines and opposite the
unconstructed portion of the .main line of said road, the grant for
which was forfeited by the act of September 29, 1890 (26 Stat., 496);
that under the provisions of the sixth section of said act of forfeiture
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was called upon to elect as to
the alternate odd-numbered sections it would take in satisfaction of the
moiety under its constructed branch line within the overlap above
described; that acting upon this direction the company excluded said
section 15, a portion of which was designated as a basis for the selec-
tion of the tract in dispute.
It also appears that since the survey of the western boundary of the
Yakima Indian reservation, to wit, on January 25, 1896, the company
filed another list, in which a new basis is assigned for the selection in
question, the same being a part of Sec. 13, T. 11 N., R. 14 E.
Against the sufficiency of this latter designation there appears to be
no objection.
The present case arose upon the application of George Streib to
make homestead entry, tendered on October29, 1887. The record made
at the hearing ordered upon an allegation of prior settlement evidences
that this land was in the possession and occupation of one Jacob Craft
at the date of the original selection on December 17, 1883. This pos-
session was transferred to different settlers until it came into the
possession of the present claimant in 1885.
Your office decision holds that the loss assigned in the list of Sep-
tember 2, 1892, was not a good and sufficient basis for the selection in
question, and as the application of Streib intervened prior to the sub-
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stitution of the new basis on January 2o, 1896, said selection was held
for cancellation with a view to the allowance of Streib's application.
A motion was filed for review of said decision, which was denied by
your office decision of August 3, 1896, and the company has prosecuted
the case upon appeal to this Department.
In its appeal the company urges that even if the basis originally
assigned for. this tract was defective, the pendency of the selection
prevented the attachment of any adverse right in Streib and entitled
the company to file a supplemental list giving a proper basis. Further,
that the former Commissioner of your office having certified that the
grant to this company was over three and one-half million acres defi-
cient, it was error to have held that the designation of any loss was
necessary to support the selection.
While it is true that the original list of December 17, 1883, was pro-
tected. by the order of May 28, 1883, relieving this company from the
specification of losses at the time of making its indemnity selections,
it nevertheless appears, that during the pendency of the proceedings
in the local office upon Streib's application, the company, evidently
acting under the requirement of the departmental circular of August
4, 1885 (4 L. D., 9), filed a list of losses as bases for the selection list
which included the tract i question, and therein specified an insufflcient
basis for this tract.
Having given an insufficient basis, in the presence of a contest
involving the right to enter said tract the company is not entitled to
plead the protection of the order of May 28, 1883; nor can a subse-
quent assignment of a sufficient basis benefit it as against the right of
the contestant, whose contest was pending at the time of the filing of
the insufficient basis.
Relative to the certification of a deficiency in the grant to this com-
pany made by your predecessor, it is sufficient to say, that this Depart-
-ment has never given recognition to that certificate, nor has the
company been relieved from the specification of losses in makin g indem-
nity selections on account of an ascertained deficiency in the grant.
It is therefore held that the company's rights under its selection lists
under consideration will not bar the completion of Streib's application.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed, and upon completion of
entry by Streib the company's selection will be canceled.
MITCHELL V. BACIES.
Motion for rehearing denied by Secretary Bliss April 30, 1898. See
departmental decision of February 12, 1898, 26 L. D., 191.
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RAILROAD GRANT-DEFINITE LOCATION-HUOMESTEAD ENTRY.
OREGON CENTRAL R. R. Co. v. THOMPSON.
The grant to the Oregon Ceutral by the act of May 4, 1870, is in the nature of' a
float, andI does not take effect upon specific trai ts until definite location; and
a homestead entry made prior to such location excepts the land covered thereby
from the operation of the grant, althongh o exception is muade therein of lindIs
thus appropriated.
The case of the United States r. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 152 UJ. S., 284, cited and
distingished.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land ffce, April
(W. V. D.) : 30, 1898. (W. A. E.)
The lal here involved, viz., lots 1, 2, and 3, and the N. t of the
NW. of See, 3, T. N., R. I W., Oregon City, Oregon, land district,
is within the primary limits of the grant made by the act of May 4,
1870 (16 Stat., 94), to the Oregon Central Railroad Compariy, and is
opposite the portion of the road definitely located May 17, 1871.
It is also within the primary limits of the grant made by the joint
resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat., 378), to the Northern Pacifie Rail-
road Company.
* May 13, 1870, Lewis Lauch t made homestead entry for said land, and
this entry was canceled Sept ember 2, 1871.
February 8, 1883, Reuben Thompson filed pre-emnption declaratory
statement for the land, alleging settlement February 7,1883. Final
proof and payment were made October 8, 1883.
November 17, 1894, your office considered the several claims to the
land, and held that the tract in question was excepted front the opera-
tion of' the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company by the prior
grant to the Oregon Central Railroad Company, and was excepted from
the latter company's grant by the homestead entry of Laueht, existing
at the date of the definite location of the road.
No action was taken by the Northern Pacific Railroad Companly, but
the Oregon Central Railroad Company filed a motion for review of your
office decision, which was demied by your office letter of August 1, 1890,
whereupon said company appealed to the Department.
The only question presented by the appeal is, when the right of the
company under its grant attached-whether at the date of the passage
of the act, or at the date of the filing of the map of definite location of
the road.
This question was fully considered in the case of Oregon Central
Railroad Company v. Jones, 14 L. D., 283, and it was there held that
the grant of May 4, 1870, is in the nature of a float, and does'not take
effect upon specific tracts until definite location; and that a homestead
entry made prior to such location excepts the land covered thereby
from the operation of the grant, although no exception is made therein
of lands thus appropriated.
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This decision was rendered March 19, 1892, and has since been fol-
lowed by the Department.
The company claims, however, that the decision of the United States
supreme court in the case of United States . Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company (152 U. S., 284), rendered March 5, 1894, overrules the
Jones case on the point here in issue.
In the case cited the supreme court had before it the question as to
which of these two rompanies had the superior right to lands within
the common granted or primary limits. It was held to be well settled
that as between parties claiming the saine land under the different
grants,.priority of grant, not priority of location, determines the ques-
tion of ownership. This rulitg was in conformitywith previous decisions
of the court and does not affect the rights of parties claiming under
the public- land laws specific tracts within the primary limits of the
grant.
In the Jones case it was well said:
To sustain the contention made by the company would have, in effect, served to
reserve all the lands in the northwestern part of the State of Oregon, as well as a
large portion of the State of Washington, to await the pleasure of the company in
the matter of the location of its road, for the grant would follow the location when
made, and all settlers in that part of the country would he at the mercy of the
company.
This was clearlynot the purpose of the act, for in providing for a reservation upon
location, it, in effect, prohibited anyreservation until location, and without reserva-
tion, rights could be acquired under the public land laws, the lands being otherwise
subject thereto, which would operate to defeat any subsequent grant.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed, and Thompson's final
proof will be approved, if no further objection to it appears.
RAILROAD GRANT-ATTACHM:ENT OF RIGHTS-AMENDED LOCATIONS.
OREGON AND CALIFORNIA R. Ui. CO. V. KIRKENDALL.
A railroad company is not entitled to the benefit of two locations of the same por-
tion of its road, and where the limits of the grant have been readjusted under
an amended location, and the changed limits have been recognized by the com-
- pany and the government, it must be held, as to the portion of the road so
changed, that the right of the company attached as of the filing of the amended
location.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner f the General Land Ofce, April
(W. V. D.) 30, 1898. (F. W. C.)
By your office decision of September 5, 1890, it was held that lots
4, 5, and 6, and the SE. of the NE. -1 of Sec. 17, T. 29 S., R. 8 W.,
Roseburg land district, Oregon, were excepted from the grant made by
the act of -July 25, 1866 (L4 Stat., 239), to aid in the construction of the
Oregon and California railroad, by reason of the settlement claim of
James A. Kirkendall.
12209-AoL 26-38
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IKirkendall filed pre-emption declaratory statement for this land on
May 22, 1877, and on July 1, 1882, transmuted the same to homestead
entry, upon which he made final proof and final certificate issued Sep-
tember 21, 1885. Your said office decision held that the company's
right, by definite location, attached to land in the vicinity of that in
question on April 8 1882, and that Kirkendall's claim antedated such
definite location and excepted the tract from the company's grant.
In its appeal the company assigned the following error:
The said company as grounds of appeal allege error in finding and holding that
its right didn't attach until April 8, 1882, whereas its right attached by map of loca-
tion filed March 7, 1871.
The only question in the case is, when did the railroad company's right attach?
The map fi]ed by said company March 7, 1871, located the road from the south line
of Tp. 27 S., R. 6 W., to the south line of See. 30, Tp. 30 S., R. 5 W.
By an amended map of location filed ApL. 8, 1882, the above location was changed
from station 1154 (centre of See. 28, T. 29 S., . 5 W.) to station 1320x50 (Sec. 6, T.
30 S., R. 5 W.) but by an oversight, the decision appealed from, finds as a matter of
fact, that the change was from some point further north than station 1154. which
would bring the land in question within the changed line and location of 1882.
As, however, the line of the road, so far as this land is concerned, was located in
1871, andnot thereafter changed, the settlement of said Kirkendall in 1879 n-as clearly
illegal.
The appeal was considered in departmental decision of March 9, 1892
(unreported), in which it was held that-
This contention raises a question of fact as to the date when the uap of definite
location of that part of said road opposite this land was actually filed. An exam-
ination shows that the true date was in March, 1871. As Kirkendall did not settle
upon the land until tle fall of 1879, it a'as not excepted from said grant. Your office
decision is reversed.
In compliance with departmental letter of May 1, 1895, the record
was returned to the Department for reconsideration.
The facts relative to the location of the company's road in the neigh-
borhood of the land in question are as follows:
With a letter from this Department received at your office March 2,
1871, was forwarded a nap, filed by the Oregon and California Railroad
Company, showing its line of definite location from the south line of
township 27 S., range 6 W., to a point in section 30, T. 30 S., R. W.
The limits of the grant were then adjusted to this location. There-
after, there was received at your office, on April 8, 1882, a map filed on
behalf of said company showing what was denominated as an amended
line of location from station 1154 in Sec. 28, T. 29 S., R. W., to station
1320x50 in Sec. 6, T. 30 S., R. 5 W. Upon this amended location the
limits of the grant were re-adjusted.
It is clear that the company can not claim the benefit of two loca-
tions of the same portion of its road.
Therefore, as to the portion of the road changed by the amended
location, as the limits of the grant were re-adjusted to this amended line
of location, and these amended limits have since been recognized both
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by the company and the government in the adjustment of the grant
and the determination of conflicting rights, it will be held that the
right of the road attached as of the filing of the second map, April 8,
1882; and in order to separate the lands opposite the unchanged por-
tion of the location of 1871 from those opposite the amended location
of 1882, it is directed that you establish a terminal line at the point of
divergence. The terminal line should be adjusted to the unchanged
portion of the location of 1871, and will be recognized in determining
the rights of the company in the neighborhood of the changed location.
The previous decision of the Department in this case is therefore
iecalled and vacated, and the papers are herewith returned that the
case may be're-adjudicated in the light of the directions herein given,
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMNITY SELECTION-DESIGNATION OF LOSS.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC R. R. Co. v. DAvIS.
The amendment of a list of indemnity selections by the. designation of losses not
assigned in the original, is, to the extent of sch substitution, an abandonment
of the prior list, and, to said extent, a new selection, and as such it will not bar
the completion of a homestead entry made subject to the original selection.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioiter of the General Land O ce, April
(W. V. D.) 30, 1898. (G. C. R.)
I have considered the appeal of the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany from your office decision of January 10, 1896 (adhered to on review
June 8,1 896), wherein you dismiss the company's protest against the
final proof offered by Jesse Davis, August 13, 1895, upon his homestead
entry made October 10, 1888, for the N. of the NW. and the SW. 
of the NW. J of See. 35, T. 16 S., R. 28 E., Mr. D. M., Visalia, California.
Davis's entry also included the SE. 4 of the NE. of Sec. 34, same
township; but this tract is not in controversy.
The lands so described in said Sec. 35 are within the indemnity limits
of the grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, under the grant
of July 27, 1866, and they were selected on behalf of the company July
21, 1885, per list No. 20. In this list the company failed to designate
the lands in place lost to the company, in lieu of which the selections
were made, and it was not until October 13, 1887, that said losses were
designated.
On April 21, 1894, the company's amended list (No. 20) of selections
was filed in your office, i which different lands were designated as the
basis of the tracts so selected.
Your office, in disposing of the case, held that the first list of selec-
tions having been made without designation of the losses, and after the
regulations of November 7, 1879, required such designations, was no
bar to other disposition of the lands, and although losses were desig-
nated by the company for the particular tracts prior to their entry by
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Davis, yet the substitution of other lands as a basis of selection, after
the allowance of Davis's entry, operated as an abandonment of the first
selection, and removed any objection that the company might make
against Davis's entry by reason of sch selection.
The principal question at issue is, whether the filing of the amended
list (April 21, 1894), designating for "the particular tracts in question"
a new basis, was an abandonment of the first selection. If so, it is
plain that Davis's entry, admitting that it was improperly allowed at
the time presented, may now be properly held intact.
As thus presented the case is controlled by the decision in the case
of La Bar v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (17 L. D., 406), in which it was
held that the substitution in an amended list of indemnity selections
of a specification of losses different from that assigned in the first list
must be treated as an abandonment of the first. Davis's entry when
allowed was subject only to the selection made in 1885 as amended by
the losses filed in 1887.
When, therefore, the company in 1894 filed an amended list with a
loss designated as the basis for the selection in. question not included
in the list filed in 1887, it thereby abandoned the prior list, to this
extent at least, and as to this tract the list of 1894 must be treated as
a new selection. Such selection can not bar Davis's right to complete
his entry by the offer of final proof therein, and your office decision
overruling the company's protest againist the acceptance of his final
proof is affirmed, and the company's selection will be canceled.
PAYAMfNT-PRE-EMPTION ENTRY.
GERMAIN vr. LUKE.
The failure of a receiver to account to the government for the purchase price of
land paid at the time of final proof will not defeat the right of the entryman to
receive patent without further payment.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W.V. D.) 30, 1898.. (L. L. B.)
On September 2, 1890, W. Thomas Luke made pre-emption filing for
the NE. i of Sec. 7, T. 40 N., R. 30 W., Marquette, Michigan.
August 3,1891, Prosper Germain made homestead entry for the same
tract. September 17th following Luke submitted final proof, against
which Germain protested, 'alleging failure on the part of Luke to com-
ply with the requirements of the pre-emption law as to residence,
improvements and cultivation, and charging that he had left land of his
own to reside on the claim.
Rearing was had on the protest October 15, 1891, and the testimony
filed November 19, 1891; and on April 10, 1894, the local officers sus-
tained the proof. Germain appealed, and by your office decision of
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January 9, 1895, the action of the register and receiver was affirmed and
Luke given ninety days from notice of the decision in which to make
payment and perfect his entry, and the local officers were directed to
notify your office of such payment, should it be made, in order that
Germain's homestead entry might be canceled.
Germain, although notified, did not appeal from this action of your
office, and in August, 1895, Luke advised your office that some time
during the progress of the hearing on G-ermain's protest, he (Luke)
had made payment to Thomas D. Meads, the then receiver of the Mar-
quette land office, that the said Meads had appropriated the money so
paid, and asked that he might be allowed ninety days in which to re-
tender the money.
By your office letter of September 23,1895, the decision of your office
of January 9, 1895, sustaining the final proof of Luke, was made final,
and Luke was given sixty days in which to show payment of the money
as alleged, or to tender payment again, and the register and receiver
were directed to give him notice of said decision and that if at the end
of sixty days he. had not complied therewith his proof would stand
rejected and the homestead entry of Gerniain would remain intact.
April 24, 1896, the register and receiver reported that Luke had been
duly notified of this action of your office and had taken no action
thereon; whereupon, by letter of May 9, 1896, the case was finally
closed and the homestead entry of Germain held intact.
There was no formal appeal from this action, but on July 6, 1896,
there was filed in this Department the petition of Luke, invoking the
supervisory authority of the Secretary of the Interior, setting forth,
in brief, the main facts of the previous history of the controversy over
this tract, and asking that patent issue to him for the same. With the
petition were filed as exhibits a certificate from the defaulting receiver,
Meads, acknowledging receipt of two hundred dollars paid him by
Luke at the time of offering his final proof, and a copy of the declara-
tion in a suit pending in the United States circuit court for the western
district of Michigan, duly certified by the clerk of. said court, wherein
the United States was plaintiff and said Meads and his official sureties
were-defendants, praying judgment against the defendants for $3,000,
on account of money received by Meads in his official character as
receiver of the Marquette, Michigan, land office, and appropriated to
his own use. Among the amounts charged to have been so misappro.
priated was the $200 paid to him by Luke.
This was the status of the land and claimants therefor when, on
October , 1896, the register and receiver issued notice of contest upon
the affidavit of Andrew J. Hunting charging that Germain, the home-
stead entryman, had wholly abandoned his entry. Said notice directed
that the testimony on Hlunting's contest be taken at the office of the
county clerk of Menominee county, Michigan, on the 13th day of
November following.
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At the time and place mentioned in the notice, Hunting appeared,
and Germain making default the testimony was taken, and on Novem-
ber 23, 1896, the register and receiver recomimended the cancellation of
the entry, the evidence showing that the entrymnan had never resided
on or cultivated the land.
There is also in the record a protest filed by Hunting in this Depart-
ment on November 5, 1897, against granting the prayer of Luke for
issue of patent, alleging his (unti11g's) interest in the land as shown
in the foregoing statement and alleging that he has had no notice of
this action on the part of Luke, and asking that he be given an oppor-
tunity to present his case after "being fully informed as to the nature
and character of the application of Luke."
Neither the application of Luke nor the protest of Hunting against
it purports to have been served upon any of the parties in interest,
both papers having been sent direct to the Secretary.
The foregoing are all the material facts presented by the record now
here for consideration.
From this it is seen that the petition of Luke for patent was pre-
sented here nearly three months prior to the initiation of Hunting's
contest against Germain, so that it was not incumbent upon Luke to
serve Hunting with notice of his petition, for at that time Hunting
was not a party in interest. The fact that he afterwards became an
interested party through his contest against Germain entitled hin to
notice of such proceedings only as were had after his interest attached.
When he instituted his contest he was chargeable with notice of all
the proceedings pertaining to the land in controversy had prior to that
time. At the time his contest was filed the petition of Luke was here,
awaiting action. His rights under his contest niust, therefore, be held
to await the determination of those of Luke as preseatecd by the
record.
Since the filing of the petition of Luke, asking that his proof be
accepted and patent issued for the land, the case of the United States
v. Meads and his sureties, heretofore noted, has been decided by the
United States circnit court of appeals, holding, in effect, that the pay-
menit by Luke to Meads was payment to the government; that the
money so paid to MVleads was received by him not only colors officii, but
in the due course of his employment as the officer and agent of the
government. See said case, 81 Fed. Rep., page 684.
The relation of the officer to the government and to the claimant as
well was considered at length in the case cited, and the court, quoting
with approval the language of Judge Severns, who presided at the
trial in the circuit court, says:
Payment of the price by the entrymau is part of the transaction whereby he is to
acquire title to the land. Rules prescribed by the department to the local land
offices are for convenience in the transaction of business. Sh is a rule requiring
payment before action on proofs by those officers,-a rule designed to prevent vain
proceedings there resulting from a subsequent failure to pay the purchase price,
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The money may properly be paid at any time while the proceedings for the purpose
are in fieri, unless some statute or rle prohibits it, and none such has been shown
to me. I have no doubt that if the money were not paid at the time of the applica-
tion, but, upon notification fron the land office that the proofs were held sfficient,
it should then be paid, the proceeding would be perfectly valid, and the purchaser
would have the right to a title. It is a matter of order only. The receiver is the
agent of the governmient to make the sale. If an intending purchaser of land should,
with his proposition to buy, pay the price asked by the ovner to the agent of the
latter appointed to make the sale, the agent would be accountable to his principal
for the money, as between them. If the transaction should fail,-as, for instance, on
account of defect in the owner's title,-the principal would be hound to make resti-
tution. The agent w"ould not be liable to the purchaser. It was known that he was
acting as agent. le was not selling his own land, nor dealing with a matter of
personal concern to himself. There are very cogent reasons for applying this rule
of agency to such circumstances as these. My conclusion, therefore, is that, at
whatever stage of the proceedings the money is paid by the applicant to the receiver
upon his intended purchase, the receiver is bound to render an account thereof to
the department. It is not his money.. He does not receive it as the agent of the
applicant. He has no such dual status. If the money was properly payable at the
time of the application, it would make no difference whether the government
exacted payment then, or was willing to waive payment until the proceeding should
ripen.
In the case of S. W. Russell, Administrator (25 L. D., 188), this
Department expressed similar views and held (quoting-from syllabus)
that:
the subsequent failure of said officer to account to the government for the pur-
chase price of the land, so paid, will not defeat the right of the entryman to receive
patent without further payment.
From this construction of the law in relation to payment to a default-
ing officer of the government, it follows that at the time Luke was
called upon to re-tender the money for his pre-emption purchase, he
was not in default, but, on the contrary, was then entitled to receive
final certificate.
By reference to the dates of the different proceedings heretofore men-
tioned, it will be seen that the hearing upoi the protest of Germain
against Luke's pre-emption proof was had October 15,1891, and although
the testimony submitted was filed in the local office November 16, fol-
lowing, the decision of the register and receiver rendered thereon was
not made until April 10, 1894. The reason for this delay is not shown
in the record, but the decision is signed by Push Calvert as receiver,
and the conclusion is almost irresistible that the decision was reserved
through the influence of Meads until the end of his service as receiver,
in order to avoid accounting for the money paid to hint by Luke and
so prevent a disclosure of his malfeasance during the term of his office.
But however that may be, it is apparent that from November, 1891,
until some time subsequent to January 9, 1895 (the date of your first-
mentioned office decision), Luke rested in security under the belief that
he had complied with all the requirements of the law necessary to secure
patent for his claim. He shows by his verified petition for patent, that
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between the date of his payment to the receiver and your office letter
requiring him to show payment,, etc., all the witnesses by whose testi-
mony he could establish the fact of such payment had disappeared,
and he was unable to comply with this requirement until shortly before
he forwarded his aforesaid petition containing the acknowledgment of
such payment by Meads himself.
While it is true that he did not serve Germain with a copy of his
petition, it clearly appears from te record that Germain had, previous
thereto (the date of said petition, July 6, 1896), abandoned his entry
and eould not be found nor his whereabouts ascertained. He had rested
under the decision of your office dismissing his protest, and his entry
was held intact, not by reason of compliance with law upon his part,
but only through the unavoidable failure of Luke to comply with the
requirements of your office letter of September 23, 1895.
The Department is, therefore, of the opinion that the claim of CGer-
main presents no equities that would prevent favorable action on the
petition of Luke, and, as before said, whatever claims Hunting may
have in virtue of his contest, they must yield to those of Luke under
his petition, because at the date of presenting the same Hunting was
a stranger to the record and was chargeable with notice of Luke's
petition.
The entry of Germain will therefore be canceled, and you will direct
that final certificate be issued to Luke for the tract in controversy.
The action of your office is modified accordingly.
MINERAL LANDS-PITOSPHIATE DEPOSITS-RAILROAD GRANT.
FLORIDA CENTRAL AND PENINSULAR R. R. CO.
Lands valuable for deposits of phosphates are mineral lands within the intent and
meaning of the laws relating to the disposal of the public domain.
The act of May 17,1856, making a grant of lands to the State of Florida to aid in the
construction of railroads does not in express terms include mineral lands, nor
are such lands expressly excluded therefrom, but in view of the uniform and
settled policy of the government to reserve such lands from grants to States or
corporations for any purpose, it is held that all such lands, whether valuable for
phosphate or other mineral deposits, are excepted from the operation of said
grant.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 30, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
The Department is in receipt of a communication, dated the 4th
instant, from your office, wherein it appears that on March 28, 1898,
your office sent to the local office at Gainesville, Florida, for publica-
tion in accordance with circular instructions of July 9, 1894 (19 L. D.,
21), a list of lands in that State claimed by the Florida Central and
Peninsular Railroad Company as present owner under the grant of
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May 17, 1856 ( Stat., 15), to the State of Florida to aid in the con-
struction of certain railroads; that the said lands are within six miles
of phosphate claims; that you are in doubt whether the decision of
the Department in the case of the Pacific Coast Marble Company v.
Northern Pacific Railroad Company et al. (25 L. D., 233) overrules that
part of the decision in the case of Tucker et al. v. Florida Railway and
Navigation Company (19 L. D., 414) which holds that lands containing
phosphate deposits are not excepted from the said grant; and that you
have directed the local office to suspend action on the said list until
you shall receive instructions from the Department in the premises.
The railroad company has submitted an argument which you transmit
for consideration here.
In the Pacific Coast Marble Company case, supra, the Department
held as follows (syllabus):
Whatever is recognized as a mineral by the standard authorities, whether of
metallic or other substances, when found in the public lands, in quantity and
quality sufficient to render the land more valuable on account thereof than for
agricultural purposes, must be treated as coming within the purview of the mining
laws.
Lands valuable only on account of the marble deposit contained therein are
subject to placer entry under the mining laws.
Lands containing valuable mineral deposits, whether of the metalliferous or fos.
siliferous class, of such quantity and quality as to render them subject to entry
under the mining laws, are "mineral lands" within the meaning of that term as
used in the exception from the grant to the Northern Pacific Company for railroad
purposes, and to the State for school purposes.
The case of Tucker ,i Florida Railway and Navigation Co., 19 L. D., 414, overruled.
A careful examination of the two decisions under consideration leads
to the conclusion that what was expressly overruled in the Tucker case
by the Marble Company case was the holding in the former that only
"those lands containing valuable metals, such as gold, silver, cinna-
bar and copper," were excepted, as mineral lands, from the indemnity
provisions of the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 194). In effect the
decision in the Marble Company case holds that phosphate lands are to
be classed as mineral lands. Not only do the definitions of the words
"mineral" and "mineral lands" in that decision include phosphates and
phosphate lands, respectively, but the case of Gary v. Todd (18 L. D.,
58), which distinctly holds that lands chiefly valuable for phosphate
deposits are mineral lands, is one of the authorities cited approvingly
therein. See also in this connection the cases of Aldritt x. Northern
Pacific Railroad Compa-ny, 25 L. D., 349;. Union Oil Company (on
review), bid., 351; A System of Mineralogy-Dana, p. 747, et seq.,
especially pp. 769 and 826; and definitions of "Phosphate" and
"Phosphate deposits" in the Century, Standard, and Webster dic-
tionaries. It would appear to be settled by these decisions and
authorities that lands valuable for deposits of phosphates are mineral
lands within the meaning of the laws relating to the disposal of the
public domain. Since the decision in the Tucker case, as to the lands
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claimed under the act of 1874, was based upon the view that phos-
phate lands were not mineral lands in any statutory sense, it would
seem that it was in this respect that that case was overruled by the
Marble Company case. This conclusion leaves open and undecided
the question whether mineral lands and especially phosphate lands
are excepted from the grant of lay 17, 1856, suprct. f they are, said
list should be pblished prsuant to the said circular instructions;
otherwise no such publication is'necessary.
There is no express exception of mineral lands from the grant, nor,
on the other hand, is there in its language any express inclusion of
them. The only express reservation of any lands from the grant is in
these words:
An2d provided further, That any and all lands heretofore reserved to the United
States by any act of Congress, or in any other manner by competent authority, for the
purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement, or for any other purpose
whatsoever, be, and the same are hereby, reserved to the United States from the oper-
ation of this act, except so far as it 'nay be found necessary to locate the routes
of said railroads or branch through such reserved lands; in which case the right of
way only shall be granted subject to the approval of the President of the United
States.
The grant in question is one among the earlier grants to aid in the
construction of railroads. None of these earlier grants, so far as the
Department is aware, contained any express exception therefrom of
mineral lands. The grants to the Union Pacific, Central Pacific and
other railroad companies, by the act of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 489),
were the first grants to contain such an exception. From each of theme
all mineral lands, except iron ad coal lands, were expressly reserved.
Nearly all, if not all, subsequent grants to railroads in mineral regions
uniformly contain a reservation of mineral lands.
* On January 30, 1865, Congress passed a joint resolution ( 3 Stat., 567)
which declares:
That no act passed at the first session of the thirty-eighth congress, granting lands
to states or corporations, to aid in the construction of roads or for other purposes,
or to extend the time of grants heretofore made, shall be so construed as to embrace
mineral lands, which in all cases shall be, and are, reserved exclusively to the
United States, n]ess otherwise specially provided in the act or acts making the
grant.
While this resolution refers in terms to grants made or extended (as
to time) during the first session of the thirty-eighth. Congress, it is
believed the language thereof, that "mineral lands . . . . in all cases
shall be, and are, reserved exclusively to the United States, nless
otherwise specially provided in the act or acts making the grante may
properly be regarded as expressive of the sense of Congress that no
grant of public lands to a State or corporation should be held to include
mineral lands unless otherwise expressly provided, and as declarative
of its uniform policy against such inclusion.
In the case of Mining Company v. Consolidated Mining Company
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(102 U. S., 167) the supreme court held that the grant of the sixteenth
and thirty-sixth sections of public lands to the State of California for
the purposes of public schools by the act of March 3, 1853 (10 Stat.,
246), which grant contained no express reservation therefrom of mineral
lands, was, notwithstanding, not intended to cover such lands. It
was said by Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court in that case (pp.
174-5),-
Taking into consideration what is well known to have been the hesitation and
difficulty in the minds of Congressmen in dealing with these mineral lands, the
manner in which the question was suddenly forced upon them, the uniform reserva-
tion of them from survey, from sale, from pre-emption, and above all from grants,
whether for railroads, public buildings, or other purposes, and looking to the fact
that from all the other grants made in this act they are reserved, one of which is for
school purposes besides the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections, we are foreed to the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to depart from its uniform policy in this
respect in the grant of those sections to the State.
In the case of Keystone Lode and Mill Site v. State of Nevada (15 L.
D., 259) the Department held that mineral lands were excepted from
the grant of school lands by the act of March 21, 1864 (3 Stat., 30), to
the State of Nevada, although "the grant made no exception of mineral
lands," for the reason that-
it has been held in such grants that they will be construed as not granting mineral
lands, because it is and has been the settled policy of the government to withhold
mineral lands unless they are expressly granted.
In the comparatively recent case (decided May 26, 1894) of Barden
v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (154 U. S., 288) the supreme
court said (pp. 317-318):
The policy of Congress as expressed in its numerous grants of public lands to aid
in the construction of railroads has always been to exclude the mineral lands from
them, and reserve them for special disposition, as seen in the following acts among
others: Acts of July 1, 1862, c. 120, 12 Stat., 489, and of July 2,1864, e. 216, 13 Stat.,
356, making grants to the Union and Central Pacific Companies; act of July 4, 1866,
c. 165, 14 Stat., 83, making a grant to the Iron Monntain Railroad Company; act
of July 13, 1866, c. 182, 14 Stat., 94, making a grant to the Placerville etc. Railroad;
act of July 25, 1866, c. 242, 14 Stat., 239, making a grant to the California and Oregon
Railroad, sections 2 and 10; act of July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat., 292, making a grant
to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad and to the Southern Pacific Railroad; act of
March 2, 1867, c. 189, 14 Stat., 548, making a grant to the Stockton and Copperopolis
Railroad; act of March 3, 1871, c. 122, 16 Stat., 573, making a grant to the Texas
Pacific Railroad. In all of these cases, and in all grants of public lands in aid of
railroads, minerals (except iron and coal) have uniformly been reserved, and in no
instance has such a grant been held to pass them.
The Department, as already stated in substance, is unable to find in
the act of May 17, 1856, any evidence of an intention to grant mineral
lands, and, therefore, and for the futther reason that the authorities
above cited seem to be conclusive of a settled and uniform policy on
the part of the government to reserve such lands from grants to States
or corporations, for any purpose, is constrained to hold that all such
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lands, whether valuable for phosphate or other mineral deposits, are
excepted from the grant in question.
You will therefore direct the local office to proceed with the publica-
tion of said list pursuant to said circular instructions.
ADDITIONAL HOMIESTEAD-SECTION 6, ACT OF MARCH 2, 1889.
GESAR . SAES (ON REVIEW).
The right to inake a additional homestead entry under section 6, act of March 2,
1889, an only be exercised by one who has made his final proof, and received
the receiver's final receipt for the land embraced in his original entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Cominissoner of the General Land Office, April
(W. V. D.) 30, 1898. (J. L. McC.)
The Department, on February 12, 1898 (26 L. D., 190), affirmed the
decision of your office, dated May 6, 1896, rejecting the application of
Porter T. Caesar to make homestead entry of Lots 9 and 10 and the SW
of the SWJ of Sec. 15, T. 14 N., R. 3 B., Guthrie land district, 0. T.
Said application was for an adjoining homestead entry under the act
of February 10, 1894 (28 Stat., 37); and the decision was based mainly
upon the ground that said act applied only in the case of persons whose
claim to the land embraced i the original entry had been initiated
prior to the approval of the act.
Caesar has filed a motion for review of said decision. The paper filed
by him as such, however, does not allege that there was any error in
the former decision, but is rather an abandonment of his claim under
said act of February 10, 1894, and an application to enter under the
sixth section of the act of March 2, 1889,-contending that his case
comes within the provisions of said act, according to the departmental
decision of August 10, 1897, i the ease of Nancy A. Stinson (25 L. D.,
113).
He fails to show, however, that he is qualified to make an additional
entry under said act. The act provides for the entry of
so much additional land as, added to the quantity previously so entered by him shall
not exceed one hundred and sixty acres," [by any person]" who shall lave made his
final proof .... for a quantity of land less than one hundred and sixty acres, and
received the receiver's final receipt therefor.
A careful examination of the tract-books and other records of your
office fails to show that Caesar has ever made final proof and received
the receiver's final receipt for the land originally entered by him.
The sixth section of said act of March 2, 1889, does not appear appli-
cable to his case.
The motion for review discloses no reason why the departmental
decision heretofore rendered should be disturbed. Said motion is
therefore denied.
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OAKES V. WEST IRENO CITY.
Motion for review of departmental decision of February 17, 1898;
26 L. D., 213, denied by Secretary Bliss, Mlay 3, 1898.
SWAITIP GRANT-CHARACTER OF LAND GRANTED.
STATE OF ILLINOIS.
Lands covered by an apparently permanent body of water, and meandered as a
lake, at te date of the swanmp grant do not pass under said grant.
SecretaTry Bliss to the Connnissioner of the General Land Office, May 3,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (C. J. G.)
The State of Illinois, through its agent, Isaac R. Hitt, has appealed
from your office decision of Jne 17, 1896, addressed to the Auditor of
State, holding for rejection its claimi, uinder the swamp. land act, to cer-
tain lands in Carroll county. sections 30, 31 and 32, township 24 north,
range 4 east, in said State.
These lands are fully described, and their estimated area given, in
your said office decision. They were included in a list of swamp land
selections reported to your office by the U. S. srveyor-general October
29, 1853. The plat of survey of this township was approved April 18,
1842. It shows that practically all of said lands are covered by an
apparently permanent body of water, meandered as a lake. April 22,
1854, your office called the attention of the surveyor-general to this
fact, and May 5, 1854, he reported that said lands were that day stricken
from the original list, for the reason that they had been erroneously
included therein. The surveyor-generalat the same time named a tract
that had been substituted for the lands in question.
In the decision appealed from your office held that
as the descriptions in question were, on September 26, 1850, no doubt water as con-
tradistinguished from land, it can not be held that they were granted to the State
by the swamp land act of that date.
The conclusion of your office that these lands were not of the char-
acter contemplated by the swamp land act at date of said act, is based
on the returns of the surveyor-general above referred to, and on evi-
dence contained in certain letters, one of which, dated November 27,
1871, addressed to your office, is from the county surveyor and acting
drainage commissioner of Carroll county. In said letter, after stating
that the county had commenced the drainage of the lake in townships
23 and 24, range 4, the surveyor proceeded as follows:
On the 25th of this month the lake was tapped. We will be able to finish the drain
within two weeks from this date unless the weather shall prove unfavorable. We
will sink the surface of the lake about five feet when finished, which will leave but
a few pond holes (as we confidently expect) in the bottom of the lake, etc.
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In another letter, dated November 7, 1878, from the county surveyor
and drainage commissioner of Carroll county, addressed to U. S.
Attorney General Devens, it is stated that the county drained the lake
in question at an expense of about 800O and attempted to sell the
lands; but that in injunction proceedings had relative to lands similarly
situated in township) 23 north, range 4 east, the courts of the State
awarded said lands to the riparian owners.
Under date of November 6, 1896, Isaac R. Ritt, agent of the State,
suggested that your office send an agent to examine these lands in the
field and to afford the county au opportunity to show that said lands
were not covered by a permanent body of water September 28, 1850.
In the event of a denial of his request the agent asked that the papers
in the case be transmitted to this Department as an appeal from your
office decision of June 17, 1896.
November 17, 1896, your office declined to send an agent to examine
these lands as requested, and adhered to its former decision in which
was cited the case of Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S., 371. The papers in
the case, however, were forwarded to this Department upon the request
of the agent of the State that his paper be treated as an appeal.
It is set forth in the appeal that subsequently to the original survey
of township 24 approved April 18, 1842, the lines were regularly
extended over that portion of the lake lying in township 23, and the
land laid out into lots. It is contended that the same thing should
have been done in sections 30, 31 and 32, township 2, and it is there-
fore suggested that a survey be ordered and the lines closed tip on said
sections.
The plat of survey approved in 1842 shows that the lake in township
24 was meandered, while in township 23 it was not. But aside from
this fact, the doctrine announced in Hardin v. Jordan, supra, precludes
the ordering of the survey as suggested.
It is also contended in the appeal that the rule laid down in the ease
of State of Illinois, 21 L.D., lS4, should govern this case. But the
only survey of township 24 was that approved in 1812, the plat of
which shows that nearly all the lands in question are within the mean-
der line of the lake. Hence the case referred to is not applicable to
the one under consideration.
Under the decisions of the Department the character of land at date
of the swamp grant determines whether it inures to the State there-
under. From what has been set out herein it appears that there is
sufficient evidence now before the Department upon which to base the
conclusion that at the date of the swamp grant the lands in question
were covered by an apparently permanent body of water meandered as
a lake; and for that reason did not pass to the State of Illinois under
said grant.
Your office decision is hereby affirmed.
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ISOLATED TRACT-ACT OF FEBRUARY 26, 1895.
(1. W. ALLEN.
The proviso added to section 24155 R. S., by the amendatory act of February 26,1895,
defining the conditions under which a tract of land may be treated as isolated,
contemplates that the tract involved must have been subject to the application
of any qualified person under the homestead law during the period specified in
said act.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) Mlay 4, 1898. (G. B. G.)
G. W. Allen has appealed from. your office decision of September 29,
1896, rejecting his application to have the SE. 4 of the SE. of Sec. 4,
T. 33 N., R. 1 W., Eau Claire land district, Wisconsin, ordered into
market Lunder section. 2455-of the U. S. Revised Statutes, as amended
by the act of February 20, 1895 (28 Stat., 687).
The appellant -makes no specific assignment of error, and the facts
shown by the record are meager.
It appears, however, that Allen's said application was made August
261, 1896, wherein it is stated, under oath, that said land is principally
valuable for agricultural purposes, contains no building stone or min-
eral of any kind, is uninhabited, and contains no improvements of any
kind or description, that it is also valuable at the present time for the
timber standing and growing thereon, and that
affiaut desires to have said land ordered into market so that he may purchase the
same for his own use for the purpose of agriculture, and for the timber standing and
growing thereon ..... that said land is isolated from any.other land subject to
homestead entry, and that said land above described has been-subject to homestead
entry for more than three years.
By your office decision it is made to appear that the adjoining NE.
of the SE. 4 is covered by the homestead entry of one Samuel Camp-
bell made Auguist 2, 1893, and that one Lewis Kellogg made homestead
entry for the land, which is the subject of Allen's application, on Sep-
tember 30, 1895, which was canceled by relinquishment August 26, 1896.
Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by said act of Feb-
ruary 26, 1895, is as follows:
It shall be lawful for the Commissioner of the General Land Office to order into
market and sell for not less than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre any iso-
lated or disconnected tract or parcel of the public domain less than one quarter sec-
tion which in his judgment it would be proper to expose to sale after at least thirty
days' notice by the land officers of the district in which such lands may be situated:
Provided, That lands shall not become so isolated or disconnected until the same
have been subject to homestead entry for a period of three years after the surround-
ing land has been entered, filed upon, or sold by the government: Provided, That
not more than one hundred and sixty acres shall be sold to any one person.
It is not believed that the status of the land involved is such as
authorizes its sale under said section, as amended. It does not appear
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whether there are surrounding lands which have not yet been disposed-
of. But the lands here sought to be brought within the provisions of
the law above quoted must "have been subject to homestead entry for
a period of three years after the surrounding land has been entered,
filed upon, or sold by the government." It must therefore have been
- subject to homestead entry for a period of three years from and after
August 2, 1893, the date of the homestead entry of Campbell for the
NE. -of the SE. I of the same section.
During the time the land involved was covered by the homestead
entry of Kellogg, to wit, from September 30, 1895, to August 26, 1896, it
was not subject to homestead entry" within the meaning of the
statute. It was of the class of lands subject to homestead entry, but
it is thought that the statute means that the particular tract of land the
subject of proceedings thereunder must have been subject to the appli-
cation of any qualified person under the homestead laws. The policy
of the law evidently was to offer at public sale only such isolated and
disconnected tracts of land as were not wanted by home seekers, and
it was directed that they should not be disposed of as such until they
had been subject to entry under the homestead laws for a period of
three years after the surrounding lands had been entered, filed upon,
or sold by the government.
It is significant in the present case that Allen's application to have
the land ordered into market as an isolated tract was made on the same
day that Kellogg relinquished his entry thereof.
The land in question had not been, at the date of the application
herein, subject to homestead entry for the time provided by statute.
Your office decision is therefore correct, and it is hereby affirmed.
AIINIFG CLAIXA-REINSTATEMENT-ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS.
JUANITA LODE.
Action on an application for the reinstatement of a canceled mineral entry should
be suspended, where the applicant has filed an adverse claim against the appli-
cation of a rlocator for the land covered by said entry, and suit on said claim
is pending in a court of competent jrisdiction.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. T. D.) iiay 5, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
In the case of the Juanita lode claim, Las Cruces, New Mexico,
mineral entry No. 120, made December 24, 1883, by Ethan W. Eaton,
and now here on appeal by Thomas B. Catron, as transferee of Eaton,
from your office decision of May 26, 1896, rejecting Catron's applica-
tion to have the entry reinstated (the same having been canceled June
3, 1895), it appears that subsequent to such cancellation and prior to
the filing, on June 1, 1896, of the application for reinstatement, the
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land embraced in. the said claimi was relocated by H. J. Abernathy
and John H. Laiin as the Mamie lode claim, and that on April 6, 1896-
said Abernathy and Lakin filed their application, No. 635, for patent
therefor.
It farther appears that during the period of publication for the
Mamie claim several adverse claims were filed, one of which was by
said Catron as owner of the Juanita claim; also that on July , 1896,
within the thirty days allowed by section 2326 Revised Statutes, said.
Catrou commenced suit against the Mamie applicants in a court of
competent jurisdiction to determine the question of the right of pos-
session to the laud in controversy. So far as appears, this suit is still
pending.
Under these circumstances, the court having apparently obtained
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter, the Department.
will suspend action upon the said appeal until final disposition shall
have been made of the said suit. See case of S. HI. Standart et at., 25
L. D., 262. The papers will be retained here.
ACCOTUNTS-SUREVY-SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
ISAAC N. CHAPMAN ET AL.
Under the provisions of section 8, act of July 31,1894, the acceptance of payment on
the settlement of an account by an auditor precludes a revision of said account.-
Special instructions issued by the surveyor-general, with respect to the execution of
a contract for a public survey, become, under the act of October 1, 1890 a part
of such contract if not in conflict with the manual of surveying instructions, or
the instructions of the General Land Office.
Compensation should, be allowed for the retracement of lines, though no provision
therefor is made in the contract, but the instructions of the surveyor-general
direct such re-surveys when absolutely essential, and the necessity for such.
action is fully disclosed by the field notes of survey.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) May 5, 1898. (W. M. B.)
Isaac N. Chapman and Alfred Bannister, U. S. deputy surveyors,
have appealed from the decision of your office of July 1, 1.895j wherein
their claim for compensation, amounting to $2,945.72, as per accounts
rendered for surveys made in the State of California under contract No.
100-entered into and executed by the said contracting deputies on the
one part and the surveyor-general on the other, on November 16, 1892,
and approved by the Commissioner of the General Land Office on June
13, 1893-was reduced to the sum of $2,817.69; being a disallowance of
$128.03 as charged in their said accounts.
The only items wholly rejected in said accounts and for which no
rate of mileage whatever was allowed or paid either in whole or in.
part consist of two miles, forty-two chains, six links of retracement or
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resurvey of the 8th standard line south. For the retracement of one
mile, seventy-nine chains, ninety-seven links of that part of said
standard line which forms the south boundary of sections 35 and 36
of township 32 south, range 34 east, the high rate $18.00 per mile was
charged, and for the retracement of 42 chains, .09 links of that part of
said standard line which forms the south boundary of the SW. I of SW.
X of section 31, township 32 south, range 36 east, M.D.M., the mini-
mum rate $9.00 per mile was charged, neither of which said rates was
allowed or paid for the resurvey of either line, as stated, because of
the rejection of said lines.
The total of the charge made and of compensation claimed for
retracement of the above described rejected lines for which payment
was disallowed aounts to $40.73, said rejection and disallowance
being made upon the ground, as alleged, that such retracenents or
resurveys of said lines were not authorized by contract No. 100.
Whether there was authority therefor under said contract and existing
law will be considered later on.
A further reduction or disallowance of $87.30-which in addition to
the stated disallowance of $40.73 makes up the aggregate disallowance
of $128.03 which appellants now seek to recover by a revision of the
settlement already made-was caused by the allowance only of the
minimum rates of mileage-instead of the high rates as charged-for
the survey of certain standard lines (other than those rejected as
stated), township, exterior lines, and section or subdivision lines.
The action of your office in reducing the high rates charged by
appellants for certain portions of the above named lines to low rates
was based upon the ground that the lands, as shown by the field notes,
over which said lines passed are not of that character which warrant
the allowance and payment of high rates of mileage. The contracting
deputies on the other hand, however, contend that the field notes show
that they are entitled to the high mileage rates wherever charged in
their accounts-by reason of the character of the land over which the
lines of survey passed-for those lines and parts of lines for which the
said high rates so charged were reduced to low rates.
Thus a direct issue is made as to what, as a matter of fact, the field
notes actually show with regard to the character of the lands over
wlich those lines passed which were put in the high rate olumn in
said accounts and which were taken therefrom and put in the low rate
column by your office.
On July 10, 1825, appellants received the sum of $2,817.69 from the
Department of the Treasury in payment of total amount of compensa-
tion allowed them in a settlement with the Auditor for surveys executed
under their contract.
Said amount of $2,817.69 includes payment of compensation for each
and every item of mileage-either at high or low rates-for the differ-
ent class of lines or parts of lines run and charged for in accounts
rendered by appellants, save for the hereinbefore described rejected
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standard lines for which no allowance or payment either in whole or
in part was made.
The fact that the contracting deputies have already accepted pay-
ment of the low rates of mileage allowed by the Auditor in the settle-
ment of their accounts in place of the high rates as therein charged-
under provision of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 208, Sec. 8, par.
3)-pretermits. the consideration of the question as to whether the
field notes show that the lands over which the lines passed and for
which low rates were paid, in lieu of high rates as charged, are of the
character which warrant the payment of such high rates, since the
acceptance of payment under said settlement of low rates for the items
of mileage in the accounts for which high rates were charged precludes
appellants from obtaining a revision of the former settlement and addi-
tional compensation as to those items of mileage upon which they have
accepted p ayment of any mileage rate whatever. See case ex-parte
Gilbert M. Ward (22 L. D., 583).
Hence it appears that appellants, under the state of facts related*
are barred by the terms of existing law from obtaining a revision of
the former settlement for the purpose of procuring payment of the sum
of $87.30, which was disallowed them by the Auditor for this Depart-
ment, as also by your office, notwithstanding the fact that the stated
disallowance was made upon the ground that the character of lands
over which the lines of survey passed did not justify payment of high
rates where low rates only were allowed and paid.
The only questions, therefore, which remain open for consideration
and determination, are () whether the retracements of the rejected
standard lines for which appellants claim the sum of $40.73 as com-
pensation were authorized by their contract, and (2) if such retrace-
ments were so authorized. what amount of compensation would the
deputies be entitled to therefor.
Though it appears that such retracements were not specifically pro-
vided for in the contract tinder which the surveys were made, as was
held by your office, the deputies, nevertheless, contend that since the
said retracements were made by authority of special instructions of
date November 16, 1892, issued under their contract, that they were
therefore made by authority of the contract itself.
Whether the rejected retracements were authorized by contract No.
100, must depend, in the first place, upon the terms of the referred to
special instructions, and, in the second place, upon the fact as to the
absolute necessity for making the same, and without which the surveys
contracted for could not have been completed with proper accuracy.
That portion of the said instructions germane to the particular question
now under consideration is in words following:
You vill make only such re-traceineuts and re-surveys of the line or lines of former
approved official surveys as may be found by you to be absolutely essential to the
proper completion of the new surveys as authorized, for which work you will be
allowed the same rate as those named in your contract, and payable from the same
appropriation.
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The lines, if any, which are to be re-ran and re-surveyed in order to re-establish
your beginning and closing points must be specifically described in the field notes
of the new surveys, and the necessity therefor clearly set forth, as also the fact
that no evidences of former approved surveys were found and that the line or lines
of alleged original official surveys as shown by the field notes and diagrams fur-
nished you by this office ae either fictitious or have been obliterated; also that a
faithful search has been made therefor.
Great care must be exercised in order to prevent, if possible, needless retracements
or re-surveys; hence the requirements providing for detailed statements of the
necessity and search for lines in question; all of which information must be embodied
in the field notes of the surveys provided for in your contract.
The foregoing instructions were issued by the surveyor-general and
the provision of law enacted October 1, 1890 (SupI. Rev. Stat., 2 Ed..
Vol. 1, 879), whereby the special instructions issued by said official under.
a contract become a part of such contract, is in words following:
The printed manual of surveying instructions for the survey of the public lands
of the United States and private land claims, prepared at the General Land Office,
bearing date December second, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, the instructions
of the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the special instructions of the
surveyor-general, when not in conflict with such printed manual, or the instruc-
tions of said Commissioner, shall be taken and deemed to be a part of every con-
tract for surveying the public lands of the United States and private land claims.
Whereas it does not appear that the special instructions issued by
the surveyor-general for California for the guidance of the contracting
deputies in executing surveys under contract No. 100 were in any way
in conflict with the provisions of the printed manual of surveying
instructions, or the instructions of your office, it necessarily follows
that the retracement made of the rejected standard lines were author-
ized by said contract, provided the same were " absolutely essential"
to the completion of the surveys specifically named and provided for
therein, and provided, further, the deputy surveyor making the retrace-
ments, in conformity with the requirements of special instructions,
clearly set forth in the field notes of the new survey the necessity for
making such retracements.
The object of the deputy in making the retracements for which pay-
ment was refused was for the alleged purpose of re-establishing that
portion of the 8th standard line which forms the south boundary of
township 32 south, range 35 east, M. D. M. in order to have a line upon
which to close, and complete the survey of said township and range
specifically provided for in appellants contract.
There being, as will be hereafter shown, no corner discoverable along
the referred to portion of said standard line which, as stated, forms
the south boundary of township 32 south, range 35 east-established
almost forty years prior to the new surveys and retracements-from.
which to run and mark the same, the deputy who made the retrace-
ments went to the old corner to sections 34 and 35, township 32 south,
range 34, east (1 mile, 79 chains, 97 links west of the locus of obliterated
corner to township 32 south, ranges 34 and 35 east) pointed out to him
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by the county surveyor, as the nearest discoverable corner from which
to start and re-establish that part of the said 8th standard line to the
south of township 32 south, range 35 east.
In order to re-establish said line the deputy retraced the 8th standard
line between the old corner to sections 34 and 35, township 32 south,
range 34 east, and the point ascertained by retracement to be the locus
of quarter section corner of section 31, township 32 south, range 36
east, a distance a little over eight miles and a half, at which latter
place was found a mound, with no post thereat, or any tree within 300
links thereof by which the old corner could be identified.
Whether the retracements along the entire length o the above
described line were necessary or not for the reestablishment of that
particular portion of the 8th standard line-6 miles, 2 chains, 55 links
long-which extends along and forms the south boundary of township
32 south, range 35 east, must be determined, in the absence of any
other evidence, solely by that disclosed by the transcript of. field notes
of said retracements, made in connection with the new surveys.
The field notes of said retracements show that there was no trace of
an old corner at the locus of the corner to township 32 south, ranges 34
and 35 east, or at that of the corner to township 32 south, ranges 35 and
36 east, there being no mound or post, or the remains of either, at said
points, or any tree within 300 links thereof, whereby said corner could
be identified. The field notes further show that there was no trace of
a corner found along the whole length of the standard line between the
points above named, or any tree within three hundred links of where
the old quarter-section and section corners were originally established,
save at the locus of the old corner to sections 33 and 34, where only a
mound was found, without post in place, or any tree within three hun-
dred links of said mound, whereby the particular corner at which the
mound was erected could be identified.
It further appears from the field notes that the nearest traces or
marks which remained of old corners on the 8th standard line south,
outside of township 32 south, range 35 east, were found-one to the
west and the other to the east of said township and range-at the locus
of what the retracements proved to be the quarter section corner of
section 36, township 32 south, range 34 east, and at the locus of which
was, in similar manner, shown to be the quarter-section corner of see-
tion 31, township 32 south, range 36 east, respectively, which consisted
of te remains of a mound, without post in place, or any tree within
three hundred links thereof, whereby either point could be identified as
being the locus of a quarter-section or section corner.
A mound merely-such as was found by retracement to be the locUs
of the corner to sections 33 and 34, upon that part of the 8th standard
line which forms the south boundary of township 32 south, range 35
east, without post in place, or any tree in vicinity thereof, whereby the
particular corner at which the mound was found could be identified,
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would not be considered as sufficient indicia, to identify an old corner
to be used as a starting point from which to, run and re-establish said
boundary or standard lines. Nor was there found at the point of the
quarter-section corner of section 36, township 32 south, range 34 east,
or at that of quarter-section corner of section 31, township 32 south,
range 36 east, similarly marked-post being gone at each point, and no
tree within three hundred links of mound-sufficient evidence of an old
corner from which to start, run, mark, and relocate that portion of the
referred to standard line to be. used as a closing line.
There being no old corner discoverable or capable of being identified
by search, as shown by the field notes, either at the point where the
corner to township 32 south, ranges 34 and 35 east, or the corner to
township 32 south, ranges 35 and 36 east should be, or at any point
along the standard line between the points last named, or at the point
where the nearest quarter-section corners should be on said line to the
south of the adjoining townships, and ranges, the deputy went to a
known corner to sections 34 and 35 of township 32 south, range 34 east,
(pointed out to him, as stated hereinbefore, by the county surveyor) on
the same standard line-i mile, 79 chains, 97 links west of the locus of
the corner to township 32 south, ranges 34 and 35 east-for a starting
point, or beginning corner, from which to run, retrace and relocate the
standard line upon which the sbdivisional lines of surveys on the
south of township 32 south, range 35 east, were closed.
The facts in the case at bar differ from those in the case of ex-parte
George W. Pearson, U. S. deputy surveyor (22 L. D., 471) wherein
compensation was disallowed for certain retracements made by said
deputy for the alleged purpose of finding the corners of former surveys
from which to run and establish lines of the new surveys.
The terms of the special instructions under which the retracements
were made by Pearson, and those by virtue of which the retracements
in the case at bar were executed, are similar-if not identical in word-
ing-in all essential particulars.
The disallowance of compensation for the retracements referred to.
and described in the cited case was made for the reasons, (1) that in
certain instances Pearson unnecessarily retraced old lines for a con-
siderable distance for the purpose, ostensibly, of finding old corners for
starting points, which, as shown by the field notes returned by said
deputy, were marked and identifiable by mounds, posts, and witness
trees in place, and were therefore-with the aid of the diagram and
field notes of the old survey-as easily discoverable by search, and with-
out retracement, as were the corners from which the retracements were
started, and (2) because in certain other instances where retracements
were deemed necessary by the deputy and were accordingly made to find
corners of former surveys to be used as beginning corners from which.
to run and establish lines in the new surveys the deputy failed to set
forth in his field notes the œecessity for making such retracements as
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was prescribed by the special instructions by authority of which he
claimed the same were made.
The provision contained in special instructions, stipulating that
retracements for the purpose of finding established corners of old sur-
veys as starting points in new surveys, must not be made except upon
the sole condition that the same are found to be " absolutely essential
for purpose stated, and the further provision that when such retraue-
ments are made for said purpose the necessity therefor must be "clearly
set forth in the field notes," are material conditions of the contract
under which the surveys are made, and as necessary to be discharged
or performed by a contracting deputy surveyor, in the manner stipu-
lated in special instructions, as any other condition imposed by, the
terms of contraet, in order to entitle said deputy to compensation for
work done by or under authority of such special instructions.
In other words the terms of a contract with regard to the above
mentioned requirements or conditions must be strictly complied with,
and the failure of a deputy to embody in the transcript of field notes
returned by him information, as Pearson failed to do' which his con-
tract expressly stipulated should be set forth therein, constitutes a
defect in said field notes and a breach of the terms of the contract
which cannot be supplied or cared by a supplemental statement-such
as were shown in the Pearson case, supra, to have been made and filed
for the purpose of showing the ecessity for certain rejected retrace-
ments-which could not be incorporated into the field notes and thereby
made to form a part thereof.
All field notes must conform strictly to the instructions under which
surveys or resurveys are made and must be complete within them-
selves, as appear to be those returned by appellants in connection
with the surveys and resurveys or retracements made by them and
now under examination.
Where payment is authorized by special instructions for retrace-
ments only to ind old corners for starting points in new surveys which
cannot be discovered by search, and when a trace merely remains
at the locus thereof which is insufficient, in connection with the
assistance of a. diagram and field notes of the former survey, for the
identification of such corners, compensation should be allowed only for
retracements absolutely necessary for locating the beginning corners,
and for only so much of the line or lines, retraced and intervening
between said starting points and the nearest discoverable corners.
Since it appears from the fact herein related, as disclosed by the
field notes, that it was "absolutely essential" for the deputy to make
the retracements herein described for the purpose already stated and
for which no compensation was allowed-the deputy having started,
as. hereinbefore shown, from the nearest discoverable or known corner
to township 32 south, range 35 east to re-establish the standard line
on the south thereof-and since the necessity for making said retrace-
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meats is clearly and fully set forth in the field notes, appellants are
entitled, under the terms of their contract, to payment therefor.
It appears from the field notes that the retraced standard line, to
the extent of 1 mile. 79 chains, 97 links, extended over land of a char-
acter for which payment of compensation at the rate of $18.00 per
mile was authorized by contract, and that said standard line to the
extent of 42 chains, .09 links passed over land of a character for which
payment of $9.00 per mile was authorized, whereby appellants are
entitled to $40.73 for said retracemenits made along said lines as
claimed by them.
For reasons herein stated the decision of your office disallowing
appellants the compensation claimed for said retracements is hereby
'reversed, and it is hereby ordered that you readjust the account of
appellants as to the above described items amounting to $40.73, and
certify said account for payment for said amount.
SETTLEMENT RIGHTS-DURESS.
KELSO V. HICKIAN.
The right of a settler on the public land must rest upon his personal and actual
settlement alone, and neither the ownership of improvements, nor possession
through an agent, constitute him a bonafide settler.
Inl determiuiug whether a plea of duress, i excuse of absence from land, is good,
the age an c physical condition of the party setting up such plea may properly
be considered.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Con2missioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. I).) May 5, 1898. (C. W. P.)
Cicero C. Hickman has appealed from the decision of your office of
May 17, 1897, boldiing his homestead entry, No. 3235, of lots 3 and 4, and
the E. A of the SW. i of Sec. 19, T. 21, R. 8 E., Perry land district, Okla
homna Territory, subject to Charles M. Kelso's superior right to said
land.
The record shows that said Kelso made a application, by mail, to
enter said land as a homestead, which was received by the local officers
on October 30, 1893; that on November 3, 1893, said Hickman was per-
mitted to make homestead entry of the same; that on November 22,
1893, the local officers rejected Kelso's application for insufficient spe-
cial affidavit, and conflict with Hickman's homestead eutry; that Kelso
appealed to your office, which affirmed the judgmient of the local offi-
cers; that on a further appeal to the Department, your office decision
was modified, and a hearing ordered to determine the rights of the
parties. A hearing was had and a decision rendered in the case by
the local officers on June 8,1896, in which it was held that as Hickman
made his entry long before Kelso established his residence on the laud,
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Rickman had the better right to the laud, and they recommended that
Kelso's contest be dismissed. Kelso appealed. Your office held that
Kelso made a, valid settlement on the land on October 23, and 24,1893;
and established residence thereon within a reasonable time; that Hick-
mail's ai o settlement, prior to Kelso's settlement, was invalid, and
that lie must rely upon his entry alone for his right to bold the land;
that Kelso had a good excuse for leaving the land on November 17,
1893, and that, even if lie had not a valid excuse, he cured any laches
of which he may have been guilty in that respect, by reestablishing
his residence on March 29, 1894,which was within less than fivellonths
after lie had moved away. Your office further held that, as Kelso's
application to enter was executed before the Probate Judge and ex
officio clerk of County Q and received at the local office by mail on
October 30, 1893, and was accompanied by his affidavit, alleging that
he is prevented by a distance of fifty-five miles from appearing at the
local land office at Perry to enter the land, and that he is physically
unable to go to the land office to make his entry, and as said applica-
tion was received by the local officers before Hickman's application was
presented, Kelso had the prior right to the land.
From this decision Hickman appealed to the Department.
The evidence is correctly stated in your office decision.
If it be conceded that Hickman ate his dinner and cut and burned
some brush on the land on October 17, 1893, and that Edwards, as his
agent, but during Hickman's absence, raised the foundation which
Edwards had placed upon the land on September 16, 1893, with his
name written thereon, Tour logs higher, and did some plowing on
October 23, 1893. yet they did not constitute evidence of settlement on
the part of Hickman. Te right of a settler on the public land must
rest upon his personal and actual settlement alone, and neither the
ownership of the improvements, nor possession by means of the
improvement of the land by an agent, constitute him a bonafide settler.
Culver v. McMillan, 17 L. D., 501; Esperance v. Ferry, 13 L. D., 142;
Willis v. Parker, 8 L. D., 623; Knight v. Haucke, 2 L. D., 188. He
must therefore rely solely on his homestead entry made oi November
3 1893, and as the testimony shows that Kelso performed valid acts of
settlement ol the land on October 23, and 24, 1893, before Hickman
made his entry, and that he moved his family on the land on November
11, 1893, thereby establishing residence within a reasonable time, it
seems to be clear that he has a valid claim to the land on the ground
of priority of settlement.
For it is apparent from a consideration of the whole evidence that
Hickman, accompanied by his uncle, Edwards, and three other men,
one of whom was armed with a " six-shooter," and another with a six-
shooter" and a "Winchester rifle," went upon the land on November
14, 1893, with the purpose of intimidating Kelso and frightening him
off the land, in which lie was entire]y successful, Kelso leaving the land
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with his family. While the display of force testified to might not
amount to duress with some men, when it is remembered that Kelso
was advanced in years and in feeble health, the facts disclosed by the
evidence were abundantly sufficient to fill the mind of such a man as
Kelso with the belief that a refusal to leave the laud would subject him
and his family to personal injury-that he did not voluntarily abandon
the land is shown by the fact that he re-established his residence
within a little more than four months after he moved away.
For these reasons the decision of your office is affirmed.
HOMESTEAD ENTRY-ADJOINING FARM ENTRY.
CHARLES B. FRANCIS.
An application to change a homestead entry for one hundred and sixty acres into an
adjoining farm entry, may be allowed on relinquishment of one subdivision
embraced in the original entry, and the purchase of a tract adjacent to the
remainder, and due showing of residence on the deeded land.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, May 6,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (C. J. W.)
July 12, 1895, Charles B. Francis made homestead entry for the SE.
4 of the SW. of Sec. 27, and the NE. 4 of the NW. a the W. J of
the NE. of See. 34, T. 20 N., R. 20 W., Harrison land district,
Arkansas.
On September 14, 1890, he tendered his relinquishment as to the SE. 4
of the SW. i of Sec. 27, T. 20 N., R. 20 W., included in his homestead
entry of July 12, 1895, and; on the salne day filed application to change
the character of his original homestead entry to that of an adjoining
farm entry.
The basis of the application is a corroborated affidavit of said Charles
B. Francis, in which he is identified as the person who made the home-
stead entry referred to, and avers that he still owns it and that it is
unencumbered; that to obtain a more convenient building site and one
nearer to water, he desires to relinquish the SE. 4 of the SW. of See.
27, and have the character of his entry changed, having purchased
forty acres adjoining said homestead; that he established residence on
said homestead about December 1, 1895; has a small house, orchard of
eighty fruit trees, one acre cleared, and five acres deadened-worth
about eighty dollars. O the deeded land the improvements are worth
three hundred and fifty dollars.
The relinquishment and application to change the character of the
entry were forwarded to your office without recomniendation by the
local officers.
On October 25, 1896, your office rejected said application.
The applicant has appealed to the Department.
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After your office rejected said application, on which date Francis still
appeared to be residinng upon the land embraced in his homestead entry,
to wit, on November 13, 1896, e filed the usual adjoining farm home-
stead affidavit, which was transmitted-With the record, and from which
it appears that he was then residing upon the deeded land. As
between him and the government there is no longer any good reason
why his application should not be favorably considered, it oily affect-
ing land already covered by his homestead entry. Having shown that
he is now residing upon deeded land which adjoins the three forties-for
which he desires to perfect entry. under the last clause of section 2289
of the Revised Statutes, it would appear that his application is within
the spirit of said clause.
Under this changed state of facts, your office decision is reversed and
the relinquishment of the SE. i of the SW. of Sec. 27 is accepted,
and Francis's homestead entry canceled as to it, and his application to
change the character of said homestead entry as to the three remaining
forties covered by it, to that of adjoining farm homestead, is. allowed.
MILLE IAC INDIAN LANDS-EQU'TTABLE AJIUICATION.
ANDREW S. ANDERSON.
A homestead entry of Mille Lac Indian lands, made after the receipt at the local
ofce of the departmental ruling of April 22, 1892, and hence not confirmed by
the joint resolution of December 19, 1893, may be submitted for equitable action,
after final proof, it appearing that the claim of the entryman was initiated and
maintained in good faith by settlement and otherwise at a time when the lands
were open to homestead entry, and nio adverse claim exists.
Secretary Bliss to the Comnissioner of the' General Lactnd Offlce, May 6,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (F. C. D.)
Andrew; S Anderson has appealed from the decision of your office,
dated April 28, 1896, holding for cancellation his homestead entry,
for the SE. of Sec. 14, T. 42 N., 1l. 26 W., St. Cloud land district,
Minnesota.
The ground of said decision was that the laud described is embraced,
within the former Mille Lac Indian reservation, andis therefore subject
to. disposal only under the act of anuary 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 6 2; 14
I. D., 497); that said entry having been made since the receipt, by the-
district land office at Taylors Falls, of your office letter communicating
to them the departmental decision of April 22, 1892 (14 L. D., 497,
supra), is not confirmed by the joint resolution of December 19, 1893
(28 Stat., 576).
It appears that the applicant, Anderson, on February 18, 1891, con-
tested the prior entry of one William Ryder for the 'and in question;
that the contest was decided in favor of Anderson on April 14, 1891;
that a re-hearing was ordered on the ground that the notice of contest,
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addressed to Ryder, was defective; that the decision on rehearing was
also in. favor of Anderson; that Ryder's entry was canceled by your
offilce letter of May 25, 1894; and that on June 6, 1894, Anderson was
permitted to make homestead entry of the land. Furthermore, that he
has been residing on the land since 1887, and has made improvements
thereon to the value of about one thousand dollars.
In his appeal Anderson alleges and contends that by his residence
and improvements he has acquired a right to the land; that his entry
~would have been made in 1891, and therefore would have been con-
firmed by the joint resolution of December 19, 1893, spra, but for. the
mistake of the local officers in issuing a defective notice to Ryder; and
that his right to make entry of the land was initiated by his applica-
tion filed with his affidavit of contest of Ryder's entry.
The question whether lie acquired any right by virtue of his applica-
tion filed upon the initiation of his contest of Ryder's entry may be
determined by reference to the language of said joint resolution of
December 19, 1893 (28 Stat., 576); which provides: -" that all bona fide
pre emption or homestead filings or entries allowed for lands within the
Mille Lac Indian reservation, in the State of Minnesota," between Janu-
ary 9, 1891, and the date of receipt of notice, by the local officers at
Taylor's Falls, of the departmental decision of April 22, 1892, shall be
confirmed. Notice of said decision was sent to the Taylors Falls
office by your office letter of May 3, 1892; when it was received by the
Taylors Falls office does not appear, but certainly long prior to the date
of Anderson's entry (June 6, 894, supra,).
Anderson's entry not having been allowed within the period specified
by the joint resolution of December 19,1893, was not confirmed thereby.
It therefore appears that no relief can be granted by this Depart-
ment in the ordinary course of proceeding; but as it is shown that
Anderson has been a settler upon this land for a number of years, has
made valuable improvements, to the amount of about $1,000.00, has
shown good faith in the matter of settlement and the prosecution of
his contest, which was initiated during the period when entries were
allowed upon the lands, and were afterwards confirmed by the said
joint resolution above referred to, and that there is no adverse claim to
the land, it seems that on principles of equity and justice Anderson
should be allowed to perfect title to the land through action at the
proper time by the Board of Equitable Adjudication; and with that
action in view, and for that purpose, Anderson will be allowed a reason-
able time within which to submit final proof on his entry. You will
instruct the local officers to that effect, and further instruct them that
,upon submission of said proof, if the same appears regular in all other
respects, they will issue filial certificate thereon, which certificate will
be held subiect to the action of the Board, to which you will please
forward the case under the "special" rule, upon receipt of the-proof
and papers in your office.
The decision of your office herein is so modified.
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LORENZO D. CHANDLER.
Motion for review of departmental decision of September 3, 1897, 25
L. D., 205, denied by Secretary Bliss May 7, 1898.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDEMINITY SILECTION-DESIGNATION OF LOSS.
WILLIAM MICKEY.
Indemnity selections are made under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior,
and the enforcement of any requirement in the matter of a specification of a loss
is only for his information, and as a bar to the enlargement of the grant, and
may be waived whenever he deems such course advisable.
Secretary Bliss to the Conimissioner of the General Land Office, llay 7,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (F. W. C.)
With your office letter of April 23, 1898, was forwarded a motion,
filed on behalf of William Mickey, for review of departmental decision
of March .10, 1898 (not reported), in which this Department refused to
recommend the institution of suit to recover the title conveyed by the.
patent issued to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company for the S. j of
the SE. , Sec. 3, T. 129 N., R1. 35 W., St. Cloud land district, Minnesota.
This tract is within the indemnity limits of the grant for said com-
pany, was included in its list filed November 7, 1883, and was patented
May 29, 1896.
On March 2, 1896, Hickey tendered a homestead application for this
land, alleging settlement October 10, 1884, and a hearing was ordered
upon said allegation of settlement prior to the issue of patent to the
railroad, but notice of the same was not received at your office until
after the issue of said patent.
The original selection of the company, which was prior to the settle-
ment alleged by Hickey, was not accompanied by a designation of a
loss as the basis therefor, and under the principle announced in the
case of John 0. Miller (11 L. D., 428) it was urged that said original
selection was not protected by departmental order of May 28, 1883 (12
L. D., 196), and was therefore no bar to Mickey's settlement.
As stated in the previous decision, the company filed a list of losses
in 1892, which were arranged tract for tract with the selected lands in
the subsequent list of May 16, 1895.
This. was all done before the tender of the application by Mickey,
made the basis of the present contest.
Indemnity selections are made under the direction of the Secretary
of the Interior, and the enforcement of any requirement in the matter
of a specification of a loss is only for his information, and as a bar to
the enlargement of the grant, and may be waived whenever he deems
such a course advisable.
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In this instance the lists filed subsequently to November 7, 1883,
were but supplemental to the list filed on that date, and the patenting
of the land related as of the date of the filing of the original list, so far
as intervening claims are concerned, the records appearing to be clear
at the date of patent, and nothing occurring in the subsequent. lists to
work an abandonment of the original list.
The approval being under the supervision of the Secretary of the
Interior, e might, upon the showing now made by Hickey, if it had
been before him then, have refused approval of the comnpany's list, but,
as stated in the opinion now under review,
Having been approved, however, and patent issued, the discretion vested in the
Secretary of the Interior has been exercised, and it is not believed that the showing
made warrants the recommendation of suit for the recovery of the title passed.
The motion is accordingly denied.
NEFF v. SNIDER.
Motion for review of departmental decision of March 15, 1898, 26
L. D., 389, denied by Secretary Bliss May 7, 1898.
MINING CLAIM-LODE WITHIN PLACER-LODE LOCATION.
CRIPPLE CREEK GOLD MINING CO. V. MT. ROSA MINTNG, MILLING
AND AND CO.
A lode location subsequent to, and in conflict with, a placer location, but made prior
to application for placer patent, does not, when based alone on a discovery out-
side the ]imits of the placer claim, and at one side thereof only, establish the
fact that the lode or vein thus claimed was known to exist within the boundaries
of said placer at the date of application for patent thereto.
The burden of proof is with a lode claimant who assails a placer patent on the
ground that it embraces lodes or veins known to exist at date of application for
such patent, and avers that such lodes or veins were consequently excepted from
the operation of the patent.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of te General Land, 0 ce, May 7,
(W.. D.) 1898. (P. J. C.)
The Mt. Rosa placer, survey No. 7407, Pueblo, Colorado, land dis-
trict, was located September 19, 1891, application for patent thereto was
made August 5, 1892, and pateht was issued April 24, 1893. The placer
application stated that certain veins or lodes were situate within the
boundaries of the placer claim, some of which were included in, and
others excluded from, the application, but it contained no mention of
the Kohnyo vein or lode.
March 7, 1894, The Cripple Creek Gold Mining Company made appli-
cation for patent for the Fortuna and Kohnyo lode mining clai s sur-
vey No. 8612. The Kohnyo claim was located October 2, 1891, after
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 623
the location of the placer claim and before the application for the
placer patent and is intersected about its center by one corner of the
placer which extends across the lode claim from one side line to the
other, thus dividing the lode claim into two non-iontignous tracts.
The Kohnyo claimant did not adverse the placer application.
August 10, 1895, the 1ohnyo claimant filed in your office, in connec-
tion with the prosecution of its application for patent, a petition
alleging that the K:ohuyo vein or lode was, at the time of the placer
application, known to exist within the boundaries of the placer and
was therefore excepted and excluded from the placer patent, and ask-
ing that in the event of its establishing this allegation, it be permitted
to obtain patent to the ground in conflict under the ruling of the South
Star Lode (20 L. D., 204).
On consideration of this petition your office, by letter of September
16, 1895, held that if said vein or lode was known to exist when the
placer application was made, August 5,1892, the title thereto remained
in the United States and could now be acquired under the laws relating
to lode claims, and ordered a hearing to determine the truth of the.
lode claimant's allegations.
A hearing was had before the local officers, who held that no vein or
lode was known to exist within the ground in conflict at the date of
the placer application. .On appeal, your office, October 22, 1897,
affirmed this decision. The case is now before the Department on fur-
ther appeal by the lode claimant, who alleges error in this finding of
the local office and of your office and in a ruling requiring the lode
claimant to assume the burden of proving the known existence of the
vein or lode at the time of the placer application.
In 1891 a shaft was sunk in the Kohnyo location about ten and one-
half feet deep, in which a vein or lode of mineral was discovered, and
in 1892 a second shaft was suk therein to a depth of twenty or twenty-
five feet, prior to August 5, 1892, the date of the placer application.
The work in this second shaft disclosed two or three small veins, but
whether any of them was the vein disclosed in the first shaft was not
known. Both shafts were, outside of the placer boundaries and near
the northerly end of the lode claim, being distant about two hundred
feet from the intersection of the claimed vein with the placer boundary.
These veins or lodes had not been shown at that time to possess min-
erals of sufficient quantity and quality to give them commercial value
or to justify expenditure in their extraction. So far as disclosed the
veins or lodes in the two shafts, appeared to take the general direction
of the lode claim and their continuous existence in that direction for
the fll length of the claim, would have carried them through the con-
flicting portion of the placer, but their presence either within the
placer boundaries or in the southerly end of the lode claim was not
shown by any discovery or development before the application was
made for the placer patent. During the years 1891 and 1892 some
small holes were dug in the northerly and southerly ends of the lode
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claim and outside of the placer boundaries, but they did not disclose
the presence of any vein or lode. This is all that was done in the way
of discovery and tracing of the vein i question prior to the date of
the placer application. Much testimony was produced at the hearing
respecting the subsequent discovery and tracing of a vein or veins
across and through the ground in conflict, but since the lights of the
placer patentee are to be determined by the conditions prevailing at
the date of the placer application, evidence of subsequent discovery
and development can not throw any light upon those conditions and
should not be consideredl. Such subsequent discovery and develop-
ment could not act retrospectively and change or affect the knowledge
possessed by the placer claimant or others at the time of the applica-
tion for placer patent. Upon this question it was said in United States
v. Iron Silver Alining Co. (128 U. S., 673,683):
Lodes.and veins in quartz or other rock in place, bearing gold or silver or other
metal, were not disclosed when the application for the patents was made. The sub-
sequent discovery of lodes upon the ground, and their successful working, does not
affect the good faith of the application. That must be determined by what was
known to exist at the time.
See also Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Co. (143 U. S., 431,434).
It is contended that the Kohnyo vein is shown to have outcropped
throughout the length of the lode claim, including the conflict with the
placer, to such an extent as to be visible to one making an examination
of the surface, and that this charged the placer claimant with knowl-
edge of its existence. The evidence on the part of the lode claimant
upon this point is not convincing. While some ofthe witnesses say,
in a general way, that the vein did so outcrop, the substance of their
testimony is that "float," more or less stained with mineral, was found
on the surface of the claim at different points, but that these indica-
tions could not be traced continuously through the claim or through
the ground in conflict. One of these witnesses, an original locator -of
the Kohnyo, says: "We could not tell whether it was float from this
vein or not."
The testimony on behalf of the placer patentee is to the effect that
these so-called outcroppings consist of granite boulders not in a con-
tinuous line, and not having the appearance of a vein; that there is
too much soil everywhere on the claim except on the summit of the
ridges to see an outcrop and that in the gulch or ravine it was more
than eight feet through the wash to solid formation.
That portion or section 2333 of the Revised Statutes which controls
this case reads as follows:
and where a vein or lode . . . . is known to exist within the boundaries of a
placer claim, an application for a patent for such placer claim which does not include
an application for the vein or lode claim shall- be construed as a conclusive declara-
tion that the claimant of the placer claim has no right of possession of the vein or
lode claim; but where the existence of a vein or lode in a placer claim is not known,
a patent for the placer claim shall convey all vailable mineral and other deposits
within the boundaries thereof.
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The application for the placer patent did not include an application
for the Kohuyo-vein or lode, and it necessarily follows from the language
of the statute that if that vein or lode was known to exist within the
placer boundaries at the time of the placer application, the failure of
the placer claimant to include therein an application for such vein or
lode must be construed as a conclusive declaration tat it had no right
or claim thereto. Upon the other hand, if te existence of the vein or
lode in the placer claim was not known at that time, by the terms of
the statute it was embraced in the placer patent and conveyed to the
patentee therein.
The questions therefore which arise upon the record and upon the
lode claimant's appeal are: First, whether it is shown that this vei or
lode was known to exist within the placer boundaries at the time of the
placer application; and, second, whether the burden of proving such
known existence was rightly placed upon the lode claimant.
It is contended that the location of the vein or lode, October 2, 1891,
based upon a discovery made outside of the placer boundaries and
about two hundred feet to the north thereof, gave it the status of a
known vein or lode within the meaning of the statute even though the
actual existence thereof had not been discovered eitlier within or to the
south of the placer claimn. The existence of a vein or lode is necessary
tothe making of a lode location. The thing located is the mineral-
bearing vein or lode and the surface ground which can be taken " along
the vein or lode" is an incident thereto intended to facilitate the con-
Ivenient and safe working of the mine. Where the existence of a vein
or lode within a placer claim is otherwise nknown its existence is not
made known by the mere inclusion of that ground within a lode loca-
tion. The marking of a lode claim upon the ground and the recording
of the location notice may actually or constructively extend to others
the knowledge upon which the lode claimants based their location, but
it canl not make known a vein or lode the existence' of which is other-
wise altogether unknown. The fact that the surface area in conflict
was claimed under the lode location prior to the placer application, is
not in itself controlling, for if, in fact, the vein or lode was not known
to exist within the placer boundaries at that time it was conveyed to
the placer claimant by the placer patent. The statute so provides in
clear and unambiguous terms. In Iron Silver Mining C(o. v. Reynolds
(124 U. S., 374,382), the court said:
The statute does not except veins or lodes " laimned or known to exist" but only
such as are "known to exist," and it fixes the time at which such knowledge is to be
had as that of the application for the patent.
The supreme court has had frequent occasion to consider and deter-
mine what constitutes a known vein or lode. In United States v. Iron
Silver Mining Co. (128 U. S., 673, 683), it was said:
It is not enough tat there may have been some indications by outcroppings on the
surface, of the existence of lodes or veins of rock in place bearing gold or silver or
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other metal, to justify their designation as "linown" veins or lodes. To meet that
designation the lodes or veins must be clearly ascertained, and be of such extent as
to render the land more valuable on that account, and justify their exploitation.
In Dahl v. Raunheim (132 U. S., 260, 263), referring to the claimed
existence of a known vein or lode within a placer claim at the time of
the application for placer patent, the court said:
There was nc, evidence of any lode existing within the boundaries of his claim,
either when the plaintiff made his application or at any time before. The discovery
by the defendant of the Dahl lode, two or three hundred feet outside of those
boundaries, does not, as observed by the court below, create any presumption of the
possession of a vein or lode within those boundaries, nor, we may add, that a vein
or lode existed within them.
In Tron Silver Mining Co. v. Mike and Starr Co. (143 U. S., 394, 404),
the court said:
It is nndoubtedly tree, that not every crevice in the rocks, norevery outcroppping
on the surface, which saggests the possibility of mineral, or which may, on sebsequent
exploration, be found to develop ore of great value, can be adjudged a known vein
or lode within the meauing of the statute.
In Sullivan v. Iron Silver Miiing Co. (143 U. S., 431, 435), the court
held:
And after tat, defendants offered a ass of testimony, the scope of which was
similar to that condemned as insulicient in the case of Iron Silver Mining Co. r.
Reynolds, spra. Its purport was that it was commonly believed that underlying
all the country in that vicinity was a nearly horizontal vein or deposit, frequently
called a blanket vein; and that the parties who were instrumental in securing this
placer patent shared in that belief, and obtained the patent with a view to there-
after developing such underlying vein. But whatever beliefs may have been enter-
tained generally, or by the placer patentees alone, there was up to the time the
patent was obtained no knowledge in respect thereto. It was, so far as disclosed hy
this testimony, on the part of everybody, patentees included, merely a matter of
speculation and belief, based not on any discoveries in the placer tract, or any trac-
ings of- a vein or lode adjacent thereto, bt on the fact that quite anumber of shafts
sunk elsewhere in the district had disclosed horizontal deposits of a particular kind
of ore, which it was argued might be merely parts of a single vein of continuous
extension through all that territory. Such a belief is not the knowledge required
by the section. In the case referred to this court said: "There may be difficulty
in determining whether such knowledge in a given case was had, but between
mere belief and knowledge there is a wide difference. The court could not make
them synonymous by its charge, and thus in effect incorporate new terms into the
statute."
See also Migeon et al. v. Montana Central Ry. Co. (77 Fed. Rep., 249;
44 U. S. App., 724).
. The rulings of the supreme court upon the exception of mining claims
from townsite patents are also worthy of consideration in this connec-
tion. In Dower v. Richards (151 U. S., 658, 663) it was said:
It is established by former decisions of this court, that, under the acts of Congress
which govern this case, in order to except mines or mineral lands from the operation
of a town-site patent, it is not sufficient that the lands do in fact contain minerals,
or even valuable minerals, when the town site patent takes effect; but they must at
that time be known to contain minerals of such extent and value as to justify
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expenditures for the purposes of extracting them; and if the lands-are not known
at that tilme to be so valuable for mining prposes, the fact that they have once
been valuable, or are afterwards discovered to be still valuable, for such purposes,
does not defeat or impair the title of persons claiming under the town-site patent.
Deffeback r. Hawke, 115 U. S., 392; Davis tv. Weibbold, 139 U. S., 507.
Examined and considered in the light of these decisions the evidence
in the case at bar, as hereinbefore summarized, does not show that any
vein or lode was known to exist within the ground in conflict when the
placer patent was applied for. This conclusion eceives some support
in the conduct of the lode claimant. f the lode location embraced
a vein or lode the existence of which within the placer boundaries was
then ascertained and known, an adverse claim duly filed and prose-
cuted would have resulted in the direct and special exclusion from the
placer patent of such known vein or lode and the djoining surface
area rightfully incident thereto. While the exception of a known vein
or lode not applied for by the placer claimant does ot depend upon
the filing and prosecution of an adverse claim, the fact remains that
this course presents the iost effectual means of obtaining a final and
satisfactory determination and adjustment of the rights of the conflict-
iDg claimants. The lode claimant, hovever, did not adverse the placer
application, but permitted the issuance of a patent for the area in con-
flict as placer ground, April 24, 1893. March 7, 1894, it made applica-
tion for patent for the lode claim excluding therefrom and from the
published and posted notices thereof the area in conflict, and mineral
entry thereof, likewise excluding the conflict, was made March , 1895.
It was not until after your office had ruled that the non-contiguous
tracts upon either side of the intersecting placer claim could not be
entered as one lode claim and had required the lode claimant to elect
which of the two tracts it would take, that any right was asserted
under the lode claim to the area in conflict. Under these circum-
stances it was that the existence of a vein or lode within the placer
boundaries was alleged to have been known when the placer applica-
tion was made. While this subsequent conduct of 'the lode claimant
could not alter or change the conditions existing at the time of the
placer application and by which the. rights of the parties must be
determined, it may properly be referred to and considered as tending
to show the lode claimants' estimate and opinion of those conditions
and of its rights thereunder.
The placer claimant has a government patent for the land in contro-
versy, obtained upon a showing held by the land department to estab-
lish the placer character thereof, and the lode claimant has attacked
that patent alleging that this land contained when the patent was
applied for a known vein or lode and was therefore excepted from the
operation of the patent. This allegation amounts to nothing if not
sustained by proof. The placer patentee was certainly not called upon
to support the title apparently conferred by the patent, simply because
it was assailed'by some one who found therein an obstacle to the
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obtaining of title to the same ground. It was therefore incumbent
upon the lode claimant to establish the truth of its allegations, and the
burdei of proving them was rightly placed upon it. Discovery Placer
Claim v. urry (25 L. D., 460, 463).
For the reasons stated your office decision is affirmed.
OLSON V. TRAVER ET AL.
Motion for review of departmental decision of March 10, 1898, 26
L. D., 350, denied by Secretary Bliss, May 7, 1898.
RLAILROAD GIIANT--INDEMNITY-ACT OF JDE 22, 1874.
FLORIDA CENTRAL AND PENINSULAR R. R. Co. v. MCDONALD.
A possessory claim to public land, not asserted under the public land lavs but rest-
ing on the prior possession of another, does not operate to appropriate such land
as aainst the right of a railroad company to select the same under the act of
June 22, 1874.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Qifice, IlJay 7,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (C. W. P.)
The Florida Central and Peninsular Railroad Company has appealed
from your office decision of July 17, 1896, holding for cancellation the
selection of said company of the NE. 1 of the NE. of Sec. 4, T. 30 S.,
R. 21 E., Gainesville laud district, Florida.
The record shows that this tract was selected by said company on
May 2, 1887, the selection being made under the provisions of the act of
June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 194); that James i. McDonald, in 1893, applied
to enter said tract as a homestead, alleging prior settlement and occu-
pancy of the land. The company was notified of the said application
and entered protest against its allowance, whereupon a hearing was
had, and from the testimony of said McDonald (the only testimony
adduced at-the hearing) and the records of your office it appears that
said tract was entered March 6, 1876, together with other tracts, by
C. M. Johnston, as a homestead (No. 3154), and that this entry was
amended February 19, 1880, by the substitution of another tract for
the tract in controversy; that Johnston amended his said entry, for the
reason that the district officers found it to be in conflict with the war-
rant location of one Pierce as to said tract, but that it was subse-
quently discovered that this location did not cover said land; that
after this discovery was made Johnston, in order to save the improve-
ments he had made on the tract in controversy, purchased from other
parties (the nature of whose title is not disclosed) that portion of said
tract upon which his improvements were located, containing ten acres,
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and that Johnston died in the belief that he had good title thereto;.
that his widow rested in the same belief and continued to occupy and
cultivate said land; that in March, 1887, said McDonald married
Johnston's widow, since which time he has continued to occupy the
land; but lived with his wife on an ajoining tract; that in February,
1890, an agent for the railroad company visited the land and asserted
the company's claim thereto, "hereupon McDonald corresponded with
your office, and was informed that the laud was subject to entry; that
shortly thereafter, he applied to enter the land.
The local officers recommended the rejection of the homestead appli-
cation of McDonald, who appealed. Your office reversed the judgment
of the local officers.
The act under which this selection was made permits of a relinquish-
ment by the company in favor of persons who had been allowed to
enter or file for lands to which it would be entitled, and provides that
the company shall upon making such relinquishment-
be entitled to select an equal quantity of other lands in lieu thereof from any of the
public lands not mineral, and within the limits of the grant, not otherwise appro-
priated at date of selection, to which they shall receive title the same as though
originally granted.
The company's claim to the land depends upon the status of the
land at the time of the presentation of its list, to wit, May 2, 1887, and
it does not appear that the land had then been appropriated by a
qualified settler under the settlement laws, for, by McDonaldns own
statements, he was holding the land in controversy not as a settler
under the public land laws, but under Johnston's purchase of that
portion of the land on which he had improvements.
The decision of your office is, therefore, reversed.
STATE SELECTION-CERTIFICATION-SECTION 2449 R. S.
SCOTT v. STATE OF NEVADA.
By the provisions of section 2449 R. S., the certification of a State selection,
made under the act of June 16, 1880, of land embraced within the bona fide
settlement claim of a qualified homesteader at the date of such selection, is
wholly inoperative, and does not divest the Department of its jurisdiction over.
the land.
Secretdiry Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, liay 9,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (W. A. E.)
November 7, 1891, Fred Scott made homestead entry for the W. of
the NE. and the S. of the NW. of See. 19, T. 30 N., R. 57 E.,
Carson City, Nevada, land district.
May 26, 1896, he filed an application to amend said entry so as to
omit the S. 3 of the NW. I and the NW. of the NE. I, and include
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instead thereof the N. -of the SW. 1 and the NW. 1 of the SE. I of
said Sec. 19. In a corroborated affidavit attached to said application
he alleges that i 1874 he settled upon and began to mprove a certain
usurveyed tract, in the Carson City land district; that lie has since
continuously resided there and has placed about twenty five hundred
dollars worth of improvements on the land; that as soon as possible
after the filing of the official plat of survey he made homestead entry
for the AV. of the NE. and the S. - of the NW. 1 of said Sec. 19,
"verily believing, from information received from persons claiming to
be well informed upon such matters, that the tract so described
embraced his mprovements and was the and lie desired to enter as
his homestead;" that in May, 1896, he employed a surveyor to deter-
mine the exact boundaries of the land occupied and improved by him,
when it was discovered that all of his improvements were upon the N. W
of the SW. 1, the NW. of the SE. and the SW. of the NE. of
said Sec. 19.
This application was duly forwarded to your office, and was denied
by your office letter of June 15, 1896, for the reason that on February
3, 1892, the State of Nevada selected, under the act of Congress
approved June 16, 1880 (21 Stat., 287), the N. , of the SW. 1 and the
NW, 1 of the SE. of said Sec. 19 (tile land that Scott is seeking to
include in his entry), which selection was approved by the Secretary
of the Interior July 22,1895, and certified to the State September 4,1895.
I Scott's appeal from the action of your office brings the case before
the Department.
The principal question involved in this case is whether the certifica-
tion to the State has divested the Department of jurisdiction over the
land in controversy.
This certification was under the act of August 3, 1854 (10 Stat., 346;
Sec. 2449 Revised Statutes U. S.), which provided that where lands had
been or should thereafter be granted to any one of the several States
and Territories, and the law did not convey the fee simple title of such
lands or require patents to be issued therefor, the lists of such lands
which had been, or might thereafter be certified,
shall be regarded as conveying the fee simple of al] the lands embraced in such lists
that are of the character contemplated by such act of Congress, and intended to be
granted thereby; but where lands embraced in such lists are not of the character
embraced by such acts of Congress, and are not intended to be granted thereby, said
lists, so far as these lands are concerned, shall be perfectly null and void, and no
right, title, claim, or interest shall be conveyed thereby.
For a long time it was held by the Department that under a grant,
which does not require the issuance of patent, the certification of lands
is equivalent to patent, and divests the Department of all jurisdiction
over the lands, and that the validity of such certification can only be
questioned in the courts. Baker v. State of California, 4 L. )., 137;
Garriques v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. 1R. Co., 6 L. D., 543;
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State of California v. Boddy, 9 L. D.? 636; Smith et al. v. Portage Lake
and Lake Superior Ship Canal Company, 11 L. D., 475.
Recently, however, the Department has modified its former ruling in
regard to the effect of certification nder the act of August 3, 1854.
In the case of English v. Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston R. R.
Co. (23 L. D., 343), it was held that the certification of land nder a
railroad grant, in accordance with the provisions of the act of August
3, 1854, is of no operative effect if the land in fact was excepted from
the grant. This decision was based upon the decision of the United
States supreme court in the case of Weeks v. Bridgman (159 U. S., 541).
In the latter case it appeared that at the date of the definite location
of the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, there was pending in your office
on appeal from the action of the local officers rejecting the same, an
application by one Brott to file a pre-emption declaratory statement
under the act of March 3, 1855, for the land there involved. flis right
to make such filing was recognized by this Department in 1861, but
notwithstanding the favorable action on his application, the land was
certified to the State of Minnesota on October 25, 1864, as a part of the
lands granted by te act of March 3, 1857, to aid in the construction of
the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad. The court held that this partienlar
land was excepted from the grant, and since it was so excepted, the
action of the land department in including it within the lists certified
on October 25, 1864, was ineffectual.
In the case of Edwin F. Frost et at. (24 L. D., 228), it was held that
the inadvertent certification of State selections at a time when the
lands covered thereby are included within an existing entry, and
involved in proceedings then pending before the Department, is inoper-
ative, and constitutes no obstacle to the issuance of patent in accord-
ance with the final judgment in said proceedings; and in the still more
recent case of St. Paul and Sioux City R. It. Company v. State of Min-
nesota (id., 364), it was held that a certification under the act of August
3, 1854, of lands on account of a railroad grant that were, at the date
of the grant, embraced within apending primafacie valid school indem-
nity selection, is no bar to the subsequent approval of such selection.
These later decisions of the Department (together with the decision
in Weeks v. Bridgman) seem to authorize the ruling that certification
under the act of August 3, 1854, is equivalent to patent, and divests
the Department of jurisdiction only where the lands certified are of the
character contemplated by the grant; and that where lands so certified
are not of the character intended to be granted, the certification is nill
and void, and does not divest the Department of its jurisdiction over
the land.
It is necessary, then, in the present case to determine whether the
land here involved was, at the time when the State's claim attached, of
the character intended to be granted by the act of June 16, 1880.
This act granted to the State of Nevada two million acres of land in
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lieu of all the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections within said State that
had not been disposed of by the State prior to the passage of the act,
and provided that:
The lands herein granted shall be selected by the State authorities of said State
from any unappropriated, uon-mineral, public land in said State, in quantities not
less than the smallest legal subdivision; and when selected in conformity with the
terms of this act, the same shall be duly certified to said State by the Commissioner
of the General Land Office and approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
Under this act the land which the State is authorized to select must
be "unappropriated, non-mineral, public land."1 If it is "appropri-
ated" at the date of the State selection, then it is not of the character
contemplated by the grant, and a certification thereof to the State
would be null and void, and would not divest the Department of its
jurisdiction over the land.
In the case of Charles Cnlverwell (15 L. D., 99), it was held that the
settlement right of a qualified homesteader excludes the land covered
thereby from selection under the grant of June 16, 1880, to the State of
Nevada. It was said in that case:
If at the date the State selected the land in list No. 127, the applicant was then a
settler on the land in question, having the qualifications of a homesteader, it can
not be said that the tract so settled upon was " uppropriated" public laud, and
if not, the State was not authorized to select it as part of its tiwo million acre grant.
Scott alleges that he settled upon the land here involved in 1874,
long prior to the State's selection, and that he was living upon and
claiming it at the date of said selection. It is true that at the time
this selection was made Scott's entry covered adjoining land, but he
claims that this was a mistake, that he intended to enter the land upon
which he was residing and supposed he had done so. If the statements
made in Scott's application are true, then the land upon which he was
residing at the date of the State's selection was not "unappropriated"
public land, and consequently was not of the character contemplated
by the act of June 16, 1880, uotwithstanding the fact.that by mistake
his entry was for different land.
Your office decision rejecting Scott's application is accordingly
reversed, and you are directed to notify the local officers to order a
hearing, of which both parties shall have due notice, to determine the
facts in regard to Scott's settlement and entry, after whieh the case
will be adjudicated in the light of the principles here laid dowl.
This decision is in place of departmental decision of April 29, 1898,
which is hereby recalled and revoked.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 633
RAILROAD LANDS-RIGHT OF PURCHA3-SE-HOMESTEAD ENTRY.
.JUSSILA V. CARATT.
The act of January 23, 1896, dispensing with actual residence as a prerequisite to the
right of purchase under section 3, act of September 29, 1890, where the lands
applied for have been fenced, or otherwise improved, does not operate to create
a right of purchase in one not having sch right prior thereto, as against the
adverse claim of a homesteader acquired under the original act, and the
amendments thereto enacted prior to the statute of 1896.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Laned ffice, May 9,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (H. G.)
George Carratt appeals from the decision of your office of April 18,
1890;, holding his homestead entry, made September 6, 1893, for the
E. t of the NW. 1 and lots and 2 of See. 7, T. 3 N., R. 15 E., W. .9
within the limits of the Vancouver, Washington, land district, subject
to the right of purchase of John E. Jussila.
The tract involved lies on the line of the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, between Wallula, Washington and Portland, Oregon, and
is included in the lands forfeited by section 1 of the act of September
29, 1890 (26 Stat., 496).
The application of John E. Jussila to purchase the said tract and
also the NE. 1 of the SW. i of the same section, under section 3 of
the act aforesaid, which is the only application transmitted with the
papers, is dated January 16, 1893, and was filed in the local office Sep-
tember 11, 1893, five days after (Carratt made homestead entry for the.
quarter section applied for by him.
Notice of the intention of J ussila to make final proof upon his appli-
cation was published by the local office, as of date December 3, 1892,
but no application appears in the record or accompanying papers prior
to the one of January 16, 1893. He admits in his testimony that but
one application was made, although his appeal.from its rejection states
that he made purchase application long before the said homestead
entry" of Carratt. This variance is, however, of no moment, as the
right to make the purchase application in this case does not depend
upon the time when it was made. His application to purchase was
rejected, together with the final proof accompanying the same, because
of its conflict with the uncanceled homestead entry of Carratt.
Jussila thereafter instituted a contest, alleging in his affidavit of
contest that Carratt
has illegally entered said tract and fraudulently interfered with the right of said
John E. Jussila to enter said tract under section 3 land grant forfeiture act of Sept.
29, 1890; that said John E. Jussila settled the said tract in (the) spring of 1886
and fenced the whole thereof that year and have (has) had peaceable possession
thereof ever since (the) spring of 1886; that he held said tract in connection with
the NE. of SW. f of said section upon which he resided a portion of the years 1887
and 1888.
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The testimony was taken November 23, 1893, before an officer
appointed by the local office for that purpose, and upon consideration
thereof, the local office held that the contestant was not entitled to pur-
chase the tracts applied for under said act; because he did not have a
contract or license to purchase the same from the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, and was not a' settler within the meaning of the
act, and recommended that his application and final proof be rejected
and the homestead entry of Carratt be held intact.
Jussila appealed from the decision rejecting his application and final
proof, but did not perfect his appeal in the contest case, as his notice
of appeal did not specify the errors complained of and he did not fur-
nish service of notice or file another appeal in conformity with the
rules of practice. Your office held, however, that he protected his
rights by his appeal from the rejection of his final proof, and that they
were preserved by the act of Congress of January 31, 1893 (27 Stat.,
427), extending the time within which persons were entitled to purchase
lands forfeited by said act of September 29, 1890, to January 1, 1894,
which was further extended by the acts of December 12,1893 (28 Stat.,
15), and January 23, 1896 (29 Stat., 4), to January 1, 1897, and because
the last mentioned act provides that actual residence upon the lands by
persons claiming the right to purchase the same shall not be required
where such lands have been fenced, cultivated or otherwise improved
by such claimants, and limiting the right to purchase thereunder to an
aggregate tract or tracts, whether contiguous or not, ot exceeding
three hundred and twenty acres.
The evidence considered at the hearing discloses that Jussila made
no improvements upon the tract in dispute, except to construct a fence
enclosing it with an adjoining forty acre tract which lie also seeks to
purchase, and that a house and other improvements thereon were
located upon such adjoining tract. His period of residence was limited
to about three months in each of the years 1887 and 1888, the fence
having been built in 1886. He now resides in an adjoining township,
and has always used the premises within the enclosure for a pastures
One of his witnesses stated that lie (Jussila) had not lived in the
"shanty" on the tract applied for by him for about five years, and this
testimony is undisputed. Carratt had not, at the timDe of the hearing,
which was had between two and three months after making his entry,
settled upon the tract, but had hauled materials for a dwelling thereon,
and desisted from further attempts to make settlement on account of
the beginning of the contest against him, and because an attorney for
Jussila had notified him, after the entry, not to locate upon or improve
the tract.
Jussila testified that lie made application to purchase the tract in
June, 1891, but withdrew sch application. He was confused in his
statements upon this point, but finally admitted that he made but one
application, the one now under consideration, which reached the local
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office after Carratt's entry. He claims that lie could not secure the
amount required to meet the purchase price of the tract applied for by
him, and it appears that he did not transmit his application and the
final proof taken before a United States circuit court commissioner
January 16, 1893, to the local office until September 11, 1893, the cause
of the delay being that he needed the money for other purposes, and
because the time for purchase had been extended one year.- He did
not claim under license, contract or conveyance with the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, the former grantee of the forfeited tract,
for the p)urchase of the lands, prior to January 1, 1888, or at any time,
although he insists that he "settled" upon the lands with the intention
of prirchasirg them from said company.
It is apparent that Jussila had no rights as a settler to the tract he
applied to purchase. is residence upon the tract during three months
in each of the two consecutive years following his enclosure of the tract-
did not constitute a settlement of the tract, with the intent to purchase
the same from the railroad compIanry, as lie abandoned his temporary
occupancy thereof for five years prior to the hearing, and used it as a
pasture, without making any attempt at cultivation. His improve-
menits are estimated in his rejected final proof at two hundred dollars,
but at the hearing they were estimated to be worth from four hundred
to five hundred dollars.
It may be true that he had "peaceable possession" of the tract
enclosed by him, from the time of such enclosure p to the time that
Carratt entered the land and hauled building materials thereon, but
such bare possession, without any "deed, written contract with, or
license from " the railroad company grantee or its assigns did not bring
him within the terms of the original forfeiture act or the acts aeuda-
tory thereof, existing at the time of his application and at the time of
the hearing of his contest against Carratt. There can be no such
thing as "settlement" disassociated with "residence." Although "set-
tlement" may precede "residence," yet it must be with a view to resi-
dence. The going upOD or improvement of land, otherwise than with
a view to residence "within a reasonable time thereafter," may be
"occupation," but not "settlelenit." This interpretationis adoptedby
subsequent amendatory legislation in the act of June 25, 1892 (27
Stat., 59), which permits extension of time only to purchasers "actually.
residing" upon the tract applied for. James . Daly (on review), 18
L. D., 571, 572.
Tile second anendatory statute-that of January 31, 1893 (27 Stat.,
427),-extended the time to persons " entitled " to purchase lands for-
feited, to January 1, 1894, and the third aendatory statute-that of
December 12, 1893 (28 Stat., 15),-further extended the time to the
same class of persons to January 1, 1897, andl contains- the following
proviso:
That nothing herein contained sall ie so construed as to interfere with any
adverse claim that may have attached to the lands or any part thereof.
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The statute of January 23, 1896 (29 Stat., 4), also extended the time
to the same date, and dispensed with actual residence as a prerequisite
to purchase, where the lands applied for have been fenced, cultivated
or otherwise improved by the claimants, and the statute of February
18, 1897 (29 Stat., 535), further extended the time to purchase to Janui-
ary 1, 1899, and has a proviso identical to that of the act of December
12, 1893, protecting adverse claims that may have attached to any of
the forfeited lands.
Prior, then, to the enactment of this statute of January 23, 1896,
Jussila had no right whatever to purchase the tract applied for by him,
as he did not fall withi the classes of persons protected by the original
statute forfeiting the lands and the supplementary legislation extend-
ing the time to purchase. He had not settled upon the lands with the
intention, in good faith, to secure title to the same from the railroad
company, and his acts subsequent to his enclosure of the tracts, show
that he did not intend to become, and was not, an actual settler thereon.
His possession was without any authority from the company, accepted
by him, whicl made him a licensee, grantee or contractee with the com-
pany, as he does not show that he ever accepted any general permission
to go upon the tracts, or had applied for permission to occupy-the same
or settle thereon. Ward's Heirs . Laborraque, 22 L. D., 229, 232.
This proviso to the statute last mentioned dispenses with the neces-
sity of establishing actual residetice upon the lands applied for, and
requires proof of cultivation, fencing or other improvement only of the
tract applied for, and would permit the purchase of the tract applied
for by Jussila, if there had not been in existence the valid and existing
entry of Carratt at the time of the taking effect of the act. It can
not be seriously contended that Congress by this latter legislation,
particularly in view of the repeated legislation to protect adverse
claims, intended to wipe out valid existing entries. It was held in
the recent similar case of Cooper v. Scherrer, 26 L. D., 251:
As Cooper did not have possession of said lands under a deed, written contract or
license from the company. he did not come within the first class prov ided for by sec-
tion 3 of said act, and as he had not established a residence on the land claimed by-
him, he did not come within the second class, provided for by said section. This
was the law in force at the date of the rejection of his application and the allowance
of the homestead entry of Scherrer. The amendment of said section made by the
act of January 23, 1896, supra, which provided 'that actual residence upon the
lands by persons claiming the right to purchase the same shall not be required where
snch lands have been fenced, cultivated or otherwise improved by sch claimants,"
will not operate to divest the right acquired by the homestead settler under the act
as originally passed and prior to said amendment.
See also Weidert et ad. v. Kroll, 25 L. D., 522, 524; James C. Daly, 17
L. D., 498, 500.
This ruling seems decisive of the case at bar, as it appears that Jus-
sila had not made a bonafide settlement upon the tract applied for by
him, followed by residence thereafter maintained, had not applied to
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purchase the same from the railroad company whose lands were for-
feited by the act of September 29, 1890, and did. not old the lands
-nder any license, contract, deed or other authority from said company
at the time of Carratt's entry, or at the time of the hearing. The
amendatory act mentioned, dispensing with actual residence ol the
land applied to be purchased, does not, therefore, operate to divest the
right acquired by-Carratt, under the original act and the supplemen-
tary acts amendatory thereof, as they existed at the time his right
attached to the land.
If Carratt has not complied with the provisions of the homestead
law since his entry, by making proper settlement and residence within
apt time, or in other material respects, that matter may be determined
by another contest between the parties. If at any such further bear-
ing it should be found that e has not complied with the homestead
laws, the application of Jssila to purchase the tract may be renewed.
Cooper v. Scherrer, 26 L. D., 251, 252, supra.
The decision of your office is reversed. The final proof of John E.
Jussila and his application to purchase will be rejected, and the home-
stead entry of George (Jarratt will remain intact.
TOWN LOT-ASSESSMENT--DEPOSIT TO PAY COST OF CONTEST.
JOHN S. SMITH.
An applicant for a deed to a town lot in Oklahoma is not entitled to receive credit
for a unreturned deposit, due stlch applicant and made to defray the costs of a
contest, as against the assessment levied on said lot by the town site trustees.
Secretary Bliss to te Commissioner of the General Land Ogce, May 10,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (G- B. G.)
With your letter of February 8, 1898, is transmitted to the Depart-
Ient the appeal of John S. Smith from the decision of your office of
September 27, 1897, sustaining the action of townsite board No. 6, in
refusing to issue deed to Smith for lot 27, in block 24, townsite of
Perry, Oklahoma Territory, until the fll amount of assessments levied
thereon had been paid, and refusing to allow him credit on such assess-
ment for money deposited by him with Amos B. Fitts, late disbursing
agent of townsite board No. 8, at Perry, Oklahoma, to secure the pay-
ment of expenses of a contest case involving title to the same lot.
It appears that in the contest case of Lyman Hall et al. v. John S.
Smith, before townsite board No. 8, in which was involved the lot in
question, Smith deposited with Amos B. Fitts, then the disbursing
agent of said board, the sum of $68.95; that Smith was the successful
party in. said proceeding, and that no part of said sum has been
refunded to him; that the full amount of assessment against said lot is
$151; that upon the tender of $82.05, the difference between 151, the
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full aount of assessment on said lot, and $68.95, the amount of said
deposit, the said sum of $82.05 was refused by the disbursing agent of
said board No. 6; and that said board declined to issue deed luntil the
full amount of assessments on said lot, $151, be paid.
No question is made of the legality of the assessment, but it is
insisted that Smith should receive a credit on the amount due the
United States, in that behalf, of the amount deposited as aforesaid.
Section 11 of the "Regulations provided by the Secretary of the
Interior for the guidance of trustees i the execution of their trust,"
by authority of the act of Congress approved May 14, 1890 (26 Stat.,
109), provides, amolg other things, that after setting apart to the
parties entitled to receive the same lots, blocks, squares, or ground,
and placing a valuation on the same as thereinbefore provided, said
trustees
-will proceed to determine and assess upon such lots and blocks according to their
value, such rate and sum as will be necessary to pay for the lands embraced i such
townsite, costs of surv^ey, conveyance of lots, and other necessary expenses, including
compensatiou of trustees, as provided for in said act.
Section 13 provides that whenever to or more claimants are found
for the same lot, block, or parcel of laud, said trustees shall proceed to
hear and determine the controversy as therein specifically directed, and
by section 20, "in order to secure the payment of costs," a deposit
"with the disbursing officer of the board" is required, sufficient to
cover and pay all " costs and expenses," and, further, " upon the linal
adjudication of a case, on appeal or otherwise, the sumll deposited by
the successful party shall be restored to him sulject to the rules in
such cases." (19 L. D., 334, et seq.)
Inasmuch as these regulations required the deposit i question to be
made with "the disbursing officer of the board,' such disbursing officer
being an officer of the United States, and that officer having failed to
restore the money, the contention of the appellant, that such sum should
be set off against the amount of his indebtedness to the United States
growing out of substantially the same proceeding, is not without force.
However, no law or regulation is provided for the application of this
money in payment for the land involved, but on the contrary it was
deposited to cover costs and expenses of the contest and was to be
returned by the officer directly to the claimant, in the event of his
success in the contest.
The decision of April 21, 1898, herein is recalled and your office
decision which was appealed from is affirmed.
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PRACTICE-AOTION FOR REVIEW-APPEAL-SOLDIER'S FILIN.G.
THRAILIKILL V. LONG.
A motion for the review of a Commissioner's decision that adversely affects both
parties to the litigation, filed i time by one of said parties, operates to suspend
all action under said decision until the disposition of said motion, and daring
such period of suspension neither of the parties is required to appeal.
Schweitzer . Hilliard, 19 L. D., 294, overruled.
A soldier's homestead declaratory statement does not operate to protect a prior
settlement clainm of the soldier to the land embraced within said filing.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, M11[ay 10,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (C. J. W.)
On April 20, 1892, Samuel L. Long filed soldier's declaratory state-
ment for the NE. 4 of Sec. 20, T. 17 N., R. 7 W., at Kingfisher, Okla-
homa. On April 26, 1892, Milton 1. Thrailkill made homestead entry
for said tract. On October 17, 1892, Long made homestead entry.
Without calling on Thraillkill to show cause why his entry should not
be canceled, on December 8, 1892, your office held his homestead entry
for cancellation. On December 21, 1892, Thrailkill filed an affidavit in
the local office alleging prior settlement and praying that the action of
your office of December 8, 1892, be set aside and a hearing ordered on
his allegation of prior settlement. February 8, 1893, Thrailkill filed an
appeal fom the action of your office of December 8, 1892, which was
forwarded to the Department November 7, 1893.
A hearing was had on the grounds of contest charged by Thrailkill,
wbich closed June 17, 1893, and which resulted in a decision of the
local office finding Thrailkill to have been the first settler and awarding
the land to him. Long appealed.
On June 20, 1894, the Department having under consideration Thrail-
kill's appeal from the action of your office of December 8, 1S92, hold-
ing his entry for cancellation, found that the appeal presented only a
preliminary question and that your office had rendered no decision on
the merits of the case. The appeal, with the record, was returned to
your office for consideration.
May 28, 1895, your office remanded the case to the local office and
returned the record for further action on account of irregularities in
the proceedings, and a further hearing was had, which closed October
30, 1895. The local office endered a second decision, in which they
found that plaintiff and defendant had made simultaneous settlement
and recommended that each party take the eighty-acre tract upon
which his improvements are located. From this decision both parties
appealed.
On April 24, 1896, your office considered the case and affirmed the
decision of the local office. Long moved for review of said decision,
and on August 1, 1896, upon a review of your decision of April 24-
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1896, a different conclusion was reached and so much of your said office
decision as awarded to Long eighty acres of the tract in question was
revoked, Long's entry held for cancellation, and Tlhrailkill's entry held
intact.
The case is before the Department on the appeal of Long from your
office decisions of April 24, 1896, and August 1, 1896.
The following are the grounds of error alleged:
1. In finding that contestant and defendant settled on said land simultaneously.
2. In not finding that Thrailkill had the burden of proof.
3. In not finding that Thrailkill made no settlement on this land until after Long's
settlement.
4. In not holding that a party can not make settlement by simply riding a horse
at full speed upon a tract of public land. (W. Reno City . Snowdlen, 23 L. D., 74.)
5. I revoking the decision of April- 24, 1896, so far as it awardeda part of the
land to Long.
6. In overlooking the fact that said decision of April 24, 1896, had become filial, so
far as Thrailkill is concerned, by reason of his failure to appeal.
7. In holding that Long was in lacies with his entry on said land.
8. In holding that Long Was not protected by his soldier's filing.
The sixth ground of error is in the nature of a plea to the jurisdic-
tion of your office to change the judgment in favor of Thrailkill in the
decision of April 24, 1896, so as to enlarge his rights thereunder, when
he had not appealed and when said decision had become final as to him.
For several reasons this proposition is not tenable. It assumes that
a decision can become final pending a motion for its review filed in
time, when the rules of practice provide expressly to the contrary.
Rule 79 of Practice is as follows:
The time between the filing of a motion for rehearing or review and the notice of
the decision upon such motion shall be excluded in computing the time allowed for
appeal.
LODg'S motion for review covered the whole case and kept in issue
the entire tract of land in dispute, and it was competent for your office,
on review of the original decision, to make an entirely different dis-
position of the land from that made in the original decision. Thrail-
kill had a right to await action on Long's motion for review, without
detriment to his right of appeal after it was disposed of, if he desired
to do so. As your office set aside so much of the decision as was
adverse to him, he found no cause for appeal. Your office, however,
was not dependent upon the action of either of the parties for authority
to correct any error in the original decision discovered before jurisdic-
tion of the case was removed by appeal to the Department, but might
do so Sata sponte, as decided in the case of Littepage v. Johnson (19 L.
D., 312), and other cases therein cited.
It is true that the Department in the case of Schweitzer v. Hilliard
et al., 19 L. D., 294, held that Rule of Practice 79 can only be invoked
on behalf of a litigant who has himself filed a motion for review; that
said rule is not for the benefit of parties who have no such motions
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pending, but a re-examination of the question leads to the conclusion
that such holding is not in accordance with the intent of the rule under
consideration.
The operation of a motion for review is necessarily to suspend all
action under the decision in question, and where said decision affects
adversely the rights of two parties, and one applies in time for a review,
it would serve no good purpose to require the other party to appeal.
In such cases the Department had already held, substantially, before
the case of LJittlepage v. Johnson that where one has moved for a review
and the other appealed, and both in time, your office retains jurisdiction
of the case to dispose of the motion and render judgment on the merits
of the case between the parties. Gray v. Ward et al., 5 L. D., 410;
Moore v. Pentecost, 18 L. D., 575.
The case, therefore, of Schweitzer v. Billiard et al. must be, and it
is hereby, overruled, in so far as it conflicts with the views herein
expressed.
As your office had authority to dispose of the whole subject matter
of controversy in the decision complained of, it remains to be considered
whether it has been properly disposed of or not.
The seventh and eiglth grounds of error present questions of law
which wete by your office considered conclusive of the rights of the
parties. It was held that Long's soldier's declaratory statement did
not relate to and protect his settlement made the day previous, so as to
make such settlement the beginning and predicate of his claim, but
that he must stand either upon his settlement or upon his declaratory
statement. The position taken is supported by the cases of Pickard v.
Cooley (19 L. D., 241), and Wood v7. Tyler (22 L. D., 679).
In the supplemental brief filed by Long's counsel, the position is taken
that the principle decided in the cases cited, s1pra, is contrary to the
former rulings of the Department, and that the effect of your office
decision is to abridge Long's rights undet sections 2304 and 2305 of the
Revised Statutes. Said sections are as follows:
SEC. 2304. Every private soldier and officer who has served in the army of the
United States during the recent rebellion, for ninety days, and who was honorably
discharged, and has remained loyal to the government, including the troops mustered
into the service of the United States by virtue of the third section of an act approved
February thirteen, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, and every seaman, marine, and
officer who has served in the navy of the United States, or in the marine corps,
during the rebellion, for ninety days. and who was honorably discharged, and has
remained loyal to the government, shall, on compliance with the provisions of this
chapter, as hereinafter modified, be entitled to enter upon and receive patents
fbr a quantity of public lands not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres, or one
quarter-section, to be taken in compact form, according to legal subdivisions, includ-
ing the alternate reserved sections of public lands along the line of any railroad or
other public work, not otherwise reserved or appropriated, and other lands subject
to entry under the homestead laws of the United States; but such homestead set-
tler shall be allowed six months after locating his homestead, and filing his declara-
tory statement within which to make his entry and commence his settlement and
improvement.
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Sac. 2305. The time which the homestead settler has served in the army, navy, or
marine corps shall be deducted from the time heretofore required to perfect title, or
if discharged on account of wounds received or disability incurred in the line of
duty, then the term of enlistment shall be deducted from the time heretofore required
to perfect title, without reference to the length of time he may have served; but o
patent shall issue to any homestead settler who has not resided upon, improved, and
cultivated his homestead for a period of at least one year after he shall have com-
menced his improvements.
There is nothing to be founid in these sections which was intended to,
or does, relieve the soldier from his obligation to comply with the
requirements of the act of May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140), where he makes
settlement prior to filing soldier's declaratory statement, if he relies
upon such settlement. The soldier's declaratory statement is no notice
of prior settlement, but is notice of intention to settle and make entry
within six months from date of filing. Long had a right on the opening
of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe reservation to settlement-of which the
land in question was a part--to compete with those who ran for it, and
sought to initiate settlement right to it on the day of opening, and the
fact that he availed himself of such right and made settlement on the
day of opening neither abridged nor added to such right as he acquired
by virtue of filing his soldier's declaratory statement.
The method of initiating a claim to the land by going upon it and
performing some act of settlement on the day of opening is separate
and distinct from that of initiating a claim by filing a soldier's declara-
tory statement. In the former case, the third section of the act of May
14, 1880, fixes the time within which notice of the claim is to be placed
of record. Said section 3 is as follows:
That ay settler who has settled, or who shall hereafter settle, on any of the
public lands of the United States, whether surveyed or unsnrveyed, with the inten-
tion of claiming the same under the homestead laws, shall be allowed the samce time
to file his home stead application and perfect his original entry in the United States
Land Office as is now allowed to settlers under the pre-emption laws to put their
claims on record, and his right shall relate back to the date of settlement, the same
as if he settled under the pre-emption laws.
Failure to comply with the requirements of the section is fatal to the
claim based on settlement.
The contention that the Department reversed a former rule and
adopted a new one, in the case of Pickard v. Cooley, is not authorized
by the authorities cited.
It is as much the duty of the soldier to put his settlement claim of
record as it is the duty of any other settler. If it be suggested that
Long was prevented from putting his settlement claim of record within
ninety days by Thrailkill's homestead entry, made April 26, 1892, the
reply is, that if Long relied upon. his settlement, he should have filed
contest against Thrailkill's entry within the like period.
In reference to Long's settlement claim, it is not only objected that
it is barred by the act of May 14, 1880, but it is also insisted that Long
could make no valid settlement, because of his entry into the Cheyenne
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and Arapahoe country during the inhibited period. Long does not
deny being in this territory on business not a great while before the
opening, and it appears from th.e testimony that he passed within about
sixty yards of the land in question. He obtained no advantage over
Thrailkill or others by reason of it, as the land was in plain view froini
the border of old Oklahoma, from which the parties who ran for it made,
their start on the day of the opening. It is not necesary to go into the
question as to how it may have affected his qualifications as between
him and the government, nor is it deemed necessary to consider the
evidence as to which of these parties actually reached the land first on
the day of the opening. Long seems to have' elected to stand on his
filing, and Thrailkill's prior settlement being clearly proven, the finding
in his favor was proper.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed.
MINING CLAInM-ORDER OF CANCELLATION-REINSTATEM3ENT.
QUARTZITE LODE.
Where, by an order of the General Land Office, an amended survey of a mining
claim is required within a specified period, the entry should not be canceled prior
to a report from the surveyor-general's office; and an entry so canceled must be
reinstated, if it subsequently appears that the mineral applicant had in fact, in
due time, applied for and obtained from the surveyor-general an order for said
survey.
Secretary Bliss to the Co mmissioner of the General Land Office, MIay 13,
(W. V. D.) ' 1898. (G. B- G.)
On December 30,-1884, John Harris, H. H. Metcalf, Emma E. Gruber,
and the Humboldt Mining and Smelting Company made mineral entry
2401, for the Quartzite lode, Leadville, Colorado.
By your office letter of December 13, 1886, to the U. S. surveyor-
general, at Denver, Colorado, that officer was directed to "notify the
claimants that they should furnish amended plat and field notes show-
ing, in accordance with existing regulations, the intersections with
surveys Nos. 356 A., 377 A., 376 A., and 749 Humboldt lode claim."
It appears that claimants did not receive notice of this order.
By your office letter of November 6, 1894, the local officers at Lead-
ville were directed to notify the claimants and allow them sixty days
within which to file plat and field notes of an amended survey, as
required by said letter of December 13, 18867 to the U. S. surveyor-
general, or show cause why said entry should not be held for cancella-
tion, and, again, by your office letter, dated March 16,1895, said local
officers were directed to allow the claimants sixty days within which
to file said amended field notes of survey and plat, and to advise said
entrymien that in event of their failure to do so, their said entry would,
in the absence of appeal, be canceled without further notice to them.
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It appears that all of the claimants were notified of the contents of
-said letter of March 16, 1895, by registered letters, addressed to them;
that the one addressed to Metcalf was receipted for, but that the others
-were returned unclaimed.
By your office letter of Jly 18, 1895, to the local officers, said entry
was held for cancellation, subject to the right of appeal. In that letter
it was said:
'Considerable difficulty has been experienced in getting satisfactory evidence of
-service upon said entrymen.
You should, if possible, ascertain the resent ost office address of each of these
claimants, and notify them in accordance with eXistilng regulations of the require-
ments contained in said letter of December 13, 1886, and that in case of their failure
to furnish plat and field notes of the required amended survey, within sixty days
from date of notice hereof, or to take an appeal, said mineral entry No. 2401 will be
canceled without further notice from this office.
August 29, 1895, copies of this decision were mailed, registered, from
the local office to each of the entrymen. The copies addressed to Met-
calf and the Humboldt Mining and Smelting Company were received
by them, but the others were returned unclaimed.
These facts were reported to your office, and upon the further report
of the local officers that no action had been taken by the claimants, said
entry was canceled by your office letter of November 30, 1895.
On March 20, 1896, said claimants made application for the reinstate-
ment of said canceled entry.
On March 3, 1896, one John J. McGowan, by his attorney, filed a
protest against the reinstatement of said entry, alleging a relocation of
said Quartzite lode, and showing by a copy of a location notice that the
ground had been, since the cancellation of said entry, relocated as the
Congress lode.
By your office letter of April 25,, 1896, the application for reinstate-
inent was denied.
This application for reinstatement was renewed June 1, 1896, and a
review and revocation of your said office decision of April 25, 1896,
requested, but by your office decision of June 19, 1896, the motion for
review was denied, and this second application to reinstate dismissed.
On June 27, 1896, the entrymen filed a motion for a re-review of the
action of your office, and again requested that the action of your office
be recalled and vacated.
On July 3, 1896, counsel for the said John J. McGowan filed a motion
-to dismiss the motion for re-review.
On September 3, 1896, your office reviewing the whole case reversed
£ormer action, and said:
The motion to dismiss is overruled and the motion for re-review will be considered,
-as said motion for re-review presents one point not heretofore considered by this
office.
Without discussing all the specifications of error in said motion for re-review cited,
,it is sufficient to say that the question raised upon which he action of this office
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hinges is one of jurisdiction. If at the time the order of cancellation was made this
office had jurisdiction and authority of law to make the order, the entry cannot in.
view of the adverse claim of McGowan be reinstated.
If however said order was, through inadvertence or mistake, made without war-
rant of law, then and in that case it never was operative, or of any force in fact, but
was a nullity from the beginning. It appears from the record that thirty-olle days
before your office reported that no action had been taken by the entrymen, and
forty-five days before the order of cancellation was made, entrynen had initiated
proceedings toward compliance with the order for an amended survey, and that four
days prior to the date of the order of cancellation the required survey had been
commenced.
Entrymen in taking steps toward compliance with the order of this office wlent to
the right place, namely, to the U. S. srveyor-general, made their application for
the amended survey, deposited the necessary fees for office work and obtained the
order for the amended survey, all in apt time, and more than twenty days prior to,
the expiration of the period allowed them for appeal.
*It is certain that if this had been known at this office at the time, the order of
cancellation would not have been made. If the U. S. surveyor-general had been
required to report prior to the final action of this office, these record facts would
have been before me.
The U. S. surveyor-general is a constituent part of the Department, and the
Department mast take cognizance of his official acts.. This being tre, the fact
that the entrymen applied to him in apt time for the amended survey, and that
he in his official capacity issued the order for the amended survey, precluded this
office from niaking a valid order of cancellation.
The order of cancellation, having been made without a report from the U. S-
surveyor-general, and in the face of the record facts in relation to this case, was a,
mistake and an inadvertence, was made without jurisdiction or authority of law,
and for that reason never was of any force or effect.
Said order of cancellation is therefore hereby vacated and set aside.
Should this decision become final, said mineral entry No. 2401 will be approved for
patenting.
From this decision McGowafl has appealed to the Department.
This appeal does not traverse any statement of fact made in the-
decision appealed from, and the eight specifiations of error may be sum-
marized, in the language of the appeal, as follows:
In view of the above, we submit that the Commissioner's decision was rendered
without authority of law, and even had the Commissioner jurisdiction nder the
law and rules of practice to render a decision upon a motion for re-review, in the
presence of appellants' motion to dismiss, said decision was erroneous in every con-
elusion. Wherefore we pray that the decision be reversed, and that the parties be
left to settle the controversy as to their possessory rights before a proper tribimal,.
viz., a court of competent jurisdiction, as provided by law.
It is not thought necessary in this case to discuss the question of the
jurisdiction of your office to render the decision appealed from, for it is
not material whether that jurisdiction be affirmed or denied. If
affirmed, it results that the proceedings are in all respects regular
under the rules of practice, and if denied, it would still devolve upon
the Department to render such judgment in the case as the law and
equities thereof appear to warrant.
The case comes to-the Department upon the appeal of McGowan, and
by thus invoking the unquestioned and unquestionable jurisdiction of
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the Secretary of the Interior, he avers a just cause, and must stand or
fall by the merits of the case as shown by the whole record.
It is believed that the claimants were uLnder the cireunstances
entitled to a reinstatement of their entry.
It is not necessary to inquire whether they received legal notice of
the orders emanating from your office, December 13,1886, November 6,
1894, and March 16, 1895, respectively. If jurisdiction of the parties
was acquired under any of those orders, the right of the government to
cancel the entry for non-compliance with the requirements thereof was
waived by the issuance of the aforesaid subsequent order of July S,
1895, wherein the entrymen were given sixty days from notice thereof
to furnish plat and field notes of the required amended survey. The
ease was then one between the entrymen and the government, and so
fai as the present controversy is concerned its status is the same as
though the government's proceedings against the entrynen had been
initiated July 18, 1895.
Claimants were not served with notice of this order until August 29,
1895. Within the time allowedl they made application at the surveyor-
general's office, and, on October 16, 895, that officer, at the instance
and equest of said entrymen, issued an order for the amended survey
required by your office. Tis order wvas issued thirteen days before the
expiration of the time fixed by your said office order of July 18, 1895.
The field work was not commenced until November 26, 1895, and the
field notes were not approved by the surveyor-general until April 3,
1896, but when the entrymen had applied for and obtained the order of
survey, the demands of the government had for the time being been
satisfied, and the subsequent proceedings, being largely under the con-
trol of officers of the government, laches may not be imputed to the
entrymen for the delay in making and approving said survey. -
The action of your office canceling the entry, November 30, 1895,
was taken without a report from the office of the surveyor-general, and
was clearly a mistake, on account of which the claimants should not be
permitted to suffer.
No sufficient reason appears for departmental interference with the
action of your office in the premises, and the decision appealed from is
affirmed.
In this connection it is thought proper to call the attention of your
office to the misapprehension and resulting mistakes which have appar-
ently grown out of a lack of information in your office of orders issued
and action taken by the surveyor-general, and to suggest that such
procedure be adopted as will prevent a recurrence thereof in future
cases.
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7INDIAN LANDS-ACT OF JANUARY 14, SS9.
FRED. A. SILVER.
The right to make a second homestead entry accorded by the third proviso to sec-
tion 6, act of January 14-, 1889, extends only to persons whose first etry was
made prior to said act.
The case of Hertzke v. Henermond, 25 L. D., 82, cited and followed,
Secretary Bliss to te Conzmnissioner of the General Land Office, May 13,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (L. L. B.)
June 20, 1889, Fred. A. Silver made homestead entry for the NW. i
of Sec. 30, T. 3 N., R. 64 W., Denver, Colorado,which was canceled on
his relinquishment January 29, 1892; and the same day Christian Boh-
linder made homestead entry for the east half of said quarter section
and lot one in said section 30.
May 15, 1896, Silver applied at the local office at Crookston, Minne-
sota, to make homestead entry for the S. t of the NW. 4 and the NW. -i
of the SW. , Sec. 22, and the NE. I of the S. I and lot 4, Sec. 21,
TL 149 N., R. 38 W., in said Crookston land district.
This application purports on its face to be made under the provisions
of the act of January 14, 1889 (25 Stat., 642), but the applicant in his
petition to be allowed to make the entry, asks that it be allowed under
the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854).
The register transmitted this application to your office, and by your
office decision of July 3,1896, the application was denied; from which
action Silver appealed.
The land involved belonged to the Red Lake band of the (.hippewa
Indians and was ceded under the provisions of the said act of January
14, 1889.
The third proviso to the sixth section of said act is as follows:
Provided, That any person who has not heretofore had the benefit of the home-
stead or pre-emption law, and who has failed from any cause to perfect the title to
a tract of land heretofore entered by' him nder either of said laws may make a
second homestead entry under the provisions of this act. (25 Stat., top of page 645.)
The use of the word "heretofore" in said proviso renders construc-
tion unnecessary to show that the benefits of the proviso were designed
to .be extended to those entrymen only who had made entry prior to the
passage of the act.
Without here deciding whether the petitioner coines within the
remedy of the act of March 2, 1889 (the tract applied for being Chip-
pewa land), it is sufficient to say, that the construction placed upon
that act in the case. of Eertzke v. lHenermond (25 L. D., 82), still
adhered to, would prevent the allowance of his application thereunder.
It is not necessary to discuss the authority of his attorney to act in
the matter of his appeal from your office decision, nor the action of
your predecessor thereon, for the application must be denied for the
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second reason assigned in your said office decision, namely, that the
law invoked does not authorize second entries where the first entry was
made subsequent to the passage of the act.
With his appeal Silver forwarded an application for the "repayment
of the purchase money paid on entry of the NW. 1 of Sec. 30, T. 3, R.
64, as per certificate No. 14342, issued at Denver, Colorado, bearing
date the 20th day of June, 1889."
As this application was made and transmitted subsequent to the
decision of your office, and so was not considered by your predecessor,
it is herewith returned for actionthereon by your office.
The decision of your office, in so far as it denies the right of Silver
to make entry of the land applied for, is affirmed.
ARID LANDS-RESERVOIR SITE-WITHDRAVAL-ENTRY.
IVIARiuS THROuP.
The act of August 30, 1890, repealed the, act of October 2,1888, in so far as said act
operated to create a general withdrawal of lands ssceptib]e of irrigation, hence
a homestead entry of lands so released from such withdrawa], made at a time
when they are subject to entry, though subsequently included within the limits
of a reservoir site, may be carried to patent irrespective of the provisions of the
act of March 3,1891.
Secretary Bliss to the Comnissioner of the General Land Office, 11fay 13,
(W.V.D.) 1898. (C. J. G.)
May 8, 1891, Marius Thorup made homestead entry for the E. j of the
NE. See. 9, and the W. of the NW. Sec. 10, T. 6 S., R. 42 E., B. M.,
Blackfoot, Idaho.
January 20, 1897, this Department, upon the recommendation of the
Director of the United States Geological Survey, directed that certain
lands, including the tract described, be segregated for a reservoir site
for the Fort Hall Indian Reservation, and that further entries or filings
on the lands designated be refused in' accordance with the act-of
October 2, 1888 (25 Stat., 526), as amended by the act of August 30,
1890 (26 Stat., 391). October23, 1897, Thorup submitted his final proof,
upon which final certificate issued the samte day. It appears from said
proof that he established actuaf residence on the land in question in
April, 1891. He was therefore an actual settler on said land at the date
the reservoir site was located and selected, which was in September,
1896.
April 26, 1898, your office transmitted Thorup's final papers to this
Department, with request to be advised as to whether or not his entry
should be approved' and passed to patent. Reference was made in
your office letter of transmittal to the case of Margaret D. Gillis, 25 L.
D., 221.
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In the departmental decision referred to by your office Mrs. Gillis
was shown to have been an actual settler on the land claimed by her
not only at the date of the location of the reservoir site, but a bona fide
settler and occupant prior to the passage of the act of October 2, 1888;
hence her rights thus secured were not impaired by the subsequent
withdrawal of the land for a reservoir site, as said land was wholly
excluded from reservoir purposes under said act. Thorup, however,
made actual settlement subsequently to the passage of said act.
The act of October 2 1888, contemplated a general withdrawal,
including
all the lands which may hereafter be designated or selected .... for sites for
reservoirs, ditches or canals for irrigation purposes and all the lands made s-uscepti-
ble of irrigation by such. reservoirs, ditches or canals.
Under the act of August 30, 1890, reservoir sites theretofore-located
and selected were to remain segregated and reserved from entry and
settlement, but said act repealed so much of the act of October 2, 1888,
as withdrew from entry, settlement and occupation " all lands made
susceptible of irrigation by such reservoirs, ditches or canals," and
allowed entry for and settlement upon said lands "in the same manner
as if said law had not been enacted." The act of March 3, 1891 (26
Stat., 1095), further restricted reservoirs to only so much land as might
be necessary for their construction and maintenance;
excluding as far as practicable lands occupied by actual settlers at the date of the
location of said reservoirs.
It is suggested in your office letter that as Thorup was an actual set-
tler on the land in question at the date of the location of the reservoir
site, said land appears to have been excluded, under the last mentioned
act, from the site of the reservoir " so far as practicable." This is true,
but such disposition of Thorup's case would make the completion of
his entry for tis land contingent upon whether or not said land shall
be found actually necessary for the construction and maintenance of
said reservoir. It will be observed that under the act of August 30,
1890, amending the act of October 2 1888, Thorup made his entry at
a time when the land was subject thereto; and the land embraced
therein was from such time segregated from the public domain and
excepted from the subsequent withdrawal for reservoir purposes.
Hence, under said act, his said entry should be "recognized and may
be perfected i the same manner as if the act of October 2, 18.88, had
not been enacted." Your office is accordingly advised that Thorup's
entry should be approved and passed to patent without. reference to
the contingency provided for in the act of March 3, 1891.
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MINING CLAIM--PLACER-SITRVEYED LAND.
ilOLMES PLACER.
A patent for a placer mining claim should describe tvith mathematical accuracy the
land intended to be conveyed thereby; and where such a degree of accuracy
cannot be obtained under an application that embraces lands theretofore sur-
veyed and returned in irregular sub-divisions as "lots," an additional survey
will be required.
Secretary Bliss to the Commnissioner of the General Land Office, AMay 13,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (P. J. C.
It appears that on December 28, 1895, Beujamin C. Currier et al. made
mineral entry of the Holmes placer mining claim, Sacramento, Cali-
fornia, land district, and the land included therein was described as
follows: lot No. , the W. - of lot 1, the W. t of the E. i of lot 1, the
W. of the SE. of the NE. , and the W. j of the E. of the SE. of
the NE.i, Sec. 3, T. 12 N. R. 10 E., M. D. M.
The township had been surveyed and divided into legal subdivisions,
and lot 1-the NE. of the NE. ,-over which this controversy arises,
was originally less than forty acres and was returned as a lot. Since
the original survey a part of it has been patented as a lode claim, vhich
cuts down its area still more.
By decision of September 4, 1896, your office conceded that where
placer claims are located on surveyed land, and they are made to con-
form thereto, there is no necessity for a survey and plat, and that land
thus located may be in subdivisions of ten acres. It was said therein
that the practice of your office has been to treat as legal subdivisions
portions of forty acre subdivisions made fractional by mineral entries,
and designated as lots ad to allow placer entries therefor without plat
and survey, but that no warrant is found for the entry of tracts of less
than ten acres by legal subdivisions without survey or plat, except in
the form of lots; that
The reason forthis holding and for the refusal to allow entry for less than ten acre
tracts (except as regularly designated) is obvious.
To allow entries by legal subdivisions (if such subdivisions can be called legal)
would be to dot the public domain (in mineral localities) with tracts of irregularly
shaped pieces of land not designated by any series of 'lot" numbers, or by mineral
survey numbers, and would tend to confusion and perhaps to mistakes in the disposal
of the public lands.
On the other hand, if these tracts are surveyed and designated by a mineral sur-
vey number, their locus and boundaries are fixed, and they can be easily found and
described.
Another objection to the entry by subdivisions of such tracts, for instance the
NW. 1 of a lot containing 19.9 acres, is the difficulty of fixing the area of the tract
and the relative areas of the other fractional parts of the lot.
In view of these facts I am of the opinion that tracts of land containing a less
area than ten acres (unless designated by the surveyor-general as "lots") and frae-
tional parls of lots must be surveyed and platted as in case of placer claims on unsur-
veyed lands, before mineral (placer) entry can be allowed therefor.
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In the case, therefore, under consiceration, you will notify the claimants that they
will be equired to apply to the U. S. surveyor-general for a survey of the tracts
described iD the entry as follows, to wit: W. i of lot 1; WV. - of E. + of lot 1.
From this decision the claimants have appealed, on te groulids (1)
that it practically nullifies the intent of the mining laws as far as they
apply to the location and patenting of lands which have been pre-
viously surveyed and designated as lots; (2) that your said office
decision would impose unnecessary expense and hardship on placer
mining applicants, and (3) that it is opposed to public policy in that it
discourages the private ownership and improvement of milneral lands.
After an investigation of the question here involved it is believed
that the ruling of your office is correct.
Il addition to the reasons given in your office decision it may be said
that in many township surveys there are fractional parts of land on the
north and west sides of the townships. Tese may be more or less in
area than the regular, or normal, legal subdivisions. When this occurs
these fractional tracts are designated as "lots," and given a number,
together with the exact acreage each contains. The designation of
these irregular tracts is thereafter, in the records of the land depart-
ment, known and described by their numbers, and not by what would
be ordinarily their legal subdivision. For instance, the tract involved
is technically known as lot 1 of section 3, and not as the NE. i of the
NE. . When any part of the land included in this legal designation
is disposed of by the government, its original identity, as to area, is
lost. The surveyor-general, in such cases, changes the area of the
original lot on the plats in his office, doducting the area segregated,
and then records the-exact acreage remaining.
A lot is necessarily an abnormally shaped tract, whether made by
the original survey or caused by the segregation of a part thereof by a
mineral entry. Hence to attempt to describe a part of it in the way
that one would describe a legal subdivision, as is done in the case at
bar, would necessarily cause confusion in the records as well as the
possibility of raising doubt as to the exact area patented.
The uncertainty of this sort of description may be illustrated in this
way: the description in the ase at bar means, practically, the west
three fourths of lot 1. There are no inonuments in connection With this
entry on the ground by which its identity can be fixed, and the legal
subdivision from which it is carved out being less than forty acres, it
is not improbable that if patent were issued with this description, it
might be insisted upon by the atentees, or their assigns, that this
description was intended to mean the west three-fourths of the actual
acreage of. lot 1, and that acreage rather than a division by cardinal
points was contemplated. In the case at bar there is a plat of the
ground prepared by the applicants which shows that it is their inten-
tion to make the segregation by cardinal points, so that in this particu-
lar case sch a question might not be raised. But this plat does. not
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necessarily become a part of the records of the office of the surveyor-
general; hence there would be no official record in his office of the same.
There is some confusion in this case as to the acreage. For instance,
the application is for 7i.20 acres. Following the description given in
the notice of application, in the published notice, and on those posted
both on the land and i the local office, it is said that the tract contains
80.46 acres, while in the register's final certificate the entry is of 79.80
acres. Whether these discrepancies are caused by reason of doubt as
to the acreage in lot 1, does not appear, as the area of each tract
included in the entry is not given separately.
It is conceived to be the duty of the Department in issuing a patent
to describe with mathematical accuracy the ground conveyed. It is
apparent that this can not be done with the description that is insisted
upon in the ease at bar, and if such a degree of accuracy can not be
obtained without an additional survey, it is incumbent on the applicant
to have the ground so described as tliat its situs may be definitely fixed.
Your office judgment is therefore affirmed.
RAILROAD GRANT-JOINT RESOLUTION OF MAY 31, 1870.
CORLIS V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO. (ON REVIEW).
The joint resolution of May 1, 1870, while making a new grant to the Northern
Pacific between Portland and Puget Sound, and enlarging the limits along the
Cascade branch within which indemnity might be taken, did not make a new
grant for said branch, hence, as to lands within the place limits along said line
their status under the grant of July 2, 1864, must determine the right of the
company thereto.
The departmental decision herein of August 28, 1896, 23 L. D., 265, vacated.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, May 13,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (G. B. G.)
This is a motion for review of departmental decision of August 28,
1896 (23 L. D.; 265), in the ease of John H. Corlis . Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, involving the W. & of the SE. 4 and lots 3 and 4 of
See. 5, T. 23 N., R. 5 E., Seattle land district, Washington.
The land in controversy is within the place limits of the company's
grant for what is known as the Cascade Branch of the Northern Pacific
Railroad, and was listed by the company on September 21, 1888. The -
road along this line was definitely located on March 26, 1884.
The record shows that one Amos Hurst made homestead entry of this
land on June 26, 1869, which entry was canceled February 11, 1871.
Subsequently, to wit, on January 27, 1894, the plaintiff herein, John
H. Corlis, filed his application to make a homestead entry of the land,
which was rejected by the local officers for conflict with the grant to
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said company. Your office approved the action of the local officers, but
on the appeal of Corlis to the Department the decision of your office
was reversed, and it was here held that the tract in question was
excepted from the company's grant and subject to the homestead appli-
cation of Corlis.
It was said in the decision under review:
In determining what lands were passed to the altered main or branch line as pro-
vided for by the resolution of 1870, said resolution must be considered in the nature
of a new grant, and that only such lands as were public lands at the date of the pas-
sage of said resolution were intended to be granted thereby.
As before stated, the records show that the tract here involved was entered under
the homestead law June 26, 1869, which entry was of record mcanceled at the date
of the passage of the joint resolution of May 31, 1870, andas againstthe grant made
by said resolution was an appropriation of the land. I must therefore reverse your
office decision and hold that the tract here in question was excepted from the com-
pany's grant on account of its branch line, and is subject to the application of
Corlis.
The reasoning of the decision in support of the conclusion reached
was, therefore, substantially that the joint resolution. of 1870 (16 Stat.,
378) was in the nature of a new grant to the company, that only such
lands as were public lands at the date of the passage of said joint
resolution were intended to be granted thereby, that at that date the
tract in controversy was embraced in the homestead entry of llurst,
and therefore excepted from the grant. This being so, it followed that
the land was public land, and subject to the application of Corlis when
made.
The company's notion for review was duly entertained. In this
motion it is urged that the decision aforesaid is manifestly erroneous,
for the reason that the company took the lands along its Cascade Branch
by virtue of its grant of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), and not under the
joint resolution of 1870.
- If the contention of the company in this behalf is sound, it would
follow, the tract iii controversy being free both at the date of the grant
and the definite location of its road. that it passed to the company
under its grant, and the decision complained of can not stand.
By the act of July 2, 1864, a grant was made to aid in the construc-
tion of a continuous line of railroad-
Beginning at a point on Lake Superior in the State of Minnesota or Wisconsin,
thence westerly by the most eligible route, as shall be determined by said company,
within the territory of the United States, on a line north of the forty-fifth degree of
latitude to some point on Puget Sound, with a branch via the valley of the Columbia
River to a point at or near Portland in the State of Oregon, leaving the main trunk
line at the most suitable place not more than three hundred miles from its western
terminus.
The joint resolution of 1870 provided, among other things,-
That the Northern Pacific Railroad Company be, and hereby is, authorized .....
to locate and construct, under the provisions and with the privileges, grants,
and duties provided for in its act of incorporation, its main road to some point on
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Piget Sound, viae the valley of the Columbia river, with the right to locate and
construct its branch from some convenient point on its main trunk line across the
Cascade Mountains to Puget Sound; and in the event of there not being in any State
or Territory in which said main line or branch may be located, at the time of the
final location thereof, the amount of lands per mile granted by Congress to said
company, within the limits prescribed by its charter, theu said company shall be
entitled, under the directions of the Secretary of the Interior, to receive so many
sections of land belonging to the United States, and designated by odd numbers, in
such State orTerritory, within ten miles on each side of said road, beyond the limits
prescribed in said charter, as will make up such deiciency, on said main line or
branch, except mineral and other lands as excepted in the charter of said company
of eighteen hundred and sixty-four, to the amount of the lands that have been
granted, sold, reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, preempted, or otherwise
disposed of subsequent to the passage of the act of July two, eighteen hundred and
sixty-four.
The effect of this legislation w as to change the company's main line
to the valley of the Columbia river, where it had been authorized by
the act of 1864 to locate its branch line, and to change its branch line
from the valley of the Columbia river to a line across the Cascade
Mountains where it had been authorized by the act of 1864 to locate its
main line. Under the act of 1864, however, one line was to stop at a
point on Puget Sound and the other at a point at or near Portland,
while by the terms of the joint resolution of 1870, both lines were to
terminate on Puget Sound. For that part of the main line, therefore,
extending from the original Columbia river line to Puget Sound, there
was no grant of lands by the act of 1864, but the joint resolution of
1870 authorized the company to locate and construct this new line
" under the provisions and with the privileges, grants, and duties pro-
vided for in its act of incorporation" which. was the act of 1864.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. McRae (6 L. D., 400); United States v.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. (152 U. S., 295).
So far, therefore, as said joint resolution relates to that part of the
main line between the original Columbia river line and Puget Sound,
it conferred a new and additional grant on the comiany, but it lid not
make a new grant for the Cascade Branch. It enlarged the limits
within which deficiencies for losses might be satisfied, but in doing so
referred to such enlarged limits as " beyond the limits prescribed" by
the company's "charter," being the act of 1864. This was a distinct
recognition of the grant of 1864 as a continuous one, and precludes the
idea of a new grant along any of the lines authorized by that act,
except as to the enlarged limits to satisfy deficiencies.
Moreover, this new grant of indemnity lands was in terms to make
up deficiencies
to the amount of the lands that have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by
homestead settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of subsequent to the passage
of the act of July two, eighteen hundred and sixty-four,
thus recognizing the continued existence of that grant and making
further provision for its fruition.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 655
In the case of Spaulding v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (21
L. D., 57), it was held (syllabus):
At Portland, Oregon, the Northern Pacific has two grants, the first for the line
eastward, tinder the act of 1864, and the second northward, under the joint resolu-
tion of 1870, and, so far as the limits of the grant east of said city overlaps the
subsequent grant, the latter must fail; and, as the road at such point eastward is
unconstructed, and the grant therefore forfeited by the act of September 29, 1890,
the lands so released from said grant do not inure to the later rant, but are subject
to disposal under the provisions of said forftiture act.
The main liie of said road down the valley of the Columbia river was
never built, and the question in the Spaulding case was, whether cer-
taiii lands within the overlapping limits of the company's grant on
account of the original Columbia river line anti the grant on account of
the line running north to Puget Sound, passed to the company on
account of said last named line by virtue of the joint resolution of 1870,
or whether they were granted to the company by the act of 1864 on
account of said branch line, and, therefore, forfeited to the United
States by the act of September 29, 1800 (26 Stat, 496).
It was held, as has been seen, that these lands came within the pro-
visions of the forfeiture act (supra). To reach this conclusion it was
necessary to hold, and was held, that these lands were granted to the
company by the act of 1864, and were therefore not subject to the
operation of the joint resolution of 1870.
This ruling is not in harmony with the ruling in the case at bar. If
the company took its grant within the limits of the original Columbia
river line by the act of 1864, there woald seem to be no reason for
applying a different rule to the Cascade Mountain line.
- If it be suggested that it may be conceded that the company took
the lands along its Cascade BranchL under the grant of 1864, and that
still by the joint resolution of 1870 a new condition was imposed
excepting from the grant those lands disposed of between the passage
of the act of 1864 and the joint resolution of 1870, the answer is that
said joint resolution does not simply except lands disposed of between
the passage of the act of 1864 and the joint resolution of 1870, in the
sense that the status at the date of the joint resolution shall be con-
trolling, but provides that
in the event of there not being . . . . at the tine of the final location thereof, the amount
of lands per mile granted by Congress to said company, within the limits prescribed
by its charter [evidently meaning the act of 1864], . then said company shall
be entitled . . .. to receive so many sections .... as will iake up such deficiency,
on said main line or branch, to the amount of lands that have been granted, sold,
reserved, occupied by homestead settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of sb-
sequent to the passage of the act of Julg fivo, eighteen hundred and sixty-foar.
The language, subsequent to the passage of the act of July two,
eighteen hundred and sixty-four " should be read in connection with
the words "at the time of the final location thereof." When so read
together it is clear that Congress intended that if it were found at the
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time of the final location of the main or branch line any lands within
the primary limits of the original grant were embraced in any subsist-
ing disposition thereof of the character named, made since the act of
1864, the company would be entitled to take indemnity therefor, within
the enlarged limits.
These views are not at variance with the ruling of the supreme court
in the case of the United States v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company
(152 U. S., 284), relied on in the decision under review in support of the
conclusion reached therein. In that case it was said:
By the resolution of 1870 it was declared that if at the tinie of the final location
of the company's main line or branch there were not enough lands per mile within
the prescribed limits, the deficiency could be supplied from lands within ten miles
beyond those limits, other than mineral and other lands as excepted in the charter
of the company to the amount of the lands that have been granted, sold, reserved,
occupied by homestead settlers, preempted or otherwise disposed of subsequent to
the passage of the act of July 2, 1864.' It is therefore clear that no public land dis-
posed of after the passage of the act of July, 1861, was intended to be embraced in
the grant of May 31, 1870.
The lands involved in the case then before the court were along that
portion of the road between the original Columbia river line and Puget
Sound, ahd, were therefore not embraced in the grant of 1864, but were
embraced in the grant of May 31, 1870, made by the resolution of that
date. In that case the court also said at page 298:
The lands in question had been disposed of by the United States prior to the
passage of the joint resolution of May 31, 1870, namely, by the act of May 4, 1870,
granting lands to the Oregon Central Railroad Company in aid of the construction
of its road, and as they were embraced by the latter grant and ere not ie/eded in
ay other grant then existing, they were not public lands within the meaning of the
grant of May 31, 1870, to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and were conse-
quently excepted out of that grant as having been previously disposed of' by the
United States.
The supreme court, therefore, when it said " that no public land dis-
posed of after the passage of the act of July, 1864, was intended to be
embraced in the grant of May 31, 170," was not speaking of lands
theretofore granted by the act of 1864, but of lands of which there had
been no antecedent grant to this company.
The better opinion is that the decision under review is not sound.
This land was granted to the company by the act of 1864, was free
from adverse claim at the date of definite location and passed to the
company at that date.
This case arose upon an application presented by Corlis to make
homestead entry of the land, all rights under which he has since relin-
quished, as evidenced by the paper forwarded with your letter of April
9, 1898. It nevertheless remains the duty of this Department to adjust
the grant and determine which of the lands within the limits passed
thereby, and for this reason the motion has been considered notwith-
standing the withdrawal by Corlis of his application.
The decision herein of August 28, 1896, supra, is vacated, and the
company's listing of the tract will be approved, if otherwise regular.
DECISIONS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS. 657
CIRCULAR IN RELATION TO EES FOR REDUCING TESTIMONY TO
WRITING, ETC.
DEPART-MENT OF THE INTERIOR,
GENERAL LAND OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., April 22,1898.
To Registers and Receivers:
GENTLEMEN: Your attention is called to the following provisions of
law:
Registers and receivers are allowed, jointly, at the rate of fifteen cents per hundred
words for testimony reduced by them to writing for claimants in establishing pre-
emption and homestead rights. (Sec. 2238, subdivision 10, R. S.)
A like fee as provided in the preceding subdivision, when such writing is done in
the land office in establishing claims for mineral lands. (Sec. 2238, subdivision
11, R. S.)
Registers and receivers in California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Colorado,
Idaho, ew Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, and Montana, are each entitled to
collect and receive fifty per centum on fees and commissions provided for in the first,
third, anl tenth subdivisions of this section. (Sec. 2238, subdivisib] 12, R. S.)
The register for any consolidated land district, in addition to the fees now allowed
by law, shall be entitled to charge and receive for making transcripts for idividuals
or furnishing any other record information respecting public lands or land titles in
his consolidated land district, such fees as are properly authorized by the tariff exist-
ing in the local courts of his district, and the receiver shall receive his equal share
of such fees, and it shall be his duty to aid the register in the preparation of the
transcript or giving the desired record information. (Sec. 2239, R. S.)
The register and receiver shall be entitled to the same fees for examining and
approving testimony given before the judge or clerk of a court in final homestead
cases as are now allowed by-law for taking the same. (Act of Congress approved
March 3,1877, 19 Stats., 403.)
This refers to. the fees provided for i the tenth and twelfth subdi-
visions, section 2238, R. S., above mentioned.
Under the timber and stone land act of June 3, 1878, as amended by
the act of August 4, 1892, registers and receivers are entitled jointly to
a fee of fifteen cents or twenty-two and one-half cents per hundred
words, as fixed by subdivisions ten and twelve respectively of section
2238, R. S., for testimony reduced to writing for claimants.
Section , act of March 3, 1891, provides as follows:
And registers and receivers shall be allowed the same fees and compensation for
final proofs in timber-culture entries as are now allowed by law in homestead entries.
This refers to the fees provided for in the tenth'and twelfth subdi-
visions, section 2238, R. S., and act of March 3, 1877, which, by the act
of March 3, 1891, are made general and applied in all cases where
similar services are rendered by- registers and receivers; that is, for
reducing testimony to writing and examining and approving testimony,
both in commuted and non-commuted homestead and timber-culture
final proofs.
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Your attention is called to the following act of Congress approved
March 3, 1883:
AN ACT in relation to certain fees allowed registers and receivers.
Be it enacted by the Senate ad cHouse of Representatties of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That the fees allowed egisters and receivers for testimony
reduced by them to writing for claimants i establishing pre-emption and homestead
rights and mineral entries, and in contested cases, shall not be considered or taken
into account in determining the maxinium of compensation of said officers.
SEC. 2. That registers and receivers shall, upon application, furnish plats or dia-
grams of townships in their respective districts showing wh, at lands are vacant and
what lands are. taken, and shall be allowed to receive compensation terefor from
the party obtaining said plats or diagrams at such rates as may be prescribed by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, and said officer shall, upon application yr
the proper State or Territoiial authorities, furnish, for the purpose of taxation, a
list of lands sold in their respective districts, together with the nanes of the pur-
chasers, and shall be allowed to receive compensation for the same not to exceed ten
cents per entry; and the sms thus received for plats and lists shall not be consid-
ered or taken into account in determining the snaxhnuns of compensation of said
officers.
Your attention is also called to the following extract from the act
making appropriatibus for sundry civil expenses of the Goverllelt for
the fiscal year ending June 30. 1887, approved August 4, 1886 (24
Stats., 239).
All fees collected by registers and receivers, from any source whatever, which
would increase their salaries beyond three thousand dollars each year, shall be cov-
ered into the Treasury, except only so much as may hbe necessary topay actual cost
of clerical services eployed exclusively in contested cases, an d they sall report
quarterly, under oath, of all expenditures for such clerical services, vith vouchers
therefor.
In accordance with the act of Congress, as quoted, receivers will
deposit to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States all moneys
received for reducing testimony to writing, and all other fees which by
the act of March 3, 1883, were authorized to be retained by registers
and receivers (except the amount payable for clerk hire, i accordance
with the terms of the law), as other public moneys of the United States
received from fees and commissions are deposited. The First Collp-
troller of the Treasury in a decision (in case of Lambert, receiver at
Pueblo, Colorado), dated July 14, 1891, and reaffirmed by letter of Sep-
tember 21, 1891, held that no otherfees can be legally appropriated to the
payment of contest clerks than those wcich have been received for reducing
testimony to writing in contest cases, and that the measure of compensa-
tion to a clerk employed in any contest must be limited to the amount
of the fee deposited for reducing testimony to writing in that partieu-
lar contest. All such fees will be reported in detail on the receiver's
monthly detailed account-current thereof (Form 4-146), and accounted
for in their monthly and quarterly accounts. But fees not earned (that
is, deposits made for services to be rendered), are stot to be deposited to the
credit of the United, States, but to the credit of the receiver and accounted
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for in his account of unearned fees ad unofficial inoneys (section 2234,
B. S., as amended by the act approved January 27, 1898).
The register's cancellation fee of one dollar, authorized l)y the act of
May 14, 1880 (modified by act of August 4, 1886), will be paid to the
receiver, who will deposit it as other unearned fees and when the entry
is cancelled and the notice given be will deposit the same to the credit
of the United States as in the case of other fees earned. This fee of
one dollar is exclusively a register's fee, of which the receiver is entitled
to no portion in making tp the maximum compensation of registers and
receivers. Should the cancellation not take place, and. no notice be
given, the fee is to be returned to the depositor.
In computing the fees for reducing testimony to writing, only the
words actually-written by registers and receivers, or persons in their
employ, must be charged for at the rates allowed by paragraphs 10, 11,
and 12, of section 2238, R. S., and no charge is to be made for the
printed words. The words actually written must be counted and
charged for, and there can be no uniform fee of a specified sum ppli-
cable to every case of the same class of entries; that is, registers and
receivers can not fix the fee at one dollar or more for each pre-emption,
final homestead, or mineral entry.
Under the second section of the act of March 3, 1883, authorizing a
charge to be made for plats or diagrams, the fees for the same are
hereby fixed as follows:
For a diagram showing entries only .-.. .. -$1. 00
For a township plat showing entries, names of caimants, and character of
entry. .. -2. 00
For a township plat showing entries, names of laimants, character of entry, -
and number-.0 .. . .. . .... .-.- . 3.00
For a township plat showing entries, names of claimants, character of entry,
number anud date of filing or entry; together with topography, etc .. 400
In no case are fees to be charged for examining and approving testi-
mony given before the judge or clerk of a court except in connuted or
non-comnuted homestead and timber-culture final proofs.
The attention of registers and receivers is called to section 2242, R. S.,
which is as follows:
No register or receiver shall receive any compensation out of the Treasury for
past services who has charged or received illegal fees; and on satisfactory proof
that either of such officers has charged or received fees or other rewards not author-
ized by law, he shall be forthwith removed from office.
You will be held to a strict compliance with the laws and regulations
relating to the matter of fees in all cases.
Registers of laud offices have no right, officially to receive any moneys
whatever except such as are paid to them by receivers as salary, fees,
and commissions. Should any money be forwarded to the register or
paid to him, he will at once pay over the same to the receiver; and
where parties address the register as to the cost of any service required,
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he will refer the matter to the receiver for answer, as the latter is the
proper officer to receive all public moneys.
In order to secure uniformity in the preparation of accounts of receiv-
ers relative to moneys received for reducing testimony to writing, and
for clerical services rendered exclusively in contest cases under the act
of August 4, 1886, the following method will be observed:
Receivers will credit the United States in their accounts as receivers
with the gross amount of all fees earned, except such sums as are paid
by them for clerk hire exclusively in contest cases, which sums must be
deducted from the gross proceeds received, and-should not be included
in the amounts so credited. They will also debit the United States with
the deposits of such receipts exclusive of the amounts for clerk hire'
referred to above. In the special disbursing accounts for clerical service
exclusively in contest cases, they will credit the United States with the
total amouits received from contestants in contest cases, and debit the
United States with the amount paid for clerk hire in such cases and also
debit the United States with balance, if any, deposited with the U. S.
Treasurer, supporting the account with sworn statements and proper
vouchers. This accopnt should exactly balance.
The excess of receipts from fees over the expenses of'clerical services
must be reported in the receiver's weekly statements, monthly fee
statements, and in their quarterly and monthly accounts-current.
Receivers will also report in detail on their receiver's monthly state-
ments (Form 4-146) all cancellation fees earned and all receipts for
reducing testimony to writing, and also enter on the same the expenses
incurred for clerical service.
Whenever money is received from a party in payment of fees, the
receipt thereof should be dly acknowledged. It is therefore directed
that in cases where testimony, in establishing a pre-emption, homestead,
or mineral claim, or the right to enter land as being valnable chiefly for
timber or stone but unfit for cultivation under the act of June 3, 1878,
has been submitted and an entry or location is allowed or final home-
stead papers issued on such testimony, and also where a fee is paid for
allowing entries under the timber-lands act of June 3, 1878, the receiver
shall endorse on both the original and duplicate receipt, or certificate of
location where there is no receipt in the case, an acknowledgment of
the amount of fees received for reducing testimony to writing, examining
and approving the same, or other special account as the case may be;
and that in contested cases where testimony is taien, as also in cases
where transcripts of records are furnished under section 2239j R. S., or
fees received under the act of March 3, 1883, he shall issue a receipt
for the money to any party paying the same (it being the duty of the
receiver to receive and receipt for the money in every case), but no
duplicate of the special receipt so issued need be transmitted to this
office.
This circular is designed to take the place of circulars "M," of July
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20, 1883 (2 L. D., 662); Augast 18, 1S86 (5 L. D., 569); November 6,
18S6 (5 L. D., 245); March 15, 1887 (5 L. D., 577), and November 12,
1891.
BiNGER HERM'IANN,
Commissioner.
Approved:
C. N. BLISS,
Secret ary.
FINAL PROOF-EQUITABLE ACTION.
JOHN A. BALL.
A homesteader who is unable, through poverty and sickness, to submit formal final
proof, or to execute his final affidavit in the land district where the land is situ-
ated, mnay be permitted to file such affidavit, made before a judge or clerk of a
court of record, with a view to the issuance of final certificate nd equitable
action thereon, it appealing from the evidence in a contest against said entry,
and otherwise, that he has in fact earned a patent to the land.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, May 16,
(W. V. .) 1898. (L. L. B.)
The appeal of John A. Ball from your office decision of October 8,
1896, allowing him sixty days in which " to take the necessary steps
toward making final proof" oll his homestead entry for the SW. 1 of
the NE. 1, Sec. 4, T. 6 S., R. 10' ., Huntsville, Alabama, is here and
has been examined.
Ball made his entry August 2, 1887, resided upon, cultivated and
improved the land until the latter part of 1891, and in December of that
year advertised to make final proof ol January 28, 1892. At the time
he advertised to make final proof he was, and has ever since remained,
an inmate of the Soldiers' Home in the city of.Wasbington, D. C., he
having been a Union soldier and entitled to a credit of three years on
his residence and cultivation by reason of his military service in the
war of the rebellion.
The record shows that at the time Ball advertised to make final
proof he was unable, by reason of sickness and poverty, to appear at
the place fixed by the published notice for taking the same, and it was
his intention to take the testimony of his two witnesses at the time and
place so'fixed and have his own testimony and final affidavit taken
before some officer in this city. Between the date of the notice and
the time fixed therein for taking the proof, he informed his agent (oIe
of his neighbors in Alabama) of his said intention, who, it seems, was
advised that Ball's presence was necessary at the taking of the proof,
and being informed that it was impossible for Ball to be present, he
instructed the witnesses that their attendance would not be required.
For this reason his final proof was not taken.
June 28, 1894, William N. Kirby filed an affidavit of contest against
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Ball's entry, charging abandonment for more than six months. Testi-
mony was taken according to the published notice, the defendant mak-
ing default. The local officers recommended that the'entry be canceled,
the proof showing that Ball had abandoned the land and left the coun-
try more than three years prior to the date of the contest.
Ball was notified of the action of the local office, and he appealed;
whereupon, by your office letter of March 19, 1895, the action of the
local office was reversed and the contest dismissed, said letter finding
that, including the credit he was entitled to for military service, he had,
at the date of the contest, fully complied with the law as to residence,
cultivation, and improvements, and had "earned his patent? TIe con-
testant did not appeal from this action of your predecessor, and the
case was finally closed by your office letter "1I" June 17, 1895.
November 12, 895, final proof not having been submitted, and more
than seven years having elapsed since the date of his entry, the local
office reported the entry for cancellation for failure to make final proof
within the lifetime of the entry. Accomnpanying this report was the
affidavit of Ball showing his former attempt to submit his proof, and
showing also that it has been impossible for him to go to Alabama to
attend to it himself and that he is and has been for a long time unable
to leave his bed except at short intervals, that he has no money and no
way of getting any to pay the expense of publication and fees for tak-
ing the testimony of his final proof witnesses, etc.
By your office letter of January 25, 1896, he was advised that proof of
residence and cultivation required by the homestead law must be sub-
mitted after due publication of notice, and he was allowed sixty clays
in which to submit the same.
August 25th following, he filed in your office the affidavits of three
of his homestead neighbors. sworn to March 10, 1896, all of them alleg-
ing his residence and cultivation of his claim for three and one-half
years subsequent to his entry.
This proof was rejected by your office, and he was advised that he
must proceed as heretofore directed, but that lie might submit his own
final proof testimony and final affidavit before some judge or clerk of
a court of record here in Washington, naming him in his final proof
notice, and allowiing him sixty days in which to take the necessary steps
in this direction. Being unable to comply with this letter, he has
appealed; and now asks that his entry may be referred to the Board
of Equitable Adjudication for confirmation.
Such, in brief, is the situation of this unfortunate claimant, now
appealing to the equity side of this Departnent for relief.
After careful research no parallel case is found in any of the reported
departmental decisions, nor is it thought that any of the rules (thus
far established) pertaining to the Board of Equitable. Adjudication
make express provision for exactly such a case. It is possible, even
probable, that of the hundreds of thousands of entrymen whose claims
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have been adjudicated by this Department, not one has presented con-
ditions exactly similar to those surrounding the appellant herein. He-
has performed all the requirements of the law necessary to securing
patent for the land covered by his entry except the formal submission
of final proof. Evidence of sch performance is not lacking, for your
predecessor has already found that he " has earned his patent." Since
that time affidavits of three reputable people have been filed showing
a full compliance with the law in the matter of residence and cultiva-
tion, and lie is in default only in the matter of not submitting his proof
in a formal manner. He has shown that he is unable to do this. Must
he lose his land after e has earned his patent and satisfied your office
as to his compliance witI the statute in relation to residence, cultiva-
tion and improvements. The only purpose for which final proof is
required to be submitted is to show such compliance. The Department
is fully convinced that lie has complied with all these essential require-
ments and that he is unable to make foi'mal proof of it.
Without designing or intending to establish a precedent, but in view
of the unquestioned good faith of the entryman and his helplessness,
you will direct tat he be allowed to make his final affidavit of non,
alienation before some judge or clerk of a court of record i the city
of Washington, D. . (Nancy J. Crews, 14 L. D., 687), and upon the
receipt of the same by the local officers within ninety days from notice
of this decision they will issue and forward to your office his final cer-
tificate for the land embraced in his entry, and upon receipt of the
same you will refer his entry to the Board of Equitable Adjudication
for action thereon. See General Circular 1890, p. 230.
Your office decision is accordingly modified.
IIOMESTEAD-AMENDM3ENT OF ENTRY.
DANIEL L. HARTLEY.
A homesteader who makes entry of one hundred and twenty acres, and contests an
entry emlbracing an adjacent forty acre tract, may, in the event of success, be
permitted to so amend his entry as to include said forty acres, where by such
action he secures the land originally itended to be entered.
Secretary Bliss to the Commnissioner of the General Land Office, May 16,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (-. B. G.)
On May 23, 1895, Daniel N. Hartley made homestead entry for the
SW. i of the SE. of Sec. 29 and the N. i of the NE. of Sec. 32, T.
24 N., R. 32 E., Clayton, New Mexico.
On February 6, 1896, the said Hartley applied at the local office to
make an additional homestead entry for the SE. 1 of the SE. of Sec.
29, T. 24 N., R. 32 E., which was rejected by the local officers, from
which action he appealed.
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On April 30, 1896, your office affirmed the action of the local officers,
and the further appeal of Hartley brings the case to the Departmnent.
It appears that Hartley, on May 23, 1895, presented at the local office
his application to enter one hundred and sixty acres of land, which
application embraced ot only the land that day entered by him, but
also the land now applied for; This application was rejected by the
local officers, for the reason that the SE. 1 of the SE. of Sec. 29, afore-
said, was at that time embraced in the homestead entry of one M. Sabino
Gallegos, made June 22, 1892. Hartley then made entry for the balance
of the land applied for, to wit, the SW. I of the SE. - of Sec. 29 and the
N. z of the NE. ' of Sec. 32, containing one hundred and twenty acres,
and on that dav, May 23, 1895, filed a contest against the said entry of
G allegos.
Trial was had, the entry of Gallegos duly canceled, whereupon Hart-
ley applied to make additional entry, as aforesaid.
The action of your office, in denying Hartley's application to make an
additional entry, as such, was correct.
The case is not within the act of larch 3,1879 (20 Stat., 472), and the
amendments thereto, authorizing additional entries in certain cases.
Treating it as an application to make a second entry, it is not within
the recent liberal rulings of the Department in the cases of Hertzke v.
Henermond (25 L. D., 82,) and Nancy A. Stinson (id., 113), construing
the act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854). The entry of Hartley was made
since the passage of that act, and he has not complied with the condi-
tions of the homestead law, in that he has not made his final proof and
received the receiver's final receipt. Hence this case is notwvithin either
the second or sixth section of said act; nor is it within the fifth section
thereof, for the reason that that section is without application, except
in the case of a homestead settler who has before the passage of the act
entered less than a quarter section of public land.
It is believed, however, that Hartley may be permitted to amend his
entry so as to include the land applied for.
In the case of Hadley v. Walter (25 L. I)., 276), it was held (syllabus)
A settler who makes entry for part of the land covered by his settlement claim,
and contests a prior entry covering the remainder, may be permitted to amend his
first entry so as to include the whole of his original claim, on the successful termni-
nation of his contest.
In that case it appeared that contestant Hadley, who was a settler
on a quarter section of land therein described, presented his applica-
tion at the local office to make homestead entry for said land, but found
that he had been anticipated as to the N. t- of the quarter section,
which land had been entered by Walter. Acting upon the advice of
counsel, Hadley made homestead entry-for the S. of the tract, and at
the same time executed his affidavit of contest against Walter, alleging
prior settlement. The Department, after finding the fact of-priority
of settlement in favor of Hadley, said:
The question recurs-Did the contestant exhaust his homestead right by aking
homestead entry of the S. of the quarter section? I think, under the circum-
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stances of this case, that the contestant can not be regarded as having elected to
take only eighty acres of land, and thus waived his right to a larger quantity. He
evidently intended to take the whole quarter section, and simply mistook his rem-
edy. WAAhen he found that the coutestee had made homestead entry of the N. , he
shonld have applied to enter the whole quarter section and filed his contest against
the contestee's entry of the N. 1.
There is no difference in principle in the case cited and the one under
consideration. In the present ease it does not appear that Hartley had
made a settlement at the time he offered his application, but this dif-
ference is not thought important. Te controlling question is, -whether
he exhausted his homestead right by making entry of less than one
hundred and sixty acres of land, it appearing that it was his original
intention to enter the whole quarter section, tat intention having been
defeated by the prior entry of another for part of the land. The course
he took was not the proper one, but this is no evidence that he had
abandoned his original intention to acquire title to the whole quarter
section. On the contrary, it is clear that he has diligently pursued a
course which it was believed by him would enable him to consnmtiate
that purpose.
The decision appealed from is modified to conform to these views, and
case remanded, with directions to treat appellants application to make
additional homestead entry as an application to amend his original
entry, and your office will allow the same, unless further objection
appears.
RED LAKE IWDIAN LANDS-SETTLEMENT RIGHTS.
HANIRE ET AL. V. OUNNINGHAM ET AL.
Settlement on Red Lake Indian lands, opened to entry under the act of January 14,
1889, prior to the time fixed therefor, does not, under the terms of said statute
or the regulations issued tereuuder, operate to disqualify the settler
Secretary Bliss to the Commiissioner of te General Land Office, Nay 16,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (G. C. R.)
On May 15, 1896, Jennie Cunniingham made homestead entry No. 2
of lots 5 and 6 See. 34, and the S. - of the NW. of Sec. 35, T. 155 N.,
R. 43 W., Crbolston, Minuesota. The register and receiver state that
her entry was made at nine oclock of said day. On the same day
John G. Skomedal made homestead entry No. 585 for lots 4 and 5 of
said Sec. 35, and lot 9 of Sec. 26, same township and range; and (as
per the records of your office) Jens M. Adsero made homestead entry
for the SW .j of said Sec. 35.
' On May 15, 1896, Louis L. Ramstad made homestead entry for lots 7
and 8 of said Sec. 34.
On May 26, 1896, Trond P. Hamre filed his affidavit of contest, alleg-
ing prior settlement upon lots 6, 7, and 8 of said Sec. 34, affecting Cun-
ningham's entry as to lot 6 and Ramstad's entry as to lots 7 and 8.
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On July 28, 1896, Grant R. Lee applied to enter lots 5 and 6 in Sec.
34, and lot 5 and the SW. 4 of NW. 1 of Sec. 35. His application was
rejected, and he filed a contest alleging prior settlement, and asked to
be made a party at the hearing. His claim conflicts with unningham's
entry as to lots 5 and 6, Sec. 34, and te SW. of the NW. of Sec.
35, and with Skomkeal's entry as to lot 5, Sec. 35.
On Jly 28, 1898, Fred E. McDermott applied to enter lots 7 and 8
in Sec. 34 and the W. of the SW. i of Sec. 35. His application was
rejected, and he filed his contest alleging prior settlement, thus affect-
ing Ramstad's entry and Hamre's claim as to lots 7 and 8 in Sec. 34,
and Jeus M. Adsero's entry as to the W. - of the SW. 1 of Sec. 35.
The register and receiver found that, since Cunnigham made entry
just at nine o'clock of the opening day (May 15, 1896), and since that
was the moment tbelands in the reservation were opened to settlement,
no claim could possibly attach prior to that time; The local officers
for that reason recommended that irs. Cunningham's entry remain
intact and the contests of Lee and Haumre, as to those portions of their
claims which conflict with her entry, be dismissed.
Ramstad's entry for lots 7 and 8, in the SE. of Sec. 3, was made
at 3:40 P. M., on the opening day. The register and receiver found
that Hamre, who claimed those lots, together with lot 6 in the NE. 1 of
Sec. 34, made no improvements on either lots 7 or 8 until after May 15;
that McDermott, "about fifteen minutes before nine o'clock, on the
morning of May 15, 1896," went upon lot 8 with lumber, bedding, etc.,
and at once posted notices, readily observable at a distance of eighty
rods, upon lots 7 and S in See. 34, and upon each of the two forty acre
tracts comprising the W. t- of the SW. of Sec. 35 (part of Adsero's
entry); that his settlement was notorious; that lie immediately com-
menced work;. that his residence was thereafter continuous; that a
part of his improvements was placed upon each subdivision claimed
by him on the morning of the opening day; that since Hanare made
no improvements on May 15, on any portion of lots 7 and 8, which is in
the SE. 1 of Sec. 34, his improvements on lot 6, which is in the NE. 
of Sec. 34, would not give him, o a simple claim of prior settlement,
any rights in another quarter section where the first improvements
were made by a competing claimant.
-Under this state of facts the register and receiver recommended that
McDermott, as a prior settler, be allowed to enter lots 7 ad 8, but
refused to pass upon his claim to the W. of the SW. of Sec. 35, for
the reason that the entryinaln (Adsero) was not made a party to the
hearing. They recommended that Ramstad's entry be canceled, and
Hlamre's contest be disllissed.
IFrom that action Lee and Ellinre appealed, and your office, by decision
dated August 14, 1897, affirmed the action of the register and receiver
as to the action taken in respect to Ratmstad's entry, as to lots 7 and 8
and in awarding the right of entry thereto to McDermott. Your office,
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however, modified the action of the local officers as to a part of the
lands entered by Mrs. Cunningham, holding that the settlements of
Lee and Flamre were simultaneous with her entry, and for this reason
they have the better right to such parts of the land covered by her
entry as they may have settled upon at the moment of the opening.
Your office held Mrs. Cunningham's entry for cancellation, i so far as
it embraced lots 5 and 6 in Sec. 34, awarding to Lee said lot 5, because
he was a settler thereon at nine o'clock of the opening day; you found
that, as to lot 6 in Sec. 34, both Haure and Lee settled thereon simul-
taneously, and that in the event both apply to enter it, the same will
be awarded to the highest bidder as between the two.
It appears that Ramstad failed to appeal from the action of the local
office, and for this reason your office closed the case as to him, in award-
ing the right of entry to McDermott.
Both Cunningham and Hanre have appealed from the judgment of
your office.
Cunniiigham alleges error in the finding that contestants settled on
the lands at nine o'clock of the opening day, or that they performed
any " valid" act of settlement until after that time; that it was error
to hold that where entry and settlement are simultaneously made, the
settler's rights are superior.
The lands in controversy are in the Red Lake Indian reservation in
Minnesota, and were opened to settlement under the provisions of the
act of January 14, 1889, which made provision for obtaining the relin-
quishmuent and cession by the Chippewa ndians of certain portions of
said reservation, and for the survey, examination and classification
(pine and agricultural) of such lands. The act provided for the dis-
posal of the lands "to actual settlers only," and directed that after
their survey the Secretary of the Interior give thirty days' notice, at
the expiration of which the lands so surveyed shall be disposed of to
actual settlers only under the provisions of the homestead laws, (25
Stat., 642.)
In pursuance of this statute, lists were published descriptive of the
lands, and your office, on March 27, 1896, formulated, and the Depart-
ment approved, a circular of instructions to the registers and receivers
at Crookston and St Paul opening up the lands. Those instructions
read in part as follows:
The surveys and examination of a portion of the ceded, lands of the Red Lake
Reserv~ation have been completed, and it has been determined to open said lands to
settlement and entry in accordance with the provisions of the statute.
The hoLr of 9 o'clock a. in., Friday, May 15, 1896, has been fixed upon as the time
ot and after 'which these lands will be open to settlement and entry, and notices for
pnblication, as required by statute, have been forwarded to the newspapers I1 which
they are to be published.
The testimony has been carefully examined and the facts are found
substantially as stated in the decision appealed from.
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It is evident from the testimony that all the parties litigant who base
their claims upon their settlement were i some doubt as to whether a
settlement upon the lands before the hour of opening would, under the
terms of the statute and the instructions thereunder, disqualify them
from making entry of the lands. It appears in the cases of Lee and
McDermott that both went upon the land a few minutes before the
hour of opening, but did no work considered by them as improvements,
until 9 o'clock, though both posted otices before that time. I.Hamre
located on lot 6 of See. 34 just at 9 o'clock and at once began his
improvements, so that all of these settlers were on the land as actual
settlers when the hour of 9 o'clock arrived.
While the register and receiver state that Mrs. Cunningham's entry
was made at 9 o'clock, yet it appears that her entry is No. 2; there
must therefore have been an interval of time between 9 o'clock and the
moment of her filing. During that interval Lee and Hamre were set-
tlers on the lands (lots 5 and 6, section 34); being settlers at that time,
and their subsequent acts showing their good faith, they. have the'
better right; even where an entry of a tract is made by one at the same
time that a settlement is made thereon by another, the settler has the
superior right.
The fact that Lee, Hamre or McDermott may have settled on the land
prior to the hour of opening did not disqualify them; for neither the
statute nor the instructions thereunder imposed any penalty for pre-
mature settlement.
As to lots 7 and 8 in said section 34, it is sufficient to say that no
valid reason appears for disturbing the action of your office and the
local officers in awarding the lots to McDermott and not to appellant
Hamre. The controversy between Lee and Skomnedal over lot 5 in see-
tion. 35, is not here on appeal from any action taken by your office; it
appears that Lee is dissatisfied with the action of the local officers with
respect to it. From the recitals in your said office decision, it appears
that neither Adsero nor Skom edal 'was made a party to the contest;
however this may be, you will take such action with respect to the
lands entered by them as may be proper under the state of the records.
Since the appeals herein were filed llamstad has relinquished his
entry to said lots 7 and 8 and has applied for repayment of fees and
commissions paid upon said entry. His application is herewith
returned for appropriate action.
The deeision appealed from is affirmed.
BARNE S . MAGEE.
Motions for review and rehearing denied by Secretary Bliss, May 16,
1898. See 26 L. D., 264.
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SCI-OOL INDEMNITY SELECTION-SETTLEMENT RIGHlT.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. TURNER.
The right to select school indemnity extends only to "unappropriated" lands, and
hence can not be ecogunized where at the date of selection the land applied for
is embraced within a oi7 fide settlement claim of a qualified homesteader who
has improved the lanfl, and is residing thereon.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, May 16,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (P. J. C.)
The plat of survey of Tp. It N. R. 11 W., M. D. M., San Francisco,
California, land district, was filed in the local office August 14,1894,
and on August 16 following the State of California filed application
No. 11740 to select as school indemnity land the SW- of the NE4- of
See. 33 thereunder. September 13, following Wellington H. Turner
made homestead entry of this tract, with others, alleging in his appli-
cation settlement September 5, 1887, which was before the land was
surveyed.
Turner gave notice of his intention to make final proof on July 25,
1895. Notice of this was served on the State, and on the day set all
parties appeared. The final proof was submitted, the witnesses ross7
examined by the State and testimony in behalf of the State introduced.
The local officers found that Turner had not established and maintained
a residence a sufficient length of time prior to the hearing to entitle
him to the land under the homestead laws. They recommended that
the proof be rejected.
On appeal your office not only affirmed the action of the local officers,
but in addition held the entire entry for cancellation, whereupon Turner
prosecutes this appeal. The appellant accepts the decision of your
office "in so far as it refuses to allow said Turner to make final entry
under his presented proofs," but alleges that it is error to deny his
request " to withdraw his application for a patent, and to be permitted
to reside upon and cultivate the land for such time as the homestead
act requires in the securing of a homestead thereunder and in holding
said Turner's entry for cancellation."
In view of the questions raised by the appeal, it is not deemed
necessary to discuss at any length Turner's connection with the land
prior to the year 1894. Whatever may be said, about his residence
before the date of the selection by the State, it is clear from the evi-
dence that at that time, and for several months prior thereto, he was
residing on the land and cultivating it. It is also shown that he was a
qualified entryman, and, within the statutory period, he made his
homestead entry.
By the act of Congress of February 28, 1891 (26 Stat., 796), amend-
ing sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes, the right of the
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State to select lands i lieu of those lost in the sixteenth and thirty-
sixth sections is restricted to " unappropriated" r lands.
It is believed that the testimony in this case is sufficient to show that
the tract in controversy was, in contemplation of the statute, appro-
priated by Turner, and that his settlement, residence and improve-
ments were sfficient to defeat the right of the State to make selection
thereof.
That part of your office judgment holding his entry for cancellation.
is therefore reversed; the State's application to select will be rejected,
and Turner's homestead entry will remain intact subject to future
compliance with law.
TIMBER CLTURE CONTEST-ACT OF MIARCH , 1893.
PETTY V. RICHARDS.
A contest against a timber culture entry, initiated after the passage of the act of
March 3, 1893, in which the charge is 11on-compliance with. la-w, presents no
cause of action, in the absence of an allegation of default on the part of the
entryman occurring during the first eight years of the entry.
Seeretary Bliss to the Commissioner of. the General Land Otfice, llay 17,
(W. V. D.) . 1898. (G-. . R.)
On July 11, 1885, Owen R. Richards made timber culture entry for
the NE. -of Sec. 3, T. 8 S., IS. 36 W., Colby, Kansas.
On January 29, 18 6, Purley Petty filed his affidavit of contest
against the entry, alleging that Richards
has wholly failed to plow, plant, or cltivate, or to cause to be cultivated any por-
tion of said tract to trees, seeds, or cuttings at any time since about July 1, 1893,
and up to this date, viz., January 29, 1896; but has wholly abandoned said tract;
that said tract is in an uncultivated condition and overgrown by grass and weeds,
and barren of trees.
Notice was given by publication, and on the day of hearing (March
5, 1896,) the defendant demurred to the complaint, stating that the
same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or
snfficient, if true, to warrant cancellation of the entry. The register
and receiver sstained the demurrer and dismissed the contest. On
appeal, your office, by decision dated June 24, 1896, sustained that
action, and a further appeal brings the case here.
It is insisted in the appeal that the timber culture laws contemplate
that the entryman must:
1. Make proof on his claim within a reasonable time after his right
to make proof accrues; or
2. Failing to make such proof, he must continue the planting and
cultivation of the land, or suffer the penalty of cancellation.
It is stated in argument that, if it be held that upon compliance with
the timber culture law for eight years, the entryman has met the full
requirements of the law, and may thereafter postpone making final
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proof for five additional years, and during such period be excused from
cultivation, planting, etc., such rule would operate to hold the title to
all timber claims in abeyance, and the lands would for such period
escape their just share of taxes, etc.
The timber culture act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stat., 113), provides that
upon proof being made of the, planting, cultivation and protection of
the trees in the manner and upon the area specified for the period of
eight years " from the date of such entry . . . . . or at any time within
five -years thereafter," patent vill be issued.
The act approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095), repealing the timber
culture laws, provides, in its first section, that the period of cultivation
shall run from the date of entry, if the necessary acts of cultivation
were performed within the proper time; also that the preparation of
the land and the planting of trees shall be onstrued as acts of culti-
vation, and that the time so employed in the work shall be computed
as a part of the eight years of cultivation required by the statute.
The act of March 3, 1893 (27 Stat., 593), amended the act of March
3,1891 (supra), by adding the following words to the fourth proviso
thereof:
That if trees, seeds, or cuttings were in good faith planted as provided by law and
the same and the land upon which so planted were thereafter in good faith cultivated
as provided by law for at least eight years by a person qualified to make entry and
who has a subsisting entry vender the timber culture laws, final proof may be made
without regard to the nmber of trees that may have been then growing on the
land.
- Neither the act of 1891 nor that of 1893 changes or modifies the
original act of 1878 in any respect as to the time when final proof may
be made. This proof may therefore be made at the expiration of eight
years after entry, or at any time within five years thereafter.
If, according to the act just quoted, the trees, seeds, or cuttings were
in good faith planted according to the requirements, and the land upon
which they were so planted was in good faith cultivated for eight years,
in the manner prescribed, and the claimant was qualified to make entry
and has a subsisting entry, upon proof of these facts being made patent
will issue without regard to the number of trees that may be growing
when the proof. is submitted.
It follows that a contest against a timber culture entry, filed after
March 3, 1893, which fails to allege a default on the part of the entry-
man which occurred during the first eight years of the entry must fail,
for proof of full compliance with the law during that period is all that
is now required; it is not even necessary to show the growth of the
trees as a result of their proper planting or cultivation.
The possible postponement of making proof on timber culture entries
to the end of the thirteenth year and the issuance of patent thereon may
result in loss to the public revenue by failure to tax the lands; but this
Department is charged with the duty of executing the laws-not in
making them.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
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HIOMESTEAD-EESIDENCE-MIILTTARY SERVICE.
OPINION.
Under existing legislation enlistment in the military service of the United States
in the war with Spain will not excuse homestead claimants from complying with
the law as to residence and improvements..
Assistant Attorn ey- General Van Devanter to the Secretary of the Interior,
31/ay 13, 1898. (G. B. G.)
I am asked for an opinion whether there is any provision which would
operate to excuse homestead claimants "who may enlist for military
service in the war with Spain" from complying with the requirements
of the law as to residence and improvements during their absence in
such service.
Section 2308 of the Revised Statutes of the United States is as
follows:
Where a party at the date of his entry of a tract of land nider the homestead
laws, or subsequently thereto, was actually enlisted and employed in the army or
navy of the United States, his services therein shall, in the administration of such
homestead laws, be construed to be equivalent, to all intents and purposes, to
a residence for the same length of time upon the tract so entered. And if his
entry has been canceled by reason of his absence from such tract while in the mili-
tary or naval service of the United States, and such tract has not been disposed of,
his entry shall be restored; but if such tract has been disposed of, the party may
enter another tract subject to entry under the homestead laws, and his right to a
patent therefor may be determined by the proofs touching his residence and culti-
vation of the first tract and his absence therefrom in such service.
In the case of Jeff C. Davis, under date of April 9, 1879 (26 L. and B.,
342), it was said by Mr. Secretary Schurz, in reference to this section:
I am of opinion that . . . section 2308 has reference only to entries made by per-
sons before or after enlistment into the service during the war of the rebellion, and
whose rights were sacrificed by reason of their absence in said service, and that sec-
tion 2308 was not intended to include persons who have served in the regular army
since the close of the rebellion, and that service can not be construed as equivalent
to actual residence on a tract of land.
In the case of AW. A. Jones, I L. D., 98, and again in the case of Owen
v. Lutz, 14 L. D., 472, the ruling in the Davis case was cited with
approval.
Sections 2304-2309 of the Revised Statutes were taken from the act
of June 8, 1872 (17 Stat., 333), and while section 2308 is not by its own
terms limited to persons who were enlisted or employed in the army or
navy of the United States during the war of the rebellion, an examina-
tion of the other sections named, as well as of the original act, shows
that this legislation was expressly confined to persons who served in
the army, navy or marine corps "during the rebellion." In this con-
nection it may be mentioned that there is now pending in Congress a
measure extending the benefits of section. 2308 and other sections to
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persons serving in the army or navy of the United States during the
present war with Spain and that this measure has received such favor-
able consideration as to justify a reasonable hope of its passage.
I am of opinion that under existing legislation enlistment in the mili-
tary service of the United States in the war with Spain will not excuse
homestead claimants from complying with the law as to residence and
improvement.
Residence upon and improvement of lands taken under the home-
stead law are statutory requirements, proof of which can not be waived
by the land department in the absence of legislative authority therefor.
Approved,
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
RE1PAYMENT-DESERT LAND ENTRY.
BERNHARD NEUHATUS.
A desert land filing, made either under the Lassen county act, or the general act, and
abandoned, exhausts the claimant's rights under the desert land laws.
Repayment of the first installment paid on a desert land entry can not be made where
the declaratory statement is canceled on account of its fraudulent character.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Offce, ilay 18,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (J. L. McC.)
Bernhard Neuhans, on April 29, 1878, filed declaration under the
desert-land act of March 3 1877, upon the S. of the SE. of Sec. 7,
T. 31 N., R. 12 E., Susanville land district, California.
On August 15, 1883, your office canceled said declaration for the rea-
son that an examination had been made by a special agent of your office,
which disclosed the facts, (1) that the land was not desert in character;
(2) that no attempt had been made to irrigate the land at the date of
his examination (in the spring of 1883). Neuhaus was notified that
sixty days would be allowed him within which to show cause why his
declaration should be reinstated; but he made no response. Therefore
the cancellation was made final on May 15, 1885.
Neuhaus applied for repayment of the purchase money paid by him
upon said tract; but his application was refused by your office letter
of August 27, 1896, on the grounds, as therein stated:
First, because the proof showing the desert character of the land was false; and
second, because the entryman made no effort to irrigate the land in compliance
with the desert-land law.
Counsel for Neuhaus filed a motion for review, contending that the
entry was "erroneously allowed," within the meaning of the repayment
act, because Neuhaus had previously filed a declaration under the
so-called "Lassen county desert act" of 1875.
12209-VOL 26-43
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Your office, on October 17, 1896, denied said motion for review,
saying (inter alias):
The point raised by you would not warrant any change in my former decision, as
the desert filing ipade by Neuhans under the Lassen county act of 1875 was made
prior to the passage of the general desert act of 1877; hence he did not exhaust the
right conferred by the act of 1877.
Neuhaus has appealed to the Department, alleging that your office
erred-
In holding tat because applicant's filing inder-the Lassen county desert law
was made prior to March 3, 1877, his right to make an entry under the desert land
laws was not thereby exhausted.
Your office was in error, in the particular statement i eferred to in the
above allegation. A desert-land filing, made either under the Lassen
county act or the general act, and abandoned, exhausts the clainant's
rights under the desert-land laws. Fannie 1). Lake, 8 L. D., 580;
Simeon D. Wyatt, 18 L. D., 99; same on review, 19 L. D., 247.)
It is proper to state, however, that the statement of counsel for the
appellant, which your office decision apparently accepts without
question, is not supported by the records of your office. Counsel's
statement is:
It is shown by the records that the applicant had entered the same lands under
the Lassen county desert-laud law, by declaratory statement No. 103, May 8, 1875.
By departmental decisions in the case of Simeon D. Wyatt, p. 99, Vol. 18, and in
the case of Fanie D. Lake, p. 580, same volume, it is held that a filing under the
Lassen county act exhausts the right of entry under either the Lassen county act
or the act of March 3, 1877. - Conseqnently the second entry of the applicant was
"erroneously allowed," and could not be confirmed; and the applicant is entitled
to the repayment of the two hundred dollars under the act of June 16, 1880.
An examination of the records of your office discloses the fact that
Lassen county desert land declaratory statement No. 103, of May 8,
1875, was made by Benjamin Neuhaus, and not by Bernhard Nenhaus.
In the case at bar, the controlling question is, Was the applicant's
declaration and his action thereunder a fraud upon the government?
The government agent so reported. Your office so found, and can-
celed the entry. He was notified that opportunity was afforded him to
show cause why his entry should not be canceled for the fraud so found,
and he made no response. The decision adverse to him upon that issue
became final.
The general circular of 1896, page 97, in defining the expression
"erroneously allowed," as used in the repayment act, says:
This can not be given au interpretation of such latitude a8 uoud countemnce fraed.
If the records of the land office, or the proofs furnished, should show that the entry
ought not to be permitted, and yet it were permitted, then it would be "erroneously
allowed.' But if a tract of land were subject to entry, and the proofs showed a
compliance with law, and the entry should be canceled because the proofs were
shown to be false, it could not be held that the entry wras "erroneously allowed";
and in such case.repayment would not be authorized.
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In the case here under consideration, it is not the final proof (for
that has never been made), but the initiatory declaration, that contains
the statements which your office has found, and which the etryman
does not deny, are untrue. Upon the showing made by Neuhaus and
his witnesses in the declaration filed by him, it was the duty of the
local officers to allow the entry. As was held by the Department in
the case of George A. Stone, on review (25 L. D., il, syllabus):
If the land entered is not of the character contemplated by the law under which
the entry is made, but is expressly represented by the entrymau to be of such char-
acter, and the allowance of the entry is procured by such representation, the entry
in such case is wrongfully procared, and not "erroneously allowed," within the
meaning of the repayment law.
In the case at bar, the judgment of your office, in so far as it holds
that repayment can not legally and properly be made to the applicant
therefor, is hereby affirmed.
LODE LOCATION-INTERSECTING MILL SITE.
MABEL LODE.
A lode location based o a discovery on one side of an intersecting mill site is not
good as to the ground on the other side of said mill site, and an entry of such
ground is therefore invalid.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Comnmissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) May 23, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
On August 24, 1896, your office held for cancellation Leadville, Colo-
rado, mineral entry No. 4061, made June 15, 1896, by Thomas Officer
for the Mabel lode claim, as to all that part of the claim which lies west
of the Rob Roy Mill Site, survey No. 2643-B. This action was taken
on the ground that the entry of a lode location divided into non-contig-
uous parts by a mill site was not permissible. Claimant appeals, con-
tending that, inasmuch as entries of lode locations which are divided
by cross lode locations are allowed, so, likewise, a lode location which
is divided by a mill site may properly be entered. -
In this case the said mill site, which lies on both sides of Eagle river,
extends entirely across the lode location near its western end, and is
excluded from the application and entry. Only non-mineral land can
be taken under the mining law as a pill site (section 2337 R. S.). By
excluding, as above, the Rob Roy mill site, the applicant practically
admits the non-mineral character of the same (Michael Howard, 15 L.
D., 504). Te non-continuity of the vein or lode through the mill site
is thus also admitted. The discovery shaft or cut of the Mabel lode is
several hundred feet east of the easterly side line of the mill site.
There is no evidence, direct or indirect, nor any presumption of the
existence of the vein on the west side of the mill site within the lines
of the Mabel location. For that reason alone a location based upon
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the Mabel discovery would not be good as to the gound on the west
side of the mill site, and the entry -,s to such ground would be invalid.
Where a lode or vein abuts upon non-mineral land, there is no
authority of law for including in a location made on such lode or vein
any ground beyond such abutment, and certainly not to embrace land
lying entirely beyond the non-mineral tract., The reason for the can-
cellation of the entry as to the ground above indicated is, therefore,
that the Mabel location is not valid as to that ground. See in con-
nection Andromeda Lode, 13 L. D., 146 Bi-Metallic Mining Company,
15 L. D., 309; and Michael Howard, spra.
It is unnecessary in view of the foregoing to discuss the question of
alleged similarity-between the case at bar and the case of a lode loca-
tion divided by a cross lode location.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
ISOLATED TRACT ACT OF FEBRUARY 6, 1895.
HAND . DE IREMEII.
A tract of land is not "subject to homestead entry" within the meaning of the act
of February 26, 1895, defin in g the period that must elapse prior to treating a tract
as isolated, while covered by an unexpired pre emption filing, or embraced
within a homestead entry.
The action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office in ordering into market
a tract for disposition under section 24,55 R. S., is subject to revision by the
Department on appeal.
Acting Secretary Byan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) May 23, 1898. (G. C. R.)
On November 11, 1895, James R. De Remer filed in the local land
office, at Denver, Colorado, his petition stating that the W. - of the
NE. j of Sec. 10, T. 8 S., R. 64 W., in said land district, is an isolated
or disconnected tract, being entirely surrounded by lands either pat-
ented or held nder valid entries-having been so isolated for a period
of more than three years; that the tract is prairie land, agricultural in
character and chiefly valuable for grazing; that no part of the tract is
occupied by any one having color of title; that he desires to purchase
the same, and agrees to bid one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre,
including all necessary expenses for advertising, etc. He therefore
asked that the tract be sold under the provisions of section 2455 of the
Revised Statutes, as amended by the act approved February 26, 1895
(28 Stat., 687), substantially complying with instructions of April 11,
1895 (20 L. D., 305).
On November 14, 1895, the register and receiver transmitted said
petition, and your office on February 25, 1896, held that the application
conforms to the requirements and authorized the sale asked for.
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Due notice was given, fixing April 25, 1896 (at ten o'clock a. in.), for
the date of sale.
On March 20, 1896, Jesse N. Hand made homestead application for
the land, which was rejected, and Hand appealed. Your office by
decision dated April 17, 1896, sustained that action.
On April 24, 1896, Hand filed a motion for review of said decision,
together with his protest against the sale of the tracts, alleging sub-
stantially:
I. That he had applied to make entry of the tracts, and had appealed
from the rejection of his application.
2. That the land had not been subject to homestead entry for three
years next prior to the date on which it was ordered to be sold.
3. That at -no time since September 7, 1887, has the land been free
from a prima facie valid pre-emption filing or homestead entry for three
consecutive years.
On August 19, 1896, your office denied Hand's mo ion for review-
stating that his protest was based on substantially the samne grounds
as the appeal and motion.
Hand's appeal from said decisions brings the case here.
The land was sold on the day advertised, and certificate of location
No. 416 13., act of June 2, 1858, for eighty acres of land, was tendered
in payment.
In view of Hand's protest, the register and receiver declined to issue
certificate of purchase.
It appears that a pre-emption declaratory statement was filed for the
land in question on September 7, 1887, and also on February 12, 1889,
and that both filings expired by limitation, no proof having been
offered; also that on March 23, 1894, Herman M. Klagg made home-
stead entry for the land, which was canceled by relinquishment Novem-
ber 9, 1895, or two days before De Remer filed his petition asking that
the same be sold as an isolated tract.
All the surrounding tracts have been disposed of-the last on April
29, 1890.
In your office decision of April 17, 1896, it was held that prior to
Kilagg's entry the tract had been subject to homestead entry for more
than three years after the surrounding lands had been entered, and
that it was therefore "isolated" within the meaning of the statute, and
that the fact that Klagg's entry was made of the land March 23, 1894.
and remained of record less than two years, did not remove such
isolation.
It was farther held that since Hand's application to make homestead
entry was made subsequent to the order of your office directing the
sale of the land, the same was not subject to entry-being segregated
under rule laid down in Mather et a. v. Hackley's Heirs (19 L. D., 48).
In the decision on motion for review, your office in answering the
grounds of error set up held that, while the land, within three years
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next preceding the application to sell as an isolated tract, bad been
covered by the prima facievalid preemption filing of one Edward MIer-
cer, who lived upon and cultivated the land, still such filing was in no
sense an entry, and did not, as would an entry, segreghte the lands;
that it conferred no rights as against the United States, and was there-
fore public land and open at any time to settlement and entry.
The appeal herein alleges error in the holdings:
-1. That pre-emption filings do not prevent land froM becoming
isolated under section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as amended.
2. In holding that Klagg's entry was no bar to the sale of the land
under said section 2455.
3. In finding that the land had been subject to homestead entry for
more than three years after the surrounding lands had been entered,
and that Klagg's entry did not remove such isolation.
Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act approved
February 26, 1895 (28 Stat., 687), provides:
It shall be lawful for the Commissioner of the General Land Office to order into
market and sell for not less than one dollar and twenity-five ents per acre any iso-
lated or disconnected tract or parcel of the public domain less than one quarter
section which in his jndgient it would be proper to expose to sale after at least
thirty days' notice by the land officers of the district in which such lands may be
situated: Provided, That lands shall not become so isolated or disconnected until
the same have been subject to homestead entry for a period of three years after the
surrounding land has been entered, filed upon, or sold by the Government: Provided,
That not more than one hundred and sixty acres shall be sold to any one person.
The first question raised by this appeal is, whether the land in ques-
tion was " subject to homestead entry for a period of three years after
the surrounding land has been entered, filed upon, or sold by the gov-
ernment," and, second, whether the period of the existence of- Klagg's
entry, made March 23, 1894, and relinquished November 9, UI,95, can
be computed as a part of the required three years.
It appears that among the filings which were made on the land was
the pre-emption filing of E dw ard Mercer, dated Februmry 12, 18,89, and
expiring by limitation November 5, 1891, or less than three years before
Klagg (March 23, 1894) made homestead entry.
It appears that Mercer built a house on the land, and had several
acres enced and under cultivation. All the surrounding lands had
been " entered, filed upon, or sold by the government; "I but the tract
in question was settled upon by one, who, under section 2265, had
declared his intention to claim the same under the pre-emption laws.
For somne reason not appearing of record, Mercer failed to make proof
and payment for the land; it was, however, less than three years from
the expiration- of his filing before Klagg 'made his homestead entry.
lad the required period of three years run when lagg's entry was
made? In other words, had the land at that date "been subject to
homestead entry for a period of three years within the meaning of the
- statute V
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Isolated or disconnected tracts of less than one quarter section result
from the disposal of the surrounding lands. It often happens that
tracts of forty acres or eighty acres are thus left undisposed of and the
homestead seeker preferring a greater quantity, refuses to take the
smaller area, leaving it "isolated." When such a tract has been sub-
ject to homestead entry for a period of three years without being taken,
the statute authorizes its sale.
While by the decisions of the Department a homestead entry may be
allowed of lands embraced i a pre-einption filing, still the pre-emptor,
if he complies with the law, may obtain patent for the land, and the
homestead entry will be canceled.
In passing the act of February 26, 1895 (supra), amending section
2455 of the Revised Statutes, one of the changes made was that lands
shall not be considered "isolated" until the same have been subject to
homestead entry for three years after the contiguous tracts have been
disposed of by the government. I other words, if three years pass
after the surrounding lands have been disposed of, and during that
period o one appropriates the tract by means of a homestead entry,
the same may then be regarded as "isolated," that is undesirable as a
homiestea(l, and, after notice, may be sold. It was the intention of Con-
gress to give ample time for the taking of the land under the homestead
law, the favored method of disposing of public lands, rather than to
hasten its disposal by sale, the exceptional method, and so te period
of three years was namned, during which the lands should be subject to
homestead entry without being taken. While land-covered by an unex
pired pre-emption filing is subject to homestead entry, it is not subject
thereto in the sense that one desiring a homestead has a full opportunity
to acquire a certain title thereto under the homestead law. His oppor-
tunity is clouded and encumbered by the pre-emptor's right to complete
title under the pre-emption law. Such a clouded and encumbered oppor-
tunity is not an inviting one and a failure to accept it does not indicate
that the land is otherwise undesirable as a homestead. During the
continuance of this pre-emption filing and prior to its expiration the
land was not subject to homestead entry within the meaning of this
statute. That filing was in existence April 29, 1890, when the last of
the surrounding land was disposed of and three years did not intervene
between its expiration November 5, 1891, and Klagg's homestead entry
March 23, 1894.
Again, during Klagg's homestead entry,, which continued to Novem-
ber 9, 1895, the laud was not subject to homestead entry within the
meaning of the statute, but segregated by that entry, and therefore not
subject to another entry until its cancellation.
The tract had not been subject to homestead entry for the required
period of three years when it was ordered sold.
Section 2455 of the Revised Statutes authorizes the Commissioner of
the General Land Office to order into, market and sell the isolated or
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disconnected tracts referred to, and when his discretionary power thus
conferred has been properly exercised the land ceases to be subject
to entry. But if, as in the case at bar, the Commissioner has acted
prematurely and without authority, his mistake will be corrected on
appeal.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and Hand's application to
make entry will be allowed.
RAILROAD GRANT-PRE-EMPTION FILING.
UNION PACIFIC RY. 0. V. HA.UTWICl.
By the express terms of section 14, act of September 4, 1841, failure to make final
proof and payment nuder a pre-emption filing for unoffered land prior to the
day fixed for the sale thereof, operates to extinguish all rights under said filing,
and though not formally canceled of record such filing will not thereafter serve
to defeat the attachment of a railroad grant on definite location.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the Geheral Land Office,
(W. V. D.) May 23, 1898. (F. W. 0.)
The Union Pacific Railway Company has appealed from your office
decision of Apri] 10, 1897, in the case of said company v. Herman F.
Hartwich, involving the N. of the SE. 4 and the N. i of the SW.:- of
Sec. 3, T. 6 S., R. 11 E., Topeka land district, Kansas.
This tract is within the limits of the grant for said company under
the act of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 489), as adjusted to the map of definite
location filed January 11, 1866.
It appears from your office decision that the records of your office
show that the N. ?, of the SE. 4 of said section is included in pre emp-
tioi declaratory statement No. 5562, filed by Gustav Sturback May 1,
1858, in which settlement was alleged April 20, 1858; that the N. - of
the SW. - of said section is included in pre-emption declaratory state-
ment No. 5561, filed by Joseph Mather May 1, 1858, in which settlement
was alleged April 22, 1858; and that both of said filings are still of
record uncanceled.
It further appears that subsequently to the muaking of said pre-emp-
tion filings lan ds i township 6 south, range 11 east, were, in accordance
with proclamation No. 636, offered at the land office at Kickapoo, com-
mencilg on the 19th of September, 1859. In the proclamation, which
was dated March 22, 1859, a notice was given to-pre-emptors requiring
them to establish their claims to the satisfaction of the register and
receiver at the proper land office and to make payment before the date
appointed for the conencement of the public sale; otherwise their
claims would be forfeited.
No action was ever taken by these pre-emptors to complete their
filings, so far as shown by the record, nor were the lands sold at the
public sale under the proclamation.
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On June 21, 1881, the tract here involved was listed by the company
on account of its grant, but patent for the same has not been issued.
Notwithstanding the assertion of claim on account of the grant by
reason of the listing, on November 20, 1896, the local officers permitted
Herman F. Hartwich to make homestead entry for the land without
notice to the company.
These facts were duly considered i your office decision of April 10,
1897, in which it was held that the pre-emption claims of Sturback and
Mather being of record uncanceled at the date of the filing of definite
location reserved the tracts covered thereby from the operation of the
grant, and the listing of the tract by the company was held for cancella-
tion. In support of the decision reference is made to the decision of the
supreme court in the case of the Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Dun-
meyer (113 U. S., 629) and Whitney v. Taylor (158 U. S., 85).
From said decision the company appealed to this Department; and
as the question involved is an important one, controlling numerous
other cases, the case was advanced for consideration and request for
oral argument granted.
From the above recitation it appears that pre-emption filings were
made for the land here involved in 1858, long prior to the grant, and
when made the land had not been offered.
Under the law of September 4, 1841 (5 Stat., 453-7), by which pro-
vision was ma(le for the right of pre-emption, no limitation was placed
upon pre-emption filings made for lands that had not been offered in
the matter of the time when proof should be offered thereunder, other-
wise than as contained in the 14th section of said act, by which it was
provided:
That this act shall not delay the sale of any of the public lands of the United States
beyond the time which has been, or may be, appointed by the proclamation of the
President, nor shall the provisions of this act be available to any person or persons
who shall fail to make the proof and payment, and file the affidavit before the day
appointed for the commencement of the sales as aforesaid.
In the year following the making of these filings the lands in the
township were, in accordance with the proclamation, offered for sale,
and the 19th of September, 1859, fixed as the date for the commence-
ment of the sale at the land office in the district in which the land in
question was situated.
No action was taken by the pre-emptors before the date set for the
commencement of the sale, as required both by the notice attached to
the proclamation and the 14th section of the act of 1841, above quoted;
nor is any claim now being asserted to the tract, so far as shown by
the records, by, through or under said filings.
More than six years after offering of the lands at public sale in accord-
ance with the terms of the proclamation the company filed its map
showing the definite location of its road opposite this land, and the
question for considerati6n is, What was the status of these filings at
the time of the filing of the map of definite location ?
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In the case of Whitney iv. Taylor, spra, referred to in your office
decision, the court, after referring to several of its decisions, including
the case of Kansas Pacific v. DunIeyer, upra, involving the question
as to the effect of claims existing at the date of the filing of the com-
pany's map of definite location, proceeds as follows:
Although these cases are none of them exactly liko the one before us, yet the prin-
ciplo (leduced from. them is that when on the records of the local land office there is
an existing claim on the part of an individual under the homestead or pre-emption
law, which has been recognized by the officers of the go-ernment and has not been
canceled or set aside, the tract in respect to which that claim is existing is excepted
from the operation of a railroad land grant containing the ordinary excepting
clauses, and thisnotwithstanding such claim maynot be enforceable bythe claimant,
and is subject to cancellation by the government at its owin suggestion, or upon the
application of other parties. It was not the intention of Congress to open a con-
troversy between the claimant and the railroad company as to the validity of the
former's claim. It was eough that the claimn existed, and the question of its
validity was a matter to be settled between the government and the claimant, in
respect to which the railroad company was not permitted to be heard.
It will thus be seen that in effect the court holds that if at the date
of definite location there was of record an existing claim to the land the
same served to defeat te operation of the grant
notwithstanding such claim may not be enforceable by the claimant, and is sbject
to cancellation by the government at its own suggestion or upon the application of
other parties.
It it clear, ho1wever, that the claim must have been in fact, and as
shown by the records of the land department, an existing claim, and
not a mere record without claim; that is, an erroneous record would
not defeat the grant, nor would the failure to note an order of cancella-
tion 1)resent such a claim by the record as would defeat the grant. The
language of the court is, i referring to the claim, "has not been can-
celed or set aside." Again, "It was enough that the claim existed."
in the case of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Co.
(23 L. D., 539), after referring to the decision of the court i the case
of Whitney v. Taylor, spra, it was held that (syllabus):
A pre-em ptor who makes homestead entry of a part of the laud embraced within
his filing thereby abandons all right under his pre-emption claim, and though the
filing may not, at such time, be canceled on the record, it is thereafter not evidence
of the existence of a pre-emption claim, and will therefore not defeat the operation
of a railroad grant, as to the tract not included in the homestead entry.
In that case the record of the pre-emption remained uncauceled at
the date of the filing of the map of definite location, but it was held
that the record did not evidence an existing claim to the land.
IUnder the 14th section of the pre-emption act, before quoted, by the
failure of Sturback and Mather to make proof and payment before the
19th day of September, 1859, their pre-emptiolt right was at an end,
and thereafter their claims could not be held to be existing claims, for
under the terms of the act of 1841 the provisions of that act were no
longer available to them. The formal cancellation of their filings upon
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the record was not necessary to destroy or put to an end the pre-emptive
right; such right was extingu shed by operation of law.
In the case of Central Pacific Railroad Co. ?. Edward L. Taylor (11
L. D., 445), the following history of the pre emption law and construe-
tioD thereof was made:
Prior to 184t the settled policy of Congress was to dispose of the public lands by
public and private sales in quantities to suit purchasers. The passage of the act of
September 4, 1841, was the first legislative action in the direction of a change to the
present beneficent policy of distributing the public domain among the people as
homes for the homeless. This legislation was apparently only tentative, for while
the public lands were thereafter to be thrown open to settlement and entry, the
policy of selling them was adhered to; the settler was permitted to acquire, by his
inhabitancy and improvements, oly a preferred right to purchase the lands when
sold. But this preferred right was not to interfere with the cherished policy of
public sales at stated intervals. If any of the lands advertised for sale Were occu-
pied by settlers, unless they availed themselves before the day of sale of the right of
pre-emption, acquired by settlement and improvement, it would be forever lost, and
the lands would be offered first at public sale, and if not sold thereafter became
subject to private sale.
In that case the tract was included in the land described in the proc-
lamation of the President as land to be offered for sale at Marys-
ville, California, on February 14, 1S59, yet from the records of the
General Land Office it appeared that the lands in the township in
which such tract was located-were withheld from sale, so that the lands
were never offered; and in that case it was held that syllabus):.
The pre-emptive right is not defeated by the failure of the settler to make proof
and payment for the land covered by his claim prior to a day erroneously appointed
for the public offering thereof, where such tract, on the discovery of the error, is
subsequently withheld from sale.
From the reasoning and argument contained in said decision it is
clear, however, that had the tract been regularly oftered in accordance
with the proclamation of the President, by the pre-emptor's failure to
make proof and payment before the day appointed for the commence-
ment of the sale, all ights under the pre-emption filing theretofore
made " would be forever lost."
Front a careful consideration of the entire matter it is the opinion of
this Department that under the circumstances heretofore recited no
right of pre-emption remained or was existing in and to the tracts here
involved, under the filings of Starbuck and Mather, at the date of the
filing of the company's map of definite location, and that upon the
record herein made the tracts involved passed to the Union Pacific
Railway Company upon the filing of its map of definite location. The
allowance of the entry by Rartwich was therefore erroneous, and the
same is directed to be cahoeled, and if otherwise regular the listing by
the company should be submitted with a view to the issue of patent on
account of the grant.
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RAILROAD GRANT-3tEINERAL LANDS-CLASSIFICATION.
INSTRIUCTIONS.
The act of February 26, 1895, does not contemplate the classification of even sec-
tions, and the character of said sections is only considered where the mineral or
non-mineral character of the odd sections cannot be otherwise satisfactorily
ascertained.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) May 23, 1898. (E. F. B.)
I am in receipt of your letter of April 22, 1898, relative to school
section 16, T. 57 N., R I E., B. M., Cour d'Aiene, Idaho, which was
classified as non-imineral land in April, 1897, by the commissioners
appointed to examine and classify lands within the land grant limits of
the Northern Pacific Railroad Company under the act of February 26,
1895 (28 Stat., 683).
It appears from your letter that the commissioners appointed for the
Coeur d'Alene district i their report for the month of April, 1897,
classified as non mineral the unsurveyed portion of township 57 N., R.
1 E., B. M., which, when surveyed, would embrace, among other see-
tions, all of Sec. 36, and that the report of the commissioners was
approved by the Department August 27, 1897.
The approval by the Secretary of the classification of lands by the
commissioners appointed under said act is final only so far as it affects
the odd sections within the limits of the grant. It was not intended
that the even sections should be classified, but should only be examined
and considered with reference to their character as mineral or non-
mineral lands where the mineral or non-mineral character of the odd
sections could not be satisfactorily ascertained without resorting to an
examination of the adjacent land.
The term " lassification" should not, strictly speaking, be applied to
such sections, as it was not intended that the character of such see-
tions as reported by the commissioners should conclude any one seeking
to acquire title to the land from showing its true character. There is,
therefore, no necessity for-noting the report of the commissioners upon
such sections on the records of your office. Hence the Department, in
the letter of November 30, 1897 (25 L. D., 446), advised your office that
a mineral return by the commissioners would not, therefore, prevent your office from
making such disposition of the land as is proper upon a subsequent showing as to
its character, but the classification should be considered as of the same effect as the
return of mineral lands made by the government surveyor.
See also letter of Mlarch 23,1898 (26 L. D., 423).
The approval by the Secretary of the report of the commissioners is
operative upon, and final only, as to the odd sections, and it is not
necessary to recall said approval in order to invest your office with
jurisdiction to order a hearing to ascertain the character of the even
sections upon a proper application made.
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SWAM GRANT-CONFLICTING GRANTS TO STATE.
STATE OF MICHIGAN.
A claim of the State under the swamp grant will not be recognized where the lands
embraced therein have been certified to the State under other grants, and such
certification has been accepted by the State and stood unquestioned for many
years.
Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Lad Offie,
(W. V. D.) ay 23, 1898. (E. F. B.)
By decision of December 5, 1895, your office rejected the claim of the-
State of Michigan, under the swamp land grant of September 28, 1850
(9 Stat., 519), to certain tracts of land therein described, amounting in
the aggregate to about eighteen hundred acres, situated in the Gray-
ling land district. Said claim was rejected for the reason that the title
to said lands has already passed to the State under the provisions of
the-act of June 3, 1856 (11 Stat., 21), to aid in the construction of cer-
tain railroads, and the act of August 26, 1852 (10 Stat., 35), and other
acts, to slid in the construction of canals.
From this decision the State has appealed, assigning the following
grounds of error:
I. These, lands having been erroneously certified to the State under the acts of
Congress of June 8, 1856, and August 26, 1852, to aid in the construction of certain
railroads-and canals, it was error to hold that such certification could prevent the
State from accepting a second certification under the swamp land grant.
II. The swamp land grant being prior to the grants to aid in constructing rail-
roads, and the records showing the laud to be swamp and overflowed, it was error
not to have certified them to the State utnder its swamp grant.
III. It was error to have rejected the swamp claim of the State for any reason.
IV. It was eiror not to have notified Britton and Gray, the attorneys of record for
the State of Michigan under its swamp land grant, of the office action of December
5, 1895.
The question involved in this case is, whether the State can be per-
mitted to claim title under the swamp land grant to lands which have
already been patented to it under another grant. This question was
also involved in the eases of Chandler v. Calumet and Hecla Mining
Company, 149 U. S., 79; McCormick v. Hayes, 159 U. S., 332; and
Rogers Locomotive Works v. Emigrant Company, 164 U. S., 559.
In all of said cases the lands were claimed as swamp and overflowed
land iuring to the State under the swamp land grant, but no selection
had been made by the State of said lands under said grant prior to the
issuance of patent, nor was any affirmative action taken directly by
the Secretary of the Interior with respect to said lands, as swamp and
overflowed land, under the grant of September 28, 1850. In each, the
lands had been certified or patented to the State under the provisions
of the several acts of Congress granting lands to aid in the construe-
tion of railroads.
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In the case of Mc(ormick v. Hayes (supra), the court said:
In the case now before us, the selection by Lina county, grantee of the State, prior
to 1875, of swamp and overflowed lands in the very section of which the lands in
dispute formed a part, without including the latter in such selection, together with
the acquiescence in that selection by the Interior Departtment, and the selection by
or under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and their certification to the
State, first in 1858, and again in 1881, of the lands in dispute, as lands inuring, under
the act of Congress of May 15, 1856, to the Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad
Company, and, therefore, not lands embraced by the act of 1850, constituted a deter-
mination, based on "observation and examination," that the lands here in displute
were not swamp and overflowed, and, therefore, had not been reserved or appropri-
ated, prior to the date of the railroad land grant act. but passed, as the Secretary of
the Interior certified, to the State, for the purposes named in the railroad act.
This view as to the effect of the action of the Secretary of the Interior
in certifying or patenting the lands to the State nder another grant
was re-affirmed by the court in the case of Rogers Locomotive Works
v. Emigrant Company (supra). In hat case the court said:
But it is equally clear that when the Secretary of the Interior certified in 1858
that the lands in controversy inured to the State under the railroad act of 1856,
he, in effect, decided that they were not embraced by the swamp land act of 1850.
(Page 574.)
Again:
In 1858, the Secretary of the Interior-decided that the lands in controversy inured
to the State under the railroad act of 1856, and, if that decision was correct, then
they were not reserved from the operation of that act by the swamp land act of
1850. The State was entitled to the lands either under the act of 1850 or under that
of 1856. It was open to it, before accepting the lands under the railroad act, to
insist that they passed, under the act of 1850, as swamp and overflowed lands. No
such claim was made. The State-the party primarily interested, and with whom
the Land Department directly dealt-accepted the lands under the act of 1856, and,
therefore, not as inuring to it as swamp and overflowed lands within the meaning
of the act of 1850, and, as just stated, has never repudiated its action of 1858, nor
sought to have reopened the question necessarily involved in the action of the See-
retary when he certified the lands to the State under the act of 1856.
The action of the Department in 1858 was intended to be final, as between the
United States and the State, in respect of the lands then certified as railroad lands.
If the State considered the lands to be covered by the swamp land act, its duty was
to surrender the certificate issued to it under the railroad act. It could not take
them under one act, and while holding them under that act pass to one of its coun-
ties the right to assert an interest in them under another and different act.
It is not intended to hold that the Department has no authority to
accept from the State a reconveyance of these lands, if they were
improperly certified or patented, and to certify and patent them to the
State as swamp land if they are of that character, and the rights of
others would not be thereby impaired. But as the State has accepted
the lands under the grants of 1852 and 1856, .and has never questioned
the correctness of that certification, or sought to have the question
reopened for reexamination until this late day, when other parties may
have acquired rights that might be affected adversely by such action,
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the changing of this title would not be a wise or judicious exercise of
such authority, even if the State offered to reconvey the lands, which
does not appear from the record. State of Arkansas v. St. Louis, Iron
Mountain and Southern Railway Company, 10 L. D., 165.
The decision of your office is affirmed.
EQITAJILE ACTION-HOMESTEAD ENTRY.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Equitable action on homestead entries, where residence is not established within
the prescribed period of six months, is not necessary, if final proof is made
within the stattitory life of the entry, and such proof shows continnous residence
for five years next preceding the date thereof.
Actinq Secretary Ryan to the Coninissioner of the General Land Office,
(W. V. D.) -y 23, 1898. (A. M.)
I have observed that among the suspended entries whereon you have
adjudged that patents should be issued, and which you have submitted
to the Board of Equitable Adjudication, from time to time, for consid-
eration under sections 2450 and 2457 Revised Statutes as amended by
the act of February 27, 1877 (19 Stat., 240), with a view to their confir-
mation, there have been certain homestead entries wherein the home-
steader did not establish -residence on the land involved within the
prescribed period of six months, but where final proof was made within
the statutory period, which proof showed a continuous residence on
the land for five years next preceding the date thereof.
The class of entries referred to has been submitted under rules 25
and 33 of the rules adopted by the Board for your guidance and it is
upon these rules, the strict letter of which would seem to warrant it,
that the action of your office, as indicated, has been based.
It is a fact however that, where a similar entry is attacked by a con-
testant after the homesteader has actually established residence on the
land, on the ground that such residence was not established till after
six months from the date of entry, the Department uniformly holds,
under its construction of the homestead law, that the establishment of
residence prior to intervention of contest cures the laches of the home-
steader and the contest has been dismissed. It is not the purpose of
the Department to apply a stricter rule in cases in which the only par-
ties in interest are the government and the claimant, than it does
where there is a contestant.
It is therefore not considered necessary that entries of the class
herein mentioned be referred to the Board for confirmation as a pre-
reqnisite to issuance of patents thereon.
In order therefore that there may be consistent action with reference
to this class of entries I direct that hereafter, if otherwise regular,
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they be approved for patenting in the usual way without being sub-
mitted to the Board for confirmatory action.
This method of procedure will relieve homesteaders of the needless
trouble, expense and delay entailed in supplying the additional evi-
dence required under the practice that has heretofore obtained.
CONFLICTING GRANTS-WITHDRAWAL-ATTACHMF.NT OF RIGHTS.
OREGON AND CALIFORNIA R. R. Co. . WILLAMETTE VALLEY AND
CASCADE MOUNTAIN WAGON ROAD CO..
The withdrawal made on behalf of the wagon road grant of July 5, 1866, operates
to except the lands so reserved from the attachment of rights on definite loca-
tion of the Oregon and California road under the grant of July 2.5, 1866.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, IAlay 24,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (C. J. W.)
It appears from yoar office decision of March 24, 1896, that the NE.
I of the NE. : of See. 23, T. 13 S., R. 1 W., Oregon City land district,
Oregon, is within the limits of the withdrawal made August 12, 1868,
on account of the grant made by the act of July 5, 1866 (14 Stat., 89),
to aid in the construction of the Willamette Valley and Cascade Moun-
taiu Wagon Road, and that one Henry C. McBee had been permitted
to make homestead entry for the same.
The tract is also within the primary limits of the grant made by the
act of July 25, 1866 (14 Stat., 239), to aid in the construction of the
Oregon and California Railroad, adjusted to the map of definite loca-
tion, filed March 26, 1870.
Your office decision held McBee's entry for cancellation, and that the
withdrawal made on account of the prior grant for the wagon road
served to defeat the grant made by the act of July 25, 1866, under which
the railroad company claims.
The railroad company's appeal rests upon the allegation that there is
no authority in the "wagon road grant for a withdrawal of lands for
its benefit," and "an executive withdrawal, if made, would not be sus-
tained by the grant, and would be inoperative as against a grant by
Congress which in terms included the land."
McBee has not appealed, and the decision has become final as to him.
Your office decision is in harmony with the ruling of the Supreme
Court and of the Department on similar questions.
In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Northern
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Musser-Sauntry Company (168 IJ. S., 604), it
was held that the withdrawal of lands within the indemnity belt of the
grant made by the acts of June 3, 1856 (11 Stat., 20), and May 5, 1864
(13 Stat., 66), to aid in the construction of the Chicago, St. Paul, Min-
neapolis and Omaha railroad, served to except such lands from the sub-
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sequent grant made by the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), to aid in
the construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad.
Neither the act of 1856 nor 1864 directed the withdrawal of the
lands within the indemnity belt, but the court, on page 607 of the
opinion in referring to such withdrawal, said:
The withdrawal by the Secretary in aid of the grant to the State of Wisconsin
was valid, and operated to withdraw the odd-numbered sections within its limits
from disposal by the land officers of the government under the general land laws.
The act of the Secretary was in effect a reservation. Wolcott v. Des Moines Co., 5
Wall., 681; .Wolsey . Chapman, 101 U. S. 755, and cases cited in the opinion; Ham-
blin v. Western Land Company, 147 U. S. 531, and cases cited in the opinion. It has
also been held that such a withdrawal is effective against claims arising under sub-
sequent railroarl land grants. St. Paul and Pacifie Railroad v. Northern Pacifie Rail-
road, 139 U. S. 1, 17, 18; Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Forsythe, 159 U. S. 46, 54;
Spencer v. McDougal, 159 U. S. 62.
While it is true that the intent of Congress in respect to a land grant is to be
determined by a consideration of all the provisions of the statute, and that the
word "reserved" may.not always be held to include lands withdrawn for the pur-
pose of supplying possible deficiencies in some prior land grant, yet, as that is the
ordinary scope of the word, if any narrower or different meaning is to be attributed
to it in this grant the reasons therefor must be clear. The use of a word which has
generally received a certain construction raises a presumption that Congress used it
in this grant with that meaning, and it devolves on the one claiming any other con-
struction to show sufficient reasons for ascribing to Congress an intent to use it in
such sense.
The grant of July 5, 1866, supraL, under which the wagon road claims,
is of
alternate sections of public land, designated by odd numbers, three sections per
mile, to be selected within six miles of said road.
Relative to the withdrawal of lands on account of said grant, it was
held in the case of Wagon Road Company v. Hagan (20 L. D., 259),
that
a withdrawal of lands by the Secretary, in the exercise of his authority, for the
purpose of enabling the company to satisfy the grant by making selections in
accordance with the granting act was equally as effective to withhold the lands
from settlement and entry as if it had been provided by the act.
The withdrawal made for the benefit of the wagon road grant has
the effect of excepting the land in question from the claim of the rail-
road company under its grant of later date.
The holding herein made is nowise in conflict with the decision of
the court in the case of Wisconsin Central R1. R. Co. v. Forsythe (159
U. S., 46), for the grants under. consideration in that case were both
made to the same grantee.
Your office decision is therefore affirmed.
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TIMBER CULTURE ENTRY-COMPLIANCE WITH LAW.
UNITE D STATES v. DAYTON (ON REvIEw).
A timber culture entry is subject to devise by will, and on due compliance with law
the devisee is entitled to submit final proof and perfect the entry.
Failure to secure the requisite growth of trees alls for cancellation of a timber cul-
ture entry where the absence of good faith in the matter of plaitibg and cultiva-
tion is apparent.
Departmental decision of July 7, 1896, 23 L. D., 54, recalled and vacated.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land OQce, May 24,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (L. G-.)
J. II. Hauser, the entryman of record, has filed a motion for a review
of the departmental decision of July 7, 1896 (23 L. D., 54), affirming
the decision of your office of January 5, 1895, which directed the can-
cellation of his timber culture entry made March 18, 1889, Aberdeen,
South Dakota, land district for the SE. of Sec. 2, T. 122 N., R. 64 W.,
and the reinstating of the timber culture entry of Lyman C. Dayton for
the said tract maide March 10, 1882, in what was then the Watertown,
Dakota, land district. As originally filed, the motion is for a review of
such departmental decision and will be treated as such although the
accompanying affidavit presents a motion in the alternative, for a
review or for a rehearing. The motion was entertained by the Depart-
ment and each of the parties interested have filed arguments thereon.
It appears that Dayton died in the year 1895, prior to the depart-
mental decision in his favor, and upon a report ordered by this Depart-
ment, it was ascertained that he died testate, leaving a will, admitted
to probate by competent authority, by the terms of which Miss Clara
D. Boswell became the sole devisee, subject to the payment of an
annuity charge upon the estate in favor of the mother of the decedent.
The annuitant died in the year 1896. and by the terms of the will, Miss
Boswefl, who was theretofore married to Samuel D. Coyne, became the
sole devisee or residuary legatee of the will, and now appears as the
only party contesting the motion for review.
If the departmental decision sougnt to be reviewed is to become final,
it is clear that this devisee is entitled to make final proof under Day-
ton's entry. A timber culture entry is subject to a devise by will, and
if the executor of the will complies.with the requirements of the law,
he may make final proof, as the deceased entryma I could have done if
living and the statute so provides. Starkweather et at. v. Starkweather
et al., 15 L. D., 162, 166.
The record in the case is complicated and the testimony taken at the
hearing is voluminous. Upon the report of a special agent for the gov-
ernment, Dayton was cited to show cause why his entry should not be
canceled for non-compliance with the law, by order of your office of
June 22,1887. The local office having reported that Dayton had made
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no response to this order, -on March 12, 1889, your office canceled his
entry and declared the tract covered thereby subject to entry by the
first legal applicant. J. R. Hlauser, now the movant, made his timber
culture entry for the tract on March 18, 1889.
It afterwards transpired that Dayton, within the time allowed by
your office in its order holding his entry for cancellation, had filed in
the local office his response to such order, and applied for a hearing,
and it was finally forwarded to your office June 1, 1891. Upon its
receipt, your office held that Dayton was not in default when his entry
was canceled and ordered a hearing "with a view of reinstating Day-
ton's entry, if found in all respects valid, and in the event of such
finding to cancel that of Hauser." A hearing was had, commencing
April 19, 1892, at which the government was represented by a special
agent. Dayton appeared in person and was represented by counsel
for a portion of the time, and Hauser appeared in person.
Owing to the complicated state of the record and the conflict in the
opinions between the decision of your office and that of the local office,
upon the consideration of the motion for review, the evidence adduced
at the hearing has been carefully examined and analyzed.
In the departmental decision sought to be reviewed, it is held that
after the cancellation of Dayton's entry and auser's subsequent
entry, Dayton was not required to cultivate-the land, "and it is not
necessary to inquire whether anything was done by him upon the land
or not." Dayton, however, testifies that he continued work upon the
tract after Hauser's entry was allowed and for the year 1889, which, if
there had been a previous compliance with the law since his entry
March 10, 1882, would have completed the requisite eight years culti-
vation and planting of the ract. After 1889, Dayton admitted that
he had not performed any labor upon the tract for the reason that he
would have been a trespasser under the laws of the jurisdiction with
the entry of Hauser in effect. This matter is also discussed in the
decision of your office, but it is entirely immaterial in the case, as if
there had been a substantial compliance with the law, in good faith on
the part of Dayton, during each of the eight years from 1882 to 1889,
inclusive, his entry would have been held intact after its re-instatement.
The clear preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that there
- was not a substantial compliance with the law on the part of Dayton.
He entrusted the work to agents who did not properly perform their
labors in the preparation of the soil, the cultivation of the area plowed,
or in the planting and care of the trees. The region in the vicinity of
the tract in dispute was visited by a severe drought for three seasons,
yet during this period, other claims were successfully cultivated in the
neighbourhood, although it appears that in the majority of cases the
attempt to secure the required growth of trees was a failure. But
the work done by the agents of Dayton was inefficiently and slovenly
performed and under the most favorable climatic conditions would have
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resulted in failure. One of those employed to plant tree seeds did not
complete his labors because he stated that he had not been paid, and
those employed for the purpose of preparing the ground for tree cul-
ture and of cultivating the young trees did not exercise ordinary car e
or attention in such work. The ground was plowed just before it
became frozen and weeds and grass were allowed to accumulate to the
detriment of the growing trees. Te most primitive methods were
resorted- to in replanting the area where the tree seeds had failed to
germinate, and the entire work done upon the tract was urriedly
performed and without system or skill. The ill-health of Dayton did
not prevent the cultivation of the tract or the planting of trees, as the
labor on the tract was never performed by him personally, but was
done by his employes.
The expenditures made by Dayton upon the claim, referred to in your
office decision, are lumped in his testimony with contest, costs. He
said:
I have expended some seven or eight hundred dollars in working upon that tract
to secure the growing of trees, and the expenses I have been forced to incur byrea-
son of the contest of John H. Bryce against my entry-afterwards this entry was
dismissed by Mr. Hauser and one of his own instituted in the place thereof.
INowhere did Dayton state what his expenditures upon the claim
actually were, and from what the witnesses state directly as the amount
paid to them for such labors for one year; and inferentially from the
amount of labor done, the outlay of Dayton was far below the amount
stated. in your office decision as the amount expended upon the claim.
The claim of Dayton that his young trees were maliciously pulled up
is not sustained by any evidence except his own, but is satisfactorily
refuted by direct testimony and by inferences to be drawn from the
testimony.
A careful survey and review of all of the evidence at the hearing
discloses that the local officers were correct in their views when they
stated as a conclusion of fact:
While no year up to the cancellation of his -entry, has passed without Dayton
making some show of cultivation on the land, yet nearly every act in that direction
evidences a compliance with the letter rather than the spirit of the law. The
breaking was done jnst as the ground was freezing for winter and barely in time to
comply with the letter of the law. Whatever cultivation has been done seems
to have been (performed) with a view of making a show upon the land rather than
to produce results by the growth of trees.
The devisee of the will has filed the affidavit of another, which is
corroborated, that Hauser has not now twenty-five trees growing upon
the tract and that his cultivation and tree culture have been negligent
and insufficient. This is a matter for subsequent investigation and
does not form a part of this inquiry.
For the foregoing reasons, the departmental decision of July 7, 1896,
is withdrawn and revoked, and the decision of your office of January
5i 1895, is reversed.
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The entry of J. H. iauser will be held intact. The motion for review,
with the accompanying papers, arc herewith transmitted for the files
of your office, and the papers in the case are herewith eturned.
RAILROAD GRANT-INDETINITY SELECTION-SpECrTIcATION OF LOSS.
BULL V. NORTHERN PACIFIC R. R. CO..
The fact that by applying the rule of approximation a particular tract might he
excluded from an indemnity selection, a in excess of the basis, will not affect
the validity of such selection as to other tracts for which a sufficient basis is
duly designated in a list wherein the losses filly support the selections.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, May 2,
(WV. V D.) 1898. (F. NV. O.)
An appeal has been filed n behalf of Knud Bull from your office
decision of April 2, 1895, sustaining the action of the local officers at
VancouLver,Washington,in rejecting his application to make homestead
entry of the SW. of the SW. I of Sec. 5, T. 14 N., R. 9 W., for con-
flict with the selection made by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.
This tract is. within the indemnity limits of the grant for said com-
pany, and was included in its list of selections filed April 2S, 1885.
This list was not accompanied by a designation of losses as bases for
the selection, the same being waived by departmental order of May28,
1883.
Oil October 24, 1887, the company filed a list designating losses in
place, and on August 20, 1892, an amendatory list was filed setting
forth the selections and losses tract for tract.
On January 3, 1895, Bull tendered his homestead application, which
was rejected for conflict with the company's selection. In his applica-
tion he alleged settlement December, 1893, long subsequent to the
filing of the company's selection list.
The appeal fron your office decision questions the suffieieucy of the
designation of losses contained in the aendatory list of August 20,
1892. This list contains selections amounting .to 3,635 acres, and the
tracts designated as a basis for the list aggregate 3,636 acres, being
one acre in excess of the total selection.
In the case of the Florida Central and Peninsular Railroad Co. (15
L D., 529) it was held (syllabus):
In the preparation of'railroad indemnity lists each loss sould be separately spec-
ified, and the selection therefor designated. The difference in acreage that may
exist in any case between the loss and selection should approximate the area of the
smallest legal subdivision.
The loss stated in the list of August 20, 1892, on account of which
the selection of the tract in question is made, is a part of the NW. jof
See. 5, T. 15 N., I. 1 W., included. in the patented donation claim of
P. D. Northeraft, the acreage of which is given as 124.06 acres.
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The selections made on account of this loss are as follows:
Acres.
SW. I of SW. , sec. 5, T. 14 N. R. 9 W ....... 40
Lot I, sec. 17, T. 14 N., R. 9 W ---------------------- ....... . .............. .10
NE.i -of NE. , sec. 29, T. 14 N., R. 9 W - ....................... 40
NW.i-of NE.Lsec. 29, T. 14 N., R.9W4 .........-. 40
Total ..- . 129.10
It is urged that your office decision erred in holding
that the basis of the selection was sufficient although it included lot 1, Sec. 17, T. 14,
N. R. 9 W., containing 9.10 acres, upon the basis of a loss of 4.06 acres, and that this
could be supplemnented by other tracts not specifically designated i the lists of
selection.
From the above statement of the selection on account of the loss
included in Northcraft's donation claim, it appears that three forty-
acre tracts, including the tract under consideration, were selected,
together with lot 1 of section 17, embracing 9.10 acres. Totaled, the
entire selection exceeds this particular loss by 5.04 acres.
If this one selection constituted the entire list it might be held, fol-
lowing the rule of approximation, that by excluding said lot 1 the
deficiency between the selection anid loss would be less than the excess
area including it. This might result in the exclusion of said lot 1 on
account of insufficiency of the basis, but it could in no wise invalidate
the selection of the remaining three forty-acre tracts, amolig which is
the tract in question. As before stated, however, the total amount
of selections included in the list is 3635 acres, and the total losses
given exceed the selections; so tat, as a whole, the list is fully
supported.
From a careful examination of the matter it is clear that the slection2
As to the SW. 4 of the SW. t of See. 5, T. 14 N., R. 9 W., the tract
here involved, the loss given is sufficient, and the list as filed is a sub-
stantial compliance with the regulations governing the selection of
indemnity lands.
Your office decision is accordingly affirmed. Bull's application will
stand rejected, and the company's selection, if otherwise regular, Will
be submitted for approval as the basis for patent.
RAILROAD GRANT-SUIT TO VACATE PATENT.
OLE SANAKER.
A suit to vacate a patent issued to a railroad company under an indemnity selection,
on the ground that a proper basis therefor Was not designated, will not be
advised, in the absence of adverse superior equities, if it appears that the indem-
nity lands are not sufficient to satisfy the losses in place.
Scretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Off ce, May 24,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (J. I. P.)
On March 15th last, the Department referred to your office for report,
a letter from one Charles L. Shelly, of Morris, Minnesota, relative to
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the claim of one Ole Sanaker to the NE. j of See. 3, T. 123 N., . 44 W.,
in the Marshall land district in said state, which it was alleged had
been erroneously approved to the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba
Railway Company. It was stated that said company had brought suit
to eject Sanaker from said tract on which he had lived continuously
since 1888, and on which he had made valuable improvements, and it
was asked that the matter be investigated by the Attorney General
and the proper action instituted by the United States to compel the
railway company to relinquish this land, or to set aside the approval of
it on account of inadvertence, etc.
Your report, dated March 29, last, shows the status of this land, so
far as the railroad grant is concerned, to be as follows:
This land is within the twenty mile indenmity limits of the grant .for the St. P aul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway, main line, under the act of March 3, 1857 (11
Stat., 195), and March 3, 1865 (13 Stat., 26), and was embraced in the withdrawal of
May 25,1869. which remained in force until May 22, 1891 (12 L. D., 541); and reserved
the land from disposal under the public land laws (12 L. D., 27 and 228)...
The records-of this office show that this land was selected by the St. Pau, Min-
neapolis and Manitoba Railway Company, main line, October 16, 1883, list No.,4;
that the same was approved March 2, 1889; and patent issued thereon March 7, 1889.
The basis designated by the company for the said tract was for land in section 9,
T. 138 N., R. 48 W., within the primary limits of the grant for the St. Vincent
Extension, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway.
Said report then goes on to give the history of Sanaker's connection
with said tract, which need not be here repeated, the point to which
your attention is called being that, as shown by the records of your
office, this tract was selected by said company October 16, 1883, as
indemnity lands within the twenty mile indemnity limits of the grant
for the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway, main line, and
that the basis designated by the company for said. tract was for land
within the primary limits of the grant for the St. Vincent Extension ot
said railway company.
i On February 26, 1889, in the case of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Manitoba Railway Company (8 Is. )., 255), 'Secretary Vilas, following
a, decision, in reference to the adjustment of the grant to the St. Paul,
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company, rendered by Secretary
Chandler December 2, 1875, held-(Syllabus)
The grant to the State of Minnesota in aid of a railroad 'from Stillwater, by way
of St. Paul and St. Anthony to a point between the foot of Big Stone Lake and the
mouth of the Sioux Wood River, with a branch via St. Cloud and Crow.Wing, to
the navigable waters of the Red River of the North' is in effect an entirety and
indivisible.
If the indemnity lands provided for one of such lines or branches shall prove
insufficient to make up the losses sustained along such line or branch, then 'the
defieiency may be supplied from the indemnity limits of the other lines or branches.
On the 10th of June 1891, in the case of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and
Manitoba and the St. Paul and Northern Pacific Railroad Company
(13 L. D., 349), Acting Secretary Chandler, following the decision of
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the supreme court in the case of the -St. Paul and Pacific Railroad
company V. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (139 U. S., 1), modified
the decision of Secretary Vilas as follows: (Syllabus)
The St. Paul and Pacific Company had no grant from Crow Wing to St. Vincent
until the act of March 3, 1865, as chahged by the act of 1871, conferred a new grant
between these points, and it therefore followsthat the grant forthis part of the road
cannot be adjusted in connection with the earlier grants to said company as an
entirety.
and on October 1, 1891, Secretary Noble, on review of the decision last
mentioned, adhered to said decision (13 L. D., 353) and held as follows:
(Syllabus)
The grant to the St. Vincent Extension of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba
Ry, is a new grant, made by an act of Congress subsequent in date to those by which
the original grant was made for the main line, and it therefore follows that the
grant for said extension should not be adjusted in connection with the other grants
as an entirety. The earlier grants must be adjusted separately from the later, and
wherever the latter conflicts with the older grant, priority of right must be
accorded the prior grant.
The separate adjustment of the grants for the main and branch lines precludes
the right of inlemnity selection by the older grant along the line of the younger,
and vice versea.
In the case of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Com-
pany v. Hastings ad Dakota Railroad Company (13 L. D. 440) it is held
A specification of losses on the line of the St. Vicent Extension cannot be accepted
as the basis for selections on the main line of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba
Railway Company.
It would seem from the foregoing that the basis on which the selec-
tion of this tract was made was an erroneous one. But the rule
requiring that every selection should be based on a designated loss may
be and has been waived by the Department, and it is not improbable
that it was waived in this case. If it should appear that the grant
to the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway Company is deficient,
that there is not enough indemnity lands to satisfy the losses in place,
then in the opinion of the Department, a suit should not be brought to
vacate the patent for said tract issued to said company, especially in
view of the absence of superior equities in the claim of Sanaker. You
are directed, however, to note in the adjustment of the grant to said
company, whether or not there has been patented to it lands in excess
of its grant. If you find such to be the case, you will prepare a list of
such lands and submit the same to the Department with your recom-
mendations in the premises.
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RAILROAD LANDS-ORDER OF RESTORATION.
INSTRUCTIONS.
Commissioner Hermann to the Register and Receiver at Los Angeles,
California, Alpril 13, 1898.
The supreme court of the United States has finally decided that the
lands lying within the overlapping limits of the grant by act of Con-
gress of March 3, 1871 (16 Stat., 573) to the Southern Pacific Railroad
Company, branch line, and the forfeited portion of the grant by act-of
July 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 592) to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, are public lands and that the Southern Pacific Railroad Company
has no right therein under said grant of 1871, Southern Pacific Rail-
Co. et al v. United States (168 U. S., 1); and the Secretary of the Inte-
rior by letters of January 18 and 28, 1898 (26 L. D., 48 and 97), has
directed that the restoration to entry of the lands which had been
directed to be restored by departmental letter of July 15, 1893, but was
suspended by Departmental letter of November 8, 1893, because of the
pendency of the suit now decided, be proceeded with, certain lands
being excepted.
Therefore, in order to carry the restoration into effect, you will cause
to be published for the period of thirty (30) days in some newspaper
of general circulation in your district, and in the vicinity of the lands,
a notice that all lands lying within the overlapping limits of the
Atlantic and Pacific Company's grant by act of July 27, 1866, and the
Southern Pacific Branch Line grant by act of March 3, 1871, and not
within the twenty mile primary limits of the grant by the former act
to the Southern Pacific Company for its main line, heretofore reserved
from entry for the Southerln Pacific Company, are restored to the pub.
lie domain, with the exceptions and additions to be noted further on,
and will be subject to entry on a day to be fixed by the notice which
shall not be less than thirty (30) days from the date of the first publi-
cation thereof.
-To the end that complications that might arise from the former prac
tice of suspending applications for these lands may be avoided and the
rightful claimants be enabled to acquire title with as little delay as
possiole, I have to direct that there be inserted in the notice of restora-
tion, a notice to all prior applicants, whatever the character of the
claim asserted, that their applications confer no rights upon them and
that upon the day set for the restoration the lands will be opened to
entry and disposal without regard to such applications, which shall be
held by the notice to be rejected.
That all said applicants, however, may have ample opportunity .to
present new applications when the lands may be, opened to entry, I:
enclose herewith a list of such of them as have applications pending
in this office, giving their post office addresses, and have to direct that.
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you at once specially notify said parties and any others shown by your
records to have pplications pending, of the rejection thereof, of the
date of the restoration and of the necessity of presenting new applica-
tions for the protection of their rights.
The exceptions from the restoration are the lands involved in the
suit recently decided by the supreme court (168 U. S., 1) which were
claimed by defendants other than the Southern Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, and the trustees in the mortgage executed by that company, a
list of which is enclosed marked "A," and the lands lying within the
San Gabriel timber land reserve. While the lands within said timber
reserve are generally excluded from the restoration, any claims therein
initiated prior to its creation, which was by proclamation of the Presi-
dent of December 20, 1892, will upon presentation receive due consid-
eration.
The south half of sections 7, 9 and 11 and all of sections 13, 15 and
17 in township 7 north, ranges 9, 10, 1, 12 and 13 west, though within
the twenty mile primary limits of the Southern Pacific main line grant,
were involved in the suit aforesaid and are also to be included in the
restoration.
I transmit a diagram showing the limits of the said grants as they
overlap the lands to be restored, and in explanation thereof will say
that under the decision of the court the restoration will embrace all the
public lands within the thirty (30) mile limits of the forfeited Atlantic
and Pacific grait to the extent it is overlapped by the Southern Pacific
branch line grant (both twenty and thirty mile limits) outside the
twenty mile primary limits of the Southern Pacific main line grant,
and also the tracts above described within said latter limits as being
involved in the suit recently decided, with the exceptions noted.
The lands outside the primary limits of the Southern Pacific main
line grant, and within the limits of its branch line grant, are of four
classes, as follows:. Lands within the common granted limits of the
Atlantic and Pacific grant and the Southern Pacific grant of 1871;
lands within the granted limits of said Southern Pacific grant and the
indemnity limits of the Atlantic and Pacific grant; lands within the
granted limits of the Atlantic and Pacific grant and within the indem-
nity limits of the Southern Pacific grant, and lands within the common
indemnity limits of both grants. The San Gabriel reservation is noted
on the diagram and colored pink.
All applications to select and all selections by the Southern Pacific
Railroad Company on account of its branch line of the lands to be
restored, are rejected and canceled, respectively, and you will so note
upon your records.
Any entries of lands which may have been allowed, will be permitted
to stand, and if no superior adverse claims to the tracts covered by
them are presented they may be perfected. In all cases of conflicting
claims you will proceed in accordance with the rules of practice in
similar cases.
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You will promptly forward a copy of the newspaper containing the
first notice of the restoration for the information of this office.
The receiver as disbursing officer, will pay the cost of publication and
forward a copy of the notice with proof of publication as his voucher
for the disbursement.
Approved, May 3, 1898:
C. N. BLISS, Secretary.
ISOLATED TRACT-PRICE WITHIN RAILROAD LIMITS.
CH ARLES TYLER.
Section 2455 R. S., as amended by the act of February 26, 1895, operates to reduce the
minimum price of isolated and disconnected tracts in alternate reserved sections
within the limits of a railroad grant from two dollars and fifty cents to one dol-
lar and twenty-five cents per acre.
Acting Secretary Rjan to the Comhmissioner of the General Land Offiee
(W. V. D.) May 23, 1898. (E. B., Jr.)
This is an appeal by Charles Tyler from the decision of your office
dated January 1, 1896, holding that the tract of public land described
as the NE. J of the NE. 4 and the S.: of the NE. 4 of Sec. 30, T. 44 N.,
R. 2 W., Ashland, Wisconsin, land district, being part of an alternate
reserved section within the primary limits of a railroad grant, is there-
fore double minimum laud, and that to entitle him to patent for the
same he must pay, as the price thereof, one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre additional to the one dollar and twenty-five cents already
paid; that is, a total of two dollars and fifty cents per acre..
The land was sold to him at public sale September 21, 1895, for one
dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, as an isolated or disconnected
tract, under section 2455 Revised Statutes, as amended February 26,
1895 (28 Stat., 687). The contention of the appeal, briefly stated, is,
that this amended section authorizes the Commissioner of the General
Land Office to order into market and sell any such isolated or discon-
nected tract or parcel of public land, whether. part of an alternate
reserved section or not, for not less than one dollar and twenty-five
cents per acre, upon the conditions therein named.
This tract is within the primary limits of the grant of May 5, 1864
(13. Stat., 66), to the State of Wisconsin, to aid in the construction of
certain railroads (which grant inured to the benefit of the Wisconsin
Central Railroad Company) and is one of the alternate even numbered
sections reserved to the United States, the price and sale of which
were regulated by section four of such granting acet as follows:
That the sections and parts of sections of lands which shall remain to the United
States within ten miles on each side of said roads shall not be sold for less than
double the minimum price of the public lands when sold; nor shall any of the said
reserved lands become subject to private entry until the same have been first offered
at public sale at the increased price.
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Most, if not all, of the railroad land grants, contain similar provision
as to the price of the alternate reserved sections,
The act of March 3, 1853 (10 Stat.; 244), extended existing pre-
emption laws to alternate reserved sections, and fixed the price thereof
to pre-emptors, as follows:
That the pre-einption laws of the United States, as they now exist, be and they
are hereby extended over the alternate sections of public lands along the lines of all
the railroads in the United States wherever pblic lands havebeen or maybe granted
by acts of Congress; and that it shall be the privilege of the persons residing on any
of said reserved lands to pay for the same in soldiers' bounty land warrants, esti-
mated at a dollar and twenty-live cents per acre, or in gold and silver, or both
together, in preference to any other person, and at auy time before the same shall be
offered for sale at auction. And providedfurther, That the price to he paid shall
in all cases be two dollars and fifty cents per acre, or snlch other minimnlm price as is
now fixed by law, or may be fixed npon lands hereafter granted;
The general policy of fixing the minimum price of reserved lands-
within the limits of railroad land grants at double minimum, or two
dollars and fifty cents per acre, as manifested in the several granting
acts and in the act of March 3, 1853 (supra), is expressed in a proviso
to section 2357 of the Revised Statutes. That section is made up from
former statutes regulating the price of all public lands and is as follows:
The price at which the public lands are offered for sale shall be one dollar and
twenty-five cents an acre; and at every sale, the highest bidder, who makes payment
as provided in the preceding section, shall be the prchaser; but no land shall be
sold, either at public or private sale, for a less price than one dollar and twenty-five
cents an acre; and all the public lands which are hereafter offered at public sale,
according to law, and remain unsold at the close of such public sales, shall be snb--
ject to be sold at private sale, by entry at the land office, at one dollar and twenty-.
five cents an acre, to be paid at the time of making such entry: Provided, That the
price to be paid for alternate reserved lands, along the line of railroads within the
limits granted by any act of Congress, shall be two dollars and fifty cents per acre.
Section five of the act of August 3, 1846 (9 Stat., 51), brought into
the Revised Statutes, substantially anchanged, as section 2455, gave
authority for ordering into market, for public or private sale, any iso-
lated or disconnected tract of public land, but made no provision as to
the price thereof, leaving that to be determined by other statutes.
The act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 854), prohibited the private sale
of any public lands, except those in the State of Missouri. Section
nine of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1095-1099) prohibited any
future publie sale of public lands, but made express exception, among
others, of "isolated and disconnected fractional tracts authorized to be
sold by section twenty-four hundred and fifty-five of the Revised
Statutes." The public sale of isolated or disconnected tracts was not
affected by either of these acts, but. thereafter they were not subject to
private sale, unless in Missouri, and were only saved from the prohibi-
tion against public sale by the express exception in the latter act of
isolated or disconnected tracts.
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As amended by the act of February 26, 1895, section 2455 reads:
It shall be lawful for the Commissioner of the General Land Office to order into
imarket and sellfor not less than one dollar and twenty-five ceWts per acre any isolated or
discoinected tract or parcel of the public domain less than one quarter section, which
in his judgment it would be proper to expose to sale, after at least thirty days' notice
by the land officers of the district in which such lands may be situated: Provided,
That lands shall not become so isolated or disconnected until the same have been
subject to homestead entry for a period of three years after the surrounding land has
been entered, filed upouj or sold by the Government: Provided, That not more than
one hundred anil sixty acres shall be sold to any one person.
As it stands since -the amendment, that section, according to its
plainly expressed language, if unaffected by other legislation, unques-
tionably authorizes the sale of isolated or disconnected tracts or parcels
of the public domain, whether within the limits of any railroad grant
or elsewhere, at a price of not less than one dollar and twenty-five cents
per acre. They may be sold as nuch higher than the minimum as any
one is willing to bid, bt cannot be sold for less than that sum.
Section four of the granting act, hereinbefore quoted, and the proviso
to section 2357, control the price of alternate reserved sections, within
the limits of this grant, unless the amended section 2455, works a par-
tial repeal thereof to the extent of excepting isolated or disconnected
tracts from the operation thereof. The question then is: Do section
four of the granting act and the proviso to section 2357, continue, unim-
paired, to fix the minimum price of all isolated or disconnected fractions
of alternate reserved sections, or did section 2455, as amended, operate
to reduce the gninimunm price of isolated or disconnected tracts in such
reserved sections, from two dollars and fifty cents to one dollar and
twenty-five cents per acre?
These sections are plainly irreconcilable as to the price of such
tracts, giving to the language of each its general and ordinary mean-
ing. They can not both be administered as to price in respect to these
tracts. The amended section is not restricted or confined to lands
lying outside of railroad or other land grants. Its language is: "Any
isolated or disconnected tract or parcel of the public domain." These
words are broad and comprehensive enough to include the particular
* class of lands therein defined, wherever found. The statute is special
in that it only applies to such isolated or disconnected tracts but it is
of equal application to all of them. As the section stood before the
amendment, such tracts when located within an alternate reserved
section were clearly within its meaning and application, but at that
time the section was silent as to price, that matter being determined
by other statutes which made the minimum price depend upon location,
that is, land within alternate reserved sections was two dollars and
fifty cents an acre, and land located elsewhere was one dollar and
twenty-five cents an acre.
Had Congress intended that the price of isolated and disconnected
tracts of public land should remain as then fixed, it was not necessary
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to have enacted any new legislation as to the rice thereof. Such leg-
islation only became necessary in pursuance of an intention to make
some change, and Congress having, under these circumstances, legis-
lated with respect to the price of such tracts in the amendatory act,
and having placed no limit or restriction on such new legislation, the
Department believes that it was the intention to cover the whole field
of price and not to leave a portion of the field to other legislation fixing
a different price. This view seems to be strengthened when we consider
the history of the act of February 26, 1895, by which section 2455 was
so amended. The bill was known as H. B. 4952, and when it was intro--
dued into and passed the House of Representatives, its language and
terms were identically those of the present act excepting that the words
"one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre" where they now occur,
then read " two dollars and fifty cents per acre." In the Senate the bill
was amended by striking out the words "two dollars and fifty" and by
inserting "one dollar and twenty-five" in lieu thereof. As so amended
the bill passed the Senate and the amendment was concurred in by the
House of Representatives. The difference in opinion thus manifested
was not as to whether this act should fix the price but was as to what
the minimum price should be. The Department is of opinion that
Congress intended to establish a uniform minimum price for all isolated
or disconnected tracts.
As before stated, the provision as to price of lands in alternate
reserved sections' in the fourth section of this grant is common to nearly
all, if not to all, grants in aid of the building of railroads, and Congress
was well aware of these provisions when the amended section in ques-
tion was enacted. It was also aware of the provisions of section 2357
Revised Statutes, fixing one dollar and twenty-five cents an acre as the
general minimum price of public lands and fixing two dollars and fifty
cents an acre as the price of alternate reserved lands within the limits
of railroad grants, so that unless the provision as to price in the
amended section 2455 was inserted with the intention of thereby cover-
ing the whole subject to the exclusion of prior statutes, it was idly
inserted, has no meaning, and adds nothing to the section. A statute
should be so construed as to give effect to every part thereof, and it
will be presumed that every part was intentionally and deliberately
enacted.
Certain it is that any lands coming within the kind or class described
in the amended section may be sold thereunder. As to kind or class,
the terms and words of description are-
.Any isolated or disconnected tract or parcel of the public domain less than one
quarter section. .... Provided, That lands shall not become so isolated or dis-
connected until the same have been subject to homestead entry for a period of three
years after the surronding land has been entered, filed upon,-or sold, by the gov-
ernment.
This language clearly embraces such tracts wherever located, those
within the limits of alternate reserved sections in railroad grants as
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well as those elsewhere. If a tract or parcel of land is embraced in
any of the provisions of the amended section, it is equally embraced in
all of them, that as to price as well as others. If the amended section
does not embrace isolated or disconnected tracts or parcels when within
the alternate reserved sections of a railroad grant, then there is no
existing provision for their sale, since the section as it stood at the time
of its amendment was the only law which authorized the sale of such
tracts, and there has been no other legislation in the premises. They
were included i the section as it stood before the amendment and the
inserting of the provision as to price was not sufficient in itself to
exclude them from it.
The isolated or disconnected tracts or parcels so authorized to be
sold, must have been subject to homestead entry for a period of three
years after the surrounding land has been entered, filed upon, or sold,
so they have necessarily proved to be not desirable as homesteads.
Many of them can not be sold for as much as two dollars and fifty cents
per acre, and Congress was aware of this when the amendatory legisla-
tion in question was enacted. On the other hand, where there remain
valuable tracts of the kind or class defined, the government's interests
are, amply safeguarded by the discretion with which the' Commissioner
is clothed in determining whether a sale shall be ordered, and by the
published invitation for competition in price at any authorized sale.
It is believed that the case of United States v. Healey (160 U. S., 13.6),
does not control the question here discussed and does not require a
different conclusion from that here announced. After full and careful
consideration, the Department has reached the conclusion that it was
intended to provide in section 2455, as amended, a simple comprehensive
and exclusive plan for the public sale of such isolated or disconnected
tracts or parcels of public lands and to subject all tracts or parcels com-
ing within the definition there given, to the same condition as to price.
The tract sold to Tyler wds sold at public sale at a price authorized by
the section as amended. If the sale was otherwise regular, it should
be approved by your office and patent should issue thereunder.
The decision of your office is accordingly reversed.
CONTEST-INTERVENING CONTESTANT-ORDER FOR HEARING.
MURPHY V. MURPHY ET AL., TAYLOR AND ALLEN INTERVENORS.
An affidavit of contest filed during the pendency of a prior contest, charging fraud
and collusion as against the parties to the pending suit, should be held to await
the final disposition of said suit.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, May 26,
(W. V. D.) 1898. - (F. C. D.)
Charles M. Taylor has appealed from your decision of April 4, 1896,
wherein you dismissed the contest of Will Murphy, and held the con-
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test and intervention of Taylor until the final determination of Murphy's
contest. -
The land involved herein is the NE. I of Sec. 20, T. 15 N., R. 2 B.,
Guthrie, Oklahoma, land district.
On December 14, 1892, Alexander McDonnell made homestead entry
for the said land, and on March 3, 1893, the entryman died, leaving his
widow, Mary McDonnell, above named, as his only heir.
On December 10, 1894, Will Murphy, above named, filed affidavit of
contest against said entry, charging abandonment of said land by said
Mary McDonnell. No notice issued.
On January 19, 1895, Charles M. Taylor, above named, filed an affi-
davit of contest against said entry, alleging, in substance, that said
Mary McDonnell had executed a relinquishment for said land and was
holding said land for sale and speculation only.
On February 14, 1895, the relinquishment of Mary McDonnell was
filed, and Jordan W. Murphy immediately made homestead entry for
said land.
April 11, 1895, Will Murphy filed an amended affidavit, alleging, in
effect, that the said relinquishment of Mary McDonnell was the result
of his contest and that therefore he was entitled to preference right of
entry, and asked that Jordan W. Murphy be cited to show cause why
his entry should not be canceled, which application was granted and
notice issued thereon.
On April 12,1895, Charles M. Taylor, above named, filed an amended
affidavit of contest, alleging, in effect, fraudulent collusion between
Will Murphy, Jordan W. Murphy and Mary McDonnell, and asked to
be allowed to "intervene" and to prove the collusion and fraud as
alleged.
No notice appears to have been issued either on the original or
amended affidavit of Taylor, or was served on any of the said parties,
until the day of trial, when a notice was served on Will Murphy and
Jordan W. Murphy.
On May 28, 1895, the day set for the hearing on the contest of Will
Murphy, an agreed statement of facts was filed bythe Murphys. After
the case was closed, Taylor requested them to take the witness stand
and testify in his behalf, which they declined to do. Thereupon Taylor
submitted the testimony of one witness in support of his allegations.
On June 20, 1895, the register and receiver rendered their joint
decision in favor of Taylor and recommended the cancellation of said
entry of Jordan W. Murphy; from which decision the entryman and
Will Murphy appealed to your office.
Will Murphy has not appealed from your said decision; therefore, as
far as his rights are concerned, your decision has become final.
As Taylor's said affidavit of contest charging fraud and collusion
against the Murphys was filed while the contest of Will Murphy was
pending, no notice should have issued on Taylor's said affidavit, but it
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should have been held for the final disposition of the prior contest.
Melcher v. Clark, 4 L. D., 504; Ludwig v. Faulkner et al., II L. D., 315;
and Gregg et al. v. Lakey, 17 L. D., 60.
The holding of your office to that effect is correct and is affirmed.
On November 21, 1896, your office transmitted to the Department an
affidavit of contest filed by one Thomas Allen, in the local office, on
August 29, 1895, against the entry of Jordan W. Murphy, alleging
fraud and collusion between the said Jordan W. Murphy, Will Murphy
and Charles M. Taylor, which affidavit is accompanied by, and is
attached to, a motion by said Allen, asking to be allowed to intervene
herein and have a hearing on his said affidavit. But as Taylor's con-
test was pending when Allen filed his said affidavit, the latter must be
held to await the final determination of said contest.
Taylor's contest has now matured, and you will therefore order a
hearing therein, causing due notice thereof to be given both Taylor
and Jordan W. Murphy.
.The decision of your office is modified in accordance herewith.
RAILROAD LANDS-Wvr.I-IDR-AVAL-ACT OF MARCH 2, 1896.
UNION PACIFIC R. R. Co.
Under the provisions of section 1, act of March 2, 1896, suit will not lie to vacate
patents issued under the act of June 22,1874, in lieu of lands lost or relinquished
in consequence of the failure of the government to withdraw said lands from
sale or entry.
Secretary Bliss to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, MlayG26,
(W. V. D.) 1898. (F. W. C.)
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of letter from your Depart-
ment dated May 2, 1898, enclosing
a copy of an opinion by the circuit court for the district of Utah in one of several
suits in Utah and other jurisdictions brought against the Union Pacific Railroad
Company to recover lieu lands.
In said letter it is stated that-
The suits were recommended by your Department in 1892. The court holds that
the company lost or relinquished its land in consequence of the failure of the gov-
eriflent or its officers to withdraw the same from sale or entry, within the meaning
of the proviso of the act of March 2, 1896. I desire to know whether your Depart-
ment so understands the proviso and the facts, and whether the facts are the same as
to company's lands in other jurisdictions.
Said letter was duly referred to the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, and from his report made thereon it appears that the
patent sought to be vacated was issued, to the company under the pro-
visions of the act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 194), in lieu of certain
tracts within the limits of the grant relinquished by the company.
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From the statement of facts made in the opinion, copy of which is
enclosed, it appears-
that certain filings were permitted to be made on land that was within the original
grant to the cmpany, but before the withdrawal of the land from entry and before
the filing of the map of definite location, but after the filing of the map of general
location and after the land should have been withdrawn. Under the act of Congress
of 1874, and at the suggestion of the Department of the Interior, the defendant com-
pany released its claim on the lands so filed on, and applied for land in lien thereof,
which application was granlted and the patent in question issued. It is now songht
to set aside said patent on the ground of mistake and inadvertence in the Depart-
ment in issuing the same. No fraud is alleged.
The Commissioner reports that the company filed a nap of the pro-
posed route of its road from a point one hundred miles west of Oinaha
to Salt Lake City, on June 28, 1865, and that the road was definitely
located April 28, 1869.
The operation of the public land laws was not extended to the Ter-
ritory of Utah until July 16, 1868, an(l a land office at Salt ILake City
was not established until March 9, 1869. No formal order of with-
drawal was made on account of this grant until May 15, 1869, which
order was acknowledged as received at the local office May 24, 1869.
By the terms of section 7 of the act of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 489),
making the grant for said company, it was provided that the Secretary
of the Interior should upon the filing of the map of generacl route, cause
the lands within fifteen miles of said designated route to be withdrawn
from pre-emption, private entry and sale. By the amendatory act of
July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 356), the limit of the withdrawal upon the map
of general or designated route was extended to twenty-five miles.
It will thus be seen that it becomes the duty of the Secretary of the
Interior, upon the fling of the map of general route, which in this
instance was June 28, 1865, to -withdraw the lands falling within twenty-
five miles of said route.
At this time, as before stated, a land office had not been established
in the Territory of Utah nor had the operation of the general land laws
been extended to that Territory, but there was nothing in this which
necessarily prevented the Secretary from complying with the statutory
direction to make a withdrawal or reservation in aid of the grant. His
authority therefor was found in the granting act and was not depend-
ent upon a subsequent extension of the public land laws. During the
period that preceded the extension of the public land laws to Utah no
harin could result to the company fromt the failure to make the with-
drawal directed by the statute to be inade upon the filing of the map
of general route, but during the period intervening between sulch
extension of the public land laws and the order of withdrawal on defi-
nite location, the failure to make withdrawal on general route, permit-
ted many persons who settled after the filing of the nap of general
route but prior to the order of withdrawal on definite location, to carry
their settlement into entries and filings. In order to relieve such claim-
ants from loss, it appears from the records of this Department that on
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February 25, 1875, the land commissioner for this company executed a
general relinquishment of all tracts within the twenty-five mile limit
established upon the line shown upon the map filed June 28, 1865,
which had been proved up and entered by bonafide settlers under the
pre-emption and homestead laws, where such claims were based on set-
tlements or entries made subsequently to the filing of the map of gen-
eral route and prior to the definite location of the road.
In transmitting said relinquishment to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, it was held that the company's rights under the
map of general route took effect from the date of the filing of the same,
June 28, 1865, in effect, recognizing the withdrawal authorized by the
statute upon filing map of general route, as a legislative withdrawal,
and it was evidently under this decision (February 27, L875), that the
company made the selection which was afterwards patented, which
patent was sought to be set aside by the suit under consideration.
In the case of the Kansas Pacific Railway Company v. Danineyer
(113 U. S., 629) the court had under consideration the question as to
the effect of a withdrawal upon the filing of the map of general route.
It was urged in that case that until an executive order issued with-
drawing the lands, they remained open to entry unaffected by the map
of general route. It was held in said opinion, however:
But we are of opinion that the duty of filing this map, as required by the act, like
that of the line of definite location, is performed by filing it in the General Land
Office, which is filing it with the Secretary of the Interior, and that whatever rights
accrue to the company from the act of filing it accrue from filing it there.
The court does not attempt to determine what those rights are, nor
what would be the effect of the failure of the Secretary to withdraw
the land, or of his act in allowing an entry before definite location
after the withdrawal of the land.
In that case the entry, allowed after the filing of the map of general
route and before definite location, was recognized under the peculiar
terms of the law of July 3, 1866, which related specifically to the Kan-
sas Pacific Railway Compahy, and not to the portion of the road oppo-
site the laud in suit.
It is clear that if the company lost the lands by reason of claims
initiated after the filing of the map of general route and before definite
location, it was because of the failure of the government or its officers
to withdraw .the same from sale or entry.
In section 1 of the act of March 2, 1896 (29 Stat., 42), it is provided:
That no suit shall be brought or maintained, nor shall recovery be had, for lands,
or the value thereof, that were certified or patented in lieu of other lands covered
by a grant which were lost or relinquished by the grantee in consequence of the
failure of the government or its officers to withdraw the same from sale or entry.
This provision is applied by the court to the case under consideration;
and in view thereof decree was entered dismissing the bill. In the
opinion of this Department the provision is properly applied by the
court.
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Relative to the question " whether the facts are the same as to com-
pany's lands in other jurisdictions," it would be impossible to make a
definite answer without a description of the lands included in each
specific case.
JORDAN . SMITH.
Motion for review of departmental. decision of April 15, 1898, 26
L. D., 527, denied by Acting Secretary Ryan, May 28, 1898.
HYOMTESTEAD ENTRY-ALIENATION-RESCISSION OF CONTRACT.
CRAWFORD . STUDY.
A homestead entry must be canceled as in violation of law, where it appears that
prior to making such entry the homesteader verbally agreed to enter the land
for townsite purposes, and after rnaing entry executed a written agreement
to the same effect, and the rescission of said agreement prior to contest will
not operate to relieve the entry of its illegal character.
Acting Secretary Ryan t the Commissioner qf the General Land Ofice,
(W. V. D.) May 28, 1898. (C. J. G.)
October 31, 1893, Leonard Study made homestead entry for the NE.
of Sec. 34, T. 29 N., R. 2 W., Perry land district, Oklahoma.
April 27, 1894, Albert B. Crawford filed affidavit of contest against
said entry, alleging:
That said Leonard Study, as affiant is informed and belie ves, is holding said land
in violation of his homestead affidavit by holding it for speculative purposes and
not in good faith for a honestead; that on or about the 20th day of November, 1893,
the said Study entered into a contract with the Wichita Townsite and Homestead
Company to enter the land for townsite purposes and when he secured the title to
said land that he would convey said tible to them to about 350 lots; that in accord-
ance with said contract the said company did dispose of said lots by lottery schemes
and drawings and in addition thereto did sell forty lots to different individuals
under the agreement to deliver deed to said lots when he secured title thereto, the
land having been surveyed into lots; that said tract is used for the purposes of
trade and business and that said Study is not holding said tract in good faith as a
homestead but for the purpose of speculation.
November 9, 1895, upon the evidence submitted, consisting of testi-
mony taken by depositions and orally, the local office rendered decision
in favor of Crawford, recommending cancellation of Study's entry.
It appears that Study settled upon the land in controversy Septem-
ber 16, 1893, and having erected a cabin thereon moved his family to
said land September 28, 1893, where they have resided continuously
ever since. The defendant testifies that he endeavored several times
to make entry, but was unable to place his entry of record until October
31, 1893, as heretofore stated.
The evidence further shows that November 21, 1893, the defetidant
and his wife entered into a written agreement with the Wichita Town-
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site and Homestead Company to enter the land in question for townsite
purposes and, having so entered it, to convey the same by warranty deed
to said company, with the exception of certain reservations therein
described; that about January 20, 1894, the defendant informed said
company of his desire to rescind said contract; that the rescission was
completed about April 7, 1894, after he had seen the members of the
company and informed them of his repudiation of the contract and
demanded its return. It seems that defendant's rescission was acqui-
esced in by the company but the contract was never returned to him.
The decision of the local office is based on the ground that defend-
ant had agreed with the company to enter this land for townsite pur-
poses, prior to his entry, and that therefore said entry was not made
solely for his benefit. Defendant denies any such prior verbal con-
tract, but it was held that the evidence shows that there was such an
understanding.
July 25, 1896, your office, upon Study's appeal, concluded as follows:
It is true that defendant settled upon the land in good faith; that he only per-
fected his contract with said company after being convinced of its legality; that
said contract was rescinded before contest was filed; that whatever contracts were
made by other parties with said company for lots of said laud appear to have been
abandoned and whatever amounts paid by them to said company returned; that it
is possible that defendant did not intend to evade the requirements of the home-
stead law. But all this does not relieve the defendant of the consequences of his
acts. (Tagg . Jensen, 16 L. D., 113: Palmer c. Stillman, 18 L. D., 196).
The defendant has now appealed to this Departmenlt.'
The evidence in this case leads fairly to the conclusion that Study
had verbally agreed with the Wichita Townsite and Homestead Com-
pany to enter the land in controversy for townsite purposes, prior to
the date of his entry. The law, however, forbidding the entering into
an agreement, or making any contract, to convey the land embraced in
a homestead entry, covers the whole period prior to submission of final
proof. In his affidavit filed at the time he applied to inake homestead
entry of this land Study swore among other things to the following:
That I do not apply to enter the same for the purpose of speculation, but in good
faith to obtain a home for myself, and that I have not directly or indirectly made,
and will not malte, any agreement or contract in any way or manner, with any per-
son or persons, corporation or syndicate whatever by which the title which I might
acquire from the government of the United States should inure, in whole or in part,
to the benefit of any person except myself.
This is the form of affidavit prescribed under section 2290 of the
Revised Statutes, as amended by section 5 of the act of March 3, 1891
(26 Stat., 1095), which was before the time Study made his entry. As
was said in the case of Walker v. Clayton, 24 L. D., 79, wbich' is. in
some respects similar to the one under consideration:
It was evidently implied, if not expressed, in his contract with the United States,
that he would continue to'hold, reside upon and cultivate the land for his exclusive
use and benefit until the time should arrive, when, after the submission of final
proof as required by law, he had earned his right to receive patent therefor.
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Much- stress is laid in the appeal upon the fact that the defendant
had rescinded the contract in question prior to the date of the contest.
The force of this recission on the part of the defendant may be gathered
from his testimony wherein he admits that he meant to carry out the
contract just as it was; which in the light of surrounding circumstances
may fairly be interpreted to mean that if the townsite scheme had
proven a success the defendant stood ready to comply with his agree-
ment. It is also urged that defendant was led to believe that after he
had secured his entry such a contract would not be illegal; and find-
ing that it was probably illegal he immediately took steps to repudiate
it. It is furthermore contended that the main question. in issue is as
to whether defendant was holding the land in violation of his home-
stead affidavit and for speculation at the time the contest was filed.
On the contrary, this being a matter between the government and the
entryinan, the main question is whether the defendant has at any time
violated the terms of his homestead affidavit. As was said in the case
of Walker v. Clayto), sPra: 
Neither is it any sufficient answer that by its terms the agreement had come to an
end long before contest was initiated . If when threatened with exposure of
bad faith a homesteader could in each instance avoid the consequences by simply
repudiating his contract to convey, the sanction of the law would be overthrown.
Your said office decision is hereby affirmed.
WEISNER V. CLEIVI.
Motion for rehearing in the cause above entitled denied y Acting
Secretary Ryan May 28, 1898. See departmental decisions of March
3, 1898, 26 L. D., 300, and April 27, 1898, id., 575.
HENRY WILD.
Motion for review of departmental decision of February 25, 1898, 26
L. D., 267, denied by Secretary Bliss, May 31, 1898.
RULES OF PRACTICE AMENDED.
Coininissioner -Herman to Registers and Receivers U. S. Land Offices,
Mfay 26, 1898.
Rules 11, 14 and 17 of practice are hereby amended so as to read as
follows:
Rule 11.-Notice may be given by publication only when it is shown
by affidavit presented on behalf of the contestant and by such other
evidence as the register -and receiver may require, that due diligence
has been used and that personal service can not be made. The affi-
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davit must also state the present post-office address of the person
intended to be served, if it is known to the affiant, and must show
what effort has been made to obtain personal service.
Rule 14.-Where notice is given by publication a copy thereof shall,
at least thirty days before the date for the hearing, be iwailed, by reg-
istered letter, to each person to be so notified at the last address, if
any, given by him as shown by the record, and to him at his present
address named in the affidavit for publication required by Rule 11, if
such present address is stated in such affidavit and is different from
his record address. If there be no such record address and if no
present address is amed in the affidavit for publication, then a copy
of the notice shall be so mailed to him at the post-office nearest to the
land. A copy of the notice shall also be posted in the register's office
for a period of at least thirty days before the date for the hearing and
still another copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place UpOD
the land for at least two weeks prior to the date set for the hearing.
When notice of proceedings commenced by the government against
timber and stone entries is given by pablication the posting of notices
upon the land will not be required.
Rule 17.-Notice of interlocutory motions, proceedings, orders, and
decisions, shall be in writing and may be served personally or by reg-
istered letter mailed to the last address, if any, given by or on behalf
of the party to be notified, as shown by the record, and if there be no
such record address, then to the post office nearest the land; and in all
those contest cases where notice of contest is given by registered mail
under Rule 14, and the return registered receipt shows such notice to
have been received by the coutestee, the address at which the notice
was so received shall be considered as an address given by the contestee,
within the meaning of this rule.
The aforesaid rules as amended shall take effect on the 1st day of
July, 1898, and be applied to all cases initiated after that date.
* Approved:
C. Ns. BLISS,
Secretary.
INDEX.
Page. Page.
lbandontent. A survey of, is required by the law and
See Contest; Residence. regulations to be in a square form as near as
AcconDUAtS. practicable -- .58
Under the provisions of section 8, act of ary purposes, by one ah olely for donicil
July 31, 1894, the acceptance of payment on business of fishing, is not an occupation of
the settlement of an account by an auiitor the land for the purposes of trade or mano
precludes a revision of said account ........ 609 t e withn the naoie of aid act - 188
Special instructions issued by the sur- ufseword "'trade," as used in section 12 of
vcyor-gencral, with respectwr toI the cxaocu- insecton 2 o
veyor-general, with respect. to thie exec- bthe act of March 3, 1891, is employed in its
tion of a contract for a public survey, be- commercial significance, and Congress, by
come, under the act of October 1, 1890, a its utse in defining the character of oress-part of such contract if not in conflict with
tenaual of surveying instructions orthe maint. ~~~~~~~panry whichs would authorize a purchase of
themaulosuvyn instructions e rlLn Or. 0 land, did not intend to include thereby landsthe instructionlsof ibe General Land Office 6809 used for farming, cattle gracing, or fox.
Absence, Leave of. raising . : ........... 212
See tesidence. An entry for purposes of trade and manu-
Adverse Claim. facture must belihuited to the land possessedSee Hining Claim. ~~~andi occupsied for such purposestalone, when,See llfississp Clonic, taken in the form prescribed by the stat.
Aifid avit. utes, and not include lands used for agricul-
See Costest. tural purposes incidental to the business of
Alaskan Lands. the purchaser- . -1.. . - 305
Directions given that whenever a survey A survey with a view to purchase under
of, is desired, dle compliance with the de- section 12, act of March 3, 1891, will not be
partmental regulations of June 3, 1891, in approved if it operates as an encroachment
the matter of written applications and other- upon lands occupied by native villagers.. 558
vise, shall be exacted in each instance . 513 Land upon which is located the fresh-w-a-
A survey of, as provided for in the act of ter supply of a native Alaskan village may
March 3, 1891, is special in its characters be regarded asland "actually occupied " by
and there is no authority tlserefor except such natives, and therefore excluded from
is preliminary to a purchase, and it there- entry for purposes of trade and manufac-
fore follows, that before suchs a survey is tures under the act of March 3,]891 518
made there should be a primafacie showing A survey of, with a view to the purchase
of the right to purchase, and due compli- thereof as a trading post, should not be
sure with the departmental requirements allowed in such form as to deprive native
regulating applications for the survey of villagers of free access to the surrounding
said lands ..... ... 232 country .- 17.......... ...... 5
Where a survey of, with a view to purchase Au entry under the provisions of section
isnder section 12 of said act, has been made 12, act of March 3, 1891, should not be
without ,written application therefor. as re- allowed in such form as to include a trail or
quired by departmental regulations, and the roadway between a native village and a ar-
amesidment of stuh survey is found neces- hor landing, long used by the natives to
sary, it will not be allowed until due appli- reach said landing, and necessary for their
cation therefor has been usadein conformity free access thereto- 512
with said regulations; and prior to the ee- Tie protection accorded to the possessory
ution of such amended survey a deposit of rights of Alaskan Indians and other persons
an amount sufficient to defray the expense by section 8, act of May 17,1884, was not in-
thereof, and all expenses incident thereto, tended to apply to cases where the settle-
must be made . 512 ment was made at a time when the land eml-
On the survey of, with a view to the pur- braced therein was included within a public
chase thereof under section 12, art of March reservation - ... 104
3, 1891, articles of personal property should Sections 2339 and 23140 of the Revised
not be included in the estimated value of Statutes are part of the general land laws,
improvements on said land - - :. 68 and are not operative in Alaska, except in
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so far as they relate to mining claims and bythe prior entry of another, while pend-
the rights incident thereto-. ............... 05 ig, serves to protect the rights of the appli-
The provisions of the act of March 3,1891, - cant as to the land open to entry ------ ... 159
contain no authority for the purchase of, to To enter, embracing in part land not open
be uset and occunied for railroad purposes, 558 to entry, while pending, operates to protect
A survey that embraces tide lands with- the right of the applicant as to such portion
in its iniits will not be approved, as thero of the land as may be subject to ppropria-
is no authority by which title thereto can tion at the date of lis application 163
be acquired under the public land laws.... 533 Pendingfinal action on, the land embraced
There is not statutory authority for the therein is not only reserved from any other
acceptance in payment, for lands purchased disposition, bt until the application is
the trade and manufacture, of the certificates allowed a charge of abandonment will not
issued on account of the deposit made to lie; nor is the applicant in such case re-
secure the survey of said land . -. -305 quired to reside on the land covered by his
Paagraph 5 of the circular regulations application pending final decision thereon 219
of June 3,1891,52 L. D., 583, revoked ........ 305 To enter, suspended on account of defects
Circular of March 17, 1898, as to use of therein, with notice of such action to the
timber in.-4 .......... 8..... ......... 404 applicant, operates to reserve the land from
other disposition until final action thereon - 389
Alienation. To enter properly rejected by final deci-
A transferee of a mining claim, whose in- sion of the Department, under the rulings
terest is acquired during the pendency of then in force, can not be reinstated with a
the departmental proceedings involving view to favorable action under a changed
the status of said claim, takes no right bet- construction of the law - -- -----. 44
te than that possessed by his grantor.... 122 In the case of, to make entry, filed sb-
A contract of sale entered into by timber jeet to prior adverse applications, lb equali-
culture entryman, to be consummated by fications of sch applicant should sot be
delivery of deed after the submission of determined before an adjudication of the
final proof and the issuance of patent, is in relative rights of the parties in interest. 553
violation of law, and makes cancellation of An applicant for the right to make home-
the entry necessary; and where after such stead entry of a tract covered by a donation
alienation the entrymau dies, his heirs are claim is not entitled, on appeal from the re-
entitled to no greater rights under the entry ,jection of his, to raise a question as to the
than he had at the the of his death .-. 378 citizenship of the donation claimant ........ 565
The sale of land embraced within a coal The tender of a relinquishment, acom-
land entry prior to the tie when final panied by, at a time when there is a vacancy
proof has been filed in the local office, but in the office of the register, and when,
after the actual execution thereof, does not under the rulings then in force, such papers
call for the cancellation of the entry in the should have been received and held to await
absence of bad faith -. ............. 413 the resumption of business, entitles the
A homestead entry must be canceled as party making such tender to have said
in violation of law, where it appears that papers treated as though filed, though in
prior to making such. entry the home- fact theywere returned on account of said
steader verbally agreed to enter the laud vacancy ........................... ........ 363
for towlusito purposes, and after making Arid Lands.
entry executed a written agreement to the a
sale effect, and the reission of said agree- - See Reservoir Lauds.
ment prior to contest will not operate to Bonitidaries
relieve the entry of its illegal character. -:- 708
See States and Territories.Atnemldinent.
Seeo-Ctry. Cancellation.
A p peal. Of a desert land entry without due notice
See Practice of such action to the original entryman,
with opportunity given hil to show causeApplieation, why such action ihould not be taken, Is un-
authorized by law, and an entry so canceled
entry successfully, on the grountd of prior must be held in law an existing entry. . 499
settlement, be is entitled to the statutory
period of three months from date of settle. Certification.
ment in which to nake entry; and in the Patent.
computation of this period, the time be-
tween his original application to enter, and Certificate of Deposit.
the date of legal notice of cancellation, Issued on account of deposit to secure
should be excluded ......- .... I1 the survey of Alaskan land can not be ac-
To enter, embracing in part land covered cepted in paymeut therefor - - 305
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Will not be granted where it is apparent, See Contestant.
from the facts as stated by the petitioner, To determine the sffloiency ot a nffi-
that if the appeal were before the Depart- davit of. as the basis for a hearing it is
ment it would be dismissed ................ 348 necessary to consider whether or not, if any
irltlarllhZS anlid InhstrUCtions,. one or more of the charges taken singly, or
See Table of, page xx. all the charges taken together as a whole,
are established, the entry must be canceled. 1l
Citizenship. The failure of a contestant to prosecute
See N'aturalization. . his suit, and a resulting order of dismissal
The usage of an Indian tribe may be ac- for want of prosecution, will defeat the
cepted to establish a claim of nembership right of such contestant to be afterwards
therein, on the part of one who under the heard on a charge substantially the same as
general rule would be held a citizen of the that presented in the first instance .- ,.. : 450
United States ., -.-. , ,.. 71 Al affidavit of, filed during the pendency
A slight difference in the spelling of the of a prior contest, charging fraud and colln-
name as shown ill the declaration of inten- sion as against the parties to the pending
tion to become a citizen, and the final suit, should be held to await the final dis-
papers, will not be held sufficient to defeat position of said suit - ,,,,,,- ,,-,,,-,,703
a claim of, on behalf of a homesteader, Allowed during the pendency of prior
where from the testimony it appears that proceedings involving the same land can
he is the identical person referred to in each not operate to confer any right as against
instance_ .. ,---,-- 191 the successful party in said proceedings... 188
A declaration of itention to become a - A derision of the Department denying a
citizen filed before a clerk of a court in 1868 motion for rehearing does not preclude the
(prior to the revision of the United States General Land Ofice from directing an in-
Statutes) is valid, and qualifies, in the quiry, in the- nature of a new contest be-
niatter of, the person taking such action, as tween the parties, to determine questions
a claimant under the settlement laws- ,, 252 arising since the original hearing -,,,-,,,, 163
An alien who for the last three years of his A second, or second hearing il the same
minority resides in this country is qualified, charge is rarely permitted, but the mere
in the matter of, as a homestead settler, fact tht a charge against an entry has
without previous declaration of intention formed the basis o a contest, which failed
to become a citizen....-.................... 100 forwantof'suficientproof, will not, in itself,
A presumption as to the continuity of precladethe Land Departmentfromfurther
alienage, when once shown, may be over- consideration ofthesame matter,ifthelegal.
come, where no record of naturalization is title to the land still remains in the govern-
found, by a presuniption of, growing out of mnent, and it is made to clearly appear that
L long continued exercise of the rights and adherence to the former finding, or dci-
duties of a citizen; and the son of an alien, sion. will lead to the patenting of public
in such ase, is entitled to the benefit of land in violation of express provisions of
such presumption of citizenship, where no law-....-.....,..... 49
record of the naturalization of the father In proceedings by the government to de-
during the minority of the son can be pro- terminewvbeteraniapplication by an Indian
duced ................... ,,,.,...... 55 to select certain tracts as an allotment shall
Coal Land. be allowed, a stranger to the record, aleg-
The time within which a claim must be ing prior settlement rights, will not be heard
perfected by purchase, where the filing to set up his claim, but must await the dis-
when first offered is properly rejected on position of the pending action .............. 207
account of a defective township plat of Au allegation of failure to comply wit
survey, and is thereafter allowed on the the law doesnot furnish a basis for cancel-
correction of said plat, should be computed lation if not made until after the alleged
fron the date when the corrected plat is default has been cured ,,,,,.,. .,.. 384
filed, and the land opened to disposal ---- 107 In a, brought on a general charge of non-
The possession of a claim by an agent is compliance with law, accompanied by an
the possession of his principal, and all acts offer to pay the expenses of the hearing,
of said agent towards perfecting title will the contestant should be required to pay
inure to the benefit of te principal-.,. 107 all of the costs of the hearing, and on his
Confirmation, falure so to do, the case may thereafter be
treated as between the entryman and theIf a contest against a homestead entry -nment .,,............ ----- 210
fails, and more than two years have elapsed --- 218
since the allowance of the entry, it is con- HOMiESTE AD.
firmed under the proviso to section 7, act Prior to the allosrance of an application
of March 3, 1891, though under the body of to enter, a charge of abandonlmesm t will not
said section the entry is not susceptible of. 239 lie- ..............- . .-........ 19
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In a, against the heirs of a homesteader, iDuress.
olu the ground that they have failed to cons- In determining whether a plea of, is good,
ply with the law, it is essential that the the age and physical condition of the party
death of the entryman should be alleged and setting up such plea may properly be con-
proven - ................... 344 sidered ............................. 616
A leave of absence granted a homesteader
under the act of March 2, 1889, protects the Entry.
entry, as against a charge of abandonment, See Oklahoma Lands.
for the period of six months after the expi- Where by the decision of the General
ration of said leave - .---- 268 Land Office the right to enter a certain tract
is recognized, but no time is fixed in said
TIMBER CULTURE. decision within which such entry shall be
Against an entry, initiated after the pas- made, the right so allowed may e lost if
sage of the act of March 3, 1893, in which not asserted within a reasonable time - 268
the charge is non-compliance with law, pre- Reinstatement of a canceled, will not be
cents no cause of action, in the absence of made, where negligence on the part of the
an allegation of default on the part of the applicant in the assertion of his claim ap-
entryman occurring during the first eight pears, and an adverse ight has intervened. 147
years of the entry. 670 On application for the reinstatement of,
Failure to secure the requisite growth of the applicant should not be heard to say
trees calls for a cancellation of a timber-cul- that lie did not receive proper notice of the
ture entry where the absence of good faith decision holding his entry for cancellation.
in the matter of planting and cultivation is where his failure to be heard on appeal is
apparent ............. - . .... 690 in no way due to the alleged insufficiencyof
such notice-147
Where canceled on account of an adverse
See Contest. claim, when it should have been held intact
The preferred right of a successful, can subject to the perfection of said adverse
not be defeated by an adverse settlement claim, it may be treated, on application for
claim acquired subsequently to the mitts- reinstatement, as though the latter action
tion of the contest ............. . 31 had been taken - 213
The preferred right of entry given to the canceled with the view to allowing the
successful contestant by the act of May 14, entryman to make a second, may be rei.-
1880, can not be held to extend to oe, who, stated, where on account of poverty lie is
under another statutory enactment, is dis- unable to make the second, and his good
qualified and prohibited from entering the faith is manifest . -.. - . 427
land involved . ...........--. 9-.-.-.-.- 34 May be amended to embrace an additional
A successful timber-cultnre, whose suit is adjacent tract that was at the date of the
begun prior to the repeal of the timber-cul- original entry included in the existing entry
ture law, bust not concluded luntil after said of another, where suds amendment corre-
repeal, is not entitled to make a timber-cul- spends with the original settlement claim,
ture entry in the exercise of his preferred and no adverse clain exists -- 69
right, if no application to enter nder said A second, will not be allowed on account
lanw was made by him prior to said repeal. 474 of the worthless character of the land
costs. covered by the first, if slch entry was made
without examination of the land ........... 23
See Practice.
DESERT LAND.
Deputy Mineral Surveyor. The act of August4, 1894, dispensing with
See Land Deiartent. annual expenditure on desert entries for
that year applies to entries existing at theDesert Lauid. time said act took effect, and does not oper-
See Jftrp. ate to revive entries rightfully canceled
The provision in the act of June 11, 1896, prior thereto ........... . 499
that patents for, may issue to the States The act of August 4,1894, relieving desert
when an ample s apply of water is actually entryluen.from.annual expenditure dllring
secured, without regard to settlement and the year of 1894, is applicable to entries
cultivation, is not limited to lands on which made in said year, and prior to the passage
liens have been placed under said act, but of said act; and the year so given should
is applicable to all lands donated by the act be computed from the date of the entry - 298
of August 18, 1894 - 74 The cancellation of a desert land e ntry
Regulations concerning the malting of without due notice of sch action to the
proof for desert lands segregated under see- original eutryman, with opportunity given
tion 4, act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat., him to show cause why such action should
372422), as amended by the act of June 11, not be taken, is unauthorized by law, and
1886 (29 Stat., 434).. . ... 434 an eutiy so canceled prior to the act of
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August 4,1894, must be held in lawan exist- equitably confirmed, i the absence of any
ing entry, and therefore entitled to the adverse claim, where it appears that after
benefit of said act .........-.............. 499 the issuance of final certificate the land was
A desert land filing, made either under conveyed to another for value and witbout
the Lassen county act, or the general act, notice of the defect in the final proof and
and abandoned, exhausts the claimant's subsequent compliance with the law in the
rights under the desert land laws .....-.... 673 matter of cultivation duly appears7 57
Failure to secure the requisite growth of
HOMESTEAD. trees calls for cancellation of an eniry
Rights lawfully acquired by homestead, where the absence of good faith in the mat-
tnder proceedings in the land office author- ter of planting and cultivation is apparent. 690
ized by existing law, may properly be per-
fected. though the law authorizing such Equitable Adjudication.
entry is subsequently repealed ............ 330 Rule 33 cited and applied to a timber-cul-
A homestead entry must be canceled on ture entry where final proof was prema-
due showing of a prior adverse settlement turely submitted - 549
right- 301 Equitable action on homestead entries,
A settler who, under the law as it stood where residence is not established within
at the time of his settlement, had exhausted the prescribed period of six months, is not
his homestead right by a prior entry, is not necessary, if final proof is made within the
entitled to make a second or additional statutory life of the entry, and such proof
under the act of March 2, 1889, where prior shows continuous residence for five years
to the passage of said act and prior to the next preceding the date thereof ............ 687
initiation of a valid settlement claim, the Evidence.
land has been sold by a railroad company Parties protestant, that allege an interest,
as part of its grant, and the right of the and at thehearing assume without objection
purchaser validated by the act of March , thebardenofproof, will not be heard to say,
1887 504 for the irsttimewhenthe case comes before
The right to make a second, under the the Department for disposition, that the
act of December 29, 1894, will not be de- burden of proof was wrongly placed 122
feated by the fact that the entryman sold May be taken by deposition, as provided
the improvements on the land covered by in the rules of practice, in the case of hear-
his first entry, and relinquished his claim ings ordered on protest against a classifica-
thereto, where it appears that, on account tion of lands under the act of February 26,
of a protracted drought, such action was 1895 - 197
made necessary to secure the means of sub- The result of proceedings, in which the
sistence -1 ---------------- 549 parties thereto have had full opportunity to
The right to make a second, under the act present evidence in support of their claims
of December 29,1894, can not be recognized, according to the recognized rules of proce-
where the fi-st entry was abandoned with- dure, should not be disturbed or affected by
out any attempt to raise a crop on the lands the report of a special agent on the entry
embraced therein -............. 23 involved 1........... . . 139
A\ homesteader who enters one hundred Fees.
and twenty acres, and contests an, embrac- School indemnity selections filed on be
ing an adjacent forty acre tract, may, in the half of the Territory of Oklahoma, under
event of success, be permitted to 0 amend section 4, act of January 18, 1897, should not
as to include said forty acres, where by suds be approved until payment of the fees pro-
action lie secures the land originally in- vided for in section 2238 of the Revised
tended to be entered ...... ........ 661 Statutes- ..-.. ....... 536
TIMBER CILTURE. Circular of April 22,1898, in relationto fees.
Is subject to devise by will, and on due for reducing testimony to writing, &C 657
compliance with law the devisee is entitled Fililg.
to submit final proof and perfect the entry- 690 See Pi-eemnption.
A successful timber culture contestant Rights under a preemption, are forfeited
whose suit is begun prior to the repeal of by long-coltinued failure to assert the same
the timber culture law, but not concluded in the manner provided by law- 252
until after said repeal, is not entitled to The completion of a preemption entry for
make a timber culture, in the exercise of part of the land embraced within a declara-
his preferred right, if no application to tory statement is an abandonment of the
enter under said law was made by him prior filing as to the land not entered - 879
to said repeal- - --....-.-.- 474 By the express terms of section 14, act of
Allowed prior to the expiration of the September4,1841, faihlre to make final proof
statutory period of cultivation, may be and payment under a preemption, for unof-
For the word Territories," in the second line from the bottom of page 57, read corporations.
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fered land prior to the day fixed for the sale On the death of a homesteader, leaving a
thereof, operates to extinguish all rights widow and heirs, the widow takes the home-
tnder said -680 stead right of her husband free from ay
rillial Proof. claim on behalf of the heirs, and is vested
One vho slbits, uinder rule 3 of pram with full power to complete the entry for
tice, during the pendency of a contest in- her own benefit, or reliquish the se if
volviug an adverse settlemtent caim, mu--st she so elects 436stan or falvonrthe stlewinths cimae s The right of an alien heir to perfect a
stand or fall en the showing thus usade as homestead entry, where the etryman dlies
to compliance with law during the period without having earned title to the land in-
covered thereby-1 votved, isn pr ed under tela that
Notice of intention to submit, usust be voed, is not protected under a treaty tat
published in a reputable newspaper having makes provision for the protection of alien
a general circulation191 heirs on the death of a person "holding
Instructions as to the manner in which real property ......... -117.. .... 3
payment may be made and final receipt If a man and woman inake entry of adij-
cent tracts and thereafter marry, and main-issued on the submission of, under entries
made within the formerly recognized limits tain esidence hina lims the le idec e of
of the Northern Pacific east of Duluth 488
A homesteader who is unable, through donwife must be ae o her av e b en han-
poverty and sickness, to submit formal, or doed from th edate bs ently dies, the
to execute his final affidavit in the land dis- if thu ufaud sbsequheryries tewidow, without forfeiting her right to per-trict where the land is situated, may be feet her husbands claim, may resume ream-
permnitted to file sch affidavit, made before deuce en her own land, in the absence of
a judge or clerk ofa court of record, with a
view to the issuance of final certificate and any itervening adverse right, and perfect
equitable action thereon, it appearing from title thereto- 194
the evidence in a contest against said entry, ACT OF JUNE 15, 1880.
and otherwise, that he has in fact earned a The right of purchase under section 2, on
patent to the land- 661 behalf of a etryman, who after the pas-
sage of said act and prior to his applicationForest Lands. for the exercise of said right, had sold the
Sec Roereatien. land to another, can not be recognized, nor
Gradiluiation Entry. is the case of John D. Hay, 1 1. D., 74,
Invalid on account of the failure of the authority therefor .......................... 239
local office to collect the full price of the ADDITIONAL.
lands covered thereby, confirmed, if other- The right to make an additional home-
wise regular, by the act tof January 18. 1898- 187 stead entry under section 6, act of March 2,
Houllestead. 1889, can only be exercised by one who has
See Otlelkoea Leads; made his final proof, and received the re-
ENIIALLY. ceiver's final receipt for the land embraced
GEHS'ERALLY. in ils original entry ............... ...... 604
land in the actual occupancy of ton-site The eight to make, under the act of Feb-
settlers is not open to settlement and entry muary 10, 1894, can not be exercised by one
under the homestead law -. .. 393,444 whose claim to the land embraced in his
The disqualification resulting from the original entry was initiated after the pas-
ow-nership of other lands is general, with no sage of said act --------- .. 190
exception as to the ownership of arid lands, ADJOINING FARM.
and operative without respect to the manner
in which title to the land is obtained 61 An application to change a homestead en-
Land more valuable on account of the try for oe hundred and sixty acres into an
sandstone therein than for ariculture is adjoining farm entry, may be allowed on
mineral in character, subject to disposition relinquishment of one subdivision embracem
uder the mining laws, d a homestead in the original entry, and the purchase of a
entry thereof is unauthorized bylaw 373 tract adjacent to the remainder, ad due
A n entry made for the purpose of secur- showing of residence on the deeded land 618
ing the timber on the land covered thereby, COMIuTED
and not for the purpose of obtaining a An entry prematurely cosimuted is con-
home, must be canceled . , 151 firmsed under the subsequent act of Jule ,
Onl the death of a homesteader, leaving 1896, in the absence of any adverse claim
minor heirs, the wife having previously arising prior to final proof, and where it ap-
died, such minors are entitled to patent on pears that the entrymsan actually resided on.
due proofofcompliamcenithl on thepart the and for six months prior to commuta-
of the entrymaon up to the time of his de- tion, and in good faith made his final proof. 561
-cease, the firt of minority at sllch tinie, and Circular of July 9, 1896, as to commuta-
the death. of both parents .................. 259 tion of, under act of Julie 3, 1896 .......... 544
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SOLDIERS. The provisions of the act of June 7,1897,
The failure to file a 'non-sooner" affida- relative to leases of Indian lands, are appli
vit, with a soldier's declaratory statement, cable only to allotments made under the act
snaybe subsequently remedied, eventhough of February 8, 1887, or other acts of Con-
an intervening adverse claim to the land gress, where the title in fee has not passed
may be asserted- .............. 54 to the allottee, and do not include a lease
A soldier's declaratory statement does not executed by the heirs of au Indian patentee
operate to protect a prior settlement claim to whom title has passed in accordancewith
of the soldier to the lan( embraced within treaty provisions- . . 45
said filing ...... -......... 1...... 39 In the issuance of patents on Chippewa
SOLDIER'S ADDITIONAL. Indian allotments the reservation of the
Where a certificate of a soldier's right Ia right of the United States to reservoir sites,
been located by an assignee, and the Iaa- as provided by act of June 7, 1897, should
tion canceled in part, and patent issued for only be inserted in patents which cover
the remainder, the assignee is entitled to a lands included in the list of reservoir lands
recertification, under the act of August 18, furnished by the Secretary of War -- t 116
1894, of the additional right for the number In the issuance of patents to the Indian
of acres not secured under the original cr- alottees of lauds in the Southern Ute Reser-
tificate ........ -... 192 vation, ver which the Denver and Rio
On appica~tion far the recertification of a Grande railroad has been constructed a
right, for the benefit of an assignee uder clause should be inserted setting forth that
the alct of August 18, 1894, and the regula- the conveyance is made subject to the right
tions thereunder, the applicant should be of way granted to said road by the special
required to make such a showing of the act of June 8, 1872 ........................ 77
facts and circumstances attendant upon the Lands within thelimits of the Great Sioux
transfer of the soldier's right, and appli- Reservation, restored to the public domain
cant's alleged ownership thereof, as will es- by the act of March 2, 1889, are subject to
tablish the fact that said applicant is a bone disposition only under the homestead law
fide purchaser for valie of said right- 55S for the benefit of the Indians ........... ... 347
C , In the commutation of homestead entries
Indentity. in the former Sisseton and Yankton reser-
See Railroad Giant; School Laad. vations the entrymen are not required to
linidiaia Lands. pay one dollar ad twenty-five cents per
It is no ebjercion to the approval of an acre in addition to the price fixed by the
Indian deed that a certified copy thereof acts of March 3, 1891, and August 15, 1894,
is presented for action, if the loss of the opening said lands to entry . - . 222
original is shown, or the custodian thereof runder the provisions of the act of Maceh
refuses to part with its immediate posses- 8, 1875, and the general allotment act, tie
sion ...... 2.......... .............. 5 right of an Indian to an allotment of tribal
The approval of an Idian deed, in the lands is not lost by abandonment of the
absence of an intervening adverse right, tribal relation - ---------------- :71
relates back to the date of said ded, and By the act of June 7, 1897, children of an
gives effect thereto from the time of its exe- Indian woman by blood, wYho at the time of
cution -. . 25 her death was recognized as a member of
Where, prior tothe approval of an Indian an Indian tribe, are placed on the sasne foot-
deed, a conveyance adverse thereto is made, ing as to rights in the property of such
aud approval thereof secured (in the ground tribe as the other usembers thereof; but the
that such action would serve to protect par- children of one who is thus protected are
ties holding under the first deed, the Secre- not entitled to allotments if the parent,
tary of theIriteriormay approve saidinstru- prior to their birth, abandons the tribal
sent, leaving the parties claiming there- relation .....i.s  71
under to assert their rights in the courts... 25 Tnder a pre-emption filing for MKille Lac
On application for the approval of deeds lands protected by the second proviso to
executed by alleged Indian heirs, proof of section 6, act of January 14, 1889, wherein
such heirship, and of the possessory right the right to inake final proof bad been ss-
of the parties claiming under said convey- pended by the act of July 4, 1884, it is in-
ances to the land involved, should be duly cumbent upon the pre-emptor, during such
furnished before favorable action is war- period of suspension, to maintain his pos-
ranted -1 563 sessory right by such acts as will negative
- Under a patent for, that contains a provi- an inference of abandonment, if the rights
sion, authorized by treaty, that the lands so of an intervening adverse clainsant are in-
conveyed shall not be alienated or leased volved - , . 19
without the consent of the President, a A homestead entry of Mille Lac lands,
lease is ineffective until approved by the made after the receipt at the local office of
President --- ...-.-.-. 44 the departmental ruling of April 22,18921 and
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hence not confirmed by the joint resolution Island.
of December 19, 1893, may be submitted for See SiCove.
equitable action. after final proof, it appear-
ing that the clain of the entryinan was ini- Isolated Tract.
tiated andimaintained i good faith by settle- The proviso added to section 2455, R. S.,
ment and otherwise at a time when the lands -by the amendatory act of February 26,1ti5,
were open to homestead entry and no ad- defining the conditions under which a tract
verse laim ae exists- -a... .... .t619 of land may be treated as isolated contem-
Tise right to inako a second homestead plates that the tract involved must have
entry accorded by the third proviso to see- been subject to the application of any quali-
tion 6. act of January 14, 1889, extends only tied person under the homestead law during
to persons whose first entry was made prior the period specified in said act ............. 607
to said act. ...... 647 A tract of land is not " subject to home-
There is no provision made in the act of stead entry " within the meaning of the act
January 14. 189, whereby an allotment of of February 26, 1895, defining the period
lands, within the ceded portion of the Red that must elapse prior to treating a tract
Lake Indian Reservation i Minnesota, canbe alo-e, evn thugh he e .aiant ay~ as isolated, while covered by an unexpiredbe allowed even though the claimant may preemption filing, or embraced within a
have mrade inprovensents on said lands priorrhomestead entry ----------- 676
to the passage of said act ............- . 275 The action of the Commissioner of the
Settlement on Red Lake opened to entry Geiieral Land Office in ordering into mar-
under the act of January 14, 1889, prior to ket a tract for disposition under section
the time fixed therefor, does not-under tho e rc o ipsto ne eto
terms of said statute or the regulations is- 2455, R. S., is subject to revision by the De-terms osadsaueotiergltsS- partment on appeal ....................... 676
sued thereunder, operate to disqualify the Section 2455, R. S.. as amended by the act
settler -------------------------- .......... 665 of February 26, 1895, operates to reduce the
Prior to the act of January 14, 1889, the minimum price of isolated and disconnected
lands embraced in the ceded portion of the tracts in alternate reserved sections within
Red Lake Reservation were appropriated to the limits of a railroad grant from two dol-
use as an Indian reservation, andwere there- lars and fifty cents to one dollar and twenty-
fore not subject to allotment under section 4, five cents per acre 699
act of February 8, 1887; and the special pro-
visions for the disposal of said lands made Judgminent.
by the act of 1889 take them out of the class of See Castcellatioi.
lands open to allotment under said section. . 275
No part of the Colville Indian Reservation Jurisdiction.
restored to the public domain by the act of rnder a local statute that suspends civil
July 1, 1892, should be opened to settlement rights during the term of a sentence of im-
and entry prior to the survey of the entire prisonuent, a decision of the General Land
tract, unless the Indians choose to take their Office is not ineffective for the reason that
allotments prior to the completion of the the party adversely affected thereby had
survey; but if they do so elect, then all the been convicted and was imprisoned at the
lands so restored to te public domain may time the judgment of the local office vas
be opened to settlement. though a portion of rendered ---------------- ........ . .30
them usay be unsurveyed -------- ----- -197 Issuance of notice on a second contest,
The preferred right to purchase the ual- during the period allowed for filing a me-
lotted Pottawatonie lands, conferred by the tion for the review of a departmental dcci-
treaty of February 27,1867, upon the Atchi- sin in a prior case, will not defeat the ju-
son, Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. o. is not risdiction of the local office, where said no-
defeated by failure to make payment for a tice is not served until after the expiration
tract of sch land within the period speci- f said period, and no motion for review is
fled in said treaty, where said tract was un- filed - 70
surveyed and hence could not be conveyed The supervisory authority of the Scre-
- by the government; and the said company tary may be exercised on behalf of a party
having attempted to convey such a tract, whose rights have been denied in a decision
may, forthe benefit of its transferee, perfect that has become final under the rules of
title thereto by making the proper payment practice, but has been overruled in subse-
therefor-245 quent cases involving the same question . 177
The status of the Seminole Indians, as The Secretary of the Interior, in the
occupants of public lands in the State of proper exercise of his supervisory anther-
Florida, is too indefinite in character to re- ity, may vacate a decision of the General
ceive recognition in patents issuedunder the Land Office and direct a reconsideration of
swamip grant-. -......... ....... 117 the case by said office, even though no ap-
Instructions anlutd Circulars. peal may have been taken from its decision
See Tables of, page xx. therein ...............-.... -----....-- 45
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Land Departiment. Itlining Clain.
A statute that provides for action on the Paragraph 53 of Mining Regulations
part of the Secretary of the Interior after amended ......... ....... .. 378
allowing opportunity for all parties in inter. A application for mineral patent should
est to be heard before him," does not re- not be allowed for land embraced within the
quire such officer to personally hear the prior pending application of another - 81
witnesses testify and listen to oral argu- In the selection of a newspaper for the
ments, if all parties have notice, and are publication of notice of a mineral applica-
permitted to submit evidence and written tion a reasonable discretion may be exer-
arguments that are considered by him. x. 280 dlsed by the register in determining what
A deputy United States mineral surveyor is a newspaper, and u-hich of several papers
is within the inteudinenstof section 452 R. S., is the one published nearest to the claim,
and consequently disqualified, under the having in view the purpose of the statute
prohibitive provisions thereof, from acquir- in requiring publication ------------------ 145
ing title to a mining claim in which he was Compliance with local laws ad regula-
interested at the time of his official report tions in the location of mining claims, in
thereon, and at the date of application for the matter of posting notices thereon, will
patent .-. -............... .... . 122 be presumed, in the absence of any showing
Hlill Site. that such question is of iaterial importancein the case ................... . 541
See Mining Claim. An applicant for the right of mineral
entry, who expressly excludes from notice
Mineral Lant~d. of his application stated areas, is not euti-
The fact that as between a mineral claim- tied thereafter to make entry of such ex-
ant and one claiming under the settlement cluded ground without due notice of such
law's the settler is estopped by his own acts intention ...... 198
from denying the mineral character of the A lode location based on a discovery on
land, does not relieve the Department from one side of an intersecting nill site is not
the duty of determining the actual charac- good as to the ground on the other side of
ter of the land in dispute- 10 said mill site, and wn entry of such ground
Land must be held non-mineral where no is therefore invalid .6.. 675
discoveries of appreciable value have been For the purposes of exploration, discov-
made, and it does not appear that a further ery, and purchase, the legal apex of a vein
expenditure would develop the presence of that dips out of ground disposed of under
mineral in paying quantities -lit . 100 the placer or non-mineral laws, is that por-
The fact that a placer claimant has con- tion of the vein within the public lands
ducted profitable mining operations upon a which would constitute its actual apex, if
part of his claim does not, in itself, give him the vein had no actual existence in the
any right as against an adverse homestead ground so disposed of - ................ 198
claimant for another part of such claim, A protestant, who fails to adverse an ap-
lying in a different quarter section, and that plication for a lode patent, will not there-
had been prior thereto adjudged non-mineral after be heard on a charge that the claimed
in a departmental decision ................ 216 discovery of the lode applicant is in fact on
Land more valuable on account of the land appropriatedby the priorlocationofthe
sandstone therein than for agriculture is protestant, or that the labor and inuprove-
mineral in character, subject to disposition ments shown by said applicant should be
under the mining laws, and a homestead credited to the protestant.... ............ 580
entry thereof is unauthorized by law - 373 An order for a hearing limited to a charge
Lands valuable for deposits of phosphates that the entryman had failed to expend the
are mineral lands within the intent and statutory sum for labor and improvements
meaning of the laws relating to the disposal prior to the expiration of the period of
of the public domain ....................... 600 publication, is in effect an adjudication that
- The act of Februiary26, 1895, does not con- the fact that the entryman had failed to
template the classification of even sections, file the surveyor-general's certificate, as
and the character of said sections is only to such expenditure, during said period, is
considered where the mineral or non-mineral immaterial, where the failure to thus file
character of the odd sections cannot be such certificate is admitted by the entry-
otherwise satisfactorily ascertained .. . 684 man, and the effect of such failure is brought
In classifying unsurveyed lands under in question bythe adverse parties ......... 122
the act of February 26, 1895, where the The statutory expenditure required to be
entire area of the tract, as designated by shown by section 225, R. S., contemplates
natural or artificial boundaries, is of the that five hundred dollars' worth of labor
same character, the classification should be shall have been expended, or improvements
made without reference to the particular tothesamevale made, for the development
Section ............-......... 423 of the mining claim ............... ..... 122
12209-vot 26-46
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Annual expenditure is not required npon Cluded rolu said application, or confer any
a mining claim after entry thereof ... 196 right thereto in SulCh ad vet se clamant- 198
On a showing made of an expenditure for Action on an aplication for the reinstate-
the common benefit of several locations, em- ment of a canceled mineral entry should be
braced in one application, the Department suspended. where the applicant haa dled an
will not undertake to determine whether adverse claim against the application of a
such plan of development will'be effective or relocator for the land covered by said entry,
not, if it appears that the expenditure is and suit on said claim is pending in a conrt
made in good faith, and for the purpose al- ofcompetent j risdiction .. ............... 608
leged1 ...... 4.......... 5 0 A lode location subsequent to, and in con-
A protest filed as thebasis foradverse pro- flict with, a placer location, bt made prior
ceedings may be properly rejected s in- to application for placer patent, does mot,
sufficient if it fails to ' show the nature, when based alone on a discovery outside the
boundaries, and extent" of theadverseclaim limits of the placer claim, and it one side
in accordance with the requirements of par- thereof only, establish the fact that the
agraphs 83 and 84 of the Mining Regnla- lode or vein thus claimed was known to ex-
tions -- 530 ist within the boundaries of said placer at
The Department may properly direct a the date of application for patent thereto 622
stay of action, under an application for min- The burden of proof is with a lode claim-
eral patent, during the pendency of judicial ant who assails apicer patent on thieground
proceedings, even though said proceedings that it embraces lodes or veins known to ex-
are based upon a protest that does not re- ist at date of application for such patent,
quire an adverse suit under the statute, if and avers that such lodes or veins were con-
suoh stay of action is in aid of a proper dis- sequently excepted from the operation of
position of said protest by the Department- 220 the patent-. . 622
A protest against a mineral application The protest of a lode claimant against a
will not be entertained during the pendency placer entry on the ground that said entry
of adverseojudicialproceedings instituted by embraces lodes or veins known to exist at
the protestant and others; and this rule is the date of the placer application, presents
especially applicable to a case where the no question for departmentat determinatiom,
matters alleged in the protest may be made where it appears that the protestant did not
the subject of legitimate inquiry in the adverse said application, and that said ap-
pending adverse proceedings- 348 plication did not include any lodes or veins,
In the case of a common conflict between for, under the terms of the statute, alllodes
several, a relinquislmment or exclusion by or veins known to exist at date of placer ap-
the applicant for patent, ill favor of one a-ho plication, and not applied for at that time
did not adverse the application, is of no by the placer applicant, are excepted flom
effect, as against another adverse claimant the placer patent, and such exception is ex-
who, prior thereto, has prosecuted his ad- pressly recognized in the language of the
verse claim to a favorable judgment - 198 patent; nor does a protest in sueh a case
Where adverse proceedings involving a call for a deteremination as to the extent of
common conflict are filed and prosecuted, lie surface area that will be so excepted
that fact necessarily appears of record, and from said patent7 ........... 1.............. 573
the parties in interest are charged with In the case of proceedings had on a pro-
notice thereof. It is then incumbent upon test against a mineral application, where
each adverse claimant to take such action the protestants, as shown by the record, are
as will determine his right, not only as without interest, and hence not entitled to
against the applicant for patent, but also as be heard as appellants, the Department nay
against the other adverse claimants. rmtili pi-operly, by smnary order, direct te
this is done the stay of proceedings con- General Land Oflice to forward the record,
manded by section 2126, P. S., is not relieved, without awaiting the regular course by ar-
and the "controversy " is not "settled or peal, from the decisions below, where such
decided by a court of competent jurisdic- action seems necessary to the termination
tion- ..-......... ........ 198 of vexatious litigation-. ................... 122
Notices of application for patent which Parties protestant, that allege an interest,
exclude stated areas without waiver of and at the hearing assume witihont objec-
rights," do not require the filing and prose- tion the burden of proof, will not be heard
cation of adverse claims to the areas thus to say, for the first time when the case
excluded; and the fact that no adverse comes before the Departuent for disposi-
claims are filed in such a case does not war- tion, that the burden of proof eas wrongly
rant the incinsion of said excluded areas in placed e them- . . 122
the entry .....-..-.. ........ ...... 198 The result of proceedings aglhslt a min-
An adverse claim filed and prosecuted suC- eral entry, in whiceh the parties thereto
cessfully against a mineral application can have bad full opportunity to present evi.
leave no effect as to the areas expressly ex- deuce in support of their claims according
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to therecogilized rules of procedure, should thereon, and at the date of application for
not be disturbed or affected by the report of patent .. :122
a special agent on the entry involved - 123 In case of an order made for an amended
On appeal from a decision refusing to survey of a mining clamsthere is noiauthor-
entertain a protest against a mineral entry, ity for requiring the deputy mineral sr-
the appellant isnotrequired to serve notice veyor to execute such survey without
of the appeal on the entrymian 196 further compensation . . 575
The issuance of to vlsite patent for landA mineral entry canceled, for failure to known at the date of the townsite entry to
comply with spplenetal requirements, cntn avohuate ode os nt ps
should not be reinstated on the ground that title to such claim, lit leaves it to the
such action was taken without notice, if in Umlted States, subject to te jurisdiction
fact the entryian hadl actual knowledge of ted epartment - i44
thereof; nor should an order of reinstate- of the lInd department - 144
ment be made, in te presence of an inter- PLACER.
vening adverse claim, without opportunity A patent for a placer should describe aith
given to such claimant to show cause why mnatheimatical ccuracy the land intended to
the application for reinstatement should be conveyed thereby; and where such a
not be allowed- - 262 degree of accuracy cannot be obtained
W1rhere, by an order of the General Land nder an application that embraces lanids
Office, an amended survey of a, is required theretofore surveyed and retiiriied in irreg-
within a specified period, the entry should ular subdivisions is "lots," an additional
miot be canceled prior to a report from the survey will be required .1 50
surveyor-general's office; and an entry so MILL SITE.
canceled must be reinstated, if it subse- A mill site etry, allowed without publi-
quently appears that the mineral applicant cation of notice of application, may be prop-
had i fact, in due time, applied for and erly regarded as a nullity, in the disposi-
obtained froui the surveyor-geieral an tion of a protest subsequently filed alleging
order for said survey -643 the mineral character of the land covered
Rights under the amended location an- by said emtry ......... . ..... 66
thorized by the Colorado statutes depend Nattralization.
upon the locator's ownership of the original See Citizenship.
location, ad if at te time of soch amended A declaration of intention to become a
location the original is owned, wholly or citizen filed before aL clerk of court in 1868
in part. by others, their title will not be (prior to the revision of the United States
divested by the amended location - 484 Statutes) is valid 252
A mineral entry allowed on insufficient The minor child of an alien, who, during
showiig of title in the applicant is properly the minority of such child declares his in-
held for canceltatioi by the General Land tentien to become citizen, bt does not
Office; but where the applicant after such conplete his, before the child attains his
decision otains by proper conveyances a majority, or thereafter, occupies under the
complete chain of title, aid nakes a show- homestead lav the statos of oe wsho has
ig thereof before the Departmet which is filed his declaration of intention to become
satisfactory, as between him mnd the gov- a citizen - 301
ernment, the entry may stand and patent Notice.
issue thereon - 484 See Practice.
A transferee of a mining claim, whose
interest is acquired during the pendency of Oklahoma Lands.
the departmental proceedings involving the The privilege of making a homestead
status of said claim, takes no right better entry, without regard to the ownership of
than that possessed by his grantor - 122 other land, was not one of the rights of sol-
The fact that i deputy mineral surveyor fiers and sailors dedied and described in
is disqualified to report tpon the expendi- sections 2104 and 21105, R S., hence the subse-
tures made on milling laim, by reason of quent legislation making the ownership of
his interest in the claim at such te, does other lands a general disqualification does
not operate to impeach the certificate of the mot abridge any right conferred by said
surveyor-generalbased on said report, if the sections - 61
facts as to such expenditures are correctly The right to make additional homestead
stated in said report 123 entrv under the act of Febtuary 10, 1894,
A deputy United States mineral surveyor can not be exercised by one whose claim to
is withintheintendmentof sectiou452R. S., the land eombaced i his original entry was
and consequently disqualified, under the iniliated after the passage of said act 190
prohibitive provisions thereof, from acqnir- The failure to flea nom-sooner" affidavit,
ing title to a mining claim in which he was with I soldier's declaratory statement, may
interested at the ticie of his official report be subsequently reiiiedied, even though ai
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intervening adverse claim to the land may By the provisions of section 2449, R. S., the
be asserted- - .5...............4... . 5 certification ofaStateselection,madeuider
The limitation by section 20. act of May 2, the act of Jue 16, 1880, of lan d embraced
1890, of the right of homestead entry in within the bosna ide settlement claim of a
Oklahoma to persons who are not "seized qualified homesteader at the date of such
in fee siuple of one hundred and sixty acres selection, is wholly inoperative, and does
of land in any State or Territory" does not not divest the Department of its jrisdic-
operate to disqualify an applicant for such tion over the land ------------- 629
right vho may at such time own a less An application for suit to set aside a pat-.
auount, though the land thus held may ent, based on a charge of fraud in securing
have been taken as a technical "quarter theenitry, -illuotbe entertainedAwheresaid
section" - 209--------- -. 369 charge was fully considered by the Depart-
Presence within the Territory, during the mont prior to the issuance of patent, and
prohibited period, by which all advantage the alleged facts on which said charge was
over others is gained, operates to disqualify made were found not to exist1 .............. 330
a claimant for land in said Territory - 393 Suit to vacate a patent will not be advised
in determining the qualifications of an on the request of a party, where it does not
applicant for the right to enter lands oh- appear that the government is nder any
tained frons the Seminoles and Creek or obligation to him to take such action or
MInscogee Indians, as provided for in the that any rights, legal or equitable, of the
first proviso to section 13, act of March 2, applicant have been prejudiced i the dis-
1089, the status of the applicant at the date position of the land ........................ 330
of his application m11ust control; and if lie A patent will not be set aside by the courts
has at such time attempted, bt for any on he around of fraud in its issuance, if by
cause failed, to secure title in fee to a ho sellch fraud the entry is only voidable, not
stead under existing lawor shall have made void, and the land so patented has been sold
entry under the commutation provision of to liocentpurcllasers without notice of ally
the homestead law, he is qualified to make defect in the title of the patentee - 330
entry under the provisions of said section - 448 Payment.
Commutation of homesteads under act of The failure of a receiver to account to the
April 11, 1898; circular instructions with government for the purchase price of land
copy of act ......-... ... ... 567 paid at the time of final proof will not de-
Patent. feat the right of the entryman to receive
The inadvertent certification of a State patent without further ................. . 596
selection at a time when the land covered Practice.
thereby is included within an existing entry, See Rules of, Cited and Construed, page
made prior to the selection, is inoperative, xxIv.
and constitutes no bar to the issuance of APPEAL.
patent on said entry- ---------------------- 239 In case of, from a decision refusing to en-
If a homesteader dies prior to compliance tertain a protest against a mineral entry,
with the requirements of the law, and the the appellant is not required to serve notice
submission of final proof, and his widow of the appeal on the entryman ............. 196
thereafter submits final prof, the patent Under a rule to show cause why an entry
should issue in her name; and a patent in should not be canceled the entrynan may
such case issued in the name of the home- either comply with the order or stand on
steader is in violation of law, and no bar to the record and appeal to the Department... 51
the correction of the final certificate and the COSTS.
issoance of patent thereon in the name of Ill a hearing ordered between a railroad
the widowo---------------- 242 company and one alleging the land in ques-
The certification of lands as sclmoolindem- tion to have been excepted from the grant,
nity, wheresaid lands aresubject todisposal are propesly taxable under rule 55 of prac-
only under the act of March 2, 1889, is wholly lice - - . -. 57
inoperative .............. 1...... 347 In a contest brought on a general charge
Where issued under a grant of land, made of non-compliance with law, accomupanied by
by a treaty in which no provision appears an offer to pay the expenses of the hearing,
for theissumce of a thefact of the grantees' the contestant should be required to pay all
death prior to such issuance is immaterial, of the .-.. : .......... I210
for if title under said grant did not pass A party who files a protest alleging
without patent, then the issuance thereof grounds sufficient to warrant the cancella-
was in pursuance of law in the meaning of tion of the entry, if proven, and offers to pay
section 2448 I. S., and the title, under the "the expenses of the contest," is properly
provisions of said section, vested in the taxable with all the costs as a contestant,
heirs, devisees, or assignees of the deceased under rule 54 of practice; and if after a
patentee as if the patent had issued in his successful termination of suds suit and
lifetime ..................... .... 562 the exercise of the preferred right by the
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contestant, a rehearing is ordered Ol the The remedy of a party who is not ready
original issue the obligation to pay the costs for trial is by way of otion for continu-
thereof rests with the contestaat -......... 384 ance, and not by application for, filed after
The rule observed in apportioning costs of default and judgment ...... 8... ..... .. 341
talking testimony in contests arising under REVIEW.
rule 5 of practice should be followed i 
hearings ordered on special agents' repor ts 519 The Secretary of the Intelrior may, i the
HEARING drdospilaexercise of his supervisory authority, byREARING . due order, uake a petition fr re-review, act
The Department will not interfere with as a supersedeas, but il the absenceof sich.
the exercise of the Commissioner's discre-
tion in the matter of orlering, if an abuseof order LaOld ne.e sorca.d. . . 441
such discretion is not ehown ............... 6 A motion for, of a Commissioner's decision 
A statute that provides for action on the that adversely affects both parties to the
part of the Sectetary ef tho Intoerr after litigation, filed intstie by one of said parties,
allowing opportunity for all parties in inter- operates to suspend all action under said
est to be heard before him," does not require decision until the disposition of said motion,
such officer to personally hear the witnesses and-diaring such period of suspension
testify and listen to oral arguments, if all neither of the parties is required to ap-
parties have notice and are permitted to peal .1.9........ 639
submit evidence and written arguments There is no authority for te review of an
that are considered by him -............ .... 280 order of the Secretary dirceting a hearing;
NOTICE. if a revocation of sch order is sought, an
Rules'l, 14,and 17 aniended .- . 710 application lierefir must be addressed to
Rule 60 requires contestants to serve the supervisory authoritv of the Secretary. 104
their own notices, and one who fails to There is no authority in the rulesof prac-
comply with this requirenseut vill smot be - tire for the review of a decision ordering a
heard to complain if Iis application fo a hearing; and treating such a motion as a
hearing is disnmissed ................. . 286 petition addressed to thesupervisory power
When notice of a decision i served on of the Secretary, it will be denied, if it pre-
counsel resident i Washington the rule sents no question that was not fully consid-
does not require a copy of said decision to ered i the decision ordering the hearing-. 377be served 1... . . ..... .348
Prior to the reconsideration of final de- Pre-emnption.
partmental action, due, hould be given all Therightto transmute apreenmption claim
parties adversely affected thereby, and in- to a homestead entry can imot be recognized,
terveming lainmants called uon to slio 'Where the applicant has perfected title to
cause why their entries should stand ..-. 143 one hundred and sixty acres under the
Of a motion for review, and oral hearing homestead law, aid his pe-emption claim
thereon, may be given to an attorney of was not initiated until after the passage of
record representing a party before the De- the act of March 2,1889 . . 267
partusetat, and mwhen so given is as flly A successful contestant who secures the
conclusive upon such party as thoilgla cancellation of au entry on a contest begun
served upon hins personally - .ll prior to the repeal of the preemption law,
The assignee of a desert entrynan is not but not concluded until thereafter, acquires
entitled to notice of action, on the part of therebyno rightof entrynnderthepre-emnp-
the government, adverse to his interests, if tion laxv, if, prior to said repeal, he had not
he Ias not prior to such time filed evidence initiated a valid settlensent claim to the
of the assignsent . 499 land ivolved ... .1. 433
Of cancellation to te successful contest- Price of Lan4d
ant in such case, by registered letter, is et See Putlic Leaod.
efiective if it fails to reach said contestant,
and such failure is not due to any negli- Private Claim.
gence on his part . - . 1 In the adjustment of the interests of the
REHEAR ING. governsimeut in a confirmed, where apotion
.. e S Lretary of.the Interior ill .ay, ill the of said lsims l i s been relinquished andThe Secretary of the Interior uslay, inl the other land taces in lieu thereof; the bound-
exercise of his supervisory authority, by ary lines of said grant, as judicially
due order, make a notion icr, filed ot of prove hi t aldcree of ciatisin,
time, act as a persedeas. but in the ab- proued the ial decree of cofirmation,
senc of ued lderit souldnot e so should be recognized as determining thesence of such or er, it hould not e so
treated in the General Land Office .441 true extent of the grant, as between the
A motion for, on the ground. of newly grantee and the government .- 576
discovered evidence, will not be granted if Public Land.
it does not appear therefrom that said evi- See Isolated Tm-act.
dence is of such character as to necessarily In the conimutation of homestead entries
modify the former conclusion ... . 441 in the former Sisseton and Yankton reser-
7 26 INDEX.
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vatious the etrymen are not required to ! timle was given by the act of Jane 22, 1874,
pay one dollar and twenty-five cents per operate as a revocation of the grant to the
acre in addition to the price fixed by the I extent of the ights of actual settlers at the
acts of March 3, 1891, and August 15, 1894, date of said act; and such revocation is
opening said lands to entry -. . 222 operative though the lands may have been
A decision of the Supreme Court of the patented under the grant. (St. i', M. & M.
United States that annuls a patentfor lands y... . 226
issued to a railroad company, and restores The act of larch 1,1877, of th e State leg-
the title to the government, renders such islature of Minnesota conteinplated in the
lands subject to settlement, in the absence asise of the fiords "legal and fll title,' a
of ally prohibition; but i such case it is perfect or complete title which could not be
competent for the Land Department to de- successfully assailed; hence a conveyance
termite when said lands shall be opened to I of lands by the State to the company ill
entry, and snake due provision therefor... 350 excess of te amount to whlicla the company
A decision of the Departineat directing was then entitled, and prior to the passage
that a tract of land, thathadbeen embraced of said act, is no bar to the State's recol-
in a railroad indemunity selection, should he v oeyance to the United States of a tract em-
held "subject to entry by the first legal ap- braced therein for the benefit of a settler as
plicant" operates to restore ch tract to provided by said act . 582
the public domain as effectually as though LANDS ExCEPTED.
restored to settlement and entry .. 63 The withdrawal made on behalf of the
Railroad Grant. wagon road grant of July 5, 1806, operates
See Railroad Lands; Won Road Grat. to except the lands so reserved from the
attachment of rights on definite location of
GENErtALLY. the Oregon and California road under the
In classifying ainsurveyed lands suder I rant of July 25, 1866 . 688
the act of February 26, 1895, where le 'The grant to the Oregon Central by the
entire area of the tract as designated by let of May 4, 1870, isin the nature of a float,
natural or artificial boundaries, is of the ! and does not take effect upon specific tracts -
same character, the classification should be until lefinite location; and a homestead
made without reference to the particular entry made prior to such location excepts
section. (iorthern Pac.) -. 423 the land covered thereby from the operation
A railroad company is not entitled to the of the grant although no exception is made
benefit of too locations of the same portion therein of lands thus appropriated 592
-of its road, and where the linits of the grait ; Lands in the Bitter floot Valley above the
have been readjusted under an amended Loo-Lo Fork, icluded in the reservation
Jocation, and the changed linits have been made by the treaty of 1855, and surveyed
recognized by the conipany and the go- nuder section 2, act of June 5, 1872, are ex-
ernent, it must be held, as to the portion F cepted from the grant to the Northern
of the road so changed, that the right of the Pacific .-. 43
company attached as of the filing of the Latids embraced within homestead en-
amendedlocation ........... . . 593 tries or pre etuption filings at the date of a,
An assignee of anl allege settler at the or at the time when said grant takes effect,
date of definite location who claims the are excepted from the operation of the
benefit of the protective provi.ions of eec- grant....... ... 503
tion 2, act of February 8, 1887, is not entitled The settlement claim of a qualified pre-
thereto, if such settler is not shown to have emptor, existing at the date of the attach-
been qualified at such time to assert a settle- ment of rights under a railroad grant, ex-
ment claim (New Orleans Par-) ............ 418 cepts the land covered thereby front the
The joint resolotion of May 31,1870, while operation of the grant . - . 252
maing a new grant to theEiorthern Pacific A pre-emptor w-ho has made an affidavit
between Portland and Puget Sound, and in support of a railroad selection, to the
enlarging the limits along the Cascade effect that he n-as not residing upon the
branch within which indemnity msight be tract embraced within said selection, at the
taken, did not make a utew grant for said date when the conipany's right attached, is
branch, hence, as to lands within the place estopped from setting up a contrary state
limits along said line their status sander the of facts, as against the heirs of one u-ho
grant of July 2, 1864, must determine the subsequently purchased said tract from
right of the company thereto . 652 tIme comupamy ------- 28
The Central Pacific Railroad is entitled to A claim of occupancy, set up to defeat a,
the lands opposite the lie between Ogden wvill not serve such purpose if the qualifica-
and Promsontory Summit, and the lie of tions of the alleged settler, and the charac
said road, betveen said points as definitely ter of the occupancy are not made to appear- 16
located October 20, I868 . - . 57 An offer tnade by a settler to purchase
The conditions on which the extension of from a railroad company lands within its
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indemnity limits that are not protected by INDEMNITY.
-withdrawal, and have iot been selected, Indemnity selections are made under the
will not defeat the right of such settler to direction of the Secretary of the Interior,
subsequently repudiate sch offer and as- and the enforcement of any requirement in
sert his settlement right . - 375 the matter of a specification of a loss is only
The sale by a State of land to which it for his information, and as a bar to the en-
has no title can not be recognized as except- largement of the grant, and may be waived
ing the land from the operation of a rail- whenerer he deems such course advisable.- 621
road grant ........ 2 ... 1.. ..... .. 27 The filing of a list of indemnity selections
A declaratory statement filed after the initiates a claim on behalf of the company
attachment of rights under definite location tbatean only be defeated on dne cause shown
is ineffective as against the operation of a why such selections should notbeapproved. 312
railroad grant -57 There has been no departmental recogni-
A pre-emption filing made after the map tion ofal ascertained defiCiencyin the North-
of definite location is filed, alleging settle- eri Pacific grant; nor has the company been
ment prior to notice of withdrawal, will reliered, on account of such deficiency, from
not in itself defeat the operation of a - 15 the specification of losses in malking indem-
While a railroad company can not, attack nity selections ......................... -589
a declaratory statement of record on the Indemnity selections, accompanied bydesignations of loss in bulk, made prior toground of the non-citizenship of the claim- the decision in the La Bar case, operate to
ant, it will be beard on such charge where
acts of settlement are relied upon to defeat sbseqent apth lieatitnth onspay, as against
the grant ........ _- ...................... w57 to said decision and the rearrangement of
The completion of a pre-emption entry losses in accordance therewith -............. 429
for part of the land embraced within a Failure of company to rearrange losses
declaratory statement is a abandonment within the time specified in the La Bar de-
of the filing as to the land not entered, and cision is a matter between the government
such filing, as to said land, will not there- and the company, and can not operate to the
after serve to except it from the operation
of & . : .... . 379 ~~~advantage of one whose settlement and ap-of a.............-I .......................... 379 plication to enter were made when the lands
By the express terms of section 14, act of -were withdrawn and embraced withi a
September 4,' 1841, failure to make final pending selection made prior to said eet-
proof and payment under a pre-emrption
filing for unoffered land prior to the day lo, and where before any steps were taken
fixed for the sale thereof operates to extin- by the gorernment looking toward the dis-
guish all rights under said filing, and position of the land the company had com-
though not formerly canceled of record plied with the requirements of said deci-
such filing will not thereafter serve to de- sion - .----------.......... ..... 429
feat the attachment of a, on definite oa- The Northern Pacificisnot entitleit toin-
tion 680 voke the protection of the order of May 28,1883 waiving specification of loss, where it
A pre-emption claim, based on alleged assigns an insufficient basis for a selection
settlement prior to definite location, and in the presence If a contest involving the
filing made prior to notice of withdrawal, right to enter the selected tract; nor can a
can not be held to defeat the operation of a, subsequent assignment of a sufficient basis
where the fact of settlement is not clearly arail the company as against the right of
established, and the pre-emptor has failed the contestant in such a ease ............... 589
to show due maintenance of his claim after The company is not entitled to plead the
his filing, and it further appears that the protection extended by the order of May 28,
laud involved has been, for a long term of 1883, to indemnity selections made without
years, in the adverse possession of one designation of loss, if, after making such
against whom the pre-emptor is estopped selection, it assigns an insufficient basis
from settingup his alleged settlement right. 28 therefor, and subsequently al adverse right
The act of May 17,1856, makinga, grant of intervenes ..............-........ 114
lands to the State of Florida to aid in the A list of indemnity selections made under
construction of railroads does not in express the order of May 28, 1883, waiving specifics-
terms include mineral lands, nor are such tions ofloss, sbseqmentlymnendedbydesig-
lands expressly excluded therefrom, but i nation of loss in bulk, under the circular
view of the uniform and settled policy of requirements of August 4, 1885; and there-
thie government to reserve such lands from after rearranged, in accordance with depart-
grants to States or corporations for any pur- mental decisions, tract for tract, with the
pose, it is held that all such lands, whether losses specified, is protected as against a
valuable for phosphate or other mineral de- settlement made after the designation in
posits, are excepted from the operation of bulk and prior to said rearraiigement ...... 312
said grant . .......................... 600 The order of May 28,1883, relieving the
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Northern Pacific company from specifying Anindemnity selection of land not pro-
losses in support of indemnity selections, is tected by withdrawal, and included within
only applicable to lauds withdrawn for the a prior settlement claim, is no bar to the
benefit of the grant -------------- 17 sbseequent recognition f the settlement
An application to select a tract as inde right.. ........... 37
nity, unaccompanied by a specification of An indemnity selection made for land in
loss, is no bar to the acquisition of a settle- eluded in a pre-enaption filing, under which
mont right to the land covered thereby .... 17 residence has been duly established and
The amendment of a list of indemnity maintained, will not defeat the right of the
selections by the designation of losses not pre-omptor to subsequently transmute his
assigned in the original, is, to the extent of claim to a homestead entry -............... 340
such substitution, an abandonment of the A settlement on land covered by indem-
prior list, and, to said extent, a new selec nity withdrawal attaches at once on the
tion, and as snoh it will not bar the comple revocation of the withdrawal, and will
tion of a homestead entry made stbject to operate to exclude such tract from subse-
the original selection-............... .. .. 595quent selection on behalf of the railroad
The fact that by applying the rule of grant; and the failure of the settler to
approximation a particular tract might be assert his claim within three months after
excluded from an indemnity selection, as in notice that the land is open to entry can not
excess of the basis, will not affect the valid- be taken advantage of by tme company-538
ity of such selection as to other tracts for
which a sufficient basis is duly desifrnated The right of a settler who is residing on
wic a sffiente basss duly desgnt land covered by a prior indemnity selection,
mna list wherein the losses fully support and whose settlement is subject to such
the selections---- s i l ...... en. . ..... wl. 693ttaent cnelto o
Lands within the overlapping limits of selection; ill ttach on the ancellation of
the grants for the Northern Pacific main said selection, if the land is then open to set-
and branch lines, emI raced within the act tlement, and defeat the right of the company
of September 29, 1890, forfeiting the grant under a subsequent selection ............... 390
for the unconstructed main line, and ex- Lands excepted from the grant to the
eluded from the moiety taken on behalf of Southern Pacific by homestead entries that
the branch line, can not be made the basis were existing at the date when the grant
for indemnity- .........-................. 113 took olleet may be taken on behalf of said
Odd-numbered sections embraced within grant in lieu of mineral lands, if at the date
the Yakima Indian Reservation afford legal of selection such entries have been canceled,
bases for indemnity selections bythe North- and the lands are free from other claims or
ern Pacific ...... . 312 rights ......-.......... .. 452
The Northern Pacific may take indemnity A suit to vacate a patent issued to a rail-
lands in one State for losses sustained in road conrpany under an indemnity selection,
another, notwithstanding such losses might on the ground that a proper basis therefor
be satisfied from lands within the State was not designated, will not be advised,- in
where the losses occurred .. . 312 the absence of adverse superior equities, if
Within the indemnity limits of the grant it appears that the indemnity lands are not
to the Northern Pacific the company has no sufficient to satisfy the losses in place . 694
claim, prior to selection, that will defeat WITHDRAWAL
the acquisition of a settlement right .. 153
Lands excepted from the withdrawal The withdrawal on general route, under
made in aid of the act of June 2, 1864, are the grant to the Northern Pacific, is not
not subject to selection thereunder, if at tle defeated by aim erroneous order of restora-
date of such selection a qualified home- tion mnade by the General Land Office - 279
steader is residing thereon - .-.- 156 The departmental decision of April13 1895,
Prior to te filing of the maps showing 20 L. D., 132, holding that thewithdrawal on
the definite location of the modified line of general route for the benefit of the Northern
road, under the act of June 2, 1864, there Pacific grant is no bar to the establishment
was no authority for the withdrawal of the of an Indian reservation within the limits
even sections within the six-mile limits of of suh withdrawal, adhered teon review 422
theoriginal grant, and such withdrawal, Awithdrawal of lands for indemnity pur-
whem made, was not operative upon lands poses under the gramt to the Oregon and
included within homestead entries 156 CaliforniaR R. CoAs inviolationofthestat-
The act of June 2, 1864, did not work a ute making the grant to said company, and
legislative withdrawal of te ven-nusm- o bar to the subsequent withdrawal for the
bered sections within the original six-nile benefit of the n-agon-road grant made by the
granted limits, and in the absence of an act of Jly 5,1866, and during the existence
executive Withdrawal of said lan ds no right of the latter withdrawal the lads embraced
of the company thereto can attach prior to therein are not subject to selection under the
selection - - .......... 508 railroad grait- ........................... 546
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ACT O JU2NE 22, 1874. der the grant and the land has been sold to
A possessory claim to public land, not a bona dde purbaser, as against the right of
asserted tnder the public land laws but rest- such purchaser - ....... .......... 271
ing on the prior possession of another, does A homestead applicantis not entitled to a
not operate to appropriate such land as reinstatement of his claim under section 3
against the right of a railroad company to if it appears that he in fact never actually
select the same under the act of June 22, resided on the land involved ... ........... 228
1874- I ............ 628 The right to receive a patent under see-
The designation of a tract as the basis of tion 4 extends to purchasers holding nder
a selection under the act of June 22, 1874, contracts of purchase, whether such con-
estops the companyfrom subsequently alleg- tracts are fully or only partially performed,
lig that its relinquishment, in favor of set- if rights thereunder are acquired in good
tIers, did not include the entry embracing faith .. ... ... ... 407
said tract ......... 6. .. .. 8 The right to receive patent conferred by
section 4, on purchasers of railroad lauds,Railrload Lands. can not be recognized, where the contract
GENERALLY. of purchase has been abrogated by a subse-
Directions given for the suspension from quent agreeient, made prior to the applica-
entry and patent of lands remaining undis- tion for the exercise of such right 360
posed of in the odd-numbered sections A purchase in good faith of patented rail-
within that part of the formerly recognized road land, based on a contract entered into
limits of the Northern Pacific grant lying after the issuance of patent, entiles the
east of Duluth-26 ........... .. : purchaser to a patent under section 4, if it,
The order of November 22,1897, suspend- subsequently appears that the land was,
ing action relative to the right of the South- erroneously patented under the grant, and
ern Pacific Company to make indemnity se- the patent is set aside - 271
lections within the forfeited primary limits A purchase of land from a railroad com-
of the Atlantic and Pacific grant, revoked, pany must be held to be in good faith, and
and directions given with respect tothe dis- entitle the purchaser to a patent under see-
position of lands in said limits . . . 48 tion 4 if the title thereto is thereafter de-
The departmental order of Jnuary 18, dared by judicial decree to be in the United
1898, 26 L. D., 48, with respect to the restora- States on account of the company having
tion of lands within the forfeited primary received, exclusive of said tract, an amount
limits of the Atlantic and Pacific grant, of land in excess of its grant, where, prior
modified .................. 0............ . 97 to said purchase and the institution of said
Order of April 13, 1898, restoring to the suit, thb land had been earned by construe-
public domain lands lying within the over- tion of the road, and had been patented to
lapping limits of the Southern Pacific and the State as provided; by the grant, and
the forfeited portion of the Atlantic and where at the time of such purchase the State
Pacific .-..........-............. 697 is holding such title... ------- --- 407
A decision of the Supreme Court of the A corporation created and existing under
United States thatannulsa patent for lands the laws of a State is a citizen of the United
issued to a railroad company, and restores Stateswithin the intent and meaning of see-
the title to the government, renders such tion 5 -.. 503
lands subject to settlement, in the absence In the exercise of the right to perfect title
of any prohibition; but in such case it is under section5 itis notmaterial whetherthe
competent for the land department to de- purchase from the company was made be-
termine when said lands shall be opened to fore or after the passage of the act, if made
entry, and sake due provision therefor 350 in good faith, believing the title to be good,
A decision of the Department directing and before the land was held to be excepted
that a tract of land, that had been em- from the grant . . . 252
braced in a railroad indemnity selection, The fact that a railroad company may
shonld beheld" subject to entry bythe first have known of the existence of a settle-
legal applicant" operates to restore such ment claim that covered a tract of land at
tract to the public domain as effectually as the date of its sale by the company is not
though restored to settlement and entry - 538 material in determining the right of plr-
ACT MARCH 3, 1887. chase under section 5, if the purchaser was
An application to perfect title under said not at such time apprised of said claim - 252
act will not defeat the right of the appli- One who purchases railroad land with
caut to subsequently abandon such applica- notice of a pending homestead claim is not
tion, and assert a claim to the land as a himself a bona fide purchaser in contempla-
homestead settler -1 ...... 351 tion of section 5, of said act, but if his
Section 3of said actdoes not contemplate grantor holds under a bona fide purchase,
the recognition of entries made, or claims made prior to said homestead claim, such
initiated, after patent has been issued un- purchaser succeeds to the right of -his
730 INDEX.
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grantor and spay perfect title under said If -an application for confirmation under
seection- ,,,, __ ------------------ 228 the act of 1896 embraces land which wras
ACT OF MARCH 2, 1889. covered by a homestead or pre-emption en-
A settlement on, restored to the public do- try that has been erroneously cancelled on
main by the forfeiture act of, af ter the pas- account of the railroad grant, stch entry-
sai e of s aid act, and prior to the time when man should be notified and given oppor-
such lands aere opened to entry, is pro- tunity to apply for reinstatement under
tected as against the ito entry o ectin 3, act of March 3, 1887 489tootd a agine th inerventuig entry of On application for; confirmation of the
another, if the right of such settler is as-
serted within the statutory period-,,,, 288 title held by an alleged bona fide purchaser,
as provided for in said act of 1896, the rail-
ACT OF SEPTEMBcR 29, 1890. road company, or its successor in interest,
The amendment of section 3, by the act should be advised of said application, and
of January 23, 1896, whereby actual rest- allowed opportunity to show cause why
deuce as a prerequisite to the right of pur- title should not be confirmed in the appli-
chase is not required if the lands have been cant- ..... -- ,, 489
fenced or improved, can not operate to di- Under the provisions of section 1, act of,
vest the right of an intervening home- suit will not lie to vacate patents issued
steader acquired under the original act.,,.251 under the act of June 22, 1874, in lieu of
The act of January 23, 1896, dispensing lands lost or relinquished in consequence of
with actual residence as a prerequisite to the failure of the government to withdraw
the right of purchase under section 3, where I said lands from sale or entry- ....-.-.-.-. 705
the lands applied for have been fenced, or
otherwise improved, does not operate to cre- Reearing.
ate a right of purchase in one not having
such right prior thereto, as against the ad- ReilqiuishialicUt.
verse claim of a homesteader acquired un- When procured from a person of unsound
der the original act, and the amendments mind, by one who is aware of the msental
thereto enacted prior to the statute of 1896- 633 unsoundness of the entrysuan, the entry
must be reinstated; and the intervening en-ACT OF MAI1CH 2, 1896. try of a third paft;, in such case. is made
The act of, prohibits the annulment of a subject to the right of the Department to
patent erroneously issued on account of a investigate the circumstances uinder which
railroad grant where the lands covered the relinquishulent was obtained, and de-
thereby are held by a bona fide purchaser, sormine the good faith of such party in con-
and confirms the rightand title heidhy such nection therewith ............. .......... 168
purchaser Under the erroneous patent, and If an entry is relinquished pending attack
thereby avoids the necessity for the issu- several parties allegingpriority of settle-
ance of another patent as required by the bents tle question of priority shotld he
adjustment act of March 3,1887 -................ 489 determined before'allowing either of the
The word purchaseras usedintheact parties contestanttomake entry oftheland
of, icludes one who under a subsisting con- involved . ....... .... ,,.,,.,,.. 177
tract of purchase, made in good faith, holds Filed pending proceedings by the govern
lands erroneously patented or certified on m
acon of a alodgrnnadttl scnent takes effect at once, and the landaccount o a railroad grant, asy title is con- is thereafter open to the first legal appli-
firmed in such apenchaser, by said act, even cant, subject osily to v alid advarse claims - 87
though he may not have made all the pay-
ments called for under said contract of Repaymienat.
purchase .-.. .......... ,..... 489 The right to, does not exist where the en-
The distribution, under a plan of reorgan- try is properly allowed on the proofs pre-
ization, of lands erroneously patented on sented, but is subsequently canceled on the
account of a railroad among the holders of ascertainment that it was procured on the
mortgage bonds, issued by the company re- false and misleading representations of the
ceivinig the benefit of the grant, brings the entryman --.---------------------. 3
parties receiving such title within the con- An entry is "erroneonsly allowed" with-
firmatory provisions of the act of 494 in the meaning of the statute providing for,
A demand under the act of, for the pay- if the General Land Office, in acting on the
mont of the government price of lands er- proofs accepted by the local office, diuds
roneously patented on account of a railroad said proofs insufficient, and cancels the en-
grant and thereafter disposed of to bona try for such reason .......... - ..... 284
fide purchasers, should not be made on a Money paid to the Secretary of the In-
railroad companyas the successorininterest terior by a railroad company to secure a
to the company receiving the benefit of the right of way across an Indian reservations
grant, if it appears that, as such successor, under an agreement which thereafter ap-
said company received no benefit from the peared could not be carried into execution
sole of the lands erroneously patented- 494 without the ratification of Congress, should
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be returned when Congress subsequently with the letter of the law; the acts of going
provides for the recognition of a preferred upon the land, and the occupancy thereof,
right of purchase on behalf of the company mast concur wNith the intent to make it a
ol the performance of certain specified con- permanent house to the exclusion of one
ditions, and such right is -thereafter for- -elsewhere __--------------------------------- 165
feited on account of the failure of said The continuity of, is not interrupted by
company to perform said conditions ....... 290 absences from the land, where good faith
Tise purpose of the act of June 16, 1880, and the intention to nake a permanent home
in requiring the relinquishment of all claim on the land are apparent - 210
nder the entry, and the cancellation A leave of absence granted a homesteader
thereof, prior to the allowance of, is to pre- under the act of March 2,1889, protects the
vent any assertion of right under such entry, as against a charge of abandonment,
entry after repayment; and such purpose for the period of six months after the ex-
is fully satisfied where the applicant, who piration of said leave :-.- -- 268
has received patent for the land, in obedi- If a contestant, who bases his claim on
cnce to a judicial decree executes a deed for . priority of settlement, fails to maintain his,
the land to another, who by such decree is on the land during the pendency of the con-
adjudged to be entitled to receive the gov- test, an intervening adverse settlement will
ern ment title: ................. 328 defeat his right to the land ................ 341
The statutory, provisions regulating, do . The acts of a settler looking toward the
not include the erroneous cancellation of an establishment of a permanent home oc the
entry among the cases where a return of the land may be properly considered in deter-
purchase money may be made - 419 mining the good faith of his -.... 384
In the case of a mortgage executed prior A plea of "judicial restraint " will not be -
to the cancellation of the entry covering accepted as a sufficient defense to a charge
the land, and a deed made to the mortgagee of nos-compliance with the law in the mat-
after such cancellation, br the purpose of ter of, and cultivation, if the homesteader
giving additional effect lthe nortgage, the had not established residence and otherwise
holder of such conveyances ay be re- - csplied with tie law prior to the time
garded as an assignee within the meaning when he was placed under such restraint . 416
of the act of June l, 1880, and as such In determining whether a plea of duress,
entitled to ------ . 425 - in excuse of absence from land, is good, the
The right of, can notbe recognized on the - age and physical condition of the party
cancellation of a desert land entry for fail- setting up such plea may properly be con-
ure to submit final proof within the statn - sidered .................. 616
tory period, when it appears that the entry Prior to the allowance of a homestead en-
was not erroneously allowed -. . 283 try al applicant for such right, who relies
Of the first installment paid on a desert on his application, is not bound to reside on
land entrv call not be made where the de- the land -------.....---.-. 219, 588
claratory statement is canceled on account In the computation of the time that may
of its fraudulent character - 673 be deducted, under section 2305 . S., from
the period of, required of a homesteader, itReservation.- is only the time actually served that can be
Instrisctions of February 21,1898, open- credited to the entryman, unless he was dis-
ing Fort Randall abandoned military ---- 237 - charged for wounds received or disability
Regulations of June 30, 1897, with respect -incurred in the line of duty ................. 150
to forest reserves, amended ----------- -- 4 rnder existing legislation enlistment in
For the benefit of Indians may be estab- the military service of the United States in
lished by Executive order within the limits the war with Spain will not excuse home-
of withdrawal on general route of the North- stead claimnants from complying with the
er Pcific .......................... 422 law as to, and improvements .- 672
Reservoir Lands. Res Judicata.
The act of August 30, 180, repealed the Sea Contest; Jri-sdiction.
act of October 2,1888, in so far as said act The rule at s applied bythe Department
operated to create a general withdrawal of in determning whether a contest is barred
lands susceptibleofirrigation, lenceahme- by prior proceeding, does not, as against
stead entry of lands so released from such the government and third parties, place
withdrawal, made at a time hen they are matters which aight have been tried and
subject to entry, though subsequently in- determined upon the same footing with
eluded within the limits of a reservoir site, those which have thus been disposed of- 34
may be carried to patent irrespective of the While the legal title to land remains in
provisions of ie act of March 3, 1891 . 648 the government the Secretary of the Interior
Resi dence. is charged ith the supervisory authority
Is motacquired by going pon aid visiting and duty of determuimliug its proper disposi-
land solely for the purpose of complying tipan; and a change in the person holding
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the office of Secretary does. not defeat or cas be used for said purpose, and returned
prevent a review orreversalin anyinstance to the stream abovetheprior approprialtoras
where te Secretary making the ruling, or intake, practically unimpaired i quality
rendering the decision, if still holding the and quantity ............... ......... 521
office, would be in duty bound to review and The maps and papers pertaining to, pro-
reverse his own act- .. . - -34 ceedings may be delivered to the receiver
A change in the person holding the office of an irrigation company, 1or purposes of
of Secretary of Interior does not prevent or amendment, on due showing that he is act-
defeat a review or departmental action if ing ander judicial authority . .. 154
the legal title to the land still remains i RAILROAD AND STATION GROUNDS.
the government, and the Secretary making All railroads in operation are by statutory
the rulisug or decision, if still in office, would provision "post roads and as such their
be in duty bound to review or reverse his right of way is subject to the use of any
own action . 177 telegraph company which accepts the pro-
If it is made to appear that lands have visions of the act of July 24, 1866, and de-
been erroneously included in a certified sires to use such right of way for its line in
swamp-land list, and patent has not issued such manner as will not interfere with the
thereon, the action of a preceding Secretary operation of the road -.-.-.-. 572
of the Interior in approving such list may . The grant oa railroad, across an Indian
be corrected by his successor . - ... 117 reservation, that has vested by reason of
When a decision of the Department has compliance with the conditions precedent,
become final under the rules of practice, is not lost through failure to construct the
has been long acquiesced in by the losing road within the period specified (a condition
party, the lands involved have been dis- subsequentl) where no advantage of such
posed of thereunder, and such disposition failure has been taken by the government . 224
was not unlawful, a petition to reopen the In the issuance of patents to the Indian
case will not be entertained, though the allottees of lands in the Southern Ute Reser-
original decision may rest on a construction vation, over which the Denver and Rio
of the law that no longer obtains .- . 383 Graode Railroad has been constructed,.a
Review. clause should be inserted setting forth that
See Practice. the conveyance is made subject to the,
Revised Statutes. granted to said road by the special act of
See Table of, Cited ad Constrsed, page June 8, 1872, which does not in terms pro-
xxisi. tet the conspany's right .................. 77
Right of I~ay.The actual use of unsurveyed public land
CNAL AN W a. as station grounds precludes the subsequentCAlNAL AND RSIRVOllR. acquisition of adverse rights to the land
The act of March 3 1891, does not author- so occupied -. 83
ize the approval of an application for a An intervening entry should not defeat
canal, across an Indian reservation; nor will fle approval of a station plot if the land
such right of way below said reservation was open to appropriation under the right-
be granted if the canal is dependent for its of-way act at the date of filing said plat-181
water supply upon the right of way ask ed Im the disposition of applications for ad-
for through the reservation- 381 ditional station grounds under the act of
Questions arising ol allegation of damage April 25, 1896, the Secretary of the Interior
to private property through the construe- must first determine the question as to the
tion of reservoirs are matters within the necessityfor taking such ground, and, there-
jarisdiction of the State tribunals. and are after, if the company's maps of definite lo-
net to be determined by the Department. . 520 cation are approved, proceed as provided by
On application for, under the act of said statute to settle the question of com-
March 3, 1891, the Department will not sensation ......................... 280
attempt to interfere with the control of ponsation2a
the water or determine the rights of con- UNDER SECTION 2447, R. S.
flieting claimants thereto, except in so far It was not intended by said section to
as muay be necessary to ascertain whether a, for highways over public lands in
such primea facie right to the use of the advance of apparent necessity therefor - 446
water, or to store the same, has been shown Riparia nl Rights.
as will entitle the applicant to utilize the
grant for the purposes contemplated by See Scrip, Ssrvep
the act ........... 8 : 20 RiVel'.
An application for a canal and pipe line, See Suroey.
under the act of May 14. 1896, to be sed
for the purpose of generating and distrib- School Laud.
utiig electric power, will not be denied on A school section snade fractional by the
the ground of a prior appropriation of the exclusion of mud fats " front the public
water, if it is made to appear that the water survey, as shown by the returns of the sur-
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veyor-general, constitutes a proper basis 1889, after the passage of said act, and prior
for school indemnity selections in the ab- to the time when such lands were opened to
sence of any proof of fraud or mistake in entry, is protected as against the interven-
the survey ........ -510 ing entry of another, if the right of such
The right to select school indemnity ex- settler is asserted within the statutory
tends only to ' nappropr-iated " lands, and period ............ ...... 288
hence can not be ecognized where at the Conceding that the time within which a
date of selection the land applied for is em- settler must assert his claim under the act
braced within a oa fide settlement claim of May 14, 1880, will not ran while the land
of a qualified homesteader who has im- is embraced within a pending indemnity
proved the land and is residing thereon.... 69 selection, yet if such selection is subse-
The provision in the act of August 23, quently relinquished, and the intervening
1894, that lands within abandoned military entry of an adverse claimant is allowed, it
reservationisrestoredfordisposallinder said is then incumbent pon seh settler; as
aet shall be subject to entry by actual set- against the adverse claimant, to present his
tiers, is a Congressional disposition of said claim by contest or otherwise within three
lands that takes them out of the operation mopths thereafter .......................... 30
of the school grant, if it had not attached Within the corporate limits of a city can
prior to the establishmenet of te reserve- confer no preemptive right on the alleged
tion ........ ............ ......... 87 settler, where no steps are taken to subject
The proviso to section 6, act of Jly 16 the land to the settlement laws-under the
1894, admitting Utah to the Union, does not octe March 3, 1877, prior to the repeal of
take the grant of, to said State out of time the preemption lair------------------------ 503
operation of the general rule as to the time A aium of notice of a settlement right by
when said grant attaches to the specific see- reason of improvemepts on the lad will not
tians, or limit the authority of Congress to be heard as against an adverse claimant,
soprovideforthedisposalof reserved lands, where, at such time, the settlenment and
thiat on their restoration the right of the posted notice of the party claiming such
State to the specific sections may be de- benefitof said improvements shorwtheasser-
feated ........................ --.......... 87 tion of a settlomentright to another quarter
Lands within thelimits of the Great Sioux section .............. 527
Reservation, restored to the public domain On land covered by indemnity withdraval -
by the act of March 2, 1889, are subject to attaches at once it the revocation of the
disposition only under thehomesteadlairfor withdrawal, and the failure of the settler to
the benefit of the Idians, and cannot be assert his claim within three months after
taken as school indeninity; ad the certifi- notice that the land is open to entry can not
cation, therefore, of said lands tnder school be taken advantage of by the company.... 538
indemnity selections is wholly inoperative One who settles o patented lands can
and conveys no title to the State ............ 347 gain no right thereto- while the patent is
Scrip, outstanding; but if the patent is aubse-
Location confers no vested right that pre- quently vacated, Mld the lands become sub-
clides inquiry on behalf of the Department ject to, as part of the public domain, the
as to the status of the land, or as to any right of such settler will attach from such
question affecting the validity of such time, andmustbeprotected, ifdluyasserted. 30
location- .- 453 States and Territories
Land lying between the meander line of Tho approval of a selection is a ial ad-
a lake and the water line thereof is not pub Judication of the rght of the State to snake
lie laud of the United States subject to loca; the same and operates to pass title there-
tion by McKee, if at the time of such under; and the State having accepted the
'attempted location the government has no thus acquired will not be heard to
interest in said land as riparian owner .... ti th airdt tno b................ 4question the validity thereof - ............94
Settlement. Natural boundaries should control in the
A minor can not acquire settlementrights settlement of the boundary lines between
under the homestead law ------------ ------- 1 the Choctaw, Cherokee, and Creek nations;
Th right of a settler oal the public land hence the boundary line of the Cherokee
must rest upon his personal and actual set- Nation should stop where it rst meets the
tleient alone, and neither the ownership Caiadian River in its southern course from
of ioprovements, norpossession through an the four-naile post refereed to in the treaty
agent, constitutes him a bone fide settler- . 616 of May 23, 1836, and from this point the
On land not sbject thereto does not oper- river uill mark the bundary between the
ate as notice, constructive or otherwise, of Creek and Choctaw nations ---------------- 140
a claim to other land in the same quarter In the treaties affecting te boundaries
section ... 264 of the lands secured to the five Nations
Ol railroad ands restored to the public wherein ariver is established asa boundary
domain by the forfeiture act of March 2, it was intended thereby to etendthe title
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and proprietorship of ripariau claimants to facts disclosed by the re-examination d-
the middle thread of the stream ----------- 516 mand such action - 453
Compensation should be allowed for the
Statutes. retracemenlt of lines, though no provision
See Acts of Congress and lBevised Statutes therefor is made in the contract, bit the in-
cited and construed, pages xxi-XXi. structions of the surveyor-general direct
Survey. such resurveys when absolutely essential,
The field notes of survey are part of the and the necessity for such action is flly
permanent official records of the General disclosed by the field notes of survey - 609
Land Office, and as such may be resorted to
upon any question, whereon they have Swlramjp Lands.
bearing, arising in any case before the Land In the adjustment of the swamp grant the
Department ------ . . 369 burden of proof is upon the State to show
The rule requiring notice of the filing of that the land claimed is of the character
a township plat of, prior to the allowance of granted, where the field notes of survey do
entries of land embraced therein, is only not show such land to be swamp and over-
applicable in the case of an approved plat of flowed .-. . 477
survey, or where an amendment thereto Where the field notes of the survey of a
adds to the area of public lands included township have been made the basis of a final
therein ... ........ .. 107 adjustment of the swamp grant, and the
The conclusive effect of the surveyor- State has accepted a patent thereunder, it is
general's return, as to the quantity of land estopped, while holding te lands so con-
in a legal subdivision, is only operative veyed, from claiming additional tracts under
while such subdivision remains public land- 369 a resurvey which also shows that a portion
A hearing should be ordered or an appli- of the lands patented were not of the char-
cation for the survey of an island in a non- acter granted .- - 182
navigable stream, alleged to be above high- The field notes of survey having been ac-
water mark, and to contain more than three cepted bythe Stateas the basisof the adjust-
legal subdivisions, and to have been in ex- isent of the swamp grant, the character of
istence at the date of the adjacent surreys, land for which the State asks indemnity
for if island of sch character was saX be deterined tlsereby, except where a
omitted from the public survey through direct issue is made, in which case an in-
fraud or mistake an order for its survey vestigation, may be ordered and te char-
may properly issue- 24 acter of the land determined on the evidence
Purchasers of lands bounded by an al- so submitted - .............. . 5
leged meander line have no vested rights Lands covered by an apparently perma-
that will prevent the government from, nentbody of water, and mneanderedas alale,
taking action to ascertain whether there at the date of the swamp grant do not pass
was in fact a body of water existing upon under said grant .............. 605
which to base said line . -. 319 Evidence as to the character of land since
Lines of survey run along permanent the date of the svamp grant is competent as
bodies of water are ran as meaner lines, tending to show whetber the land was it
the water itself being the true boundary fact swamp and overhiowed at the date of
line of the land to be sold, and all accretions said gra-lt - . 477
after survey and prior to patent pass under status of the Seminole Indians, as oc-
the patent when issued, the govern- cupants of public lands in the State of
ment thereafter is not entitled to subse- Florida, is too indefinite in character to re-
quent accretions - 453 eeive recognition in patents issued under the
The jurisdiction of the Land Department swamp grant .........-. -.... 117
is confined to public lands, and does not ex- Lands occupied and cultivated by Indians
tend to lands that have passed into private cannot, however, be held as ofthecharactcr
ownership; hence if through mistake, or contemplated by said grant, and i, on due
otherwise, a tract is surveyed as public investigation, lands so occupied and im-
land, when in fact it is private property, proved appear to have been certified to the
such survey will not change the status of State nuder said grant, the certification
the land so that the Department wvill tere- thereof should be revoked-. .. . 118
after be prevented from taking proper In a case arising between a homesteader
action to protect the rights of the private and a State claiming under the swaimp -
owner - ------ 453 grant, a hearing may be properly ordered to
Of a tract of land and the approval determine the character of the land, where
thereof do not preclude the Department the said grant is adjusted on te field notes
from re-examuining the matter at any time of survey, but the survey having been tirade
before the legal title to te land has passed prior to the grant, furnishes no satisfactory
Omit of the United States, setting aside such evidence as to the actual character of the
approval, and annulling the survey, i the land .:...................... - 9
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The act of Septeraber 28, 1850, removed Alaska, under the act of March 3, 1891 (26
the restrictions and exceptions in the grant Stat., 1093) ---------- ... 404
of swamp lands made to the State of Louis- Timber an d Stoie Act.
iaoa by the act of March 2, 1849, and vested A contest against a timber land entry, on
the title in said State to all the swamp and the ground that it embraces land of known
overflowed lands which remained unsold at mineral character, must be determined on
the passage of said act of1850, and it there- the conditions existing at the date of the
fore follows that said State is entitled to the purchase, and not on developments subse-
benefit of the indemnity provisions of the quent thereto ------------ 9
acts of 1855 and 1857 ...............-.- . 5 The requirement that a timber land appli-
The act of March 3, 1837, did not confirm cant shall show that the land applied for
a certified list of swamp selections based on - contains no mining improvements, contem-
an erroneous survey, where, prior to the plates improvements on existing mining
passage of said agct, the certification had claims. Abandoned mineral workings on
been corrected on evidence furnished by a land not included in any existing location or
resurvey- 98 entry are no bar to a-purchase under said
The act of March 3, 1857; did not confirm, act ...........-.-....... 10
to the State where the grant had been ad- A homestead entry made for the purpose
justed as to any particular township, or of securing the timber on the land covered
townships, and such adustmenthad become thereby, and not for the purpose of obtain-
final and conclusive by the acceptance, on ing a home, must be canceled - 151
the part of the State, of a patent for the The application of a timber land applicant
lands covered by such adjustment - -- 182 to re-advertise, lie having failed to submit
A claim of the State under the swamp proofand make payment in accordance with
grant will not be recognized where the his first advertisement, can not be allowed,
lands embraced therein have beeb certified where, pending action thereon, an applica-
to the State under other gramts, and such lion to purchase the land is filed by an ad-
certification has been accepted by the State verse claimant-318
and stood unquestioned for many years..- 685 Towl Lot. -
- Where a State, during the pendency of its An lotf
appeal from the adverse action of the local An applicant for a deed to a, in Oklahoma
office on a swamp land claim, selects the is not entitled to receive credit for an inre-
tracts involved in said claim nder other turned deposit, due such applicant adnmade
State grants, and such selections are to defray the costs of a ontet as against
proved, the action of the State in umakiugl the assessment levied on aid lot by the
such selections must be held a waiver of its town-site trustees-817
claims nder the swamp grant -- 94 Town Site.
If it is made to appear that lands have Tie issuance of patent forland known at
been erroneously included in a certified the date of the townsite entry to contain a
swamp land list, and patent has not issued valuable lode claim, does not pass title to
thereon, the action of a pi-eceding Secretary such claim, but leaves it in the United
of the Iterior in approving such list may States, subject to the jurisdiction of the
be corrected by his successor .....- -------- 117 land department - 144
An entry cannot be allowedt if the proof
Timt 11 b e r C l t u rxe . offered ails to show that the, land is occu-
See Contest, Estrp pied for the purposes of trade and business
T imilbe Ir e uttti ng. - or settled upon and occupied as a townsite' 214
Logging regulations of September 28, Actnal occupancy of land for townsitoLo97,ngrepcatoneded Shipteaars 284 purposes is a prerequisite to the right to1897,ith respect to ceded Chippewa lands make an additional townsite entry -........ 323
Permission to place portable saw' mills in In all cases, either of application to make
the vicinity of dead and dowm timber, cut o o
under the provisions of the act of June 7, itants of the land are ess thhortehed ab-
1897, for the purpose of manufacturing sucsh in number, it is a matter of executive dis-
timber into lumber, maybe granted, where oretion whether such entry will he allowed. 323
the applicant enters into a contract in the
form prescribed by the regulations of Sep- Wagon Road Grant.
tember 28, 1897, nd submits proof as to the Under the wagon road grant of July 5,
present imnpracticability of marketing the 1866, it is the duty of the Secretary of the
timber - - - - - - 86 Interior to see that the selections made in
Rule~s and regulations governing the use satisfaction of the grant are confined to
of timber on nou-imineral public lands in lands described in the granting act, bitt as
certain Stmtes and Territories, under the betn-eenm different sections, equally subject
act of March 3, 1891 26 Stat., 1093) - 1---- 399 to selection under said grant, and the order
Rules and regulations governing the use of withdrawal, the Secretary cannot say.
of timber on public lands in the district of which shall be taken ........-. .... 356
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An executive order of wvithdrawal made to the Willamette Valley road, and not in-
in aid of a Congressional graot, where there eluded in pending selections ................ 6 3
is no statutory prohibition against such no- A selection made on behalf of a wagon
tion, rests upon the general authority of the road company, and thereafter relinquished,
Department, and no rights, either legal or can not be reinstated for the benefit of a
equitable, can be acquired by settlement or purchaser from said company, if it appears
entry in violation of such order ------------ 356 that said company has already received an
Directions given for the restoration of amount of land in excess of its grant .-. 440
lands withdrawn for the benefit of the grant
. .~~
